FOUNDING THE UNITED NATIONS: CANADA AT SAN FRANCISCO, …

[Pages:62]FOUNDING THE UNITED NATIONS: CANADA AT SAN FRANCISCO, 1945

Denis Stairs

In April 1945, delegations from 50 nations, including Canada, gathered in San Francisco for the conference resulting in the founding of the United Nations. It was still two weeks before the final Allied victory in Europe, while the war in the Pacific raged on to its conclusion in August. While the great powers assured their dominant role with their veto on the Security Council, the smaller powers like Canada carved out a place for themselves with rotating seats on the Security Council and a major role in developing the permanent multilateral infrastructure of the UN in agencies such as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), based from its founding in Montreal. "If the dominance of the great powers was tolerable in a time of global war," writes Denis Stairs, "it would hardly do in a time of peace, when a more inclusive politics would be much better suited to the needs of the lesser states." In this look back at the San Francisco conference, Stairs writes how Canada got in on the ground floor.

En avril 1945, les d?l?gations de 50 pays, dont le Canada, se sont retrouv?es ? San Francisco pour la conf?rence de fondation des Nations unies, deux semaines avant la victoire finale des Alli?s en Europe et quelques mois avant la fin de la guerre du Pacifique en ao?t. Tandis que les grandes puissances assuraient leur domination en s'attribuant un droit de veto au Conseil de s?curit?, les plus petites s'y octroyaient un si?ge tournant et, surtout, un r?le majeur dans l'?laboration de l'infrastructure multilat?rale permanente de l'ONU, compos?e d'agences comme l'Organisation de l'aviation civile internationale, dont le si?ge social est ?tabli ? Montr?al depuis sa cr?ation. ? Si on tol?rait la domination des grandes puissances en temps de guerre, ?crit Denis Stairs, on le peut nettement moins en p?riode de paix, quand une politique d'inclusion convient beaucoup mieux aux ?tats de moindre importance. ? Revenant sur la conf?rence de San Francisco, l'auteur d?crit comment le Canada a jou? d?s le d?but un r?le d?cisif.

O n April 25, 1945, the delegations of 50 states gathered at San Francisco to attend the "United Nations Conference on International Organization." The 282 official delegates -- 7 of them Canadians -- were accompanied by 1,444 advisers and support staff. Collectively, they were served by an international secretariat of 1,058. On average they generated documents totalling a half-million pages per day. From the sidelines, their politics were interpreted by a swarm of 2,636 radio and newspaper reporters. And their primary mission was to agree on a constitution -- a charter -- for a new organization to succeed the ill-fated League of Nations, which had been established for collective security purposes, albeit with little effect, in the wake of World War One.

The draft with which the delegates had to work had been agreed upon by four great powers -- the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China -- in a meeting at Dumbarton Oaks (a private estate in Washington) in August 1944. In its original form, it had emanated largely from the State Department, although the ensuing fourpower negotiations had resulted in a number of changes, many of them on the vigorous insistence of the USSR. Not surprisingly, given its authors, the final version of the greatpower draft gave pride of place in the new organization to the most powerful states, and it was therefore received by those of more modest capacity with something less than total enthusiasm. By the time the San Francisco conference ended on June 26, roughly 1,200 amendments to the

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Denis Stairs

Dumbarton Oaks proposal had been futile undertaking. The grand designs But relieved or not, he was happy

advanced for discussion. More than a would be concocted by the great pow- enough at wartime conferences in

few of them had originated with ers. The smaller powers would have to Quebec City and elsewhere to make no

Canadians, or were strongly supported content themselves with wary vigi- demand for a personal seat at the

by them.

lance and forceful reaction. In a for- table. Away from it, he would settle

eign service schooled in the traditional instead for some politically convenient

C anada's diplomatic interests, style and the humanities disciplines "photo-ops."

needless to say, were reflected in (especially history, philosophy, litera-

If the dominance of the great

its constitutional preferences, as well ture, and the classics), a conception of powers was tolerable in a time of glob-

as in the arguments that were used to international politics as the "art of the al war, however, it would hardly do in

defend them. Constitutions amount, possible" was the dominant view. It a time of peace, when a more inclusive

after all, to sets of rules for the making encouraged a focus on cultivating politics would be much better suited

of decisions, and in politics -- nation- room for manoeuvre within the con- to the needs of the lesser states. In the

al and international alike -- the straints imposed by the prevailing dis- Canadian view, neither the Big Three,

stakes, as much for the long term as tribution of international power and nor the Big Four, nor even the Big Five

the short, can be very high. It follows by the political realities that flowed (with a liberated France added to the

In the Department of External Affairs, planning for the post-

list) should be allowed to assume that they were free

war international order began as early as 1943. A few in the department -- Escott Reid notably -- thought that Canada might usefully propose a grand design of its own, but those

to run the post-war order as

they wished. This was the 20th century, not the 19th.

of a more hard-headed disposition, typified best by Hume Wrong, knew from the beginning that this would be a futile undertaking. The grand designs would be concocted by the great powers. The smaller powers would have to content themselves with wary vigilance and forceful reaction.

A s the Dumbarton Oaks draft was later to indicate, however, the "concert system" approach to the management of world affairs appeared to be very

much a part of what the

that constituent assemblies are serious from it. What objectives were reason- great powers had in mind. After all,

business, and the San Francisco con- able? What could Canada hope to get they had control of the most substan-

ference was a constituent assembly. away with? These were the operational tial agglomerations of the resources of

Hence, the Canadian response to it questions. In probing for the answers, statecraft. It followed that they would

can tell us a great deal about the there was a need, certainly, to push, to carry most of the peace and security

underlying foundations of Canada's pull, and to stretch, but in the end burden. They were entitled in conse-

post-war foreign policy.

there would be no point in allowing quence to have the most say over what

Perhaps that is why the story has the reach to exceed the grasp.

the institutions of the post-war order

been told so often. But the recent rhet-

In reflecting on their mandate, the would do -- or, and often more impor-

oric of Canadian policy-makers, with planners in Ottawa had immediately tantly, would not do. They would, for

its frequent emphasis on "values" as before them a clear example of what example, have permanent seats on the

the most important driver of Canada's they wanted most to avoid. World War Security Council. Others would come

behaviour abroad, suggests that we Two was still in train. But it was being and go. And they would each have a

need to be reminded, yet again, of the run on the allied side by the "Big veto over the council's decisions.

fundamental premises of Canadian Three" -- the United States, the United Others would not.

behaviour.

Kingdom, and the USSR. The assess-

To this evolution in great-power

In the Department of External ment of the prime minister, Mackenzie thinking, about which the Canadians

Affairs, planning for the post-war King, was that this was the way it had were kept particularly well-informed

international order began as early as to be. The big decisions would be by the British, there was at the con-

1943. A few in the department -- made by the big battalions. His judg- ceptual level -- the level of principle

Escott Reid notably -- thought that ment may have been fortified by a -- an ingenious Ottawa response. The

Canada might usefully propose a sense of relief. He had no hope of Canadians bought easily enough into

grand design of its own, but those of a influencing outcomes in any case, and the great power notion that the new

more hard-headed disposition, typi- keeping clear of the top-level policy- collective security organization and

fied best by Hume Wrong, knew from making meant he could avoid being its more prosaic off-shoots (the

the beginning that this would be a blamed if things went badly wrong. Specialized Agencies, including the

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Founding the United Nations: Canada at San Francisco, 1945

Montreal Gazette Archives

Mackenzie King was happy enough to host Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, here at the first of two Quebec Summits in August 1943, rather than demand a seat at the big table of the Security Council. But Canada also thought the dominance of the great

powers, acceptable in wartime, should give way in peacetime to "a more inclusive politics" at the new United Nations.

World Health Organization [WHO],

the Food and Agriculture

Organization [FAO], the International

Civil Aviation Organization [ICAO],

the

International

Labour

Organization [ILO], and a small but

growing battery of others) ought to

have institutions that would allocate

decision-making responsibility in

accordance with the real distribution

of power. If they did otherwise, they

would not be viable. For starters, the great powers might then pick up their marbles and go home -- in which case the entire collective security enterprise would have been lost. Given the complexities of international politics, the new United Nations would have little enough chance of succeeding as it was, without its being further crippled by so fundamental a structural flaw.

The Canadians did try hard, however, to modify the way in which the great power notion would be applied. The conceptual apparatus upon which they founded their effort was composed of two principal ingredients. The first and most fundamental was embodied in the so-called "functional principle." It held, in effect, that the role assigned to any given state in the making of decisions ought

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Denis Stairs

to reflect the degree and intensity of was in and who was out. But it was tus, the not insubstantial capacities of

its interest in the matters at issue, on hard to deny -- even by reference to the middle powers warranted their

the one hand, and the significance of the classical test of military might -- having a few special privileges, too.

the assets it could bring to bear in that there was a discernible gap The principle was the same. Only the

responding to them, on the other. between the capabilities of countries application was different.

The ingenuity of the argument lay in like Canada on the one hand, and

It is important to notice here that

its implication that the hierarchy of countries like Haiti or Iceland on the this had little to do in itself with poli-

power, and hence the entitlement to other. With the Axis defeated and the cy substance. It was a matter of posi-

institutional positions of influence, Europeans broadly, if temporarily, tional politics -- of establishing an

might vary from one issue-area to the incapacitated by the devastations of entitlement to greater opportunities

next. However Canada's place in the war, some observers in 1945 ranked for the exercise of influence. How the

international system might be ranked Canada fourth in the international influence would actually be used was

by reference to the classical

not addressed. It remained to

measure of military capacity, by other measures it could easily be regarded as a great power in its own right. This was clear-

It might be true that the great powers would end up carrying most

of the security freight, but powers

be seen. In the meantime, what really mattered was the need on the one hand to trim the presumptions and the privi-

ly the case in the production of food, for example, or in the development of civil aviation, or in medical research and the

on the next rung down might have to move a lot of it, too. And on that

next rung down, Canada was a

leges of the great powers (even if the political realities meant that this could be done only at the margins), and on the other

delivery of sophisticated

leading player. Its extraordinary

to head off the more legalistic

health care services, or in the cultivation of atomic energy. Bread baskets ought to be especially prominent in the FAO. The headquarters of ICAO

contribution to the conduct of the war -- as much economic as

military -- was proof of the strength of its currency. The conclusion was

organizational principle reflected in the doctrine of state equality (which for obvious reasons enjoyed a certain popularity among some of the small-

might reasonably be located in Montreal.

T he "functional principle" was complemented by the

obvious: if the extraordinary capacities of the great powers entitled them to extraordinary privileges in the new institutional

er players). There is neither the need

nor the space here to address in great detail the specific measures that the Canadians

second conceptual ingredient of the Canadian position -- namely the concept of the "middle power." This was espe-

apparatus, the not insubstantial capacities of the middle powers warranted their having a few special

were led -- by their assessment of the possible and their analysis of their own interest in the face of it -- to advocate. A few

cially relevant to the exercise of privileges, too. The principle was illustrations will suffice to

the UN's primary role as an instrument for the maintenance of international peace and security. The challenge

the same. Only the application was different.

establish the general pattern.

F or this purpose, it is instructive to begin with

posed by the functional principle to hierarchy. It might be true that the the election of non-permanent mem-

the basic premise of the argument for great powers would end up carrying bers to the Security Council. During

great power supremacy lay in its asser- most of the security freight, but pow- the San Francisco discussions, various

tion that the ingredients of power ers on the next rung down might have attacks were made on the notion that

itself varied with the issue in play. The to move a lot of it, too. And on that the great powers alone should have

challenge posed by the notion of the next rung down, Canada was a leading permanent seats. The Netherlands,

middle power came from its insistence player. Its extraordinary contribution for example, thought that the middle

that the international community was to the conduct of the war -- as much powers should have permanent seats,

composed, not of two classes of states economic as military -- was proof of too. India -- not surprisingly -- made

(great powers and all the rest), but three the strength of its currency. The con- the argument that in the election of

(great powers, middle powers, and all clusion was obvious: if the extraordi- non-permanent members, special

the rest). The middle power category nary capacities of the great powers attention should be paid to a combi-

might be a trifle fuzzy at the edges, and entitled them to extraordinary privi- nation of population and economic

there could easily be quarrels over who leges in the new institutional appara- capacity. Some of the Latin

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Founding the United Nations: Canada at San Francisco, 1945

Americans, supported by Egypt and zation's core "collective security" pro- meeting. It had been controversial

the Philippines, argued for a principle visions, and it effectively empowers enough even among the Big Four, with

of regional distribution. The the Security Council to call on the the Soviets and Americans insisting on

Canadian position, however -- sup- UN's members to take various actions the broadest application, and the

ported by Australia, and with backing in response to aggression, including British attitude being slightly more

from France, among others -- was the mobilization of military force. relaxed. In the San Francisco phase,

that preference should be given to The members are obligated to some delegations thought the veto

countries with a demonstrated will- respond, in accordance with negotiat- ought to be abandoned entirely, while

ingness and capacity to contribute to ed agreements. With strong backing others (like the ebullient Australians)

the fulfillment of the UN's purposes. from the Netherlands and others, advocated very aggressive restrictions

The upshot was a compromise however, the Canadians were anxious on its use. The Canadians, concluding

amendment (suggested by the British) to ensure that they would not be in their pragmatic style that the veto

power was the sine qua non

The Canadians were also strongly involved in promoting what of great power participaeventually became article 10, which essentially provides that tion, decided instead to opt

the General Assembly, on its own initiative, can recommend action to the members at large, or to the Security Council itself, in relation to any matter falling within the scope of the Charter...In essence, and with others, the Canadians were

for minor revisions. Hence they lent their support in particular to a successful amendment providing that the veto could not apply to

attempting to strengthen the role of the General Assembly (where numbers count most), while making it possible in certain circumstances to circumvent the Security Council

decisions on matters that were purely procedural (article 27). In practical terms, this meant among

(where power counts most).

other things that no great

power could veto a propos-

that accommodated both the drawn into a collective security al to refer to the General Assembly a

Canadian and regional criteria. engagement without having an matter upon which the Security

Incorporated in article 23 of the opportunity to participate in the Council was deadlocked. The conces-

Charter, it provided that in the elec- making of the decisions that would sion was possible because the General

tion (by the General Assembly) of lead to the active deployment of their Assembly, unlike the Security Council,

non-permanent members, "due forces. After a series of complex nego- cannot require members to take con-

regard" would be "specially paid in tiations -- and the inevitable compro- crete action. It can only make recom-

the first instance to the contribution mises -- their requirements were at mendations. The Canadian delegation

of members of the Organization least partly met by wording to the also supported a provision of

toward the maintenance of interna- effect that before the Security Council Australian origin to the effect that a

tional peace and security and toward called on "a Member not represented great power could not veto a "peaceful

the other purposes of the on it to provide armed forces," it settlement" measure under chapter VI

Organization, and also to equitable would provide the member with an -- that is, an attempt to resolve a dis-

geographic distribution." In practice, opportunity "to participate in the pute by means of negotiation, enquiry,

the insertion later of the geographical decisions...concerning [their] employ- mediation, conciliation, arbitration,

criterion had a more significant ment." The provision ensured that judicial settlement and the like -- if

impact, but both the functional prin- potential contributors of military the great power itself were a party to

ciple and the middle power aspiration contingents -- and the middle powers the dispute in question.

are clearly evident in the first half of were likely to be prominent among

In like manner, the Canadians

the amendment. If Canada had been them -- would at least be consulted were also strongly involved in pro-

more effective, it would have been on by the council before being called to moting what eventually became arti-

the Council more often.

active duty.

cle 10, which essentially provides that

Similar Canadian preoccupations

the General Assembly, on its own ini-

T -- this time fortified by a domestic

politics rooted in the unhappy experi-

he thorny question of the veto tiative, can recommend action to the granted in the Dumbarton Oaks members at large, or to the Security

ence with conscription -- centred on proposals to each of the Security Council itself, in relation to any mat-

a provision that ultimately emerged Council's permanent members was not ter falling within the scope of the

in chapter VII of the Charter as article surprisingly the object of considerable Charter. It can even do this in refer-

44. Chapter VII contains the organi- sound and fury at the San Francisco ence to security matters, in cases

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Denis Stairs

where the Security Council itself is tation for being "liberal international- ence to security, after all, the system

not taking action. In essence, and ists" is well-deserved. It was in the depended on the amicable co-opera-

with others, the Canadians were very nature of the beast they were tion of what came later to be called

attempting to strengthen the role of helping to create, moreover, that it the Security Council's "Permanent

the General Assembly (where num- would be multilateral. With any luck, Five," and it was already becoming

bers count most), while making it it would moderate the exercise in clear that getting the Soviet Union to

possible in certain circumstances to international affairs of raw power, co-operate in the pursuit of what were

circumvent the Security Council replacing the Hobbesian version of ultimately western preferences was

(where power counts most).

the state of nature with something going to be difficult. It would not be

akin to a rule-ordered environment. It long before Canadian officials would

A little of this sort of textual analy- might help as well to create opportu- be ruminating in public about the sis goes a very long

way, and more of it is From the point of view of institutionalizing the world at large,

not required here. the creation of the United Nations was at least a start, and the

Suffice it to say that the Canadians were heavily

mechanism has accomplished much more over the years than

involved in other areas those who focus only on the collective security component of

as well, notably in its mandate are inclined to notice. It is obviously a work in

strengthening the role of progress, and no one should expect its performance to surpass

the Economic and Social Council and improving

what its own members -- the most powerful of them

Canada's own chances particularly -- are willing to make of it.

of being elected to it,

and re-elected, too (the functional nities for constructive diplomatic possibility of establishing a regional

principle again). They were also active manoeuvre -- for the building, that (specifically, a North Atlantic) collec-

in advancing provisions that they is, of advantageous, if kaleidoscopic, tive defence system as an alternative

hoped would improve on the calibre diplomatic coalitions. These could mechanism for securing the western

and political independence of the not be expected to level the playing world against the potential preda-

professional international staff of the field completely, as the San Francisco tions of an increasingly polarized

Secretariat, and expand the secretary- conference itself had amply demon- great power adversary.

general's own power of initiative. strated, but they might nonetheless

But from the point of view of

They also worked hard to clarify the smooth over some of the sharper institutionalizing the world at large,

relationship between the UN and the bumps in the terrain.

the creation of the United Nations

Specialized Agencies. In all these

was at least a start, and the mecha-

I cases, of course, they worked closely

with other powers of like mind, some-

t needs to be recognized, however, nism has accomplished much more that most other delegations at San over the years than those who focus

times in a leading, and sometimes in Francisco -- particularly on the `west- only on the collective security com-

a supporting role. In this they were ern' side -- had similar aspirations, ponent of its mandate are inclined to

acting at San Francisco much as they and in that respect the Canadian posi- notice. It is obviously a work in

hoped they would be able to act in tion was hardly distinctive. The real progress, and no one should expect

the UN itself once the organization substance of the negotiations, at least its performance to surpass what its

was fully established and had become on the surface, had less to do, there- own members -- the most powerful

operational.

fore, with the UN's underlying inter- of them particularly -- are willing to

It is true, of course, that the nationalist purpose than with the make of it. But the project itself is

Canadians were hoping that the new institutional mechanisms through well worth pursuing, even if the pace

system would prove to be both reli- which that purpose would be pursued. is sluggish. It is not surprising, there-

able and effective in maintaining Everyone at the conference, the fore, that Canada should still be so

international order and in promoting Canadians included, wanted to emerge keen on the task of reform.

the public service purposes of the from the bargaining with the strongest

Specialized Agencies. It is also true hand they could get.

Denis Stairs is McCulloch Professor in

that at least some of them hoped that

By the end of the proceedings, Political Science at Dalhousie University

the system as a whole would lead to the optimism of most of the and a member of its Centre for Foreign

the further institutionalization of the Canadians who had been actively Policy Studies. He is also a fellow of the

international environment over the involved had been pretty much Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs

long haul. To that extent, their repu- reduced to a faint glimmer. In refer- Institute.

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