SUPREME COURT, STATE OF COLORADO



SUPREME COURT, STATE OF COLORADO 9:00 a.m.

Oral Argument: Tuesday, December 5, 2006 EN BANC

Bailiff: Susan Curtis

06SA106 ( 1 HOUR)

|CONCERNING THE APPLICATION FOR WATER RIGHTS OF LOGAN WELL USERS, INC.|))))|For the Opposers/Appellants, Centennial Water and Sanitation |

|IN LOGAN, MORGAN, WASHINGTON, AND SEDGWICK COUNTIES. |))))|District, City of Boulder and Pawnee Well Users, Inc.: |

| |))))|Veronica A. Sperling |

|Opposers/Appellants: |))))|Brian A. Knutsen |

| |) |Moses, Wittemyer, Harrison and Woodruff, P.C. |

|CENTENNIAL WATER AND SANITATION DISTRICT, CITY OF BOULDER; PAWNEE |) | |

|WELL USERS, INC.; LIDDLE DITCH COMPANY; THE HARMONY DITCH COMPANY; |) |For the Opposers/Appellants, Liddle Ditch Company, Harmony Ditch |

|and THE NORTH STERLING IRRIGATION DISTRICT, |) |Company, and North Sterling Irrigation District: |

| |) |Timothy R. Buchanan |

|v. |) |Alan E. Curtis |

| |) |Timothy R. Buchanan, P.C. |

|Applicant/Appellee: |) | |

| |) |For Opposers/Appellees, Harold (Hal) D. Simpson, State Engineer; |

|LOGAN WELL USERS, INC., |) |and James (Jim) R. Hall, Division Engineer for Water Division 1: |

| |) |John W. Suthers |

|and |) |Attorney General |

| |) |Paul L. Benington |

|Opposers/Appellees: |) |Assistant Attorney General |

| |) |Alexandra L. Davis |

|HAROLD (HAL) D. SIMPSON, State Engineer; JAMES (JIM) R. HALL, |) |Assistant Attorney General |

|Division Engineer for Water Division 1; CITY OF STERLING; THE |) |Natural Resources and Environment Section |

|HENRYLYN IRRIGATION DISTRICT; IRRIGATIONISTS’ ASSOCIATION, WATER |) | |

|DISTRICT 1; CITY OF AURORA, acting by and through its Utilities |) |Entry of Appearances Only |

|Enterprise; PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO d/b/a EXCEL ENERGY; |) |For Opposers/Appellee, City of Aurora: |

|BIJOU IRRIGATION COMPANY; BIJOU IRRIGATION DISTRICT; SOUTH PLATTE |) |Steven O. Sims |

|DITCH COMPANY; THE FARMERS RESERVOIR AND IRRIGATION COMPANY; TIM |) |John A. Helfrich |

|COOK; EAST CHERRY CREEK VALLEY WATER & SANITATION DISTRICT; |) |Brownstein Hyatt & Farber, P.C. |

|ACCOMASSO BROTHERS; THE UNITED WATER AND SANITATION DISTRICT; |) | |

|PIONEER WATER AND IRRIGATION, INC.; FARMERS’ PAWNEE CANAL COMPANY; |) | |

|LARRY B. FOILES; DAVE KAUTZ; CHARLIE BARTLETT; GORDON STUMPF; BRYAN |) | |

|DERMER; DOROTHY HELMUT; HOWARD HETTINGER; RUSTY SMITH; RONNIE QUINT; |) | |

|JIM QUINT; CHRIS VANDEMOER; and PARKER WATER AND SANITATION DISTRICT.|) | |

| |) | |

| |) |Cont’d on to next page |

| |) |06SA106 |

| |) |Cont’d from previous page |

| |) | |

| |) |For Applicant/Appellees, Logan Well Users, Inc.: |

| |) |Kim R. Lawrence |

| |) |Kelly J. Custer |

| |) |Lind, Lawrence & Ottenhoff, LLP |

| |) | |

| |) | |

Appeal from the District Court, Water Division 1, 03CW195

Docketed: April 6, 2006

At Issue: October 10, 2006

ISSUE(S):

Did the water judge err in refusing to answer the questions of law posed in the Rule 56(h), C.R.C.P., motion regarding how the State Engineer is to administer the plan for augmentation?

Does § 37-92-305(8), C.R.S., authorize the State Engineer to curtail out-of-priority diversions under a decreed plan for augmentation when the plan is being operated in compliance with all of the terms and conditions of the decree?

Does § 37-92-305 (8), C.R.S., authorize the State Engineer to allow out-of-priority diversions under a decreed plan for augmentation when the plan is not being operated in compliance with all of the terms and conditions of the decree?

______________________________________________________________________________

Oral Argument: Tuesday, December 5, 2006 10:00 a.m.

EN BANC

05SC646 ( 1 HOUR)

|Petitioner: |))))|For the Petitioner: |

| |))))|Douglas K. Wilson |

|CARLOS FLETCHER, |))))|Colorado State Public Defender |

| |) |Tracy C. Renner |

|v. | |Deputy State Public Defender |

| | | |

|Respondent: | |For the Respondent: |

| | |John W. Suthers |

|THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO. | |Attorney General |

| | |Matthew D. Grove |

| | |Assistant Attorney General |

| | |Appellate Division |

| | |Criminal Justice Section |

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals, 03CA0154

Docketed: October 11, 2005

At Issue: October 17, 2006

ISSUE(S):

Whether evidence of an alleged victim’s virginity in a sexual assault trial is inadmissible character evidence pursuant to C.R.E. 404(a)(2), inadmissible because it is irrelevant pursuant to C.R.E. 402, or unfairly prejudicial pursuant to C.R.E. 403.

Whether evidence of an alleged victim’s virginity constitutes “prior sexual conduct,” that is presumptively irrelevant and inadmissible under Colorado’s Rape Shield Statute, section 18-3-407(1), C.R.S. (2005), and whether the proponent of such evidence must comply with the notice and hearing provisions of the statute.

___________________________________ _________________________________________

Oral Argument: Tuesday, December 5, 2006 11:00 a.m.

EN BANC

06SA213 ( 1 HOUR)

|In re: |))))|(Plaintiffs and Petitioners filed combined briefs) |

| |))))|For the Plaintiffs and Petitioners, the Board of County |

|Plaintiffs and Petitioners: |))))|Commissioners of the County of San Miguel: |

| |))))|Steven J. Zwick |

|THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF SAN MIGUEL, THE |)) |Rebekah S. King |

|COALITION OF CONCERNED SAN MIGUEL COUNTY HOMEOWNERS, HANS (HENSON) |) | |

|JONES, THE WILSON MESA HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, AND PTARMIGAN RANCH |) |For the Plaintiffs and Petitioners, The Coalition of the |

|OWNERS ASSOCIATION, |) |Concerned San Miguel County Homeowners, Hans (Henson) Jones, The|

| |) |Wilson Mesa Homeowners Association, and the Ptarmigan Ranch |

|v. |) |Owners Association: |

| |) |David S. Neslin |

|Defendants and Respondents: |) |Harris D. Sherman |

| |) |Arnold & Porter, LLP |

|THE COLORADO PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, COMMISSIONER GREGORY E. |) | |

|SOPKIN, COMMISSIONER POLLY PAGE, COMMISSIONER CARL MILLER, FORMER |) |For the Defendants and Respondents, Colorado Public Utilities |

|COMMISSIONER JIM DYER, TRI-STATE GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION |) |Commision, Commissioner Gregory E. Sopkin, Commissioner Polly |

|ASSOCIATION, INC., AND THE BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE | |Page, Commissioner Carl Miller and Former Commission Jim Dyer: |

|COUNTY OF MONTROSE. | |John W. Suthers |

| | |Attorney General |

| | |David A. Beckett |

| | |Assistant Attorney General |

| | |Business and Licensing Section |

Original Proceeding, District Court, San Miguel County, 05CV79

Docketed: June 30, 2006

At Issue: September 7, 2006

ISSUE(S):

Whether the district court’s order requiring the PUC to add the memoranda prepared by its advisors to the record on judicial review, which memoranda were not evidence submitted in the PUC’s adjudicatory proceeding, violated the controlling statutes (namely §§ 40-6-113(6) and 40-6-115, C.R.S.) and constitutes an abuse of discretion for which immediate review is appropriate.

_____________________________________________________________________________

SUPREME COURT, STATE OF COLORADO 9:00 a.m.

Oral Argument: Wednesday, December 6, 2006 EN BANC

Bailiff: Jason Astle

05SC762 ( 1 HOUR)

|Petitioner: |))))|For the Petitioner: |

| |))))|Eric A. Samler |

|MIGUEL TRIMBLE, |))))|Hollis A. Whitson |

| |) |Samler and Whitson, P.C. |

|v. | | |

| | | |

|Respondent: | |For the Respondent: |

| | |John W. Suthers |

|THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO. | |Attorney General |

| | |Patricia R. Van Horn |

| | |Assistant Attorney General |

| | |Appellate Division |

| | |Criminal Justice Section |

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals, 03CA0647

Docketed: November 3, 2005

At Issue: October 24, 2006

ISSUE(S):

Whether the court of appeals erred in reviewing for plain error petitioner’s Confrontation Clause issues raised under Crawford v. Washington when the petitioner raised a contemporaneous general hearsay objection, he raised the confrontation issues at the close of the People’s case, and Crawford had not been issued at the time the hearsay was admitted.

Whether an excited utterance made to a police officer investigating a crime by a non-testifying declarant witness can be deemed testimonial hearsay under Crawford v. Washington.

______________________________________________________________________________

Oral Argument: Wednesday, December 6, 2006 10:00 a.m.

EN BANC

06SC26 ( 1/2 HOUR)

|Petitioner: |))))|For the Petitioner: |

| |))))|John W. Suthers |

|THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, |))))|Attorney General |

| |) |Cheryl Hone |

| | |Assistant Attorney General |

|v. | |Appellate Division |

| | |Criminal Justice Section |

| | | |

|Respondent: | | |

| | |For the Respondent: |

|QUENTIN LOBIN MORENO. | |Theodore P. McClintock |

| | |Elizabeth A. McClintock |

| | |McClintock & McClintock, P.C. |

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals, 04CA0074

Docketed: January 10, 2006

At Issue: September 26, 2006

ISSUE(S):

Whether a defendant whose offense traumatizes his victim so badly that she is unable to testify against him at trial thereby forfeits his Sixth Amendment right to confront that witness at trial.

_____________________________________________________________________________

Oral Argument: Wednesday, December 6, 2006 10:30 a.m.

EN BANC

06SC471 ( 1 HOUR)

|Petitioners: |))))|For the Petitioners: |

| |))))|Leslie A. Eaton |

|TRAVERLERS CASUALTY COMPANY OF CONNECTICUT and TRAVELERS CASUALTY AND|))))|Jon Bernhardt |

|SURETY COMPANY, | |Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP |

| | | |

|v. | | |

| | | |

|Respondent: | | |

| | |For the Respondent: |

|VILLAGE HOMES OF COLORADO, INC., a Colorado corporation. | |Bradley A. Levin |

| | |Jeremy A. Sitcoff |

| | |Roberts Levin & Patterson, P.C. |

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals, 04CA1396

Docketed: July 26, 2006

At Issue: November 30, 2006

ISSUE(S):

Whether the court of appeals erred in not following the precedent of Browder v.

U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 893 P.2d 132 (Colo. 1995), which holds that coverage under a liability insurance policy is not triggered by a third-party property damage claim against an insured brought by a third-party claimant who acquired the property after the expiration of the insurance policy.

Whether the court of appeals erred in determining that coverage is available under a liability insurance policy for third-party claims brought against an insured by third-party claimants who did not suffer any actual harm during the policy period.

_____________________________________________________________________________

SUPREME COURT, STATE OF COLORADO 9:00 a.m.

Oral Argument: Thursday, December 7, 2006 EN BANC

Bailiff: Teri Scott

04SA218 ( 2 HOURS)

|Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee: |))))|For the Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee: |

| |))))|Philip A. Cherner |

|NATHAN DUNLAP, |))))|and |

| |) |Michael Heher |

|v. |) | |

| | | |

|Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant: | |For the Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant: |

| | |John W. Suthers |

|THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO. | |Attorney General |

| | |Paul Koehler |

| | |Appellate Division |

| | |Criminal Justice Section |

Appeal from the District Court, Arapahoe County, 93CR2071

Docketed: July 9, 2004

At Issue: September 22, 2006

ISSUE(S):

Whether Mr. Dunlap was denied his right to counsel in connection with his trial counsel’s prior representation of a State witness?

Whether defense counsel’s production of evidence against Mr. Dunlap and his failure to object to that evidence to object to that evidence violated Mr. Dunlap’s right to counsel?

Whether counsel’s failure to present available mitigation evidence on the pivotal issue of future dangerousness was ineffective assistance of counsel?

Whether counsel’s incompetent performance prejudiced Mr. Dunlap?

Whether the cumulative effect of instances of substandard performance by trial counsel was prejudicial?

Whether the 35C court’s reliance on evidence of Mr. Dunlap’s statements during the State Hospital commitment and the fruits thereof violated numerous of his Constitutional and statutory rights?

issues continued on next page

04SA218

issues continued from previous page

Whether the 35C court’s consideration of evidence of custodial statements of the accused to law enforcement agents was error where the State made no effort to show compliance with Miranda or that the statements were voluntary?

Whether the 35C Court erroneously considered jail worker Stuart’s testimony?

Whether the 35C Court’s reliance on improperly-admitted “lay opinion” testimony of State Hospital nurses and technicians was error?

Whether the capital sentencing scheme applied in this case under C.R.S. § 16-11-103 violates the Constitutions?

Whether the instructions and verdict forms which required that the jurors be “convinced” and that they must affirmatively find that life imprisonment was the “appropriate punishment” before voting for a life sentence were erroneous?

Whether the ‘burdenless burdens’ in the capital sentencing process and the instructions which effectively put the burden and risk of non-persuasion on the accused, violated the Constitutions and C.R.S. § 16-11-103?

Whether retroactive application of the ‘burdenless burdens’ announced in People v. White, 870 P.2d 424 (Colo. 1994) violated due process?

Whether the retroactive application of the capital sentencing scheme announced in People v. Dunlap, 975 P.2d 723 (Colo. 1999) violated the due process and cruel and unusual punishment clauses?

Whether Mr. Dunlap was denied effective assistance of counsel by his counsel’s opening statements at the sentencing trial and trial on the charges?

Whether Mr. Dunlap was denied his right to counsel by defense counsel’s sentencing closing argument, and whether the 35C Court’s finding that the arguments were appropriate because the jurors were controlled by powerful emotions shows that Mr. Dunlap was denied due process, a fair trial by impartial jury and his eighth amendment rights?

Whether there was evidence to support the finding of the “prior conviction” aggravating factor?

Whether the trial court’s sua sponte instruction on six aggravating factors not alleged by the State violated the Constitutions and the Order requiring the State to disclose aggravating factors before trial?

Whether the instructions’ misstatement of the third step of the sentencing process violated C.R.S. § 16-13-103 and the constitutions, as did the instruction that there was no presumption of innocence at the eligibility stage?

issues continued on next page

04SA218

issues continued from previous page

Whether the District Attorney should have been disqualified, the death sentence should have been vacated, and the stolen records and the testimony of the State’s Complicitor should have been suppressed, due to the District Attorney’s theft of Mr. Dunlap’s medical records?

Whether the trial court erroneously excused jurors due to supposed opposition to the death penalty, and whether it applied incorrect legal standards and inquiries in doing so?

Whether Mr. Dunlap was denied a fair trial by impartial jury by the denial of challenges for cause, and whether he was denied his right to counsel by trial counsel’s failure to exhaust peremptory challenges and failure to excuse four jurors who had been challenged for cause?

Whether the conviction of attempted felony murder was void since there is no such crime, and whether the sentencers’ consideration of the non-existent offense violated the Constitutions?

Whether the trial court’s refusal to inquire of the jurors after learning that alternate jurors had emotionally congratulated the jurors on the guilty verdicts, complete with hugs, and that the jurors and alternates had “discussed the case” after the verdicts, and that the jury had discussed the ‘Burger King’ case before deliberations, violated Harper v. People, 817 P.2d 77 (Colo. 1991) and the Constitutions?

Whether allowing the State to present false testimony in order to bolster the credibility of an important witness, and refusing to allow Mr. Dunlap to cross-examine the witness on important aspects of his testimony, violated the Constitutions?

Whether the jury instructions at the guilt/innocence phase were erroneous in ways that directly impacted the death sentence?

Whether defense counsel’s stipulation to gang affiliation evidence and raising of the “gear gang” incident were ineffective assistance of counsel?

Cross Appeal Issues:

Whether defendants who make postconviction attacks and then appeal the rejection of those attacks face substantial burdens.

Whether defendants who attack the effectiveness of their trial counsel face high burdens, especially in connection with attacks on counsel’s strategic and tactical decision making.

Whether Mr. Lewis did not represent Dunlap under the influence of a conflict of interest (Dunlap’s Arguments 1 and 2).

Whether counsel was not ineffective for deciding not to present evidence about the security features at the Colorado State Penitentiary (Dunlap’s Argument 3).

issues continued on next page

04SA218

issues continued from previous page

Whether the trial court erred in determining that Mr. Lewis made deficient strategic decisions concerning the investigation and presentation of penalty phase evidence about Dunlap’s mental state. However, the record does support its findings that Dunlap suffered no prejudice because of that performance (People’s Cross-Appeal Argument 1; Dunlap’s Arguments 4 and 5).

A. Defense counsel was faced with substantial evidence that Dunlap malingered and committed other bad acts while undergoing a competency evaluation at the state hospital.

B. The trial court found that defense counsel provided Dunlap with deficient performance concerning the investigation and presentation of “double-edged” penalty phase mitigation evidence about Dunlap’s mental health.

C. The trial court’s findings of fact about the “double-edged” nature of Dunlap’s alleged mitigation evidence, and the breadth of the mitigation investigation conducted, negate its deficient performance conclusion (People’s Cross-Appeal Argument 1).

D. The trial court’s no-prejudice finding is supported by its findings of fact and the correct legal standards.

Whether the trial court erred in determining that Mr. Lewis’ decision not to object to a single sentence of the prosecution’s closing argument constituted deficient performance (People’s Cross-Appeal Argument 2).

Whether the statements Dunlap made during his state hospital competency evaluation, and his actions there, were not involuntary. The trial court properly considered them at the postconviction hearing because the claims Dunlap made—and his own experts’ testimony—opened the door to them (Dunlap’s Arguments 6, 7, and 8).

Whether the trial court did not abuse it discretion in considering evidence from the state hospital staff members who testified as lay witnesses about their observations of Dunlap’s behavior, and their opinions of that behavior based on comparisons with the behavior of other state hospital patients (Dunlap’s Argument 9).

Whether Dunlap’s attack on § 16-11-103, C.R.S. (1993 Supp.), is successive (Dunlap’s 10).

Whether penalty phase jury instructions 14 and 24 did not require the jury to find that life was the “appropriate” sentence for Dunlap’s crimes before it could impose that sentence. The verdict form said nothing improper by using the phrase “appropriate punishment” in referring to the jury’s sentencing decision (Dunlap’s Argument 11).

Whether the trial court correctly did not give “presumption of life” instructions. Neither this court’s decision in People v. White, nor Colorado’s capital sentencing procedures which impose no burden of proof in steps three and four of the sentencing process, violate ex post facto or due process (Dunlap’s Arguments 12 and 13).

issues continued on next page

04SA218

issues continued from previous page

Whether this court’s decision in Dunlap I did not violate due process or ex post facto (Dunlap’s Argument 14).

Whether trial counsels’ guilt and penalty phase opening statements were not ineffective (Dunlap’s Argument 15).

Whether Mr. Lewis was not ineffective in his penalty phase closing argument (Dunlap’s Argument 16).

Whether sufficient evidence supports the jury’s penalty phase aggravating factor finding that Dunlap had a prior felony conviction for a class 2 felony (Dunlap’s Argument 17).

Whether the trial court did not instruct the jury on aggravating factors not alleged by the prosecution (Dunlap’s Argument 18).

Whether the instructions and verdict forms adequately informed the jury of its penalty phase step three decision (Dunlap’s Argument 19).

Whether the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dunlap’s motion to recuse the prosecution from the postconviction proceedings (Dunlap’s Argument 20).

Whether the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting prosecution challenges for cause (Dunlap’s Argument 21).

A. Defendants face substantial burdens when they attack trial court rulings that granted prosecution challenges for cause.

B. The trial court did not mislead the venire during the jury selection process on the standards for sentencing a defendant to death.

C. The trial court devised and employed extensive procedures for the jury selection process that were fair to both parties.

D. The appellate record supports the trial court’s exclusion of jurors because of beliefs they held opposing the death penalty.

1. Prospective juror M.

2. Prospective juror S.

3. Prospective juror E.

4. Prospective juror D.

5. Prospective juror T.

6. Prospective juror M.

7. Prospective juror H.

8. Prospective juror J.

9. Prospective juror A.

10. Prospective juror G.

issues continued on next page

04SA218

issues continued from previous page

Whether Dunlap’s complaints concerning the trial court’s denial of his challenges for cause are waived. The defense team was not ineffective in its jury selection representation of Dunlap. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense challenges for cause (Dunlap’s Argument 22).

A. Dunlap’s complaints are waived because the defense team was satisfied with the jury chosen and did not need to exercise all of its available peremptory challenges.

B. Dunlap must demonstrate more than five erroneous denials of challenges for cause before he can deserve a new trial.

C. Defendants face substantial burdens when they attack trial court denials of their challenges for cause.

D. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense challenges for cause.

1. Juror C.

2. Alternate juror M.

3. Alternate juror P.

4. Prospective juror H.

5. Prospective juror W.

6. Prospective juror M.

7. Prospective juror McC.

8. Prospective juror L.

9. Prospective juror S.

10. Prospective juror W.

Whether a void conviction was not used to sentence Dunlap to death (Dunlap’s Argument 23).

Whether the trial court fully and appropriately addressed the juror misconduct issue (Dunlap’s Argument 24).

Whether Dunlap’s complaint concerning Carl Wilson’s polygraph test results is successive (Dunlap’s Argument 25).

Whether none of Dunlap’s guilt phase instruction challenges reflect error, let alone plain error (Dunlap’s Argument 26).

A. Guilt phase instruction 1.

B. Guilt phase instructions 2 and 13.

Whether defense counsel was not ineffective for stipulating to the admission of evidence about Dunlap’s involvement in gang-related activity (Dunlap’s Argument 27).

______________________________________________________________________________

Oral Argument: Thursday, December 7, 2006 11:00 a.m.

EN BANC

06SA211 ( 1/2 HOUR)

|In re: |))))|For the Petitioners: |

| |))))|Brad R. Irwin |

|Plaintiffs: |))))|Chris L. Ingold |

| |))))|Asher M.B. Ritmiller |

|PASCUAL HERNANDEZ; GLORIA SMITH; JANET HERNANDEZ; MIKE HERNANDEZ; |) |Irwin & Boesen, P.C. |

|ANTHONY HERNANDEZ; RALPH HERNANDEZ; ANNETTE TERRONES and CHRIS | | |

|CAULDWELL, | | |

| | | |

|v. | | |

| | | |

|Defendants: | | |

| | | |

|SAMUEL W. DOWNING, IV, M.D. and PARKVIEW MEDICAL CENTER. | |For the Respondent Parkview Medical Center: |

| | |Barbara H. Glogiewicz |

| | |Ronald H. Nemirow |

| | |Kennedy Childs & Fogg, P.C. |

Original Proceeding, District Court, Prowers County, 05CV64

Docketed: June 28, 2006

At Issue: September 25, 2006

ISSUE(S):

Whether the special procedures created by the Colorado Wrongful Death Statute supersede the Rules of Civil Procedure and prevent severance of claims based on a change of venue.

Whether an analysis of joinder should precede an analysis of venue when the facts of the case interrelate the defendants.

______________________________________________________________________________

SUPREME COURT, STATE OF COLORADO 8:45 a.m.

Oral Argument: Monday, December 11, 2006 EN BANC

Bailiff: Judd Choate

Courts in the Community

Gateway High School

Aurora, Colorado

05SC816 ( 1 HOUR)

|Petitioners: |))))|For the Petitioner: |

| |))))|Robert R. Duncan |

|DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, and REGIONAL |))))|Donald M. Ostrander |

|TRANSPORTATION DISTRICT, a political subdivision of the State of |))) |James Birch (Special Counsel) |

|Colorado, | |Duncan, Ostrander & Dingess, P.C. |

| | | |

|v. | |For CDOT Only: |

| | |John W. Suthers |

|Respondent: | |Attorney General |

| | |Office of the Attorney General |

|MARILYN HICKEY MINISTRIES d/b/a HAPPY CHURCH. | | |

| | |For the Respondent: |

| | |Leslie A. Fields |

| | |John R. Sperber |

| | |Faegre & Benson, LLP |

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals, 04CA0928

Docketed: November 18, 2005

At Issue: August 15, 2006

ISSUE(S):

Whether the court of appeals erred in ruling that the landowner in this case, whose property is being taken by eminent domain for a State transportation project, has a cognizable right to damages for the impairment of passing motorists’ view of the landowner’s property.

______________________________________________________________________________

Oral Argument: Monday, December 11, 2006 10:25 a.m.

EN BANC

06SC21 ( 1 HOUR)

|Petitioner: |))))|For the Petitioner: |

| |))))|Shawn Gillum |

|GLENN TURBYNE, |))))|William W. Hood, III |

| |) |Blain D. Myhre |

|v. |) |Isaacson Rosenbaum, P.C. |

| | | |

|Respondent: | | |

| | |For the Respondent: |

|THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO. | |Carol Chambers |

| | |Arapahoe County District Attorney |

| | |Paul Wolff |

| | |Chief Deputy District Attorney |

| | |Jacob Edson |

| | |Deputy District Attorney |

Certiorari to the District Court, Arapahoe County, 05CV3705

Docketed: January 6, 2006

At Issue: September 6, 2006

ISSUE(S):

Whether the district court erred when it reversed the county court and ruled that good cause for noncompliance with a driver’s request for a blood test under the Express Consent Law means a factual situation that the officer did not create, rather than the law enforcement system as a whole.

Whether the district court erred when it engaged in a de novo review of the operative facts to find an exceptional circumstance that it concluded amounted to good cause for noncompliance with petitioner’s request for a blood test and Colorado’s Express Consent Law.

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