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RAW TRANSCRIPT – NOT YET REVIEWED FOR CORRECTIONS BY CASSINI PERSONNEL

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Moderator: Trina Ray

September 27, 2011

1:00 pm CT

Coordinator: ...me I'd like to inform all participants that today's conference call is being recorded if you have any objections you may disconnect at this time. If you need assistance please press star 0 and a coordinator will be on line to assist you. Thank you Ms. Burton you may begin.

Marcia Burton: Okay, thanks a lot. Hopefully people were able to download the PowerPoint, it was a PPTX file format, but hopefully you've been able to do that successfully. Just a quick reminder that star 6 is a toggle switch that will mute and unmute your phone. So please do that if there's noise in your area.

Okay, our speakers, this is the September CHARM Telecon and our speakers today are Trina Ray and Kim Steadman of the Cassini Team at JPL. And Trina spearheads the group that plans the Titan observation, that group is referred to as TOST. And she's a group supervisor at JPL as well and if I'm not mistaken started the CHARM Telecons in the dim past.

Trina Ray: I did.

Marcia Burton: Yes.

Trina Ray: My brainchild.

Marcia Burton: And Kim Steadman has a number of responsibilities on Cassini, she works on the TOST group, the Titan group as well. There's some noise, sounds like me echoing.

Coordinator: Everybody should press star 6 to make sure they're muted.

Marcia Burton: Yes.

Coordinator: If you're muted than you'll hear - then you'll have unmuted yourself, but then do it again and you'll mute yourself. And you'll catch the one who is open.

Marcia Burton: Okay, so Kim, back to Kim. She's got a number of responsibilities on Cassini, works on the Titan TOST planning group as well as working in the SCO Office, the Cassini Space Craft Office as Assistance Engineer.

So their talk is based on or inspired by a talk they gave at the recent Dragon*Con convention in Atlanta. So maybe in the course of the talk they'll mention a bit about what that is for the uninformed.

Anyway it's about all you ever know about what it takes to plan and acquire all the great scientific data, observations and images that we've managed to achieve on Cassini. They're going to describe that process for us, and it's entitled, A Year in the Life of Cassini.

And I'm not sure if you guys are going to do it in Trina first and then Kim, or interspersed, or whatever so.

Woman: We'll do a mix of everything.

Marcia Burton: Okay, good deal. So take it away you guys.

Trina Ray: Well thank you Marcia. This is a really interesting topic to us. As Marcia just mentioned we gave this talk at a recent science fiction convention. Dragon*Con is sort of the largest fan based science fiction convention in the United States, probably in the world. Comic-Con is the largest for profit one and that's here in California every year.

But Dragon*Con has several tracks that are very friendly to science, so they have a science track, a space track, a skeptic's track. And that means they fill programming in a room all day every day just talking about space and science and skepticism and all kinds of interesting things. And so when we go to Dragon*Con we get invited to do a variety of talks for the space and science tracks. And so this is one of those talks.

So let's see we'll try to let you know when we're going forward in the PowerPoint. So if you go to Slide 2, A Year in the Life of Cassini, we picked this most recent year, which is the year 2010. But if you go to the next slide you sort of have to understand where 2010 is sort of in the - in the sort of life cycle of the whole Cassini Mission.

It's only when you sort of appreciate the full context of what it took to get to this point to do what it is that we're doing to get the science that we ultimately get, that I think that you appreciate sort of the amount of effort. And how it all has to work together to make it all work.

So up in the upper left hand corner of that picture is Dr. Linda Spilker, she was on the Voyager Team when Voyager flew by Saturn back in the early 80's. And as soon as they flew by Saturn and they took the images of Titan, and they saw that Titan was covered in a thick atmosphere that they couldn't see through. They didn't realize that they wouldn't be able to see through until they got there and they took those images.

They realized right away that they had to have another mission to Saturn, and so this is back in the early 80's and people started to think about the Cassini Mission. And they started to think about having an orbiter in orbit around Saturn.

And throughout the early 80's the scientists sort of pushed this idea with their colleagues, talking about the scientific merits of the mission. They also pushed the idea with NASA Headquarters and at the time the sort of just burgeoning European Space Agency, which hadn't done a lot of mission on its - you know big missions to the outer solar system at all at that point.

And there was a joint ESA-NASA workgroup - working group that started back in 1983 when they started work. It took them five years to get approval for this mission. So by the time we're in the late 80's then you have group of scientists that are getting paid to write up what's called the Announcement of Opportunity.

Okay, we're going to go to Saturn, here are the questions we want to answer, everybody out in the world go compete an instrument to be on this spacecraft to answer these question. And we'll talk a little bit more about the Announcement of Opportunity later in a little bit more detail.

So this is happening now in 1988, so the instruments get approved and - soon after that and they start building the instrument and the spacecraft. In 1992 or around there is when they had the big downsizing -- it used to be Craft Cassini -- most of you might remember we were going to go to - gosh Craft was an asteroid or a comet? Now I've already forgotten. I think it's an asteroid wasn't it?

Marcia Burton: It's an asteroid.

Trina Ray: Boy that's sad, I'm getting old.

Marcia Burton: Comet, it's a comet.

Trina Ray: It's a comet. Of course it is. Man I'm getting old Marcia. And so then the spacecraft became sort of the format that you see it in today which is a very large spacecraft, all the instruments body fixed, we gave up the scan platform. All kinds of things happened sort of the early 90's.

Then of course we built Cassini and by 1997 it was built and headed off to the Cape and we launched in 1997. We did a very complex interplanetary cruise to give us several gravity assists by Venus, by Earth by Venus again, and also by Jupiter to get us out to Saturn in a wicked fast seven years. We got out to Saturn in 2004.

And then the final image on there on the lower right hand corner is sort of an overview of the Cassini Mission from 2004 out to 2017. And you can see every year is a column, and then if there - the number of little pictures of Titan is how many Titan flybys there were. So you can see Year 3 was a record setting year for Titan flybys.

And the current year that we're in, that we're going to talking about is sort of 2010. Now remember we got to Saturn on July, you know sort of July 1, right? So if you talk about years at Saturn it always is like the - from July to December and then on to the next July. So it's always kind of weird.

So you'll see that 2010 is actually split across a couple years. But you can see that Year 7 of the Cassini Mission was pretty light in Titan flybys. But to make up for it, it's pretty heavy in icy satellite flybys if you're in the equator of the orbit, basically orbiting around the equator of Saturn. Then you get a lot of icy satellite flybys in that configuration. So Year 7 and Year 8 very few Titans, but boy you got a lot of icy satellite flybys.

So now that's kind of 2000 - I mean that's, you know, this is like the context of what it is we're going to talk about today, which is sort of the nuts and bolts of how you go from, you know, scientists having ideas to science. Which, you know, most of time telecons are all about the analysis and results of the mission. That's the Cassini-Huygens analysis and results of the mission.

So this is sort of the prep work that goes on. But there was so much that just got us to here, I mean just to start with science planning, sort of you know, doesn't embrace all the work that got us here.

So if you go on to the next slide, which is the title slide for Science Planning. So the next slide after that. One thing I would very much like to sort of convey today is sort of what makes our job fun and what makes it hard. So that - appreciating sort of what goes into it.

And we have a lot of things that make the job, fun equal hard really in our business. If it's really hard then it's really fun. The fact that we have distributed operations is a real challenge, that means we have people and scientists all over the world.

We have a team in the Germany that has the best detector. We have a team in London that has the magnetometer. We have teams spread all over the United States. It's just very complex.

So just for example, think to yourselves, "When do you plan a meeting so that everybody in the world can call in?" Well because you have people in Germany and people in Los Angeles you're already basically isolated to between sort of 6:00am and noon.

You can't - if it too - or know earlier than 6:00am you just can't possibly do it in Los Angeles, and later than noon you just couldn't possibly do it in Germany. So basically we thank God that we don't have an instrument in Hawaii or we'd be dead.

We also because we have distributed operations and people are responsible for controlling the spacecraft, and therefore putting, you know, it's a very complex instrument it has a lot of instruments on board. We have a lot of planning rules that we have to enforce.

We have rules about pointing, we have rules about power, we have rules about when you deliver files, we just have a lot of planning rules that we've learned and optimized over time and a lot of work is done there.

Also because we have international partners we have sort of a substantial investment in ITAR, which is the - which is basically the international agreements that we have the State Department.

And of course these small teams that are, you know, far away they're not big teams. The team at JPL is by far the largest, you know, there's 100 plus engineers and scientists here, but the teams at these remote sites are very small and they sort of have to do it all. So also becomes a challenge when you have distributed operations. If you go to the next slide I just put a nice image there for everybody to see the science teams and their distribution all over the world.

The second thing that makes science planning fun and hard is managing shared spacecraft resources. Because we don't have a scan platform we have to work very hard at sharing the spacecraft pointing. And because all the instruments are body fixed, so if you imagine it is sort of - imagine that you can't move your head to side to side. You could look straight ahead.

So if you wanted to look at something behind you, you would literally have to turn your body all the way around to see it. And because of that we have to very, very carefully coordinate all of the spacecraft pointing. It's probably something that science planning spends most of time doing, is coordinating who is going to point the spacecraft and where are they going to point the spacecraft.

We also of course, have a limited amount of data volume storage on the spacecraft. The - not only is the solid state recorded limited in size, but we have down links are how you empty the sold state recorder. So it's - it constantly gets filled up and emptied and filled up and emptied every day, and you have to track very carefully how much it's been filled and how much it's emptied.

If you have a gigantic,70 meter antennae you can empty a lot, if you have like a beam wave guide, which is a smaller antennae, you can't downlink - you can downlink about 1/4 of the data you can from a 70 meter. So you have to carefully manage how much data is going and how much data is going off.

One thing that we did do though on Cassini, sort of a lesson learned from previous spacecraft, is we have what are called, Operational modes for power. So we don't fight about every little bit of power every day. We have 15 or 20 modes and we - and these modes have been checked thoroughly. All the thermal constraints have been thoroughly. And if you're in the mode you're fine.

So what we have is we just transition from mode to mode to mode, and you just find the mode that works the best for you and you go with it. Occasionally we ask the Spacecraft Team to look at a special mode for us. In fact just recently on one of the Titan flybys we asked the Spacecraft Team to do a special mode for us.

So Kim was our spacecraft rep and she worked very carefully with the power spacecraft engineer and came up with sort of very unique mode for a Titan flyby for us.

Let's see I talked about solid state recorder storage and reaction wheels. Okay, the reaction wheel they've become a shared resource. They weren't a shared resource in the beginning. But now we - we've been having a little bit trouble with our wheels, and so we have to treat them with tender loving care. And we have to sort of watch their speeds all the time.

We have to make sure they don't get too slow or the lubricant gets too sticky. We have to make sure they don't get too fast or we start having problems with them interfering with the instruments. So we spend a lot time with the reactions wheels. We spent a lot of time making sure that, sort of, like I say, giving them tender loving care so that they make it through.

So science planning is basically about figuring out all shared resources and how we're going to divvy those up every minute of every day of the year.

Marcia Burton: Hey Trina.

Trina Ray: Yes.

Marcia Burton: Trina. Perhaps people know what the reaction wheel subsystem is, but you could describe it because you really didn't say what it does.

Trina Ray: Okay, well I think Kim should do that, because she's the spacecraft person.

Marcia Burton: Okay.

Kim Steadman: Well the reaction wheels we have two ways to turn our spacecraft that's with our reaction control system, which are small thrusters - little clusters of thrusters around the spacecraft and they actually use propellant when we use those.

And then the other way that we can turn our spacecraft is call, Reaction wheels. They're basically little cages that have little ball bearings that spin. And as you spin the ball bearings it creates momentum and it turns our spacecraft.

And the reaction wheels were I guess were getting towards the end of their planned lifetime, but - so we have to make sure that we use reaction wheels in smart way because they have lubricant to make sure that the balls spin. Because you know if you've got metal spinning on metal that creates a lot of friction and it doesn't work very well.

So these little ball bearings are sitting on a lubricant, some kind of oil, and the oil will begin breaking down - excuse me, as we get further and further away from when we actually built the reaction wheels back in the late 90's. And so what we do is we have program that we run -- that the attitude control engineers run -- that will tell them if you're pointing the spacecraft this way and that way.

We give it a pointing profile from our sequence, and then it will tell what our reaction wheels speeds - how fast the RPMs, the revolutions per minute, of the reaction wheels, of the little ball bearings.

And what we want to do is we is we want to avoid the low RPM area which about 300 - plus or minus 300 RPMs. And also we don't want them to spin them too high, up about 800 RPM. So that's what the reaction wheel is.

Marcia Burton: Great, thanks Kim.

Trina Ray: Yes from a science point of view the reaction wheels because they're these, you know, it's basically an exchange of momentum between these wheels and the spacecraft. From a science point of view the reaction wheels offer us extremely outstanding steady pointing, just outstanding.

I mean Cassini is giant anyway okay, it's a giant, giant - it's like the size of bus. So you - it was going to be pretty stable no matter what. But the reaction wheels are just very delicate, fine motor controls for this spacecraft. And you just get - this is how you get these fantastic images, because there's not smear. You can take very short exposures or very long exposures, just fantastic because of the reaction wheels.

On the flip side the RCS, the thruster control that Kim was talking about, that allows to move the spacecraft fast. And so for - or to fight something that's not allowing us to point in the direction we want to point. The perfect example there is Titan's atmosphere.

We do a close Titan flyby, Titan's atmosphere is pushing at the spacecraft and it says, you know, trying to point it, you know, trying to push it against it. And we're trying to point in a particular direction. So we have to transition from the wheels to thruster control so we can sort of force the spacecraft to be exactly where we want to be in the flyby.

So again it's shared resource in that way and science planning spends a lot time on negotiating that.

If you go to the next slide you just see that I put a spacecraft image on top the managing the shared resources. There you can see all the instruments and the high gain antennae and the engines at the bottom, that sort of thing. Let's see, can I see a reaction wheel on that? No I can't.

Kim Steadman: No they just look like circles.

Trina Ray: Yes, they're about - I don’t know, what about a foot and a half in diameter, sort of a thing. And there are four them.

So if you go to the next page, this is Slide 9, another thing that makes science planning fun or hard, depending on how you think about it, is just how intense the process is. These - there are 12 instruments on board the spacecraft. They all started working back in the 80's to be on this spacecraft.

They built their instruments in the 90's. They - there are people who have dedicated an entire professional career to this mission. The scientists feel extremely attached to their science. And they absolutely feel that their science is sort of the best science that can possibly be done.

And so it very competitive in terms of - and everybody's science is great. That's the great thing about Cassini, everybody's doing great science. So it's not like wrong, right? It's not like, "Oh you're doing crap science." No, everybody's doing great science you just can't do it all.

And so there are 12 instruments, they're competing all the time for those shared resources. You can't lead by fait really if you're dealing with scientists who competed to get their instrument on board the spacecraft back before, you know, you were even working at JPL.

You have to lead by consensus and so the scientist have to collect themselves into groups where they can negotiate where the coin of realm of scientific discovery, scientific opportunity and shared resources. And so you collect the scientists into groups and have them argue it out.

And they have - you have to get them to a consensus of what has to happen. That means it takes a lot of time and so we have a long lead time when we're planning, when we're doing the science planning. Even though we're telling you about 2010 and we're going to talk about just one or two segments that we're planning and then, you know, four or five sequences, we are talking in the scientific community about all the science planning from here out to 2017.

I mean we are already having meeting about flybys and opportunities out in 2017, so it's a long lead time. And all of these science teams, which again I want to remind you, are small. They're doing all right? They're supporting all these various science planning activities that could either be talking about a flyby or a segment next month, or one seven years from now.

They're also doing all the commanding, they're doing all the health and safety monitoring, and they're doing all of the data analysis when it comes down. And they're also publishing and doing science results. So it's a small team, there's many concurrent and iterative processes so it really makes it a challenge.

And of course, the fact that there's so much going on, the multi-disciplinary scientific objectives and opportunities, it's almost hard to wrap your mind around it. That's why we wanted to talk today about sort of what it all takes.

So the next slide. There was - sorry I put a nice image there that sort of shows all the overlap. I mentioned all the overlap and just wanted you see sort of what we're talking about in terms of overlap. There's a lot of overlap in the mission.

So now if you go to Slide 11, we're not going to go over this in excruciating detail, but what I wanted to do was give you a sense of it, right? These are the AO objectives that I mentioned that were written back in 1988, that the instruments competed to say, "I can help answer this question."

So let's just take one of them, Number 2 for Titan. Determine the relative amounts of the different components in the atmosphere. That's the scientific objective, the Announcement of Opportunity objective that we're trying to get to.

As we look at the table at the bottom you'll see how many instruments feel that they can contribute to that question; Caps, SIRS, INMS. You know, almost all of them feel that they can help contribute to that. Every checkmark on that page becomes a request for shared resources.

Every checkmark becomes maybe one request for one flyby, but more likely it becomes hundreds and hundreds of requests for pieces of flybys where you can try to get some piece of information that's unique, or build up a (signal to noise), it's - every one of these explodes into, you know, somewhere between dozens and hundreds of requests in our database.

And this is just Titan. If you go on to the next page you'll see the matrix for Saturn. If you go onto the next page it's the matrix for ring. And the next page is the matrix for moons and then the magnetospheric instruments.

So just imagine how all of these scientists are arguing about their science and how they all have to get the data that allows them to fill out this check marked box. And so that we can answer the questions what Cassini was designed to answer.

It's a wonderfully complex spacecraft to work on. You can look at things from the view of - there are 12 instruments on board the spacecraft. You can look at things like there are 5 Disciplines.

You can look at things like there are engineers and scientists, there are many, many ways to collect people on Cassini into teams - virtual teams, so they can work a problem that could be horizontal to the team that they were working on before. This is one of the things that makes really, really fun.

So if you go onto the next page, this is Slide 16. Slide 16 what I wanted to do was sort of show you how we break things up. Because we can't just - you can't, you know, you can't just say, "Okay we're just going to do a 10-week sequence, okay science go off and do that."

The scientists - there's 200 scientists, you would never get 200 scientists to agree to anything. So what you have to do first is you have to break up the tour in a way that makes sense.

And the way that makes sense to scientists is breaking it up along those disciplines. So we put all the Titan scientists in a group and they focus on the 48 hours around a Titan flyby. You put on the icy satellite scientists in a group and they focus on the day or two around all the Enceladus and Rhea and Dione flybys.

You take all the Saturn scientists you put them in group and they focus at the three or four days around periapsis when you're closest to Saturn. You take all the maps instruments and you put them in a group, and they sort of focus on the big loop that goes away and comes back to Saturn. If it happens to be in a good place in the magnetosphere, you know, they'll want to take data on that one.

And then, let's see I'm missing one.

Kim Steadman: Rings.

Trina Ray: Rings. You take everybody who cares about rings and you put them in a group. And they also focus in the three to four days around periapsis when you have really high resolution of the rings.

So that's one way to break up the time so that you can start planning this. Then once they've - that's called integration by the way. When you get scientists in a room and you say, "Okay, negotiate the best science compromise for this time. You can't have it all, but go ahead and negotiate the best science compromise."

Let me just take 30 seconds here to say, "There was a previous process, what you see on the display there, called Tour Design." Tour design is when you don't know what the tour looks like yet, and you get all the scientists, also by discipline, telling the tour designers what they want out of the seven year Solstice Mission, and they just try to maximize the opportunities.

You don't look at any conflicts, you don't do any, you know, you don't do anything that looks like integration. All you do is you say, "Tour designers maximize the science opportunities." And that's usually a couple of years it takes us to do that now.

We got pretty good at it toward the end. The first time of course, just planning the Cassini Tour original took five or six years. But now we did this last one in about a couple of years.

So that's tour design. Again the scientists take the lead there. They're in their little discipline groups, not really in their instrument groups and they're trying to maximize science opportunities. Then you cut up the tour into pieces based on if there's a Titan flyby or if this is a good rings periapsis.

And you get all the Titan scientists or the ring scientists in a group and you say, "Okay, the rubber meets the road here. You can't all do it all. Negotiate the best science compromise and give us a conflict free timeline where all the shared resources are shared, what you think is fairly, for the best science that you can get."

Then we hand that off to the sequence folks, and Kim's going to tell you all about that process. But the sequence folks, they break things up just in terms of time, "Ten weeks; we're going to do a ten-week sequence."

"I don't care if it's four Titan flybys or one, I don't' care if it's two giant Saturn segments or seven little Saturn segments. I don't care what science is in there, I just want ten weeks and I want to plan all the commands that it takes to do those ten weeks."

And then of course we execute. And our execution right now is for ten week sequences.

So you could kind of see that what happens is we come out of tour design, we start integrating and implementing and then executing in sort of this rolling fashion. The integrators are all up there doing their thing, they're delivering segments. Then the sequencers come in, chunk it up into ten week pieces and then they go off and implement it, and then it executes.

So if you go on to the next slide, and if you happen to be running this in PowerPoint where it's doing its animations you'll see quite a lot of nice animation on this slide. But if you're not, that's okay it'll still work.

This is an example in detail sort of, of a Titan flyby. So now I'm putting on my hat where I'm the lead of the Titan group. And the mission has told me and my Titan scientists that we have, here's T78, you have to go off and integrate this Titan flyby. And so we say, "Okay," we'll go off and do that.

Well now for the Titan folks, one thing that we did is we got together up front and we looked at all the flybys as a group and we decided who's going to get the closes approach of each flyby. So not every group does that, that's kind of how the Titan group does it.

But nonetheless, even when you've decided that, there are lots of people who want to control the pointing of the spacecraft, so you could kind of see that at the top, everybody kind of wants a little piece of the spacecraft. So the first thing you have to do is you have to figure out who gets the pointing.

And once you figure out who gets the pointing, then you could go ahead and figure out, "How do we lay out the power, the outmodes that work, how do we lay out the telemetry mode so that we can make sure that everybody gets their data?" And then, like I said if you've got the PowerPoint working there's a really nice animation where it all just falls into place just so easy, magically with no work, and the prime pointing is decided and who's riding along with the prime pointing is decided. And then once you've got the pointing then you can very methodically step through and check all these other things.

If you go on to the next page - why didn't my next page look - oh yes, you could see the final, the writers have been added at the bottom there, and the telemetry and power modes have been determined.

And then on Page 19, you can see how we started looking at the data vine. So at the beginning, as we have a DSN, the data is being pulled off the SSR, the Solid State Recorder, and it's slowly getting towards empty. But then we start our flyby and we start filling it up again. And of course we go over 100%, so again we have to negotiate the shared resources and make sure we get rid of that SSR overrun.

And basically we just keep iterating on this. We just keep working out, you know, "Here's the pointing, here's the data volume, here's the telemetry, here's the power, here's a dual playback, here's this, here's that."

And by the end our job is complete when we can hand off to the planners, a plan where all the shared resources have been negotiated, we've gotten all the science that we - we've gotten the best science we think that we can, having followed the rules of the integration process, and then we go ahead and hand it off to the sequencers to implement that. And I think we go to Kim.

Kim Steadman: Yes, as Trina talked to you about, what we call integration, and I'm going to talk to you about what we call implementation. And I'm sorry, I've got a bit of a cold today.

So if you look at the next slide there's a lot of things that make the science planning and the integration hard, make the sequencing hard, or what we call implementation. We also have to deal with the small distributed teams all over the world, because when we accept files from like the magnetometer team or the CDA team, those files are coming from across the sea.

And also within those small teams, like with ISS, they're in the U.S., but one lady will be the - I say, "Lady," because it seems like there's only two ladies that do that so.

But anyway, so when ISS sends us a file, they send us a file that has all of their observations for the whole sequence, for the whole ten week period. But the one person who sends us the file is not the one who designed each and every observation.

Working underneath her, she has a team of four or five engineers that designed the various observations. So they delivered to her, she delivers to us. And so it's quite complex because we're all over the U.S. and in Europe and you know, when we have meetings it's always over the phone, sort of like we're talking to you guys.

And also what we do during the implementation process is we check the flight rules. So flight rules are sort of checked to some degree, during the process that Trina was talking about. So a lot of the flight rules don't get checked until we actually build what we call a sequence; until everybody puts their files together and all their observations together.

And then we run it through various versions of different software to make sure that we're not breaking anything on the spacecraft. Because if we were to point the spacecraft in the wrong way and burn out one of our instruments, that would not be very good.

We also have an aging spacecraft. We launched in 1997, and it was designed for a four-year tour. And here we are many years later, after a four-year tour, a two-year extended tour, and now we're on to what's called the Solstice Mission which is supposed to be for seven years.

So (RBOT) is listed there. (RBOT) is a tool that we use to tell us what the speed, the reaction wheels are. And so during the sequencing process we monitor the reaction wheels to make sure they're not being, you know, in the low RPM area that we don't want them to be in for too long.

We also have decreasing power. When we launched we had 825 watts of power, now we have about 667 watts of power. And we also have anomalies that come up and things that we didn't anticipate happening, so we have to work around those.

Intense sequencing process, this says, "Rare and precious science opportunities lead to sequence complexity," yes. What happens is that for some reason these really, you know, great flybys seem to happen in clusters, they're not all spread out. So you know, you're not spread out evenly through the seven years.

So you can get a sequence that doesn't have any targeted flybys or you could get a sequence that has five or six targeted flybys. So you know, it's just - and then the competition for resources on the spacecraft are even greater.

It says, "Also concur at sequence development," and that means what we're doing is we're doing implementation at the same time that a sequence is executing on the spacecraft, and all the little teams are going off and they're doing integration for stuff that's happening down the line.

And there's a lot of overlap. The same people that do integration do the implementation that, you know, monitor the spacecraft during execution. So at one time you can get very confused working on the spacecraft, because right now I'm working on Titan Flyby 86 for integration, but I'm working on Sequence Number 71 for implementation. And currently on the spacecraft executing is Sequence S70. And you get really confused where you are.

Next; okay this slide just shows you that the integration is what Trina was talking about. And so you see the little green areas represent the cross discipline group and the orange is the Saturn group and the pink are Titan flybys and the purple's rings. So this is just what our Sequence Number 68 looked like.

And so we took all those different, what we call segments, and put them together and that's - the integration is just, you know, every team works with their little box and then when we get to sequencing we take those ten weeks, package it up together, and we do our implementation. And then once we're finished with this process we send it up to the spacecraft and it executes.

Next, this is what sequence implementation looks like; it's a 22 week process and we have what we call ports which - well I like to call them is they're called Merges.

What you do in each port is you take the files from all of the different subsystem, the engineering subsystems, the instrument teams, and you take those files and you put them and make them into - merge them into one sequence. So now you have one big file that has all the commands for the whole sequence.

And what you can do with that is the different subsystems and the instrument teams can go off and look at that one file and make sure that they're meeting all their - first of all the instrument teams want to make sure they're doing what they meant to do, and then they also want to make sure that they don't have any flight rules - flight rule violations.

There are flight rules for the instruments, there are flight rules for the engineering subsystems and for the spacecraft overall, like pointing. And so when we get to Port 1, that's the first time that we're merging everything together. But when we do this, all that we're looking at is the pointing designs.

Everybody that controls where the spacecraft's going to point has to deliver a file to us. And this could be an engineering file, because some of the subsystems have - the engineering subsystems, when they do their periodic engineering maintenance, they want to point the spacecraft.

This is also mostly the instrument teams and also science planning, because science planning is responsible for turning the spacecraft to earth for downlink, and downlinking all the data and then turning back away so that the scientists can pick up again and start doing their stuff.

So what we do...

Trina Ray: You know I didn't realize until just this minute that that's what we do in integration; we do pointing first. Pointing is the thing that just everything flows from that. And I didn't realize until just this minute that's exactly how the sequence process is based too; get the pointing done first, and check everything from there.

That's interesting; I learned something in my own talk. That's cool.

Kim Steadman: Well the most important, and the place where we can really break the most flight rules is in pointing.

So we have to make sure that the spacecraft is safe, that we're not pointing, you know, any of the engineering subsystems or any of the instruments where they don't want to be pointed. And we also want to make sure that we're not heating up any of the instruments that don't like to be heated up.

So Port 1 really is just looking at the pointing, making sure the pointing is right, making sure you don't have any interrupted turns, because if an instrument team, you know, like say ISS, the imaging subsystems, say that they're pointing at something and they're turned, you know, back you know, at the end of their observation to what we call a Weigh Point, which is just a safe point to drop off the spacecraft.

That way with the weigh point, during any period of time we specify what the weigh point is. The weigh point is just telling everybody, "Point over here when you're done with your observation."

That way the next team knows where they're going to pick the spacecraft up and they don't have to call the previous instrument, you know, that control point and say, "Hey ISS, where are you leaving the spacecraft," they know where it's going to be when they cite their observation.

But sometimes during the integration time they can think, "Oh this turn will only take 24 minutes," and that turn actually took 30 minutes. And so we have to fix stuff like that, like overlapping turns. And sometimes what we can do there is speed up the turn rate.

Okay, and that gets us through Port 1. In Port 1 we've looked at everybody's pointing design and told - given them feedback and said, "Yes, your point in is good, everything's fine, we're good to go," or "Here, please change this and then we'll be good to go."

In Port 2 we add in a little more complexity; this is where we get what we call the Rider Observations. I'll pick on ISS again; say ISS is pointing at Titan, well that, you know, pointing at Titan is also good for the VIMS instrument, and you know, some maps instruments can also get data while we're doing this, and perhaps even UVIS. So all the teams that integration had designed, you know, rider observations, here's where they delivered those files.

So and this is also - I put in here DSN negotiations begin. Before we got to our sequence, our mission planner had already sent to our DSN, our Deeps Space Network scheduler, our plan of when we want to downlink to what dishes around the globe.

And so we told the DSN, "This is optimum; this is what we want." And this is where the negotiation process begins because you know, there are only so many dishes out there that we can use, and there are a lot of other missions out there. And so what we have to do is make sure, that you know, we don't - we're not trying to use the DSN station at the same time that Mars is.

So the DSN - our DSN scheduler goes and negotiates with the DSN schedulers for other missions, and that way that what their product is, you know, a plan on which each, you know, for each antenna, when it's going to be used, where it's going to be pointed.

And so that way we know that when we come up to the end of this process that we know exactly where our DSN passes are and we have the correct telemetry boards on - telemetry modes on board the spacecraft, so that we are actually downlinking at a rate that the DSN antenna can listen to.

So this is where the negotiations begin. And they last pretty much right up until the end of our implementation process. And this is also the first time in Port 2 that we check our data volume allocation. Trina talked about when they're in their little segments they try and - they make sure that they're not overfilling the SSR.

So we're double checking here to make sure that no one's, you know, snuck in some extra data, or that they're not, you know, they haven't made a mistake. And so we're making sure that all these little segments said they were, they you know, had managed the SSR correctly.

So when we get to the sequence we look at the overall picture and make sure that the data volume allocations to each instrument is acceptable. And this is also where we do the reaction wheel checks.

Okay in Port 3 is where we implement. So we talked about (RBOT) earlier. So our attitude control engineers have gone and they've looked at the speeds of the reaction wheels during all of these observations during this ten week sequence.

And what they did is if they found a place where we weren't happy with the speeds of the reaction wheels, they asked the instrument teams to change their pointing. And when the instrument teams changed their pointing, then hopefully our reaction wheels are now at a happy speed.

So in Port 3 is where we implement all these changes that were requested by the attitude control engineer.

Trina Ray: The biases too right? We put in the bias...

Kim Steadman: Yes, we also put in biases, and that's another part of this RWA safety check, is that the attitude control engineers put in biases like, for every few days what we do is we spin - we change the wheels of the - change of the speed of the wheels.

So say we're getting close to having them in a really bad area, so we can just do what we call buys and say, "Oh no, let's spin the wheels back up to this speed."

We have three reaction wheels at use at any time and so each reaction wheel is set to a new speed. And that way when we get to the next what we call a different kind of segment, an (RBOT) segment, for the next segment that means the reaction wheels will stay in the happy zone.

And also at Port 3 is the first time that we get our first estimate of the hydrazine that we're going to be using during this - the whole ten-week sequence. And hydrazine is something that we watch a lot, because hydrazine is our propellant that is used for the reaction control system.

And when we launched we had 132 kilograms, and now I think we're down to 61 kilograms. And when it's empty, you know, we can't stop at you know, the local gas station and fill up. So we have to really, you know, nickel and dime what we use and keep an eye on it.

We have someone that, our mission planner, who looks ahead and estimates how much hydrazine we're going to use from today until the end of the mission and so we want to make sure when we're implementing these sequences that we're staying along her line - staying within her estimates and not using too much hydrazine.

And also at Port 3 this is the first time that we have the full sequence, so all the commands for engineering, for playing back the data, for science planning, and for all the instruments -- all those commands are built into here. And at each one of these ports everybody redoes all of their flight rule checks.

So you've got all the instrument teams turning in a flight rule check, you've got all the engineering subsystems and the systems engineer turning in a flight rule check. And so everything is checked several times before it goes up in the spacecraft; we did the check in Port 1, we did the check in Port 2, we're doing a check now.

And then the next one we have is PSIV, which is Preliminary Sequence Integration Validation. And so this is where once you get past Port 3 you can't make any changes without it being approved by the science planner in charge of the sequence. So at this point you have to implement what we call a Sequence Change Request.

So if suddenly at Port 3 an instrument team decides, "Well this isn't exactly what we want to do, we want to do this instead," to get that approved it has - they have to fill out a form.

And it - and that way everybody gets an eye on it because at this point we've already checked the flight rules three times. (Unintelligible) to check them once more, and so we want to make sure any changes here are tightly controlled.

And it's also where if we are breaking any flight rules - because some flight rules are there to protect you, but occasionally you have to break them, and this is what we call a Waiver. If you're breaking a flight rule, and you know you're breaking a flight rule, then - and you think it's okay, then you have to have a Waiver approved.

So the instrument team or the engineering subsystem that's breaking the flight rule in - you know, puts in a Waiver and then it gets approved by many other subsystems, and eventually the project manager.

So at PSIV we do the flight rule checks again. At this point the DSN negotiation should be finalized so we know exactly what downlink passes we're going to get, all the changes for those downlink passes are included in PSIV. And so here we have a safe, flyable sequence that should give us the science that we had planned back in integration.

So we do have one more port that is not always used called the Final Sequence Integration Validation. And mainly that's in case at PSIV you suddenly caught something that was dangerous to the spacecraft, "Oh wow, I didn't see this."

"We have this problem. This is a health and safety violation so we need to fix it." And that's what we use FSIV for. Usually we don't even have FSIV, the file that was approved during PSIV is the one that gets approved at the approval meeting and is sent up to the spacecraft.

Next, now we sent the file up to the spacecraft. We've sent our sequence up to the spacecraft so for the next ten weeks the spacecraft knows what it's supposed to do. But that's not the end of our job, we don't just merrily go along, and you know, wait for the science to come back, we have to monitor the sequences that executes on the spacecraft.

The next one just shows some of the tasks that we do while the spacecraft's up there happily executing our sequence that we spent 22 weeks, you know, to get ready to go up there. So this mainly involves the sequence lead and engineering teams.

The instrument teams are watching their data come back every time we have a downlink pass. And if they're missing data then they let us know.

But mostly the work done during sequence execution is done here at JPL. We monitor the spacecraft health whenever we get a downlink of science data. We're also getting engineering data; we pour through that to make sure everything's expected.

The science planners are heavily involved in doing any live updates. What live updates are is if you're, you know, you're looking at a, like one of our small icy satellites like Helene and you think it's going to be here but for some reason we're a little bit off the trajectory.

The navigation folks, you know, track exactly where we are compared to the plan trajectory. And so you can just be a little bit off and you might miss one of these satellites, these small icy satellites.

So if we get into a position where we're going to miss our small icy satellite observation, then what the science planning team to send an update to the spacecraft saying, "No, Helene's not over there, it's really over here." So we make sure that we're actually pointing the spacecraft where we want to be.

We also do some real-time commands. These would be in the form of if we did a live update, it would be a real-time command that goes up to the spacecraft. And we also do engineering and science real-time commands. Like when we do maneuvers, those are always done with a real-time command.

Or real-time commands can also be done for DSN changes, like if a spacecraft is supposed to be launching and they're delayed a few days, then we may be - plan to have a DSN pass, but we may lose it because the spacecraft, you know, on the launch pad didn't launch when it was supposed to and now a few - it's launching a few days later and now they need one of our DSN passes.

So we can send up real-time commands if we know ahead of time to tell the spacecraft, "Don't downlink here because we don't have a pass. Just save it on the - our solid state recorder and we'll get it later." And we also send up real-time commands for anomaly response, which we don't like to do.

Okay, I thought I'd just give you a quick introduction on our orbit trim maneuvers. Our orbit trim maneuvers is what keeps us on the trajectory. You remember our trajectory planners took two years to come up with this wonderful trajectory that would take us around the Saturn system and get all these wonderful opportunities to look at the rings, to look at Titan, and to look at all the icy satellites. So this was a really well planned trajectory.

But to stay on the trajectory for every targeted flyby that we have, we have to do three maneuvers; we have an approach maneuver that's done about three days before the encounter; we have a cleanup maneuver that's about three days after the encounter; and then we also have what we call our near (APO APS) maneuver. So when we're furthest away in our orbit away from Saturn, we usually do a maneuver there.

So this three maneuver strategy is how we make sure that we're going to get to Titan at the right time and be the right, you know, distance above Titan, and be over the correct area of Titan that the scientists were expecting.

So when we do these maneuvers they're always done over a nine-hour long DSN pass, because we like to see the spacecraft when we do a maneuver, the OTM transitions and everything that we need to setup the maneuver in the background sequence. The maneuver itself is uplinked in real-time.

I think that's it for that, and next page is the Cassini OTM implementation and execution. We're on Page 28 now. This is just telling you sort of what we do here down on the ground to implement - to make sure that we get these maneuvers done.

We have a maneuver design team that's responsible for planning the maneuver, building the maneuver, sending it up to the spacecraft and watching it execute.

The maneuver design team first starts out with the navigation team is - the navigation team is responsible for determining where Cassini is, where it's going and where it should go. So their job is to do what they call Orbit Determination; determine where Cassini is and where we are.

So it's sort of like, you know, using your smartphone to see, "Where the heck am I," when you're lost. That's their job, is to determine where the spacecraft is and in what direction we're flying and how fast we're going.

And then they also have a maneuver team on - in navigation. And the maneuver team is responsible for planning a maneuver that's going to keep us on our path that we planned out years and years ago.

So - now Trina's writing me a note.

Trina Ray: No, no, no. I'm writing a note for myself. The - that was a really good analogy. I really like that; I'm going to steal that, that the maneuver team is like - like you went into Google maps...

Kim Steadman: Right.

Trina Ray: ...so you have a plan. Your GPS is telling you where you are all the time, and they're telling - and then the maneuver is, "Turn left here," (unintelligible).

Kim Steadman: That's exactly right. The maneuver team tells us the direction of the maneuver and the magnitude of the maneuver -- how big the maneuver is. And once they give us that information, then the spacecraft office actually builds a block of command that will perform that maneuver on the spacecraft.

The spacecraft team is also responsible for - again here come in the flight rules, we're sending a new file up to the spacecraft that's going to execute and tell the spacecraft to fire either its main engine or its little reaction control thrusters, to give us this change in momentum for the - change in Delta V so that we'll stay on our path. So we have to check the flight rules. We not only have to check the flight rules for the little, you know, block of commands that we're sending up to do this, we have to make sure that this block of command fits over the top of what's already up there.

So we take our maneuver, once it's built and we've checked out to make sure it does what we intend to do, it does what NAV wants it to do, and we're not breaking any flight rules with it, then we merge it with the background sequence, which is already on the spacecraft, and we do another check.

We make sure that we're not, you know, adding you know, something bad to the spacecraft. So one thing we have to check for is same second command. There are some commands that cannot happen in the same second, so you have to make sure what you're sending up with your maneuver is going to work well and play well with the background sequence that's already there.

So once we've built this file and checked all the flight rules, then the maneuver uplink engineer, this poor person, has to come in at the start of the DSN pass...

Trina Ray: Whatever time that happens (unintelligible).

Kim Steadman: ...whatever time of day or whatever day of the year -- Christmas morning at 1:00 am it could be -- they have to come in.

The first thing they do is they look at the telemetry coming from the spacecraft, because remember we're over our DSN pass, they verify the health and state of the spacecraft. They make sure that everything is as expected on the spacecraft before we send the maneuver up.

Once they verify that the spacecraft is healthy and happy then we uplink the maneuver. Once the maneuver is up there and the maneuvers usually execute six hours after the DSN pass begins. It's up - the maneuver's uplinked at the beginning of the DSN pass, and then six hours later it will execute.

We have a team of engineers, the sub - the systems engineer, and several of the subsystem leads come in and monitor the real-time data coming down from the spacecraft.

So what they want to do is they want to get a look at what the spacecraft looks like right before the maneuver executes, they watch the turns to the burn attitude, and then of course the spacecraft turns off for us to execute the maneuver.

And then when it turns back to Earth and starts downlinking again, we have to - we want to make sure that we get a first look at what the spacecraft looks after the burn, and make sure it's still happy and healthy.

And so before and after the maneuver during this DSN pass, we will be downlinking science. During the maneuver, we halt the downlink of science so that we don't lose any science.

And the next page is just a really busy chart that I thought I would throw in here for your viewing enjoyment. This is just what a managing maneuver block looks like.

We, you know, we turn to the burn attitude, we spin down the wheels, we do the burn, we turn back to Earth point. And there's a lot more information in there that I probably won't go over. But it's nice to show exactly what the maneuver's doing.

Next is just a sample of what a four-month OTM schedule looks like. The little green blocks with numbers in them, those are when the OTMs actually execute. We can't plan the OTM until we get about three days before the OTM so all of our work schedules are tied to these dates.

As you can see, some of them happen on Christmas day, you know, Christmas Eve, or the weekend of Thanksgiving. So this is what causes us to work off-shift hours is all of our meetings are tied to exactly when the maneuver's going to be. And they don't' take into account that, you know, it's the weekend or it's Christmas.

Okay here's just a quick - since we're covering 2010, sometimes things don't exactly go as we planned.

So back on November 2, which was a Tuesday, we were - what we were doing is we were uploading new flight software to the backup attitude control flight computer.

And this, you know, once - when we have new software that we send up, we've already tested it down here to make sure that, you know, when we put this new software up there it's not going to do something unexpected, you know, so we don't send up, you know, new software and end up like Microsoft and crash our system.

So this is what we were doing. It's just a normal thing that we do, you know, every few years, uploading new flight software. And then - and we always do this over DSN pass, so that you know, that it goes in steps.

We don't just upload one file and everything's happy, we you know, upload several files and then we watch to make sure that the channels that are changed are changed how we expected them to be changed.

But during this process the attitude control guys were working, and you could hear them, we have what's called a (VocaBox), and so when we're doing real-time stuff, everybody talks through the (VocaBox), it gets recorded and then everybody can hear. And you could hear them sending up their commands, and you know, reading off the information that was changing on the spacecraft.

But suddenly - and remember, this is in the afternoon so everybody's at work, which is always helpful, but suddenly, you know, Cassini stopped talking to us -- and that's never a good thing. That's when you look around and you're like, "Hmm," when you know, the DSN station calls and tells you, "Well we've lost lock, we're not getting any data from the spacecraft," you're like, "Hmm, that's not good."

So what you do when your spacecraft stops talking to you; well the first thing is you don't panic. You know, usually if the spacecraft is going to go into what we call Safing - and safing I'm not sure if you guys are familiar with that.

That's when - what the spacecraft does is it's gotten something or something's happened and it - that it does not expect. And so what it needs is it needs user input. So it calls home to mommy is what it does. IT turns off all non-essential systems and it turns to a safe attitude, that went up with the sequence.

When we send a sequence up we tell it what the safe attitude is. And so it turns to its safe attitude, turns off everything it doesn't need to stay alive and it calls home and it waits for us. But if you're - you know, if you're in the middle of a downlink, your spacecraft's going to turn off Earth point because it's turning to its Safing attitude.

And so it will turn off Earth point and go through all its safing stuff. And when it turns back it takes about an hour for it to do that. So we knew when we called our anomaly meeting, while we still didn't have data, that if the spacecraft had safed - and safing isn't really bad, safing is there to protect you.

It's to protect the spacecraft so that when it, you know, doesn't know what to do, something's happened to it, it calls home and it, you know, it doesn't do anything that makes the situation worse. So we called an anomaly meeting, which means we all did panic and run into the meeting room, and started just going over scenarios.

You know, that's where - during this time when you don't know what's happened, what you're looking at is, "What was going on - what was happening on the spacecraft when we lost lock," you know.

Trina Ray: This is the time when outrageous speculation takes over.

Kim Steadman: Right, right. And you're also at this time, before you get any data because without data you can't make a decision and you can't take action.

This is what we're looking at; what files might be useful to send up to the spacecraft, you know, when we do, you know, get downlink telemetry. And so you're just - and then the people are going through, "Well, this is what we were doing, this couldn't have caused safing." And you're also looking at what's upcoming.

So, and then during the meeting - during this meeting we actually got telemetry back from the spacecraft that did confirm that Cassini was in safe mode. And so the first thing - and we - but we were towards the end of our pass, so what we did was we sent up a few, just housekeeping commands, commands that we knew that we would need to send up just based on the spacecraft being in safing.

And so we sent up the immediate commands for the subsystems and instruments. In fact I think VIMS was turned on. The spacecraft, when it goes into safing, it turns all the instruments off. But some instruments are much happier when they're on so we turned VIMS back on.

But the main - the first thing that we have to do is to play back the engineering data to determine what went wrong and if there's anything we need to do to fix it. Sometimes safing is caused by - in something, you know, solid state power switch getting tripped by a cosmic ray.

So what we have to do is, before we do anything because you know, when you start trying to fix stuff before you know what's wrong with it, you could cause more harm than good.

So our first job is to play back the engineering data and have each subsystem go read their engineering data and come back to another meeting and tell us the State of their subsystem, the State of the spacecraft, and you know, what errors did they see, if any?

During this same time, while the engineers are downstairs trying to do this, they're also looking at what is needed to stay on tour. Remember we do these maneuvers all the time. They can be as close together as just a few days apart, as opposed to six, you know, five or six days apart, or it could be a whole month until your next OTM.

But what will you do, you know, you want to stay on tour so you do a mission status evaluation. So you've got your engineering subsystems team looking at what's causing it, and then you also have your systems engineers looking at, "What do we need to do," you know, "What's coming up? Are we doing a Titan flyby tomorrow? Do we need to get a maneuver off to stay on tour?"

And so at this point we needed to execute the OTM256 just four days later, so we started playing on what to do to make that happen. And then also the science planners were looking at what activities need to be accomplished on the spacecraft before reactivating the background sequence.

That background sequence that we took all those weeks to prepare to send up to the spacecraft, as soon as the spacecraft goes into safing, it terminates the background sequence.

So we've got to make sure that the spacecraft, you know, all the instruments are in the correct state, and everything is up there, you know, to restart this background sequence. You can't just flip a switch and turn it back on.

And you also - the scientists look at, you know, "What upcoming science observations do we have," and, "What are the most important ones," and, "What is our goal?"

You always have a goal, like when we first looked at this we were like well - this happened on November 4, well the next upcoming big science thing was T73, which was November 11, and then the next thing after that was Enceladus 12, which was on November 13. So you - the scientists work with the engineers...

Trina Ray: Thirtieth; November 30.

Kim Steadman: Sorry, November 30.

Trina Ray: That's fine.

Kim Steadman: The scientists work with the engineers and the science planners to come up with a plan to reactivate the sequence. At this point we had switched our command data systems from A to B and so it wasn't trivial to restart our background sequence.

So the decision was made to start the background sequence and to start at the next sequence. E12 was in the next sequence. We were doing S64 when the safing happened, we were - there was only a couple weeks left, and so the decision was made not to reactivate a background sequence until S65 was sent up.

And so what we were trying - we did fly by T70, but we didn't take any science data during T - excuse me, T73, but we didn't take any science data because we hadn't reactivated the background sequence. But E12 on November 30 was saved.

Trina Ray: And that was sort of an exciting thing that happened, isn't that? We've only had what, five safings in the whole course of the mission?

Kim Steadman: Yes, and I think only two since we've reached Saturn.

Trina Ray: Yes.

Kim Steadman: So it's a very rare event, but you have to be on your toes and know your subsystem really well so that you and react and do the right things.

Trina Ray: I know that you guys just went through the CHARM Anniversary telecons recently, so I - you know, for Dragon*Con I had a whole bunch of slides in here about the recent science. So I just threw in a couple of slides for the sciences last year, which you guys have heard all about. But I couldn't stop myself, I had to have some science in there.

So on Slide 35, there's the Titan equatorial storm that had then the giant methane and ethane rain that dumped out of it and made the surface change from light to dark. In the upper left there's the great Saturn storm of 2010 there in the middle and a zoom in on the upper right.

We've had a really nice set of papers from all the maps instruments that have been released recently showing the electrical connection between the little moon Enceladus and Saturn, and how you can see towards the North and South Poles of Saturn, you can see a little signature of Enceladus as it goes around because of this electrical connection.

And then, there in the lower bottom is that rain storm, darkened. If you have the PowerPoint these come in and you can see it blink back and forth.

And then I don't know, Marsha, did anybody talk about the Hyperion flyby for the anniversary? It would have been probably (Zibby).

Marcia Burton: Yes, I'm trying to remember. I don't really remember, so go right ahead. If I don't' remember, the audience probably...

Trina Ray: Yes, it was just - it was recent and it was really cool.

Marcia Burton: Yes.

Trina Ray: And it was one of those little, what - it was one of those little moons that you had to do a live update to catch and we just - so I threw in just, you know, 1/2 dozen of the close-up images, just hot off the presses, sort of very recent, this year.

And with that I don't really think we have anything else Marcia. Why don't we take questions?

Marcia Burton: That was great. Thanks Trina and Kim, that was a really good - good overview. So out there in the audience, let's barrage Trina and Kim with questions about their presentation. So who'd like to start?

(Bob): This is (Bob) in the Chicago area.

Marcia Burton: Hi (Bob), go ahead.

(Bob): I was wondering how many of these procedures and rules and stuff were in place when Cassini was launched and how many have been developed as the mission's gone on?

Trina Ray: Okay, so let me break it up into three categories; the instruments, from a physical - and the engineering subsystems, in a physical way, they have physical things that can harm them. And so if you shine the sun on the infrared instrument it causes harm. And it could cause permanent damage.

So flight rules like that, that were very physical and tied to the building of the spacecraft, many of those were - you know, 90+% were done when we launched. In terms of the flight rules for the planning - or the procedural rules, the planning rules and the sequencing rules; zero when we launched.

We had a long cruise; we had a seven year cruise. We didn't even bring in the science planning manager until a few years after we'd launched. And then he started putting together the process. And then once you put together the process, then you have the rules.

So zero when we launched. We had a wonderful Jupiter encounter on the way to Saturn. This was in what, the year 2000, and we were really able to flesh out a lot of the interactions of the science teams and the planning process in that encounter.

And probably at that point we had - going into that, like I said, we had none, so we were building them all. Coming out of that, we had enough to get through the Jupiter encounter, and probably we had 60% of sort of the final set of rules that we operate with now.

And then as we came into the extended mission, the solstice mission, where we had a reduction in funding, we had to change our planning process and therefore we had to change our rules. So the final say 20%, sort of have been polished up in the last few years.

Is that roughly in the ballpark Kim, would you say?

Kim Steadman: Yes, and then also you get things that surprise you, like somebody will do something that you never thought they'd do. So then you have to make a rule...

Trina Ray: A new rule.

Kim Steadman: Yes, you have to make a new rule. But you have to be careful with that or you'd end up with so many rules you just couldn't function.

Trina Ray: Yes.

Marcia Burton: Like what Kim? You said something (unintelligible).

Trina Ray: So for example we had - when - in trying to deal with the (RBOT) we tried a couple of different things for putting rules farther back into integration. You know, don't look at anything if the thing that you're looking at moves more than 60 degrees across the sky.

If you're going to look at three things, they all have to be within 30 degrees of each other. These are all new rules that have come along that - where you've said, "Well gosh, maybe that's too restrictive. Maybe it should be 35 degrees," you don't know yet.

So you go ahead and you put in the rule for 30, but then you think to yourself, "Well, is 30 really the right answer," you know.

Marcia Burton: Right. So these are all rules that were put in place to preserve the reaction wheel subsystem?

Trina Ray: That's just one example. We didn't get...

Kim Steadman: Yes, that's an example. There's also examples of like, what we - I talked about - briefly about the weigh point but you could put in a custom period.

Which means instead of each instrument team, after their observation, returning the spacecraft at the weigh point, you know, maybe time is of the essence and you have a quick flyby of Enceladus and so you want a custom period, which means that ISS is handing over to SIRS.

But ISS and SIRS have to work together to decide exactly where ISS is going to leave the spacecraft and SIRS is going to pick it up. And that adds a lot more complexity.

And so what you'd end up with sometimes is, just to save time you - maybe somebody would implement like a custom period that involved many, many handovers and lasted for many hours.

And so then the rule is put in there that custom periods can, you know, can only be used at certain times and they can only last so long so that, you know, you have to cut down on the complexity because it can really - you know, adding so much...

Trina Ray: Drive up workforce.

Kim Steadman: It drives up the workforce, and it also, you know, gives you more opportunity for errors. So you have to limit some of the complexity along the way.

Marcia Burton: Okay.

Trina Ray: Did that answer the question (Bob)?

(Bob): Yes it did.

Trina Ray: Excellent.

Marcia Burton: Any other questions for Trina and Kim? No?

Trina Ray: Well we hope we've sort of conveyed to you guys how sort of hard but how awesome this mission is. I mean I just - it's a privilege to go to work every day when basically all you're doing is solving problems and puzzles.

And you can see how we've put everything together on Cassini, there's just nothing but opportunity to solve puzzles and have sort of a - it's just a wonderful spacecraft to work on. I just - I enjoy it so much. And I hope you guys get a sense from today's talk, really how hard it is, but how awesome it is.

And then of course, this great science results that come from it, you know.

Kim Steadman: Yes, yes. We love seeing the science come down because we work so hard to make sure that the scientists get their data, that it's just wonderful when you get an opportunity to listen to them talk about their science results and show off. It's great.

Marcia Burton: That's great. Well thanks very much guys it was really good. So unless there are any...

Trina Ray: You're welcome.

Marcia Burton: ...final questions, any comments from anybody about CHARM telecons or announcements that people want to make?

(Don): I have one question.

Marcia Burton: Okay.

(Don): This is (Don). So I'm teaching students in 5th and 8th grade about managing missions and they never believe me about the collaboration part.

So other than just showing them the timelines and what has to be done, is there anything you can think of that would convey to them the difficulty of collaborating, mostly asynchronously, and doing it in a way that's very professional? They don't really experience that at school.

Trina Ray: Let's see. Let me just pause for a minute and let me think if there is a good movie that I think has had a good example of scientists - what about Contact?

Kim Steadman: Apollo 13 maybe.

Trina Ray: So - okay, so that's another one. So for people working collaboratively to plan science or to do science, I think Contact is a very good example of that happening.

And you know, when she was trying to get funding, and it's hard to get funding, but then when she has funding and they discover the signal, and then she has to work with colleagues around the world to decode it. That's a very sort of collegial thing.

In terms of an anomaly, I think Kim's right, Apollo 13 is a very good movie that is, I think very accurately represents what you do in an anomaly. I mean, remember you said you know, "Don't panic people, work the problem," I mean that's exactly...

Kim Steadman: Yes.

Trina Ray: ...what they said in those - in that movie I think. So those are two movie examples. Can you think of another movie example?

Kim Steadman: No. I know when I was in school one thing that was really interesting and - was doing group projects, especially some kind of group project with limited resources so that you had to, you know, work together with other people, listen to other people's ideas because the group had to all say that, "This is our final answer," so.

Trina Ray: I have another good one; I bet you World of Warcraft is something that your students would relate to.

Kim Steadman: Oh no, don't do that to him.

Trina Ray: No, no? Okay, so okay, I was going to say an online collaborative game. You have to work with people or you're not successful, for what are they called, Raids or something or?

Kim Steadman: Yes, yes. But it's good, you know, especially...

Trina Ray: You know it's...

Kim Steadman: ...the limited resources...

Trina Ray: Yes.

Kim Steadman: ...is really the key.

(Don): Okay.

Kim Steadman: Somehow you have to give them some sort of limited resource that they really need to - you know, they have to make tradeoffs so, "We can't do this and this, but we need to do some combination of parts of those to get to the end product."

And that's what, you know, makes our, you know if we were - like the Rovers have part of the same problem that we do, but if they go up to a rock and three or four of their instruments want to do something, well they can just sit there and each instrument take its turn. And they can stay there as many days as they want. But when we're flying by Enceladus, we're only doing it X number of times, and when we go by, we go by really, really fast.

So you know, not everybody can do what they want. But here's this question that we have to answer, so you have to figure out which parts from the different instrument teams do you need to answer that. And so it makes it, you know, the instrument teams have to work together and collaborate.

Trina Ray: So maybe another example in their lives of working with limited resources is maybe a family budget, something like that. I mean I'm trying to think of things that are not spacecraft things because you know, they don't work in that everyday whereas we do, you know.

(Don): Well and the (unintelligible) aspect is really important. You know, the time constraints you guys work in is really amazing.

Trina Ray: Yes, Cassini's sort of at one end of the spectrum and the Mars Rovers are sort of at the other end of the spectrum. You know, we know what's going to happen seven years from now, and they don't know what's going to happen, you know, seven days from now.

So - but then they have the flip side of it which Kim has just - it's a perfect example. They can stay at an interesting place as long as they want, and we have rare and precious opportunities that are gone in an instant. And so it drives two completely different kind of planning processes.

Kim Steadman: Well and another interesting thing with our scientists is that, you know, one instrument team, he wants his time - they want their time on the spacecraft, but to answer the question that they're trying to answer, they need data from another instrument. So sometimes one instrument is an advocate for another instrument to get time during a flyby because they need that data to give them the full picture.

Trina Ray: And a very good example of that is the Enceladus story. The Enceladus story; any one instrument would not have been able to give you the story that we understand now to be one of the most fascinating that has come out of the Cassini mission, right?

I mean the first discovery that something was going on unusual from that came from the magnetometer instrument that convinced everybody to have a lower flyby in the July flyby in 2005. And then when we flew by, we had you know, the ultraviolet instrument was able to do an occultation right at the South Pole and get a great occultation of cloud at the South Pole.

And the INMS, Ion and Neutral Mass Spectrometer is the one who flew through the cloud of material and could tell you the composition. And the imaging instrument is the one that can look at the surface and tell you about the tiger stripes. But it's the SIRS instrument that tells you how hot the tiger stripes are. And then it's the imaging instrument, when you do a high phase observation, that shows you the extent of the plume.

I mean any one instrument would not have been able to tell you that story; it's only in a collaboration that they can all contribute a piece of the puzzle.

(Don): I wish I could remember all that and write it up into some simulation for the kids to do.

Marcia Burton: Well you'll have to download the audio afterwards because everything that Trina said will be archived here.

Trina Ray: And don't they do a transcript Marcia?

Marcia Burton: And a transcript as well, yes.

Trina Ray: Yes.

(Don): Great. Okay.

(Jane): Hey Marcia and Trina, this is (Jane).

Marcia Burton: Hi (Jane).

Trina Ray: Hey (Jane).

(Jane): Cassini outreach. And I wanted to also get this in the record, you know, so people can download it, but in our education area of the Cassini Web site, we have an - we have some classroom activities for middle school classrooms called Saturn in your Kitchen and Backyard. And a couple of the activities are kind of spacecraft engineering, collaborative -- exactly what some of these questions were about.

One is called Which Way Should I Point? And it's about, you know, it's you know, the scientists and the engineering talking about that kind of stuff.

Trina Ray: That's great.

((Crosstalk))

(Jane): So that's...

(Don): (Unintelligible) right now, thank you.

(Jane): ...saturn.jpl.education...

(Don): I'm already there.

(Jane): So look for middle school activities and just scan through those.

And then we also have another collaborative activity called Cassini Scientist for a Day, where a classroom or a couple of students or a home school or a after school program can try to win, you know, try to put a proposal together, a 500 word proposal, as to what Cassini should point at, for a student activity.

And the kids get to, you know, enter - the teacher and the kids get to enter. It's going on right now but it goes I believe either through late October - let me just click on it. It's right below - it's right in the education area.

Deadline; U.S. deadline is October 26.

(Don): Okay.

(Jane): And what we do is we have activities, we have some little videos with scientists and an engineer, each trying to you know, tell the kids why they're target is the best. And then the kids write up an essay.

And then those of us on the mission, you know, some scientists, some educators and some, you know, just whoever will volunteer their time, review all of these essays and pick several winners in the Grades 5 through 8 and then from Grades 9 through 12 categories.

((Crosstalk))

Trina Ray: And then most important, they execute that on the spacecraft.

((Crosstalk))

(Jane): Yes, exactly. They execute it on the spacecraft and they kind of learn how, you know, how they - you know, by going to the project, what it's like to be here, and you know, need to weigh safety versus science, et cetera. Anyway, with that I turn it back to Marcia and Trina and Kim.

Marcia Burton: Yes, thanks (Jane), that's really a fun thing to work on, Scientist for a Day.

(Jane): Yes.

Marcia Burton: And I think it's international now as well so that's really cool.

(Jane): It is international. And for international, we don't actually do - we're sort of a passive participant.

Marcia Burton: Okay.

(Jane): The country - all the countries already have a coordinator, and they kind of run the whole thing. And they don't have to have a deadline, you know, that we monitor. Then we send them certificate - you know, we send them a PDF that they can give to the kids then.

Marcia Burton: That's great.

(Jane): Yes, it's all there on the Web site, 2011 contest. It's about our eighth contest so far.

Marcia Burton: Yes, that's great. Thanks (Jane).

(Jane): Okay.

Marcia Burton: Any other comments for - questions for our speakers? Anything? Sounds like a no so, thanks again to Trina and Kim. That was really a really fun CHARM talk. It was really a good discussion and a good overview.

Just to let you know, next month's CHARM telecon probably will be cancelled. It's the week of the PSG and we're kind of on this XSM, you know, fewer CHARM telecons, we're not sure about the schedule quite yet.

But it's hard to get a speaker nonetheless, in the middle of PSG week. So this is the meeting that all the Cassini scientists attend. So we'll be back in business probably the following month. The CHARM telecon is the week following Thanksgiving.

So I think with that, I'll say goodbye. And thanks again to our speakers. And talk to you in a couple months.

Trina Ray: Okay, thanks Marcia.

Marcia Burton: Bye.

Man: Thank you.

END

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