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a response to “on being an atheist”___________________A Paper Presented toProf. C. Wayne MayhallLiberty University___________________In Partial Fulfillmentof the Requirements for the CoursePHIL201 Philosophy and Contemporary Ideas___________________byMary MaticeAugust, 2010a response to “on being an atheist”H. J. McCloskey in “On Being an Atheist” states the cosmological, teleological, and design arguments are three proofs that theist use to determine that a God exists with omnipotence, omniscient, immutable, morally perfect, and eternal characteristics. He argues specifically against these characteristics of a God. He doesn’t so much reject the existence of God as much as the existence of theism. To McCloskey, these arguments fail as proofs. He objects to the cosmological argument stating that even if a necessary being as a first cause is valid, of which he doubts, the argument itself is insufficient to prove that this necessary being is of the nature that theism assigns it. A similar conclusion is ascribed to the teleological and design arguments. McCloskey states, “One cannot legitimately argue, as do the exponents of this argument, from there being some sort of evidence of purpose or design to there being an all-powerful, all-perfect planner or designer… all we should be entitled to conclude was that there was a powerful, malevolent, or imperfect planner or designer.” Simply stated, the teleological and design arguments if valid would not prove theism. McCloskey has other objections to these arguments, but the objection of failing as a proof needs to be addressed before determining whether or not the other objections can have reasonable replies. McCloskey has a thoughtful point in that each argument he discusses cannot alone prove theism and therefore warrants its rejection. The question needs to be asked: Is the failure of the individual arguments sufficient to warrant a rejection of theism? The cumulative case approach states that it is not the individual arguments standing alone that provide a strong case for theism but rather the combination of several arguments. According to this approach, McCloskey may be accurate in stating that the cosmological, teleological, and design arguments fail to prove theism in themselves. However, when these individual arguments are combined together and combined with other arguments they do provide a logical basis for theism. Each argument while not proving theism, if valid, contributes an important characteristic of theism. When these characteristics are combined theism is consistent with them. While an examination of McCloskey’s additional objections is required, it is reasonable to conclude that the failure of these arguments as proofs for theism does not alone warrant the rejection of it. Nevertheless, if the individual arguments have valid objections that cause the argument to necessarily fail, then the cumulative case approach will also fail. McCloskey raises objections to this end. He believes his objections essentially derail each argument so completely that theism becomes an irrational and uncomfortable position. If it is found that his objections have reasonable replies, theism rationally stands. This paper will attempt to reasonably reply to such objections thereby concluding that McCloskey is mistaken and theism can still be maintained as both rational and comforting. There are three substantial objections against theism found in “On Being an Atheist.” The first is the objection to a necessary being. The lack of indisputable examples of design or purpose in the world serves as McCloskey’s second objection. The final objection rests in the problem of pain or evil. The problem of evil pervades McCloskey’s objections. It directly effects all other argument objections. For this reason it will be examined first. The final two objections, that of faith as irrational and theism uncomfortable, are dependent on the validity of the other objections. When reasonable replies are given to the three main objections, these final two objections will dissolve as well.McCloskey stresses that every argument requires looking at “the world as it is.” He identifies the world as having the philosophical problem of evil by acknowledging that something is truly wrong in it. This wrong is the evil of avoidable suffering by innocent humans. McCloskey concludes that it is not logically possible for an all perfect being to create a world in which innocent humans experience avoidable suffering. He breezes through seven common replies to his objection, giving quick though meaningful objections to these responses. The seventh objection, regarding free will, is given the most attention. Only one reply, shown to be logically possible, is needed to refute the assertion that the existence of evil contradicts the existence of an all-powerful, morally perfect God. Starting with free will, McCloskey makes the statement, “theists cannot consistently argue that free will and necessitation to virtue are incompatible, for they represent God himself as possessing a free will and as being incapable of acting immorally.” This is an interesting and difficult point, especially in light of the biblical new heaven and new earth which contains human agents who are made perfect, free from sin. The question here would be whether or not these humans still retain free will. Additionally, the Christian theist will state that God did in fact create beings in the Garden of Eden which were created sinless and remained sinless until their first sinful choice. In this view, God created a non-evil being with presumably the potential not to sin as well as the potential to sin. It is stated that evil and suffering were not a part of the world until their choice to sin. In other words, the “world as it was” contained no evil and human beings contained no evil. The question of free will still remains, but seems implicit within the story. The objection to the incompatibility of free will and necessitation to virtue seems to be valid. If we assume this as valid, the theist may still reply. Just because God could have created free creatures that always choose the right, does this mean God ought to have? If we take McCloskey’s argument of omnipotence in a different direction we find that it necessitates that God could have also created free creatures who do not always choose the right. In this case, the objection centers on the characteristic of moral perfection. McCloskey’s assumption is that a morally perfect being would not, and by nature could not, create beings with the potential for moral imperfection. Perhaps McCloskey’s understanding of moral perfection is not accurate. It may be that the goodness of suffering or evil transcends our ability to determine its worth. Perhaps a morally perfect being would be justified in creating beings with the potential for evil and a world with the potential for unnecessary suffering. This would refute the idea that good is necessarily opposed to evil. Perhaps a morally perfect being allows moral imperfection for a purpose. In this way it is possible that a good being doesn’t always eliminate evil. According to the soul-making theodicy, God allows evils in order for beings to develop virtues otherwise unobtainable. In essence God could have created free creatures that always choose the right, but he did not have to in order to be consistent in moral perfection.However, the assumption that “complete virtue is compatible with the possession of free will” is not irrefutable. Manis argues that McCloskey’s type of objection may not be sound. In taking a libertarian view of freedom, one in which individuals are exclusively responsible for a genuinely free choice, it may be that there is a “logically possible world that God cannot actualize.” This would not be contradictory to omnipotence, because omnipotence applies only to what is logically possible. In addition to this, the free-will theodicy states that without such moral dilemma choices human beings could not be truly morally responsible agents capable of freely loving. It is important to note that McCloskey’s objection to God from the problem of evil argument only stands if there is indeed an objective reality of good and evil that exist independent of self and society. If there is no objective good or evil, then evil cannot exist. Evil becomes an experience to each individual or society and does not actually say anything about the world as we know it. The world as we know it would in essence be just as it should be, morally perfect. Thus the argument would fail to disprove God. It is only when good and evil are objective truths defined by something other than the universe that the problem of evil can be presented. When objective truths are recognized, then the moral argument for theism shows that theism is logically plausible. The question of free will still remains and McCloskey questions the value of created free will as opposed to the value of being a robot free of pain and suffering. Regardless of this, the problem of evil can has two possible logical replies. Free will and the value of it do not have to be proven for these replies to be logically plausible. It is enough that they are possible. Therefore, McCloskey’s objection that evil in the world is logically incompatible with theism is refuted. Removing the problem of pain from McCloskey’s objection to the cosmological argument removes the most compelling reason to reject the argument. It leaves only the objection to a necessary being. McCloskey states, “The mere existence of the world constitutes no reason for believing in the existence of such a being.” He does not think the cause must be necessary, only that the cause must be equal to the effect produced, the world as we know it. He refrains from defining what the cause is. The problem with the idea that the world only requires a cause sufficient enough to create it is that it merely switches the focus from the world and to the cause that produces the world. McCloskey tells us that he seeks to avoid an infinite regress of causes, but his argument does give sufficient reason to believe that the cause that produced the world avoids this infinite regress of causes. There are only two ways to make this statement but McCloskey doesn’t postulate either one. As Manis points out the objection to the existence of a necessary being can be made in two ways. First, contingent beings might not have a cause. Second, that there is an infinite series of contingent beings. However this view is lacking in explanation. In either of these, there is no final conclusion as to why a contingent being or the series itself exists. If this is McCloskey’s meaning, then he is stating that there can be no ultimate explanation thereby denying the principle of sufficient reason. The cause of the universe must be necessary or else it is illogical. It may be rational to conclude that the cause of the universe is not theism (in that matter itself or something else may be necessarily existent) but not that it is uncaused or unnecessary. A necessary cause is required. While the cosmological argument does not “entitle” us to conclude theism, it is nevertheless reasonable and logically consistent to do so.McCloskey’s objection to teleological and design arguments must also be looked at. He rejects the idea that there is evidence of design and purpose in the universe. He states first that there must be “genuine indisputable examples of design” in order to make such arguments. Secondly, he rejects that such examples occur in light of evolution. Finally he states that theism cannot be logically accomplished from these arguments, if valid, in light of the problem of evil. This last objection being refuted turns attention to his first two objections. Do the teleological and design arguments in fact require indisputable examples of design and purpose? Is it possible that the arguments can be made with disputable examples of design and purpose? The argument can reasonably be made from plausibility. Even if what appears to be design can be disputed, design is still be possible. In order for it not to be a possible argument, the disputer must irrefutably show a lack of design and purpose. There are clear design examples that are unanswerable from either position. Therefore apparent design is still plausibly true design. The design argument is still reasonable, just not proven. Thus it is restated that individual arguments don’t have to be proved, they just have to be plausible. It is not reasonable or necessary for McCloskey to preface these arguments with such a premise.Considering examples though, we have numerous strong examples of design in irreducible complexity. The eye is just such an example. The complexity and function of the eye makes the design and purpose highly plausible. A committed naturalist, while not being able to scientifically refute such examples, may still logically explain order by evolution.” Even if evolution is assumed to be true, does this negate design or the need for a designer? Is it not possible that evolution itself is the means that God, the designer of evolution, used to produce the universe? It is definitely rationally plausible. Indeed the laws of nature make design and purpose highly plausible. Manis shows that only way to refute this is to claim that there is an infinite number of actual universes, each with different physical laws and constants. Being that there is no empirical evidence for such a statement, it can only be a possible, not proven, conclusion. Yet even in this possibility, the naturalist must also answer the fine-tuning argument. Why is it that this universe is fit for life? Thus the possibility of a designer cannot be decisively refuted and the design and teleological arguments retain their merit. Thus there are successful replies to McCloskey’s three main objections. The cosmological argument remains to show that the universe must have a necessary and powerful cause. Likewise, the teleological/design arguments continue to show that it is highly plausible that there is an intelligent and personal designer of the universe. While these arguments do not prove theism, theism is certainly consistent with their conclusions. As other arguments are added, such as the moral argument, theism gains in strength as the best explanation for the nature and reality of the universe. As mentioned previously, McCloskey’s final two objections also dissolve. Faith remains reasonable. Theism can be comforting and not as McCloskey states, “a source of concern, dismay, and anxiety.” Even so, McCloskey’s thesis is that atheism is a comfortable position.Is this a consistent position for an atheist to claim? William Lane Craig comments that the personal and universal threat of non-being for an atheist is one of fear and unbearable sadness.The life of an atheist can have no ultimate meaning, value, purpose. He must hold to this to be consistent within his atheistic position. All humans and the entire universe will cease to be. The atheist maintains that there is no design or purpose. Therefore, ultimately, it makes no difference if the universe or mankind exists or how it exists or why it exists. It does not matter how one lives. There is no purpose. There can be no moral values. No judgments should be made of any kind. Rape, slavery, racism, or suffering has no objective or ultimate value of any kind. Personal and societal opinions have no real consequence. All things must be permitted and what’s left is the misery of an absurd existence brought about and ended equally in chaos and chance. McCloskey states that the solution to this is to live self-reliantly in such a way that demands we give comfort and help to each other.But is this consistent? What comfort or encouragement can the atheist be required give others? Why should he? Is such comfort and help giving consistent with an atheistic moral-less existence? There is no basis for it. How can comfort come from such a view? Man cannot live comfortably within a universe void of moral values, purpose, and meaning which will ultimately cease to be. These are the very things that generate safety, encouragement, and joy. While atheism may be a logical possibility, the implications of such a view are tragic. Man cannot live consistently and comfortably within them. Does not this inconsistency and unhappiness in itself cast doubt upon atheism? Theism, being shown rationally possible, is also shown to be rationally consistent with comfort. Profound sadness, though, is experienced when one considers the implications “On Being an Atheist.” Bibliography ADDIN EN.REFLIST Craig, William Lane. Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics. 3rd ed. Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2008.Manis, R. Zachary. Philosophy of Religion. 2nd ed. Contours of Christian Philosophy, ed. C. Stephen Evans. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2009.McCloskey, H.J. "On Being an Atheist." Question 1 (1968): 62-69. ................
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