The American governmental structure functions like no ...



The American governmental structure functions like no other. The unique separation of powers system created by the framers two hundred years ago has given us a stable democracy that still relies on that same governmental structure. But the unique genius of American governmental structure is also perhaps its greatest weakness. For many analysts one such weakness is the system’s tendency to produce divided government. The post-war era has been marked by an increase in incidences of divided government. The causes of divided government include many factors such as the increased use of split ticket voting, and various theories have been proposed to account for changes in voting patterns. What concerns us here, however, are not the causes of divided government but its effects.

One key drawback to divided government is the supposed inability of majority parties to push through legislative agendas. When the electorate votes, it is argued, it votes for that party's legislative and ideological agenda. Divided government makes it difficult for a President (all of the authors focused on the President as the initiator of the legislative agenda, perhaps since the Republican landslide in 1994 had not yet occurred) to implement his policies, thwarting the public's wishes in the face of an opposing party which controls other governmental branches.

A second broad area of agreement about the negative consequences of divided government concerned the area of general government effectiveness. Divided government, it is argued, prevents the formation of coherent policy solutions to problems. This trend is often exacerbated in times of crisis. Divided government, in other words, leads to increased partisan bickering and “gridlock” at those very times when coherent policy solutions are called for.

A third drawback to divided government, it is argued, is the lack of public accountability the system produces. Without one clear dominant party voters do not know who is accountable for policy failures and successes. Because both parties share power voters do not know who is responsible for policy outcomes and a democratic system in which parties are punished or rewarded for performance is circumvented.

Several constitutional changes have been proposed to deal with the incidence of divided government. The most prominent of these efforts was the Committee on the Constitutional System, a bipartisan group composed of prominent academics and ex-government luminaries. Among political scientists perhaps the most prominent advocate of constitutional reform has been James Sandquist. In his book Constitutional Reform and Effective Government Sundquist outlines four possible solutions to the problem of divided government.

The first is the so-called "team ticket" proposal in which citizens vote only for a party ticket, and not for individual candidates. Proponents argue that this proposal would increase party discipline by linking the fate of the President's program with that of Congress and making it more difficult for individual legislators to vote against their party's position. While not guaranteeing a majority government, this proposal would greatly enhance its prospects.

The chief drawback of this proposal is, of course, its limitation of voter choice. Voters simply would not like being forced to select a candidate they disliked. Furthermore, members of Congress would be alarmed at a proposal which would increase party cohesion and thereby limit their ability to make individual choices on specific votes and issues.

Two more moderate approaches were in fact endorsed by the CSS. These were the optimal straight-ticket vote and the proposal to move Congressional elections to two weeks after the general election.

Both of these half-hearted measures would seem to be poor choices. It is highly significant that in states where the optimal straight ticket is already in place differences in voting patterns are almost non-existent. A Congressional election held two weeks after the general election might add a marginal amount of momentum to the winning executive's party. However, its implementation would probably lower voter turnout in a substantial way. Furthermore, as Sandquist himself notes, it is by no means clear that Americans would show an increased tendency to vote for the party that had won the general election; in fact, I think it much more likely that allegiance to the district representative would override any concern over governmental

effectiveness and unity.

The fourth alternative that Sundquist discusses is that of so-called bonus seats, in which the winning executive's party (again the possibility of a Congressional landslide is not considered) would be rewarded with extra seats in Congress so as to produce a legislative majority needed for united rule. This proposal seems to have a bit more merit. However, its difficult implementation (how and when and how many at-large delegates would be chosen, for example), and its fundamentally undemocratic character render it an unwise solution.

Another proposal suggested by various authors, the most prominent of whom was Woodrow Wilson, was a form of cabinet government in which cabinet members would hold seats on the floor of the legislature and act as enforcers of the parties' legislative proposals. Quite obviously this would involve a formal interlocking of the separate branches but would probably enable the President to forge closer, more coherent policy choices with Congress.

All of these proposals would move our system of government closer to the British parliamentary system. It would in all likelihood produce, more cohesive, unified parties. Underlying all of these proposals is the assumption that a divided government is a key reason for government ineffectiveness. It is surprising then that so little scholarly attention has been focused on analyses of divided government performance.

Several scholars tend to minimize the importance of the supposed problems associated with divided governing, arguing either that policy output is unaffected, or that features of American political process contain countervailing mechanisms which counteract gridlock at the national level.

R. Nathan's analysis of state responses to governmental policy shifts at the federal level reveals an interesting finding that the reformers may have overlooked. Nathan's key point, for the purposes of our analysis, is that in times of activist federal government conservatism the states take on a more activist government role, while the response to activist federal government is a typical shrinkage of state programs. Ironically, Nathan's analysis implies that one feature of American government structure, that of federalism compensates for policy inefficiency at the federal level. Nathan's analysis is important because it suggests that deadlock in Washington does not mean that the government stops functioning; instead state government performs many of the functions the federal government cannot do in Washington.

A more direct challenge to the reformers' claims was that of David Mayhew (1991). In a comparison of policy outputs produced under united and divided government, Mayhew found that periods of divided government produced as many important pieces of legislation as periods of united government. Mayhew's finding is startling, because of the accepted wisdom that divided government produces policy gridlock. Mayhew's findings suggest that, within the American system at least, legislative outcomes may rest largely exogenous to that of party identification. This is perhaps linked to the fact that American parties are extremely weak in terms of ideological coherence, and individual legislators are in many cases are not significantly constrained by party positions.

The preceding analyses would suggest that the problem of party government has been significantly overstated by constitutional reformers, that American government can and does overcome periods of institutional division to produce effective policy solutions. Since most of the proposed solutions to divided government consisted of proposals to move the American political structure closer to that of a parliamentary system, it may be instructive to turn to a study of a comparison of governmental performance between presidential and parliamentary forms of government. A comparison of the performance of parliamentary and Presidential government system would perhaps suggest possible outcomes of a restructering of the American political system.

Weaver and Rockman (1993) attempt just such a study. In assessing government capabilities across ten different categories of task performance Weaver and Rockman find that generalizations that claim that parliamentary systems allow the government to function more effectively than Presidential regimes are too simplistic. Three of their conclusions are highly significant for the purposes of assessing changes in American political structure. First, sweeping generalizations, such as the claim that divided government produces inefficiency and gridlock cannot be made across regime and government types. Second, Weaver and Rockman argue caution against assuming that the risks and opportunities associated with a particular set of political institutions will be the same regardless of societal conditions. (451) Lastly, desirable institutional capacities vary by country.

Weaver and Rockman do seem to agree with certain reformist criticisms of divided government. In contrast to Mayhew's finding of comparable policy output across regime types, Weaver and Rockman argue that divided party control of the legislative and executive branches of government “exacerbates some problems of governance." (451) Specifically, divided government "lowers elite cohesion” and increases the importance of the many veto points that stand in the way of effective policy implementation. It also reinforces short-term electoral pressures for leaders of the executive and legislative branches of government to generate blame against the other

Weaver and Rockman's conclusions suggest that we need a broader and more complex conception of the policy-making process. Divided government is undoubtedly the most visible aspect of American governmental structure. Because it is an obvious and unique aspect of that structure analysts point to its prevalence as the sole cause of governmental inefficiency and gridlock. It is important to recognize however, that the American political system contains many other features which contribute to difficulties in policy implementation. In Weaver and Rockman's analysis, for example, the multiplicity of veto points, the decentralization of Congressional power, and the heterogeneous social and cultural context in which governmental policy is implemented combine to make policy development and implementation a difficult process. I am suggesting that the reformers overestimate the impact of divided government on governmental performance; elimination of divided government is not a cure-all for the problems of American government.

Another important flaw in the reformers' thesis is an outgrowth of the first. Specifically, the reformers fail to examine the impact of the proposed changes on a multi-ethnic, heterogeneous populace. As Lipjhart has shown us, multi-ethnic democracies may function best in coalition governments. Americans are not simply Democrats or Republicans but span an immense racial and ethnic matrix. This has had an enormous impact on the make-up of the makeup of the national parties, particularly the Democrats, who are essentially a coalition party of many smaller groups. The reformers fail to take into account the fact that the structure of our political parties reflect the heterogeneity of our populace. Lipjhart's point, if I understand him correctly, is that a united government, with more cohesive parties

rooted on ideological grounds may not be desirable, or even possible in a highly heterogeneous society.

Although the common-sense notion that divided government is responsible for government inefficiency is held by a large plurality of analysts and perhaps even political scientists, the policy impact of a divided government structure is highly debatable. The reformers seem to be right, however, in claiming that divided government reduces accountability.

The various proposals suggested to prevent divided government thus seem premature. More research of the type done by Weaver and Rockman needs to be pursued if we are to gain a better understanding of the impact of divided government on institutional efficiency; at present the picture is muddled. Divided government does seem to reduce political accountability. However, wholesale changes with the constitutional structure should await the results of future research.

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