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Robi Kroflič, PhD, Senior Lecturer

CAN CREATIVITY BE CULTIVATED THROUGH AUTHORITY? (draft version)

(For symposium Quality Education and Creativity, Pula, 14–16 June 2001)

Abstract:

The author begins with the Kantian definition of creativity as freedom of the spirit able to ask essential existential questions and take due responsibility for the answers at which it arrives (Passmore). The definition originates in the paradigm of man as an autonomous being – a paradigm increasingly often contrasted with the idea of the child’s spontaneous creativity which education effectively suppresses. I nevertheless believe that my argument can be successful, since certain analyses of puer aeternus show a link with outbursts of creative imagination particularly in the field of art, which may, however, be accompanied by narcissism and covert authoritarianism. Other problems connected with permissive educational concepts include the incapability of encouraging “healthy” internal motivation to invest effort into creative activity and the impossibility of the transference of the spontaneity of family education into institutional environments. Education for creativity must therefore be based on clear authority which encourages/motivates the child to develop the necessary cognitive abilities and willingness to empathise with the outside world, as well as responsibly seek solutions to ethical dilemmas. It also entails a reorientation from the concept of education as reproduction of traditions to one of education as promotion of the development of personality potentials necessary for creative processes.

Keywords:

Creativity, authority, autonomy, spontaneity, permissive education, puer aeternus, pathological Narcissism.

When we consider education that encourages the development of the child’s ability to solve existential problems creatively and responsibly, we face one of the toughest issues in education theory, most explicitly formulated by I. Kant as follows:

“One of the greatest problems of education is how to reconcile submission to the coercive law with the capability to exercise our freedom … How do I cultivate freedom through coercion?”

(Kant 1988, p. 157)

Since education is always paradigmatic and agogic and therefore always connected with coercion, it is relatively easy to see it as mere reproduction of existing knowledge, patterns of thought, values, views and (moral) habits, and much more difficult to see it as an activity which, while indeed assisting children to control their thought patterns (paradigms) and instructing them to develop basic life orientations (agogicity), also cultivates their potentials to think independently and creatively. It is hardly surprising that many distinguished sceptics saw it primarily as a tool used by adults to inoculate into children a bulk of (un)necessary knowledge, unreflected customs and illusions, and, as S. Freud sarcastically wrote in Civilization and Its Discontents, that “education is behaving as though one were to equip people starting on a Polar expedition with summer clothing and maps of the Italian Lakes.” (Freud 1979, p. 344-345); in The Future of an Illusion he added: “Think of the depressing contrast between the radiant intelligence of a healthy child and the feeble intellectual powers of the average adult.” (Quoted from Millot 1983, p. 184)

Education theory provides two possible solutions to the conflict between the coercive character of education and its task – to form a freely thinking human; they are related to two different conceptions of creativity. According to the first, creativity emerges from the child’s innate imagination and inquisitiveness, and will develop spontaneously if we do not restrain it at an early age with out demands and matrices but rather encourage the child’s independent activity. According to the second, children will develop into autonomous and creative persons only if they successfully resist the dictate of the biologically based pleasure principle and choose the difficult task of independent thinking instead of embracing the pleasure of following external authorities; this can only be achieved through the pressure of education aiming at the disciplining of the will (the motivation to use the mind freely).

This basic conflict within the twentieth-century pedagogy – between the permissive and repressive models of education – is therefore related not only to the general attitudes to the use of permissive or repressive methods and devices, but also to the attitude to the possibility of encouraging the development of creative potentials.

My point of departure is the definition of creativity as freedom of the spirit able to ask the essential existential questions and take due responsibility for the answers at which it arrives. Of the psychologists interested in the phenomenon of creativity, this dimension was best expressed by E. Hilgard, who wrote that “…creativity is mainly about discovery, that is, addressing, opening problems, not about their solving… The very addressing of a problem often indicates its solution. Thousands of solutions, inventions and discoveries would still be closed and unknown, had not there been creative minds who asked the relevant questions.” (Hilgard, Creativity and Problem Solving, Anderson (ed.), Creativity and Its Cultivation, New York 1959; quoted from Trstenjak 1981, p. 29) According to A. Einstein, putting a new question clearing the path to new discoveries takes a certain degree of naivety, that is, a sense of spontaneity, ingenuity and freedom from conventionality and settledness, since it is precisely “…intolerance to old laws that brings about the discovery of the new ones” (ibid.). The freedom of thought was described by psychologists as a form of divergent thought (Guilford) or as contact with one’s pre-focal (unconscious) thoughts (Thurstone), which affects the whole personality and its value system (R. B. Catel), since a creative personality must be able to reject and overcome previous experiences (N. E. Golovin) (ibid. p. 26–68). The relationship between cognitive abilities and motivational factors enabling the rejection of the existing thought patterns must be particularly emphasised if we are to believe that adults with their educational authority have an important influence on the development of the child’s creativity. M. Pergar-Kuščer, for example, found a statistically significant link between the teacher’s creativity and certain personality traits (sociability, daring, gaiety, class loyalty, discipline, emotional stability, down-to-earth attitude) on one hand and the development of the pupils’ creativity on the other (Pergar-Kuščer 1994, p. 256-263).

The paradox of the link between the development of creativity (conceived as freedom of the spirit) and educational authority therefore cannot be avoided even in psychological research. Moreover, the original contradiction of the project “Education for Freedom of the Spirit” seems to be even more serious if we consider the two apparently irreconcilable ideas which emerge as preconditions for free and creative thinking:

• creativity is not possible without a certain spontaneity, freedom of thought;

• creativity develops on the basis of the teacher’s authority and the child’s motivation to reject the existing patterns of thought, evaluation, etc., which is an essential trait of an autonomous personality.

The author of the second idea and its education model, based on the concept of autonomy, is I. Kant. It is interesting that the whole life project of Kant’s philosophy can be linked to the issue of defining man as a free being capable of creating new ideas (pure reason), of imagination (judgment) and practical decision (practical reason). Kant is of course aware that man is primarily a natural being subject to natural laws (causality) capable of growth in his natural spontaneity to reach a certain level of well-being in which his needs are fulfilled relatively without restriction; but according to Kant, this biological basis is not where we should expect to find human freedom and creativity. These properties can only become real in the area of human reason, which obeys different principles of causality and order. It is characteristic of reason that it can create a priori ideas, as well as take practical decisions which are completely free from the dictate of the momentary need or social pressure. According to Kant, this is possible because in the world of reason the laws of natural causality do not apply; they are replaced by the capability to create new ideas spontaneously.

Kant therefore sees the freedom of the mind in its pure positive form as spontaneous production of new ideas. But he never forgets that man is not only an intelligible being, but also a natural (biological) one, which puts the practical possibility of the free mind in a completely different existential perspective. The split between the biological and spiritual natures brings spontaneous decision-making into the vicinity of the pleasure principle, the fulfilment of our needs, which runs contrary to the idea of free use of one’s reason. This is true particularly in juveniles, who depend on their parents, teachers, priests and other important others and at the same time lack the fully developed structures of reason to direct their will and motivation to act. The pleasure principle drives them to submit themselves to the authority of the important others and to the dictate of biological needs. That is why Kant in his Answer to A Question: What Is the Enlightenment says that we should not blame man’s immaturity on his lack of reason, but rather on his lack of will (Kant 1987, p. 9); he is convinced that an enlightened pedagogy must on one hand train the child’s reason and on the other discipline and strengthen his will (for a more detailed presentation of Kant’s philosophy and pedagogy see Kroflič 1997, pp. 161-203).

J. Passmore links Kant’s conception of man as split between the biologically determined and the free rational natures with the concept of the emerging capability of critical thinking, which can also be described as creative and responsible thinking. He says that critical thinking cannot be defined as a “mental skill”, but rather as a “character trait”. Accordingly, he differentiates three levels of critical thinking: the level of critical competence, which is identical with mental skill; the level of critical spirit, which typically makes possible critical judgment of given situations and decisions; and the level of creative critical thinking, which combines the abilities to maintain critical distance and to creatively transcend the existing solutions (Passmore 1975, On Teaching to be Critical, summarised from Fenstermacher 1992, pp. 96-97). According to Passmore, the development through these levels is connected with different dimensions of teaching. Whereas the training of mental skills is sufficient to reach the first level of critical competence, the teacher who wants to achieve higher levels must “develop the pupils’ enthusiasm for responsible participation in critical discussions” (ibid., p. 97).

It is interesting that this view of human nature was embraced by all great Enlightenment thinkers, and later by most scientists in the period of separation of the arts and social sciences. Even, J. J. Rousseau, the great critic of disciplining as the basic task of education, did not oppose Kant’s statement that children are inclined to imitate adults and that we should, with a careful control the educational environment, restrict the child’s excessive desires and needs – not by disciplinary measures and punishment, but by a careful manipulation of the natural conditions to make the child feel the resistance of the situation and give up his momentary needs: if he wishes to play outside naked in winter, he will be cold and will want to dress himself voluntarily… Even more interesting for us is the attitude of psychoanalysis to the child’s spontaneous play. The analysts – as followers of the Kantian concept of man – do not see in it as much a proof of the child’s boundless creativity as a symbolic “remedy” for the momentary tensions and conflicts arising from his contradictory nature: let us just remember the many symbolic games in which the child compensates for failed separation processes (the child, for example, hides under a sheet, meaning that he was swallowed by a whale, and then attempts to crawl out – i.e. escape from the whale’s stomach).

Different conceptions of education assisting the development of the child’s creative potentials are therefore not so much a result of different key assumptions regarding their developmental nature. And if I began by quoting Freud’s thought of the difference between the “radiant intelligence of a healthy child” and “the feeble intellectual powers of the average adult”, I must emphasise here that in spite of his conviction that most neuroses result from overly repressive education, Freud did not embrace the illusion of “friendly repression-free education” and the “spontaneous development of the child’s creativity”. There are at least two reasons for this.

The first is of theoretical nature. Freud is convinced that man as a cultural being simply needs a certain degree of pressure, frustration, since he must learn to resist the destructive contradictory pressure of his drives; therefore the prohibition of incest is the first act of every culture, and realistic demands for the sublimation of one’s needs are the “engine” of education: “… if we took away the family, this germ of culture, it is impossible to foresee what new paths the development of culture would take; but we can be certain that the indestructible characteristic of the human nature (the split of the drives between eros and thanatos, note by R. K.) would follow him there.« (Freud 1979, p. 321) According to Freud, education must therefore be moderately repressive for the individual to learn to control the destructive dictate of his own drives, which on one hand force him to seek the protection of the authority of important adults (the tendency of eros or libido) and on the other encourage distancing, resistance and search for one’s own identity (the tendency of thanatos or aggression).

Freud wrote about the second reason in Civilisation and Its Discontents; he found it “empirically”, that is, in the clinical practice of the time which in rare cases confirmed his theoretical surmises: “The two main types of pathogenic methods of upbringing – overstrictness and spoiling – have been accurately assessed by Franz Alexander. The unduly lenient and indulgent father is the cause of children’s forming an over-severe superego, because, under the impression of the love that they receive, they have no other outlet for their aggressiveness but turning it inwards.” (Ibid., pp. 339-340)

To what can we therefore attribute the twentieth century boom of the philosophies of spontaneous development of the child’s creativity in various orientations of reform pedagogy and rejection of the repressive, frustrating education allegedly suppressing the child’s development of creative potentials? In my opinion, the reform movement in pedagogy is primarily a response to the prevailing repressive and rigidly repetitive pedagogy at the turn of the century, characterised by a persevering exorcist view of education as correction of the child’s sinful nature and as a transfer of the pre-made corpus of knowledge and values from the older to the younger generation – typical of the so-called cultural transmission model of education. To avoid this repressive view of the inherently sinful nature of the child, which can be seen in the attempts to suppress his/her sexual development and in teaching methods based on the repetition of knowledge and values utterly disregarding the development of the child’s independent mental practices and the training of cognitive structures, the alternative educationalists advocated:

• as for discipline, a more relaxed education based on positive emotions (the pedagogical eros) and relaxed educational authority (e.g. A. S. Neill);

• as for teaching methods, education emphasising the child’s free activity, learning through play and the expression of emotions through art (e.g. the representatives of the Arbeitsschule, M. Montessorri, R. Steiner, L. Malaguzzi).

Although reservations about free education appeared as early as in the thirties (F. Alexander, A. Aichorn, S. Freud), individual reform projects aimed at an unhindered development of the child’s spontaneous creativity were undoubtedly successful to a certain extent. Jung’s student M. L. von Franz in her work Puer aeternus analysed the biographies of certain distinguished artists of the beginning of the twentieth century (with the focus on Saint-Exupéry – the author of The Little Prince) and showed convincingly that narcissist personalities (and pathological narcissism is believed to be the prevailing personality type produced by the permissive educational practice of the twentieth century) develop a high level of artistic creativity; Malaguzzi’s Reggio Emilia project was also exceptionally successful in the development of artistic creativity in pre-school children.

In addition to the pathology typical of the “eternal youth” personality type (her descriptions are comparable to the symptoms of pathological narcissism described by O. Kernberg in his theory of object relationships), von Franz also stressed certain positive traits which may develop in such personality: wittiness, unconventionality, boyish charm and lovingly cultivated imagination (von Franz 1988, pp. 9-10); she noted that “… the tendency to resort to surprisingly childish pleasures is not only a symptom of the problem of puer aeternus, but is also part of a creative personality. Creativity requires a great deal of sincerity, freedom of internal impulses and spontaneity… The inclination to playfulness is something perfectly natural and ingenuous in most artists and other creative people. For them, play is a great relaxation and a way to recover after a great and exhausting creative effort. Therefore this trait of Saint-Exupéry’s personality cannot be attributed only to his nature as puer aeternus, but perhaps also to the fact that he was an artist.” (Ibid., p. 27)

On one hand, the eternal youth is typically characterised by the mother complex, which can lead to asocial individualism (ibid., p. 7) and a marked lack of self-control – which is a necessary component of the creative process (“Every work, even creative work, contains a degree of tedious routine that a puer aeternus shuns, saying ‘this is not it’.” /Ibid., p. 11/). On the other hand, his spontaneous imaginative creation displays something which may further complicate our consideration of the preconditions for the development of creativity. In his essay The Psychology of the Child Archetype, C. G. Jung wrote: “…the child symbolises the pre-conscious and super-conscious essences of man. His pre-conscious essence is the unconscious state of the earliest childhood; his super-conscious essence is the analogous anticipation of an afterlife. This idea expresses the all-embracing nature of the psychic whole… The ‘eternal youth’ in man is an indescribable experience, a discord, hindrance and divine exclusive right… the immeasurable which determines the highest worthiness or unworthiness of the personality.« (Ibid., p. 53)

Neither Jung nor von Franz provided a final answer to the question whether puer aeternus with his life orientation is a sign of pathology of permissive education and culture or, on the contrary, a sign of divine choice. Indeed Von Franz explicitly mentioned the very practical problem of when to decide to cure a narcissist personality, since the symptoms alone cannot tell us whether a person is a genius or a complex-ridden individual. The motif of eternal youth in Jungian psychoanalysis can be a symptom of infantilism dragging like a shadow from a conflictive childhood or a sign of a divine talent revealed in youthful energy investable into an active and creative designing of one’s future (ibid., p. 30).

For an educationalist, another question is important: can the existence of certain positive traits of puer aeternus or narcissist personality mislead us to see the permissive, motherly model of education as the most suitable for encouraging creativity?

I will attempt to justify my negative answer with a theoretical analysis of Jung’s concept of genius as an exclusive divine right and an analysis of the success of certain educational concepts of reformist permissive pedagogy.

If Jung links the presence of the puer aeternus archetype in a genius with a “divine right”, then the latter’s creative nature cannot be attributed to the effects of education at all! Indeed creative personalities have existed throughout human history regardless of the type of education they received in their childhood. It seems that neither the extremely authoritarian education of the fatherly type nor the possessive loving permissive education of the motherly type could smother the creativity of these chosen individuals. What is more, the repressive effects of education – which can result from either the father’s excessive demands for conformist submission or from all-embracing motherly love not allowing the child to begin the process of individuation and liberation from the symbiotic link – certainly cause suffering, and the acceptance of suffering can arrest the child’s development or even cause painful regression – or, on the other hand, instigate personal growth oriented towards responsible, creative decision-making. Many theoreticians of the twentieth century wrote about the overcoming of suffering as a precondition for personal growth: V. Frankl, M. Montessorri, S. Weil, C. G. Jung, as well as the aforementioned M. L. von Franz: “… the child in the adult is a source of suffering; it is the child who suffers, since man with the adult part of his personality can accept life as it is, and suffers less. Childhood suffering is the most painful; it is the true suffering, even if it is about trivialities – that one must go to bed at a time when one wants to play… Many adults simply cut off this part and so miss the true path to individuation, since this process can only develop if one accepts one’s childishness and the suffering that goes with it.« (Ibid., p. 62)

The experience of limitation and suffering emerging from thwarted satisfaction is particularly emphasised in the theology of St. Paul, according to whom the knowledge of the law made us aware of our own sinful nature, and it is only this awareness that can lead us to salvation by divine grace (Romans 7: 7-11). Even more interesting for us is Lacan’s derivation of the concept of desire from St. Paul’s view of the relationship between the law and sin; Lacan replaces Paul’s sin with the analytical concept of Thing as the object of desire (Lacan 1988, p. 85). Cultural limitations presented to the child during education cause frustration (suffering), but at the same time trigger the development of desire; according to Lacan, without the latter there is no human striving for freedom. To put it simple, Lacan sees an unhindered child as weary and unmotivated to overcome his limitations, while the experience of obstacles encountered during education triggers desire, that is, independent, imaginative yearning (the concept of sublimation) and a tendency to realise the object of desire (the concept of phantasm).

These thoughts should not be interpreted as an appeal for repressive education. On the contrary! If we are aware of the conflictive nature of human development, as well as the conflictive nature of education itself, which can never avoid certain frustrations, we really cannot talk about education as friendly and conflict-free; nevertheless, we are ethically responsible to assist the child in the solving of conflicts and the soothing of tensions! In education, this role is best contained in the concepts of educational authority and pedagogical eros.

From this perspective, many positive effects of reformist permissive pedagogy can be interpreted. Let us consider two typical examples to illustrate two of the typical features of reform pedagogy: the new concept of the disciplinary function of education and the demand for encouraging the child’s active imaginative creativity.

A. S. Neill, the founder of the Summerhill project, based his concept of education on the trust in the child, in his internal motivation to learn (class attendance is not compulsory) and his capability of negotiating and accepting the rules to solve conflicts (the concept of Saturday meetings in which the pupils themselves determine the rules of residence and supervise compliance). Although as a theoretician he sometimes misjudged the true nature of his education (for example, he thought that he educated without authority), he often successfully applied the new concept of pedagogical eros and authority as a practitioner. He understood pedagogical eros as an essential trust in the child who is naturally good, bright, realistic and will, if allowed his freedom and spared the interfering influence of important adults, develop his own natural capabilities optimally (Neill, Summerhill; quoted from Millot 1983, p. 207); and he saw authority as the power of personality which the teacher must be able to control, giving the child the opportunity to make independent decisions. This principle is well illustrated in the following anecdote: “‘Come on, teach me something, I’m bored,’ asks a girl who has not been doing any work at school for years. ‘OK,’ says Neill enthusiastically, ‘what do you want to learn?’ ‘I don’t know’, she says. ‘All right, I don’t know either,’ says he and leaves her there.” (Ibid., p. 210) According to Millot, Neill in such cases disregarded the danger of obligatory freedom, which may make the child see such gesture as pressure of the demand: be free!; but as an intuitively good practitioner, Neill evaded such danger with two basic features: with the suggestive power of his personality linked to pedagogical eros, which signalled to the child that he believed in the correctness of the child’s decisions; and with the fact that his reserved stance, as he limited his suggestions what children should do or what rules might make the life at Summerhill most effective, allowed the children to “free themselves of the submission to the demand of the Other and achieve their own desire.” (Ibid., p. 214) This orientation is best illustrated in Neill’s statement that the key to Summerhill’s success is in the democratic system of rules adoption, the Saturday meetings which introduced the children to “the dimension of symbolic order” (ibid., p. 209) which they learned to create themselves; and this in turn strengthened their autonomous position in the Kantian sense of the word: use your mind freely, but obey its laws unconditionally! Neill was so convinced of the therapeutic power of independent negotiation that after the success of Saturday meetings he gradually completely stopped individual therapeutic meetings with problematic individuals.

If Neill's originality was in the creation of a new educational and disciplinary regime with a new role of the educator as an important person in it, L. Malaguzzi’s Reggio Emilia project focuses on pre-school children and techniques intended to encourage their inquisitiveness and internal motivation for creative learning supported primarily by art. Although Malaguzzi also believes in the spontaneous, “radiant” capability of the child to use hundreds of languages creatively, he does not limit education to naïve fulfilment of the child’s needs. He rejects the behaviourist plans which prescribe to the nursery “teaching without learning, while we are supposed to degrade nurseries and children by directing them to forms, repetitive patterns and manuals generously provided by the publishers.” (Edwards, Gandini & Forman 1998, p. 88) Instead he invented the concept of the educational environment as the third educator (Fyfe 1994, p. 24) providing the child with numerous stimuli for activity and learning, since the nursery must be oriented towards encouraging the child’s independent learning and creative expression: “We agree with Piaget that the goal of teaching is providing the conditions for learning … learning is the key factor on which the new ways of teaching should be based to become the child’s auxiliary source of different possibilities, suggestive ideas and assistance. Teaching and learning should not stand on the opposite banks merely watching the river flowing by; on the contrary, they should both embark on the journey down the river. Only an active and reciprocal exchange, such as teaching should be, can strengthen learning for learning.” (Edwards, Gandini & Forman 1998, p. 83)

This brings us back to Kant: the inherent nature of the mind (or divine givenness, according to Jung) contains potentials for free, responsible, imaginative creation of new ideas. (Repressive) education should not suppress these potentials, but rather encourage their development. But to cultivate creativity, the assistance to internal motivation/energy/will is equally important and requires the role of the parent or the educator as an authority. If the latter is not excessive (in such case it can break the child’s will) nor covert and based on loving attachment (in such case it can disable resistance and the beginning of the process of individuation), it is undoubtedly necessary – despite the apparently irreconcilable contradiction with the idea of freedom. That form of authority, consisting of the necessary degree of antagonism, limiting the child’s whims but supporting gradual emancipation, I call the self-restricting authority (Kroflič 1997, pp. 288-339).

One of its advantages is that it does not base education on manipulation by creating an environment for covert control and maintaining the appearance of a loving, authority-free education (ibid., pp. 204-245); it makes possible the transference of parental authority to the professional educator – which causes the greatest problems to educational institutions in the environment of covert authority created by permissive education (ibid., pp. 266-287).

Creativity can therefore be cultivated – but not only by supporting the child’s spontaneous imagination, but also by strengthening his capability to overcome obstacles and conflicts and to resolve frustrations caused by every education in an optimal manner.

Literature:

Fenstermacher G.D., 1992, ‘The Concepts of Method and Manner in Teaching’, Effective and Responsible Teaching. The New Synthesis (eds. Oser, Dick and Party), San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, pp. 95-108.

Edwards, Gandini & Forman, 1998, The Hundred Languages of Children, The Reggio Emilia Approach – Advanced Reflections, Second Edition, London: Ablex Publishing Corporation.

Fyfe B., 1994, ‘Images from the United States: Using Ideas from the Reggio Emilia Experience with American Educators’, Reflections on the Reggio Emilia Approach, Urbana: ERIC/EECE.

Freud S., 1979, ‘Nelagodnost u kulturi’, Odabrana dela Sigmunda Frojda (Knjiga peta: Iz kulture i umetnosti, pp. 261-357, Beograd: Matica srpska.

Kant I., 1987, ‘Odgovor na vprašanje: Kaj je razsvetljenstvo’, Kaj je razsvetljenstvo? (Vestnik SAZU), No. 1, pp. 9-13, Ljubljana: Znanstvenoraziskovalni center SAZU (Inštitut za marksistične študije).

Kant I., 1988, ‘O pedagogiki’, Problemi – šolsko polje, Vol 26, No. 11, pp. 147-158, Ljubljana.

Kroflič R., 1997, Avtoriteta v vzgoji, Ljubljana: Znanstveno in publicistično središče.

Millot C., 1983, ‘Anti-pedagog Freud’, Gospostvo, vzgoja, analiza, pp. 184-217, Ljubljana: Analecta.

Pergar-Kuščer M., 1994, ‘Povezava med učiteljevo osebnostjo in ustvarjalnostjo otrok’, Sodobna pedagogika, Vol. 45/111, No. 5-6, pp. 254-264.

The Bible (Standard Slovenian translation), 1996, Ljubljana: Svetopisemska družba Slovenije.

Trstenjak A., 1981, Psihologija ustvarjalnosti, Ljubljana: Slovenska matica.

Von Franz M., 1988, Puer aeternus, Ljubljana: ME TA.

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