Pargal, S



Impact of Informal Regulation of Pollution on Water Quality

in Rivers in India

Bishwanath Goldar* and Nandini Banerjee**

Abstract

This paper presents an econometric analysis of determinants of water quality in Indian rivers. Water quality (water class) data for 106 monitoring points on 10 important rivers for five years, 1995 to 1999, are used for the analysis. To explain variations in water quality, an Ordered Probit model is estimated, in which industrialization, urbanization, irrigation and fertilizer use in agriculture, and poll percentage (a proxy for informal regulation) are taken as the main explanatory variables. A significant negative relationship is found between the level of industrialization of a district and the water quality in rivers at monitoring point(s) falling in the district. Similarly, irrigation and fertilizer consumption in agriculture are found to bear a significant negative relationship with river water quality. A significant positive relationship is found between poll percentage and water quality, and also between the proportion of people who have completed school education in a state and the water quality in rivers flowing through the state. These results point to a significant favorable effect of informal regulation of pollution on water quality in rivers in India.

JEL: Q 25

[Paper presented at the Second World Congress of Environmental and Resource Economists, Monterey, June 24-27, 2002]

________________

* Institute of Economic Growth, University Enclave, Delhi – 110007, India

** National Council of Applied Economic Research, New Delhi, India

Impact of Informal Regulation of Pollution on Water Quality in Rivers in India

Bishwanath Goldar and Nandini Banerjee

1. Introduction

Water pollution is a major environmental concern in India. The main sources of water pollution are: (1) discharge of domestic sewage and industrial effluents, which contain organic pollutants, chemicals and heavy metals, and (2) run-off from land-based activities such as agriculture. Agricultural development is causing deterioration in water quality in Indian rivers in two ways. First, with increasing use of fertilizers and pesticides in agriculture, the run-off from irrigated lands is polluting the water bodies. Secondly, because of the growing irrigation intensity and the high rates of abstraction of ground and surface water for this purpose, rivers at many places do not have sufficient water for dilution of industrial effluents/ domestic sewage[1], aggravating thereby the problem of water pollution.

It is known that the present formal environmental regulation system in India, based on ‘command and control,’ has not performed well in controlling pollution of Indian rivers. Despite a strong legal framework and the existence of a large bureaucracy for dealing with environmental regulation, the public perception is that implementation remains weak (Pargal, Mani and Huq, 1997; Murty, 1999; Murty and Prashad, 1999). Water quality monitoring data (discussed later) reveal that at many monitoring points on India rivers, the water quality is poor. Also, there is a good deal of anecdotal evidence on high levels of pollution of Indian rivers, especially in relatively more industrialized states and in the vicinity of big cities.[2]

The object of this paper is to analyze variations in water quality across different monitoring points on Indian rivers with a view to identifying determinants of water quality. For this purpose, an econometric model is estimated. Since industrialization, urbanization, and irrigation and fertilizer consumption in agriculture are expected to be important factors affecting water quality, these variables are included in the model as determinants of water quality. An important focus of the study is on the impact of informal regulation of pollution on ambient water quality, motivated by a growing body of literature on the role of informal regulation in controlling pollution. Accordingly, some proxy variables for informal regulation (reflecting the strength of informal regulation) are included in the econometric model for capturing the effect of informal regulation on water quality.

The significance of informal regulation for achieving environmental goals is well recognized in the literature.[3] It is known that when formal regulation is weak or absent, informal regulation through local community participation can force the polluter to abate pollution. Informal regulation takes many forms, including demand for compensation by community groups, social ostracism of the polluting firm’s employees, the threat of physical violence, and efforts to monitor and publicize the firm’s emissions (Pargal, Hettige, Singh and Wheeler, 1997). Two “formal” channels of informal regulation are (1) to report violation of legal standards to the regulatory institutions (where such standards and institutions exist), and (2) to put pressure on regulators (politicians and administrators) to tighten their monitoring and enforcement.

Education, degree of political organization and environmental awareness are considered to be important factors determining the strength of informal regulation, which is influenced also by information, legal or political recourse, media coverage, the presence of non-government organizations (NGOs), and the efficiency of existing formal regulation. Many of these factors are correlated with the community income levels. Therefore, in several studies (for example, Pargal, Hettige, Singh and Wheeler, 1997), the mean community income level (or the development level) has been taken as a proxy variable in econometric analysis to capture the effect of informal regulation.

There have been two earlier studies on informal regulation of water pollution in India, one by Pargal, Mani and Huq (1997) and the other by Murty and Prashad (1999) (discussed later). Both studies have considered the discharge of effluents by large and medium scale industries and examined how this is influenced by the characteristics of local communities. The present study is different from the studies of Pargal-Mani-Huq and Murty-Prashad in that it is concerned with ambient water quality, not industrial discharge of effluents. Hence, it has a more comprehensive coverage of the sources of water pollution.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 discuss the system of formal regulation of water pollution in India and the existing water quality monitoring network, providing thereby background information for the study. Section 4 quickly reviews the two earlier studies undertaken in the Indian context on informal regulation of industrial water pollution. Section 5 discusses the data and methodology used for this study. Section 6 presents the econometric results. Section 7 summarizes and concludes.

2. Regulation of Water Pollution in India

The legal provisions that empower the Indian government to enforce environmental regulations are the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act (1974) and the Environment (Protection) Act (1986).[4] The Water Act prescribes both general and industry specific standards for the discharge of wastewater into water bodies. Discharge of wastewater, carrying pollutant concentrations beyond the specified standards, into surface waters, public sewers, on land for irrigation and marine coastal waters is prohibited. The Act lays down penalties for non-compliance. These standards uniformly apply to all firms within an industry, or to all firms in general (where specific standards do not exist). The standards differ according to the class of water bodies into which the wastewater is discharged (for example, the standards are most strict for discharge into surface water bodies and relatively less strict for disposal on land for irrigation). The pollution standards are concentration based, i.e. they are specified as milligrams (mg) of pollutant per liter of wastewater discharged. The Environment Act provides the Central Government with greater powers to set and enforce environmental standards than what was provided in the Water Act. However, the basic features pertaining to industrial pollution abatement remain the same.

There is a basic division of power between the center and the states in India in regard to environmental regulation, reflecting the federal nature of the Indian Constitution. The mandate of the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) is to set environmental standards for all plants in India, lay down ambient standards, and co-ordinate the activities of the State Pollution Control Boards (SPCBs). The implementation of environmental laws and their enforcement, however, are decentralized, and are the responsibility of the SPCBs. Anecdotal evidence suggests wide variations in enforcement across the states (Pargal, Mani and Huq, 1997).

SPCBs have the legal authority to conduct periodic inspections of plants to check whether they have the appropriate consent to operate, whether they have effluent treatment plants, take samples for analysis, etc. Some of these inspections are also programmed in response to public requests and litigation. There are penalties for non-compliance. Until 1988, the enforcement authority of the SPCBs was very weak. But, now, the SPCBs have the power to close non-compliant factories or cut-off their water and electricity by administrative orders.

Highly Polluting Industries

In 1992, the CPCB identified 1551 large and medium industrial units in 17 categories of highly polluting industries, contributing the major part of the industrial pollution load. The industrial units were given a time schedule to install necessary pollution control equipment to comply with the prescribed standards. In 1993, out of the 1551 identified industrial units, 540 were defaulters, i.e. these did not have pollution control equipment to comply with the standards. Over time, more and more of the defaulting industries have installed the necessary pollution control equipment or have closed down. By December 2000, out of 1551 industrial units, 1350 had installed the necessary pollution control facilities, 177 had been closed down and the remaining 24 industrial units were defaulting. A state-wise summary status of the pollution control in the 17 categories of highly polluting industries is given in Annex I.

Industrial Pollution Control along the Rivers and Lakes

A program was initiated in 1993-94 to identify polluting industries along the Indian rivers for priority action for control of industrial discharge into rivers. In July 1997, the National River Conservation Authority decided that the polluting industries which were discharging their effluents into rivers and lakes should be directed to install requisite effluent treatment systems within three months failing which closure notices should be issued. A total of 851 industrial units were identified in 1997 which were discharging 100 kg/day or more of BOD (Biological Oxygen Demand). In the course of the next few years, most of these units installed the requisite effluent treatment systems. The number of defaulters declined from 851 in August 1997, to 574 in June 1998, 514 in March 1999 and 22 in December 2000. As of December 31, 2000, 233 out of the 851 identified polluting industrial units had been closed, 596 had installed the requisite effluent treatment systems, and 22 remained defaulters. The state-wise break-up of identified industrial units and defaulting units is shown in Annex II.

It is evident from the above that during the second half of the 1990s the pollution control authorities at the central and state level had made most of the water polluting large and medium scale industries install the requisite wastewater treatment facilities. It is, however, difficult to say whether this has had a large effect in terms of reducing discharge of pollutant by industries into the rivers. Doubts arise on this point because even if an effluent treatment plant is installed, it may not be operated regularly. Indeed, there is a perception that the wastewater treatment plants in many industrial units in India are activated only at the time inspections are scheduled to occur (Pargal, Mani and Huq, 1997).

Urban Wastewater

It should be mentioned here that disposal of untreated wastewater from the cities and towns is a major cause of water pollution of rivers in India. It is known that the cities and town are generating large volumes of wastewater, of which only a small part is treated. To give some facts, a study undertaken by the CPCB has brought out that in 1994-95 class-I cities in India (299 cities) generated 16,663 mld of wastewater of which only about 24% was treated.[5] [6] The rest was disposed without treatment. A similar study of the class-II towns (345 towns) done by the CPCB has brought out that in 1995 the volume of wastewater generated in class-II towns was 1649 mld of which only about 4% was treated.[7]

The present legislation gives the CPCB sufficient power for control of water pollution. For example, the CPCB is empowered to lay down and maintain ambient water standards, to demand information regarding effluent emissions, to shut down polluting activities and prevent new discharges of effluent and sewage. However, the legislation has had limited success in checking water pollution arising from discharge of untreated sewage. The rise of public opinion against polluting industries has found expression in Public Interest Litigation (PIL). But, this has not been matched by a similar challenge to municipal pollution. A few cases have been filed against municipalities for their failure to keep the cities clean and maintain environmental standards (for example, the Ratlam case). These cases, filed by citizen, manifest that there is some degree of informal pressure on municipalities (at least on some of them) to perform their duties for the control of pollution. The media has probably also played a role in making the municipalities pay some attention to the environmental problems. It must be admitted, however, that neither formal nor informal pressure has been very successful in making the municipalities undertake collection and treatment of urban wastewater.

3. Water Quality Monitoring

Water quality monitoring program was started by the CPCB in 1976 with 18 stations on river Yamuna. The program was gradually extended over time. In 1989, there were 324 monitoring stations. At present, there are 507 monitoring stations in the country spread over all important water bodies. Out of 507 stations, 414 stations are on rivers, 25 on ground water, 38 on lakes and 30 on canals, creeks, drains, ponds etc.

The quality of water is monitored for 25 physico-chemical and biological parameters. The monitoring network covers 126 rivers (including the tributaries), wells, lakes, creeks, ponds, tanks, drains and canals. Five classes are used for water quality, A to E. A is the best quality, and E is the worst. At certain stations, the water quality is found to be below E. The criteria for the water classes are shown in Table 1.

The distribution of river water quality at the monitoring stations (in terms of water class) during 1999 is shown in Table 2. At 4.7% of the monitoring stations, the water class was A. At about 60% of the monitoring stations, the water class was D, E or “below E”.

On the basis of last 10 years’ water quality monitoring results, the CPCB has estimated riverine length having different level of pollution. This is presented in Table 3. The estimates indicate that about 14% of the length of river stretches are highly polluted (BOD level above 6 mg/l), while another 19% are moderately polluted (BOD level in the range of 3 to 6 mg/l). Thus, about two-thirds of the length of river stretches are relatively clean (BOD level less than 3 mg/l).

Table 1: Primary water quality criteria for designated-best-use-classes

.-----------------------.----------.------------------------------.

| Designated-Best-Use | Class of | Criteria |

| | water | |

|-----------------------|----------|------------------------------|

| Drinking Water | A | 1. Total Coliforms Organism |

| Source without | | MPN/100ml shall be 50 or |

| conventional | | less |

| treatment but after | | 2. pH between 6.5 and 8.5 |

| disinfection | | 3. Dissolved Oxygen 6mg/l or |

| | | more |

| | | 4. Biochemical Oxygen Demand |

| | | 5 days 20oC 2mg/l or less |

|-----------------------|----------|------------------------------|

| Outdoor bathing | B | 1. Total Coliforms Organism |

| (Organised) | | MPN/100ml shall be 500 or |

| | | less |

| | | 2. pH between 6.5 and 8.5 |

| | | 3. Dissolved Oxygen 5mg/l or |

| | | more |

| | | 4. Biochemical Oxygen Demand |

| | | 5 days 20oC 3mg/l or less |

|-----------------------|----------|------------------------------|

| Drinking water | C | 1. Total Coliforms Organism |

| source after | | MPN/100ml shall be 5000 |

| conventional | | or less |

| treatment and | | 2. pH between 6 to 9 |

| disinfection | | 3. Dissolved Oxygen 4mg/l or |

| | | more |

| | | 4. Biochemical Oxygen Demand |

| | | 5 days 20oC 3mg/l or less |

|-----------------------|----------|------------------------------|

| Propagation of Wild | D | 1. pH between 6.5 to 8.5 |

| life and Fisheries | | 2. Dissolved Oxygen 4mg/l or |

| | | more |

| | | 3. Free Ammonia (as N) 1.2 |

| | | mg/l or less |

|-----------------------|----------|------------------------------|

| Irrigation, | E | 1. pH between 6.0 to 8.5 |

| Industrial Cooling, | | 2. Electrical Conductivity |

| Controlled Waste | | at 25oC micro mhos/cm Max.|

| disposal | | 2250 |

| | | 3. Sodium absorption Ratio |

| | | Max. 26 |

| | | 4. Boron Max. 2mg/l |

'-----------------------'----------'------------------------------'

Source: Central Pollution Control Board, Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India

Table 2: Distribution of Monitoring Points according to Water Class, 1999

|Class |% of monitoring points |

|A |4.7 |

|B |14.1 |

|C |19.7 |

|D |54.6 |

|E |4.7 |

|Below E |2.2 |

|All |100.0 |

Source: Computed from Water Quality data of the CPCB, available at their website.

Table 3: Riverine length according to pollution level

|Pollution level |Definition used |length of river stretches (km) |Per cent |

|High pollution |BOD >6 mg/l |6086 |14 |

|Moderate pollution |BOD= 3-6 mg/l |8691 |19 |

|Relatively clean |BOD ................
................

In order to avoid copyright disputes, this page is only a partial summary.

Google Online Preview   Download