Norms



Norms

A norm is a sanction-supported behavioral regularity in a group of people, where the regularity exists in part because each group member thinks each group member ought to act in accord with that regularity.[1] The “ought” may be purely prudential, justified by a fear of legal and non-legal sanctions; or, it may be justified in light values the person accepts. Before turning to the question of what norms apply in the case of contracting, some comments about norms in general are in order.

One feature of norms which is particularly relevant here is that they typically resolve conflicts between competing values.[2] Consider three examples. You are making a comment during a roundtable discussion. Like everyone else, you value both having your say and hearing from the others. How long should you talk before it is someone else’s turn? You enter an elevator in which several others are already present. Where should you stand? Each person values not feeling crowded, but each also values being able to ride the elevator when it arrives. Two strangers—a lawyer with a large briefcase in a great hurry and a mother carrying a young baby—meet in a narrow corridor. Who makes what effort to allow the other to pass? Both value letting the one with the greatest need pass with the least effort, and both value showing special deference to mothers with infants. In each example, norms solve a recurring conflict in values by ensuring that the parties share expectations which provide them with a ready-made solution. Norms govern how long you talk in the roundtable, where you stand in the elevator, and who gives way to whom in the narrow corridor.

To avoid misunderstanding, it bears emphasis that it may be difficult to express a norm with complete explicitness and precision. The “how close to stand in an elevator norm” is an example; we all know where to stand (more or less), but the norm proves difficult to articulate with complete explicitness and precision.[3] Difficulty in articulation does not mean that the norm does not exist.[4] A difficult to articulate norm will reveal itself through a shared conception of paradigm cases, cases which serve as standard exemplars of the type of situation in which group members think they ought to conform to the regularity in question (think of different examples of where to stand in a more or less crowded elevator). The norm will also reveal itself through a pattern of judgments of relevant similarity and dissimilarity to the paradigm cases.[5] The judgments expand the demand to conform to the regularity beyond the paradigm instances.

I conclude this brief discussion of norms in general by introducing a distinction which plays a fundamental role in what follows. The first point to note is that we typically conform to norms without much thought; when you step into an elevator, for example, you just unreflectively stand in the appropriate spot. You think you ought to stand there, but you do not worry or wonder about the justification for that “ought.” The point to emphasize is that you could justify it. You could--after sufficient, adequately informed, and unbiased reflection—justify the balance the norm strikes between the value we place on not being crowed and the value we place on being able to use the elevator when it arrives. In general, with regard to many—but importantly not all—norms, everyone (more or less) could—after sufficient, adequately informed, and unbiased reflection—regard conformity to the norm as justified (more or less) in light of the values they hold.[6] Call such norms value-justified. The key point is that not all norms are value-justified. As an example of the latter sort of norm, imagine a norm which requires selecting men instead of women for police officers. Assume that, even though most unreflectively abide by the norm, they would not regard the norm as justified if they were to reflect on it sufficiently, in an unbiased way with adequately information.

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[1] Michael Hector and Karl-Dieter Opp, What Have We Learned About the Emergence of Social Norms?, in Michael Hector and Karl-Dieter Opp (eds.), Social Norms 394, 403 (2001). Narrower definitions require a particular explanation of why the regularity exists. Some require that the regularity be the solution to a coordination problem.

[2] See Karl Waynard, Transaction Cost, Institutions, and Evolution, 25 Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 219 (1994). Waynard emphasizes that norms coordinate expectations and hence reduction transaction costs. Waynard does not formulate this point in terms of values.

[3] “Maximize the distance between you and your nearest neighbor” might seem to do the job. However it does not fully capture the norm. For example, when one person is in an elevator and a second person enters, they will stand more or less at opposite ends of a horizontal running parallel to the door. It would maximize distance to stand at opposite end of a diagonal line connecting corners of the elevator. Standing at opposite ends of the horizontal line keeps the two people more or less in each other’s peripheral vision.

[4] Gary Alan Fine, Enacting Norms: Mushrooming and the Culture of Expectations and Explanations, in Social Norms 139.

Try giving a complete specification of the “where to stand in an elevator” norm.

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