Rough Draft 2/8/00



Rough Draft 2/8/00

ACCIDENTAL WAR IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

Scott D. Sagan

Department of Political Science

Stanford University

Stanford, CA 94305-2044

415-725-2715

DRAFT: DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION

ACCIDENTAL WAR IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

Has There Ever Been an Accidental War?

In the large literature on the causes of war, there is a stark contrast in the ways in which political scientists and historians view the concept of "accidental war" or "inadvertent war." The possibility that a war might occur "by accident" -- produced by the inadvertent dynamics of military organizations or systems, rather than by incompatible political intentions -- has played a central role in the way political scientists think about the causes of war in general and especially the risks of nuclear war.[1] In the major works by historians on the causes of war, however, the whole idea of accidental war is either conspicuous by its absence or explicitly dismissed as conceptually confused and historically irrelevant.

Indeed, among historians there appears to be a consensus that there has never been an "accidental war." Geoffrey Blainey's The Causes of War, for example, reaches the conclusion that "no wars are unintended or `accidental':"

The idea of `unintentional war' and `accidental war' seems misleading. The sudden vogue for these concepts in the nuclear age reflects not only a justifiable nervousness about war but also the backward state of knowledge about the causes of war.[2]

Blainey's position reflects a wide-spread opinion among modern military and diplomatic historians. Michael Howard states that "however inchoate or disreputable the motives for war may be, its initiation is almost by definition a deliberate and carefully considered act...if history shows any record of `accidental' wars, I have yet to find them."[3] "I know of no war in modern times," Bernard Brodie similarly wrote, "that one could truly call accidental in the sense that it came about despite both sides having a strong aversion to it, through not seeing where their diplomatic moves were taking them."[4] Evan Luard's review of the causes of wars from 1300 to 1985 similarly concludes that "throughout the whole period of history we have been surveying it is impossible to identify a single case in which it can be said that a war started accidently: in which it was not, at the time when war broke out, the deliberate intention of at least one party that war should take place."[5]

In short, war is conceived by these historians in pure Clausewitzian terms. It is a rational tool controlled and used by statesmen to achieve important political objectives. Wars do not begin by accident.

Has there ever been an accidental war? One purpose of this essay is to answer "yes" to that specific question: this is an effort, an "existence proof" if you will, to provide the logic and evidence that cuts against the historian's consensus. A broader purpose of the piece, however, is to provide a better analytic framework for understanding the phenomenon of accidental war in general. What does it mean to say that a war was accidental or inadvertent? How should one assess such claims?

The essay has three basic parts. First, I will define the concept of accidental war and provide, through use of an analogy between accidental war and automobile accidents, a typology of scenarios that could be realistically produce an accidental war. Second, I will present in some detail an historical example of each of these types of an accidental war. Finally, I will discuss the significance of this concept for our theories about the causes of war in the past and, unfortunately, in the future as well.

Definitions and Analogies

The terms "accidental war" and "inadvertent war" could have many different meanings.[6] Sometimes the terms have been used rather promiscuously to refer to any war in which such common factors as misperceptions of an adversary's intent, overconfidence in crises, imperfect decision-making processes, or miscalculation of the consequences of war played some role in the conflict. This is not helpful: by this loose definition, most wars in history could be seen as accidental. More commonly, however, the terms are used in the literature to refer to the idea that war could break out, at least in theory, not because it served the basic political interests of states or statesmen, but rather because of some unintended consequence of the structure or operations of military organizations. The theory of accidental war is therefore based on the insight that military organizations are, like other complex organizations and machines, inherently imperfect and therefore subject to break-downs and accidents. In this light, professional military organizations are seen as tools of national security, but tools that take on a life of their own and are very difficult to statesmen to control when implementing the state's security policy in an international crisis. Could these difficulties in organizational control be so intense that they could produce a war even when statesmen on both sides believe that there is "no fundamental basis for an attack" (to use Thomas Schelling's term[7])?

Decisions, Counterfactuals, and Accidents

It is this more narrow conception of accidental war which has produced the large conceptual gap between political scientists and modern historians. As Marc Trachtenberg nicely summarizes the historian's central perspective:

The professional diplomatic historians as a rule never paid much attention to the military side of the story. While military power as such was always seen as very important, the coming of war was never viewed as the product of a dynamic that was largely military in nature. We all took if for granted that war was essentially the outcome of political conflict.[8]

But what does it mean to say that a war was "essentially the outcome of political conflict" and not an accident caused by a "dynamic that was largely military" in character? Certainly the "test" used by the historians cited above to asses the "political conflict theory" and criticize the "accidental war theory" is inadequate. In each of their works, the historians have an exceedingly narrow definition of accident in mind. For them, the simple fact that a choice or a decision to use military force was made implies that some degree of intent existed and that the war was therefore not accidental. One should note the language of soft rational choice at play here. Blainey, for example, argues that "there can be no war unless at least two nations prefer war to peace."[9] Howard refers to "a deliberate and carefully considered act;" Brodie finds statesmen seeing where the diplomatic "moves" are taking them; and Luard states that war has always been "the deliberate intention" of one party "at the time when war broke out" in the discussions quoted above.

This definition of a "non-accidental" war -- that someone "decided" to initiate the use of force -- is highly misleading. Indeed, both accidental acts and deliberate actions usually involved some sort of decision. The point can perhaps best be made through the use of an analogy.

We all recognize that there are such things as automobile accidents. Yet, very few car crashes would be automobile "accidents" by the historians' logic since individuals "decide" or "choose" to steer their cars into other objects. Drivers "prefer" to veer to the left, instead of the right. They make a "deliberate" decision to switch lanes when a car is next to them. They "see" that they have "moved" into incoming traffic. They "intend" to enter the expressway, not knowing that it is a one-way ramp going in the opposite direction.

Individuals may still make decisions, and may still have their hands on the steering wheel, but they are involved in automobile accidents nonetheless. To continue the analogy, three pathways to an accidental war can be usefully compared to a kind of an automobile accidents: accidents can be caused by false warnings or information, by unauthorized activities, or by loss of control. In the body of this essay, each of these accident "scenarios" will be examined in some detail.

What does it mean, from a social science perspective, to call a war accidental? For a conflict to be considered an accidental war, there would have to be some activity or incident inside the military machine, without which war would not have occurred. It is not enough therefore to show that some military accident occurred and that it was the proximate cause of the outbreak of war; one must also argue that the war would not have occurred anyway. This obviously places the scholar squarely into the problematic world of counterfactuals, but there is little alternative to such thought experiments if we seek to understand whether a particular factor played "a very marginal role" or an essential role in causing any specific historical event.[10]

To make reasonable judgements in such matters it is essential, in my view, to avoid the common "fallacy of overdetermination." Looking backwards at historical events, it is always tempting to underestimate the importance of the immediate causes of a war and argue that the likelihood of conflict was so high that the war would have broken out sooner or later even without the specific incident that set it off. If taken too far, however, this tendency eliminates the role of contingency in history and diminishes our ability to perceive the alternative pathways that were present to historical actors.

The point is perhaps best made through a counterfactual about the Cold War. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, a bizarre false warning incident in the U.S. radar systems facing Cuba led officers at the North American Air Defense Command to believe that the U.S. was under attack and that a nuclear weapon was about to go off in Florida.[11] Now imagine the counterfactual event that this false warning was reported and believed by U.S. leaders and resulted in a U.S. nuclear "retaliation" against the Russians. How would future historians have seen the causes of World War III? One can easily imagine arguments stressing that the war between the U.S. and the USSR was inevitable. War was overdetermined: given the deep political hostility of the two superpowers, the conflicting ideology, the escalating arms race, nuclear war would have occurred eventually. If not during that specific crisis over Cuba, then over the next one in Berlin, or the Middle East, or Korea. From that perspective, focusing on this particular accidental event as a cause of war would be seen as misleading. Yet, we all now know, of course that a nuclear war was neither inevitable nor overdetermined during the Cold War.

Has there ever been an accidental war? In each brief case study offered below, I will first discuss the type of "accident" that occurred. I will then assess the likelihood that war would not have occurred had not that specific military incident taken place.

Scenario #1: False Warnings or Faulty Information

The political authorities who decide whether or not to go to war, must make the choices based upon warnings and information provided to them by others. Sometimes this information is false. If the county road crew placed the wrong signs on the expressway ramp, leading drivers to enter the road in the wrong direction, an accident would occur despite the driver having the "intent" to drive as he did. Similarly, a statesman who made a calculated decision to "retaliate" or "initiate" a conflict after having received inaccurate information that an adversary had already started or was about to start combat operations, would be launching an accidental war based on a false warning.

At a tactical level, it is clear that false warnings can precipitate accidental attacks and individual skirmishes, through a mistaken belief that the other side has fired or is about to fire first. The 1987 Vincennes Incident is a prominent example of an accidental attack and the Battle of Wounded Knee is a famous case of a false warning producing an accidental skirmish.[12] But such incidents, however tragic, are not wars. Has there ever been a war that was caused by a such false warning events?

The Seven Years War in North America

Perhaps the best example of a major war caused by false warning incidents is the Seven Years War in North America, commonly (but inaccurately) known in the United States as "the French and Indian War."[13] Many historians have traditionally viewed the French and Indian War of 1755 as the inevitable result of British and French imperial rivalries on the North American continent, with the immediate political issue at stake being the ownership of the Ohio Valley. More recent historical research, however, has shown that the British and French governments did not place sufficient value on the Ohio Valley so as to intend to fight a major war over the territory. (Indeed, in the 1748 Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, the French and British had not cared enough about the Ohio territory to even mention it.[14]) Instead, the war was the result of a set of false warnings to the government in London that the French had encroached upon British colonial territory and thereby threatened the security of the colonial communities.

Patrice Higonnet's important 1968 study provided the first sustained argument that the conflict was an accidental war:

No one wanted to fight this war. It would never have occurred if, in their sincere efforts to resolve it, the French and the British governments had not inadvertently magnified its insignificant original cause into a wider conflict. The coming of the Seven Years' War owes more to diplomatic misconception efficiently achieved than to `the course of history.'[15]

Three specific false warning incidents sparked the war. First, starting in 1753, Virginia Governor Robert Dinwiddie repeatedly sent reports to London and to other British colonial governors that the French had encroached directly onto British claimed land and appeared to be planning an attack on Virginia. In June 1753, he wrote an official letter to the British Board of Trade (the body that oversaw the colonial governments at the time) falsely claiming that ongoing French excursions into the Ohio valley were part of "an impending French invasion" of the British colonies.[16] Second, the fears produced by this warning were compounded by the claims of the Earl of Halifax, head of the Board of Trade, when he reported on Dinwiddie's letter to the cabinet in London in August 1753. Halifax claimed that the French had moved into territory "not more that 200 to 250 miles from the Sea Coast," including area inside Pennsylvania territory, which had resulted in "Your Majesty's subjects having abandoned their settlements in a great Panick."[17] (In reality, no English settlements had been abandoned and, indeed, Virginian colonialists were so unenthusiastic about the prospects of fighting the French over minor forts on lands far from their settlements that Dinwiddie later had severe difficulties recruiting colonial soldiers for military operations there.[18]) Given this information, the London cabinet authorized Dinwiddie to "repel Force by Force" within "the undoubted limits of His Majesty's Dominions," which Dinwiddie interpreted to mean anywhere in the Ohio Valley, eventually sending a small detachment of troops under the command of George Washington who initiated a skirmish with a small French and Indian force and retreated to his new base camp, Fort Necessity.[19]

Fort Necessity was attacked and captured by the French on July 4, 1754. In the mean time, a third false warning incident occurred in Massachusetts territory, which appeared to be independent confirmation of French intent to invade the British colonies. In April 1754, Massachusetts Governor William Shirley reported to London that the French had made a fort or a settlement on the Kennebec River, which was clearly inside British colonial territory. This too was painted as a direct threat to the security of the colonies: if the French are permitted to stay, Shirley wrote, "there may be a Danger of their soon becoming Masters of the whole River Kennebeck; which Event would prove destructive to His Majesty's Subjects within this Province, and greatly Affect the Security of his Territories within the other Colonies of New England."[20] Although this report turned out to be completely inaccurate, as the Massachusetts' soldiers found out when they eventually reached the site of the non-existent French settlement, the British cabinet and the Duke of Newcastle resolved upon receiving Shirley's letter and the report of the fall of Fort Necessity, to take immediate military actions against all French forces in North America. British regulars were therefore dispatched to the American colonies in September 1754; the French and Indian War had begun.

In the final analysis, what was the causal effect of these false warning incidents? Given their conflicts of interest concerning the balance of power in Europe at the time, it is certainly possible that a war between the French and British would have occurred anyway in the 1750s, without these events in North America. It is also possible, however, that even in the event of a military conflict between the two powers in Europe, war in North America could have been avoided altogether or severely limited between the colonial territories. What appears clear is that in 1753 neither London nor Paris sought to take complete control over the Ohio Valley. Without these false warning incidents, leading to the major war in 1754, the eventual division of the North America continent between France and Great Britain would have been settled by a significantly different set of negotiations and conflicts.

Scenario #2: Unauthorized Acts

Military forces are large and complex organizations, in which a significant degree of decentralized decision-making is inevitably involved. Decisions by subordinate individuals, if not authorized, can produce accidents from the perspective of the higher authority. If one is driving down a crowded highway and one's five year old son grabs the wheel to watch the car bump the pretty yellow bus on the outside lane, the resulting crash would be an accident from the driver's perspective even though the child "intended" to turn the wheel. Similarly, if an unauthorized action by a subordinate military commander caused a war, it would be an accidental war from the perspective of the central authorities.

In the fog of war, many individual battles are started by unauthorized acts. This is inevitable given the decentralized nature of military combat. But have their been wars caused by such acts?

The Japanese Invasion of Manchuria

The 1931 Manchurian Incident, in which Japanese Kwantung Army units attacked Chinese forces in Mukden and then conquered all of Manchuria is perhaps the most clear-cut historical example of unauthorized activities by military officers causing a war which was unintended and therefore "accidental" from the perspective of the central political authorities. Serious disagreements between senior military officers and leading civilian official over policy in Manchuria existed in the late 1920s, as Japanese officers often expressed the desire to take direct military control over the territory and Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi consistently opposed such action. The willingness of the military to act in an unauthorized manner was heightened, however, by the Imperial cabinet's approval of the London Naval Treaty in April 1930, against the strong opposition of the Navy and Army General Staffs.[21] In early 1931, senior officers in the Kwantung Army feared that the Tokyo government might reach a negotiated settlement concerning rights in Manchuria with the Chinese Government and decided to take matters into their own hands, "even if it means flouting the mother country."[22] Secret contingency plans for a military conquest of Manchuria were drafted: Because the Kwantung Army was outnumbered by Chinese forces in the territory, the plans called for an overnight take-over of key areas of the south, after a manufactured bomb incident on the Mukden railroad provided an excuse for such aggression, to be followed by rapid offensive operations in the north.[23]

In the summer of 1931, government officials in Tokyo got wind of the plan. The imperial court and elder statesmen urged caution and the Army General Staff sent a senior officer to Manchuria to warn the Kwantung officers their against taking such actions. On the night he arrived, however, the Japanese Kwangtung Army took over the city of Mukden, ostensibly to protect the railroad facilities after an explosion there, and took advantage of the resulting fighting to attack Chinese military units through out Manchuria.

There is a virtual consensus in the historical literature that neither the initial Mukden incident nor the rapid expansion of the conflict were authorized by the senior members of the Tokyo government, who repeatedly sought to bring an end to the campaign in Manchuria against the Chinese forces.[24] According to Akira Iriye, Kwantung "staff officers frequently fabricated crises, accumulated faits accomplis without obtaining prior endorsement from Tokyo, and privately complained of the supreme command's attitude."[25] Indeed, defiance of Tokyo's wishes went beyond ordering unauthorized infantry assaults and bombing attacks; senior Kwantung Army officers were even rumored at the time to have boasted that they would declare an independent Manchuria and use it as a base for a coup-d'etat against the Tokyo government, if their efforts to conquer the territory were stymied by the central authorities.[26]

In short, while the war in Manchuria was "intentional" from the perspective of the senior officers of the Kwangtung Army, it was clearly "inadvertent or accidental" from the perspective of the Japanese government in Tokyo.[27] Without the unauthorized actions of the Kwangtung Army, it is likely, though by no means certain, that the war would have been avoided. The central government in Tokyo had no intent to initiate direct military conflict with China at that time, had strong incentives to avoid the resulting political conflict with the international community over Manchuria, and had entered serious negotiations over control of Manchuria. The fact that the leaders of the Kwantung Army started the Mukden incident precisely because they feared that these negotiations would produce a peaceful compromise over Manchuria is the best evidence that the war could have been avoided.

Scenario #3: Loss of Control

Many automobile accidents, and by analogy many concerns about accidental war, fall under a third general category: the "loss of control" scenario in which individuals take a risky action, threatening, but not intending, to produce collision, but that is what occurs when the individual "loses control" of the automobile. Imagine two drivers arriving at an intersection at the same time. Both have an interest in crossing as quickly as possible and both therefore try to signal the other that they are going first by immediately moving into the intersection. Both drivers are jockeying for position: although neither intends for there to be an accident, both consciously raise the risks of a crash by continuing to move forward in an attempt to convince the other driver that he or she should slow down and stop first. Once this process begins, however, it is certainly possible that one or both of them will not stop in time. Perhaps one driver's foot slips off the steering wheel, or there is failure in the brake peddle, or both step on the accelerator at the same time. Neither driver intended to cause an accident, although both accepted, indeed deliberately created, some risk of a crash when they entered the intersection.

Although variants of this "loss of control" scenario are often seen in the theoretical and emperical literature concerning "games of chicken " or "brinkmanship" in international crises, assessing whether any war that results from such a process should be labeled as an accidental war is a complex matter. Just as there can be numerous reasons why drivers may fail to stop busy intersections, there may be many reasons why statesmen fail to avoid a war in a crisis. Different cases can therefore differ significantly in the degree to which even an unintended "collision" should be considered accidental in nature. U.S. tort law takes this into account by requiring that an assessment be made concerning whether the driver was driving recklessly or reasonably when courts assign responsibility for "unintended accidents." The degree of negligence, not original intent of the actor, is the issue at stake: a driver, for example, who had an unanticipated epileptic seizure or whose brake pads unexpectedly blew out while in the intersection, is not held responsible for a resulting accident; while, in contrast, the driver who did not care whether he or she hit another car, or was drunk, or knowingly drove a car with no brakes into the intersection would be responsible for the crash.[28]

A similar kind of assessment is necessary when determining the degree to which a war, which was preceded by a statesman's "loss of control" over his military machine in a crisis, should be conceived of as an "accidental" war. This point has not been adequately recognized in the political science literature on "inadvertent escalation" and "inadvertent war." Alexander George, for example, defines an inadvertent war as "a war that is authorized during the course of a crisis, even though at the onset of the crisis central decision makers did not want or expect a war."[29] This definition would therefore include both "deliberate war" cases in which decision makers changed their positions and actively sought war in a crisis, as well as more "accidental" cases in which statesmen felt forced to accept war reluctantly due to their inability to control events. Loss of control scenarios are, therefore, best conceived of as existing along a continuum; some unwanted or unexpected wars are not accidental or inadvertent in nature, others are much more so. At one extreme is the least accidental or inadvertent case in which the statesmen who instigated the crisis neither wanted nor expected war, but was perfectly willing to go to war if war was deemed necessary to achieve his political objectives. In the middle of the continuum would be a crisis in which a statesman began to achieve a limited objective short of war, but unexpectedly accepted war as an alternative outcome after his actions inadvertantly produced changes the strategic situation during the crisis itself. At the other extreme, the most accidental case would be a crisis in which a statesman tried to back down when confronted with a strong possibility of war, but was not able to do so successfully because of loss of control over his state's actions. (See Figure 1-1.) This argument is best illustrated by contrasting three international conflicts that range across this continuum of "loss of control" scenarios: Hitler's war against Poland in August 1939; the June 1967 Six-Day War in the Middle East; and the First World War in 1914.

Non-Accidental Accidents: A.J.P. Taylor and WWII

To be added.

Nasser and the June 1967 War

Many studies of the origins of the June 1967 war in the Middle East focus on the logic of the Israeli decision to launch a preemptive first strike. For many years preceding the crisis, Israel had publicly declared that any closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping would be a causus belli and after a series of provocative actions -- Egypt's military mobilization and deployment of forces to the Sinai peninsula on May 14, the expulsion of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) from the peninsula on May 18, and finally, the closing of the Straits of Tiran on May 23 -- decision makers in Tel Aviv became convinced that an Arab attack was ultimately unavoidable, that military action must be taken to restore the credibility of Israeli deterrent threats, and that a preemptive air strike offered the best chance of military success.[30] Focusing on Israel's final decision, however, fails to answer the more intriguing and important question: why did Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser take these extremely provocative actions which led to the Israeli preemptive attack?

Three basic interpretations of Nasser's actions exist: they can be seen as 1) part of a premeditated plan to precipitate war with Israel; 2) as a failure of rational deterrence due to the lack of credibility and strength in Israeli retaliatory threats; or 3) as the result of crisis actions that spun out of control due to Nasser's inability to manage military and diplomatic operations. Each interpretation will be examined in turn.[31]

First, it is at least theoretically possible that Nasser deliberately planned for a major war with Israel from the start of 1967: he took these provocative steps believing that they would likely lead to war and he deliberately goaded Israel into striking first in order to minimize the risk that the U.S. would intervene in the resulting conflict. There is, however, scant evidence to support such a premeditated war theory. Nasser's own testimony on the subject -- he claimed in the May 22nd speech that closed the Straits of Tiran, for example, that "we had no plan [for war] before May 13 because we believed that Israel would not dare attack any Arab country" -- is supported by all the accounts of other participants and is widely held by scholars to be an accurate reflection of his orginal intentions.[32] Additional evidence against the premeditated war theory is the fact that the Egyptian military budget was significantly reduced in 1966 and 1967, and that one-third of the Egyptian army was stationed overseas in the intervention force in Yemen at the time, highly unlikely acts if Nasser had been planning for a war with Israel in June 1967.[33] The second interpretation envisions the June 1967 war as a classic failure of rational deterrence due to Nasser's underestimation of Israeli resolve to follow its threats to attack if the Straits of Tiran were closed. Nadav Safran's major study concludes, for example, that "the most fundamental reason for Nasser's decision to proclaim the blockade was the weakness manifested by Israel in response to his previous moves." Prime Minister Levi Eshkol's efforts during the crisis to reassure Nasser that Israel was not planning to attack either Syria or Egypt projected an "appeasement mood," Safran argues, and "encouraged Nasser to believe that Israel under its current leadership might not fight." As evidence, Safran cites Nasser's post-war speech in which he said (according to Safran) "that he estimated that the chances of war as a result of the closure of the Gulf at 50 percent - not more."[34] Safran thus concludes that "given this low estimate of the chances that Israel would respond with war, the closing of the Gulf had great appeal to Nasser."[35] The problem with this explanation is that significant evidence exists suggesting that, on the contrary, Nasser believed that an Israeli attack was highly likely if the Egyptians closed the Straits of Tiran. Although participants in the crucial May 22 meeting in which Nasser ordered the blockade differ on precisely what he said his estimates of war were at the time, the majority state that Nasser argued that it was highly likely that ISrael would follow its causis belli statements. Hussein al-Shafi `i, for example, wrote that Nasser said the blockade would "increase the expectation of military confrontation form 80 percent to 100 percent."[36] Anwar Sadat's memoirs similarly recalled that Nasser told his advisers: "Now with our concentrations in the Sinai, the chances of war are fifty-fifty. But if we closed the Strait, war will be a one-hundred percent certainty."[37] In addition, Nasser himself told the Arab Trade Union Council on May 26, 1967 that "taking over Sharm el-Sheikh meant confrontation with Israel. Taking such action also meant that we were ready to enter a general war with Israel." This evidence strongly suggests that Nasser did not believe that an Israeli attack was unlikely after the Straits were closed; the central problem was therefore not that the Israeli threat to retaliate lacked credibility.

The third explanation emphasizes psychological theory, seeing Nasser's decisions as determined by motivated biases: he miscalculated the likelihood of war, believing that it was low because he had strong incentives to believe so. This wishful thinking argument is also problematic, however, given what we know about Nasser's estimates. Alternative views are that the believed that Egypt would win because he needed to believe that.[38] The problem with the second interpretation, emphasizing psychological distortions, is that it fails to explain why so many in Egypt had similar assessments of the military situation. It does, however, accord with accounts of what Nasser said both publicly and privately, accepting the risk of war but also believing that it was better to let Israel strike first, without the Us that to have Egypt strike first and face the U.S. too. But what we do not know is whether such confident statements reflect Nasser;s true assessment (supporting Lebow) or his efforts to shore up the moral of his soldiers (and himself) in a situation from which he felt he could not safely extradite himself. Also note possibility of another kind of test: If Nasser says the same thing (we will win etc.) publicly and privately, and consistently, this suggests true belief...if he is inconsistent, it may reflect efforts to shore up the confidence of others.

This leads to a fourth interpretation: that the war as an accident. third explanation: Nasser sent troops into the Sinai to deter Israel from attacking Syria and ordered a limited withdrawal of the UNEF to enhance the credibility of his threat. He did not want the UNEF to pull out of Gaza or Shaim al Shieck. Indeed, he specifically tried to minimize that chance. He did not know how inflexible the UN machine would prove to be.

Once he put them there, however, he could not back down without suffering great loss of prestige in the Arab world and possible loss of power at home. It was like the Game of Chicken: tried to be careful (the UNEF case is clear and even tried to accept the UN sponsored delay on the Straits confrontation ...see Draper page 63)

Like teenager who enters intersection...in game of chicken. He could not back down once his bluff was called (rather unintentionally by U Thant). The organizational component is 1) the Egyptian failure to make clear that they were only asking for a very limited redeployment, which might have led to a more compromising UN position and 2) a more flexible U Thant position (Nasser misestimated his flexibility) In short, this is an accident the way James Dean has an accident in Rebel Without a Cause. Once he enters into the Game of Chicken his reputation is at stake, which raises the costs of pulling back. This is still an accident, but only in this limited way, and one whose responsibility still falls on Nasser.

Give scenario: got into intersection to deter car; then had to crash because bluff was called (could not back down to UN key...) Accepted crash, did not want it. The comments were for domestic audiences. etc/

The Mixed Case of World War I

The First World War is perhaps the most commonly-cited example by political scientists of an "accidental war" in the pre-nuclear era. A large number of articles and books have analyzed the events of the July 1914 crisis and a continuing debate has developed concerning the degree to which German military operational plans, especially the need to mobilize and strike promptly, caused Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg to lose control of the crisis, leading to a war which he had hoped to avoid once it became clear that Great Britain would enter the war on the side of France and Russia.

Any serious discussion of accidental war must take into account Marc Trachtenberg's detailed critique of the "inadvertent war" theory of the causes of the First World War. "The most remarkable thing about all these claims that support the conclusion about events moving `out of control' in 1914 is how little basis in fact they actually have," Trachtenberg concludes.[39] Yet Trachtenberg is only half right. One common argument made by political scientists about World War I as an accidental war -- the "failure to turn the trains around" story -- is simply not accurate. The other argument, however -- that military pressures prevented the "Halt in Belgrade" plan from succeeding -- is more accurate. Each will be discussed in turn.

Stopping the Trains

A common view of the origins of World War I stresses that it was an accidental war because of the rigidity of the Schlieffen Plan, which prevented the German military from fighting against Russia only. This view is based almost entirely upon the following story. On August 1, after German mobilization had begun, the Berlin government received a message from their ambassador in London which suggested that Great Britain would remain neutral, and might guarantee French neutrality, if Germany refrained from attacking France and limited the war to an eastern campaign against Russia. Kaiser William was elated at the news, ordered champagne, and told General von Moltke, according to Moltke's memoirs, that Germany should "simply deploy in the east with the whole army" and attack Russia:

I assured His Majesty that this was not possible. The deployment of an army of a million men was not a matter of improvisation. It was a product of a whole years work and, once worked out, could not be changed. If His Majesty insisted on leading the whole army eastwards, he would not have an army ready to strike, he would have a confused mass of disorderly armed men without commissariat.[40]

According to the commonly repeated version of the story, the Kaiser reluctantly had to back down when confronted with the stunning rigidity of the German war plan. Richard Ned Lebow's version is typical: "Moltke, supported by the other members of the general staff, held firm and the Kaiser relented."[41] Many other political scientists have argued that it was Moltke's unwillingness to change the rigid German mobilization plans that produce an inadvertent war, not sought by the Kaiser.[42] Joseph Nye notes, for example, that despite Moltke's claims, "after the war, General von Staab of the railway division of the German army admitted that it might have been possible after all to have altered the mobilization schedules successfully." Nye, therefore concludes, that "had the Kaiser known that and insisted, there might have been a one-front war."[43] Henry Kissinger similarly argues that the Kaiser had built "a military doomsday machine," insisting that the German army's rigid plans caused the conflict because they prevented William "from mobilizing only against Russia."[44]

Yet the story as told here is simply wrong in the final, and most critical, detail. It was Moltke who relented, not the Kaiser. As Moltke's memoirs make clear, William gave direct orders that no German troops attack across the borders in the west and permitted the planned mobilization there to continue only after being informed that the army, after full mobilization the west, could wheel around and move east toward Russia if necessary.[45] Moreover, the whole episode was of little consequence. Within hours, Kaiser William received a telegram from King George stating that Grey's message had somehow reflected "some misunderstanding:" Great Britain could not guarantee French neutrality if war broke out between Germany and Russia and would not, itself, likely remain uninvolved if France was attacked.[46] William therefore immediately summoned Moltke, handed him King George's telegram, and said, "now you can do as you will."[47]

In short, the episode in no way shows that war was an accident, in the sense of being caused by military plans forcing the hands of the politicians.

Moltke and the Austrian Rejection of the Halt in Belgrade Plan

A second explanation for WWI as an accidental war, however, is more complex and more accurate. It focuses on the causes of the failure of Bethmann-Hollweg on July 30th to get the Austrians to stop their planned large-scale attack on Serbia and, instead, accept a limited operation, attacking and taking Belgrade. The "Halt in Belgrade" plan was independently devised by both Sir Edward Grey, and Kaiser William. Again, Trachtenberg is the strongest analysis, but on this point he is wrong. Bethmann originally did not support the idea, for example telling the Austrians to agree to discuss it only to avoid impressions of belligerence. On July , however, after Bethmann became convinced that England was likely to enter the war, he strongly urged the government in Vienna to accept the Halt in Belgrade plan to avoid what now would clearly be a world war. Thus, at 2:55am on July 30th he informed the Austrians that because England would join the Triple Entente, it was imperative that Vienna accept a settlement:

As a result we stand, in case Austria refuses all mediation, before a conflagration in which England will be against us; Italy and Roumania to all appearances will not go with us, and we two shall be opposed to four Great Powers. On Germany, thanks to England's opposition, the principal burden of the fight would fall. Austria's political prestige, the honour of her arms, as well as her just claims against Serbia, could all be amply satisfied by the occupation of Belgrade or of other places. She would be strengthening her status in the Balkans as well as in relation to Russia by the humiliation of Serbia. Under these circumstances we must urgently and impressively suggest to the consideration of the Vienna Cabinet the acceptance of mediation on the above-mentioned honourable conditions. The responsibility for the consequences that would otherwise follow would be an uncommonly heavy one both for Austria and for us.[48]

A few minutes later Bethmann sent a second telegram to Vienna to reenforce the message urging them to halt at Belgrade: "We are, of course, ready to fulfil the obligations of our alliance, but we must decline to be drawn wantonly into a world conflagration by Vienna, without having any regard paid to our counsel.[49] Throughout the day, Bethmann continued to pressure the Austrians, finally cabling Vienna at 9pm to "urgently advise that Austria accept the Grey proposal, which preserves her status for her in every way."[50]

General von Moltke, however, opposed the Halt in Belgrade plan and at 2pm on July 30th sent for the Austrian military attache and undercut Bethmann's efforts. The message that von Moltke sent to Vienna urged immediate mobilization and the rejection of the Halt in Belgrade plan:

Moltke says he would regard the situation as critical unless the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy at once mobilizes against Russia. Russian publication of the order to mobilize creates necessity for counter-measures on part of Austria-Hungary, this to be indicated in the public proclamation. This would give the casus foederis for Germany. Bring about honorable arrangement with Italy by assurances of compensation to keep Italy in the war on side of Triple Alliance, be sure to leave no troops on the Italian frontier. Reject renewed English demarche for maintenance of peace. Last means of preserving Austria-Hungary is to fight out (durchhalten) a European war. Germany with you unconditionally.[51]

Von Moltke then reenforced this message, by sending another directly to Conrad again urging rejection of the compromise plan:

Stand firm against (durchhalten) Russian mobilization. Austria-Hungary must be preserved, mobilize at once against Russia, Germany will mobilize.[52]

The Vienna government was thus getting strongly conflicting advice. As Berchtold exclaimed when he read both messages on the morning of July 31st, "Who actually rules in Berlin, Bethmann or Moltke?"[53] The Vienna government, thus reenforced against the Halt in Belgrade, therefore rejected the compromise plan and opted for total mobilization and war.

Trachtenberg emphatically rejects the idea that the incident shows that war was inadvertent, making two arguments against it. First, he insists that there is no good proof that "Moltke was overstepping his own authority, since the Kaiser may have authorized his messages to the Austrians."[54] Second, he insists that Moltke's action "could hardly be viewed as a cause of war:" it had "no practical effect" since the messages were submitted to the Austrian leaders on the morning of July 31 "after the Austrian decision for general mobilization had been made."[55]

Trachtenberg is on shaky ground with both arguments. First, while there is no direct evidence, one way or the other, on whether the Kaiser even knew of Moltke's actions, there is one very strong indirect piece of evidence that suggests that he had not approved Moltke's bellicose messages to Vienna.[56] William himself sent a message to Emperor Franz Joseph at 7:15pm on July 30th urging that he accept the Halt in Belgrade proposal "to the effect that, after occupying Belgrade or other places, Austria should make known her terms."[57] The existence of this message, sent after Moltke's messages urging the opposite, seriously undercuts the notion that the Kaiser might have secretly authorized Moltke's efforts to get Austria to reject the compromise plan.

Second, Trachtenberg is wrong to argue that the Austrian government had already decided to reject the Halt in Belgrade plan prior to Moltke's intervention. What the leaders of the Vienna government had done on the evening of July 30th was make a tentative choice in favor of war, but they explicitly had to revisit the decision the next morning -- once the Imperial War Council including Count Stefan Tisza, the Hungarian Prime Minister, could be gathered together -- before submitting the military mobilization proclamation to the emperor for his final signature. It was in this context that Moltke's intervention had its effect, pushing the Austrians forward and encouraging them to ignore the frantic, last-minute pleas of Bethmann. Indeed, Berchtold referred to the Moltke messages when he began the crucial meeting with Conrad and Tisza on July 31:

I have sent for you because I had the impression that Germany was beating a retreat; but now I have the most reassuring pronouncement from responsible military quarters.[58]

It was only after this meeting in Vienna on the morning of July 31st that the final decision to reject Bethmann's Halt in Belgrade efforts was made. General Moltke had undercut Chancellor Bethmann's diplomacy on the brink of war. In this light, it is hard to disagree with L. C. F. Turner's assessment that "Moltke's intervention on the afternoon of 30 July constitutes one of the most significant developments in the constitutional history of the German empire, and foreshadows the military dictatorship of Hindenberg and Ludendorf in 1916-18."[59]

How should one assess this event? Perhaps the best accident analogy would one with a student driver being given very contradictory advice by two instructors. From Bethmann's perspective, the failure to stop the Austrian mobilization was an accident: he lost control of his military machine.

Does this mean that World War I was an accident. The answer depends on whether one believes that the growth in Russian military power after 1914 would have eliminated the perceived possibility of a successful German preventive war. Ironically, to the more one accepts the Fritz Fisher thesis that Germany sought to strike before the Russian buildup was completed in 1916, the more one can imagine a persistence of peace if war was avoided until that date.

Beyond the Nuclear Divide

NOTE TO READERS: MY DRAFT ENDS HERE.

In the final version, I plan to discuss how the nuclear revolution and the end of the Cold War influence the likelihood of accidental war. Add point re Airbags. Key variable: offensive plans (military) unauthorized use (military); and loss of control (civil-military ) etc.

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[1] Works on the "accidental" or "inadvertent war" in political science include: Alexander L. George (ed.) Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991); Richard Ned Lebow, Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987); Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993); Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961).

[2] Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: The Free Press, 1973), p. 249 and p. 144.

[3] Michael Howard, The Causes of War, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), p. 12.

[4] Bernard Brodie, "How Much is Enough? Guns versus Butter Revisited," California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, Lecture Series No. 56, August 1975, originally cited in Marc Trachtenberg, "The Past and Future of Arms Control," Daedalus, vol.120. no.1, (Winter 1991), p. 208. Trachtenberg adds that "my own sympathies are with Brodie's side of the argument. As a general rule, great wars do not break out because of forces generated from within the military sphere." Ibid.

[5] Evan Luard, War in International Society (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 232.

[6] Alexander George defines "accidental" war as one that starts because of unauthorized activities by individuals below the leadership level in the chain of command, and "inadvertent" war as one that was authorized during a crisis, even though leaders did not want or expect a war at the onset of the crisis. Of the three accidental war scenarios described below, according to this definition, wars caused by false warnings or loss of control incidents would be "inadvertent" wars and only unauthorized attacks would be "accidental." See George, Avoiding War, pp. 8-9.

[7] Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 207.

[8] Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. viii.

[9] Blainey, The Causes of War, p. 245 (emphasis added).

[10] James D. Fearon, "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science," World Politics vol. 43, no. 2 (January 1991) and Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin (eds.) Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics (forthcoming). Also see the discussion in Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 10-11 and pp. 77-78.

[11] For the details of this false warning incident and other "near accidents" during the Cuban crisis, see Sagan, The Limits of Safety, pp. 130-131.

[12] On the Vincennes Incident see Scott D. Sagan, "Rules of Engagement," Security Studies, vol. 1, no. 1 (Autumn 1991). On the Battle of Wounded Knee, see Robert M. Utley, The Indian Frontier of the American West 1846-1890 (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1984), p. 256-8 and Richard E. Jensen, R. Eli Paul, and John E. Carter, Eyewitness at Wounded Knee (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1991).

[13] As Ian Steele has stressed, the English colonialists utilized Indian allies as often and with as much effectiveness as did the French. See Ian K. Steele, Warpaths: Invasions of North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

[14] Patrice Louis-Rene Higonnet, "The Origins of the Seven Years' War," Journal of Modern History, vol. 40, no. 1 (March 1968) p. 60.

[15] Ibid, p. 58.

[16] In January 1954, Dinwiddie similarly informed the other governors that the French in the Ohio were "Invaders of British Property." Ibid, p. 63.

[17] Ibid, p. 64. Also, see, however, see T. R. Clayton, "The Duke of Newcastle, The Earl Of Halifax, and the American Origins of the Seven Years War," The Historical Journal, vol. 24, no. 3 (1981), pp. 571-603.

[18] See James Titus, The Old Dominion at War: Society, Politics and Warfare in Late Colonial Virginia (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), pp. 47-48 and pp. 59-61.

[19] Clayton, "The American Origins of the Seven Years' War," p. 584 and Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988), pp. 46-70.

[20] William Shirley to the Earl of Holderness, April 19, 1754, in Correspondence of William Shirley (New York: Macmillan, 1912), p. 53. Shirley also stressed other potential British interests in the region, beyond protecting the security of the New England colonies, noting that along the river there was "a sufficient Quantity of white Pines to Supply the Royal Navy for more than fifty years." Ibid, p. 60.

[21] W. G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism: 1894-1945 (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 190.

[22] The quote is from the January 1931 speech of Sada Kojiro to the Kwantung Army in Port Arthur, as quoted in Seki Hiroharu, "The Manchurian Incident," in James W. Morley (ed.) Japan Erupts: The London Naval Conference and the Manchurian Incident, 1928-1932 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), p. 165.

[23] Beasley, Japanese Imperialism, pp. 191-192.

[24] The best source on the escalation of the conflict is Shimade Toshihiko, "The Extension of Hostilities," in Morley (ed.) Japan Erupts, pp. 241-335.

[25] Akira Iriye, "Introduction," in Japan Erupts, p. 237.

[26] Mark R. Peattie, Ishiwara Kanji and Japan's Confrontation with the West (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 128, citing Sadako Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria: The Making of Japanese Foreign Policy, 1931-1932 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964, p. 94.

[27] Blainey states that this conflict in Manchuria should not be seen as being an accidental war, since "the war, while not intended by the Japanese government, was fully intended by the Japanese Kwangtung army; and the army by its defiance had become in effect the Japanese government in Manchuria." Blainey, The Causes of War, p. 144. This is, however, a tautological argument. If any individual or group who orders an attack is "in effect" the government of the state, then the possibility of an unauthorized war is eliminated by definition.

[28] The classic discussion is William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing, 1971, fourth ed.) pp. 139-187.

[29] George, Avoiding War, p. 8. In contrast, Lebow argues that "when loss of control leads to war...it does so because of the actions of subordinates which leaders are unaware or unable to prevent." Lebow, Nuclear Crisis Management, p. 75. Also see Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).

[30] See, for example, Nadav Safran, From War to War (New York: Pegasus, 1969); and Janice Gross Stein and Raymond Tanter Rational Decision Making: Israel's Security Choices, 1967 (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1980). A useful analysis of preemptive wars, including the June 1967 war, is Dan Reiter, "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen," International Security, vol. 20. no. 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 5-34.

[31] Maybe add something on why it is impossible to know for sure which interpretation is correct. Nasser never explained why and he said different thing to different people.

[32] Nasser's speech is quoted and analyzed in in Safran, From War to War, p. 272. A detailed discussion of this subject is L. Carl Brown, "Nasser and the June 1967 War: Plan or Improvisation?" in S. Seikaly, R. Baalbaki, and P. Dodd (eds.) Quest for Understanding (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1991), pp. 119-137. Also see Richard B. Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation in the Middle East (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 1993), pp. 41-44; Dan Schueftan, "Nasser's 1967 Policy Reconsidered," The Jerusalem Quarterly, No. 3, (Spring 1977), pp. 124-144; and Richard B. Parker (ed.) The Six-Day War: a Retrospective (Gainsville, FL: University Press of Florida, 1996).

[33] See Brown, "Nasser and the June 1967 War," p. 121.

[34] Safran, From War to War, p. 289. The July 23 speech is reproduced in Theodore Draper, Israel and World Politics (New York: Viking, 1968), pp. 238-244. It is not clear from the text of the speech, however, whether Nasser's statement about a 50% estimate of war refers to his view of the likelihood of war before he closed the straits or if he closed the straits.

[35] Safran, From War to War, pp. 288-289. Safran repeats the argument in Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 395-397. Also see Stein and Tanter, Rational Decision-Making, pp. 159-160; and John Orme, "Deterrence Failures: A Second Look," International Security vol. 11, no. 4 (Spring 1987), pp. 119-121.

[36] As quoted in Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation, p. 72.

[37] Anwar el-Sadat, In Search of Identity (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 172. Mohemmend Heikel, who apparently did not attend the meeting, however, later wrote that Nasser said the risk of war rose to 50 per cent if strait was closed. See Parker, The Politics of Miscalculation, p. 72.

[38] Lebow and Stein.

[39] Ibid, p. 99.

[40] Moltke's memoirs as quoted in Albertini, Origins of the First World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953), vol. 3, p. 172.

[41] Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crises (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 236.

[42] To be fair to political scientists, one should note that serious historians also have repeated the false ending to the incident. James Joll, for example, argues that the Kaiser "was obliged to learn the limits of his power (when) Moltke told him that this was impossible." James Joll, The Origins of the First World War (New York: Longman, 1992, 2nd ed.), p. 25. Also see Arden Bucholz Moltke, Schlieffen, and Prussian War Planning (Providence, RI: Berg, 1991), pp. 311-312 and Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army: 1640-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1955).

[43] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Understanding International Conflicts (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), p. 68.

[44] Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 216.

[45] See Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, pp. 58-59.

[46] Albertini, The Origins of the First World War, vol. 3, p. 176.

[47] Ibid, p. 177 quoting Moltke's memoirs. The "misunderstanding," however, was rooted in a momentary panic on Grey's part. See Ibid, pp. 380-386.

[48] Bethmann to Tschirschky, July 30, 1914, Document 395, Outbreak of the World War: German Documents Collected by Karl Kautsky (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), p. 344.

[49] D.D. 396, in Ibid, p. 345 (emphasis added). The seriousness of Bethmann's desire for the Halt in Belgrade is also seen in his private conversations. As he confided to Kurt Riezler on July 28, unless the Austrians made concessions, "(we) will be completely dragged in by Vienna. This I do not want even at the risk of being accused of cowardice." Reizler diary, August 15, 1914, as quoted in Konrad H. Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of Imperial Germany (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973). p. 170.

[50] D.D. 200, as quoted in Geiss, July 1914, p. 305. Bethmann told Goschen on July 31 "that he was pressing the button as hard as he could and that he was not sure whether [the] length to which he had gone in giving moderating advice to Vienna had not precipitated matters rather than otherwise." Goschen to Grey, July 30, 1914. BD no. 329, as quoted in Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor, p. 173.

[51] Albertini, Origins, vol. 2, p. 673 (emphasis added).

[52] Albertini, Origins, vol. 2, p. 673.

[53] Joll, The Origins of the First World War, p. 18.

[54] Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, p. 89.

[55] Ibid, p. 89. Here Trachtenberg is following Ritter, p.

[56] When directly asked, after the war, whether he had approved Moltke's message's to Conrad, Kaiser William pointedly declined to answer, presumably so as not to have to have to accuse Moltke of direct insubordination. See Albertini, The Origins of the First World War, vol. 3, pp. 12-13.

[57] DD 437, in German Documents, p. 371.

[58] Albertini, Origins, vol. 2, p. 674.

[59] L. C. F. Turner, "The Role of the General Staffs in July 1914," The Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. XI, no. 3, (December 1965), p. 316.

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