Yola



Conflict in Europe 1935 – 1945

Growth of European tensions

Dictatorships in Germany and Italy

The European conflict that broke out with the German invasion of Poland in September 1939 was linked to the grievances expressed by Hitler and Mussolini about the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. Hitler created a personal persona around his avowed “mission” to recue to German people from the shame of WW1 and to free Germany from the restrictions imposed by the Treaty. In Mein Kampf, Hitler wrote that ‘Germany would be a world power, or there would be no Germany’. Mussolini pledged to restore Italy to its former Imperial glory. He wanted to build a new Roman empire. In 1935 he defied the League of Nations and invaded Abyssinia in North Africa.

▪ When Mussolini invaded Abyssinia, the democratic powers’ memories of the horrors of WW1 meant that their fear of another war outweighed the desire to enforce the Treaty of Versailles.

In 1933 Hitler had to improve a number of fields before he could go to war:

▪ Depended on a variety of imported raw materials

▪ Army had many units that were still under-equipped

▪ Short of munitions

▪ Navy was no match for Britain’s Royal Navy.

Hitler overcame this in a number ways. In 1935, Hitler reintroduced conscription, announced the creation of a German air force, and the expansion of the German army beyond the limit of 100 000 imposed by the Treaty. In opposition, the Italian economy could not meet the demands generated by Mussolini’s ambitions. The Italian economy could not sustain the effort required by a major war, because:

▪ Italian economy depended primarily on small-scale agriculture

▪ Relied heavily on imported raw materials

▪ 80% of Italy’s imports came passed British-controlled naval bases, which meant that Italy could easily be blockaded

▪ Much of Italy’s vital imports were carried by British ships before the war.

An awareness of this is likely to have influenced Mussolini’s caution in declaring war. Italy did not enter the conflict in Europe until the defeat of France was certain

Germany

• German foreign policy leading up to the war in 1939 was motivated by lebensraum (living space) and race (survival of the fittest)

• Hitler had 4 stages of foreign policy which were:

1. Revisionism: tearing up the treaty of Versailles, ending reparations, restoring military power, taking back stolen territories and re-establishing Germany’s place in Europe

2. Creation of Grossdeutschland: Uniting Germany and Austria (Anschluss) and bring back the Germans forced to live with inferior races

3. Autarky: economic self sufficiency, important for future expansion

4. France: once France was dealt with, Hitler could turn eastwards

• Hitler said what the other countries wanted to hear: I do not seek military dominance, only equality, Germany seeks a peaceful Europe and the German people demand only what was taken from them in 1919

• Germany’s foreign policy in action

– October 1933: Germany leaves the League of Nations, gives Hitler and the Germans freedom

– January 1934: Germany and Poland sign a 10 year Non-Aggression pact, highlights Germany peaceful intention, puts the Polish into a false sense of security and stops any possible Polish-Soviet pact

– March 1935: Reintroduction of Conscription and Britain and France take no action

– March 1936: Remilitarisation of the Rhineland, Germany’s strategic position is improved

– April 1937: Guernica, Bombed to nothing by German Aircraft

Italy

• Benito Mussolini became the Prime Minister of Italy on the 31st October 1922, and by 1929 he had set up a corporate state

• During the 1920’s they made significant economic and social gains such as: expansion in primary and secondary education, hydro-electric schemes and the Pontine Marshes near Rome were drained

• Mussolini had several foreign policy aims which were:

1. Military power: sought to pursue rearmament, conscription and military strength in a similar way to Hitler

2. Italian Empire: a revival of the glory of the Roman Empire, dreams of turning the Mediterranean Sea into an Italian lake

3. Major European power: desire for national glory and strength and was pursued for its own sake

• Mussolini fell under the influence of Hitler and Italy became the junior partner in the German Italian relationship

• Italy’s foreign policy in action

– October 1925: The Locarno Treaty, guarantees west European frontiers

– 1928: Abyssinian affairs, Mussolini signs a friendship treaty with Abyssinia

– April 1935: the Stresa Front, Britain, France and Italy form a common front against any future German aggression

– February 1937: Italy leaves the league of Nations

– May 1939: Pact of Steel, Italy and Germany sign an alliance

The League of Nations and collapse of collective security: Abyssinia, the Spanish Civil War

• Successes of the League of Nations: Yugoslavia ended its invasion of Albania in 1921 when threatened with international sanctions, a clash between Greece and Bulgaria in 1925 was ended with League intervention, dealing with the administration of the Saar and Danzig’, stateless refugees, health, transport and finance

• Failures of the League of Nations: Allied intervention in Russia in 1919 was ignored by the League, Italy ignored the League in 1923, the League failed to deal with issues outside of Europe and several issues were not allowed to be presented to the league such as: Allied debts, relations between Britain and Egypt, and between China and the great powers

• Reasons for the failure of the League of Nations

1. The League operated on the idea of ‘internationalism’, where all countries were focused on nationalism

2. The aim of disarmament was flawed as it called for disarmament level consistent with national safety. That level was interpreted as more than their neighbour

3. Countries did not want to be involved with conflict that had nothing to do with them

4. The League became seen as backing the interest of established powers

5. The League was only as strong as its members, this didn’t reflect the true world balance of power

Abyssinia

• 3rd October 1935, Italy launched a full scale attack on Abyssinia. The League of Nations attempted to the persuade Abyssinia to accept border changes.

• Both France and Britain chose not to take action against Italy as they were more concerned with possible German behaviour

• The League imposed a number of sanctions which were ineffective because: the Soviet Union and Germany helped Italy and Austria, Albania, Switzerland and Hungary refused to impose the sanction

• The impact of Abyssinia: proved the concept of collective security was dead, was the death of the Stresa front, encouraged Hitler that he could get away with acts of aggression, transformed Italy into Germany’s partner and the Hoare-Laval plan made it clear Britain and France would rather do deals with dictators

AJP Taylor: “this was the death blow to the League as well as to Abyssinia”

The Spanish Civil War

• Started July 1936, military officers revolted against the government. Tortures, massacres and civilian killings were common and were seen clearly by the bombing of Guernica in 1937

• Significance of the Spanish Civil War

– Consolidated the divisions within Europe which would play out in World War two, Germany and Italy backed the Nationalists. Britain and France were sympathetic to the Republics

– Italy’s junior status in the Axis partnership was highlighted, Germany provided much military equipment and had the opportunity to test out their air force

– Soviet assistance to the Republicans was distrusted

– Highlighted the incapacity of the League of Nations, Spain was seen as the rehearsal for a bigger conflict

AJP Taylor: ‘the international failure surrounding the War was a symptom of the failure of collective sec.’

Britain, France and the policy of appeasement: an assessment

• Appeasement had been in operation since 1919, Lloyd George sought the moderate the Treaty of Versailles realising the British economy needed a stable and prosperous Germany

• Factors behind appeasement:

1. The League of Nations and idea of collective security was dead

2. Britain armed forces were run down, British believed appeasement gave them the chance to rearm

3. Britain’s main partner was France who were faced with internal divisions and relied on the Maginot

4. Britain was preoccupied with domestic matters, unemployment was high

5. Dread of another war, new technology would make future wars worse

6. Hitler was admired by some in Britain, as he brought discipline to his country and provided defence against communism. His actions were viewed sympathetically

• Appeasement in action:

– October 1933: German rearmament, Germany played up the fear of communism

– March 1935: Germany introduces conscription, mild protest by Britain

– March 1938: Austria, Britain accepted ‘Anschluss’ as inevitable

– September 1938: The Czechoslovak Crisis, the Munich Conference. Hitler’s demand for the Sudetenland was given, for war to be avoided

• The Munich agreement was dissolved, once Germany took over the rest of Czechoslovakia and Mussolini annexed Albania.

• Invasion of Czech, March 1939: Policy of Appeasement came to an end in March 1939 – Hitler proceeded to take over rest of Czech. Western democracies realised Hitler could only be stopped by military force. Invasion of Poland 1939 – Britain + France declared war on Germany

• Historical opinion: historians continue to try and justify the policy of appeasement 1935-1938, immediate aftermath of war – appeasement regarded as ‘surrender in the face of Hitler’s blackmail’, view shared by number of wartime politicians including Winston Churchill. 1967 – New government documents available, view of Chamberlain and appeasement began to change, analysed in his internal context – historians discovered appeasement in fact a valid policy given the circumstances. *

David Dilks: “[Chamberlain believed that] Germany had a genuine case for revision of the Treaty of Versailles and fully understood that the possession of military strength was fundamental to a successful foreign policy.”

John Wheeler-Bennet: “[Chamberlain] failed to confront the moral issues inherent in negotiating with an openly aggressive dictator.”

Significance of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact

• Reasons why Hitler and Stalin signed a non-aggression pact

– Britain’s guarantee to Poland made war inevitable, Stalin hoped Hitler would exhaust himself against France and Britain

– A deal would give Stalin a share of Poland and provide security between Germany and Russia

– With Hitler busy in the west, Russia could consolidate and strengthen its forces

– The west could not be trusted: proven by Munich and Western vacillation in1939

– Fear of a two front war, the deal allowed Poland to be defeated quickly

– The Soviet Union could be dealt with once western nations were beaten

– The deal would stop Germany getting into the mess it had in July/August 1914

• Ribbentrop arrived in Moscow on the 23rd August 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union sign a ten year non-aggression pact. This was the green light to invading Poland

• Article 2 stated that if Germany or Russia were involved in a war with a third power, the other would not get involved

• Article 7 stated the agreement would take effect immediately

• Contained secret agreements which created Soviet and German influence such as Germany would receive western Poland and Lithuania and the Soviet Union would get Estonia, Latvia, Finland and Romania

Philip Bell: ‘the reasons for the pact were Britain’s distrust of Stalin and that Hitler was able to offer Stalin what he wanted immediately, where the British and French could offer nothing’

Richard Evans: ‘neither Hitler nor Stalin expected the pact to last however at the time it suited both Hitler and Stalin to drop their mutual distrust. Stalin avoided a war with the German’s and it offered long term prospects’

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