UNITED NATIONS
United Nations Development Programme -
Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia
Annual Report on Activities and Operations
1994
Table of Contents
A Brief History........................................................................................................... 1
Funding Arrangements........................................................................................... 1
Emergencies Unit Activities: January to December, 1994........................... 4
Emergencies Unit core operational activities................................................ 5
Response to the 1994 food crisis....................................................................... 5
Informal technical support to the RRC............................................................ 6
Support for the RRC Project Tracking and Fund Raising Unit...................... 7
Field monitoring - Region 5.............................................................................. 8
Field monitoring - Somalia............................................................................... 9
Public information and “networking”.............................................................. 9
Inter-agency coordination................................................................................. 10
Emergencies Unit project activities.................................................................. 11
1. Technical assistance to the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission........... 11
Project ETH/94/009 - Strengthening the RRC................................. 12
Strengthening the Information Technology Centre........................ 12
Strengthening the Logistics Department.......................................... 13
Strengthening the Public Relations Department............................. 14
Strengthening the APCM Department............................................. 14
Computer training.............................................................................. 15
Supply of computer equipment......................................................... 15
Inter-agency cooperation................................................................... 15
Possible future interventions............................................................. 16
2. Afder and Liben zone dispersal and rehabilitation programme................. 17
Background......................................................................................... 17
Region 5 Rehabilitation Programme - the initial phase.................. 18
Management structures...................................................................... 18
Provision of management support..................................................... 19
Transport and logistics....................................................................... 19
Support for reintegration and agricultural production.................. 20
A programme with honourable objectives but nonetheless flawed? 22
3. Technical support for UNHCR returnee operations...................................... 23
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4. Technical and logistics support for Armyworm control operations.............. 23
Development of the Armyworm outbreak in Ethiopia...................... 23
UN and donors act quickly to support MoA control operations....... 24
Despite some collateral damage, control measures are effective..... 26
Plans for 1995.............................................................................................................. 27
Annex I: UN Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia - Organogram
Annex II: Donors to UNDP Project ETH/89/UO1 (EPPG/EUE) 1987-1994
Annex III: Reports prepared by the UN-EUE in 1994
UNITED NATIONS
EMERGENCIES UNIT FOR ETHIOPIA
Activity report for
1994
A brief history
In November 1984, at the height of the worst famine seen in Africa this century, the United Nations established the Office for Emergency Operations in Ethiopia (OEOE) with a co-ordinating unit in New York and a secretariat in Ethiopia. In October 1986, with the worst effects of the famine largely mitigated, the Secretary General decided that the time was appropriate for the OEOE to be dismantled and for its key functions to be absorbed into the mandate of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), thereby placing support for national disaster preparedness and prevention on a firmer footing. This led to the formation of the UN Emergency Prevention and Preparedness Group (UN-EPPG) in January 1987 as a project implemented by the UNDP field office and largely financed through donor contributions to a trust fund.
Both the OEOE and the EPPG had wide-ranging mandates to strengthen and maintain the capacity of the UN system to respond quickly and effectively to meeting emergency relief needs in Ethiopia and to help mobilise resources, monitor the provision of assistance and help the Government to determine needs and develop credible donor appeals. In 1988-89, the EPPG played an important part in supporting the development of a national disaster strategy. This was later modified to accommodate the new federal administrative structure and was officially adopted by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia in November 1993 as the National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management. This emphasises decentralised management structures and the productive use of relief aid.
Though perennial funding problems often threatened its closure, donor support for the EPPG was such that it was able to maintain field operations throughout the latter stages of the civil war and through to the end of 1993. In the months following the change of Government in May 1991 the EPPG played a crucial role in the formulation of a programme for the reintegration of more than 350,000 ex-soldiers and in the development of a joint UN approach to assisting the recovery process. It also worked closely with the relief and Rehabilitation Commission and UNHCR in implementing relief and rehabilitation activities in refugee and returnee impacted areas of south-eastern Ethiopia. To bring its title into line with those of similar UN humanitarian offices in other disaster prone countries, on 1 January 1994 it was renamed the UN Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia (UN-EUE). The change, however, was not just cosmetic; it also signified the beginning of a new, more constructive relationship with the Government. While the mandate of the Emergencies Unit remains largely unchanged, there is now a firm commitment to providing more institutional support to the Government in the building of local capacities to manage disasters without the need to resort to the scale of operations seen in 1984/85.
Funding arrangements
By November 1993 the EPPG was facing its most serious financial crisis ever. Available funds were at rock-bottom and to keep the office functioning most Field Officers and a number of Addis-based staff had to be laid-off. UN agencies and donors were informed that without new pledges the office would close completely at the end of the year. This was all taking place against a backdrop of dire warnings of impending famine in the country following the failure of the main season rains earlier in 1993. Late in December, a timely contribution from the Norwegian Government enabled the EPPG to retain its senior management staff and begin to plan a programme of action in support of relief operations in 1994.
The Norwegian donation was soon followed by the confirmation of continued support from the Government of Switzerland, to include both the secondement of staff and a substantial cash grant. This placed the Emergencies Unit on a firmer footing and allowed the recruitment of new technical staff to monitor conditions in drought affected areas of the country and to continue the work of providing the wider aid community with informative and timely general and special reports on the situation. On the negative side, after more than five years of continuous financial and material support to the EPPG, and the OEOE before that, the British Government decided not to continue its support into 1994. Other traditional donors, such as the USA and Canada, likewise indicated their inability to provide funding until such time that the United Nations itself could identify a mechanism to channel sufficient regular financing to meet at least the core management costs of the office.
Strenuous efforts have been made by EUE staff to identify a source of regular UN funding but with very little success. Following its creation in 1992, much hope in this respect was pinned on the Department of Humanitarian Affairs which was expected to take a firm leadership role in field coordination. Unfortunately for the Emergencies Unit, this did not happen and though the DHA was able to help identify two new bilateral donors for the Emergencies Unit in 1994 (the Governments of New Zealand and Cyprus), there was no indication of any willingness to commit funds from its own, albeit limited, regular resources. Mechanisms such as the Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF), managed by DHA in New York, were also looked at as a potential source of regular funding. Though donors had agreed that interest from the fund could be used to support ‘field co-ordination’, a General Assembly Resolution on the coordination of humanitarian assistance made it clear that such funding could only be released to assist the initial establishment of offices like the Emergencies Unit, not for meeting long-term recurrent costs.
While observers waited for the DHA to adopt a lead role in coordinating the broad sweep of humanitarian activities within the United Nations, UNDP was quick to broadcast its own credentials as the lead UN agency in the field for all but the most complex of emergencies. In particular, it actively re-affirmed its responsibility for internally displaced persons (though, in practice, UNHCR are the most active in this field) and in providing leadership and a focus for inter-agency coordination at the country and sub-regional level. With this in mind, it was anticipated that UNDP would create appropriate procedural and financing mechanisms to help it discharge these responsibilities and that mechanisms would also be available to the Emergencies Unit, located as it is in one of the countries in Africa most vulnerable to natural and man-made disaster. Approaches to UNDP New York failed, however, to identify any long-term (by this we consider 2/3 years as ‘long-term’) financial commitment to the Emergencies Unit, which appears to be perceived as being at the wrong end of the relief to development “continuum” - itself, in the context of Ethiopia, a misleading concept. Having said this, UNDP in 1994 were able to identify ad hoc funding for the post of Technical Co-ordinator using the SPR (Special Programme Resources) mechanism (a contribution requested in 1993 but only confirmed and made available in 1994). It was also found possible to re-phase funds from the Disaster Management Training Programme to the Emergencies Unit. Both arrangements, however, were essentially ‘one-off’ and did not help to address the underlying problem of core funding for the Unit.
The failure to secure a source of regular funding has been a particular disappointment as the Emergencies Unit is supposedly an integral part of the United Nation’s disaster management strategy for Ethiopia and a practical expression of UNDP’s proclaimed mandate to assist in the co-ordination of humanitarian assistance in the field. However, another option for securing longer-term support from UNDP was examined during the latter part of 1994 which may hold some hope for the future. For some years, UNDP has maintained two regular posts within its country office through ‘emergency’ funds. Though originally intended as a measure to assist with staffing the EPPG, both posts have been used in support of the regular programme work of UNDP in Ethiopia. It has been suggested that one, or even both these posts should revert to the Emergencies Unit. This would very effectively address the need for continuity in the senior management and would open the way for the Emergencies Unit to be more closely integrated with UNDP, especially with regard to the implementation of Programme 4 of the 5th Country Programme: Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and Management.
The contributions available to the Emergencies Unit in 1994 were split very roughly 60:40 between mostly un-earmarked “core” and earmarked “project” funds. In addition, an in-kind contribution of two Field Officers was provided by the Swiss Government through Swiss Disaster Relief and UNHCR made a loan of two field vehicles. Table I, given below, summarizes the various sources of funds available during the year, including income arising from the late payment of UN light aircraft fees. A substantial un-earmarked contribution from the Netherlands Government in 1992 helped to cover the initial costs of this service, so the net balance of funds recovered by charging-out to users can be considered as notionally “Dutch”. It should also be noted that this summary includes funds amounting to $180,631 from UNHCR that should have been paid in 1993 under a sub-agreement signed by UNDP. As the costs supposedly covered in the 1993 agreement were effectively paid out of Emergencies Unit core funds, this amount was considered as being available to meet general office expenses in 1994.
|Donor |Cash (US $) |Comments |
|Norway | 99,468 |Support to UN-EUE core costs - given in December 1993 |
| | 50,000 |Capacity building in RRC - earmarked project funds |
| | 6,500 |Armyworm control in N. Ethiopia - earmarked project funds |
|United States | 45,000 |Capacity building in RRC - earmarked project funds |
|Netherlands | 8,195 |Armyworm control in N. Ethiopia - earmarked project funds |
| | 13,900 |Capacity building in RRC - earmarked project funds |
|UNHCR | 182,682 |UN-EUE core costs - earmarked general funds |
| | 180,631 |Reimbursement of 1993 core cost paid in 1994 - un-earmarked funds |
| | 266,929 |Support for Dolo dispersal operations - earmarked project funds |
| | 165,770 |Technical support for UNHCR - earmarked project funds |
|DHA | 50,400 |From New Zealand Government - core costs, earmarked |
| | 4,800 |From Cyprus Government - core costs, earmarked |
|UNICEF | 33,000 |Support for UN-EUE core costs - earmarked funds |
|UNDP | 100,000 |SPR carried-forward from 1993 - earmarked general funds |
| | 99,571 |SPR ex-DMTP - support for core costs - un-earmarked |
| | 50,000 |Armyworm control in N. Ethiopia - SPR earmarked project funds |
| | 96,977 |Capacity building in RRC - SPR earmarked project funds |
|Switzerland | 40,927 |Armyworm control in N. Ethiopia - earmarked project funds |
| | 211,416 |General support to UN-EUE - un-earmarked funds |
|Contract services | 107,000 |Income arising from late payment of UN aircraft user fees |
| | 13,350 |Income from consultancies (Burundi) - un-earmarked general funds |
Table I. Available funds - 1994
Though subject to final confirmation, total expenditure, including unliquidated obligations, during 1994 amounted to roughly $1,158,100, of which approximately $586,000 was against the core costs of the Emergencies Unit and $572,100 for various ‘project’ activities. Table II, over the page, gives a more detailed breakdown. For core Emergencies Unit operations, carry-over funds from 1993 amounted to less than $50,000. Taking into account the need to return un-utilized project and earmarked core funds (mostly UNHCR), funds carried-over and available for the core operations of the office as of 1 January 1995 amounted to approximately $430,000, all of which were un-earmarked.
The Emergencies Unit ended 1994 in a much healthier financial position than 12 months earlier. Despite the apparently substantial carry-over of un-earmarked funds, however, there will still be a need for additional contributions to meet the costs of maintaining the Unit’s public information and field monitoring operations for the last quarter of 1995 and to provide some carry-over of funds for the first part of 1996. In addition, the office still requires funding for the purchase of new field vehicles to replace its aging fleet and new computer and communications equipment to enable the office to make the best use of opportunities presented by the revolution in information technology.
|Activity |Expenditure (US $) |
|UN-EUE Core Operations | |
|Staff costs | 367,000 |
|Travel including DSA | 80,500 |
|Vehicle operating costs | 34,500 |
|Capital equipment | 66,000 |
|Miscellaneous office costs | 38,000 |
|Total | 586,000 |
|Support for Dolo Dispersal | |
|Staff costs | 25,000 |
|Transport | 130,000 |
|Seeds & Tools (net of sales to NCA) | 28,000 |
|Miscellaneous costs | 7,000 |
|Total | 190,000 |
|Technical Support to UNHCR | |
|Staff costs | 160,500 |
|Travel including DSA | 35,500 |
|Miscellaneous costs | 5,000 |
|Total | 201,000 |
|Technical Support to the RRC | |
|Staff costs | 74,000 |
|Capital equipment | 20,000 |
|Miscellaneous costs | 7,000 |
|Total | 101,000 |
|Armyworm Control Operations | |
|Logistical Support | 48,500 |
|Technical Consultant | 6,800 |
|Spray Operations | 24,800 |
|Total | 80,100 |
Table II. 1994 total net expenditure (including obligations carried into 1995)
Emergencies Unit activities: January - December 1994
As in previous years, the work of the Emergencies Unit can be split into two main categories: what are referred to as “core” and “project” activities. Core activities are those that are directly linked with the prime mandate of the Emergencies Unit. They therefore include monitoring and assessing emergency relief needs, facilitating and coordinating the humanitarian response of the UN system in Ethiopia and providing a public information service on behalf of the both the UN and wider aid community. In 1994, much of the core work of the Unit was directed at assisting the Government to avert the threat of another famine following poor main season rains in 1993 and the failure of the short, or belg, rains in early 1994. Project activities, on the other hand, are generally managed and financed separately from core operations and stem from the Unit’s wider mandate to (a) assist in building the capacity of national institutions (primarily the RRC) to manage disasters and (b) intervene directly in response to particular relief needs if there is a perceived gap or lack of capacity among the operational agencies.
In 1994, the Emergencies Unit was directly responsible for managing four major projects. These were:
• Technical assistance to the RRC for capacity building in emergency planning and response.
• Logistical and technical field support to a joint UN/RRC/NGO programme to disperse and resettle returnees and locally displaced people living in Region 5;
• Support to the Technical Services Unit of UNHCR in the provision of short-term specialist staff to work on returnee settlement issues and to assist in monitoring the work of implementing partners; and
• Logistical and technical support to the Ministry of Agriculture during an outbreak of Armyworms in Northern Ethiopia in July, funded jointly by donors and UNDP.
Emergencies Unit core operational activities
Response to the 1994 food crisis
The 1994 emergency was typically complex, with relief needs emerging in varying degrees of intensity throughout the country. With the poor belg rains compounding the failure of the 1993 harvest, it was clear that without the rapid delivery of large quantities of relief food there was an imminent danger of famine. The Emergencies Unit responded to the crisis by stepping-up its field monitoring programme, deploying staff to all the more seriously affected regions and providing a focal point within the UN for collating data on the progress of the relief operation. Information collected was freely disseminated and used to help the Government prioritise the relief programme, pin-point gaps in coverage and lobby donors to bring-forward relief food shipments and make additional pledges.
Initially, it was the north of Ethiopia that gave rise to the most concern, with reports emerging of distress migration taking place from parts of North Welo and of very low stocks of relief food. There were also many problems faced in gearing-up the relief programme. Coverage was poor and in many cases the Government’s active promotion of food-for-work as the more ‘politically correct’ alternative to gratuitous relief confused some NGOs and local administrations, leading to an inertia that prevented some organisations from making a rapid switch from development to relief.
The failure of the belg rains in February/March led almost immediately to the emergence of critical food shortages in some densely populated areas of Southern Ethiopia. In particular, famine conditions developed in Wolaita far quicker than anyone had predicted. As early as mid-April, a full-blown emergency was evident in places like Bele town where 20-30 severely malnourished children a day were being admitted to a feeding centre run by the NGO, Inter-Aide France. Though a number of both church-based and secular NGOs work in the district, coordination was poor and overall coverage extremely patchy. The newly-formed zonal bureau of the RRC was weak and not in position to coordinate or support the work of the voluntary organisations. To make matters worse, though available from central warehouses in Nazereth, relief food had not been transported to the affected area and little capacity existed for targeting the food aid once it was available. With reports emerging that upwards of 5,000 people may have died of nutrition-related causes, the Government made Wolaita a top priority for the relief operation. The Emergencies Unit likewise responded by supporting the needs assessment work of the Government and NGOs, assisting in the formulation of a local relief plan and, once operations were underway, by deploying field staff to provide advice and support to local RRC officials and to look in more detail at the problem of achieving long-term food security in the area.
In monitoring the development of the crisis in Northern Ethiopia, the Emergencies Unit relied very much on its Field Officer for Region 1 and 3, seconded by Swiss Disaster Relief. He travelled extensively throughout the affected area and developed a good understanding of the needs. He was supported from time to time by other members of staff including Unit’s Agriculturist who looked into issues such as livestock health and the prevalence of plant diseases and pests (particularly striga - a parasitic weed of Maize and Sorghum) that are a significant factor in determining crop production in marginal agricultural areas. Regular visits were made to locations throughout former Gondar, Welo and Tigray regions to follow-up on the relief activities of NGOs, the Government and the Red Cross and to determine where gaps in coverage might exist. Both the general monitoring reports of the Field Officer and specialist reports of the Agriculturist were widely circulated amongst donors and NGOs in Addis Ababa as well as copied to the RRC and UN agencies.
In the South, an Assistant Field Officer was assigned to work closely with local RRC officials, giving practical advice on the management of food distributions and methods of targeting needy beneficiaries. He was assisted by staff seconded by Swiss Disaster Relief and by the Unit’s Agriculturist who spent considerable time looking into the cultivation of enset, or false banana, which is the mainstay of household food security in the highlands of Southern Ethiopia during times of stress. Reports of mounting mortality in the area attracted the attention of the international media for a time and Emergencies Unit received a number of requests for information regarding the role of the UN in the relief operation. Where appropriate, copies of situation reports were shared with journalists and appointments made for meetings with RRC officials.
Informal technical support to the RRC
The advent of the emergency caught the RRC mid-way through a major re-organisation with authority for the managing relief operations in the process of being devolved down to newly established and inexperienced regional bureaux. The relief operation, already facing major delays resulting from low carry-over stocks and the inherent time lag between the announcement of a pledge and the actual arrival of food at the port, also faced operational confusion at all levels. At the national level the RRC had been unable to devise a relief plan sufficiently flexible to be able to respond to a rapidly evolving situation while at the wereda and zonal levels, there was much confusion regarding individual responsibilities and the role of NGOs. The situation was further compounded by poor lines of communication with the regional bureaux as well as poorly defined organisational responsibilities within the RRC itself.
The RRC has long been wary of approaching the Emergencies Unit for technical assistance and advice. In pre-1991 days, the office was viewed by the Mengistu regime as having a watchdog function on behalf of the donors and was therefore kept at arms length. In the two years immediately following the change of Government, the EPPG tended to be viewed as outmoded and intent on duplicating the functions of the now wholly trustworthy and transparent RRC. However, the growing crisis in the early months of 1994 and the alarming prospect of a repeat of the famine of ten years earlier brought a softening of the RRC’s position and a new spirit of openness and cooperation.
Though EPPG senior staff worked fairly closely with the RRC on the final presentation of the appeal for 1994, launched in mid-December, true collaboration between the two organisations did not really begin until the following March when it became clear relief operations were not proceeding as efficiently as the Government had originally hoped. The decision to re-launch the appeal in April was followed by a request to the Emergencies Unit for assistance in both re-assessing food needs in the light of the very disappointing belg rains and in the preparation and final presentation of the revised appeal itself. Given the importance of accelerating the delivery of relief food, the two organisations jointly agreed the main thrust of the appeal should be to convince donors of the need to immediately effect shipment of their existing pledges. To press home the point, staff collaborated on the production of a 15 minute film depicting the rapidly deteriorating situation in Wolaita and pointing out that there was still time to avert a 1984-like disaster provided immediate steps were taken to ship food and arrange internal transport to the most affected areas - before the main rains began in June.
The launching of the appeal was followed in May by the departure of a high level Government delegation on a tour of several western capitals to solicit support for Ethiopia relief operations. Emergencies Unit staff assisted in the production of background briefing materials, speeches and handouts later used by the delegation in meetings with the senior representatives of a number of major donors.
The result of these various efforts was very positive. Against a revised food appeal of 1.27 million tons, of which 771,000 tons was for emergency relief, new pledges were confirmed with unprecedented rapidity. Of even more significance, a number of donors, including the European Union and USA, made exceptional arrangements to bring forward shipments by up six months. By the middle of the year more than 80% of total relief needs were already covered; by the last quarter of the year this figure was approaching 94% with more than 600,000 tons actually delivered.
The spirit of collaboration between the RRC and Emergencies Unit was considerably strengthened by this experience; informal contact at a senior level increased and there appeared to be a greater willingness to consider external technical assistance. In May, work began on the formulation of a short-term project to provide the RRC with help in the development of a “rolling” relief plan, the design and implementation of a computerised logistics and information management system, in the provision of training and technical assistance to the Public Relations Department and (jointly with Swiss Disaster Relief) in the modernisation of the radio communications network. The project, managed by the Emergencies Unit, began work in July with start-up funds borrowed from the UNDP/DHA Disaster Management Training Programme. Once underway, other donors also contributed to the project, including the USA, Netherlands and Norway. Full details of the project and its many achievements are given in the following section.
Concerned that the appeal for 1995 should be realistic and presented in a professional manner, in November the RRC invited the Emergencies Unit to join an informal forum to discuss a strategy and agree the most appropriate format. To allow an opportunity to obtain feedback on the proposed format and content of the appeal, the RRC were encouraged to also include the donors and representatives of the NGO community in these discussions, a proposal that received a very positive response. With relief operations winding down the forum decided that the appeal should focus on support for the National Policy on Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and Management and the role to be played by the RRC in implementing Programme 4 of UNDP’s 5th Country Programme. The overall themes chosen for the appeal were those of capacity building and linking relief and development. In addition to providing advice and guidance on the content and presentation of the appeal, Emergencies Unit staff assisted in the final production of the appeal documents and wrote a discussion paper examining the concept of linking relief to development.
Support for the RRC project tracking and fund raising unit
Though not formulated formally as a project, during the period February-May the Emergencies Unit loaned an experienced Field Officer to the RRC Aid Coordination department to look into the issues of project tracking and fund raising - areas of particular weakness already recognized by the RRC and donors alike. The main objective of the ‘consultancy’ was to examine the feasibility of establishing a specialised unit within Aid Coordination responsible for monitoring projects funded by donors through the RRC, preparing narrative and financial reports and identifying funding and/or implementation gaps requiring special attention.
In the course of the consultancy, discussions on possible approaches to the problem were held at all levels within the RRC. It was found that the fundamental requirement for improved project monitoring and fund raising was the systematic collection and analysis of information and the presentation of that information in a manner that could be used by management. Based on these findings, a framework for the establishment of a Project Tracking and Fund Raising Unit was developed and presented to RRC senior management for review. Elements of the proposal were later incorporated into the functions of the newly established Aid Programmes Coordination and Monitoring Department which itself received technical support from the Emergencies Unit under project ETH/94/009 beginning in August.
Another proposal to come out of the consultancy was for the upgrading and modernisation of the RRC radio communications network with the objective of improving the quality and speed of reporting from the field. In part, this proposal was taken up by Swiss Disaster Relief who began a programme in October to re-equip twelve radio stations (eleven regional and one base station in Addis Ababa) and provide training for RRC operators in the use of computer-based SITOR radio-telex equipment. Eight stations were fully operational by the end of the year.
Finally, the consultant produced a practical database of project information covering the two major returnee programmes of concern to the RRC in Regions 4 and 5 (Borena and Afder/Liben zones respectively). Although not fully comprehensive, the exercise revealed a number of gaps that were later addressed by NGOs and the UN, such as the provision of rural water supplies for returnees in the Afder-Liben zone implemented by a local NGO financed by UNICEF.
Field monitoring - Region 5
Region 5 - the Somali region - with its long history of neglect and poor investment in development, remains an area of priority concern for the United Nations in Ethiopia. The events of recent years in neighbouring Somalia have led to the influx of an estimated 500,000 refugees and returnees, placing an enormous burden upon the economic and social fabric of this largely pastoral and normally thinly populated area. The experience of providing humanitarian assistance to the region has been very mixed and given the almost impossible task of distinguishing between the indigenous population and newcomers, in recent years the UN, at the prompting of UNHCR, has adopted the so-called “cross-mandate” approach. With a focus on returnee and refugee impacted communities, the approach emphasizes the coordinated action of UN agencies, Government and NGOs in the provision of relief and rehabilitation assistance on the basis of collective need rather than individual entitlement. It avoids the problems associated with the screening and registration of individual beneficiaries and, as much as possible, concentrates on community assistance with the full involvement of traditional leaders and the local administration.
Since 1992, the EPPG/EUE has played a key role in coordinating and managing cross-mandate operations in Region 5, especially Gode, Kelafo, Dolo and Suftu which have been host to large concentrations of displaced people, refugees and returnees. In 1992 and 1993, cross-mandate operations were very much directed at the provision of immediate relief assistance and EPPG staff were more-or-less permanently based in Gode and Dolo managing the operations in close cooperation with the RRC. In 1994, the emphasis was switched to finding a long-term solution to the problem of the camp populations. Under the direction of the RRC, the Emergencies Unit participated in a pilot programme to disperse the camp at Dolo and help the re-establishment of people in the Afder and Liben zones of Region 5. This programme is described in somewhat more detail later.
As in previous years, apart from its direct involvement in field operations, the Emergencies Unit has endeavored to monitor general developments in Region 5 and keep the UN and donors advised of any specific humanitarian needs. A Field Officer with specific responsibilities for South and South-Eastern Ethiopia traveled widely throughout the region meeting with local officials, traditional leaders and members of the elected administration. Particular attention was paid to the performance and effectiveness of the regional administration which, since its formation following the June 1992 elections, has remained weak and fraught by internal political tensions. In June, the former President of the region, Hassen Jirre, was forcibly removed and replaced by Abdirahman Ugaas, a former head of the regional RRC and Gode Peace and Stability Committee. Nine members of the former executive were also replaced to make way for a new committee less dominated by the Ogadeni clan. Shortly afterwards the capital of the region, Gode, was “temporarily” moved to Jigjiga where it was claimed communications were easier and suitable office accommodation more readily available. Following these changes there were hopes that the new administration would be able to accelerate implementation of the capital budget for which substantial central government funds had been made available and to address the long-standing problem of security. After a period of six months, however, little progress in either had been observed and although it appeared Abdirahman Ugaas retained the support of the broad mass of people in the region he was asked to step down (though never officially relieved of his duties) in December, when the Secretary of the Executive took over the responsibilities of leader of the Administration.
Though travel to the main towns was normally possible by air, access by road to the countryside remained difficult and potentially hazardous for much of the year. Both the Ogadeni National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Al-Ittihad became increasingly active, restricting movement along the main roads of the Ogaden and effectively isolating the towns of Gode, Kebridehar and Warder sometimes for weeks at a time. By the end of the year, however, the deployment of a people’s militia, formed by the Administration with assistance from the EPRDF, was beginning to have a positive effect although attempts to conduct the National Census in rural parts of the region in October met with little success and ended with the murder of several enumerators near Aware. Thankfully, the rains in the region were generally good during the year and other than the need to provide a minimum level of assistance to displaced people around the main towns, no exceptional relief needs were observed. With relative peace in the North West and North East of Somalia, the export trade in livestock to the middle east enjoyed a resurgence. This greatly benefited the economy in Region 5 from where large numbers of animals were exported through the ports of Bosasso and Berbera.
Field monitoring - Somalia
The economic well-being and political stability of Region 5 is very closely linked with the situation in neighbouring Somalia. The Emergencies Unit has always attempted to follow events in Somalia but this has been made difficult due to poor communications and institutional links with UN agencies working there. The need to upgrade this monitoring capability was heightened towards the end of 1994 when growing tensions in the self-proclaimed state of “Somaliland” threatened to de-rail UNHCR plans to commence the repatriation of some 50,000 Somali refugees from camps around Aware, to be followed in 1995 by the return of upwards of 150,000 refugees from Hartisheik and other camps near Jijgiga.
In October, a Somalia specialist was recruited by the Emergencies Unit to monitor developments both in Region 5 and Somalia and to assist in the formulation of contingency plans. The specialist also provided donors and UN agencies alike with a detailed analysis of the political situation in the region. At about the same time, forces loyal to the President of “Somaliland”, Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, finally took direct action to wrest control of Hargeysa airport from the ‘Iidagale militia who had been exhorting illegal “taxes” from travelers for several months. In the ensuing fighting, an estimated 200,000 people were displaced from Hargeysa and upwards of 50,000 members of the ‘Iidagale clan fled to the refugee camps around Aware. To help avoid a situation whereby a classic refugee style response would attract substantial numbers to cross the border, the Emergencies Unit worked closely with UNHCR to develop a strategy to balance assistance provided on both sides of the border. Direct links were established with the inter-agency emergency task force in “Somaliland” to exchange information and improve the coordination and closer integration of relief operations on both sides. The facilitative role played by the Emergencies Unit in this initiative was well received by all involved and by the end of the year the initial crisis seemed to be over and the situation, although still volatile, appeared to be stabilizing.
Public information and “networking”
The collection, analysis and dissemination of timely and accurate information on relief needs and field operations is crucial to the ability of the Emergencies Unit to influence donors and assist in the coordination of an effective emergency response. The office maintains an “open door” policy and personal contact with Government officials, NGO representatives, visiting journalists and donors are all actively sought and encouraged. Except for certain sensitive internal documents, all publications and reports produced by the office or available to it are shared with those who might be interested, either through one of a number of circulation lists maintained by the office or by means of electronic-mail (‘e-mail’). The value of this “networking” has been proven many times over in past years and is a service much valued by donors and UN agencies alike. The Emergencies Unit is committed to a process of continually upgrading and expanding the public information services it offers and to this end employs a full time Information Officer to act as a focal point for the preparation and circulation of field trip reports, special assessments, maps, briefing papers, appeals and other documents. In addition to editing reports of the field officers and supervising the distribution of documentary materials, the Information Officer maintains an extensive archive of relevant books, mission and assessment reports, newspaper clippings and other documents. This is open to any organisation or person wishing to have access and provides the aid community in Addis Ababa with a valuable source of information on past and current emergency operations in Ethiopia.
During the course of 1994, the Information Officer and other senior staff briefed numerous visiting donor, UN and NGO delegations on the relief situation in Ethiopia and provided detailed background information on both past and present operations. Specific briefings were given to a number of local and international journalists and arrangements made for visits to the field. With the assistance of the Emergencies Unit, articles on relief and rehabilitation operations in Ethiopia appeared in a number of well-known newspapers and magazines, including the Independent, London Times, Guardian, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times and the Economist Magazine. Interviews were also given to German TV, BBC World Service radio, CBC and Danish TV.
The global information revolution is beginning to have an impact upon the public information and networking functions of the Emergencies Unit. For a number of years, e-mail has been possible through the Fidonet dial-up network managed locally by the Pan-African Documentation and Information Service (PADIS) of the UN Economic Commission for Africa. This has been used extensively to exchange reports and data with other agencies working within Ethiopia. In 1993, PADIS began to provide an enhanced service including a gateway (provided by Greennet in London) to the Internet - a global “network of networks”. The Internet is rapidly becoming the focus of the information revolution and it is now possible to exchange reports, send messages and participate in all manner of subject-specific conferences electronically from Addis Ababa. Although still dependent on the dial-up system provided by Fidonet, i.e., on-line or “instant” access to the Internet is not yet available, this facility has greatly increased the ability of the Emergencies Unit to access information available through remote databases, electronic conferences and newswire services. It also means that situation reports and other documents can be circulated to interested subscribers around the world almost instantaneously.
With some assistance from the Emergencies Unit, PADIS has also established an electronic bulletin board, the “Hornet” (+251-1-514534), to serve the aid and development community in the Horn of Africa. The Emergencies Unit is a major provider of reports and other documents which are posted to the bulletin board and available for anyone with a computer and modem to download or view directly.
Using a contribution from UNICEF, the Emergencies Unit was able to supplement its older equipment with the purchase of a number of Pentium-based computers and other peripherals. A peer-to-peer network was established and all existing documents and data files archived and made available for instant access. As well as increasing the overall efficiency of the office and improving the quality of the documents produced, the new equipment enabled the production of better maps and other graphics for the use of both the Emergencies Unit and other UN agencies. The office also helped a number of agencies, including the World Food Programme, FAO, UNDP and the RRC to design and produce professional standard leaflets and brochures. A computerised listing of all documents held in the UNDP and Emergencies Unit libraries was updated as were databases on trucking fleets, warehouses, road networks, airstrips, shipping schedules (through WFP) and food deliveries. On a pilot basis, the library and airfield databases were made available for remote interrogation through the Hornet bulletin board and it is hoped to expend this service to other databases managed by the Emergencies Unit in 1995.
Inter-agency coordination
With good working relations and the free exchange of information being at the centre of inter-agency coordination, the Emergencies Unit recognised the importance of its continued active participation in a whole range of both regular and ad hoc committees responsible for relief and rehabilitation policy, field operations and coordination. The principle forum within the UN system is the weekly meeting of the Disaster Management Team which comprises the heads of the main operational agencies and is chaired by the Resident Coordinator. The Emergencies Unit serves as the secretariat for this committee, providing background briefings, discussion papers and field reports. The Technical Coordinator also attends the weekly heads of agency meeting with the RRC Commissioner where matters of national policy are discussed together with the coordination of joint UN/Government initiatives, such as the cross-mandate approach. Another important forum for discussing relief needs and emergency operations in Ethiopia is the monthly meeting of the Informal Donors Group. In addition to ambassadors of the principle aid donors to Ethiopia, this committee includes the UN Resident Coordinator and representatives of the main UN agencies, including the Emergencies Unit.
As the 1994 crisis reached its peak relations between the RRC and international NGOs often became strained with thinly veiled accusations from both sides of incompetence and sometimes even of outright malfeasance. In the interest of all concerned, the Emergencies Unit attempted on several occasions to use its good offices to bring the various sides together and encourage a spirit of mutual cooperation rather than distrust. A series of joint meetings were sponsored to look at specific technical problems, such as the deployment of NGO relief trucks, as well as to improve the coordination of field operations, such as the special task force set up for Wolaita. By the end of the year, relations between RRC and NGOs were much improved and there was hope that the various groups set up during the emergency could form the basis for regular inter-agency meetings to be held under the auspices of the RRC in 1995.
In addition to meeting on an ad hoc basis with a wide range of both international and local NGOs, the Emergencies Unit participates in monthly Emergency Task Force committee convened by the main umbrella organisation for NGOs working in Ethiopia, the Christian Relief and Development Agency (CRDA). The Technical Coordinator also attends the monthly membership meeting of the CRDA in the capacity of an observer and provides a briefing on the food supply situation in the country, the food pipeline and UN relief and rehabilitation activities. At a more operational level, staff attend the weekly shipping meeting chaired by WFP and attended by UN, donor, NGO and Government representatives. It is in this forum that pledges of relief food are discussed along with issues concerning the scheduling of food shipments, port operations and the food pipeline in general.
Emergencies Unit project activities
1. Technical assistance to the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) is the secretariat for the highest policy and decision making body on disaster management within the National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management (NPDPM) as well as the executing agency for the National Programme on Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation (NPDPPM) under the 5th Country Programme. Given the wide scope of activities undertaken by the RRC, different departments are responsible for providing accurate and timely information to assist the RRC in carrying out its role as the focal agency tasked with coordinating relief activities and integrating relief inputs with development efforts.
In the last three years, the RRC has undergone a significant change in its organisational structure, working philosophy and scope of responsibility. In pursuing the national policy of decentralising Government ministries, regional bureaux of the RRC have been established, while at the centre a major retrenchment has taken place and department responsibilities have changed. More recently, a complete restructuring took place resulting in the streamlining of the Commissions responsibilities with less emphasis on management of relief and rehabilitation operations and more emphasis on coordination. However, the RRC has been restricted by a lack of adequate institutional capacity to effectively coordinate relief and rehabilitation activities.
While these fundamental changes were taking place, a poor main season harvest in 1993 and the failure of the 1994 belg rains once again plunged the country into a situation requiring a major relief response. The RRC had to take a lead role in mobilising resources, identifying needs and coordinating the overall relief operation even though its regional bureaux were newly established and inexperienced and institutional links with the centre were somewhat weak.
These institutional constraints necessitated improvements in the management information flows and planning capabilities of the RRC, not only within a national framework, but also at the decentralised levels. It is against this background and to address the immediate information requirements of the RRC that the Emergencies Unit formulated with the RRC a special capacity building and institutional strengthening project - ETH/94/009.
Project ETH/94/009 - Strengthening the RRC
In July 1994, start-up funding was obtained by means of a loan from Special Programme Resources (SPR) funds originally earmarked for the UNDP-DHA Disaster Management Training Programme. The primary aim of the project was to provide senior RRC management with information needed to make operational and policy decisions and prioritise activities during the 1994 emergency. By the end of 1994 the capacity of the RRC to utilise resources, plan and deliver relief supplies and inform the Government, donors and the NGO partners on the status of the emergency situation was greatly strengthened. Under the project four major interventions were covered:
• support and assistance to the Information Technology Centre (ITC) of the RRC in developing data collection mechanisms, data bases and reports to provide information on pledges, distributions and up-country stocks to the RRC, the donor community and NGOs actively involved in relief operations;
• support and assistance to the Logistics Department of the RRC in setting up data collection and reporting systems (Logistics Information Tracking System -- LITS) and designing a series of computer programmes, databases and reports to meet the needs of the RRC in managing the existing relief transport infrastructure;
• support to the Public Relations Department in strengthening the presentation skills of the PR section and advising on general aspects of donor relations, information dissemination and the development of appropriate strategies and methodologies for publicising relief requirements; and
• support to the Aid Programmes Coordination and Monitoring Department in strengthening the effectiveness of APCMD through a three phase management review covering in detail all aspects of information, reporting and relief coordination structures of the department.
Strengthening the Information Technology Centre
The Information Technology Centre (ITC) of the RRC is a relatively new unit with the overall mandate of providing the RRC management with useable and concise information on the status of relief operations. The ITC is also responsible for directly communicating with NGOs and other counterparts, not only to ensure a consistent flow of information but also to meet the reporting needs of co-operating partners and the donor community.
At the request of the RRC, a consultant was recruited for the ITC to provide assistance in strengthening its capacity to handle information on pledges, arrivals, distributions and stock balances in order to facilitate the coordination of relief operations. Under the advice of the consultant an extensive database on monthly relief distributions was established to produce reports for use by RRC decision makers, the donor community and other counterparts.
The reports produced at the ITC are generated by a system especially designed for the RRC and are based on two distinct information sources:
• Reports on food aid status, pledges and consignments derived from the weekly shipping bulletin maintained by the World Food Programme.
• Food aid distribution reports and status reports on NGO and RRC stocks based on the monthly information forwarded to the ITC by the distributing agencies.
The ITC, in its capacity as the information management section of the RRC, was also responsible for assisting the Logistics Department in the installation of a modem and computer equipment at the Assab RRC office and a Local Area Network (LAN) at the Logistics Department in Addis Ababa as well as a LAN system at the ITC office. Furthermore, it established an experimental Bulletin Board Service to provide remote access to RRC weekly and monthly reports to organisations equipped with data communications devices.
Strengthening the Logistics Department
The Logistics Department of the RRC is responsible for coordinating and monitoring all aspects of transport operations in the country. The careful and efficient utilisation of the existing transport capacity is essential for the smooth movement of relief goods from the ports to primary warehouse and, ultimately, to the final beneficiaries. The availability of prompt and accurate information on food aid stocks at the port and offtake information by consignee, donor and trucking contractor was seen as essential for the effective management of the complex relief operations taking place.
During the emergency of 1994, the RRC Logistics Department identified an urgent need for assistance in establishing a system to effectively collect, prioritise and organise information flows from the ports and primary warehouse, within the department and with other sections of the RRC. The primary task of the adviser assigned to the Logistics Department was to provide the management with useable and concise information on the status of logistic operations, design a programme for the analysis of logistic information and develop clear guidelines for standard reporting procedures.
To meet these requirements the Logistics Information Tracking System (LITS) was designed to track the movement of relief cargo from ports and RRC central warehouses and provide concise information on all port activities. The first phase of the LITS system was put into place by the end of August and provides the RRC, NGOs and the donor community with timely and regular information on all aspects of port offtake and port stocks as well as special reports on request. These reports assist the RRC management and donor community in (over page):
• tracking the movement of relief cargo to primary warehouses
• monitoring daily offtake from ports and RRC central warehouses
• compiling port and primary warehouse dispatch information
• determining stock balances at ports and RRC central warehouses
The high level design of the LITS also provides the RRC with on-line information regarding port stocks, offtake by consignee and carrier, clearances, carrier contracts, dispatches and warehouse stock balances. LITS reports are designed to meet a variety of needs and may also be enhanced to address specific requirements of the RRC, participating NGOs and donors.
An important part of the 1994 work plan of the Logistics Department was the installation of a modem and facsimile equipment in Assab port, which handled about 80% of all relief cargo into Ethiopia in 1994 and the setting up of facsimile and computer equipment in warehouses at Nazareth, Dire Dawa and Kombolcha. With this equipment in place and operational, a regular, automated flow of information between the RRC Headquarters, central distribution points and Assab port has been established.
Strengthening the Public Relations Department
The Public Relations Department of the RRC needed to upgrade the standard of its English language publications and PR material to make them more acceptable and accessible to the donors, media and international community. It also required assistance in the development of strategies for publicising relief needs, for fund raising campaigns and for securing and maintaining the interest of the international media. Furthermore, the RRC felt that the Public Relations Department needed a better understanding of international relations, modern journalism practices and public information services as well as training in writing skills, publishing and information management. A short term consultant was therefore recruited to assist the RRC in achieving these objectives and to advise on possible organisational improvements and ways to further enhance the role of the Public Relations Department.
During the limited time of the adviser's tenure at the RRC a number of practical innovations were proposed to immediately improve public relations activities. Long-term needs and resource requirements were also identified. It was observed that there is a clearly stated desire to improve relationships between the RRC and its partners as well as to better inform counterparts and the general public of the role of the RRC in disaster prevention and management. A selection of partners were consulted in order to solicit their views and ideas on the ways of improving public relations. As a result of these meetings and discussions within the RRC, weaknesses and strengths were identified, tasks were assigned and recommendations were presented to the Public Relations Department.
These recommendations can be separated into two categories:
• long-term goals that comprised image-making, improvement of external relations, improvement of management practices and fund raising strategies; and
• short-term goals that included training of department staff in relevant areas, improving the quality and presentation of publicity material and improving existing information gathering and dissemination mechanisms.
Detailed discussions were held with the RRC staff and management on how to realise these objectives and the need to design an overall strategy for public relations activities, to eliminate duplication and fully utilise resources and to considerably improve the English language capacity within the Public Relations Department in order to properly promote Ethiopia, publicise its problems, successes and plans and to solicit international response and support.
Strengthening the Aid Programmes Coordination and Monitoring Department
The Aid Programmes Coordination and Monitoring Department (APCMD) of the RRC is tasked with the responsibility of coordinating all relief and rehabilitation activities in Ethiopia. This includes being the focal point between the RRC at the centre and the regional Relief and Rehabilitation Bureaux (RRB), liaison and support for all NGOs working in Ethiopia, liaison with other RRC departments regarding relief needs, allocations and distributions and monitoring the arrival and distribution of relief supplies as well as coordinating, monitoring and identifying relief and rehabilitation programmes in the regions.
An adviser was recruited to support the RRC Headquarters in analysis of information obtained from the RRC regional bureaux and its NGO counterparts and to assist, when feasible within the context of the emergency, in establishing linkages between relief programmes and rehabilitation/development initiatives. The consultant also worked closely with the three main divisions of the APCMD (NGO, Regional Liaison and Projects) in a detailed study of the paper flow within the office including an analysis of all reports into and out of each of the “divisions” and an analysis of responsibilities. At the end of the consultancy a report was completed listing recommendations for standardisation of reporting formats and streamlining in the general paper flow. Elements of this report were also used to begin a programme for the computerisation of the NGO division.
To help identify opportunities to further strengthen the effectiveness of the APCMD, a three phase management review of the department was conducted in September 1994. Over a two month period, three elements of information management, reporting structures and relief coordination capacity were reviewed. Following this, a report was presented to the Commissioner incorporating the results of consultations with APCMD line managers and other staff and consolidating the findings of all three elements of the review. The report highlighted ways in which the outputs of the department might be enhanced and examined the benefits of using computerised systems, new reporting procedures and formats, training workshops and other structural changes that might be necessary within the department.
Computer training
Following a preliminary assessment which identified a need for expansion of the existing computer system at the RRC, an extensive training programme was started in November 1994 by the Information Technology Centre (ITC). The training programme comprised of two components: (a) general computer training and (b) in conjunction with a Swiss Disaster Relief (SDR) donation of 10 Radio/Telex systems for the regions, a special training programme for Radio/Telex operators.
A special training room was established at the RRC with six dedicated training computers and a full time instructor. Two training manuals were also developed and specifically tailored for the RRC - one for MS- DOS and the other a Windows training manual. The training of RRC staff on the general use of computers and applications such as word processing, spreadsheets and databases to enable them to manage and use the information systems in place at the RRC, started with the overall objective of training approximately 100 users.
To improve the speed and accuracy of information transmitted from the regions to the RRC Headquarters, a computer-based radio/telex network was supplied and set up by Swiss Disaster Relief (SDR). The installation of this system in twelve locations throughout Ethiopia (including Addis Ababa) commenced in October 1994. As part of installations at the “decentralised levels”, a comprehensive and detailed training programme was started in November to upgrade the skills of 30 existing radio operators. The programme included training on the use and maintenance of equipment, reporting guidelines and procedures, data collection and correct analysis of food aid information. An SDR consultant, in conjunction with the Training Officer provided by this Project, also developed a special training manual for the radio/telex operators.
Supply of computer equipment
In addition to the assignment of international advisers and locally recruited computer trainers, the Project also purchased for the RRC additional computer equipment, software, fax machines and spare parts as well as enhancements for old computer equipment transferred to the RRC from the World Food Programme Transport Operation for Ethiopia upon its closure in February.
Inter-agency cooperation
One of the unstated objectives of Project ETH/94/009 was to develop a set of practical management tools within a short time span. In order to do so, the project advisers had to rely heavily on existing systems, traditional information sources and available human resources within the RRC. The cooperation and active support of the RRC management and staff, both at the main office and at the Logistics Department, was instrumental to the success of this Project.
The assistance and cooperation of the World Food Programme in providing access to the WFP shipping database and food pipeline information also greatly contributed to the successful transfer of information to the RRC. As of early September, the two offices were connected by a fax modem, which enabled a more consistent and effective transfer of data. At the present time, ITC is assisting the WFP Food Aid Information Unit to refine its shipping database to become compatible to the information systems in place at the RRC.
Extensive cooperation and exchange of ideas with NGOs, who are major partners with the RRC both in terms of logistics as well as distribution, have been among the factors contributing to the successful implementation of the Project. Numerous meetings and visits took place with the NGO community to discuss and plan different aspects of the systems at ITC and the Logistics Department and to incorporate NGO needs and advice into the new systems. These meetings and the solid cooperation from the NGO community were essential to the Project and the RRC in designing a system that meets the information needs of not only RRC management but also the NGOs.
Possible future interventions
The Transitional Government of Ethiopia is committed to supporting the National Programme on Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation to alleviate, over a five year period, the effects of disasters and to promote the linking of relief to development. The overall objective of the NPDPPM is to build capacities both at the central and decentralised levels. This Programme, financially supported by UNDP, has several sub-programmes and includes the strengthening of institutions involved in disaster management.
Although interventions under Project ETH/94/009 began in response to the 1994 emergency in Ethiopia and were based on the immediate management needs of the RRC, they include long term solutions that need to be further refined in order to ensure their sustainable incorporation into the NPDPPM. The following programmes are under discussion with RRC and, subsequent to the completion of the Emergencies Unit project at the end of March, may be incorporated under implementation arrangements being formulated jointly by UNDP and the RRC for the NPDPPM:
Aid Programmes Coordination and Monitoring Department
Under the recent restructuring of the RRC, the APCMD has been given additional responsibilities but the actual number of staff members has been reduced. The three divisions of the Department need to be computerised and their work streamlined. Under the current project some progress has been made in this direction but under the newly restructured RRC this intervention needs to be reviewed and the basic outlines of a possible database developed.
Although logistics and distribution information systems now exist, there is a need for a “rolling” allocation plan system that can be used by both the Logistics Department to allocate trucks and the RRC management to monitor distribution in terms of allocations and targets. The proposed Food Allocation and Planning System will use existing arrangements (LITS and distribution information) as well as early warning information to regulate and update food allocations on a rolling basis.
Logistics Department
The present Logistics Information Tracking System is a management tool providing information on port offtake as well as performance data by consignee and trucking contractor. This system has been implemented in Assab, which accounts for 80% of relief food imports, and a similar system is to be established in Djibouti and Massawa during the first quarter of 1995.
The LITS provides valuable information to RRC senior management on the port situation and offtake but is essentially a management tool and not a food audit system. However, the LITS system has the potential to be used as the foundation of a food tracking and food audit system for the RRC that will enable management to track RRC food consignments in the audit sense. With this system in place, it will be possible to track consignments from the port to primary warehouses, secondary warehouses and, ultimately, to distribution points.
Information Technology Centre
Distribution reports prepared by the ITC currently only provide information at the regional level. This information is an important component of relief operations but the same type of information is also needed from the zones and weredas. The ITC is also required to produce a number of reports for different departments at the RRC and to provide computer training for all departments. With such a wide range of responsibilities, the ITC requires further assistance to carry out its role as the information centre of the Commission. Under this project, computer training was started with two trainers and six computers, but the unit and training staff have to be expanded. As computer knowledge at the RRC is limited, both extensive and intensive training is needed.
Public Relations Department
Basic skills within the Public Relations Department need to be further upgraded with extensive training in such areas as press and donor relations, news releases and feature article writing, publications and audio visual presentations and computer skills. Although upgrading English language skills can be done through local institutions, professional assistance is required if the PR Department is to become proficient in representing the RRC.
2. Afder and Liben zone dispersal and rehabilitation programme
Background
For a number of years, the Emergencies Unit has worked closely with UNHCR and other agencies in supporting relief operations in Region 5. The camps of displaced people around Gode, Kelafo and Dolo were the focus of intense activity in 1992/93 following an influx of people displaced by drought and fleeing renewed fighting in Somalia. The Emergencies Unit (in its former guise as the UN-EPPG) helped the local authorities manage relief food distributions and, together with WFP, coordinated an airlift of food to towns isolated by poor roads and insecurity. The demographic profile of the camps was complex with substantial numbers of refugees, drought affected, returnees and local poor intermingled and virtually indistinguishable from each other. Of the returnees, which made up in excess of 40% of the total caseload, some had moved back to the main towns in search of assistance following the failure of the rains in 1992 while many others had never dispersed from the camps which were first established near the towns during the massive spontaneous movement of returnees from Somalia that took place during 1990/91.
In the immediate aftermath of the emergency, considerable attention was given to the problem of assisting the camp populations to disperse and return to their home areas. In 1993, UN assistance was provided following the principles laid down in the “cross-mandate” approach. In part, this was intended to help avoid the syndrome that draws people into artificial camps and saps their ability to be self-sufficient. Emphasis was placed on providing assistance to communities outside the camps in the hope that this would encourage people to disperse. Without special assistance to help people re-establish themselves, however, it was clear that many would remain dependant on relief handouts for the foreseeable future. The problem of dispersing the camps and helping people to become self-sufficient was seen as a priority by the Ethiopian Government which, through the RRC, began to examine various options with the regional administration from the middle of 1993 onwards. After numerous field assessments and several months of detailed study, the RRC issued a comprehensive plan of action to rehabilitate the population of displaced people throughout Region 5, beginning with Afder and Liben zones.
Region 5 Rehabilitation Programme - Afder & Liben zones initial phase
The programme, put to the UN and international community in February 1994, outlined a phased operation that would begin with the transport of 12,500 people from the camps around Dolo, Suftu and Negelle back to their chosen villages of reintegration in the surrounding area (Afder and Liben zones). If successful, this initial phase was to be followed by an expansion of the programme to include other camp populations throughout the region, including those around Gode and Jigjiga. In addition to the dispersal of people, the Afder and Liben phase of the operation included a proposed Birr 27 million package of rehabilitation and basic services, to be provided at the point of reintegration. The assistance, to be channelled through agencies already working in the area, would include the pre-positioning of basic supplies (food, seeds, agricultural tools); the development of land for agriculture, including the purchase of irrigation pumps and fertiliser; improved access to animal drugs and veterinary services; the establishment of revolving credit schemes and the construction and repair of school buildings and health facilities. The Government ear-marked Birr 4.8 million of its own resources through the RRC in support of the operation and appealed to the UN and the international community to meet the remaining deficit and provide practical support for the operation in the field.
Due to the large number of returnees in the target camps the Government looked to UNHCR to take the lead in providing substantial material and financial support to the dispersal programme. In consultation with the UN Disaster Management Team, UNHCR decided it would assist the programme both directly through the deployment of a number of its own staff and indirectly through the auspices of the Emergencies Unit, which was already acting as lead UN agency in Dolo under the “cross-mandate” approach and had a capacity to procure inputs and services and provide a basic level of management expertise in the field. To this end, UNHCR provided the Emergencies Unit with approximately $266,000 to cover the cost of providing field management support, agricultural inputs and transport for both the dispersees and supplies.
Management structures
Though a fledgling Relief and Rehabilitation Bureau had been established in Gode, the RRC in Addis Ababa decided that it would coordinate and manage the operation though through a complicated system of committees established at the Addis Ababa, Gode and zonal levels. All UN and NGO agencies working on the programme would be represented on the committees as would the regional administration. This was intended to build on experience derived from the numerous ad hoc Task Force Committees established at the regional and local levels during previous years under the cross-mandate programme.
The basic management unit for the Afder and Liben operation was the Technical Implementation Group (TIG), which functioned at the zonal level and was comprised of technical staff drawn from the RRC and its local bureau, the Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA), the zonal administration and participating UN and NGO agencies. It was intended that the TIG should report to and be accountable to a Senior Programme Operation Team (SPOT) based in the regional capital, Gode, with responsibility for the overall management and coordination of the programme. The SPOT was to be chaired by a representative of the Regional Executive Committee and comprise a membership drawn from the RRC, ARRA and UN agencies. In turn, the SPOT was to report directly to a National Coordination Committee (NCC) in Addis Ababa chaired by the RRC desk officer responsible for the operation. Ultimate responsibility for policy matters lay with the National Executive Committee (NEC), chaired by the RRC Commissioner and consisting of the representatives from ARRA and specialist UN agencies. The NEC was also responsible for identifying and mobilising resources required for the programme and ensuring that activities on the ground proceed according to plan.
The RRC insisted that the formation of the SPOT team in Gode was an essential first step before the dispersal operation could commence. Accordingly, staff from the Emergencies Unit were assigned to Gode in mid-February where they joined a representative of the RRC in discussions with the Regional Administration to agree the details of the proposed programme and to assign responsibilities. The volatile political situation in the capital, however, and the difficulties experienced in maintaining communication links, seriously hampered the effectiveness of the SPOT which received very little practical support from the Regional Administration even though the programme itself was fully endorsed. The sudden replacement of the Region 5 President, Hassan Jirre, at the end of April and the shift of the capital to Jigjiga put plans to permanently establish the SPOT in Gode on ice and the day-to-day management of the operation thereafter became almost entirely the responsibility of the TIG working in close consultation with the NCC in Addis Ababa.
The establishment of the TIG for the Afder and Liben zones took place at the end of February following the assignment of a representative of the RRC from Addis Ababa and the deployment of Emergencies Unit, UNHCR and ARRA field staff. Though it was originally intended that the TIG be located in the zonal “capital” of Afder zone, Hargele, for reasons of access and communications Dolo was found to be more suitable. For several years, Dolo has been used as an operational base for the UN and a number of NGOs working in the area and, though rudimentary, enjoyed at least a basic level of services.
Provision of management support
With funds provided by UNHCR, the Emergencies Unit recruited an expatriate Logistician and a national Field Assistant to work alongside the TIG in Dolo. UNHCR also loaned a four-wheel drive vehicle for the operation which was equipped with an HF radio by the Emergencies Unit to provide communications both locally and with Addis Ababa. Though assigned the formal role of “Reporting Officer” by the TIG chairman (an RRC official appointed from Addis Ababa) the Logistician provided much-needed practical advice and assistance in organising and managing the trucks used to transport people to their reintegration areas.
The Logistician was supported by the regular Emergencies Unit Field Officer for Region 5 who was also funded by UNHCR. By coordinating the work of the three, the Emergencies Unit was able to maintain a permanent presence in Afder and Liben throughout the period when operations were proceeding. EUE staff accompanied each convoy and maintained detailed records of daily activities, food delivered and distributed, numbers dispersed and inputs provided. In the first months of the operation a number of reconnaissance missions were conducted to the reintegration areas to determine prospects for the settlement of the dispersees and to obtain confirmation from local leaders that they indeed would be willing to receive people from the camps. The findings of these missions were shared with the members of the TIG and NCC and reported in writing to the Emergencies Unit and UNHCR.
The actual dispersal operation, though logistically straight forward, was fraught with administrative and practical problems. To maintain some semblance of momentum, Emergencies Unit staff assisted in managing food supplies for the operation, provided local transport and communications for other members of the TIG and maintained a small working imprest through which local labour, clerks, security forces and health workers could be paid per diems while assisting in the convoys.
Transport and logistics
The provision of transport to help people move to their chosen places of re-integration was a major component of the dispersal programme. As the Transport Operation for Refugees (TOR) managed by GTZ were already present in Dolo and possessed four-wheel drive short-haul trucks suitable to the road conditions and terrain in the area, it was agreed with the NEC that this fleet would be most appropriate for the initial phase of the programme, with private trucks used to supplement the TOR fleet if there was need to expand the operation. Six trucks deployed at the beginning of 1994 to ferry relief food around Dolo were reinforced in March by an additional nine trucks transferred from Gode, making a total of 15 available for the dispersal operation. Though placed at the disposal of the TIG, the TOR fleet was managed by GTZ staff assigned to Dolo working closely with the Emergencies Unit Logistician and local representative of UNHCR.
Though it had been expected that the dispersal of people from the Dolo camp would begin in early April, an outbreak of acute diarrhoeal disease (possibly cholera, though this was never actually confirmed officially) in Cheriti, with further cases reported elsewhere, delayed the start of the operation until the beginning of June. Meanwhile, El’Medo was identified as a suitable location to resettle upwards of 5,000 dispersees, being some 40 kilometres from the main market in Cheriti and having ample under-utilised land close to the Ganale river. The access road, however, was in poor condition and it was agreed a temporary health post should be established to provide some basic cover for newcomers while ADD remained a threat and access to Cheriti difficult. Accordingly, the Ministry of Health seconded two Health Assistants from Gode to the programme and the Emergencies Unit agreed to cover their per diems. Meanwhile, the TIG arranged for repairs to the road through a small food-for-work project. UNICEF and the NGO umbrella organisation, Christian Relief and Development Association (CRDA), donated health supplies and equipment for the proposed El’Medo health post. Constant delays suffered by the operation and problems of access to El’Medo combined to prevent the health post from ever being constructed and, in practice, the two Health Assistants worked out of the Dolo Health Centre and provided a mobile health care service for dispersees travelling with the convoys.
With cases of acute diarrohea declining, the NCC finally gave the green light to proceed with the operation at the end of May. The first convoy, to Cheriti, took place on 9 June with 392 people on board. It had been intended to take these people to El’Medo but this was not possible due to problems crossing the Ganale river which was in spate following heavy rains upstream in the Bale mountains. Three further convoys to Cheriti took place during June and the TIG soon developed an efficient system of registration and convoy management. With heavy rain making Hargele completely inaccessible by road, dispersees were provided with rations directly from the Amino Rubb Hall as the convoys passed, instead at the point of arrival as had been originally planned. Farm tools were also distributed upon departure from Dolo and people were encouraged to take all their belongings and shelter material with them on the trucks.
The operation stopped again following a convoy to El’Kere on 9 July due to a combination of a dispute over the allocation of relief food to the Dolo camp and heavy rains that closed roads and flooded many of the intended reintegration areas. Convoys resumed in September after the Dolo administration had been loaned 81 tons of food for distribution to the “needy”. By October, however, it was becoming clear that interest in the operation was waning fast and the TIG were beginning to face difficulties in identifying people for the convoys. In addition, it was realised that many of those who had been transported to Cheriti had immediately returned to Dolo and some were attempting to make the trip repeatedly simply for the purpose of receiving the three month food ration. At the beginning of October, in an effort to reduce costs, UNHCR and the Emergencies Unit unilaterally decided to reduce the number of TOR trucks from 15 to 5. There followed a series a smaller convoys, including one epic journey with 145 people to Ginnir and Imi - a round trip of almost 1,500 kilometres - before operations finally ceased at the request of RRC and ARRA Addis Ababa at the end of November. By this time a total of 2,625 persons had been assisted with transport and provided with a basic package of food for three months tools - far short of the 12,500 originally planned for the operation.
In addition to the transport of people, UNHCR funds were used to pay for the transport of other supplies for the operation. These included 200 tons of maize seed purchased in Gode (see below), some 6,665 agricultural and construction tools, 600 cartons of high energy biscuits donated by Save the Children Fund (UK) from their stores in Dire Dawa and a quantity of construction materials and office supplies both donated by different UN agencies and purchased by the Emergencies Unit.
Support for reintegration & agricultural production
(a) Seeds
Using funds from UNHCR, the Emergencies Unit purchased tools and seed to assist dispersees during the initial phase of their reintegration. With time already short if the April deadline for the next planting season was to be met, an Emergencies Unit Agriculturist travelled to Gode in February to determine if the Gode Farmer’s Cooperative, a project supported by UNDP, would be in a position to sell maize seed. The cooperative confirmed that it would be able to sell at least 300 tons of short-cycle maize seed at a price of Birr 84 per quintal, including bagging. Germination and quality checks by the Agriculturist determined that minimum standards were met and as the price was considerably cheaper than any other commercial source in Ethiopia, a contract for the purchase of a total of 300 tons was agreed. Using a combination of privately owned and TOR trucks, the delivery of maize seed commenced on 3 March. The operation was completed three weeks later but with only 200 tons uplifted. The cooperative stores were empty by this time and no further stocks of the required variety or quality could be identified. It is thought the balance had been sold, probably at a higher price, to traders from Somalia.
By separate agreement, reached locally by the TIG, 150 tons of the Gode maize seed were transferred to Norwegian Church Aid, who were implementing an agricultural rehabilitation project in Afder zone and wished to coordinate their activities with the dispersal operation. 49 tons were delivered directly to NCA stores in Dolo and 10 tons to their store in Cheriti. The balance of 91 tons, together with 50 tons for the TIG were delivered to the RRC store in Hargele (a Rubb Hall donated to the dispersal operation by UNICEF and erected by the Emergencies Unit). The cost of transporting and handling the seed was covered by the Emergencies Unit using funds ear-marked for the purpose by UNHCR.
Norwegian Church Aid project staff distributed the seed to farmers in communities expected to receive people from the camps. The intention was that the dispersees would receive their own supplies directly from the TIG and by channelling assistance to the host communities as well, resentment between the two groups would be minimised. The NCA programme was largely successful in distributing seed before the main rains began. In May, however, very heavy rain isolated Haregele preventing both the TIG and NCA from reaching the store. An official delegation from Gode representing the zonal administration and EPRDF flew to Hargele by helicopter in mid-month. Seeing the contents of the store, the delegation authorised the distribution of the remaining seed to farmers living in the immediate locality so that they could take full advantage of the good rains. At this time the TIG had 50 tons in stock and NCA 27 tons. Despite pressure from both the Emergencies Unit and RRC, the zonal authorities have never produced a detailed distribution report.
(B) Tools
As the plan put forward by the RRC envisaged dispersees clearing and cultivating virgin land and building their own shelters, it was agreed that the Emergencies Unit should procure a quantity of tools appropriate for the clearing of bush, simple construction work and cultivation. After formally issuing a tender for the contract, a local merchant was selected to provide the tools shown in table III on the basis of his competitive prices and quality of manufacture.
The tools were transported during the first week of March to stores in Dolo and Hargele. It was planned that families would cooperate during the initial phase of their reintegration and would share tools and supplies provided to them by the TIG. Each family therefore received one tool of a different type each as they boarded the trucks destined for their reintegration area. The slow pace of the operation meant that the number of tools distributed by the TIG did not reach the levels originally anticipated, with just 908 pieces handed-out to a total of 876 households.
|Description |Origin |Number |
|Flat Hoe |China | 1000 |
|Bush Knife |China | 1000 |
|Sickle 16” |China | 1000 |
|Axe |Ethiopia | 1000 |
|Pick-axe |Imported | 500 |
|Shovel |Ethiopia | 1000 |
|Hammer - 4kg |Imported | 50 |
|Wheel barrow |Ethiopia | 15 |
|Digging hoe |Ethiopia | 1000 |
|Iron bar |Ethiopia | 100 |
Table III: Tools for the Afder and Liben zone dispersal and rehabilitation programme
A total of 108 tools were loaned to the RRC to assist in food-for-work activities related to the dispersal operation, including repairs to the Cheriti - El’Medo road, rehabilitation of the Hargele airstrip and construction of the Rubb Hall compound also in Hargele. During May and June, the TIG prepositioned a total of 314 tools in El’Kere and 411 in Cheriti using temporary stores selected by the local administrations. Stocks in both places were later looted by persons unknown and all the tools lost. Investigations by the TIG and lengthy discussions with the authorities did not resolve the issue.
At the end of the year, when the operation was formally terminated by the RRC, a balance of 4,924 tools remained in stock, 1,631 in Dolo and 3,293 in Hargele. The use of these will be decided jointly with UNHCR though it is likely they will be transferred to Save the Children Federation (US) and Norwegian Church Aid both of whom are planning to support the rehabilitation of farmers in Afder and Liben zones during 1995.
A programme with honourable objectives but nonetheless flawed?
The Afder and Liben zone dispersal and rehabilitation programme was formally called to halt by the Commissioner of the RRC at the end of November. Out of an original target figure of 12,781 only 2,625 were moved under the direct auspices of the operation, although a much larger number are thought to have dispersed spontaneously during the same period. The reasons for the failure to reach the planning figure are numerous and include delays resulting from the outbreak of diarrhoea and bad weather during the middle months of the year, problems resulting from the obstructive behaviour of some community leaders in Dolo who had a vested interest in the continuation of the relief programme and bureaucratic problems within the RRC itself. It was also clear, however, that the failure of the Government to fully implement the rehabilitation component of the programme resulted in there being little incentive for people to move out of Dolo where at least basic services were still available. In fact, during the latter stages of the operation EUE staff observed that the majority of people moving with the convoys to Cheriti soon reappeared in Dolo, presumably after selling their three month ration. Enthusiasm for the operation also declined rapidly once people realised that the package on offer was not commercially valuable. By November very few people were coming forward to be registered for the convoys.
Despite the failure of the dispersal operation itself, a number of valuable lessons were learnt. The most important of these is that creating the right conditions in the areas of reintegration is more likely to encourage people to disperse from the camps than using the simple expedient of providing transport - creating “pulling factors” rather than relying on the “pushing” effect of providing trucks and food rations. In this context, it became clear that providing a food “incentive” created both an expectation of further free handouts and encouraged some individuals to abuse the programme and profit by selling the food on the open market and then re-registering for the next convoy.
On a more positive note, despite the cumbersome and bureaucratic management structures created by the RRC for the operation, agencies concerned with the programme demonstrated a clear commitment to resolving the long-term problems faced by the region and there was a high level of interest in coordinating rehabilitation activities at the local level and finding joint mechanisms to identify needs and share resources. This valuable aspect of the programme was only really recognised towards the end of the year and there was unfortunately little opportunity to move the focus towards developing the various small scale rehabilitation initiatives that were emerging. The unilateral decision of the RRC to close the operation down and disband both the NCC in Addis Ababa and the TIG in Dolo meant that any last chance to change the emphasis of the programme and redirect resources to more productive ends was lost.
In retrospect it would be too easy to criticise the involvement of UNHCR and the Emergencies Unit in this programme on the basis that it was poorly formulated and ultimately a waste of time and resources. It should be remembered that at the beginning of 1994 this programme was very high on the list of priorities for the Government and there was considerable pressure on the UN generally, and UNHCR specifically, to furnish both moral and substantial material support. In the end there was little choice but to take a flawed programme (although one with the honourable objective of helping dependant camp dwellers become self-sufficient) and try and make it work. The lessons learnt should not be forgotten and somehow the momentum lost in the last months of the operation regained and directed towards the support of small-scale initiatives with long term benefits -- livestock health services, labour intensive road construction, basic health services and education.
3. Technical support for UNHCR returnee operations
In 1992 and 1993 it was seen that a funding relationship between UNHCR and the Emergencies Unit could have clear benefits for both organisations. The collaborative relationship was taken a step further in 1994 with funds amounting to approximately $166,000 provided for the recruitment of short-term technical staff by the Emergencies Unit for secondment to UNHCR -- an arrangement which while being no particular burden to the Emergencies Unit provides UNHCR with considerable flexibility in securing additional technical staff quickly as and when they are needed. Staff recruited by this mechanism during the year included an expatriate and national water engineer for 7.5 and 9 working months respectively, a social anthropologist for 6 months and two national Field Assistants for a total of 11 man-months. In addition, an Assistant Programme Officer was employed for a 5 month period until October when the person concerned was transferred to a UNHCR contract.
Selection and appointment of candidates was conducted jointly by the management staff of the Emergencies Unit and UNHCR with the two agencies drawing from registers of potential candidates maintained by each. Those appointed were placed on short-term (Special Service Agreement - SSA) UNDP contracts and though administratively under the Emergencies Unit, day-to-day work was supervised by the Technical Services Unit of UNHCR. Though the individual terms of reference were purposefully broad and very flexible, staff recruited by this mechanism were mostly used in support of returnee operations in the South and North-West of Ethiopia. Specific tasks included monitoring the work of NGOs and other agencies contracted by UNHCR to assist in the transport and resettlement of returnees from the Sudan, reviewing the provision of basic services to returnees, drawing up plans for water supply projects in settlement areas, investigating prospects for initiating a return of Somali refugees to the North West of Somalia and providing some technical advice for the Afder and Liben zone dispersal programme. Staff seconded directly to UNHCR were supplemented from time to time by the Emergencies Unit Agriculturist (not funded by UNHCR) who helped assess crop production potential and the availability and suitability of land for returnee settlements in the Humera and Metema areas of Region 1 and 3.
Funds from this project were also used to partially finance the study of the process of reintegration and rehabilitation experienced by Tigrayan returnees repatriating from Sudan to the Humera area of North West Ethiopia. The goals of the research are to identify the requirements for self-sufficiency and sustainability of the returnee community. The preliminary findings of the research have been circulated by the Emergencies Unit in the form of a series of occassional special reports.
4. Technical and logistics support for Armyworm control operations
Development of the Armyworm outbreak in Ethiopia
In 1994, following a widespread drought in many mid-altitude cropping areas, unusually widespread infestations of the Armyworm larvae were observed in many areas of south-eastern Ethiopia, including Hararghe, Borena and the Ogaden. The problem was first seen in the Teltele wereda of Borena on April 18 and quickly spread. By July 10, the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) were estimating an unprecedented total of 869,000 hectares of grassland and crops affected. Second and third generation outbreaks in these areas exhausted local supplies of pesticide and stretched MoA resources even before outbreaks reached Welega, Gojam, Gonder, and West/Central Tigray.
At this time, crops in the Tigray region were just emerging or about to be planted and it was evident that control measures would be needed quickly to avoid widespread devastation. The failure of the 1993 harvest had already led to a major food relief programme in the region and it was feared that an un-controlled outbreak of armyworm at this critical point in crop development could lead to a second harvest failure and further increase the chances of famine developing. The rapid spread of the outbreak had caught the Plant Protection Department unprepared for a major control operation in Tigray. Supplies had not been pre-positioned in sufficient quantities and a network of trained extension workers ready to manage ground spraying was not in place. With the livelihood of many thousands of peasant farmers in the balance, however, the Government determined that a major control operation had to be mounted even though it would be expensive and fraught with logistical and technical problems
UN and donors act quickly to support MoA control operations
By the end of June, it was clear that the outbreak was spreading fast and according to an unusual pattern. The upsurge in Hararghe was followed almost immediately by outbreaks in Northern Ethiopia, with successive generations threatening to reach as far as Eritrea. To judge the seriousness of the threat to crops and to advise both the UN and Government on appropriate control strategies, Dr Wolfgang Meinzingen, an expert on migratory pests and previously head of the FAO regional migratory pest control programme, was called from Nairobi on a short-term consultancy. Contracted through the Emergencies Unit, this initiative was taken following consultations with FAO and charged against emergency funds made available through the UNDP Resident Representative's access to UNDP Special Programme Resources.
Dr Meinzingen arrived on Thursday, June 30, and immediately travelled to Tigray to assess the extent of the problem and make proposals for UN action. He soon reported back that the situation in the western and central zones was deteriorating rapidly with a far wider area of infestation than had been previously thought. Staff of the MoA Plant Protection Department in Mekelle confirmed that stocks of pesticide in the region would be exhausted within one or two days and that they did not have the capacity locally to contain the outbreak. The consultant strongly recommended that immediate steps be taken to position another spray aircraft and additional stocks of pesticide in the affected areas.
During May and the early part of June, the Desert Locust Control Organisation (DLCO) deployed a Beaver spray aircraft in Hararghe where it had been active in supporting MoA ground control operations in Garamuleta and Jigjiga. With reports that the situation in Tigray was worsening, on 28 June, the DLCO aircraft was re-deployed to Mekelle and Humera. Its effectiveness, however, were hampered by the aircraft’s restricted endurance, limited pesticide capacity and problems of securing adequate supplies of Avgas. The DLCO also despatched 2,000 litres of insecticide to Humera and 2,000 litres to Mekelle from its own limited strategic stocks held in Addis Ababa. This was only enough, however, to cover 8,000 of the 75,000 hectares of cropland reported to be affected by armyworms on July 4.
In response to an appeal from the Emergencies Unit, on 1 July the Humanitarian Aid Division of the Government of Switzerland confirmed a pledge of Swiss Francs 54,433 ($40,927.07) to support armyworm control operations in Northern Ethiopia. This was used to contract a second spray aircraft, this time a more modern turbo-prop Thrush, from the Ethiopian Airlines Spray Services Unit (formerly Admas Air) with twice the pesticide capacity and endurance of the DLCO plane. The EA-SSU aircraft was ferried to Mekelle on Sunday, 3 July, and began spraying the following day. With the main outbreak concentrated in the central and western zones of the region, the aircraft were positioned to operate out of Axum and Enda Selassie. From these locations most areas affected by armyworms could be reached easily without the necessity of undertaking long, and expensive, ferry flights. Supplies of pesticides and aviation fuel, however, had to be shuttled from Mekelle by MoA truck and, at only 600-2,000 litres per load and a two-three day turn-around, this arrangement was not enough to keep both aircraft fully utilised. Meanwhile, stocks of pesticide and Avgas in Mekelle were dwindling fast and replenishment could only come from Addis Ababa - a seven to ten day journey by road.
Also on Friday, July 1, the Swedish Government re-phased one million Birr (approx. $160,000) from their bilateral assistance programme to the MoA thus enabling the Plant Protection Department to purchase an additional 32,000 litres of insecticide from the Agricultural Input Supply Corporation (AISCO). Though this was calculated to be sufficient to contain the outbreak in Tigray, there was still the problem of how to pre-position both the insecticide and aviation fuel in the affected areas fast enough to both maintain the momentum of current aerial and ground control operations and to allow an expansion to areas previously not covered. The “window of opportunity” was extremely short -- a matter of only ten to twenty days -- if the emergence of further generations of armyworm was to be avoided.
Given the urgency of the situation, on 8, 9 and 10 July the Emergencies Unit chartered an Ethiopian Airlines DHC-5 (a small, twin-engine cargo plane with STOL capability) to fly aviation fuel and ULV pesticide from Addis Ababa directly to the airstrips at Enda Selassie and Axum. The three flights, which included a shuttle on 8 July from Mekelle to Axum with additional Jet-A1 fuel for the EA-SSU plane, delivered a combined total of 4,800 litres of ULV and 1,400 litres of EC insecticide, 1,600 litres of Avgas and 2,600 litres of Jet-A1 aviation fuel - sufficient to spray around 10,000 hectares of infested cropland at the standard aerial application rate of 0.5 litres/hectare. In addition, on July 7, UN-EUE dispatched a private truck to Mekelle with 3,400 litres of ULV, 6,400 litres of EC and 3,100 kilograms of wettable powder insecticide. The first DHC-5 flight arrived just in time to avoid the grounding of the spray aircraft due to a lack of supplies. This flight was made possible by a contribution of funds made available through the Norwegian Embassy. The second and third flights plus the cost of contracting the private truck were charged against the Swiss contribution.
Though the DHC-5 had the advantage of being able to fly directly to the airstrips at Axum and Enda Selassie, its capacity was very limited and the flights were only sufficient to keep the spray planes operational on a day-to-day basis. On July 9, with the scope of control operations still outstripping the ability of the MoA to maintain an adequate supply of pesticides and fuel, the UN-EUE chartered an Ethiopian Airlines Hercules L-100 to carry 6,000 litres of ULV pesticide, 3,200 litres of Avgas and 532 backpack sprayers to Mekelle. This was followed by a further two Hercules flights to Mekelle on July 16 and 22 carrying a total of 12,200 litres of Fenitrothion ULV, 11,600 litres of Malathion EC and 4,750 kgs of Carbaryl wettable powder. The first flight was made possible through a contribution of the Netherlands Embassy while the second and third flights were charged to UNDP emergency funds. During this period, the MoA also chartered three flights of the Hercules using their own resources. Table IV below summarises the transport assistance provided through the Emergencies Unit and details the cargo carried and source of funding in each case.
|Date |Type of Transport | Destination |Cargo |
|8 July |Aircraft: DHC-5 |Shire/Axum/Mekelle |800 lts Avgas + 1000 lts ULV + 2600 lts Jet-A1 |
| | | |(Mekelle - Axum) |
|8 July |Private truck/trailer | Mekelle |3100 kgs Carbaryl + 6400 lts Malathion EC |
|9 July |Aircraft: DHC-5 |Axum/Shire |2400 lts ULV + 800 lts Avgas |
|9 July |Aircraft: L-100 |Mekelle |535 backpack sprayers + 3200 lts Avgas + 6000 lts ULV |
|10 July |Aircraft: DHC-5 |Shire/Mekelle |2200 lts ULV + 2000 lts Jet-A1 (Mekelle - Shire) |
|16 July |Aircraft: L-100 |Mekelle |8000 lts Fenitrothion ULV + 2000 lts Malathion EC + |
| | | |4750 kgs Carbaryl WP |
|22 July |Aircraft: L-100 |Mekelle |9600 lts Malathion/Sumithion EC + 4200 lts Fenitrothion ULV |
Table IV: Emergencies Unit logistics support to MoA-PPD armyworm control operations in Northern Ethiopia, July 1994
The airlift bought time for the Plant Protection Department in Tigray, allowing them to concentrate on the technical side of the control operation. Management of the aerial spraying programme was under the direct control of local MoA officials although Emergencies Unit staff were able to observe and monitor activities during the early stages of the operation. Areas to be sprayed were surveyed first and then marked for spraying using smoke - often from fires lit by farmers in the area. The pilots, who were observed to be very experienced and skilled in their job, were guided in the cockpit by either MoA staff or representatives of the local administration who knew by sight the locations to be sprayed. Both aircraft were equipped with Micronair ULV sprayers and an application rate of 0.5 litres/hectare was used as recommended by experts in armyworm control.
The EA-SSU plane continued to operate under contract to the Emergencies Unit up until 17 July. During this period, the plane flew a total of 40 hours and applied insecticide to just under 30,000 hectares of cropland at a final cost to the Unit of $24,759.98. From 18 July until the end of the spraying programme the plane came under a contract with DLCO paid for out of a further $50,000 committed by the Canadian Government. The table above summarises the daily operations of the EA-SSU plane while it was under contract to the Emergencies Unit.
Despite some collateral damage, control measures are effective and prevent further infestation
The 1994 armyworm outbreak in Ethiopia was the most serious for many years. As so often in the past, it followed a period of drought and therefore posed a serious threat to the economic recovery of many farmers living in the affected areas. Though a forecasting system exists under the auspices of DLCO-EA Regional Armyworm Project based in Nairobi, the MoA were still unable to predict accurately the outbreak this year and were caught largely unprepared. Without sufficient warning, stocks of insecticide, equipment and other supplies were not pre-positioned in time nor were regional staff prepared. Consequently, the control programme could only react to outbreaks as they were reported and was forced to rely on aerial spraying and the expensive use of cargo planes to transport supplies.
Traditional control methods (trampling by cattle, trenching and beating with sticks) and ground spraying using pneumatic and ULV knapsack sprayers are generally considered to be more effective and less damaging to the environment than aerial spraying which has a tendency to be indiscriminate unless carefully controlled. However, given the seriousness of the outbreak in Tigray during 1994, and the inaccessibility of much of the affected farmland, the MoA had little choice but to employ aerial spraying. Due to time constraints, proper surveys prior to each day's spraying were not always possible and the pilots often had to rely on local guides to point out the infested areas. As a consequence, it has to be concluded that the spraying was not always as accurate as it should have been and, in some cases, areas where the larvae had already pupated were sprayed.
Altogether, the two aircraft in Tigray are thought to have utilised approximately 30 tons of pesticide during the July operation. Though the intended application rate was 0.5 litres/hectare, on occasions this may have been higher. In some areas it is thought the insecticide used caused serious damage to honey-bees, which are an important source of cash income for small farmers in Axum and Shire. Though the economic loss due to the damage to the honey industry may have been considerable, it was almost certainly more than compensated by crop production that might otherwise been lost due to armyworms had the spraying not taken place. If it is assumed that 40,000 hectares of cropland was treated, at a nominal yield of 5 quintals per hectare the potential crop failure could have been as high as 20,000 tons. In economic terms, with relief food costing approximately $460, including delivery to Tigray, the savings can be estimated to be in the order of $9 million. There were other benefits that can not be quantified, for instance the success of the operation boosted the morale of farmers who saw, perhaps for the first time, that the Government will indeed act to assist them when such problems arise.
Though control operations did succeed in preventing widespread crop losses in Tigray, damage was still incurred. Estimating the extent of this damage is notoriously difficult as outbreaks tend to be patchy and there is always a tendency to over-estimate the degree of infestation. The calculation is made even more difficult as poor rains during this period retarded the crop in the early growing period and it is not always clear whether farmers ploughed and replanted due to the drought, armyworm or both. The MoA, however, have calculated that a minimum of 2,500 hectares had to be re-ploughed due to armyworm attack. The cost in terms of lost production is estimated at $230 per hectare, or a total of $575,000 (FAO consultants report - October 1994). Recent figures obtained from the Region 4 Agriculture Bureau suggest that damage in East Haraghe due to armyworms was much greater than in Tigray with the loss of production estimated at some 26,000 tons for sorghum and 32,500 tons for maize.
The entire emergency control operation in Tigray was made possible through the co-ordinated efforts of the Ministry of Agriculture-Plant Protection Division, the regional, zonal and local representatives of the MoA and the Emergencies Unit. The Emergencies Unit and the MoA-PPD established an excellent level of co-operation and understanding while arranging flights and cargo to meet the seemingly impossible needs. Aerial spraying was supervised in the field by zonal MoA staff working with the Emergencies Unit Agriculturist until the head of the regional bureau of the MoA arrived. Local MoA officers went to the countryside to verify farmer reports of outbreaks, to mark out the area to be sprayed with white flags and hay smoke signals and to navigate the pilot to remote target areas. The farmers reaction can best be summarised by one reply, “Always before the aeroplanes would come to kill us, this time they came to kill our enemy”. This positive feeling, expressed by many farmers to MoA personnel in the field, can largely be attributed to the success of the aerial control campaign.
Plans for 1995
Following a generally satisfactory main season harvest over much of the country, 1995 is expected to be a year when the Government can again focus on tackling the root causes of food insecurity. As outlined in the national appeal launched by the RRC in December, implementation of the National Policy on Disaster Prevention and Management will be given top priority. The Government is expected to use the opportunity of the commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the 1984/85 famine, to take place during February and March, to mount a public information campaign on the policy and to regain some of the momentum lost during the 1994 emergency. Working in close collaboration with the RRC, the Emergencies Unit has already assisted in the formulation of a strategy for the tenth anniversary commemorations and has been able to secure $92,000 from UNDP “add-on” funds to finance an anniversary secretariat and a range of specific public information activities.
Much of what the Emergencies Unit has done in terms of capacity building to date has been of an ad hoc nature, meeting immediate needs as they arise and helping the RRC to manage the 1994 emergency more effectively. The project of short-term technical support to the RRC begun in August will be wound up by the end of March. The Emergencies Unit will conduct any future programme of technical assistance to the RRC within the overall framework established by the 5th Country Programme and, in particular, that of the recently ratified National Programme 4 -- Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation. In this regard, discussions are taking place with the RRC to explore ways in which assistance can be provided for the planned decentralisation of the national early warning system, in the development of regional relief plans and in a regional disaster management capacity study. The RRC has already indicated that it intends to give these three projects priority during the coming year using resources made available by UNDP and interested donors. Opportunities for further collaboration may develop during the course of the year, especially if a current proposal that the Emergencies Unit should formally take responsibility within UNDP for the management of Programme 4 is agreed.
One of the strengths of the Emergencies Unit, and the EPPG before it, has been the capacity to deploy experienced field staff throughout the country, often at very short notice, to monitor developments, assess needs and provide operational support. In the past, this operational capacity has been provided through the establishment of a small core staff of both expatriate and national field officers. Normally, the staff recruited are generalists with a broad understanding of relief and development issues and extensive experience of Ethiopia, often with an NGO. To add further depth to the analytical and supportive functions of the Emergencies Unit, in 1995 additional technical staff will be recruited to supplement the expertise provided by the Agriculturist recruited to the staff in early 1994. These are likely to be nationals and will include a water/public health engineer, a health/nutrition specialist and a sociologist/anthropologist. These will available to participate in multi-disciplinary assessment missions and as a resource available to other agencies as needed. As with the staff Agriculturist, these additional technical staff will also be expected to prepare occasional specialist reports on issues of general concern and within their field of expertise.
In recent years the Emergencies Unit has provided technical and managerial support for a number of specific field operations. These have included airlift and air-drop operations, a light aircraft service, and relief activities in the Ogaden conducted jointly with other agencies under the principles of the “cross-mandate” approach. Although the Emergencies Unit is essentially non-operational, it will continue to retain a capacity to provide practical support for joint UN-Government relief activities in the field. Such initiatives will be kept administratively and financially independent of the core functions and managed as a "project" financed through direct contributions from donors.
In the coming year the Emergencies Unit hopes to further enhance the already exceptionally high level of UN coordination and inter-agency cooperation that exists in the country. The main means of influence in this regard will be the advisory role the Unit has vis-à-vis the UNDP Resident Representative in his capacity as the UN Resident Coordinator, and as the secretariat for the UN Disaster Management Team (DMT), which is the main forum for discussing matters of joint UN policy on relief and rehabilitation in Ethiopia. As in the past, the Emergencies Unit will be a focal point for joint UN initiatives either of a practical nature (as in the various cross-mandate projects undertaken in previous years) or in terms of advocacy, media relations and public information. Though a consolidated UN appeal was not prepared for 1995, the Unit will work, as before, to ensure that a coherent and integrated programme of UN activities is presented to donors for funding. Coordination at the international level will be through the Department of Humanitarian Affairs with whom regular contact is maintained and which cooperates in initiatives to promote increased donor funding for rehabilitation and development in Ethiopia.
The complex set of challenges facing the countries of the Horn of Africa - civil war, drought, refugees, food insecurity and long-term dependence on external aid - have given rise to an acknowledgement that special measures need to be implemented at a sub-regional level if long-term solutions are to be found. With this in mind, a number of international initiatives were launched late in 1994, including the UNDP Horn of Africa Initiative, the Clinton Initiative and the DHA Initiative for Sub-Saharan Africa. These all promote the regional approach and the need for better coordination of programmes with an impact extending beyond the borders of just one country. Improved inter-agency coordination and the sharing of information is a common thread running through all the initiatives. In 1995, the Emergencies Unit will work to facilitate the sharing of information between UN agencies in the Horn of Africa and promote closer operational planning and coordination.
The work on monitoring the inter-related events in Somalia and Region 5 begun in late 1994 will be continued and developed further in 1995. Contacts already established with various organisations, agencies and individuals interested in the region will be maintained and, where appropriate, support given to the peace process. In the majority of cases this will be through the sharing of information and by playing the role of advocate. If given the necessary mandate by the UN agencies and provided suitable staff are available, the Emergencies Unit may extend this regional monitoring function to cover the border regions of South Sudan where continuing civil conflict maintains the potential for future influxes of refugees.
Existing informal links with the NGO community will be maintained and used to explore new opportunities for joint action and to cultivate a relationship that is mutually supportive. In 1995, the opportunities for creating links with NGO groups working in the Horn of Africa region and beyond will be explored using the rapidly expanding range of networking facilities provided by the information technology revolution. Though the Unit has a good dialogue with most of the larger NGOs, the formal link with the wider NGO community in Ethiopia will continue to be through its umbrella organisation, the Christian Relief and Development Association. The much improved relations between the RRC and NGOs, however, holds out the promise that to an increasing degree the RRC will be at the centre of NGO policy making and operational coordination. This will be a process actively encouraged by the Emergencies Unit both at the central and regional level. Where necessary, as in 1994 the Unit will intervene on behalf of the NGOs if particular views or concerns are not being addressed or if the participation of a third party is seen as useful.
Access to timely and accurate information and analysis is recognised as an essential component of any strategy aiming to help mobilise resources and foster inter-agency cooperation. Through its many informal contacts with Government, donors, NGOs and the UN agencies, the Emergencies Unit is able to access a vast amount of both anecdotal and documentary information. The Unit firmly believes in the principle of free dissemination of information and much use is already made of e-mail in the collection and distribution of reports. With the purchase of addition specialist computer equipment, the opportunities presented by the revolution in information technology in disaster management and inter-agency networking will be further explored, both locally and within the Horn of Africa. Funds permitting, the Emergencies Unit will upgrade and modernise its existing library to form a specialist documentation centre holding written materials and electronic data in a form that can be quickly and easily accessed. Creating links with other libraries in the region will also be looked at as will the feasibility of establishing a computerised database of documents, reports and news items that can be accessed and interrogated remotely, possibly through a dedicated bulletin board system set up within the Emergencies Unit itself.
ANNEX I
UN Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia: Organigram (mid-1994)
Staff seconded to UNHCR UN-EUE Staff Staff seconded to RRC
Notes:
1. * - Denotes UN-EUE positions funded by UNHCR and assigned to the Afder/Liben zone dispersal programme
2. Staff seconded to UNHCR are funded by UNHCR and only provided with administrative support from UN-EUE
3. Most staff seconded to the RRC are funded through project ETH/94/009 - capacity building in the RRC
4. † - Denotes staff seconded by Swiss Disaster Relief (SDR)
ANNEX II
DONORS TO UNDP PROJECT ETH/89/UO1 (EPPG/EUE)
1987 - 1994
|Donor |Year |Cash (US $) |In-kind |Comments |
|Canada |1990 | 86,206.90 | |Ear-marked for one Field Officer |
| |1992 | 50,420.17 | | -ditto- |
|Norway |1993 | 100,000.00 | |General resources - un-earmarked |
| |1994 | 99,468.00 | | -ditto- |
| |1994 | 50,000.00 | |Capacity building in RRC - ETH/94/009 |
| |1994 | 6,500.00 | |For armyworm control in N. Ethiopia |
|United Kingdom |1987 | |Two Field Officers |Including local travel & vehicle costs |
| |1988 | | -ditto- | -ditto- |
| |1989 | | -ditto- | -ditto- |
| |1990 | | -ditto- | -ditto- |
| |1991 | | -ditto- | -ditto- |
| |1992 | | -ditto- | -ditto- |
| |1993 | | -ditto- | -ditto- |
|United States |1989 | 150,000.00 | |Ear-marked for staff costs |
| |1990 | 160,000.00 | | -ditto- |
| |1991 | 143,000.00 | |Purchase of equipment + staff costs |
| |1992 | 295,845.00 | |Staff costs + Gode State Farm project |
| |1994 | 50,000.00 | |Capacity building in RRC - ETH/94/009 |
|Netherlands |1994 | 8,194.56 | |For armyworm control in N. Ethiopia |
| |1994 | 13,900.00 | |Capacity building in RRC - ETH/94/009 |
|European Union |1992 | 54,404.00 | |Support for UN light aircraft service |
| |1993 | 33,825.00 | | -ditto- |
| |1993 | 18,499.00 | | -ditto- |
|UNHCR |1992 | 125,000.00 | |General resources - un-earmarked |
| |1993 | 100,100.00 | |Ogaden relief and rehabilitation |
| |1993 | 180,631.00 | |Staff costs and Ogaden operations |
| |1994 | 615,380.00 | |As above + staff for UNHCR |
|World Food Programme |1993 | 100,000.00 | |General resources - un-earmarked |
|DHA |1993 | 170,000.00 | |From Dutch Gov. - un-earmarked |
| |1994 | 50,400.00 | |From New Zealand Gov. - core funds |
| |1994 | 4,800.00 | |From Cyprus Gov. - core funds |
|UNICEF |1994 | 33,000.00 | |General resources - un-earmarked |
|UNDP |1987 | 299,000.00 | |Project start-up funds - un-earmarked |
| |1993 | 100,000.00 | |Earmarked for Technical Coordinator |
| |1994 | 99,571.00 | |SPR funds (ex-DMTP) - un-earmarked |
| |1994 | 50,000.00 | |For armyworm control in N. Ethiopia |
| |1994 | 96.977.00 | |Capacity building in RRC - ETH/94/009 |
|Switzerland |1990 | |One Field Officer | |
| |1991 | | -ditto- | |
| |1992 | | -ditto- | |
| |1993 | | -ditto- | |
| |1994 | |Two Field Officers | |
| |1994 | 40,927.00 | |For armyworm control in N. Ethiopia |
| |1994 | 211,416.00 | |General resources - un-earmarked |
|France |1988 | |One Field Officer |Through AICF |
Note: This includes contributions to projects directly implemented by EPPG/EUE.
ANNEX III
REPORTS PREPARED BY
THE EMERGENCIES UNIT FOR ETHIOPIA
IN 1994
January
December Situation Report, prepared by EUE from information provided by UN agencies and NGOs
Field Trip Report - Ogaden Update, by Gromo Alex, EUE Field Officer
Field Trip Report - Borena, by Admassu Haile Yesus, EUE Field Assistant
February
January Situation Report, prepared by EUE from information provided by UN agencies and NGOs
A Special Report on Striga, by Dr. Robert Shank, UN-EUE Agricultural Officer
March
February Situation Report, prepared by EUE from information provided by UN agencies and NGOs
South West Ogaden Situation Report for February, by Admassu H/Yesus, EUE Field Assistant
A Briefing Paper Prepared for the Consultative Group for Ethiopia. Paris 7-8 March, by Mark Bidder, EUE Deputy Coordinator
The Repatriation of Refugees from Eastern Sudan to Humera, Tigray, a first in a series of reviewing the issues regarding repatriation from the Sudan, prepared by Laura Hammond, an anthropologist working with EUE
A Desk Review of NGO Activities in Northern Ethiopia (Wello, Gondar and Tigray), by Hans Spiess, EUE Field Officer
April
March Situation Report, prepared by EUE from information provided by UN agencies and NGOs
1993 Activity Report: A Comprehensive Record of the Activities and Operations of the UN Emergency Prevention and Preparedness Group (EPPG) in 1993, by Mark Bidder, EUE Deputy Coordinator
Survey in South Wello Zone of Region 3: A Situation Report, by Hans Spiess, EUE Field Officer
Special report on Wheat Stem Rust and Drought Effects on Agricultural Production, by Dr. Robert Shank, EUE Agricultural Officer
Chronological Summary of the Works and Decisions of the Technical Implementation Group for Afder and Liben Zone, by Brian Cox, EUE Logistics Officer
A Brief Report on the Reconnaissance of El'Medo, the Intended First Destination for Dispersees from Dollo, by Frederic Vigneau, EUE Field Officer for Region 5
Situation report of Region 1 (Tigray): A General Report of the Current Situation in the Region, by Hans Spiess, EUE Field Officer
Scenario of Food Needs, Availability and Consumption for Ethiopia as of 15 April, prepared by Jim Borton, EUE Technical Coordinator
Ethiopia - Food and Population: A Chart, prepared by Jim Borton
Special Report on United Nations and the Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia Activities concerning the current Ethiopian Food Emergency, by Jim Borton, EUE Technical Coordinator
1995 - Another Famine?; public information film prepared for the launching of the revised 1995 RRC relief appeal by UN-EUE consultant, Ben Parker, and Deputy Coordinator, Mark Bidder
Food Situation Report for Ethiopia, prepared by Jim Borton
May
April Situation Report, prepared by EUE from information provided by UN agencies and NGOs
A Report on North Wello Zone of Region 3: An Assessment of the Situation in 4 Weredas (Sekota, Zequala, Bugna and Dehana), by Dr. Robert Shank, EUE Agricultural Officer
The following one page briefing papers were prepared by EUE staff and UN agencies for the RRC (May Delegation):
Main Elements of Revised RRC Appeal
Government Efforts Regarding the Current Emergency
"Worst Case" Scenario - 1995
The Progress of the 1994 Belg Season
Food Production and Food Needs
The Emergency Food Security Reserve
RRC Capacity Building Programmes
FAO Non-Food Assistance Requirements
UNICEF Non-Food Assistance Requirements
WHO Non-Food Assistance Requirements
Funding Requirements for Non-Food Assistance
Affected Population and Food Requirements by Region
Scenario of Emergency Food Availability
Assessment Mission and Summary of RRC/NGO Activities in North Omo (Welayita), EUE Agricultural Officer,
Dr. Robert Shank
The Enset Culture: A Technical Report on Enset, Its Cultural role, cultivation and Future Prospects, by Dr. Robert Shank, EUE Agricultural Officer
1994 Food Needs in Ethiopia: a Briefing Document, prepared by Mark Bidder, EUE Deputy Coordinator
Returnees, Local Farmers and Big Business, the Politics of Land Allocation in Humera (Region 1), prepared for the EUE by anthropologist Laura Hammond
Field Trip Report to North and South Gondar Zones of Region 3 (Amhara), by Hans Spiess, EUE Field Officer
June
May Situation Report, prepared by EUE from information provided by UN agencies and NGOs
Special Report on Pesticide Availability and Use for the Control of Non-migratory pests in Northern Ethiopia, prepared by Dr. Robert Shank, EUE Agricultural Officer
July
June Situation Report, prepared by EUE from information provided by UN agencies and NGOs
A Special Report on the Situation of Draught Animals in the Current Drought Affected areas of the Central, Eastern and Southern Zones of Tigray, prepared by Hans Spiess, EUE Field Officer
Field Report to Jigjiga: A Report Reviewing the Present Political Situation, Security and Ongoing Operations in Jigjiga (Region 5), prepared by Frederic Vigneau, EUE Field Officer
Field Trip Report to Wolayita and North Omo: A Report Reviewing the Present Situation and Ongoing Relief Operations and Coordinations in Wolayita and North Omo Zone, prepared by Theodor Erni and Admassu H/Yesus, EUE Field Officers
Situation Report on South Welo zone: a Field Trip Report with an Assessment of recent Developments in the Drought Situation in South Welo zone of Region 3 (Amhara), prepared by Hans Spiess, EUE Field Officer
Field Trip Report to Wolayita and North Omo: A Report Reviewing the Present Situation and Ongoing Relief Operations and Coordinations in Wolayita and North Omo Zone, prepared by Ralph Klingele and Admassu H/Yesus, EUE Field Officers
August
July Situation Report, prepared by EUE from information provided by UN agencies and NGOs
September
August Situation Report, prepared from information provided by UN agencies and NGOs
Situation Report of Tigray, North Wello and South Gonder: a report reviewing the present situation and ongoing relief operations and coordinations in Tigray, North Wello and South Gonder; prepared by EUE Officer, Hans Spiess
Armyworm Emergency Operation in Tigray: a special report on the armyworm outbreak in Tigray, with an assessment of the control operations carried out in the area, prepared by Dr. Wolfgang Meinzingen, EUE Consultant and Dr. Robert Shank, EUE Agricultural Officer
Situation Report of Wolayita and North Omo zone: a report in a series reviewing ongoing relief operations and coordinations in Wolayita and North Omo; prepared by Ralph Klingele and Admassu H/Yesus, EUE Field Officers
Field Report of Gode and Kalafo zones: a report providing update information on the current situation in Gode and Kalafo zones of Region 5 (Ogaden) prepared by Frederic Vigneau, EUE Field Officer for Region 5
Field Trip Report to North Shewa, Oromo and South Welo zones of Region 3 (Amhara): a brief report providing update information on the situation in the visited zones prepared by Hans Spiess, EUE Field Officer
Situation Report of East and West Hararghe zones of Region 4 (Oromia): a situation report based on visits to 10 weredas in Eastern Hararghe and 13 weredas in Western Hararghe zones prepared by EUE Field Officers Ralph Klingele and Admassu H/Yesus
October
September Situation Report, prepared by EUE from information provided by UN agencies and NGOs
Situation Report of North Omo and Wolayita: a final report in a series reviewing the general situation and NGO operations and coordinations in North Omo and Wolayita (Southern Region), prepared by EUE Officers, Ralph Klingele and Admasu H/Yesus
Emergency Assistance for Armyworm Control Operations in Ethiopia: Final report for donors; prepared by UN-EUE Deputy Coordinator, Mark Bidder
November
October situation report, prepared by EUE from information provided by UN agencies and NGOs
Returnee Agricultural Crop and Land Assessment: a report based on the field trip conducted in early October to Metema and Humera returnee settlements in Regions 1 (Tigray) and 3 (Amhara); prepared by EUE Agricultural Officer, Dr. Robert Shank
The need for Integrating Indigenous and Bio-medical Health Care Systems: a case study from Ada Bai returnee settlement; prepared for EUE by anthropologist Laura Hammond
Dolo Dispersal Operation: Dolo-Bay to Imi; a special report on the dispersal programme in Region 5 (Ogaden); prepared by EUE Field Officer, Frederic Vigneau
Report on Mission to Haud Area, Region 5: a special report on the situation in Haud area of Region 5, prepared
for the UN-EUE by consultant, Matthew Bryden
December
November situation report, prepared by EUE from information provided by UN agencies and NGOs
Situation Report: Mission to Somaliland; prepared for EUE by consultant Matthew Bryden
Linking relief and development - A conceptual outline: prepared for the launching of the 1995 RRC relief and rehabilitation appeal by UN-EUE Deputy Coordinator, Mark Bidder
January (1995)
Strengthening the RRC’s Capacity for Emergency Planning and Response: End of year report for project ETH/94/009; prepared by the UN-EUE
Preliminary Findings of Household Economic Survey, Ada Bai Returnee Settlement, Humera, Ethiopia; prepared for UN-EUE by anthropologist, Laura Hammond
Report on Mission to Djibouti and Boraama, North West Somalia; prepared by UN-EUE Field Officer, Frederic Vigneau.
-----------------------
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
EMERGENCIES UNIT FOR ETHIOPIA
(UN-EUE)
Annual Report on Activities and Operations
1994
27 March 1995
TECHNICAL COORDINATOR
Jim Borton
DEPUTY COORDINATOR
Mark Bidder
ADMIN. ASSISTANT
Etagegnehu Mekonnen
INFORMATION OFFICER
Leila Pakkala
ACCOUNTANT
Kiflu Begashaw
PROGRAMME OFFICER
Tarik Muftic
ADVISER - PROJECT TRACKING
Theo Erni†
FIELD OFFICER
Hans Speiss†
FIELD ENGINEER
Gary Campbell
SYSTEMS ANALYST - MAIN OFFICE
Guido Notari
AGRICULTURIST
Dr. Robert Shank
ANTHROPOLOGIST
Ahmed Farah
SYSTEMS ANALYST - LOGISTICS
Anthony Karibian
SOMALIA LIAISON
Matthew Bryden
FIELD OFFICER
Frederic Vigneau
ANTHROPOLOGIST
Laura Hammond
ADVISER - EMERGENCY OPS
Fred Beekers
LOGISTICS OFFICER*
Brian Cox
Asst. FIELD ENGINEER
Kiflemariam Abraha
ADVISER - PUBLIC RELATIONS
Angela Mackay
COMPUTER TRAINING OFFICER
Yodit Woldemichael
Asst. FIELD OFFICER
Admassu H/Yesus
Asst. FIELD OFFICER
Ephrem Kassaye
Asst. FIELD OFFICER*
Asgedom Z/Michael
COMPUTER TRAINING OFFICER
Solomon Tesfaye
Asst. FIELD ENGINEER
Atnafseged Hagos
DRIVER/FIELD Asst.
Haile G/Tsadik
INTERN
Gabriella Croce
DRIVER/FIELD Asst.
Belihu Endale
DRIVER/FIELD Asst.
Ayelew Abebe
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