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Framing Opposition to Renewable Energy in U.S. StatesA Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of theRequirements of the Renée Crown University Honors Program atSyracuse UniversityMargaret K. FitzgeraldCandidate for Bachelor of Artsand Renée Crown University HonorsSpring 2020Honors Thesis in Political Science Thesis Advisor: Sarah Pralle, Associate Professor, Political ScienceThesis Reader: Sherburne Abbott, University Professor, GeographyHonors Director: Dr. Danielle Smith Abstract Public support for renewable energy is bipartisan and very high in the United States. While many states are making progress by implementing policies that encourage ambitious renewable energy targets, some states are moving backwards by lowering energy efficiency standards, providing fewer tax incentives for renewables, and continuing considerable subsidies to fossil fuel plants. How are some conservatives, corporations, coalitions, and private interest groups blocking and reversing renewable energy policy on the state and local level despite strong public support for utilizing renewable energy technology? This paper examines differences in strategies and framing that influence renewable energy policy rollbacks and blockages in the United States by analyzing and comparing two renewable energy policy case studies. Opposition groups largely play by-the-books, using strategies that are consistent with opposition to environmental policies over time. Opposition spending predominantly influences the success of special interests opposing a renewable energy policy. I argue that timing and a focus on institutional procedures determine the success or failure of renewable energy policies.Executive Summary Few scientists dispute the reality of climate change and the influence of human activities on the observed warming of the climate. As human activity pumps greenhouse gases into the atmosphere at a highly accelerated rate, average global surface temperature is rising, resulting in numerous and severe consequences to life on earth. In the United States, about 38 percent of greenhouse gas emissions come from the electricity sector, using fossil fuels like natural gas and coal (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 2019). Renewable energy presents an opportunity to shift energy usage away from carbon-intensive energy sources to significantly reduce U.S. greenhouse emissions, achieving a transition towards a more sustainable future while allowing for a strong economy to operate as usual. Transitioning the United States’ entire energy sector away from fossil fuels and towards renewable energy is essential to effectively mitigate climate change. Renewable energy has high public support in the United States. According to the Yale Program on Climate Change, 83% of adults in the U.S. support funding research into renewable energy sources and 81% of registered voters in the United States think the U.S. should use more renewable energy sources. Renewable energy is widely regarded as a partial solution to three important challenges: meeting the growing demand for energy, ensuring energy security, and reducing harmful air emissions (Bidwell, 2016). Despite this seemingly bipartisan public support, some conservatives, corporations, coalitions, and private interest groups are waging an influential war on clean energy. They have attempted to block renewable energy policies and projects, weaken state energy efficiency standards, decrease tax incentives for renewables, and maintain subsidies to fossil fuel plants in many states across the United States. States are vital actors in initiating and implementing renewable energy policies and projects, because they control of their electricity markets, mostly by Public Utility Commissions. Forty-three states have net energy metering policies that compensate individuals and organizations for supplying distributed energy to the grid. Twenty-nine states, Washington D.C., and three territories have renewable portfolio standards, which require that a certain percent of electricity that utilities sell come from renewable energy sources. Half of the growth in the United States’ generation of renewable energy since 2000 is attributed to state renewable energy requirements (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2020). Most state targets are between 10 and 15 percent, but California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Mexico, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington have requirements of 50% renewables or higher (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2020). However, as renewable energy policies become increasingly politicized, efforts to block, repeal, and weaken these policies are taking off around the United States. In 2018, Arizona Proposition 127 was on the ballot as a proposed constitutional amendment. The proposition would have increased the state’s renewable portfolio standard by requiring electric utilities in Arizona to acquire electricity from renewable resources each year, with the percentage increasing annually from 12 percent in 2020 to 50 percent in 2030. The measure was defeated with a strong (68.6%) majority. At the same time, Nevada Question 6, an initiative to require electric utilities to acquire 50 percent of their electricity from renewable resources by 2030, was approved with a 59.28% majority. Both proposals were equally ambitious, requiring 50% renewables by 2030. The PACs advocating these propositions were primarily funded by the same group, likely employing similar campaign strategies. What contributed to the difference in outcomes following these proposals? What strategies and frameworks are utilized by opponents to persuade the public to vote against renewable energy projects that represent the public good? How do private interests get public backing and voter support when public opinion is not in their favor? This paper will analyze and compare two case studies in order to gain a better understanding of the strategies used by private interests to oppose renewable energy policies and projects, despite strong public support. The cases in Nevada and Arizona were selected based on their similar energy profiles, geographic proximity, initiative timelines, and initiative content. Arizona and Nevada have the highest solar energy potential in the nation. The proposition side used very similar campaign strategies and propagated the same narrative in favor of both initiatives. The same organization, NextGen Climate Action, sponsored both pro-renewable initiatives, holding the campaign strategies on the proposition side constant and allowing for a comprehensive exploration of the differences that may exist on the opposition side. This will allow me to identify the factors that determine the success of opposition narratives and strategies in blocking proposed renewable energy policies and projects. The obvious and highly significant difference between the cases of Nevada and Arizona is partisanship. Nevada leans Democrat, and Arizona leans Republican. I propose that while partisanship is an important factor in the difference in outcome between Nevada Question 6 and Arizona Proposition 127, it is not the entire story. Based on the available literature, I will identify a number of important variables in the case studies in order to understand the opposition’s relative success in blocking proposed renewable energy policies. I will examine how opponents framed the negative costs associated with proposed renewable energy policies as local and immediate to individuals, with a focus on increased consumer prices and job loss. I will discuss what determines shifts in balance of power between proponents and opponents. Finally, I will apply both Kraft and Kamieniecki’s (2007) and Layzer’s (2012) frameworks to the strategies employed by opposition groups to block proposed renewable energy policies. Table of ContentsAbstract ……………………………………………………………………………… iiExecutive Summary …………………………………………….…………………… iii Acknowledgements …………………………………………………………………. viii Literature Review ………...………………………………………………………….. 1 Case Overview ………………………..……………...……………………………….. 4Case 1: Arizona ……………………………………………………………………….. 6Case 2: Nevada ………………………………………………………………………. 15 Opposition Narrative Framing ……………………………………………………… 21Conclusion ……………………………………………………………………………. 28References ………………………………………………………………….………… 30Acknowledgments I cannot thank my wonderful advisors, Professors Sarah Pralle and Dimitar Gueorguiev, and my reader and academic advisor, Professor Sherburne Abbott, enough for their support and guidance throughout the completion of this project. Literature Review Public attitudes towards renewable energy are very positive, but opposition groups, representing some corporations, utilities, fossil fuel companies, conservative coalitions, and other private interests, are often successful in blocking proposed renewable energy policies and projects. A particularly difficult contributor to climate policy opposition is that climate policies reap benefits that are global, while the negative effects often associated with these policies are experienced locally (Stokes, 2016). Opposition to renewable energy can be understood on an individual and corporate level. Fossil fuel and electric utility corporations oppose renewables based on potential profit loss in the nonrenewable energy industry (Cass and Walker, 2009; Stokes and Warshaw, 2017). Individual opposition to renewables can be based on “NIMBY-ism,” used to describe the attitude of actors who are spatially affected by the development of renewable energy projects, like wind farms. These actors support renewable energy projects elsewhere, but “not in my backyard” (Cass and Walker, 2009). Costs imposed on residential ratepayers is a common cause of opposition to renewable energy policies and projects; in fact, opposition to renewable energy policies and projects is typically concentrated in communities where costs are imposed on individuals directly upon the implementation of the policy (Stokes 2016). Stokes and Warshaw (2017) suggest that renewable energy policies that emphasize public health benefits and job creation earn broader public support. Democracy aims to reflect changes in policy congruently with changes in public opinion. Some theories of democratic responsiveness assume that changes in public preferences cause changes in policy (Page & Shapiro, 1983). However, this relationship is inconsiderate of third factors that bear significant influence on both public opinion and policy change, including world events, interest group campaigns, technological change and scientific discovery, and more (Page & Shapiro, 1983). While general consensus amongst social scientists suggests that public opinion influences public policy, special interest groups can alter the relationship between public opinion and policy (Burstein, 2003). Variation in renewable energy policies across the United States is driven not by public opinion alone but by shifts in the balance of power between supportive and opposition interest groups (Stokes, 2015). When utilities and fossil fuel interests are empowered in politics and the legislative system, renewable energy policy and projects are blocked, but when renewable energy advocates are strong, policy expansion succeeds. Interest groups, both in opposition and support of renewables, structure public opinion surrounding renewable energy policy, which effectively drives policy enactment and change (Stokes, 2015). Of course, interest groups are not always accurately representative of public opinion. Large portions of the public remain unorganized and unrepresented by interest groups (Olson, 1965). More importantly, organized interest groups use issue framing to exaggerate attitudes held by the public to advance their policy goals, disproportionately spotlighting certain issue areas to lawmakers (Kraft & Kamieniecki 2007). Interest groups are influential in increasing the perceived salience of issues to lawmakers. Klu?ver and Pickup (2018) argue that interest groups influence government responsiveness to public opinion, but that the effect varies by the type of interest group. Cause groups, groups that fight for a specific belief or principle like environmental protection, increase the responsiveness of governments to their constituents. In contrast, sectional groups, groups that represent private interests of a specific section of society such as the fossil fuel industry, decrease government responsiveness, weakening the link between voters and representatives (Klu?ver & Pickup, 2018). Sectional groups use inside lobbying, like personal contact with lawmakers, while cause groups use outside lobbying, like grassroots mobilization and media campaigns, to affect legislative decision making. Sectional interest groups and elite actors have resources available to achieve their policy goals, even in opposition to public opinion (Burstein, 2003). Kraft & Kamieniecki outline a three-pronged strategy that business interests use to prevent environmental issues from becoming salient when businesses are faced with the prospect of an environmental regulation that will threaten their bottom line (2007). Business interests discredit the science that informs environmentalists’ claims, stating that it is uncertain or distorted by bias, portray environmentalists as elite, and draw considerable attention to the economic costs of addressing the problem, with a particular focus on jobs and consumer prices (Kraft & Kamieniecki 2007). This framework is highly applicable to the opposition narratives explored in this paper employed by fossil fuel interests and coalitions that oppose renewable energy projects and policies by attacking the environmental issue in question. Historically, conservatives have had a substantial impact on environmental policy by implementing a specific framing strategy that establishes an anti-regulatory narrative to encourage disdain for government interference and regulations and distrust in science (Layzer, 2012). This narrative counters the need for environmentalists’ policies and regulations, mobilizes grassroots opposition to environmental policies and regulations, and undertakes legal challenges to proposed environmental policies and regulations. This framework culminates to create skepticism towards environmentalists and proposed environmental policies (Layzer, 2012). This strategy has proven more successful in blocking efforts to pass new environmental legislation than attacking existing laws (Layzer, 2012). Case Overview State Energy Profiles?ArizonaNevada% Utility-scale net electricity generation from renewables1321.1% Utility-scale net electricity generation from petroleum0.10% Utility-scale net electricity generation from natural gas46.271.9% Utility-scale net electricity generation from coal12.87% Utility-scale net electricity generation from nuclear33.10Total energy production (2017)621 trillion Btu 100 trillion BtuKey FeaturesPartisan control ArizonaNevadaRepublicanDemocratOpposition interest PACArizonans for Affordable ElectricityVote No ArizonaSouthern Arizonans for Responsible EnergyN/ASpending$41,094,911.25 $0.00 Supporting groupsPinnacle West Capital CorporationGrand Canyon State Electric Coop Association, Inc. UniSource Energy CorporationNational Rural Electric Cooperative AssociationSalt River ProjectThe Coalition of Energy UsersPro-renewable interest PACClean Energy for a Healthy ArizonaNevadans for a Clean Energy Future Spending$24,126,339.52 $10,740,223.29 Supporting groupsNextGen Climate ActionLeague of Conservation VotersSierra ClubNextGen Climate ActionNevada Conservation LeagueSierra Club% in favor of funding renewable energy research8282% in favor of requiring utilities to produce 20% of electricity from renewables6161Case 1: Arizona Politics Arizona’s registered voters are closely divided between partisan groups, with more than a third registered as Republicans, just more than a third registered Independent, and just less than a third registered as Democrats. State politics are predominantly controlled by the Republican Party. In 2018, the year of the vote on the ballot measure, the Governor, Secretary of State, and Attorney General were Republicans, the State Legislature was controlled by Republicans, and both United States Senators for Arizona were Republicans. In the 2016 Presidential election, Arizona’s 11 electoral votes went to Donald Trump when he won 48% of the state and 5 out of 9 congressional districts. Energy Profile Renewable energy provides about 13% of Arizona’s net electricity generation (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2020). Half of this comes from hydroelectric power, provided mostly by the Glen Canyon Dam and Hoover Dam located on the Colorado River in northern Arizona (U.S. EIA, 2020a). These plants use pumped storage to allow system operators to time-shift power generated during low demand periods for use during periods of high demand for electricity use. Solar photovoltaic and solar thermal facilities surpassed hydroelectric power in Arizona’s renewable generation for the first time in 2017 (U.S. EIA, 2020a). Arizona is the sunniest state in the country with more than 300 days of sunshine annually, and the state’s solar energy potential is second only to Nevada in the United States (U.S. EIA, 2020a). Yet in 2017, solar accounted for just 6% of the state’s net electricity generation. Wind power has some potential in Arizona, particularly along the mountains in central Arizona. The first commercial-scale wind farm in the state began operations in 2009 (U.S. EIA, 2020a). Since then, wind has accounted for less than 1% of the state’s electricity generation.Arizona has few fossil fuel resources available throughout the state, but it is the site of the highest-grade uranium mine in the nation and many other major uranium reserves that power a booming nuclear energy industry. The state’s largest power plant (and the nation’s largest nuclear power plant) is the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station. The Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station is powered by Arizona Public Service Co., the largest electric utility in Arizona and the primary subsidiary of Pinnacle West Capital Corporation, a publicly traded S&P 500 member. The plant’s 3 operating reactors generated 30% of the state’s net electricity in 2017 (U.S. EIA, 2020a). Coal makes up the second largest share of electricity generation in Arizona, followed by natural gas. Arizona has two coal fields – Black Mesa and Pinedale. Black Mesa was home to the state’s only operating coal mine, which permanently closed on November 18, 2019, located in the northeast on the Navajo and Hopi reservations (U.S. EIA, 2020a). The plant’s operator, Arizona utility Salt River Project, said the closure was necessary due to shifting economics within the energy industry (Pyper, 2019). Arizona has no significant crude oil reserves, no oil refineries, and no significant natural gas reserves. Arizona relies on imports from nearby states to power the state’s energy needs. Renewable resources, namely solar and hydroelectric power, make up the rest of Arizona’s electricity generation (U.S. EIA, 2020a). The transportation sector is Arizona’s largest end-use energy consumer (489.4 trillion Btu in 2017) followed by the residential sector (401.4 trillion Btu in 2017) (U.S. EIA, 2020a). Arizona’s economic activities are not carbon-intensive, because most of the state’s gross domestic product relies on the service sectors, including real estate, professional and business services, finance and insurance, and health care (U.S. EIA, 2020a). Other key industries include electronic products manufacturing and aerospace and defense. Renewable Energy Policy and OpinionEighty-two percent of voters in Arizona support funding research into renewable energy sources and 61% of voters in Arizona support requiring utilities to produce 20% of electricity from renewable sources (Yale Program on Climate Change, 2019). In a statewide poll in 2019, the Arizona Public Interest Research Group found that nearly 90% of Arizona voters believe the growth and use of renewable energy should be a priority for the state, and 70% of voters agree that increasing the use of clean and renewable energy sources in Arizona will create jobs and encourage economic development in the state (Arizona Public Interest Research Group, 2019). Arizona’s current renewable energy standard requires that investor-owned electric utilities and electricity suppliers increasingly acquire electricity from renewables. In 2006, the Arizona Corporation Commission, Arizona’s regulatory agency for non-municipal utility companies, adopted a renewable portfolio standard to increase the amount of renewable energy production and use in the state. Arizona’s renewable portfolio standard mandates that electric utilities acquire a minimum of 15 percent of electricity from renewable energy sources by 2025– a goal that has already been met. Distribution companies with more than 50 percent of their customers from outside of Arizona are exempt. Proposition 127 would have increased the renewable portfolio standard annually until reaching 50 percent electricity from renewables by 2030.In addition to the renewable portfolio standard, Arizona has established state energy efficiency standards that require investor-owned utilities, electric companies, and natural gas utilities to achieve cumulative savings equal to 22% of their previous year’s retail electricity sales (U.S. EIA, 2020a). The savings target for electric companies is 16.5% by 2020 (U.S. EIA, 2020a). Strategies employed to reach this goal include peak demand reductions, increased energy efficiency in building codes, and demand-side management. Arizona has implemented a number of state incentives for renewable energy. In 1997, the state approved a Solar and Wind Equipment Sales Tax Exemption for 100% of sales tax on the retail sale and installation of solar energy devices up to $5,000. Southwest Gas Corporation offers a rebate program to commercial and industrial facilities who install efficient Combined Heat and Power systems of up to 50% of the installed cost of the project. Since 1995, taxpayers in Arizona have been entitled to Arizona’s Solar Energy Tax Credit upon installation of a solar or wind energy device at the taxpayer’s residence. The Phoenix City Council adopted a policy in 2005 to require all new city buildings built with 2006 bond funds to meet the LEED certification level. These programs and more incentivize the use of renewable energy technologies in the state of Arizona (Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, 2020). Arizona Proposition 127: Renewable Energy Standards InitiativeOn November 6, 2018, Arizona Proposition 127 was defeated on the ballot as a constitutional amendment. The measure proposed that electric utilities in Arizona should acquire a certain percentage of electricity from renewable resources each year, with the percentage increasing annually from 12 percent in 2020 to 50 percent in 2030. Just 31.4% of voters in Arizona voted in favor of the Renewable Energy Standards Initiative, defeated by 68.6%. The ballot initiative was originally filed with the Arizona Secretary of State in February 2018. The initiative was filed by Clean Energy for a Health Arizona, a coalition funded by NextGen Climate Action, League of Conservation Voters, and the Sierra Club. The initiative was filed with more than 480,000 signatures, nearly twice the requirement to get initiated constitutional amendments certified for the ballot (Arizona Proposition 127). Supporters of Proposition 127 hired a grassroots coalition to collect signatures for the position. A total of $5,843,652 was spent to collect the more than 225,000 valid signatures. The cost per required signature was $25.86 (Arizona Proposition 127). A group of eight individuals under Rep. Vince Leach (R-11), mobilized by the initiative opposition group Arizonans for Affordable Energy, filed a lawsuit against Arizona Secretary of State Michele Reagan (R) after her initial approval of Arizona Proposition 127 – claiming that the petitioners failed to follow state laws by not disclosing the financial backer of the initiative on the petitions, firing signature gatherers based on quotas, submitting deficient petition sheets, and providing a misleading title and summary on petitions (Arizona Proposition 127). The Maricopa County Superior Court overruled the plaintiffs, ruling that Proposition 127 did not violate the state’s standard for signature gathering and petition language. The proposition moved to the ballot for the midterm elections of 2018. Proposition 127 was one the most expensive ballot fight in Arizona’s history (Howard Fischer Capitol Media Services, 2018a). Clean Energy for a Healthy Arizona was the leading committee in support of Proposition 127. The coalition raised $24,126,339.52 in support of the Renewable Energy Standards Initiative (Arizona Proposition 127). Tom Steyer, billionaire philanthropist, is the founder of NextGen America, an environmental advocacy nonprofit and political action committee. Steyer focused the group’s efforts on Arizona’s renewable portfolio standard because he saw unused potential in the nation’s sunniest state to develop solar energy technology. He argued that Proposition 127 would lead to lower electricity costs, cleaner air and better health outcomes, and job creation (Associated Press, 2018). Towards the end of the fight for Proposition 127, as it became less and less likely that the measure would pass, NextGen America and Clean Energy for a Healthy Arizona refocused their efforts away from the proposition and towards the election for Attorney General of Arizona. Mark Brnovich was running for reelection against Democrat January Contreras. Brnovich’s election to office as Attorney General of Arizona in 2014 was heavily supported by Arizona Public Service, the state’s largest utility. The utility gave $425,000 to Brnovich’s campaign (Roberts, 2014). The Attorney General oversees the Arizona Corporation Commission, the state’s regulatory body for non-municipal utilities, lending to Arizona Public Service’s interest in who secures the Attorney General election. The Attorney General supervises the commission regulators and has significant weight in the rules and regulations set to cover the state’s public utility companies. Brnovich had previously interfered with Proposition 127 by adding language to the summary portion of the ballot proposition, writing that utilities would need to meet the clean energy requirements “irrespective of cost to customers” (Kwok, 2018). This wording implies that approving the bill would increase costs to Arizonans, a highly disputable and unfavorable claim for the proposition side that more than likely interfered with the bill’s success. In retaliation, Clean Energy for a Healthy Arizona spent $3.6 million via Tom Steyer on advertising opposing Brnovich. He won reelection regardless. Advocacy groups that worked in opposition to Proposition 127 were Arizonans for Affordable Electricity, Vote No Arizona, and Southern Arizonans for Responsible Energy. These groups were largely funded by Pinnacle West Capital Corporation, Grand Canyon State Electric Cooperative Association, Inc., UniSource Energy Corporation, National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, and Salt River Project, all major electric utilities or cooperatives. Donations to the opposition of Proposition 127 totaled $41,094,911.25, two times as much as the Clean Energy coalition (Arizona Proposition 127). Opposition to Proposition 127 in Arizona began even before the measure was officially on the ballot. Arizona Governor Ducey signed a bill into law in March that reduced penalties for utility companies in violation of clean energy mandates imposed by the Arizona Constitution to no more than $5,000 and as low as $100 (Arizona Proposition 127). House Bill 2005 makes noncompliance with state renewable energy standards cheaper than compliance, likely leading entities to serve their shareholders instead of consumers by ignoring clean energy mandates and paying the penalties instead of shifting towards more clean and sustainable energy practices (Howard Fischer Capitol Media Services, 2018b).Arizona Public Service funded and provided data for an economic analysis that concluded that Proposition 127 would cause Arizonan’s annual household utility bills to increase by an average of $1,000 per year (Kormann, 2018). This, in combination with Brnovich’s “irrespective of cost to consumers,” was used heavily in the opposition narrative propagated by the utilities and groups against Proposition 127, emphasizing the financial burden on individual consumers. An opinion piece published by the Goldwater Institute, a conservative libertarian think-tank, claimed that Proposition 127 would disproportionately impact low-income families because “the poor pay about five times more of their income on energy than rich families do” (Moore, 2018). In contrast to APS’s analysis, Wesley Herche, an energy-security expert at Arizona State University, published a peer-reviewed report that found no association between clean and renewable energy generation and increased utility rates (Herche, 2017). The proposition side attempted to flip the cost-raising narrative onto the opposition, pointing to the fact that APS had raised power rates for customers by an average of 2.7% annually (Kormann, 2018). Arizonans for Affordable Energy and other opposition groups claimed that Proposition 127 would lead to the forced closure of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, the largest nuclear power plant in the nation (Charlton, 2018). The facility generates about 35 percent of Arizona’s electric power and employs more than 2,000 full-time workers. Opposition groups fear that requiring that 50% of Arizona’s electricity be generated by renewable sources in accordance with Proposition 127 would eliminate the need for the nuclear power plant because Palo Verde could not operate at levels low enough to satisfy the proposed requirements (Miller, 2018). Billionaire philanthropist Tom Steyer, the face and the funds behind much of Next Gen America’s work in both Arizona and Nevada, became an easy target for opposition groups working to block Proposition 127 and Question 6. He was framed as an elitist and a radical leftist. An opinion piece opposing both Proposition 127 and Nevada Question 6 published by Daily Caller pointed that Steyer’s hedge fund, Farallon Capital, invested in fossil fuels for decades, accusing Steyer of “[disguising] himself as a full-blown climate advocate after being shamed by liberal activists over his investment portfolio” (Norquist, 2018). He was criticized for his interest and investment in Arizona, far away from his home state of California. Opponents questioned his motives and his authority to involve himself in the state’s politics, delegitimizing his position as a forerunner on the proposition side. In an opinion piece published in AZ Central, Mark Brnovich stated that Arizona deserved to control its own conservation and clean energy decisions, calling Proposition 127 a “smear campaign against elected officials like me” orchestrated by Steyer (Brnovich, 2018). He called the proposition a “repackaging [of] California’s failed policies,” blaming Steyer for “spending millions of dollars in disingenuous ads and seeking political scapegoats” and claiming that Brnovich would be eager to support “developing technology to harness the power of the sun in more cost-effective ways… that are less polarizing and more economically sound” (Brnovich, 2018). Case 2: NevadaPolitics Nevada’s active registered voters more strongly favor Democrats, with nearly 40% of the eligible population registered as Democrat, 35% registered as Republican, and the remaining 25% divided between the Independent and Libertarian parties. State politics are predominantly controlled by the Democratic party. However, in 2018 (the year of the elections in question), the Governor, Secretary of State, and Attorney General were Republicans, the State Legislature was controlled by Democrats, and one United States Senator was Republican and one was a Democrat. In the 2016 Presidential election, Nevada’s 6 electoral votes went to Hillary Clinton when she won 47.5% of the state and 2 out of 4 congressional districts. Energy Profile Nearly 25% of Nevada’s electricity is generated from renewable resources (U.S. EIA, 2020b). Due to several large-scale solar thermal and PV projects, a dramatically increasing share of Nevada’s electricity generation is from solar (13.7% in 2019) (Solar Energy Industries Association, 2019). In 2016, solar generation exceeded hydroelectric power for the first time, and in 2017, solar exceeded generation from geothermal power. Solar resources provided nearly half of Nevada’s electricity from renewable in 2018, leading the nation in solar power potential (U.S. EIA, 2020b). Nevada is one of the only states that has large-scale electricity generation from geothermal resources. Geothermals account for almost one third of Nevada’s renewable generation, second highest geothermal production in the nation just behind California (U.S. EIA, 2020b). Even though Nevada is the driest state in the U.S., hydroelectric power makes up almost all of the rest of Nevada’s renewable energy generation, most notably from Hoover Dam, which supplies electricity to Nevada, Arizona, and California (U.S. EIA, 2020b). Nevada has some wind power potential, but because four-fifths of the land in the state is controlled by the federal government, most large-scale wind projects need federal approval. To date, there is only one utility-scale wind farm operating in Nevada (U.S. EIA, 2020b). Nevada has no significant fossil fuel resources. The state is the sixth lowest energy producer in the nation, and more than 90% of energy consumed in Nevada comes from outside the state (U.S. EIA, 2020b). Natural gas is the largest supplier for power generation in Nevada, fueling 70% of Nevada’s net electricity generation, mostly imported from Utah, California, and Idaho Coal-fired power plants make up a small 5% of Nevada’s net generation (U.S. EIA, 2020b). Until operations were suspended in 2006 due to concerns about water supply availability, the largest power plant in Nevada was the coal-operated Mohave Generating Station (U.S. EIA, 2020b). The last utility-owned coal power plant in Nevada, supplied by coal mines in Wyoming to provide electricity to northern Nevada, is scheduled to close by 2025, as renewable energy resources generate five times more net electricity than coal (U.S. EIA, 2020b). Nevada consumes more electricity per capita than the national average, but per capita energy consumption is among the lowest quarter in the nation. The transportation sector is Nevada’s largest end-use energy consumer, accounting for one third of end-use energy consumption in Nevada (228.0 trillion Btu in 2017), followed by the industrial sector (172.1 trillion Btu in 2017). The hospitality industry is the state’s largest employer, as tourism is a major driver of the state’s economy.Las Vegas, Nevada’s largest city, has drawn 100 percent of its power from renewable energy sources since the end of 2016 (Munks, 2016). Thanks to a partnership with NV Energy, the city powers more than 140 facilities with renewable resources. Most of the city’s renewable energy generation comes from solar, including on-site facilities and panels on City Hall, but the portfolio also utilizes hydropower from the Hoover Dam. The city is estimated to save $5 million annually because of the shift to renewable sources (Munks, 2016). Renewable Energy Policy and OpinionEighty-two percent of voters in Nevada support funding research into renewable energy sources and 61% of voters in Nevada support requiring utilities to produce 20% of electricity from renewable sources (Yale Program on Climate Change, 2019). A poll conducted by the Center for Western Priorities, a nonpartisan conservation organization, found that 66% of Nevada voters have a favorable view of solar energy companies, while just 35% have a favorable opinion of utility commissions (Messerly & Rothberg, 2016). Nevada’s renewable portfolio standard was adopted by the Nevada Legislature in 1997 and has been modified in nearly every subsequent legislative session (Public Utilities Commission). Prior to Nevada Question 6, Nevada’s renewable portfolio standard required all investor-owned electric utilities to generate 25% of their total electricity sales from renewable energy sources and energy efficiency measures by the year 2025. The renewable portfolio standard originally required that 1.5% of the state’s total net electricity generation had to come from solar power by 2016. This requirement was drastically exceeded when 11% of the state’s total net generation was solar-powered in 2017 (U.S. EIA, 2020b). Nevada Question 6 would require electric utilities to acquire at least 50% of their electricity from renewables by 2030. In 2016, voters in Nevada approved the Nevada Legislature to Minimize Regulations on the Energy Market and Eliminate Legal Energy Monopolies Amendment (Question 3), supporting a constitutional amendment to require the Nevada Legislature to establish an open, competitive retail energy market, reduce energy market regulations, and prohibit energy monopolies (Nevada Question 3). For decades, NV Energy had been granted a regulated monopoly, providing electricity to 90% of Nevada (Nevada’s Power Politics, 2018). The campaign in support of Question 3 in 2016 was led by Nevadans for Affordable, Clean Energy Choices. This PAC was predominantly funded by the Las Vegas Sands Corporation, a hospitality company founded by Republican political donor Sheldon Adelson. Casinos, resorts, and other big energy users were impacted negatively by NV Energy, as they must either submit to the monopoly or pay tens of millions of dollars in exit fees to use an alternative provider. Question 3 would have provided Nevadans with more choice. The monopoly prohibited Nevada from generating electricity from renewables to the state’s full potential. The proposition argued that without a competitive energy market, Nevadans have been denied the freedom to lower their electricity costs and adopt clean energy. Opposition to Question 3 was led by No Handouts to Billionaires in 2016, arguing that the measure was backed by billionaires, raising electrical rates for residential customers, disproportionately hurting poor and rural Nevadans, and resulting in inevitable layoffs at NV Energy (Nevada Question 3). The measure passed with a strong majority of 72.36% in favor of prohibiting electricity monopolies, particularly the monopoly that NV Energy, a public utility company, has in the state. The measure would guarantee that energy customers in Nevada have the right to choose their energy provider and generate their own energy for resale (Nevada Question 3).However, in Nevada, constitutional amendments must be approved two times in even-numbered elections, meaning that after Question 3 was approved in 2016, it was on the ballot again in 2018. The second time, the measure failed with a 67.05% majority opposing an open electric energy market in Nevada (Nevada Question 3). In 2018, opposition to Question 3 was led by Coalition to Defeat Question 3. NV Energy contributed more than $63 million to the opposition PAC to protect their monopoly. I will return to this significant reversal of public opinion about a renewable energy policy in my case comparison in an effort to explain the reframing and strategies used to so drastically disrepute Question 3 in Nevada in just 2 years. Nevada Question 6: Renewable Energy Standards Initiative On November 6, 2018, Nevada Question 6 was approved on the ballot as an initiated constitutional amendment. The measure proposed that electric utilities in Nevada should be required to acquire 50% of their electricity from renewable resources by 2030. Fifty-nine percent of voters voted in favor of the state’s increased renewable portfolio standards. In Nevada, initiated constitutional amendments need to be approved in two election years. Even though Question 6 was approved in 2018, it will need to be approved again in 2020 to officially amend the Nevada Constitution. The committee Nevadans for a Clean Energy Future filed the ballot initiative in February 2018. The ballot initiative was approved by Nevada Secretary of State Barbara Cegavske in July with the announcement that 133,005 signatures were valid, certifying the initiative to appear of the ballot for the election in November (Nevada Question 6). The committee hired a grassroots coalition to collect signatures for the position. A total of $1,402,142.75 was spent to collect the more than 112,000 valid signatures. The cost per required signature was $12.46 (Nevada Question 6). Nevadans for a Clean Energy Future led the campaign in support of Nevada Question 6. The group argued that Nevada is ready to cut emissions, create clean-energy jobs, and modernize power. The committee raised $10,740,223.29, funded almost entirely (96%) by NextGen Climate Action (Nevada Question 6). Following Question 3’s defeat, Tom Steyer decided to back Nevada Question 6, supported by the Nevada Conservation League and the Sierra Club, in pursuit of tougher renewable energy mandates, calling Nevada “the Saudi Arabia of solar energy in the United States, and Arizona is number two” (Rindels, 2018). He argued that Nevada and Arizona together could produce “enough energy to produce enough electricity for the whole United States” (Rindels, 2018). Although no political action committees registered to oppose Question 6, the opposition was led by the Coalition of Energy Users, chaired by State Senator Don Gustavson (R-14) and supported by Controller Ron Knecht and Representative Jim Wheeler (R-39). The group denied the energy crisis in Nevada, stating that residents currently enjoy safe and reliable delivery of energy (Nevada Question 6). Coalition of Energy Users funded “No on Question 6,” a group that argued that the proposition would cause energy costs to rise, disproportionally harming low-income consumers, and impact jobs in manufacturing, agriculture, and tourism. Again, the group faulted Tom Steyer, labelling him as an “out of state hedge fund billionaire” (No on 6). Given the overlapping timelines of Nevada Question 6’s initial appearance in the polls with Nevada Question 3’s second round on the ballot, I suggest that coalitions, private interest groups, and corporations that favor non-renewables focused their efforts solely on blocking Question 3 from officially amending the state constitution. The stakes are much higher and more immediate, as Question 6, even in its initial approval in the 2018 election, will have to be reconsidered in 2020 to officially amend the state’s constitution. In 2018, Question 6 faced little opposition. Most likely, the 2020 elections will see a much stronger reaction from Nevada’s utilities and other interest groups as the renewable portfolio standard advances towards amendment. Opposition Narrative Framing The proposed renewable energy policies examined in this paper faced opposition that adhered to the existing literature about opposition to environmental policy by interest groups and private interests. I will identify the variables of interest (negative costs framed as local and immediate to individuals, with a focus on increased consumer prices and job loss, and shifts in balance of power between renewable energy support and opposition groups) within the opposition groups’ strategies and framing by demonstrating the applicability of Kraft and Kamieniecki’s (2007) and Layzer’s (2012) frameworks to the opposition narratives utilized by groups in Arizona and Nevada. Framing the negative costs associated with implementing a renewable energy policy distracts consumers from the global and long-term benefits of transitioning away from greenhouse gas-emitting fossil fuels in favor of clean, renewable energy. The basis of the leading opposition groups’ narratives against the proposed renewable energy policies was, consistent with Kraft and Kamieniecki’s proposed framework, increased energy costs for consumers, irrespective of accredited economic analyses that dispute these claims. Arizona Attorney General Mark Brnovich’s addition to the summary portion of Arizona Proposition 127 implied that the policy had no cap on added costs to consumers. Arizona’s largest utility, Arizona Public Service, funded an analysis that concluded that Proposition 127 would raise individuals’ annual utility bills by $1,000. A spokesman for Arizonans for Affordable Energy, a group opposing the ballot initiative, stated that the group’s “focus is to ensure every Arizona family, senior, small-business owner, and ratepayer knows Proposition 127 will increase their electricity bills” (Benson, 2018). No On 127’s Twitter bio reads, “Can you afford to double your electricity bills?” (No on 127). Further, opposition argued that the ballot measure would lead to the closure of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, eliminating the more than 2,000 full-time workers’ positions. “No on Question 6” followed suit in Nevada, arguing that the proposed constitutional amendment would raise the price of energy. Spokespeople for the opposition groups point to the affordability of natural gas, the largest utility-scale electricity generator in the state, and argue that the passage of Question 6 has no way to guarantee a price for renewables. The opposition referenced a 2013 report commissioned by the Nevada Policy Research Institute to analyze the impact of the current 25 percent renewable portfolio standard requirement. This report states that the standard could cost Nevada between 500 and 3,000 jobs by 2025, when in reality, the clean energy economy grew substantially in Nevada in 2018 with the addition of nearly 8,000 clean energy jobs (32% growth) (E2, 2019). These strategies are consistent with the assumption that opposition to renewable energy policies and projects will frame the costs associated with the proposition as local and imposed directly on individuals, with an emphasis on consumer cost and job loss. This strategy is identifiable within all three cases, revealing its prevalence in instances both when opposition groups were successful and when opposition groups were unsuccessful in blocking a proposed renewable energy policy. Opposition in Arizona relied heavily on portraying Tom Steyer as an untrustworthy and ill-intentioned environmental elitist, consistent with Kraft and Kamieniecki’s strategies to prevent a problem from becoming salient when businesses are faced with the prospect of an environmental regulation that threatens their bottom line. Arizonans for Affordable Energy accused Steyer of “spending millions of dollars to trick Arizonans into voting for a clean energy scheme,” portraying Steyer as untrustworthy, investing in Arizona with questionable motives (Mufson, 2018). “No on 6” in Nevada piggybacked off of Proposition 127’s opponents, accusing Steyer of “[coming] in with a wheelbarrow full of money and [influencing] the electoral process” (No on 6, 2018). Opponents in Nevada also accused Steyer of killing blue collar jobs and making “dark money” political contributions. Kraft and Kamieniecki’s assumption that opposition to proposed environmental policies will attempt to discredit the science that underpins environmentalists’ claims by portraying it uncertain and distorted by bias is demonstrated by opposition groups to Arizona Proposition 127. An opinion piece disputing Proposition 127 published by The Arizona Daily Independent rejects the scientifically proven fact that carbon emissions from burning fossil fuels contributes to global climate change, arguing that “this claim is not based on physical evidence but only upon garbage-in, garbage-out computer models” (DuHamel, 2018). The article argues that because the push for increasing renewable energy usage is based on biased and untrustworthy science, Proposition 127 is unnecessary. This counters the need for an increased renewable portfolio standard, a strategy Layzer observed conservatives utilize in their anti-regulatory rhetoric opposing environmental policies and regulation. Shifts in balance of power between opposition and support groups result in the existing variation in renewable energy policies across the United States. This suggests that interest group power and influence in a state at the time a renewable energy is proposed is indicative of whether or not the proposition will be successful. Sectional groups representing fossil fuel, utility, and other private interests that assert more power than cause groups advocating for environmental protection to oppose a proposed renewable energy will be successful in blocking the proposition. Interest group power will be examined in terms of money, presence in the community, and demonstrated support from elected officials. Opposition to Arizona Proposition 127 was well-established before the bill was officially on the ballot and had substantial demonstrated support from elected officials, beginning with Governor Ducey’s penalty reduction for utilities that violate clean energy mandates imposed by the state constitution, setting a precedent of noncompliance and disregarding a need for ambitious policies that require more renewable energy. Layzer suggests that conservative opposition to environmental policy will undertake sophisticated legal challenges as a method to promote disdain for environmental advocates. This was demonstrated with Arizona Representative Vince Leach’s lawsuit against the approval of Proposition 127 was another early attack facilitated by an elected official in an attempt to block the proposition from falling into the hands of voters. Finally, Mark Brnovich’s interference with the wording of Proposition 127 to suggest that the bill would raise energy prices for consumers infiltrates the proposition in favor of the opposition narrative that the renewable energy policy would be harmful to individual consumers. Preliminary support from elected officials helps to establish opposition from the top down, legitimizing opposition groups and influencing the way voters learn about the proposed bill with a secured and established opposition narrative. The fight for Arizona Proposition 127 was loud and highly publicized. The Washington Post called it “the hottest, most expensive campaign in Arizona,” an “ugly” battle “replete with allegations of fraud, corruption and phony economic analyses” (Mufson, 2018). Arizonans for Affordable Energy splashed newspapers, radio stations, and local television channels with advertisements opposing the initiative, bringing the debate over the proposed renewable portfolio standard into Arizonans’ everyday lives. Both the support and opposition narratives were infiltrated into the community. In terms of campaign contributions, significantly more money was spent on the opposition side. The PACs registered in opposition to Proposition 127 raised $41.09 million, with 97% of their funds from Pinnacle West Capital Corporation, owner of Arizona Public Service and provider of retail and wholesale electric to most of the state of Arizona (Arizona Proposition 127). The proposition PAC, Clean Energy for a Healthy Arizona, raised $24.13 million, with 95% of their funds from NextGen Climate Action (Arizona Proposition 127). The opposition presented greater fiscal power in Arizona, pouring more money into aggressive ad campaigns, lobbying, and other strategies. The case of Nevada Question 6 examines the influence of interest group power under vastly different circumstances. Because of the nature of Nevada’s constitutional amendment process, Question 6 will be voted on as a ballot measure again in 2020. Since the stakes were relatively low in 2018, there were no political action committees registered to oppose Question 6. Any groups interested in preventing Question 6 from amending the constitution were likely focusing their efforts and resources on supporting opposition to Question 3 in its second appearance on the ballot. Nevadans for a Clean Energy Future registered in support of Question 6, raising $10.74 million for their successful proposition campaign. Examining the campaign processes of Nevada’s Question 3 and Question 6 reveals the significance of institutional procedures that may affect the way constituents vote on proposed bills. Initiated constitutional amendments must be approved in two successive general elections in Nevada, essentially taking away the urgency in the first round of elections. Until a proposed bill is approved and advances to a second round of voting in the next general election, the stakes are very low. So low, in fact, that no opposition groups registered to counter Question 6 when it made its first appearance on the ballot in 2018. Opponents in Arizona relied on institutional procedures as a means to combat Proposition 127. Opposition narratives throughout all three cases often relied on an alleged commitment to renewables, just not by the conditions of the proposed bill being disputed. Opposition in Arizona argued that the biggest problem with Proposition 127 was “that the ballot measure cements the mandates into the Arizona Constitution,” locking in mandates so “regulators can’t adjust them in the face of shifting realities” (Prop. 127, Arizona’s renewable energy initiative, 2018). In other words, the constitution makes a commitment to renewable energy too permanent, too much of a commitment. Nevada’s Question 3 first appeared on the ballot in 2016 and was opposed by the No Handouts to Billionaires Committee. The group received just over $900,000 for its opposition campaign, contributed mostly from the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, one of the largest nonprofit labor unions in the world. Nevadans for Affordable, Clean Energy Choices, the group who lead support for Question 3 in both 2016 and 2018, raised $3.44 million in 2016. The measure passed with flying colors on its first ballot appearance (72% in favor, 28% opposed) (Nevada Question 3).In 2018, when the possibility that Question 3 could amend Nevada’s constitution and disrupt the state’s longstanding utility monopoly became more immediate, opposition picked up to full speed. The second vote was astronomically more expensive, with the support side spending over $33 million and the opposition side spending nearly $64 million, a more than 7,000% increase in spending from the first cycle. 2016 was a test run for the proposition on the ballot, but 2018 threatened to topple NV Energy’s established monopoly, potentially eliminating huge amounts of business by allowing an open, competitive market. Opposition is more than likely to come in swinging hard when Question 6 is on the ballot again this year. Because utilities interested in preserving their monopoly and securing business around Nevada have vested interest in opposing both Question 3 and Question 6, due to the threat an open market or a higher renewable portfolio standard poses to a utility company, it is likely that all the groups who would have opposed Question 6 in its first ballot appearance were busy focusing in on blocking Question 3 from actually amending the state constitution. The stakes will be equally high for Question 6 in 2020. Nevada’s institutional structure allows for an initial, low-stakes vote that reflects voters’ choice, largely independent of the influence of an opposition group. Nevada voters approved two policies that would allow for the expansion of renewable energy usage throughout the state, furthering their commitment to the utilization of clean energy. Question 3 was attacked by the state’s largest utility in an effort to preserve their monopoly. Question 6 will likely face the same fate when it reappears on the ballot as utilities fight to preserve their profits. Conclusion My research focused on the framing and strategies used by opposition groups fighting to block proposed renewable energy policies in the United States. I found that opposition groups largely play by-the-books, utilizing predictable strategies that some conservatives and anti-regulatory groups have used to oppose environmental policies and regulations for years. Opponents to renewable energy discredit climate science, portray environmentalists as biased and untrustworthy elitists, and emphasize the costs associated with the policy as imposed on the individual. Interest groups gain power and influence, seizing control of the narrative and more effectively persuading the public, through political contributions, inside lobbying, and relationships with elected officials. Campaign spending plays a major role in the ballot outcomes examined in this paper. In both instances, the side that spent more money either opposing or promoting the ballot initiative was successful. Interest groups can reach larger groups of voters and employ more persuasive campaign tactics when they have the resources available. These findings are consistent with my initial research on interest group strategies and framing opposition to environmental policies. I argue that timing and a focus on institutional procedures account for the difference in outcomes between the cases examined in this paper. In Nevada, traditional opponents to a renewable energy policy were occupied with a fight to preserve a utility monopoly, leaving the renewable portfolio standard undisputed and ultimately approved by voters. Perhaps if Arizona’s ballot had been flooded with other proposed renewable energy policies, opposition groups would have had to commit to one over another based on available resources and means of opposition. When faced with multiple propositions that challenge anti-renewable energy groups’ policy preferences, these opposition groups will focus on the lesser of the evils to challenge the policy with higher stakes and more consequences. Without the influence of opposition narratives about renewable energy policies, voters would vote more consistently with public opinion, strongly in favor of renewable energy. 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