U s e s



LECTURE NOTE ON CHLORINE HANDLING

FOR

THREE DAYS INHOUSE TRAINING PROGRAMME ON

NAPTHA & CHLORINE HANDLING

|G. D. Pandey, S.S.A. Directorate of Factories, U.P. & Joint |Venue: NTPC, Dibiyapur |

|Secretary, National Safety Council, U.P. Chapter | |

| |Date: 27th Feb. to 1st March, 2003 |

C H L O R I N E

PACKING

QUALITY OF CHLORINE

The quality of chlorine being supplied to the plant is as under :-

chlorine purity : 99.6 % Minimum

Moisture Content : 12.5 ppm Maximum

Non-Volatile Matter : 30 ppm Maximum

The Liquid Chlorine is being dispatched in tonners of 900 Kgs. capacity and also smaller cylinders of 100 Kgs. each to the consumers. These containers are designed and fabricated to strict BS and ISI codes, and are duly approved by Chief Inspector of Explosives, Nagpur. For safe handling and transportation the chlorine, containers are filled, loaded, unloaded, stored, tested and maintained as per provisions of teh Gas Cylinders rules 1981 and other applicable regulations. For bulk consumers the supply of Liauid Chlorine cas also be made through suitable rail or road tankers.

For consumers located near the plant bulk supply of chlorine gas is also being undertaken through pipelines.

U S E S

Chlorine is a versatilo basic chemical which is put to more diverse use than any other known chemical. Some of the major uses are in :

- Pulp and Paper

- Textiles

- Water at waste treatment

- Aluminium Chloride and other metal alkalies

- Insecticides & Pesticides

- Stable bleaching Powder

- PVC

- Organic Solvents

- Large number of other organic and in organic chemicals

TOXICITY

Chlorine is corresive, It reacts with body moisture to form corrosive acids. Chlorine gas is primarily a respiratory irritant. It is so intensely irritating that concentrations above 3 to 5 ppm by volume in air are readily detectable by a normal person. Inhalation of chlorine can cause respiratory injury ranging from irritation to death, depending upon its concentration and duration in inhalation.

Acute Effect :

The first symptom of exposure to chlorine is irritation to the mucous membranes of eyes, nose and throat which increases to smarting and during pain. Irritations spread to the chest. A reflex cough develops which may be intense and often associated with pain behind the breastbone. The cough may lead to vomiting. If the duration of exposure or the concentration of chlorine. is excessive, it will cause restlessness, throat irritation, sneezing and copious salivation. In extreme cases, lung tissues may be attacked resulting in pulmonary edema, fall of blood pressure.

Effect of Chlorine at Various Concentration :

|Chlorine concentration in air (ppm) |Effect |

|0.2 – 0.5 |No noxious long term effect. |

|0.5 |Slight odour. |

|1.0 – 3.0 |Definite odour, irritation to eyes and nose. |

|6.0 |Irritation of the throat |

|30.0 |Intense cough fits. |

|40.0 – 60.00 |Exposure without effective respirator for 30 to 60 minutes or |

| |more may cause serious damage. |

|100 |May cause lethal damage |

|1000 |Danger to life even after few deep inhalations. |

FIRE/EXPLOSION/CORROSION HAZARDS

|Hazards |Precaution, Fire extinguishing agent |

|Fire: | |

|Neither liquid nor gaseous chlorine is inflammable by itself, but|Avoid contact with chemicals which can cause fire. Keep away from|

|both react with many organic substances like either, turpentine, |head and flame etc. Remove all containers from the fire zone |

|hydrogen and hydrocarbons with evolution of heat. Carbon steel |immediately. Do Not put water directly on the leakage. |

|ignites at temperatures above 250 C. | |

|Explosion: | |

|In is non-explosive, Chlorine with hydrogen can form explosive |The lower explosive limit of hydrogen chlorine mixture varies |

|mixture, more so in sunlight and at high temperature. It reacts |from 4.0% to 8.1% depending upon pressure and other variables. |

|with ammonia and ammonium compounds to form nitrogen trichloride.|Hence keep hydrogen below 4% by volume in hydrogen chlorine has |

|which is explosive in nature. Pressure builds up and bursting |mixture. Keep away from ammonia and its compounds, Keep away from|

|occurs due to heating of liquid chlorine in containers, pipe |heat. |

|lines and equipments. | |

|Corrosion : | |

| | |

|Chlorine reacts with water to form hydrochloric and hypochlorous |Do not put water on a leaking cylinder. |

|acids which are highly corrosive in in nature | |

|Wet chlorine is corrosive to most of the metals. | |

| |Dry pipe lines and equipment, etc, before introducing chlorine |

| |gas. |

Dry chlorine gas generated by vaporization of Liquid Chlorine is dry (unless) brought in contact with moist air/gas or water is not very corrosive to most metals used in industries excepts titanium.

Wet Chlorine, however is highly corrosive. This characteristic of chlorine can lead to hazardous conditions. in case some in-experienced user tries to test or stem leakage of Liquid Chlorine or dry chlorine has by pouring water or by trying to submerge chlorine container etc. under water.

Chlorine Effect :

In small concentrations men rapidly lose their ability to detect the smell of chlorine gas there fore concentration higher than TLV of 1.0 ppm may occur without immediate notice. Due to prolonged exposure to concentration more than 5.0 ppm, bronchial problems and tuberculosis may result. Due to long exposure to chlorine, affected persons may get acne. Enamel to teeth may get damaged.

PHYSICAL & CHEMICAL PROPERTIES OF CHLORINE

|A Physical Properties | | |

|Chemical Fromula | |Cl2 |

|Moecular Weight | |70.906 |

|Boiling Point | |-34.05 |

|Freezing Point | |-100.98 c at 1 atm |

|Flash Point | |None |

|Specific Gravity Liquid Gas | |1.468 at 0 c and 3617 atm |

|Vapour Pressure | |2.483 at 0 c and 1 atm (Air =1) |

|Vapour Pressure | |4800 mmHg |

|Density Liquid | |1405 kg/m3 at 21.1oC and 1 atm |

|Gas | |3.2085 kg/m3 at 21.1oC and 1 atm |

|Critical Temperature | |144oC |

|Critical Pressure | |7711.1 kpa, absolute |

|Critical Density | |573.07 kg/m3 |

|Solubility in Water | |% maximum at 10oC |

| | |Solubility decreases with rise in temperature. Below 10oC it |

| | |forms chlorine hydrate ( Cl3.8H2O) |

|Colour and Odour | |Greenish-Yellow gas with pungent and irritant odour. Liquid |

| | |Chlorine has amber colour. |

|TLV | |1.0 ppm ( 2.9 mg/m3) |

|Specific Volume of Liquid chlorine | |0.6812 cc/gm at 0oC and 3.617 atm |

|Specific Volume of Dry Chloring Gas | |311.7 cc/gm at 0oC and 1 atm |

|STEL | |3.0 ppm ( 9 mg/m3) |

|Ratio of Secific Heats Cp | |0.473 KJ/(kgxoC) between –1.1o C |

|Cv | |0.348 KJ/(kgxoC) 27o C |

|Viscosity Liquid | |0.3518 CP at 20oC |

|Gas | |0.0132 CP at 20oC |

|Latent Heat of Vaporisatin | |68.7 g.cal/g at –34.05oC |

|Flammability/Explosion | |Non-Flammable/Non-Explosive |

|Fatal Dose | |1000 ppm |

SAFE HANDLING

Chlorine being a hazardous chemical, it is very important that proper care is taken by the user while handling chlorine. Following information is provided as a general guideline to chlorine consumers:

UNLOADING

|Safe procedure to be followed |Precautions to be taken |What can happen if precautions are not |

| | |taken |

|a. Unload chlorine containers with |Do not remove valve protection hoods before|if valve hoods are not firmly kept in |

|Mechanical or electrical hoist. |unloading |position any accidental impact on valve may|

| | |damage the valves, Liquid chlorine will |

| | |start coming out which can not be |

| | |controlled. |

|b. If the above is not available, unload |Do not drop containers on a hard ground |Container wall will get dented and become |

|containers manually on to cushion of tyres.|where pebbles or any iron or beams are |weak or may get punctured. |

|on a slanted ramp from the truck. |lying. | |

|c. After unloading check the containers |White fumes indicate leakage of chloring |any chlorine leakage will increase with |

|near valve hoods with dilute ammonia |gas. In case any such leakage is found, |time if its not corrected in time. |

|solution. |take suitable action | |

N.B. 1. DO Not drop containers on hard surfaces.

2. Do not remove valve hood until contailer is to be discharged.

STORAGE

|Safe procedure to be followed |Precautions to be taken |What can happen if precautions are not |

| | |taken |

|a) Store the containers in a covered shed |Keep containers away from head of sun or |Excessive heating may tremendously increase|

|only. |any other s source of heat lied hot water |the chlorine pressure inside the container |

| |steam, direct flame and furnace. |resulting in its bursting. |

| |Do not lead or store Chlorine container | |

| |with explosives, acids and articles of | |

| |inflammable nature. | |

| |c) Do not store containers in wet and muddy| |

| |areas. |It will spoil the container paint and |

| | |start corrosion of container wall. |

| |b) Use container in the order of their | |

| |receipt | |

|a) Use chlorine container as a storage |Do not keep container valve in slightly |In such a case due to high velocity of |

|vessels. Operate container valve to full |open position for chlorine gas glow |chlorine gas, the valve seat may get |

|closed position. |control. |damaged by erosion. |

| | |Valve will later on leak even in closed |

| | |position. |

|b) Use proper size of valve spindle |Do not use loose spanner or pipe. |Spindle head may get rounded causing |

|spanner. | |inconvenience while operation specially |

| | |when there is some leakage. |

| |Do not apply tool much force while |It may twist and damage the spindle. |

| |operating the valve. | |

| |Keep one spindle spanner always fitted on |It is quite helpful to close the valve |

| |the valve on which connection has been |immediately in case a sudden leakage |

| |given. |develops. |

|c) Provide regulating valve for chlorine |Appropriate control valves should be fitted|Uncontrolled quantity of chlorine will |

|gas flow control. |to the process pipe lines. |enter your process which may create |

| | |problems. |

|d) Provide a pressure gauge of range 0 to |It should be provided between the chlorine |If the container is emptied our completely |

|25.0 Kg./cm. with one isolation valve. |container valve and the regulating valve. |but still remains connected to a system, a |

| |It is necessary to establish that the |temporary vacuum is cleaned inside the |

| |container is being emptied properly when |container due to lowering of atmospheric |

| |pressure comes down to zero. A chlorine gas|temperature and liquid from the process may|

| |press. |get. |

CONNECTING TO PROCESS

|Safe procedure to be followed |Precautions to be taken |What can happen if precautions are not |

| | |taken |

|Connect Chlorine container only to a |It is very much essential to avoid back |There is very possibility of an explosion |

|process piping where an appropriate |flow of any liquid from the process into |taking place in side the container. |

|inverted U-type barometric leg is provided.|the container by siphoning, when the latter| |

| |is emptied out, |a-1 ) Unwanted corrosion of the container |

| | |will take place. |

|Remove valve protection hood. Keep |In this way Chlorine gas can be taken out |If this is not followed, only liquid |

|container on horizontal plane in such a way|from upper valve and Liquid chlorine from |chlorine will come out from both the |

|that the two valve are in a vertical. |lower valve. |valves. |

|Remove valve outlet nuts, Make connection |It is necessary so as to take out Chlorine | |

|from the upper valve with proper fitting. |in gas from. | |

|For proper and leak proof connection, use :|Tighten the clamp properly on container |Any leakage of Chlorine will corrode the |

|Seamless copper tube OD-12 mm, ID-8 mm or 6|valve and the connecting nipple to make a |valve outlet which may damage the valve |

|mm, Low Temp. |leak proof joint. |outlet which may damage the valve outlet |

|CS Nipple |d-I. Use lead washers. Do not use rubber |and become uncontrollable. |

|CS Clamp |washers or steam gas-kit washers. |d-I. Rubber or other washers get damaged |

| |d-II. Do not use rubber hose for Chlorine |easily causing, Chlorine leakage. |

| |gas transfer. Use seamless copper tube and |d-II. Rubber hose in cold chlorine gas gets|

| |C.S. Piping. |hardened and cracks. It may burst any time |

| | |resulting in an accident. |

|Check the connection with dilute Ammonia |Open the container valve and close it |If leakage is not checked before hand, then|

|solution for any leakage |immediately for checking leafages. If |on opening the valve fully there will be a |

| |leakage is observed tighten the clamp and |lot of gas nuisance from the joint, if the |

| |leakage will stop. |same is leaking. |

CHLORINE GAS TRANSFER

|Safe procedure to be followed |Precautions to be taken |What can happen if precautions are not |

| | |taken |

| |Use of 0.0 Kg/cm2 should be left inside the|sucked into the container if a barometric |

| |container before disconnecting. |leg is not provided. |

|Do not heat Chlorine container with hot |Chlorine will come out automatically under |Due to excessive heating, pressure of |

|water system of direct flame, to take out |the normal atmospheric temperature in |Chlorine gas inside the container will |

|Chlorine gas. |gaseous form. |increase tremendously which may become very|

| | |dangerous. |

| | |e-I. Container paint will get spoiled and |

| | |cylinder wall will get corroded. |

1- DO NOT USE CHLORINE CONTAINER VALVE FOR FLOW CONTROL.

2- DO NOT HEAT CHLORINE CONTAINER FOR TAKING OUR CHLORINE GAS.

DISCONNECTION AND RETURN OF EMPTY CONTAINERS

|Safe procedure to be followed |Precautions to be taken |What can happen if precautions are not |

| | |taken |

|1 |2 |3 |

|a. As soon as Chlorine has been consumed, |See that pressure in the gauge has reduced | |

|disconnect the container from the process. |to 0-0.5Kg/cm2. It shows that Chlorine has | |

| |been consumed. | |

| | | |

| |a-I. Leave pressure of 0-0.5Kg/cm2 of |a-I. Any other liquid coming inside the |

| |Chlorine gas in the Cylinder to avoid back |container may cause explosion or chocking |

| |flow of any liquid from the system. |of the container. |

| |a-II. Close the container valve fully. Then| |

| |close the flow regulating valve. Loosen the| |

| |lamp to release Chlorine the connecting | |

| |tube. | |

|b. Fix the valve outlet nuts and the valve |Valve outlet nuts and protection hoods are |b. Due to loose fittings these parts may |

|protection hood and remove the container. |to be fitted firmly. Make a check chart of |full apart during transportation and valves|

| |material for each container and fill it up |will be unprotected and under unsafe |

| |while returning. |condition. |

|c. Make proper challan of the empty |Give correct serial number of containers |c. If correct serial numbers are not |

|containers being returned. |being returned. |mentioned it becomes difficult to maintain |

| | |proper records. |

| |c. Mention that valve outlet nuts and hoods| |

| |are fitted on the containers. | |

|a. Load Chlorine container on truck with | | |

|mechanical or electrical hoist. | | |

|b. If above, is not available load |People loading containers manually should |Containers may slip causing accident and |

|manually through slanted ramp or with the |use safety shoes. Loading should be done |Injury to people handiling containers. |

|help of wooden beams and ropes. |carefully. | |

|c. Load containers in one layer on the |Do not load containers in three layers. |This may cause accident. |

|truck if containers are loaded in two | | |

|layers, these should be properly supported.| | |

1- LEAVE A PRESSURE OF 0-0.5KG/CM2 OF CHLORING GAS INSIDE THE CONTAINER WHEN IT HAS BEEN CONSUED.

2- VALVE HOODS SHOULD ALWAYS REMAIN IN POSITION EXCEPT WHEN CONTAINER IS BEING USED.

3- DO NOT LOAD CONTAINERS ON TRUCKS IN THREE LAYERS.

CHLORINE TONNER IS OF WELD STEEL CONSTRUCTION WITH THE NET CARRYING CAPACITY OF APPROXIMATELY 900 KGS.. IT IS CYLINDRICAL IN SHAPE WITH CONCAVE DISHED ENDS ON THE BOTH SIDES. THIS DESIGN IS BASICALLY ADOPTED AS A SAFETY MEASURES TO PREVENT EXPLOSION IS CASE ON UNDUE PRESSURE BUILD UP INSIDE, IN WHICH CONTINGENCY THE CONCAVE DISHED ENDS WILL BULGE OUT, REDUCING THE PRESSURE INSIDE.

ON THE ONE SIDE OF THE DISHED END, TWO VALVES ARE LOCATED NEAR THE CENTRE. BOTH THE VALVES ARE COVERED BY A PROTECTIVE HOOD CONNECTED TO THE CONTAINER BY MEANS OF LUGS. THE INSIDE ENDS OF THE VALVES ARE CONNECTED TO THE EDUCATION PIPES. THE TONNERS ARE ALWAYS KEPT HORIZONTALLY. WHEN THE TWO VALVES ARE IN A VERTICAL ALIGNMENT, ONE BELOW THE OTHERS, GASEOUS CHLORINE CAN BE DRAWN BY OPENING THE UPPER VALVE. THE LOWER VALVE WILL DELIVER LIQUID CHLORINE, WHEN OPENED.

OPERATOR SELECTION AND TRAINING & OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS

It is essential that personnel selected are of adequate physical fitness with having capability of effective communication and reliable under stress conditions

Training should comprise both Off-the-Job and On-the Job

|Off-the Job- |Basic information on the Physical, Chemical and |

| |Toxicological properties of chlorine. |

| |As well as |

| |Detailed description of the process description being |

| |adopted. |

| On-the-Job- |Use of chlorine handling emergency kit and adoption of |

| |emergency procedures and should be carried out under the |

| |guidance of an experienced person, who is familier with the |

| |process and emergency handling. |

Training programme must include coverage of procedures for special operation, which arises only at infrequent intervals like :-

- Shut down

- Isolation

- Preparation of equipment

- Maintenance & inspection

- Plant re-commissioning

- Practice with use of Breathing Apparatus

Emphasis must be given to safety precautions & methods dealing with chemical emergencies.

Re- Tranining Programmes at definite intervals also will increase the working efficiency of the worker for operation as well as for emergency handling.

LIST OF SUPPLIERS OF CHLORING APPARATUS

1. M/s. Arvali Mecial Safety appliances P.Ltd,

4E/15, Ashoka Centro, Jhandewalon Exten,

P.Box No. 5719,

NEW DELHI 110 055.

2. M/s Protective Appliance Services,

85-A,Panchkuian Road,

New Delhi 110 001.

3. M/s Dragerwork Aktiengesell Schaft Lubeck,

Fedral Republic of Germany,

Post Box No 1339,

Moislinger Attee 53/55,

D-2400 Lubeek.

4. M/s Avone (Prod and AGS) P.Ltd,

Baldota Bhavan,

117,m.Karva Marg,

Bombay 400 020

5. M/s Joseph Laslie and Co,

130,Appollo Street,

4th Floor, Post Box No.668,

Bombay 400 001.

6. M/s Chubb Panoramo Ltd,

Industrial Estate Bagnar Regis,

Klest Suresex,

Enclant PO 229 RT UK.

REVIEW OF PAST ACCIDENTS

A container with a compressed gas inside like chlorine is always a potential hazard. The container may give way at fittings or elsewhere due to defective nature of the fittings, corrosion of shell, rough handling and wrong operating procedures by the workers.

Some of the major accidents that occurred in the country from 1970 onwards. These accidents relate to the portable containers including cylinders of chlorine and do not cover static storage.

|SL. NO. |DETAILS |CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT & REQUIRED ACTION & PROCEDURES |

|01- |AT MADRAS CITY ON 9-02-1971 | |

| |200 INJURED | |

| | |On examination, the cylinder was found to have two holes, about|

| |The SIET Women’s collage, Madras had a regular chlorinaion |0.5 cm in diameter through which chlorine( about 34 Kgs.) had |

| |arrangement for purifying swimming pool water. But the |escaped |

| |equipment was lying out of order since long and the purpose|The bottom had extensive pittings caused by external corrosion.|

| |was being served by etting a cylinder occasionally. |The pits, some of which were almost 5 mm deep, were quite old. |

| |On 9-02-1971, about half an hour after chlorine was |Proper care in examination of the cylinders during in each |

| |switched on, the irritating smell of chlorine was perceived|filling on the part of the filling plant could have avoided the|

| |in the class rooms nearby. The leaking gas aided by strong |accident. |

| |wind, invaded the class rooms. |Also the adverse effects could have been substantially reduced,|

| |Out of the 200 gil students, who had to be taken to |if the consumer had proper knowledge of the thorough inspection|

| |hospital, about 100 were admitted as in-patients |procedurebefore taking in and hazards involved and the measures|

| | |to be taken in case of emergency. |

|SL. NO. |DETAILS |CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT & REQUIRED ACTION & PROCEDURES |

|02- |AT NANGAON RATNAGIRI ON | |

| |13-12-1973 | |

| |ONE KILLED AND SIX INJURED | |

| | |If any of the “Bundh” enthusiasms was aware of the nature of |

| |A truck carrying chlorine cylinder on a “Bundh” day was set|the cylinders, and the hazards that the contents may cause. |

| |onfire by some people. The fusible plugs of some cylinders |Perhaps the truck would not have been set on fire. |

| |gave way releasing a large quantity of gas. Out of the | |

| |seven people affected, a child died. | |

| | | |

| | | |

|03- |AT BOMBAY ON 19-12-1973 | |

| |96 INJURED | |

| | | |

| |A fire started in a closed chemical factory lying abandoned| |

| |for some time. Inside a heap of scrap material two chlorine|The factory management, before abandoning the premises, should |

| |cylinders were lying unnoticed. When the fire reached the |have disposed of the dangerous item like the chlorine cylinders|

| |heap, one of the cylinders burst releasing the toxic gas. |in the interest of public safety. |

| |07 firemen and 89 residents of sorrounding locality, were | |

| |affected. | |

|04- | A consignment of 18 cylinders was being unloaded from a |A little awareness of the hazards of chlorine and a little more|

| |truck into the godown of the transport company. In the |care in handling the cylinders could have avoided the mishap. |

| |process of unloading, a cylinder fell from the truck on the| |

| |ground. | |

| | | |

| |The valve protection cap was not fitted to the cylinder. | |

| | | |

| |Due to fall the valve get loosened causing leakage of | |

| |chlorine | |

| | | |

| |Altogather 42 persons in the vicinity were affected. | |

| |Out of them one boy died later. | |

|SL. NO. |DETAILS |CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT & REQUIRED ACTION & PROCEDURES |

|05- |AT BANGLORE ON 9-12-1775 | |

| |96 PERSONS INJURED | |

| | | |

| |In the bleach liquor manufacturing shed of a reputed |If the operator was properly trained on safety measures to be |

| |textile factory in Banglore, two tonne containers were kept|taken in emergency, he would have perhaps closed the valve |

| |on the plateform inbetween the connected troughs containing|averting the accident instead of bolting from the site in a |

| |caustic soda solution for bleaching. A PVC tube fitted to |panic. |

| |container through a copper tube held tight by a clamp, was | |

| |inserted into the solution at the other end. One container,| |

| |filled on 28-11-1975 was on use for several days. | |

| |On 9-12-1975, an operator opened the valve and observed | |

| |leakage of chlorine at the joint of PVC tube and the copper| |

| |tube adapter. | |

| |He rushed to the higher officials to report. By the time, | |

| |the valve was closed by an officer wearing a gas mask, | |

| |atleast 10 kgs. Of chlorine had escaped and moved to the | |

| |hutment area just outside the mill boundary. | |

|06- |AT KONNERIKUPPAM VILLAGE, SOUTH ARCOT DISTRICT, TAMILNADU | |

| |ON 1-07-1980 | |

| |14 KILLED AND 3 INJURED | |

| | | |

| |At Madras six tonne containers filled with chlorine were | |

| |loaded to atruck alongwith ten wooden crates each |Due to impact between the heavy containers aided by the wodden |

| |containing a carboy of 30 kgs. Of glacial acetic acid. |crates, the protection caps was detached and the valve stem got|

| |At the out-skirt of the city, the driver took 15 persons on|broken. |

| |board for a lift upto salem. |In the dazed condition due to accident, the passengers could |

| |On the way the running truck capsized due to bursting of a |not run away from the gushing out chlorine, and were killed by |

| |front tyre. |suffocation. |

| |Eight persons killed on the spot and six out of nine |This unfortunate accident involving loss of so many lives is a |

| |injured died later in hospital. |typical example of the complete lack of safety awareness |

| | |normally encountered within our country. |

|SL. NO. |DETAILS |CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT & REQUIRED ACTION & PROCEDURES |

|07- |AT DADAR, BOMBAY ON | |

| |31-10-1976 | |

| |08 PERSONS ENJURED | |

| | | |

| |A czechoslovokian cylinder manufactured and tested in 1974 |The defective nature of the valve cap and the valve should have|

| |and purchased by the central railways in 1975 was sent from|been noted at Central Store itself before sending it elsewhere,|

| |their Central Stores at Dadar to the Inspector of Works at |and the cylinder should have been sent back immediately to the |

| |Bhopal on 11-06-1976. |filler for rectification of defects. |

| |The later officer found the valve stuck up and the |More careful handling of cylinder during unloading under the |

| |protection cap not fitting to the body. He sent back the |supervision of a responsible officer aware of hazards involved,|

| |cylinder. |also could have averted the accident. |

| |The cylinder was unloaded from railway wagon at Bhyculla | |

| |and sent by a truck to Dadar. | |

| |On 31-10-1976, seven railway porters were unloading the | |

| |cylinder from the truck, 4 being on the ground and 3 on the| |

| |truck. | |

| |In the process, the cylinder slipped, fell on the ground | |

| |and its valve end collied against the wall of a station bus| |

| |and snapping off the valve stem. | |

| |Due to inhalation of chlorine the 7 porters and the driver | |

| |were badly affected and had to be treated in the Railway | |

| |Hospital for a few days. | |

|SL. NO. |DETAILS |CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT & REQUIRED ACTION & PROCEDURES |

|08- |AT ALEPPY, KERALS ON 23-4-1981 | |

| |3 KILLED & 154 INJURED | |

| |A cylinder of czechoslovokian origin was purchased in 1977 |It was quite clear that by keeping the cylinder in a stream of |

| |by the Public Health Department, Kerala from a firm in |water, the corrosion process was only accelerated. |

| |Mumbai. The cylinder meant fro carbon-di-oxide was |Also during the long period of about 15 days, no effect was |

| |permitted to be used for chlorine under certain conditions,|made to contact the filling plant for disposal of leaky |

| |one of which that the valve would be replaced by a chlorine|cylinder. |

| |valve. | |

| |This was, however, not done. | |

| |The cylinder was hydraulically tested on 10-07-1979 in a | |

| |chlorine manufacturing plant in Udyogmandal, Kerala. The | |

| |cylinder was received at pump site no. 2 of PHED at | |

| |Aleppy,Kerala and was kept there in the garage presumably | |

| |for chlorination of drinking water whenever necessary. | |

| |A fortnight before the accident, the gas started leaking | |

| |from the cylinder. It was then shifted from garage and kept| |

| |in the drain ducts below the water reservoir with the | |

| |anticipation that leaking gas would get dissolved in water.| |

| | | |

| |On 23-4-1981 chlorine started gushing out through a hole | |

| |punctured through the neck of the cylinder. | |

| |The gas spread to the adjoining ladies hostel. The inmates,| |

| |exposed unaware to the atmosphere, were severely affected | |

| |. Out of 157 ladies admitted to hospital, three died and | |

| |others were released after varied periods of treatment. | |

|SL. NO. |DETAILS |CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT & REQUIRED ACTION & PROCEDURES |

|09- |LEAKAGE OF CHLORINE TONNER IN A POWER PLANT IN U.P | |

| | | |

| |A filled Chlorine tonner, was lying in the plant premises | |

| |unattended at an isolated bushy area for a longer period. |The inventory and proper placement/storage of the cylinder |

| |The use of chlorine for water purification had been stoped |could have inverted the scene. |

| |and the management had switched over to bleach for water | |

| |purification. | |

| |One day cyliner started leaking, initially slowly, later on| |

| |due to the corrosion effect over the valve neck, the valve | |

| |shered of form the cylinder body. The releage of heavy | |

| |amount of chlorine lead to serious environment | |

| |contamination. | |

| | | |

| |Actually it may become a major accident and its heavy | |

| |consequences may be seen, if the reverse wind direction | |

| |took place as well as the foresty area consumed the | |

| |chlorine vapours. Further the high boundary wall of the | |

| |plant restricted the travel of chlorine vapours going | |

| |outside the plant premises. | |

FEW CASE STUDIES OF OTHER ACCIDENTS OCCURED IN THE FACTORIES

|TYPE OF JOB |INCIDENT DETAILS |FINDINGS/ OBSERVATIONS |MEASURES TO BE TAKEN |TYPES OF ERRORS |

| | | | | |

|CLEANING AND REPAIRS OF A|A STORAGE TANK WAS IN |A THIN FILM OF HYDROCARBON |STEAM HEATING AND PURGING SHOULD BE |- POOR TRAINING |

|LARGE STORAGE TANK |HEAVY HYDROCARBON |COATING ON THE TANK WALL |DONE BEFORE COMMENCEMENT OF ANY HOT |- MANAGEMENT |

| |SERVICE; |MELTED, EVAPORATED AND CAUGHT |JOBS. | |

| |IT WAS FLUSHED, OPENED, |FIRE, WHEN WELDING WAS |SAMPLES OF THE SIDE COATINGS SHOULD |FAILURE |

| |AND SLUDGE WAS CLEANED |COMMENCED. |BE TESTED FOR FLAMMABILITY | |

| |OFF. ON INSPECTION, A | | |- OPERATOR |

| |CRACK WAS NOTICED IN THE | | |FAILURE |

| |WALL; | | | |

| |AFTER ISSUING A FIRE | | | |

| |PERMIT AND GAS TEST, | | | |

| |WELDING WAS STARTED, THE| | | |

| |TANK WALL CAUGHT FIRE | | | |

| |FROM INSIDE | | | |

| | | | | |

|DRAINING OF RESIDUAL | | | | |

|STEAM FROM THE JACKET OF | | |THE DRAIN PIPE SHOULD BE REGID AND | |

|A REACTION VESSEL |THE OPERATOR OPENED THE |THE FREE END OF THE FLEXIBLE |NOT OF A FLEXIBLE TYPE; | |

| |STEAM DRAIN VALVE ON THE |HOSE PIPE WAS NOT CLAMPED; |IF THE USE OF A FLEXIBLE HOSE IS |- POOR TRAINING |

| |JACKET OF THE VESSEL; | |UNAVOIDABLE, ITS FREE END SHOULD BE |- MANAGEMENT |

| | |THE VALVE ON THE STEAM DRAIN |CLAMPED WITH ITS OPEN END DIRECTED | |

| |THE FREE END OF THE HOSE |LINE WAS OPENED FULLY AT ONE |AWAY FROM THE OPERATOR IN A SAFE |FAILURE |

| |PIPE FIXED TO NOZZLE OF |GO. |DIRECTION; | |

| |THE DRAIN VALVE BEGAN TO | |STAEM SHOULD BE LET OFF SLOWLY BY |- OPERATOR |

| |FLAP ABOUT WHEN STEAM | |INITIALLY CRACKING OPEN THE STEAM |FAILURE |

| |EMERGED; | |DRAIN VALVE; | |

| | | |THE STEAM DRAIN VALVE SHOULD BE | |

| |WHEN THE HOSE PIPE BEGAN | |LOCATED SOME DISTANCE AWAY FROM THE | |

| |TO FLAP ABOUT, AT ONE | |STEAM DRAIN OUTLET. | |

| |STAGE, IT WAS DIRECTED ON| | | |

| |THE LEGS OF AN OPERATOR | | | |

| |CAUSING SEVERE STEAM | | | |

| |BURNS. | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

|TYPE OF JOB |INCIDENT DETAILS |FINDINGS/ OBSERVATIONS |MEASURES TO BE TAKEN |TYPES OF ERRORS |

| | | | | |

|BRUSTING OF STEAM |AN INDENT WAS RECEIVED |THE SAID PRESSURE VESSEL’S |PRESSURE VESSEL SHOULD BE CLEARLY |MANAGEMENT FAILURE |

|JACKETED PRESSURE VESSEL |FROM MAINTENENCE DEPT. |SAFE WORKING PRESSURE WAS 1.7 |MARKED WITH THEIR SAFE WORKING | |

|USED FOR CURING MATERIALS|THAT THE REQUIRED |KG/CM2(g) AND THE REQUIRED |PRESSURE AND THERE SHOULD BE RED LINE|POOR TRAINING |

| |TEMPERATURE WAS NOT BEING|TEMP. WAS ACHIEVED AT THE |MARK ON THE PRESSURE GAUGE; | |

| |OBTAINED ON A STEAM |PRESSURE OF 1.47 KG/CM2(g). |BEING THE RESPONSIBLE PERSON, THE |OPERATOR ERROR |

| |JACKETED VESSEL |THERE WAS NO MARKING EITHER ON|SUPERVISOR SHOULD ALWAYS FET A FEED | |

| |A MAINTENENCE FITTER WENT|PRESSURE GAUGE OR PRESSURE |BACK FROM THE CONCERNED FITTER | |

| |TO THE SITE AND RAISED |VESSEL REGARDING ITS SAFE |REGARDING REPAIRS CARRIED OUT ON | |

| |STEAM PRES. FORM 2.6 TO |WORKING PRESSURE; |MACHINES; | |

| |3.0 Kg./cm2(g). THIS WAS |TWO MONTHS PRIOR TO THE |THE SAFETY VALVE SHOULD BE EXAMINED | |

| |DONE ALMOST AT THE END OF|MISHAP, THE REQUIRED TEMP. WAS|PERIODICALLY, IN THEIR PARTICULAR | |

| |1ST SHIFT. |ACHIEVED WITH 1.47 KG/CM2 |SETTINGS; | |

| |AGAIN AT THE START OF THE|STEAM PRESSURE; |PROPERTROUBLE SHOOTING IS REQUIRED | |

| |SECOND SHIFT, AN INDENT |THERE WAS A PROBLEM WITH THE |INSTEAD OF BLIND ACTION. | |

| |WAS RECEIVED THAT THERE |CONDENSATE SYSTEM AND THE | | |

| |WAS A STEAM LEAKAGE ON |CONCERNED FITTERS WERE RAISING| | |

| |THE SAME VESSEL. |THE STEAM PRESS., INSTEAD OF | | |

| |WHEN THE FITTER WENT TO |FINDING A FAULT IN THE | | |

| |THE SITE, HE NOTICED THAT|CONDENSATE REMOVAL SYATEM. | | |

| |THE SAFETY VALVE HAD |MOREEVR THE SAFETY VALVE WAS | | |

| |LIFTED UP. HE TIGHTENED |SET ABOVE 2.7 KG.CM2 AGAINST | | |

| |SAFETY VALVE SCREW. |SAFE WORKING PRESSURE OF 1.47 | | |

| |AFTER ABOUT 4 |KG/CM2 | | |

| |HOURS, THERE WAS AN |ON THE DAY OF ACCIDENT, THE | | |

| |EXPLOSION AND THE VESSEL |SECOND SHIFT FITTER WITHOUT | | |

| |BURST. LUCKILY NOBODY WAS|INVESTIGATING,WHY THE SAFETY | | |

| |INJURED. |VALVE HAD BLOWN, JUST | | |

| | |TIGHTENED THE PRESSURE SETTING| | |

| | |SCREW. | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

|TYPE OF JOB |INCIDENT DETAILS |FINDINGS/ OBSERVATIONS |MEASURES TO BE TAKEN |TYPES OF ERRORS |

| | | | | |

|LHSH TANK BRUSTING |LSHS MAIN STORAGE TANK |THERE WAS A PRESSURE BUILD UP |INSTALL LOW LEVEL AND HIGH LEVEL | |

| |ROO BRUST OPEN GIVING OUT|IN THE TANK DUE TO THE RUPTURE|ALARMS FOR THE STORAGE TANK; |MANAGEMENT FAILURE |

| |FUMES AND SPILLING HOT |OF THE HEATING STEAM COILS |CHECK ALL LSHS SUPPLY TANKERS FOR | |

| |LHSH IN THE AREA |INSIDE THE TANK, AND |WATER CONTENT OF MAXIMUM 1% |POOR TRAINING |

| | |SUBSEQUENT BOILING OF WATER |BEFORE UNLOADING TANKERS; | |

| | |DUE TO HIGH TEMPERATURE. |PRESSURE TESTHEATER COILS ONCE A YEAR| |

| | | |INSTALL AN ADEQUATE SIZED GOOSE NECK | |

| | | |VENT ON THE TOP OF TANK; | |

| | | |PERIODICALLY DRAIN THE TANK BOTTOM TO| |

| | | |GET RID OF WATER; | |

| | | |USE LOW PRESSURE STEAM INSTEAD OF | |

| | | |MEDIUM OR HIGH PRESSURE STEAM IN THE | |

| | | |COILS | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | |UNDER NO CIRCUMTANCES HYDRAULIC | |

|RUPTURE OF PIPE DURING |THE HYDRAULIC PRESSURE |NORMAL CODE OF HYDRAULIC |PRESSURE TEST BE SUBSTITUTED BY AIR | |

|PRESSURE TEST |TESTING PUMP WAS BUSY, |PRESSURE TESTING WAS FOUND |OR STEAM-IT IS HAZARDOUS; | |

| |BUT THE HIGH PRESSURE AIR|VOILATED |PNEUMATIC AND STEAM TEST AS A SPECIAL| |

| |LINE WAS READILY | |CASE MAY BE RESTRICTED TO LOW | |

| |AVAILABLE NEAR THE | |PRESSURE WITH CLOSE SUPERVISION. |MANAGEMENT FAILURE |

| |PIPELINE; | | | |

| |PNEUMATIC PRESS. TESTING | | |POOR TRAINING |

| |WAS IN PROGRESS; | | | |

| |PIPELINE GOT RUPTURED AND| | | |

| |FLYING SPLINTERS INJURED | | | |

| |TWO WORKERS SERIOUSLY | | | |

|TYPE OF JOB |INCIDENT DETAILS |FINDINGS/ OBSERVATIONS |MEASURES TO BE TAKEN |TYPES OF ERRORS |

| | | | | |

|INSPECTION OF AGITATOR |THE PROCESS VESSEL |IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT |A PERMIT SYSTEM FOR ENTRY INTO VESSEL| |

|BEARING OF A PROCESS |NORMALLY CONTAINS |SUFFICIENT TIME HAD NOT BEEN |HAS TO BE INSTITUTED, WHEREIN ENTRY |MANAGEMENT FAILURE |

|VESSEL |CATALYST IMPREGNATED IN |ALLOWED TO ELAPSE BETWEEN |IS PERMITTED INTO THE VESSEL, ONLY IF| |

| |OIL UNDER AN ATMOSPHERE |PURGING THE VESSEL WITH CO2 |THERE IS ADEQUATE SUPPLY OF |POOR TRAINING |

| |OF HYDROGEN. AS THE |AND ASKING THE TECHNICIAN TO |BREATHABLE AIR AND A FRESH AIR HOSE | |

| |AGITATOR BEARING WAS |ENTER THE BASE TANK. |HAS TO BE CONNECTED TO THE VESSEL |OPERATOR ERROR |

| |MAKING AN ABNORMAL SOUND,|NO CHECK FOR OXYGEN CONTENT | | |

| |THE PLANT WAS SHUT DOWN |HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT. | | |

| |AND HYDROGEN WAS PURGED | | | |

| |OUT OF THE TANK USING CO2| | | |

| |FROM A CYLINDER BANK; | | | |

| |AN OPERATOR WAS ASKED TO | | | |

| |GO INSIDE THE VESSEL TO | | | |

| |INSPECT THE BEARING, | | | |

| |WHILE HIS FOREMAN WAS | | | |

| |STANDING OUTSIDE; | | | |

| |THE OPERATOR COLLAPSED | | | |

| |INSIDE THE TANK FOR WANT | | | |

| |OF SUFFICIENT OXYGEN AND | | | |

| |WAS PULLED OUT BY | | | |

| |FOREMAN. | | | |

| | |THE WORKMAN INSTEAD OF | | |

|REACTOR ENTRY | |CHECKING WITH THE OPERATING | | |

| |A WORKMAN ENTERED THE |STAFF WHETHER THE REACTOR |AN IMPROVED COMMUNICATION AND | |

| |REACTOR WITHOUT AN ENTRY |SHOULD BE ENTERED OR NOT, |TRAINING BEFORE ANY SHUTDOWN TO | |

| |PERMIT WITH THE AIM OF |DECIDED ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE |RE-EMPHASISE THE VESSEL ENTRY | |

| |LEVELLING THE CATALYST |TO DO SO AND FURTHER, |PROCEDURE; | |

| |SUPPORT MATERIAL AND WAS |MISTAKING A NITROGEN POINT | | |

| |OVERCOME BY THE NITROGEN |FOR COMPRESSED AIR, CONNECTED |THIS TRAINING SHOULD ALSO HIGHLIGHT | |

| |IN THE REACTOR; |THE SAME TO THE REACTOR |THAT RESCUE OPERATION SHOULD BE DONE | |

| | |FORCOOLING; |AFTER CONSULTATION AND TAKING | |

| |ANOTHER PERSON ENTERED TO| |ADEQUATE PREACUTIONS. | |

| |RESCUE THE ABOVE WORKMAN | | | |

| |WITHOUT TAKING ANY SAFETY| | |MANAGEMENT FAILURE |

| |PREACUTIONS OR | | | |

| |CONSULTATION AND WAS ALSO| | |POOR TRAINING |

| |AFFECTED. | | | |

| | | | |OPERATOR ERROR |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

|TYPE OF JOB |INCIDENT DETAILS |FINDINGS/ OBSERVATIONS |MEASURES TO BE TAKEN |TYPES OF ERRORS |

| | | | | |

|REACTOR BATCH CHARGING |AROMATIC OIL AND ACID |AS THE OXIDISING ACID WAS |THERE MUST BE A PROPER SEQUENCE OF | |

| |CATALYST WERE CHARGED |CHARGED INTO THE REACTOR |CHARGING THE FEED INTO THE REACTOR. A|MANAGEMENT FAILURE |

| |INTO A REACTOR; |HAVING AROMATIC OIL LAYER ON |WORKMAN ON THE JOB SHOULD BE AWARE OF| |

| |AN OXIDISING ACID WAS |TOP, THERE WAS INSTANTENEOUS |THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WHAT HE IS |POOR TRAINING |

| |THEN CHARGED INTO THE |VIOLENT REACTION CAUSING |OPERATING, AND HAZARDOUS PROPERTIES | |

| |REACTOR UNDER VACUUM FROM|PRESSURE INSIDE; |OF CHEMICALS HE HANDLES; |OPERATOR ERROR |

| |A BUCKET THROUGH A HOSE |WHEN THE VALVE ON CHARGING |ANY OF THE FOLLOWING OXIDISING AGENTS| |

| |CONNECTION; |LINE WAS OPENED, THE PRESSURE |LIKE CONC. NITRIC ACID, POT. PER | |

| |THE MOMENT THE VALVE ON |IN THE REACTOR RELEASED |MANGNATE, HYDROGEN PEROXIDE,SODIUM | |

| |THE CHARGING VACUUM LINE |THROUGH THE HOS AND THE ACID |HYPOCHLORITE etc. MUST EITHER BE | |

| |WAS OPENED, ACID FROM THE|FROM THE BUCKET SPLASHED |CHARGED IN AN AQUEOUS MEDIUM | |

| |BUCKET SPLASHED SUDDENLY |AROUND CAUSING SEVERE BURN |OR BEFORE CHARGING ORGANIC AROMATIC | |

| |ON THE BODY OF THE |INJURY. |OIL INTO THE REACTOR. | |

| |WORKER, CAUSING SEVERE | | | |

| |BURN INJURY AND A FIRE ON| | | |

| |THE FLOOR SPILLAGE. | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

| | | | | |

C:\temp\g k pandey.doc

-----------------------

1- DO NOT USE RUBBER HOSE FOR LIQUID CHLORINE SERVICE

2- USE SEAMLESS COPPER TUBE OR C.S. PIPING ONLY

3- USE LEAD WASHERS

4- DO NOT MAKE CONNECTIONS FROM THE LOWER VALVE

................
................

In order to avoid copyright disputes, this page is only a partial summary.

Google Online Preview   Download