CRM Integration



CRM Integration issue - Advisory panel December 6th 2007.

Steve Jarvis.

The subject of further integration of CRM was brought up as a possible objective for the panel. The following contains what I recall, and inevitably some of my own views.

The topic of ‘the definition of integration’ was forwarded. From my own point of view I was thinking of the integration of the theory of CRM / Human Factors into the operation, as well as further aspects of the operation. There are still many pilots who, despite the work of the panel and others, see CRM as a separate entity to the rest of their flying ‘something that has to be done’ rather than something that is integral to the safe operation of an aircraft. This thinking often pervades management also; CRM is seen as a box to be ticked, costing money, rather than a useful process that is worth something to the company. This comes from CRM standing alone as a topic; even being viewed as theory that has little impact in the real world (a bolt-on). Ultimate success would be if CRM and Human Factors were gently merged into line flying so well that their use became inseparable and indistinguishable (integrated). The question of ‘buy in’ to CRM was expressed by Jeremy Butler which is, in my view, part of the same issue.

In my opinion this ‘buy in’ occurs with individuals, but can spread throughout a company if the right people are in place to make it happen. I expressed the view that getting this happening can often be rather a ‘random’ process, and it depends to a large extent on the particular individuals and their contact and experience of CRM, as well as their own ability to see operational applications in CRM concepts. Companies that do CRM very well are usually those that have one or more very effective ‘champions’ of CRM, who have ‘sold’ CRM and hopefully shown the advantages to high levels of the company. The ‘buy in’ occurs at various levels of a company of course (and in different ways) but needs energetic individuals working at and across those levels to achieve success in getting the positive messages over. Equally, sceptics and ineffective individuals can work against CRM ‘buy in’ at all levels, but are obviously more damaging in positions of management / training management.

In my view effective integration of CRM theory to practical operational use is very important for achieving this buy in. For example pilots may only start to ‘buy in’ when they see for themselves that it works for them. This is unlikely to occur in a briefing, book, or classroom, but will when CRM is used as an integral part of a line flight or LOFT exercise, and is seen to make a difference. Pilots need to see it work (for it to be integrated in what they do, leading to ‘breakthrough moments’ ie. those moments where pilots experience and see for themselves the effectiveness of applying a particular HF /CRM concept in context). For example after learning about communication techniques, a pilot in a LOFT session may decide to choose to use a different form of words to his/her normal manner during the simulated emergency, and find that it has a very favourable result. Several such breakthrough moments will have a big influence on individuals. The reason that it is important for line pilots to be convinced is that common sense (as well as social science) has long shown that beliefs and values are most effective when backed up by respected peers. If a critical mass of pilots in an organisation have bought into CRM then most others will follow as this filters through the community (accepting that there will always be a small minority of those that, for reasons of personality and their own identity, will strengthen their views in the opposite direction).The individuals that could accelerate such change are the trainers (TREs, TRIs, etc) who could facilitate successful use of CRM in LOFT and line training, and focus attention on these successful moments (as many already do).

Some individuals within companies have managed to get CRM accepted at all levels across the company. I suggest that these companies are now achieving a good deal of the sort of ‘integration’ that I am referring to here. Many other companies have clearly not reached this stage, or have managed only to reach certain levels. Often it is down to certain individuals to begin the change (the champions of CRM).

I believe much of the original disillusionment with HF / CRM came from trying to teach crews psychology and physiology and then assuming that this knowledge would make a difference to how they operate aircraft (an assumption unfortunately still held by many academics / training organisations). This was quickly seen to of little use, since most pilots could not integrate the HF training into their operations (unsurprisingly since it had not been done in training). In my opinion many pilots still see it in this way. Due to work, for instance by members of the panel, some airlines now run excellent programmes and most pilots will be engaged, but this often still depends to a large extent on the people running them.

CRM scepticism among crews can be well founded. It is not that these pilots / management are deviants but that their experience of CRM / HF has been poor, and they are rational people. The ‘disintegration’ that I refer to (ie. CRM perceived as a separate and ineffective topic) has embedded itself strongly in some groups over many years. It is often cultural (comments made by trainers such as “ok guys, I’m sorry but we’re going to just get this CRM stuff done, then we can get on with the proper work”). My own view is that it begins with the HPL exam. A look at the syllabus shows that it teaches a lot of physiology and psychology, but this is only loosely applied if at all. For example; pilots are expected to learn the names of the four chambers of the heart (this is examinable: learning the names). This is easy prey for sceptics; “The pilot crashed after mistakenly calling it the left ventricle instead of the left atrium!”. Such knowledge cannot be applied to the job in hand, and so some pilots see this as pointless exercise. This attitude can become embedded if pilots continue feeling that the most important outcome from learning CRM / HF is passing an exam / check.

Having said this, I do believe that much of CRM / HF should be taught away from the operation initially and then integrated. But…the material should be considered for its relevance and the subjects taught should all be of some value later when they are ‘integrated’ across the operation, otherwise why are they there?

As I said, some airlines have conquered this to a large extent, and some individual trainers have gone a long way to dealing with this (probably most trainers on the panel). It would be worth finding out what pilots feel about CRM from different airlines, and asking those who are positive about it to outline the perceived reasons for their positive thinking. Such research would be valid since the perception is the important factor for buy in.

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