Aristotle and the Problem of Concepts - D-Scholarship@Pitt

Aristotle and the Problem of Concepts

by Gregory Salmieri B.A., The College of New Jersey, 2001

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The College of Arts and Sciences in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of Pittsburgh 2008

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH College of Arts and Sciences

This dissertation was presented by Gregory Salmieri

It was defended on June 3, 2008

and approved by James Allen, Professor, Philosophy Allan Gotthelf, Visiting Professor, History and Philosophy of Science Jessica Moss, Assistant Professor, Philosophy Dissertation Advisor: James Lennox, Professor, History and Philosophy of Science

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Aristotle and The Problem of Concepts Gregory Salmieri, PhD

University of Pittsburgh, 2008

Copyright ? by Gregory Salmieri 2008

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Aristotle and the Problem of Concepts

Gregory Salmieri, PhD

University of Pittsburgh, 2008

Abstract

By a "concept" , I mean a unitary thought (of the sort normally represented by a word) that applies to a plurality of differing objects, and by "The Problem of Concepts" I mean the pervasive philosophical questions of how such thoughts are to be explained and by what standards they are to be evaluated. Aristotle is generally held to have been a Moderate Realist, who held that a concept is a putative grasp of a mind-independent universal object that exist somehow in or derivatively on the many particular objects to which the concept applies. I argue that Aristotle rejected the posit of such universal objects and instead understood universality as a feature of thought, which has a basis in reality and a function in cognition. With some notable exceptions, concepts are based on relations of difference in "the more and the less" between their instances and on the causal relations between the various parts and characteristics of each instance. A concept's function is to serve as a term in deductions which enable us to represent the necessity of causal connections. I go on, then, to explore the manner in which, on Aristotle's view, concepts compose propositions and bodies of knowledge and the way in which they are formed.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE ................................................................................................................................................................VII

1.0

THE PROBLEM......................................................................................................................................1

1.1

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF CONCEPTS .......................................................3

1.1.1 Concepts as unitary cognitions of indefinitely many differing objects ................................3

1.1.2 The Problem of Concepts: How can pluralities be unitarily cognized? ...............................4

1.1.3 The normative import of the Problem ....................................................................................7

1.2

SOCRATES, PLATO AND THE PROBLEM OF CONCEPTS.............................................12

1.2.1 Socrates' "What is F?" question............................................................................................14

1.2.2 The Socratic View of Concepts ..............................................................................................23

1.2.3 Plato's Theory of Forms as a theory of concepts .................................................................29

1.2.4 Aristotle on Platonic Forms and the need for universals ....................................................35

1.3

THE PROBLEM OF CONCEPTS AS THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS.......................38

1.3.1 Competing construals of the Problem of Universals............................................................40

1.3.2 Why speak of the Problem of Concepts rather than a Problem of Universals? ................43

1.3.3 Realism as a theory of concepts .............................................................................................44

1.3.4 Moderate Realism as a theory of concepts............................................................................48

1.3.5 Classifying theories of concepts .............................................................................................52

2.0

WAS ARISTOTLE A MODERATE REALIST? ...............................................................................56

2.1

REFORMULATING OUR QUESTION IN ARISTOTELIAN TERMS ...............................58

2.1.1 Concepts as simple thoughts of non-numerical unities........................................................58

2.1.2 Five varieties of non-numerical unity recognized by Aristotle ...........................................62

2.1.3 Moderate Realism and the five varieties...............................................................................67

2.1.4 Aristotle's generic sense of "universal" ................................................................................68

2.2

ARISTOTLE'S REJECTION OF MODERATE REALISM ABOUT KINDS .....................71

2.2.1 Zoological kinds ......................................................................................................................71

2.2.2 Kinds as determinables ..........................................................................................................76

2.2.3 The kind-form relationship as allowing for the unity of definition ....................................82

2.3

ARISTOTLE'S ASSIMILATION OF KINDS TO MATTER ................................................86

2.3.1 Is something's kind its physical matter?...............................................................................87

2.3.2 Kinds as intelligible matter ....................................................................................................93

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