Ridgway Research



July 15, 2014Dilemmas and Developments of Outer Space: A Case of Japan and China Space Cooperation under the Security DilemmaKobe University Graduate School of International Cooperation StudiesDepartment of International Cooperation Policy StudiesAcademic Advisor: Minohara Toshihiro132i404iJeff Carasiti132i404iJeff CarasitiSummaryBeing two of the largest economies and strongest political powers in the world, Japan and China have many opportunities to be leaders in the coming years. Tensions and conflict continue to proliferate across the globe, as the information age and technological advances of war, consumption, and energy create increasingly potential sources of danger and instability. Facing these challenges, the relationship between China and Japan will have lasting effects on a variety of these issues going forward. The two will continually be looked to as leaders and examples in the areas regarding technology, energy, and Asian-Pacific security, among others. One of these areas of Asian-Pacific security, or rather, global security, is that of outer space technology and space policy/programs.Many theories and principles of international relations can apply to the increased chance of outer space conflict/competition, but one idea of what might be fueling the trend can be found in the ‘security dilemma’. The security dilemma is the pervasive fear of decision-makers in regards to the intentions of an adversary: whether a move or development may be for offensive hostility or passive defense, meaning that what one state may do to feel more secure makes others feel less secure. Thus, this paper is a brief study of the literature surrounding space developments and a “space race” in East Asia regarding Japan and China, emphasizing examples of the security dilemma at play. The paper begins identifying what the security dilemma is, and why it is an issue in regards to outer space. Following that is the core of the study, focusing on the history compiled by the literature of Japanese and Chinese space programs, and examining them for instances of the security dilemma. Next is a discussion on the potential for conflict in the area, followed by the need to recognize the security dilemma and an avoidance of interpretations of space policy that might exacerbate the dilemma. Finally, the paper concludes with highlighting key areas of where cooperation in outer space in East Asia could thrive under the security dilemma, such as management of common space interests (such as orbital debris), increased commercialization of outer space, and the promotion of trust. Cooperation and the potential for such, through these relations, can help to ease tensions and maintain the region’s stability and safety, and the safety of the outer space environment and that of the world. For that the security dilemma in this area must be recognized.Table of ContentsPg. 4 - IntroductionPg. 7 - The Security Dilemma and Outer Space: Theory and BackgroundPg. 13 - Histories of Outer Space Programs and Policies of Japan and ChinaPg. 22 - Is there a Resolution, or Resolutions, to the Outer Space Security Dilemma?Pg. 35 - ConclusionIntroductionBeing two of the largest economies and strongest political powers in the world, Japan and China have many opportunities to be leaders in the coming years. Tensions and conflict continue to proliferate across the globe, as the information age and technological advances of war, consumption, and energy create increasingly potential sources of danger and instability. Facing these challenges, the relationship between China and Japan will have lasting effects on a variety of these issues going forward. The two will continually be looked to as leaders and examples in the areas regarding technology, energy, and Asian-Pacific security, among others. One of these areas of Asian-Pacific security, or rather, global security, is that of outer space technology and space policy/programs.After the United States and Russia, and discounting international launched/operated, China and Japan are the next leading possessors of functional and dysfunctional satellites in orbit, with 163 and 142 respectively. To put this in perspective, while Russian launches as the former Soviet Union and the United States launches have satellites numbering over 1300 each, the next independent satellite possessing states after China and Japan are France with 59, followed by India with 58. Japan is often considered the de facto leader in technology, along with the United States, and while not as prominent as the United States’ presence, Japan has a long history of outer space involvement. China too is in a position of increased activity in outer space, setting yearly domestic and international records of successful rocket launches, and recently putting its Jade Rabbit rover on the moon in December of 2013, being only the third nation to land on the moon with a rover. In this regard, Japan and China can become, and already are, leaders in outer space development and technology.But with regional tensions rising, and since events such as Japan revising its space policy to include national security in 2008’s Basic Space Law, and China launching a successful ASAT test in 2007, there has been a great deal of discussion over the threat of a conflict in/for outer space or of a Asian space race. National security strategies are beginning to incorporate the threat of outer space security and militarization into their statements, and some claim the era of the “coincidence” of peaceful use of outer space is coming to an end. Many theories and principles of international relations can apply to the increased chance of such outer space conflict/competition, but one idea of what might be fueling the trend can be found in the ‘security dilemma’. The security dilemma idea has been expressed since the 1950s, independently by international relations scholars John Herz and Herbert Butterfield, and developed later in depth by Robert Jervis. The security dilemma was touched upon relating to space issues in East Asia by Columba Peoples, summing up the meaning of the dilemma by quoting Jervis: “many means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others.” Thus, the issue, Peoples continues, is that “states can never be entirely sure whether the actions of another… are for defensive or offensive purposes, as in many instances they can conceivably be both.” With outer space technology this is especially true, due to the dual-use nature of the technology (i.e. a global positioning satellite for civilian use can be, and often is, used by militaries for missile strike and precision targeting, etc.) Because of this, Joan Johnson-Freese describes that it is difficult to interpret a space asset as a military weapon or not, and Peoples highlights that this confusing aspect of intent can increase issues of the security dilemma environment, especially given the historical rivalries and tensions of the East Asian region.So why is this dilemma an issue? Well, if such trends continue, this area can lead to what might be a space arms race or conflict that can extend to outer space, the subject of many current writings. James Clay Moltz for example, has written an entire book on the subject, called Asia’s Space Race, and declaring that yes there is indeed a space race going on in East Asia, and its outlook, military or otherwise, is undetermined. If the space race, and thus security dilemma in general, indeed proceeds more militarily, a conflict involving outer space would be especially devastating. The vulnerability of space assets has been noted numerous times and even just targeting and destruction of these assets, which would be a central strategy for war against a space power, would damage both critical military and civilian infrastructure as necessary as lines of communication. With a potential for such a devastating conflict that might occur, and with regional tensions rising (such as Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe administration’s July 2014 reinterpretation of Article 9 to constitute collective self-defense, and historical/territorial issues such as the Senkaku Islands between China and Japan) the security dilemma in this area must be analyzed and addressed. The two nations, along with the United States and other spacefaring powers, need to be aware of the security dilemma, and instead strive to become leaders in securing the safety of outer space and pursuing the development of safe and cooperative programs.The Framework of the ArgumentIn order to further develop the sense of the security dilemma problem in outer space, and to provide an understanding of space technology developments in regards to the future of international cooperation in East Asia and globally, this paper focuses on the outer space relationship and perceptions of Japan and China. While the core of this paper is on China and Japan, analysis of a conflict between Japan and China cannot be considered without incorporating the United States as well (which much of the literature focuses on extensively), due to the strong security alliance between Japan and the United States, and given that the United States has the largest space presence and power status. Thus, the majority of this paper will focus on the Japan and China space programs and developments, but the issue of conflict in outer space will involve analysis of the United States, also given that a conflict in space would ultimately involve the United States, if not the world, provided the global characteristic of the environment. Extensive literature has been written on the subject, and the subject of national space policy is often a complex and very murky issue with transparency issues. Thus, this paper looks at some of the common literature, specifically pieces by James Clay Moltz, Kazuto Suzuki, Columba Peoples, Saadia Pekkanen, and attempts to analyze the literature, and thus the histories and situations compiled by these authors, all in how it relates to the security dilemma and possible futures for the area of outer space and East Asia. The paper will begin with a discussion of the security dilemma and background on why outer space is a unique environment where the security dilemma playing out can become a major problem. Then it will examine the histories of Japanese and Chinese space policies as tracked by Suzuki and Moltz, and examine their literature for instances of the security dilemma. Finally, the paper will conclude with the potential for conflict in the region based on the security dilemma, the issue of exacerbating the dilemma by certain perceptions, and then options expressed in the literature or otherwise for possible solutions to avoiding such conflict and enhancing cooperation in the space dilemma between Japan and China. The outlook can be promising, especially if the states and parties involved can recognize and act more cognizant in regards to the security dilemma currently proliferating in outer space. The Security Dilemma and Outer Space: Theory and BackgroundThe DilemmaCalled ‘the quintessential dilemma’, the security dilemma is the pervasive existential uncertainty that looms over policy-makers’ decisions regarding international relations; “the challenge faced by one set of decision-makers when trying to read the minds of the decision-makers of other states takes place in an international political cockpit in which the cost of getting it wrong could mean national disaster.”As mentioned, the security dilemma term has its origins in the writings of John Herz, in which the scholar questions the fear of uncertainty humans possess in regards to the fact that humans have the capacity to kill each other, so necessary caution or suspicion arises, yet also that humans must interact and depend on each other for survival. Herz elaborates on how this creates an increase in the feeling of insecurity for many, and this translates to the security dilemma; people are concerned about attack, domination, or annihilation by others, and thus strive to achieve more power to secure themselves, which in turn renders the others more insecure, and thus driving a “vicious circle of security and power accumulation.” And this circle ensues, because rather than being caught unaware and thus destroyed, actors will prefer to embrace the power struggle for security. Independently, Hebert Butterfield termed this the “irreducible dilemma”, describing that because one cannot see into the minds of others, and vice versa, people cannot truly know the intentions of others. Even if one actor does not mean the other harm or threat, this cannot truly be known, because the assurances may not be genuine. Thus this uncertainty occurring on both sides creates a predicament where only threat and harm is perceived, including a failure to recognize why the actor, or oneself, is fearful, nervous, and acting this way. A failure to recognize the dilemma is a key aspect which will be touched upon in further sections regarding the outer space security of East Asia.To summarize, Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler describe the security dilemma as a “two-level strategic predicament”, first with a “dilemma of interpretation,” followed by a “dilemma of response.” The first stage incorporates a decision by policy makers to attempt to correctly interpret, in a state of uncertainty, whether perceived military developments of others are for defense and to enhance one’s security, or for offense and possibly to seek a changing of the status quo to their advantage. The second level is in how to appropriately respond to such a development/interpretation of development, under the same conditions. Reacting on misplaced suspicion in a military manner in turn though, will cause a rising of insecurity and mutual hostility, when none may have been intended by either actor, but response based on (possibly) misplaced trust could leave the actor vulnerable to risk. How all the above aspects and definitions of the security dilemma relate to outer space technology, policy, and developments, will follow.The Outer Space Environment“Space power is the modern-day equivalent of the 18th-century sea-power domain so eloquently described by Alfred Thayer Mahan, but extended to both the vertical and digital dimensions. Countries with global ambitions understand that, absent significant space capabilities, they will neither attain nor retain global pre-eminence.”Outer space currently is a very dynamic environment rife with peculiarities and uniqueness in the terms of how states interact with and through it as a medium. Outer space and its uses cover the entire globe, and this alone creates a unique situation to its uses and aspects; while more complex in its actualities and mechanics, placing an object in orbit does indeed potentially allow it to reach a space over top any one nation or territory. This initially became the most important factor leading to the initial outer space technology development, as the potential for surveillance and reconnaissance of an adversary became paramount throughout the Cold War space race of the United States and the Soviet Union. But unlike Earth airspace or territorial waters, intruding an asset (i.e. satellite) over another’s global space in orbit, has not been considered a violation of sovereignty/act of war.Outer space is also theoretically accessible to any nation with proper launch conditions or launch partnerships, and can be utilized in a variety of manners. Space is used for technological and infrastructure functions, scientific discovery and exploration, and military applications. What is unique with outer space is that despite being utilized militarily, there is a lack of a weaponized/securitized environment, as technological and political limitations have prevented weapons from being deployed to/from assets or stations in space. There is no adopted treaty banning weapons in space, but the 1967 Outer Space Treaty bans the stationing, and use of weapons of mass destruction in outer space. In addition to technological limits restricting conventional weapons being stationed or used in space (except for ballistic missile technology which enters and exits orbital space during its flight path [of which such missile technology is a subject of its own and not the primary focus of this paper when referring to space objects or assets]), sort of unspoken international norms have arisen to keep space uses peaceful in nature. Much of this is due to the desire to preserve the reconnaissance and safeguarding utility of space assets (as discovered during the Cold War by the two major powers), the desire to preserve all the other benefits and infrastructure provided by satellites (such as preventing more chaotic orbital debris which threatens the lifespans of satellites and space stations), and out of a desire to not add to the list of global-reach threatening weaponries that exist. Nonetheless, space is becoming an increasingly securitized environment, with research and development, testing, and discussions of strategy involving space weapons and space warfare increasing.A few of the many contributing factors to the increased securitization of outer space are the dual-use capabilities of space assets, their use in force enhancement, and asymmetrical advantages or vulnerabilities involving these space assets. “Space is now understood as a fully dual-use domain, with space systems not only part of the digital and cyberspace domains and as such powerful socio-economic enablers, but also at the core of all global defense policies and operations. Indeed, space is the smart-power tool par excellence, effective for applying both soft and hard power or, as is more often the case, a little bit of both.” It is this dual-use, both in regards to civilian and military utility, and with soft or hard power achievements, that is a major contributor to the security dilemma in outer space. For example, the U.S. GPS satellite constellation is used to enhance civilian infrastructure and daily life throughout the world, but it is also used to guide missiles and rockets and other military endeavors. Simply put, a space development, such as a global navigation system, has a dual-use capability that can contribute to the security dilemma; i.e. is this development for civilian use, military use, both? Is it a passive/defensive development to boost soft power by inviting investments and partnership use in the technology, or one to increase the ability to achieve hard power advantages (such as force enhancement)? Arguably, it can always be both. In East Asia, and everywhere else, Japan and China are among the most important space actors, and their programs cross over between military and civilian use, which “means that while their most publicized space aspirations focus on civilian dimensions, these states can also be players in military space activities.” Force enhancement currently becomes the most utilized aspect of these military space activities, enhancing ground, sea, and air conventional forces, which the United States put on display with the first Gulf War and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. As will be discussed later, Japan and China too have begun to seek the benefits of force enhancement provided by outer space. But along with this, nations, such as China and others, have become aware of the asymmetrical advantage outer space-based force enhancement provides to the military of the United States, so they have become the focus of targeting in military strategies as well, highlighting their vulnerabilities, which strategists on all sides have become fully aware of. A satellite in orbit is targetable with existing missile technology, with currently little to no counter measures to defend it. This has led to discussions of the increased securitizing of the outer space environment recently, most notably by the major powers, such as the U.S. in attempting to cover for these vulnerabilities and to control or deny others the same space capabilities. Thus, the ‘circle of security’, brought on by this security dilemma, continues as “a tragic irony”. And this is a problem, because a conventional war targeting space systems will have devastating effects for the world. Although these same systems are used for force enhancement, they also make up the infrastructure of the developed global community. There are telecommunication satellites that provide the global grid for the internet and other communications, and satellites that synchronize financial transactions and other economic infrastructures. Even monitoring and surveillance satellites, which are used to collect national security intelligence, are also used to monitor the globe for weather patterns and natural or man-made disasters, with over 90% of environmental data coming from space assets. Not only would a conventional war between two major powers be devastating in their theaters, at home or abroad, if space becomes a battleground as well, all of these vital assets to global daily life would be lost, having crippling effects and far-reaching unintended consequences for the modern world as a whole.And this is not a farfetched scenario, as a conflict involving outer space can begin with something as simple as the current and historical rivalry/tensions between Japan and China. Given the security arrangement since the end of WWII, a conflict erupting between Japan and China would involve the United States, especially combining with the factor of the current superpower rivalry occurring between China and the United States themselves. In this regards, an arms race or possible conflict can spill over into outer space. With China testing ASAT capabilities in the last decade, and the U.S. researching and strategizing on how to secure space assets from such a threat, the trends of a security dilemma in this area are indeed present. Arnold Wolfers articulates this in theory, highlighting that power struggle is entered out of survival in the anarchical system, leading to greater insecurity.This paper is not mean be too alarmist, but to highlight the urgency to recognize the situation in outer space and the security dilemma. Positive outcomes can still prevail, as the literature indeed highlights avenues of cooperation in regards to the security dilemma and the outer space environment. Due to resource limitations and factors, post-Cold War national space programs have needed to cooperate to develop capabilities. And this is something that needs to continue, because it is often that nations, such as the U.S. or China for example, attempt to proceed unilaterally, exacerbating the problem; “China might cooperate on space activities to accelerate a particular program or to gain prestige and recognition along the way, but ultimately its aim is to become a global competitor in space.” Cooperation is possible under the security dilemma, but “the challenge is to recognize the reality that security dilemmas cannot be escaped, but at the same time seek to develop the political conditions that dampen uncertainty and promote trust.”All of this cooperative potential will be discussed in detail towards the conclusion of this paper, as the core of the study will be examined first: to assess the prominent literature compiled on the histories of the space programs and cite instances of the security dilemma at work. This is all then to discuss potential avenues for cooperation in an increasingly high-risk East Asia region, by recognizing the security dilemma and adjusting to it in hopes of reducing its affects in the region and outer space going forward.Histories of Outer Space Programs and Policies of Japan and ChinaThe following provides a brief overview of the outer space policies of the Japanese and Chinese space programs from the beginnings to the present. While an in-depth account is beyond the scope of this project and author, this paper attempts to analyze the histories already compiled by certain authors, notably Kazuto Suzuki and James Clay Moltz. Very detailed and extensive historical accounts on the Japanese and Chinese space programs can be found in the works of Suzuki, Moltz, Paul Kallender-Umezu, and Saadia M. Pekkanen, among others. Thus, the following analysis will focus on citing instances of the security dilemma at play, or lack thereof, in each nation’s space policy history as outlined by Suzuki and Moltz, among a few of the others. Attention is paid to overall strategy and purpose, under the security dilemma, that has and can potentially contribute to the current state of affairs and the prospects of conflict or cooperation going forward.History of Japan’s Space Program: A Shift towards Space Security As Kazuto Suzuki states, “since its beginning the objective of Japanese space policy, has been to ‘catch-up’ with advanced spacefaring countries.” This statement sets the tone for the majority of the development of Japan’s space policy. Originally, Japanese space policy was rather benign and focused on research and development, with a strict adherence to “peaceful purposes.” Eventually a variety of factors, such as financial and bureaucratic difficulties, along with a changing of the security environment and Japan’s perception of itself in relation to space, resulted in a rework of the space policy in 2008, called the Basic Space Law, which for the first time included the use of “security” in relation to space policy for Japan. The following outlines Kazuto Suzuki’s historical account of the Japanese space program, analyzing it for evidence of the security dilemma at play, all culminating in the Basic Space Law shift.As mentioned, originally Japanese space policy lacked a political or strategic mindset as opposed to other nations, due to its pacifist constitution. Early on in the program’s development, in 1969, the Japanese Diet adopted the Space Development for Exclusively Peaceful Purposes resolution. This meant that from then on, Japanese space programs were conducted under civilian authority with the purpose being research and development of new technology, not defense or security. At this point, with the Japanese space programs focusing almost exclusively on science, there was the indication that these programs were a sign of national prestige and an attempt at “catching up” with the other spacefaring nations, such as the U.S.The idea for the “exclusively peaceful purposes” clause sprung out of Japan’s concern over nuclear technology and dual-use capabilities in general. The Diet members of 1969 sought to apply a peaceful use to outer space technology as it was applied to nuclear technology. There was the concern that nuclear technology and space can be, and are, developed for both military or civilian uses, and with Japan being deeply affected by the nuclear attacks of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Diet sought to control the two as tight as possible. Given that Japan’s Science and Technology Agency was in charge of both technologies, the Diet restricted both to peaceful purposes, and civilian use/administration only; no military sector involvement was to be allowed. National prestige and technological excellence was the focus of Japanese space policy and development. This shows that at this time, with the security arrangement with the United States, and Japan’s pacifist constitution in full-effect, Japan’s space program began and continued without a focus on any security aspects in regards to its national or regional security. Thus, without the perception of existential threats, and a reliance on others to interpret and counter those threats (i.e. the United States) there is shown a lack of the security dilemma in decision making, and Japan’s program could develop benignly without being securitized.This changed with the end of the Cold War, as the United States began to put pressure on the Japanese government to share some of the responsibility of regional and global security that the U.S. was previously doing alone. As this sharing of responsibility increased, and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces began being deployed globally with U.S. missions, such as the War on Terror, the SDF was learning it needed to develop its own space-based capabilities. Additionally, North Korea’s 1998 launch of a Taepodong missile over Japan began to create fears in the public of the North Korean threat, and the increased demand for security by the population resulted in the government launching the Information-Gathering Satellite (IGS) program. The IGS satellites, which were designed to monitor the military activities of Japan’s neighbors, created a situation where Japan was caught in a legal predicament involving their deployment and use. Japan had recently enacted the 1990 Accord on Non-R&D Satellite Procurement, as a result of U.S. economic pressure, which made Japanese satellites open for commercial bidding. Japan saw most of its satellites being contracted to American companies, and it sought to keep the IGS under Japanese control for military purposes, but it also had to comply with the 1969 “peaceful purposes” clause. This meant the IGS satellites were not to be part of the National Space Development Agency (which later became the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency [JAXA]) to avoid being contracted out, and were labeled “multi-purpose” satellites for “crisis management” under the Japanese Defense Agency. This legal struggle, and Japan then finding issues of collective defense and an overreliance on U.S. intelligence gathering systems, made Japan realize that its legal constraints were not allowing it to adapt to the new post-Cold War environment and North Korea.Thus, Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party member, Takeo Kawamura, saw this and the continued frustration of the political/legal/bureaucratic restraints on Japan’s space programs, and in September 2004 Kawamura convened an informal study group: the Consultation Group for National Strategy for Space. In October 2005, the group issued a report citing that Japan’s space policy lacked a coherent strategy and institutional arrangement, and because it was civilian administered, it could not achieve national strategic objectives, and this also resulted in a lack of competitiveness of Japan’s space industry and of Japan on the international level. Additionally, in this consultation group, there was a deep concern about China’s developing space program. The concern was not over Chinese space achievements per se, but instead over China’s behavior in the region and elsewhere in regards to space. China was using its space development and sharing of technology to strengthen bilateral agreements with Nigeria and Venezuela to better procure oil deals. Japan perceived this a threat to its own oil supply, and was frustrated with its inability to have done similar with its space program. China also initiated the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO), which was becoming a rival to Japan’s already led Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF). These are examples of the security dilemma at play in decision making by these space policy recommenders, in concern over China’s activities being an existential threat to Japan or a changing of the status quo. Then additionally, Kawamura and the LDP attracted attention for their initiative and received another boost of public and political support when in 2006 North Korea conducted another missile test, thus paving the way to present the Diet with the draft of its Basic Law for Space Activities in June 2007. As shall be seen, the roots of a security dilemma in East Asia outer space development starts to take form.Thus, in 2008 the Basic Space Law was enacted, with the purpose to attempt to boost space activities focusing on “user-driven policy” (rather than for just research and development), streamlining the bureaucracy, and also challenging the previous “exclusively peaceful purposes” clause of the 1969 resolution. By this, the Basic Space Law became controversial, because it allows for space activities to be used for security applications, through Article 3’s use of “national security”. Subsequently, in the 2009 Basic Plan for Space Policy, there is a section called the “Enhancement of national security utilizing space,” which states:The new use and R&D of space are promoted to enforce the national security for the purpose of improving and reinforcement of information gathering functions and enhancement of warning and surveillance activities in the light of the international situation, especially the circumstances in North East Asia.This demonstrates Japan’s shift to allowing space based security applications, due to a variety of factors, but also a noted and acknowledged feeling of insecurity due to the current security environment of the region. Additionally, according to Peoples, the laws also “broadened” the concept of space security to encompass “human security to environmental issues, crisis management and disaster response as well as potential military applications.” And thus since, Japan has developed the latest rocket and satellite capabilities for both civilian and military uses, and has continued to conduct manned space activities and the planning of human spaceflight. To summarize, over time many factors combined (factors including “changing security realities, corporate interests, domestic political realities, and the presence of a military space race in Asia”) that increased Japan’s militarization of its space assets. Although the security dilemma is not the only factor contributing to these changes, it was clearly present in the concern of the policy-makers over the changing global and regional security environment. And the resulting Basic Space Law and subsequent policies have become a contentious issue in the region’s perception of security (i.e. the presence of the security dilemma) going forward.History of China’s Space PolicyChina’s space program also has a long history of policy changes and subsequent developments. China’s program can be highly categorized as focusing on national prestige in regards to outer space: “one such benefit, increased national pride, is more important in China than in any other current major spacefaring power -- with the possible exceptions of India and Russia -- because it helps unify the country during periods of great stress and transformation.”With this context in mind, China’s space developments and policies have gone through a variety of different scenarios throughout history, with it all culminating in its current status as the third largest space presence behind the United States and Russia. The following is a brief analysis of the history of China’s space program compiled primarily by James Clay Moltz, with an examination of the security dilemma throughout.The origins of China’s space program begins differently and much slower than Japan’s, because unlike Japan, China failed to industrialize as rapidly, and also lacked the key knowledge and education base needed for space development. China’s program did begin with initial assistance from the Soviet Union, with goals in replicating the Soviet R-2 rocket and building it in China. But by 1960, the technological relationship with Moscow fell apart over differences in political direction. Then in 1964, China succeeded in launching the DF-2 long range missile, and it used this success to attempt a revival of the satellite program. But then the cultural revolution caused major setbacks in the space programs’ progress, even though during this time, the backbone of China’s launch capabilities, the DF-4 derived Long March (1) rocket was developed. This was because Premier Zhou Enlai protected a small number of top scientists, who continued to work on high-priority projects, notably out of the need for military reconnaissance. The Dong Fang Hong-1 was then put into orbit as China’s first successful satellite launch on April 1, 1970, being the fourth country to accomplish such a feat (Japan being the third).Afterwards, China was exposed to the U.S.’s technological and scientific achievements after President Richard Nixon’s trip to China in 1972. This emphasized to the CCP that China was falling behind the rest of the world, which resulted in Zhou Enlai outlining a new set of national priorities at the January 1975 National People’s Congress: “the goal being to catch up with the West in agriculture, industry, defense, and science and technology by the year 2000.” At this point, the security dilemma comes into play, as China perceived itself “at risk of permanent underdevelopment in science and technology compared to its two major rivals (the United States and the Soviet Union) and regional rivals such as Japan, Deng argued successfully to the CCP that China had put its security at risk. This priority required the reestablishment of professionalization and a downplaying of politics.”What is interesting here though, is that military aspects do not entirely come into play at this point due to technological limitations, as Moltz describes how Deng sought to prioritize use of space for economic development through communications and remote sensing, over military assets which were “out of its reach”, in order to raise the country’s standing compared to the others. At this time, a series of scientific, technological, and financial cooperative efforts ensued, most notably with the United States, throughout the 1970s, 80s, and early 90s. China sent scientists abroad, and exchanges with U.S. physicists and scientists also occurred during the 1970s. In 1978, the two nations established an Understanding on Cooperation in Space Technology, creating a joint commission and several working groups, and many technology sharing and purchasing deals of space assets were initiated (but most did not come to fruition). Then, in an example of the security dilemma, both China and the U.S. reacted to shared perceptions of the Soviet military threat and began to cooperate more extensively after Ronald Reagan’s election. This is an interesting example of the security dilemma, in that it fostered cooperation between these two due to a common threat perception, even though now the two have become distinct rivals. But, due to fears of nuclear espionage, the Cox Commission pushed congress to categorize space technology as munitions due to charges that space technology had been shared that provided assistance to China’s delivery systems (i.e. missiles), which resulted in a complete break in the cooperation between the U.S. and China space programs. China then continued to work with other nations in space technology sharing to become a leader in the region.Subsequently, the security dilemma began to play out in China’s space policy developments. China witnessed the U.S.’s successful use of space assets during the Gulf War and following U.S. operations in the War on Terror, and with the issues over Taiwan, China moved to close the gap. During this time, China also began to promote space arms control, which Moltz suggests, may have been “as a hedge against the possible failure of its military systems or in an effort to halt a U.S. movement toward national missile defenses,” because China possibly perceived the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as a path towards space-based interceptors that could be a risk to China’s nuclear arsenal. China’s perception of U.S. progress and actions at this time instilled a sense of insecurity in the nation (the security dilemma). Towards this end, China and Russia collaborated on a series of treaty draft proposals to ban space weapons, which are continually rejected by the U.S. due to the lack of clear definitions and verification principles, but China continues to mention the proposal as an alternative to the “weaponizing” of space by the U.S. The above perceptions and actions are another indication of the security dilemma, because even while China attempts these treaty proposals banning space weapons or threats of attacks from or on space objects out of fear of U.S. capabilities, it then still tested an anti-satellite weapon in 2007 (successfully). While China was condemned extensively by the international community for this test, China attempted to blame the United States, and its numerous U.S. Air Force documents and the U.S. National Space Policy, with its rhetoric of U.S. space “dominance” and “control”, for forcing China to focus on this military aspect of space. In a clear demonstration of the security dilemma over this, at this point in the history, Moltz includes a quote from a Chinese space expert stating: “the United States has not been very responsive … for many years. I think China is justified in thinking that if the leading space power is unwilling to be limited then nothing is possible with arms control in space.”This quote shows the uncertainty and insecurity Chinese decision-makers are facing due to being unable to discern the U.S. behavior. What’s interesting here is that while Japan’s eventual program began to develop with the security dilemma over concerns in the region about China and Chinese foreign policy intentions (and justified security concerns over North Korea), China too has developed its space program in the later stage under the security dilemma. For China, its decision-making was being affected by concern and confusion over the U.S. developments/intentions since the break of cooperation.In addition to the above instances, China has continued using space in a variety of ways, ways incorporating soft power as well. China thus has robust scientific and engineering capital, and a leadership “that seems determined to go beyond the symbolic prestige factor of space to harness its commercial and military power.” China created the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) in 2005, with initial parties Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan, Peru, and Thailand, and in which China is the leader. In 2003, China became the third country, behind the former Soviet Union and the U.S., to independently launch humans into space. Additionally China has launched and tested a preliminary space station craft, the Tiangong-1, and plans to orbit a fully operational space station by 2023. Estimates predict that China will “catch up” with European commercial space by 2020; having its Beidou navigation system operational before Europe’s Galileo; landing a Chinese astronaut on the moon around the same time that China’s GDP may exceed the U.S., which will all indicate “a subtle soft-power means of highlighting China’s growing influence.” The dual-use development and use of space power for both hard and soft power applications/achievements is the current China presence in outer space today.As can be seen, China has had an extensive history of space policy and programs, beset by initial setbacks, and then recently flourishing to become one of the major players in space. Similar to Japan, prestige and the idea of “catching up” with the established space powers (technologically, economically, commercially, and militarily) has been a main driving factor behind China’s space developments, and all the while with instances of the security dilemma throughout. Most notably are the recent security dilemma examples of the past few decades, ones that allowed even for cooperation with the United States for a time (due to fears of the Soviet Union), then later against the United States in concern over its growing space capabilities, uses, and intentions, resulting in China’s confusing ASAT test all the while promoting the ban of space weapons and weapons of this kind. With all the many factors contributing to China’s space development overall, “more than any other actor, China has understood these facets of space in the modern era and has moved to present itself as the pre-eminent global challenger to the U.S.” How this “challenge” can, or even may, play out is the subject of the following. Is there a Resolution, or Resolutions, to the Outer Space Security Dilemma?In discussing a resolution of the above security dilemma that has grown out of East Asia’s space developments, the status and future outlook of the area must be considered as well. Continuing to use Japan and China as the case study, this section begins by indicating trends that point towards a conflict over the security dilemma in the region, in outer space or otherwise, and this conflict’s potential to continue. Then there is a brief discussion on the importance of recognizing the security dilemma and avoiding a threat-framing lens to the space policy developments, which might exacerbate the dilemma. Following is a section focused on what may be seen as a more cooperative assessment of the situation, and concluding with the author’s recommendations for certain avenues of cooperation in outer space development alongside this entrenched security dilemma.Potential for ConflictTo begin an examination of the potential for conflict, first, looking at the space development trends, James Clay Moltz clearly states “there is a space race going on in Asia,” but cautions that it is still questionable whether it will evolve as “peaceful competition or military confrontation.” Moltz cites that this is evident in the two organizations APSCO/APRSAF being separate and led by China or Japan, showing that certain national motivations take priority over international cooperation in regards to East Asian space development. Moltz believes that it may not end up this way, but that there is indeed a risk this race will transition to military conflict, as military space expenditures are rising. This is where Columba Peoples believes the security dilemma can certainly be applied, indicating a risk of conflict, because as mentioned previously, John Herz and Robert Jervis claim that as states compete to increase power and preserve national security (“many means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others”), along which the dilemma is noted to possibly be exacerbated by the ambiguities evident in the dual-use technology of space and the increases of risk and historical rivalries and response. But given these dynamics, how might a potential conflict be taking shape in the region?Recent indicators in certain areas seem to support that a security dilemma is playing out that could result in conflict; the following is not an exhaustive list, but a few examples of current trends. For example, in a clear demonstration of the security dilemma, in 2012, claiming that U.S. continued missile defense activities “undermines the strategic stability,” Chinese Major General Zhu Chengu warns that China will have to update its nuclear arsenal to maintain deterrence capabilities. On the other hand, the U.S. is indeed increasing its missile defense in the area, with plans to place an additional radar system in Japan as a response to North Korean and Chinese evolving capabilities. And while these developments have been ongoing, in regards to Japan, on July 1, 2014, the Shinzo Abe administration authorized the reinterpretation of Japan’s Article 9 pacifist clause to now allow for collective self-defense, which is seen by China and South Korea as a “sign of resurgent Japanese militarism”, concerns that China has indeed voiced recently prior to the reinterpretation. The timing of this is coinciding with the Japanese public’s fear of China’s military rise, and Prime Minister Abe and Japanese military personnel say this revision will increase Japan’s deterrent powers. There has been indication that this reinterpretation indeed occurred over worries at the top-level about China and North Korea. After which, China expressed its renewed concern over this reinterpretation, even citing that Japan should be aware of others’ security needs and not to ‘fabricate’ “the China’s threat” in order to carry out domestic policy goals. This too is a clear example of the security dilemma at work in the general geopolitical realm, as the act of making one nation feel more secure (Japan allowing for collective self-defense) because of perceived threats (such as from China) makes others in the region (China) feel less secure, and the potential for conflict rises.Thus, this potential conflict can spread to outer space. As Saadia M. Pekkanen states, “unlike nuclear technology… space technology is not stigmatized in Japanese domestic politics,” and she continues to describe how its dual-use integration into civilian life protects the technology from public criticism, so much so that unless something “drastic” changes, “a Japanese public, increasingly sensitive to the country’s relative perch with China and North Korea, is not likely to oppose space assets that are justified on national security grounds.” And for China, Pekkanen highlights that China’s air force chief acknowledges a militarized space race, and that Japan and India have gotten involved. Combine this with the fact that the security dilemma also exists in the fact that the force enhancement capabilities of the U.S. and Japan are perceived as threats to Chinese ground forces. This then causes China to feel less secure and push for policies and programs to replicate these capabilities, and also to test and plan for targeting and countering U.S. said force enhancement capabilities, thus increasing the U.S. and Japanese need to securitize their space assets to counter China, which will then turn into a cycle of (in)security. Couple this with the ambiguity of the dual-use technologies, and all this means that, as mentioned before, space assets are increasingly becoming targets in a would-be conflict or war in the region that might occur due to any of the reasons stated above or otherwise, especially with the security dilemma like this as it is. But does this conflict need to be the outcome?Recognizing the Security Dilemma and Avoiding a Threat-Framing LensOne issue that can exacerbate the security dilemma, and thus possibly this trend towards conflict, are the interpretations of said policies and decisions. This is because interpretations are key to the security dilemma. As mentioned earlier, Booth and Wheeler describe the security dilemma as a “two-level strategic predicament”, first with a “dilemma of interpretation,” followed by a “dilemma of response.” As the first stage incorporates a decision by policy makers to attempt to correctly interpret whether perceived developments are for passive defensive or for offensive hostility, and the second level is in how to appropriately respond to such a development/interpretation of development, so reacting on misplaced suspicion in a military manner in turn could cause a rising of insecurity and mutual hostility. This can even be the case when no hostility may have been intended by either actor, just security, but there is the fear of acting poorly and leaving oneself vulnerable to risk. So how can there be an end to this spiraling of insecurity? One key method is to recognize the security dilemma, and avoid self-fulfilling prophecies based on biased interpretations. As compiled by Columba Peoples in his introduction to Space Policy journal’s 29th volume, there is much in literature on this subject in relation to the space policies and developments of China and Japan. In highlighting the different interpretations of the 2008 changes in Japanese space policy, Peoples cites Christopher W. Hughes, who suggests recent changes in Japanese space policy reflect interest in Missile Defense systems, and that this is in possible violation of Japan’s adherence to Article 9. Hughes believes there has been a shift of space policy to be geared more defensive-militarily in space assets. On the contrary, Peoples argues that Japan’s 2008 revision can possibly indicate a shift towards a military space policy, but that instead it is more “broadening” to a “comprehensive” understanding of security, suggesting it is an attempt “to offset potential military applications of space programmes by positioning these within a context of broader non-military ‘security’ functions: social development, crisis management, disaster response and environmental monitoring, among others.” Peoples elaborates that this does not create a clear trend of development towards remilitarization as others suggest, but rather Japan pushing for normalization and meeting the “international standard” of spacefaring nations, i.e. balancing Art. 9 and what it means to be a space power. There is a risk though, which Peoples stresses, that this balancing act may have created more ambiguities in Japan’s space policies/programs that can be interpreted regionally or globally with too much emphasis on military security. Whereas for China, Peoples cites Michael Sheehan, who argues that too many interpret China’s developments in space within the broader “China threat” military-mentality (that China, in seeking to become a hegemon, will ultimately confront the U.S. and regional neighbors militarily) and that this is a problematic oversimplification; prestige and domestic motivations of China must equally be taken into account. Next, Yongjin Zhang is referenced, who argues that U.S. analysts and policy-makers too readily interpret Chinese space developments as a military challenge to its global hegemon, and this becomes a problematic viewpoint, which often gets “bound up with constructing the threat that they claim to analyse.” To synthesize, Peoples mentions how Mark Hilborne believes that suspicion and misunderstanding between Chinese and US space policies could be a cause for conflict (the U.S. too often assumes overlap between China’s military and civilian sectors of space programs, and China is often not transparent about space capabilities, which exacerbates U.S. fears due to the dual-use predicament), but recent changes in US policy may provide room for cooperation, and keeping the status quo and global collaborative space security may be seen as more beneficial than risking conflict/competition.The above examples compiled by Peoples suggests that analysts are becoming more and more aware of the issue of a threat-framing lens that other commentators and policy-makers tend to adopt when assessing new developments. In regards to the space policies of Japan and China, it is clear that this is the case recently, and that it has the potential to exacerbate the security dilemma. As Zhang and the others suggested above, by possessing a fear-based threat mentality of the other’s development or policy shift, there is the potential that this will too often lead to self-fulfilling prophecies and worsening the security environment, especially if responses to these interpretations continue to create the threat itself (i.e. the security dilemma). With this notion in mind, it does indeed give credence to Bruce Blair and Chen Yali’s caution against an offensive realist mindset in this regard, because “there is nothing China can do to convince American worst-case analysts that China could not possibly adapt its dual-use space capabilities for ‘possibly’ posing military threats to the United States.” In order to remedy such a fear, the above highlights the need to recognize this threat-framing tendency, recognize the security dilemma, and reduce the effects of either, all in order to encourage the support of transparency measures to ensure good will and trust. Trust is deemed important by Booth and Wheeler in coping with the security dilemma, so states must avoid a trend of exacerbating the dilemma by framing the actions of the other (in policy, rhetoric, or analysis) in a threat-based manner.Avenues of CooperationIn contrary to the above, there are also many indicators that the outer space environment in East Asia shows evidence that it can trend to a progression focused more on cooperation rather than conflict or competition. China and Japan, being the two most developed space powers in the region, are in a position where signs of cooperation in space activities stem from their leadership and technological expertise. Thus, while many experts in this area, such as Moltz and Pekannen, argue that indeed there is a space race in east Asia, and caution that nationalistic tendencies and other behaviors in East Asia regarding space and otherwise would tend to indicate conflict is a very real possibly, the authors also highlight areas where cooperation can and has occurred. These areas consist of common-interests and economic arenas, such as disaster preparedness, environmental monitoring, civil space with a more regional/human view, and commercial space. Kazuto Suzuki even disagrees with the more cautioning tones of Moltz and Pekkanen, arguing that claiming a space race in East Asia is an overstatement, that space as a battleground was revealed to be dangerous by the Chinese 2007 ASAT test causing massive debris problems, and that China and Japan are not competing with each other in the civilian and military arenas of outer space. Suzuki argues that the two are actually competing for leadership in the field and in the region, citing the rivalry between APRSAF and APSCO with Japan and China using their positions in each, as facilitators of space technology and capabilities with developing countries, to compete for diplomatic leadership. It is in this leadership and regional cooperation/rivalry that best provides the area to assess cooperative avenues. Because the fact is, there have been instances in history of space cooperation among the leaders/rivals in space, even at times of power tensions and security dilemmas. For instance, “If there is a single lesson from the Cold War in space, it is that both sides eventually learned that unrestricted military behavior risked uncontrollable conflict and the possible ruination of the near-Earth space environment, thereby worsening their individual and mutual security. For this reason, Washington and Moscow exercised remarkable self-restraint even during the most hostile years of the space race, forged non-interference agreements, and never fired shots in anger in space. Ironically, in some respects we seem further from such cooperative policies in the early twenty-first century.”This historical example demonstrates that even in one of the largest and potentially deadliest military-tech arms race in history, cooperative approaches ensued between the main actors (for this example in the space domain) to ensure individual/mutual security for themselves. The space assets were just that crucial. But, as Moltz suggests, and as trends in the previous section have highlighted, current geopolitics especially in East Asia are displaying a distance from the cooperative policies of the past, so historical cooperation in the space environment of East Asia should be noted again as a reminder. While much can be discussed on Japanese and U.S. cooperation in space activities especially recently (such as JAXA and NASA scientific collaboration on missions, Japanese astronauts flying alongside American ones, and ballistic missile defense) it is important to note again that China has examples of such relationships with Japan and the United States in the past. These include Chinese scientists being able to attend the Fourth International Aeronautics and Astronautics Exhibition in Japan in 1973, the exchanges between U.S. and Chinese scientists mentioned in the previous sections, and even when two Chinese experiments flew aboard the U.S. space shuttle in 1992. Additionally, even after the Tiananmen Square incident and subsequent U.S. economic sanctions on China, then president George H. W. Bush allowed for two U.S. purchased contract launches by Chinese launch services to proceed, showing that even under increased tensions, cooperation still could exist. Currently, the U.S. is engaging in new space partnerships as a form of national security space strategy, to enhance its space capabilities, and deter the use of counter-space technologies against U.S. assets. This highlights that even as a security dilemma response, cooperative responses are chosen as well, even if for self-interested motivation. This notion (cooperation in the security dilemma through self-interest) is something which will be discussed in the following. For now, how can this history of space-based cooperation continue, and be renewed, especially for East Asia, but also globally for the outer space environment?For starters, cooperation in the security dilemma is possible. As Robert Jervis points out, “when the security dilemma is the problem, either or both sides can seek changes in preferences over strategies (both their own and those of the other) in the form of implementing standard “cooperation under anarchy” policies. In these cases, defensive realists and neoliberals see similar ways to reduce conflict. Both embrace the apparent paradox that actors can be well advised to reduce their own ability to take advantage of others now and in the future. Both agree that cooperation is more likely or can be made so if large transactions can be divided up into a series of smaller ones, if transparency can be increased, if both the gains from cheating and the costs of being cheated on are relatively low, if mutual cooperation is or can be made much more advantageous than mutual defection, and if each side employs strategies of reciprocity and believes that the interactions will continue over a long period of time.” In addition to the “cooperation under anarchy policies”, which will be mentioned later, the above highlights that what needs to change are preferences over strategies. Jervis elaborates that many conflicts can be seen as both the product of an avoidable security dilemma and of irreconcilable differences. So whereas goals of states may not need to change in response to attempting to achieve greater security, it is the preferences in how those goals are achieved that need to, and often internal domestic changes on perceptions in order to avoid the problem of irreconcilable differences. And this directly relates to outer space, because while this entire paper has been devoted to the examination of the states’ feelings of a need for security based in and derived from outer space developments under the security dilemma, the states need not change their goals, but just adapt their preferences to their attainment. In addition to this, trust is an important aspect for cooperation to thrive under the security dilemma, as suggested by Booth and Wheeler.On Certain Space-based Institutions: Cooperation through Mutual Security and BenefitAlong that line of thought, Jervis expresses that neoliberals think establishing institutions can increase cooperation, while realists believe states will only establish an institution if they seek goals the institution will help them reach. So, as security has been established as the ultimate goal, and in ways regarding to outer space, then the goals of the institutions will need to provide mutual security and trust in areas that can involve cooperation. For space, these areas fall under the realms of managing access to space and launches, given space is increasingly “crowded”, managing orbital debris and other issues of common concern regarding space asset security, such as the security and allotment of the electromagnetic frequencies used for space technology. In these areas, there has indeed been a history of cooperative institutions having a role in this, such as the Outer Space Treaty and the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, and even though the liability and enforcement areas are lacking in these institutions, they still work, as Sterner states, “because they reflect the self-interest of launching states in conducting safe launch activities.” This references back to the idea that even self-interested motivation can indeed promote cooperative efforts, through institutions or otherwise, and especially involving outer space. Additionally, Sterner continues that “space remains vast enough, and spacecraft small enough, that collisions are still relatively rare,” so an even greater challenge is managing the electromagnetic spectrum that satellites use. To avoid interference issues and the like, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is used. It has an office in the United Nations, 192 member states, and over 700 private-sector members and associates. It also convenes the World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC) every few years for members to vote on ITU policies and division of the electromagnetic bands. Sterner admits the ITU/WRC is not perfect, decisions are made for political reasons as much as technical reasons and the mechanisms are difficult to adapt to quick changes or emergencies in space, but the process “generally works well” and has provided the framework and environment needed to grow the communications satellite sector, global information infrastructure, and enhancement of national capabilities successfully (the GPS system being a prime example). Thus, “most of the existing regimes and practices governing space launch and in-orbit behavior presume, and benefit from, the self-interested, candid and voluntary cooperation of space actors.” So not only are the above examples of self-interests and cooperative efforts going hand in hand in space development, but there is also a sense of fitting Jervis’s previously mentioned outline of “cooperation under anarchy” principles. The ITU and other space regimes are examples of institutions in which the transactions of managing the space domain can be divided up into smaller ones, transparency measures increase with registration through these institutions, the gains of cheating are low, and mutual cooperation can benefit the whole space community.Thus, another avenue of potential cooperation falls in the realm of the major international institution, the United Nations, where there have been recent discussions of increasing transparency and other confidence-building measures around space programs. In the past, in 1959, U.N. Resolution 1472 (XIV) established The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), which coordinates and codifies international law and procedure for peaceful use of outer space. Despite the above, as one former chairman of the committee, Ciro Arévvalo-Yepes, and Kazuto Suzuki and others expressed recently, U.N. space activities are geographically and thematically fragmented throughout the world. Thus, the authors emphasize that stability and change are needed to adapt to modern challenges; “too much is at stake for the global community for the United Nations to watch from the sidelines and to be only passive and reactive”. There is a need for: increased regulation and coordination to stabilize orbit, using the U.N. COPUOS as a forum for interregional dialogue and coordination, and to continue to promote using space to benefit all of humankind, treaty-verification, environment monitoring, and development. Although the United Nations is not without its limits in geopolitical actualities, some points of cooperation can begin by using the U.N. COPUOS as a forum for disaster management, space debris mitigation, space traffic management, nuclear power safety, and planetary defense from space objects. This is because, “the great reliance on space systems means that security on Earth is increasingly linked to security in space,” and “by its very nature, all space activities are global in character and essence.” This is a theme consistent in the literature, specifically from Moltz, arguing that space should be seen in a more “humankind approach… rather than one based on competing nations, as in the past.” If the U.N. COPUOS space policy can be defined and strengthened, as advocated by Arévalo-Yepes et. al., then it has the potential to become another cooperative space-based institution that can be utilized to further the humankind approach, and diminish the effects of the security dilemma.Other Approaches: Interconnectedness through Privatization and the Diversity of Players, Assessing Current Motivations In addition to several of the already established space-based institutions/forums, new and continuing overall economic relations can foster cooperation and collaboration in outer space. As Suzuki outlines, the constraining budgetary conditions nations have been put in recently, causing space spending to be diminishing in some nations due to a lack of public interest in the technology for purely just technology/progression sake, has begun to create a situation where space spending and space programs have become government-third party partnered or privatized. In this era where space programs are becoming increasingly privatized, regardless of military intentions in the programs or not, having more entities, and especially economic entities, invested in space assets for a nation is another reason that governments will continue to see invaluable interest in keeping space assets safe and available, and outer space free and open to access. This form of interest can be another, modern form of the learning lesson described by Moltz previously. The U.S. and U.S.S.R realized that jeopardizing space assets over a conflict was more of a danger than cooperating to ensure space’s safe and continued access. This indeed can apply to the privatized investment in space today, for nations such as Japan, China, and others, if only they can recognize the security dilemma and be made aware the potentially harmful effects continuing down a path of conflict could have on this technological/economic sector.To go further, the international nature of space launch and operation means that international cooperation and partnerships will continue to be formed between privatized space entities, increasing the interconnectedness and cooperative aspects of outer space operations for economic and state entities alike. Additionally, this shared-investment effect by diversifying the stakeholders can cause nations to desire cooperation to keep space assets free from harm, as the economic value, in addition to and primary over political value, of space technology begins to rise again. This can shift the perspective on securitizing space assets not due to perceived existential or security threats, but from an increasingly economic incentive, shifting the “securitizing” of space to be proscribed in more benign economical methods. At least for Japan and the United States, economic benefits and incentives for space programs are sought by the tax payers in the form of a better environment and navigation and communications, indicating the average citizen is not concerned with the militarized or geopolitical aspects of space any more, but more with the better daily-life enhancements space provides. In order to keep this taxpayer interest, not only can this aspect be shared with China as the more ideal goal of space utilization to increase cooperation, especially as the Chinese citizens begin to reap the benefits of increased space infrastructure utility in their daily lives, but overall economic incentive and interest in outer space reflects a deep investment in keeping the space arena peaceful and non-contested. This is a point that must be emphasized to avoid the security dilemma, because, “new” space “players” such as China still see space as a sign of national prestige and a marker of progress, whereas the “old” space players such as the United States and Japan see the enhanced utility and dependence on space as justification for its use and the as the focus of priority for the policies of that use. For the latter, space is a means that must be maintained so the ends (benefits such as communication, navigation, environment/disaster management, enhanced security) can be maintained, while the former may see space as an end itself. This is a discrepancy that could tilt towards competition and a space race rivalry if not balanced correctly, and these motivations need to be recognized and shared. When a discrepancy on motivations comes into play, along with the ever-present uncertainty, the security dilemma is brought back into the mix (especially given the dual-use technology of space), so the economic and privatized benefits of space need to be acknowledged, shared, and sought after, which will, along with the already established space-based institutions and management of common security issues like orbital debris, all continue to promote cooperation in the space environment for Japan, China, and everyone else.ConclusionTo conclude, this paper has been a brief study of the recent literature surrounding space developments and a “space race” in East Asia regarding Japan and China, examining the security dilemma at play in this outer space environment, and possible remedies to said dilemma. The paper began identifying what the security dilemma is, and why it is an issue in regards to outer space and its unique environment and features. Following that was the core of the study, focusing on the history compiled by scholars of Japanese and Chinese space programs, and examining them for instances of the security dilemma. And finally was a discussion on the potential for conflict in the area, avoiding the threat framing lens to discourage self-fulfilling mistrust that could exacerbate the security dilemma, and then highlighting key areas of where cooperation in outer space in East Asia could thrive under the dilemma. These included management of common security interests like the orbital environment, outer space debris, management of the electromagnetic spectrum, and other avenues of cooperation provided by common worries/management through key space-based institutions. Additionally, the continued diversifying of stakeholders by the increased commercialization/privatization of space utility promotes cooperation through economic incentives and the benefits of a more interconnected outer space. This paper’s intention was to synthesize the literature of the security dilemma, histories and current trends of Japan and Chinese space programs, and the theories and analysis of conflict and cooperation by the cited experts, into one, while arguing for the cooperative opportunities to be pursued instead conflict. At this point, the goal becomes to recognize the security dilemma and attempt to reduce its potentially harmful effects on decision making. There must be an acknowledgement that uncertainty takes many forms and can’t be escaped, but a conscious effort to transcend the current forms of uncertainty and the security dilemma, to create the relationships that can eventually foster trust;“in short, what marginalizes the culture of military competition, transcends security dilemmas, and ultimately erodes the power of the war system, is a shared and daily commitment to create the conditions globally for the politics of peaceful uncertainty.”Security communities are a form this transcending, but not escaping, of the security dilemma can take place. As promoted by Booth and Wheeler, the authors point to the examples of Europe and the North Atlantic nations as successful security communities. This region (with the EU and NATO) has practically institutionalized non-aggression towards each other, and war has become nearly irrelevant to those players, even in a system still composed of separate nation-states. This is what Suzuki outlined as forming in Europe in 1957 with the European Economic Community, which Suzuki concedes has not been perfect, but has paved the way to a war-free Europe with a “significant level of peace and prosperity” since. If Europe, with its history of wars and conflicts and rivalries can eventually realize the benefits of disregarding war amongst each other, then there’s no reason any other region, such as Asia, can’t eventually do the same; East Asia bore the brunt of WWII as bad as Europe, and memories of such should not be forgotten. Even if the outlook is currently bleak, the eventual option for cooperation over conflict is still there. Steps in this direction, or at least in positive directions, can be provided by outer space, as Moltz provides an outlook of space to be viewed with more of a human security approach; “the unique characteristics of space make it a good candidate for promoting a sense of community among nations.” A war within, derived from, or targeting the outer space environment and space assets would be devastating to the global modern infrastructure, but, as outlined throughout the paper in terms of history and current events, use of outer space requires the cooperation of many nations. A sense of community can form through space in East Asia. With the twenty first century continuing to create changes in security dynamics, it is important to assess the developments in these areas in regards to major space leaders such as Japan and China. The outer space environment provides one example where the cooperation and the potential for further open forums of dialogue through relations can help to ease tensions and maintain this region’s stability and safety, and that of the world. The security dilemma of outer space must be recognized, and transcended. ................
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