TRANSCRIPT



TRANSCRIPT

Richard D. Ball, Captain Greensboro Police Department

Public Hearing #2 of the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission

August 26, 2005 Greensboro, North Carolina

Italics: Commission members

RB: Captain Richard Ball

MT: Sgt. Mike Toomes

TRANSCRIPT BEGINS

I would like to invite Captain Rick Ball and Sgt. Michael Toomes to come forward if you are here. As they come forward to save time since we are were running a little behind. I will mention that Captain Ball is currently the head of the Vice and Narcotics Division of the Greensboro Police Department. He has been a member of the police department since 1976, and was one of the very first officers on the scene on November 3, 1979.

Sgt. Toomes also has been a member of the police department since 1974 along with Captain Ball was one of the first officers on the scene after the shootings.

And we are very grateful to the gentleman for coming and helping us understand what happened on November 3, 1979, from the perspective of being a sworn officer of the law. So it is definitely a different perspective in what we have heard thus far.

I believe Captain you have a prepared statement.

RB: Yes Sir.

Commissioner Brown: And I would like to just remind you just before you start speak into the mike and if that one is not projecting you may want to (not audible).

RB: I will.

Commissioner Brown: Great. Thank You.

RB: First, let me make it unequivocally clear that I am not here as an official representative of the Greensboro Police Department, nor am I representing the City of Greensboro. I am the senior command level officer who was a member of the department on November 3, 1979. I am also here because I am a lifelong resident of the City of Greensboro, and I wish to express my observations regarding the event in question.

I began my career on October 1976. On November 3, 1979, I was assigned as a patrol officer in 240 Zone, which at the time encompassed Morningside Homes. I had worked that zone for approximately two years, preceding this event. After working 3rd shift, I went home approximately 07:30 a.m. At about 11:45 a.m., I received a telephone call from my immediate supervisor who, knowing that additional resources were going to be needed, asked me if I would report directly to the Police Department. After doing so I was assigned scene security at Everett and Carver Streets, pending the removal of the bodies still lying on the ground. After that I was assigned prisoner security at the Guilford County Jail. I, like many others, continued on duty for the next 24 hours. We were to be prepared for any ensuring problems, but the streets were very quiet. There was very little activity across the city.

Like most officers who were mobilized, I had little information regarding what had happened. I was told there was a shootout between some Communists and some Klansmen and several people had been killed, and a bunch of other people had been wounded at the scene. In talking to other officers at the scene, I remember questions being asked about, “Who are these people and where did they come from?” For the most part, we recognized they were not from Greensboro. So, the question was, “Why did they come here for this”? For those of us in law enforcement we dealt with the situation at hand, put it behind us and moved on.

As a law enforcement officer, I can easily identify with current, retired, and former police officers who do not feel the necessity to speak at this commission. As police officers, we are compelled to provide testimony in courts of law that are based on fact without bias of personal feelings or opinions, on countless occasions through out our careers.

We provide this testimony in prosecution of offenders in violation of the law. Most often, these defendants are convicted. Sometimes they are not. Regardless of the outcome, we are required to disregard our personal feelings and move forward in our responsibilities. Notwithstanding an appealed case, there is rarely a situation where revisiting a case is necessary. As one officer who was there told me, “Everything I could say about that day has already been said and is officially documented and recorded. I don’t see the purpose of doing it again”. Another said, “I talked to the Internal Review, at two criminal cases and a civil case. How many times do I have to do this? No, not any more”.

From a police perspective, there were a lot of things we could have done better on November 3rd. There was also exemplary performance on the part of some officers present like Art League, Sam Bryant and others, including the officer seated next to me (Sergeant Mike Toomes). Unfortunately, their actions on that day have long been overshadowed by accusations that they and other members of the Greensboro Police Department conspired to commit the murder of 5 individuals. I am here before you to say, enough is enough. When you separate fact from rhetoric, you will find not one ounce of credible evidence to support any such allegation. Because it does not exist.

To some people, the events of November 3rd, will forever be etched in their minds as a tragedy unparalleled magnitude. To the average cop although unique in some ways, this event was not their first exposure to violent death. And although not encountered on a daily basis, it would not be the last. It has been said that the average police officer will see more human tragedy in two years on the street than the average person could see in a lifetime. This is just one more reason that we move on; there is always more tragedy to come. We deal with it, and we put it behind us if we can.

I certainly do not want to undervalue the devastating impact that this event had on family and friends of those who lost their lives, or were injured that day. I do want you to understand that for the police officers exposed to the tragedy of this event, it was one of many. Please don’t misunderstand the Department’s or individual officer’s silence as indifference or conspiracy. It’s a simple matter that we have to move on.

Finally, I would like to take a hard look at “Truth” and ‘Reconciliation”. Truth is based on FACT, and not on rhetoric. And, you have or you will have in your possession all the documents, files, recordings, and statements regarding this event to certainly establish the factual chronological sequence of events of November 3rd, 1979.

Reconciliation is defined as restoring harmony. To that end, I have a recommendation for the first step. The people responsible for organizing and orchestrating the “Death to the Klan March”, those responsible for challenging Klansmen and Nazi’s to come to Greensboro to engage in a violent confrontation, the Klansmen and Nazi’s who came, and all those who participated in the ensuing violence on that day, should extend a sincere apology to the citizen’s of Greensboro or more importantly to the people of the Morningside Homes Community.

I will try to answer questions.

Commissioner Sills: Thank you very much. You mentioned that you had been on the beat that included Morningside Homes for about two years. What was your personal experience Captain with the relationship between police officers in general and the people in that community and those around there? Was there antagonism, was there trust, or was there a mixture of feelings? Just share with us about your own experience.

RB: In 1979?

Commission Sills: Yes.

RB: You know, I hate to say that. It is probably pretty close to the way it is today. Every officer that goes out here on one call we meet a friendly face and somebody thanks us for what we do. The next one we are met with indifference, and the next one somebody because of the color of the uniform they take an immediate dislike to you. They hate you. They don’t know who you are, but they hate you because of that uniform. It is like a revolving door. That goes on. It went on then. Unfortunately, I don’t think much of that has changed.

RB: When I was considering that aspect I recalled an individual experience I had which was in the summer of 1979 prior to this event.

I responded late one night to a shooting call at Windsor Center Community Center there. Two young men had been shot. Unfortunately, one was extremely serious and life threatening.

I conducted my investigation and was able to identify a suspect. The events led me to his residence; which I went to his residence and was able to make the arrest and secured the weapon. I took him up to the police department and it was late at night by then. I was waiting the detectives to come and do the follow-up investigation which was standard procedure.

I was sitting in C.I.D. I was thirsty, and it was hot. So I asked this kid. I asked him if he was thirsty. He nodded his head. I said, “Come on let’s go get something”. So, we walked around to the canteen. Really no people around, and uh.

I bought us a couple of sodas and handed it to him. He was very silent and he was looking at me and then he said, “Why are you doing this”? I. I really didn’t know what he was talking about. And then I said, “Doing what”? And He asked me a question. He said, “When are you going to beat me”?

I started laughing. I thought (Captain Ball laughing) what are you talking about? And I looked in his eyes and I could tell that he was serious. And I asked him I said, “Where did you hear this at”? He said, “Everyone knows that when you get taken up here you get beat”. He was serious.

You know I kind of laughed it off. I said “Man, I don’t know who you have been talking to but that that doesn’t happen”. You know, I have never forgotten that. I always wondered what can I could do to change that. I never had an answer other than treating people fairly.

That is what we do. I will be the first to tell you that there a lot of things that go wrong.

We have to recruit from the human race like everyone else does. Most often we get good people. Every now and then we don’t. When it is that pervasive that the police act a certain way. It’s very difficult to try to deal with; and these young officers out here try to make some decisions about how can we show that um that is not the case?

Commissioner Sills: That’s uh an interesting story. It really illustrates very well I think

the kinds of tension that exists in communities particularly between police and community relationships.

I realize that that given the rank you held at that time that you were not in the decision making um ranks and you weren’t part of planning for how the police were going to respond to the march and so forth.

However, I believe you had the opportunity to review some of the internal document: and just so that we can understand because we are not police officers. We haven’t had the training you’ve had and we don’t understand how the department operates.

Could you walk us through the sequence of events from the police perspective, and help us understand how certain decisions got made including why there were no officers uh on at the time the shootings broke out.

RB: Well, to do so I have to qualify my answer and say that you are absolutely right that I was not involved in the decision making process.

Uh. You make reference to documents that I have reviewed and I am going to tell you upfront. I have reviewed one document that was not obtained through from the police department. It was obtained through an investigative reporter that gave it to me. It happens to be an official document I do know that through my experience. And uh. And it’s an administrative report dated November 19, 1979.

So, yeah I have looked over that. And I do understand that you have questions about the sequence of events and how they developed so when I respond to that I am doing so based on this document which I believe you do have.

Commissioner Sills: That’s correct. (Inaudible).

RB: Okay. You will have this document.

RB: And we are talking specifically about the event on Nov. 3rd.

Commissioner Sills: Yes.

RB: You have to bear with me because I am going to have to make some references here because I certainly want to be accurate in what I say.

RB: I believe on October 19, a parade permit request was made by one of the leaders of the CWP. Um.

He was advised that uh. Or he advised the parade would start at Everett and Carter at twelve noon on November 3. The march would terminate at the All Nations Pentecostal Holiness Church at 1800 Freeman Mill Road.

And the permit was received and sent to the City Manager’s office for approval and he was advised that uh he would be notified if it was approved by the manager’s office. And it was.

RB: That was October 19.

RB: October 22. There was a circular distributed throughout Greensboro. That was an

open letter to various Klansmen. And on the back of it (silence) there was information that the march speaking of the “Death to the Klan March” would assemble at 11:00 a.m., November 3, in the parking lot of Windsor Community Center.

(Silence)

RB: On Thursday, November 1st, a parade permit was granted and given to the leader of the CWP.

RB: November 2, there was an article in Greensboro Record Newspaper stating that the march would occur leaving at 11:00 a.m. from the Windsor Community Center.

There was a review of this information in a operational plan put into place to provide police escorts for the march.

RB: There was a Supervisor assigned directly to the march. There was a second patrol unit assigned to follow the procession at the rear. Because of potential problems, there were also (2) tactical squads assigned to assist in the march with also command staff.

Those two squads were to take a “low profile” appearance and do what we call a leap frog throughout the route. As the parade continued on its its uh route, they would leap frog from place to place on periphery to provide any assistance that maybe called upon.

(Silence)

RB: The police officer who was in charge was asked to go by both locations to determine of the conflicting information that we had in which one in fact would be the beginning of the parade.

RB: The Supervisor at 10:15 a.m., went by Everett and Carver and the Morningside Homes Community. And drove around for approximately 15 minutes and reported that it was nobody there.

RB: At 10:30 a.m., he went to the Community Center, Windsor Community Center.

RB: At 10:30, he reported there were approximately 40-50 individuals gathered and someone who was talking on the bull horn and uh described the uh clothing of someone.

At that time, he and one other officer approached the crowd and attempted to actually contact uh the organizer who had gotten the parade permit. They didn’t know him by sight but they went to try to find him to provide information to him. To say that they were met with hostility would be an understatement. Um. There was no valuable dialogue that took place. The Supervisor withdrew and had the officers take up positions in the neighborhood and await the arrival of additional people.

They reported that at that time the crowd continued to grow and the supervisor had been instructed to meet the organizer at 11:30 at Everett and Carver. He decided to wait there and see if he could locate him there, and at 11:30 he was going to go over to Everett and Carver.

(Silence)

RB: There was a police briefing to discuss operational plans held at approximately 10:00 a.m. that morning. The officers were briefed on their responsibilities and uh various laws were discussed, assignments were made, And I believe somewhere in the vicinity of 10:40 they were excused and told that because nobody knew how long this was going to take if they wanted to run out and get a bite to eat to go ahead and do it. But, everyone had to be on their post by 11:30.

(Silence)

RB: A total of 26 police officers were assigned to that march.

(Silence)

RB: The Police Supervisor who was at the community center stated he felt it was necessary to stay there, because it was where the large group was growing and he felt that there was much likely leaving from there to go to Everett and Carver.

(Silence)

RB: At approximately 11:06 a.m., a detective in the intelligence section advised that eight vehicles had been located sitting on the ramp of 85 and 220. He continued to monitor activities at that location.

RB: At 11:12, there was discussion over the police radio about hostilities from the group at the Windsor Community refusing to talk providing the information.

RB: Also at 11:12, the intelligence officer reported that the caravan is on its way.

There was some communication between supervisor who was assigned the march and the detective. The detective made the statement, “They’re on their way”. The question was asked, “Are they headed this way”? The response was, “They are definitely headed in that direction”.

(Silence)

RB: At 11:15

(Silence)

RB: Command personnel, (2) Lieutenants, (1) District Lieutenant, (1) Tactical Lieutenant, and (2) Sergeants conversed about making sure, let’s go ahead and get everyone headed to their post. They are leaving a little bit earlier than we had anticipated.

RB: At 11:17, the intelligence officer advised the caravan had just made a turn onto Lee Street. The travel route was obviously down the Highway up 29 to Lee Street. Which incidentally would be the direction you would go if you were at any location that was in such close proximity.

RB: At 11:18, he reported they were turning on Willow Road.

RB: At 11:19, there was radio traffic stating to get everyone moved. We need to get into position.

RB: At 11:20, the intelligence officer stated they are at Everett and Willow.

RB: 11:21, there was additional conversation from command staff.

And there was a problem in that the district lieutenant received a message from Communications to call the Rev. Johnson at the Pentecostal Holiness Church on Freeman Mill Road, because he had denied um the privilege of having the march in there.

The Lieutenant, again were are talking about 1979. Technology back then isn’t what it is today. We had 4 radio frequencies that uh the entire city operated off of. The problem was if you uh you can’t have but only one person talking at a time. If you have 2 heavy radio traffic it’s knocked out. Unlike today, where we have literally hundreds of radio frequencies. We didn’t have that.

The other thing is, we didn’t have cell phones back then. So, when he was called to go to make a phone call to the Reverend, he had to pull underground at the police department. Get out of his car, and and go inside to use the telephone.

RB: As he was doing so at 11:22, the intelligence officer stated that 9 or 10 vehicles had arrived at the scene and were now appeared to be heckling the crowd.

RB: At 11:23, intelligence officer advised, “We have a 10-10”. Which is a code for a “Fight in Progress”. He stated, “You better get some units on down here”. Only seconds later, the intelligence officer advised, “Shots Fired”. “Sounds like”. Then Communication was broken.

RB: At 11:23, the same time the Frequency 3 operator which is a different frequency than what uh normal Patrol units were on asked about where cars on Frequency 1 which is the normal patrol officers where they should be sent. That same minute, lieutenant of the district responded, “Move them into the area of the Windsor Community Center”.

(Silence)

RB: “Just move them into the area and stand by”.

RB: I believe there was a question about that that why would um a lieutenant direct them to Windsor if that is not the location.

Well first off, every tactical unit that was on established frequency was heading to Everett and Carver at that time. Very tactically sound if you want to mobilize every available unit throughout the rest of the department. You don’t want them rushing into a potential crime scene without understanding what’s going on. Also the volume of the cars themselves could create dangers for people. So the lieutenant selected a near by position which would obviously be a staging point for additional units. That’s why he selected Windsor Center. He knew it was close.

RB: At 11:23, he actually said, “Pull all available units in the city to the area of Windsor Center”.

RB: At 11:24, again there was some confusion.

RB: At 11:24, seconds later; the scene supervisor reported, “It is not at Windsor. I think they are Everett and Carver. We are with the group at Windsor and there is no problem”. The intelligence officer came back on the radio and reported, “Most of the fire is coming from the yellow van. They are leaving the scene now”. Then his transmission was broken off.

The officers who were responding to the scene who had been told to be on their posts at 11:30, and this is preceding 11:30, were actually at posts they were assigned to. I believe Mike was at uh one of the nearby schools which is where he was told to be. So those officers I believe as you will see in this report the number of officers that were there within mere seconds.

Really, what happened after that I think you all have a pretty grasp of.

Commissioner Sills: That’s a very helpful review of the sequences and is complicated. It helps to remember that the technology we’re so familiar with today available today was not available in that day. So it sounds just like a complete break down in Communication or confusion of Communications in ways. Including confusion about which direction the caravan was headed in.

RB: I really.

Commissioner Sills: It. Well, from your perspective, I mean. You are the professional officer here and have years of experience. We are intrigued by a statement that Art League, another officer, who was quoted by the News and Record saying, “That every police department learned what to do. We were the guinea pigs. Everybody learns from mistakes. It took a bad incident for everybody to learn”.

I would presume the Police Department and not only the Greensboro Police Department but others as well watching this have learned some important lessons from what happened.

Commissioner Sills: What are some things that you have learned?

RB: Well, you know I think it is important to evaluate any situation based on the facts that are available.

You know, even as police officers we are held to a standard of our actions based upon what we knew at that time. You know hindsight is 20/20. It’s always easy to say look what happened and why wasn’t something done to prevent this. You know we could assume that if that caravan had not been stopped, I mean if nothing had happened that day, nobody would be scrutinizing what we did and how we did it.

RB: I would like to illustrate that by another example and that would be Columbine.

You know, that was a very tragic situation at that school. Those two young men went into that school with guns. Shortly thereafter the police were notified and the police responded. And they undertook a very well established tactical position and that is containment and apprehension.

You know, (words are inaudible- someone is coughing) and (inaudible) gloom. We all know that and we did that and in similar situations. Unfortunately, while they were taking those positions there was probably some kids that died.

If you look at the end results and you say, “Wow, they sure did make some mistakes”. If that is the way you want to term it. Yeah. Based on the information they had at that time it wasn’t no mistake.

RB: But, to answer your question. Did they learn from that? Did we learn from that?

That’s how you learn. You know we unfortunately do not have the ability of a crystal ball to know what the outcome is. And, we all learn.

You know the Bank Robbery’s in L.A. where the two heavily armed and fortified with bullet proof vests. Those two guys took the streets out there. There were a number of innocent people that were shot by those two guys. And the police they were just in no position to do anything about it. Is that a mistake considering a lot of people got shot?

Certainly you can say yes that was terribly a mistake. Well, based on what they knew at the time certainly they hadn’t anticipated it happening. It had never happened before.

But, no matter if it was November 3 , whether it was Columbine , or L.A., or President Kennedy’s assassination we in law enforcement have to learn from those situations and those issues and it is what we do afterward that has to be important.

RB: What did we learn from Nov. 3? Let me tell you something.

Every one of us could tell you hey if we had that crystal ball it never would have happened.

RB: Did anybody anticipate that level of violence? No!

They were as you well know. They confronted each other probably just as heavily armed or heavily armed in China Grove and it didn’t happen there.

But you know the position that you have seemed to took based upon by what rhetoric we were faced with is uh let’s take a low profile position on this. Should they have done this? Probably not. So we all try to learn.

When you look around as you come through this building there is a great deal of security here. This is a result of November 3. We do not take a low profile anymore. As a matter of fact we constantly get accused of overacting. Well, that’s what we learned.

So, you know the criticism is going to come from no matter what we do. But, I can tell you that we all learn; and every police department across the country for all those events I just named and many many more we all learn and unfortunately sometimes people die in the process.

Commissioner Sills: Thank You. Any other Commissioners with questions you would like to ask?

Commissioner Brown: I just have one question, and you may have said the answer to this. But I am not clear that I understand how it was. Well, first of all let me clarify. Did the Klan Nazi Caravan go anywhere other than to Morningside? Prior to going to Morningside did they go to any other location?

RB: No. Not unless they were in the vicinity of 220 and 85.

Commissioner Brown: I am not clear that I understand, and if you can help me understand this I would appreciate it. How did the Klan Nazi caravan know how to come to Morningside and the police didn’t know?

(Audience members begin to laugh).

Commissioner Brown: And I am really puzzled by how these folk coming from out of town could know and not the Greensboro Police Department who had gotten information about providing security for this event.

RB: You will have to clarify that question because you’re asking me how did we not know. We knew where Everett and Carver were.

Commissioner Brown: I’m saying, they came directly to the location where the march was assembled. They came directly to that location. I’m assuming based on Judge Long’s comments earlier that they were coming because they wanted to heckle the marchers and demonstrators.

So clearly, there was information that indicated that was somehow indicated to the Klan Nazi groups that this is where the march would be and this is where a rally would take place. Given the testimony that happened during the trials, I’m not clear that I understand how it was that they had the information, but the police didn’t have the information. I’m just asking if you can shed some light on that.

RB: I can shed some information how they had the information. But, I don’t accept your statement that we didn’t have that information. I don’t understand that question.

Commissioner Brown: I’m actually responding to what you were saying about. I’m thinking that I heard you say that our understanding as police was that this rally and march was going to begin at another location at Windsor. I’m saying that there is obviously. The Klan had awareness and that there was going to be another convening point because they went directly there.

RB: Let me answer the first part of your question.

We know that one of the Klansman came to the city to obtain a parade permit after it was issued. Which again that parade permit described Everett and Carver at 12:00 as the beginning location for that march.

(Silence)

Commissioner Brown: So, you are saying to me that is why you all had that information but you are not aware of how it is that the Klan knew to come directly to Morningside.

RB: Well, I imagine they had a map.

Commissioner Sills: I think what the confusion here as I listen to the testimony is that that while the Klan had one document they were working from which was the parade permit which clearly defined Everett and Carver. The police had that document but also went by there, but also you had some other document that you mentioned that mentioned (inaudible) Everett.

(Inaudible). Commissioner Sills and Captain Ball are both speaking.

RB: You can see clearly here they were describing Windsor Center as the location in fliers, news releases, and press conferences.

And to answer your question. It was like you said did the police know. You know, we did know. If I tell you I am going to be standing there and I am going to be standing here. Can you tell me which one I’m going to be standing at? No.

Commissioner Brown: I’m not trying to debate this. I’m not trying to counter what you’re saying. I am asking for clarity about how the people who in this caravan had information that clearly was not information that the police had in terms of the Morningside location.

Clearly, I understand that you all shared information or had the same information about the Windsor Center location. So, I was just trying to see if you could shed light on that difference.

RB: No, I think that is a question for the Klansman.

(Audience Members Laugh).

Commissioner Brown: Thank-You.

Commissioner Peters: I have a question. Were there any African Americans in the chain of command during November 3, 1979?

RB: Yes Sir.

The District Commander in charge. The Executive Officer of the Tactical Division were both African Americans.

Commissioner Walker: May I have a chance here. Back to the business of knowing about where the gathering was going to be. You had the police permit that specified Carver and Everett. Would that not be the first place you would check since that was on the permit?

RB: And as I have stated. That was the first place checked.

RB: At 10:15 until 10:30 that morning, a supervisor patrolled that area.

Commissioner Walker: Yes, that’s true but that was way long before the hour that was given on the parade permit.

RB: Correct. They went to Windsor Center and found approximately 40-50 people already gathered there.

Commissioner Walker: I understand that. I uh. Even when they uh. Some of the officers were called to duty. I shouldn’t say called to duty or asked to appear there at the place of tragedy. There still seems to be in the police report, a little bit of confusion where they were supposed to go. I have trouble with that. Can you help me to understand that?

RB: Yes, if you are viewing through those transcripts the response of the officers that were not directly assigned.

Commissioner Walker: That’s right.

RB: Every officer that was directly assigned knew where to go. It’s not referring to the one’s who were assigned to the march. That is referring to those who were responding from the field in various locations.

Commissioner Walker: At the same time, were they not instructed to go to Everett and Carver? Or should they have been instructed to go to Everett and Carver? Because, that’s where the tragedy was taking place.

But they. There seems to me if I remember correctly and I will have to flip through this again. There was an idea among a couple of the officers at least that they should have gone to Windsor Center.

RB: I think you have to understand that there were several groups of officers in different positions. The tactical officers who were one group of officers who knew to be on their post at 11:30. There is another group of officers that is referred to in the transcripts of their radio traffic and these were officers who were reached out and grabbed out of the field and from there plot zones for anybody nearby.

Commissioner Walker: I understand that. I understand that.

RB: There are at least 2 different groups there. You know you say should they have not been when the tragedy. Do you know what?

Commissioner Walker: I’m sorry, that is not what my question meant. I don’t mean to be rude by interrupting you. But what I was asking probably wasn’t clear enough. Even when they were summoned from the field it seemed to me like they weren’t very sure about where to go and the dispatcher or whoever didn’t say go to Carver and Everett. He said, “Get over here”. Uh that. Is that ordinary or usual?

RB: I tried to explain that earlier. Because number one, you got 26 officers who are responding to Everett and Carver. Okay. That is a lot of police cars converging on one area. And now they have already reached out and said give me every other car you got in the city and have them respond. And think we are calling cars off of Battleground Avenue off of Holden Road.

So, in order to have some type of legitimate control over this response. The Executive Officer said send them to this location which is less than a mile away. That is a tactically sound maneuver to.

When you ask for people to come you don’t want everybody rushing to the one little place. You’re going to have wrecks and get people run over. You know until and He said until I can access the scene have them start to this location. He was going to be able to assess the scene before most of the cars ever got on this side of town. So, that was the purpose of that.

Commissioner Walker: Thank-You. That helps me.

RB: Yes ma’am.

Commissioner Jost: I’d like to ask you a question about November 3. The big question the community is why were the police not there and I am sure you have heard that.

In the context of the first trial the state criminal trial the jury said that the first 2 shots fired that were from the front of the caravan by the Klansman were non-aggressive shots. And I just want or would like both of you to comment if you had been there, or even today, if you were at an event and you heard a couple of shots would you consider them non-aggressive for any reason . If you were present in a situation.

MT: Not me.

(Audience laughs)

Commissioner Jost: What would your response be if you were. Would you consider them aggressive shots?

MT: All shots are aggressive as far as I am concerned.

MT: Yeah, I mean you would have to. You are discharging a firearm in the city and you don’t do that. I would definitely consider them aggressive whether I had observed the shots being fired or heard the shots being fired.

RB: I think I would address that by. I don’t know who described it that way.

Commissioner Jost: That was the outcome of the first trial. The state’s criminal trial.

RB: Whoever the individual was that described it as how you said the shots were

Commissioner Jost: Non-aggressive.

RB: Non-aggressive. You know. I am like Mike; anytime I am around gunfire that erupts you know that is not an easy feeling.

(Audience Laughs).

RB: But, in their defense if they were visually observing somebody take the gun and shoot it in the air maybe that is why they described it that way; but that’s the only other possibility. I do not know.

Commissioner Peters: I have a follow-up to that. If there a lot of people gathered in the area including a lot of children and firearms are discharged in the air would you consider that hostile or aggressive?

And the fact that there are a lot of children or people in the area would that influence your view? In other words, the fact that there are children and a lot of people there would that tend to make it more hostile wouldn’t it?

RB: If I was there by myself it would be hostile. So, yes, absolutely I think to a degree.

We are not going to debate whether firing a weapon is hostile or not. It is.

You know, now maybe even we are prohibited from firing warning shots. We don’t even do that. So the discharge of a firearm in any situation is hostile and unnecessary.

Commissioner Jost: So, would you comment then, Officer Cooper who was there observing and heard the shots. If you were in his place how would you have reacted?

Is it. Would that be a policy to jump out and help the people and take control, take charge?

RB: I honestly cannot answer that question. I can tell you that I have been in situations with gunfire and I know how I reacted. But, let me tell you something you don’t know.

Commissioner Sills: If there are no more questions. We thank you very much and give you just one more chance. Officer Toomes you have not had a chance to make a statement would you care to or would you?

Officer Toomes: No. Well, I had planned not to make a statement; but I came here because I was there. I was on the scene. I was one of the ones that responded from my location. Which was Gillespie School on what was Asheboro Street but is now Martin Luther King. Uh. We had my partner and I when we heard the caravan getting closer to the location we began moving that way; and of course like I said, we were assigned away from that particular area. And uh. Of course then when we heard shots fired everybody move in of course we were on 29 and there within just a matter of seconds and and uh. arrived directly at the scene.

Commissioner Sills: We appreciate very much your coming and sharing with us. You helped us greatly in understanding the sequence and also I think the spirit. We are grateful.

RB: I would like to say one additional thing. Just to kind of cover what I said. We. Nobody is going to say that everything is perfect. It wasn’t. It wasn’t. Like most everything we do. We try to learn from it. But what you have before you is a real challenge and uh you got a lot of work. I stand here looking at this.

And I give you a suggestion on how to make it easier. As you go through this and evaluate what people are telling you, when they give you rhetoric, ask for facts. When they give you facts, double check them. Cause only with facts will you find the truth.

Thank You.

(Audience: Claps)

Commissioner Brown: Thank you very much. I would like to announce that we are going to take a 10 minute break. Actually a 15 minute break, and resume at 5:30.

END OF TRANSCRIPT

Contact information:

Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission

P. O. Box 20566

Greensboro, NC 27420

(336) 275-6462

Fax: (336) 275-6227

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