1AR



1AR Case --russia advAT: causes Russia expansion Russia is reactionary to western pressures—that’s 1AC Mearsheimer and hillison a few warrants:1] russia is an aging depopulating country trying to maintain defensive security2] ukraine wasn't revisionist - putin had said he didn't support invading until domestic turmoil convinced him the west was threatening the region3] nato worsense tensions - it's a mix of western countries bent on curbing influence, which russia views as wildly provocative —plan resolves by extracting US from nato and eliminating pressures for russia to react Block says Syria proves – that was in reaction to us involvement !! putin feared being crowded out by American military and reacted accordingly AT no security trap Yes war – the NATO security trap makes escalation of conflicts inevitable because it forces the US into border skermishes along Russian territory – they have to mediate disputes against Russia that involve neighboring countries in tension-prone regions —that’s 1AC Shifrinson— no unifiying efx – article 5 is escalates conflict by drawing in more actors AT Russia pockets the plan No link – russia wouldn’t seize territory – the block hasn’t named a region of eastern Europe where Russia would have reason to be aggressive – 1ac mearshimer says they’re pressued by US presence in the region to be aggressive Russia is defensive – their ev has a western bias but they’ve abided by i-law, and revisionism in Ukraine is exaggerated !!Elias G?tz 18. **Postdoctoral Researcher at the Uppsala Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies (UCRS), Uppsala University, Sweden. **Camille-Renaud Merlen, PhD Candidate in International Relations at Kent. “Russia and the question of world order.” European Politics and Society 11/15/2018. T&F. To begin with, there are a number of reasons to be sceptical about the ‘revanchist Russia’ perspective. First, it adopts an overly deterministic position, which negates the open-ended character of history by underlining its predetermined course through certain ‘iron laws’ and the supposedly unchanging ‘essence’ of Russia. In so doing, this perspective effectively denies the role of individual agency: Whoever the leader is, or whatever the regime may be, Russians are subordinate to the quest for imperial greatness. This is a view that incidentally dovetails with that of extreme Russian nationalists, who see Russian history in similar holistic terms of a ‘single stream’ that connects Ivan IV, Peter the Great, Stalin, and Putin. However, Russia has experienced tremendous upheavals throughout history that dramatically changed its society and its relations with the outside world. This happened often at the instigation of one or a few individuals. Both the beginning and the end of the Soviet Union, for example, serve as powerful reminders of the role agency plays in affecting Moscow’s internal and external affairs. Furthermore, essentialist claims about Russian identity do not offer much insight into the dynamics of Moscow’s approach to the liberal international order, which has significantly fluctuated over time (Tsygankov, 2016). Second, Russia’s revisionist behaviour should not be exaggerated. Its intervention in Ukraine has remained relatively limited, as has its military activity in other post-Soviet states (G?tz, 2016, p. 9). In fact, the scope of Russia’s revanchist aims is a matter of debate. It is doubtful whether Moscow has a blueprint for an alternative international order with different norms and principles than the current one. Nor does its promotion of conservative authoritarianism seem to constitute a genuine agenda. As Lewis (2016) writes, ‘the export of conservative social and political values (…) has so far not developed into a coherent campaign, but remains a rather ad hoc and inchoate critique by Russian politicians of “multiculturalism”, LGBT rights and “political correctness” in Europe.’ Furthermore, the ‘revanchist Russia’ perspective is unable to account for the numerous instances in which Moscow has adhered to the norms, rules, and institutions that are associated with the existing liberal order. While it might be a stretch to describe Moscow as a consistent defender of multilateralism (Lo, 2015), it has supported frameworks such as the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. It also acceded to the World Trade Organization in 2012 – after 19 years of talks – and continues to be a member of the European Court of Human Rights. The liberal goals and supranational methods of these institutions hardly fit with a revisionist imperial agenda. Third, Moscow’s behaviour is much more in line with that of an ordinary great power than the ‘revanchist Russia’ perspective makes it out to be. For one thing, Russia is by no means unique in its quest to establish a zone of influence in its near neighbourhood. As Carpenter (2017, January 19) points out, Russia is hardly the only country to regard the [sphere of influence] concept as important for its security. Or do U.S. officials believe that Chinese actions in the South China Sea, Turkey’s policies towards Iraq and Syria, and Saudi Arabia’s actions in Bahrain and Yemen do not involve such a consideration? For another, interference in the domestic affairs of other states is something of a habit for great powers. Whether they are democratic or authoritarian does not seem to make a difference in this regard. The United States, for example, has a long track record of meddling in the internal affairs and electoral processes of other countries (Levin, 2016). It is therefore unlikely that a more democratic Russia will substantially change its key foreign policy objectives and activities. Furthermore, the discrediting of Russian concerns over NATO enlargement as an ‘imagined’ threat, rather than a ‘real’ one, misses the mark. Any international relations scholar worth their salt knows that uncertainty about others’ intentions is central to security dilemma dynamics. Thus, Moscow’s fears should not be brushed aside as idiosyncratic Russian paranoia. In conclusion, it seems fair to say that the ‘revanchist Russia’ perspective faces an array of explanatory challenges and shortcomings. AT kagan Kagan’s wrong – it’s abt Obama-era foreing policy and assumes Russia is prestige seeking – prefer hullison – it accounts for historical dynamics and says Russia is solely reactive to western expansion --leadership advAT heg sustainableHeg is unsustainable – that’s 1AC carpenter – it says the only way forward is a more restrained global grand strategy – it’s game over when the block’s only evidence is too old to account for trump and his changes to the global world order --there’s no fill in – the block says china is expansionist – obvi doesn’t stop US defenses from responding to them AT entanglement disprovenNon responsive – this doesn’t prove deterrence works best – either way it’s not offense for them – only a risk the plan makes defense posyure better by strengthening EU defense systems AT US firm nowOnly ev is from Obama admin – clearly not applicable now --but that’s only triggered conflict, Russia has gotten into conflicts and adventured abroved bc their motivated by the US AT trump tough on RussiaHe’s clearly not – elections, Taliban bounty and more prove this admin is not checking back on Russia – but either way squo proves it’s not effective – 1ac hillison says tensions are spilling over --europeKicking it – no offense – interfighting turn is nuq bc that’s the squo CMR DA Top Case turns the disad—hegemonic collapse caused by overstretch would dramatically decrease CMR—it’d be Vietnam all over again but worse2AC 1 – turn Breaking CMR norms is GOOD – that’s lee – trump’s tanked them now by trashing the DOD so breaking norms acts as an alarm bell to signal that something is amiss – only undermining norms provides space for new ones to be re-built [the block says trump’s with nato now – it’s non responsive – he’s thrashed top military brass which shows a comparatively larger singnal abt CMR AND foreign policy isn’t as important to the public’s perception as domestic actions 2AC 2 – NUQ Trump’s already triggered the link – that’s boot – he’s trashed top generals and wont listen to the pentagon which means CMR writ large is tanked They said trump’s lowering tension now – their ev just says he stuck to the script at the west point graduation – we have several thumpers with bigger magnitude:1] he dumped on mattis for mishandling the DOD early in his admin2] he did nothing after hearing Russia paid the Taliban to kill soliders 3] he ordered the military to use force against protestors Saideman, Carleton University Professor, 6-3-20(Stephen, “CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS ARE BROKEN,” accessed 6-4-20, ) JFNMonday, June 1, 2020, was perhaps not the worst day in American civil-military relations. The US Army didn’t kill, capture or torture citizens (see Lindsay Cohn’s article for some history and the legalities of all of this). But because the events of the day (see below), especially the use of force to create a photo op, broke so many norms of American civil-military relations, it was perhaps the worst day for the crucial relationship since veterans marched on Washington during the Great Depression. Here’s where things have gone very wrong: Secretary of Defense Mark Esper—the person with responsibility for managing the civil-military relationship, the most senior civilian focused on defense—referred to Minneapolis as a “battlespace.” That only makes sense if American citizens are the adversary. It was an awful, awful thing to say, because it means that the US military, regulars, or National Guard are at war with civilians. Esper has tried to walk back his statement, but the damage has been done. Senators and Representatives on the respective Armed Services committees play a key role in overseeing the armed forces. One of the key players on the Senate Armed Services Committee, Tom Cotton, called on the US regular troops to enter the fray, holding back nothing, and giving no quarter—which means killing those who surrender. Everyone pointed out this would be a war crime. Given that the GOP has a majority in the Senate, don’t expect much serious oversight coming from there, as Cotton and his peers are unlikely to let the agenda of that committee drift towards doing its responsibilities. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is senior adviser to the President and the Secretary Defense but has no command authority except over the Joint Staff—a group of unarmed staffers (I didn’t see a weapon in my year in the Pentagon on the Joint Staff except by troops from elsewhere guarding the building). Yet, Trump said that General Mark Milley was in command of the effort. Making it appear that way, Milley walked around the aftermath of the ejection of protestors near the White House, wearing his Army Combat Uniforms—the uniform officers wear when engaged in operations, not the usual spiffy uniform worn when advising the President. Even if Milley was not in command, he appeared to be so. The President of the United States, the commander-in-chief, abused his authority to deploy US forces—National Guard and maybe Regular—for a photo op. At the time of writing, we still do not have clarification about who were flying Blackhawk helicopters to attempt to disperse—or intimidate—crowds, but it came clearly at the request of Trump so that he could hold a bible in front of the vandalized church—despite the preferences of those who run that church. Does the President have the authority to do this? According to Lindsay Cohn: mostly, yes. But abuse of power is when one uses their power in ways that are inappropriate—and using the military for a photo op while squelching the first amendment rights of peaceful protesters is clearly very wrong.****CMR is already at historically low levels Shinkman, 9-30-19(Paul, “The Joint Chiefs’ Power Surge,” accessed 10-1-19, ) JFNHowever, a bipartisan commission formed by Congress last year expressed deep concern about the growing divide between civilians and their military counterparts at the Pentagon – and the latter group's beefed-up influence. "Civilian voices have been relatively muted on issues at the center of U.S. defense and national security policy, undermining the concept of civilian control," the National Defense Strategy Commission wrote in its final report after studying the latest strategy document then-Defense Secretary Jim Mattis created to guide Pentagon policy for the coming years. Without referencing him by name, the report cited Gen. Dunford's "effort to centralize defense direction" and warned of "profound strategic problems" if civilians fail to regain control of managing America's global forces.2AC 4 – no impx History proves there’s no impx – that’s owen – even in times of tension b/w Andrew Jackson and troops, or Clinton and don’t ask don’t tell, low CMR never resulted in a tangible negative outcome – we dare the neg to name an example of tensions spilling over into an actual impx [the block says] unilateral decisins are bad – no link to this, obvi trump can’t singlehandedly get out of nato – plan would require at least congress and military consultation as well *******CMR decline has never lead to an impx Feaver and Kohn, Professor of Political Science, 05 (Peter Feaver, professor of Political Science and Public Policy and the director of the Triangle Institute for Security Studies at Duke University, and Richard H. Kohn, Professor of History at the University of North Carolina, 2005, “The Gap: Soldiers, Civilians, and Their Mutual Misunderstanding,” in American Defense Policy, 2005 edition, ed. Paul J. Bolt, Damon V. Coletta, Collins G. Shackelford, p. 339, LMM)Concerns about a troublesome divide between the armed forces and the society they serve are hardly new and in fact go back to the beginning of the Republic. Writing in the 1950s, Samuel Huntington argued that the divide could best be bridged by civilian society tolerating, if not embracing, the conservative values that animate military culture. Huntington also suggested that politicians allow the armed forces a substantial degree of cultural autonomy. Countering this argument, the sociologist Morris Janowitz argued that in a democracy, military culture necessarily adapts to changes in civilian society, adjusting to the needs and dictates of its civilian masters.2 The end of the Cold War and the extraordinary changes in American foreign and defense policy that resulted have revived the debate. The contemporary heirs of Janowitz see the all volunteer military as drifting too far away from the norms of American society, thereby posing problems for civilian control. They make tour principal assertions. First, the military has grown out of step ideologically with the public, showing itself to be inordinately right-wing politically, and much more religious (and fundamentalist) than America as a whole, having a strong and almost exclusive identification with the Republican Party. Second, the military has become increasingly alienated from, disgusted with, and sometimes even explicitly hostile to, civilian culture. Third, the armed forces have resisted change, particularly the integration of women and homosexuals into their ranks, and have generally proved reluctant to carry out constabulary missions. Fourth, civilian control and military effectiveness will both suffer as the military—seeking ways to operate without effective civilian oversight and alienated from the society around it—loses the respect and support of that society. By contrast, the heirs of Huntington argue that a degenerate civilian culture has strayed so far from traditional values that it intends to eradicate healthy and functional civil-military differences, particularly in the areas of gender, sexual orientation, and discipline. This camp, too, makes four key claims. First, its members assert that the military is divorced in values from a political and cultural elite that is itself alienated from the general public. Second, it believes this civilian elite to be ignorant of, and even hostile to, the armed forces—eager to employ the military as a laboratory for social change, even at the cost of crippling its warfighting capacity. Third, it discounts the specter of eroding civilian control because it sees a military so thoroughly inculcated with an ethos of subordination that there is now too much civilian control, the effect of which has been to stifle the military's ability to function effectively Fourth, because support for the military among the general public remains sturdy, any gap in values is inconsequential. The problem, if anything, is with the civilian elite. The debate has been lively (and inside the Beltway, sometimes quite vicious), but it has rested on very thin evidence—(tunneling anecdotes and claims and counterclaims about the nature of civilian and military attitudes. Absent has been a body of systematic data exploring opinions, values, perspectives, and attitudes inside the military compared with those held by civilian elites and the general public. Our project provides some answers.Assurances DAT/LFraming issue – NATO’s failing to deter adversaries now but the plan strengthens the EU defense framework which solves all of their fill in arguments – no turns case – we control a bigger I/L to deterrence b/c a downsized nato would disincentive Russian aggression and prolif in the region 2AC 1 – NUQ Global prolif is inevitable – that’s sokolski – iran, south Korea and japan have all shown interest in leaving the NPT, and others like the turkey and Egypt insist they have a right to uranium and recycling plutonium which is the last step before producing nukes – regardless of the plan, global spread of nukes is guaranteed [the block reads the Kuhn card – it flows aff – it says that germany has been a leading world power in disarmament and that merkel has said she wouldn’t consider nuclearizing Iran will pull out of the npt, that triggers the link regardless Rouhi, 2020, <research fellow with the nonproliferation and nuclear policy program at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Mahsa>, Foreign Policy, Will Iran Follow North Korea’s Path and Ditch the NPT?, March 16, p. , JPK <accessed, 6-7-20>****NCC’20 Novice Packet****Washington’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran has recently pushed each side into a series of escalatory moves and countermoves. Since U.S. President Donald Trump took office, his administration has hoped that Iran would eventually relent and make concessions on its nuclear program, missile development, and regional activities, but it seems increasingly likely that Iran may instead decide that its best path forward is to follow North Korea’s example and withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), long considered the global cornerstone for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. (Three years after pulling out in 2003, North Korea tested its first nuclear weapon.) The mainstream view in Iran until recently was that withdrawing from the NPT would bring further diplomatic isolation, lead to increased sanctions, and court a U.S. military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Therefore, it would be counterproductive to Tehran’s larger aspirations of regional leadership and reintegration into the international community. But recent events have caused Tehran to reevaluate those ambitions, as they seem increasingly far-fetched. In the past year, the prospect of withdrawing from the NPT has transformed from a fringe idea among hard-liners in Iran into a real policy option that resonates with a surprisingly large spectrum of Iranian society.2AC 2 – no german prolif Germany can’t nuclearize – that’s tertrais – it’s says there is zero appetite in german policy circles for a nuclear program AND they lack the capabilities – Germany doesn’t have indigenous uranium enrichment or fuel reprocessing capabilities The block says a US withdrawal would change internal dynamics BUT this ignores the fact that structural limitations prevent Germany from building nukes – they can’t proliferate if they don’t even have the materials to make bombs They literally don’t have the tech to do so!!! Volpe & Kühn, 2017, <Assistant Professor at the Defense Analysis Department of the Naval Postgraduate School and a Nonresident Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Tristan; Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Ulrich>, Washington Quarterly, Germany’s Nuclear Education: Why a Few Elites Are Testing a Taboo, vol. 40, #3, pp. 12-13, JPK****NCC’20 Novice Packet****Yet, Germany’s nuclear latency is undergoing a major decrease as the country abandons nuclear energy. In the wake of the 2011 Fukushima disaster, Chancellor Merkel responded to a groundswell of public opposition toward nuclear technology. Her ruling coalition decided that all nuclear power plants be phased out by 2022, leaving Germany with a handful of small research reactors, the Urenco enrichment plant, fuel fabrication facilities, research and development projects, and interim spent fuel storage sites. Consequently, Josef Joffe, publisher of the liberal German newspaper Die Zeit, denounced a German latent hedge capacity as “undoable,” because the country was losing its “wherewithal for a weapons option, except for a limited low-enrichment capability doomed to go when the last power reactor goes.” In a similar vein, Theo Sommer, former editor-inchief of Die Zeit, argued that detachment from America was “no real option” because “Germany no longer has the technical infrastructure for nuclear weapons production,” and it “would take decades” to rebuild sufficient ENR capabilities.2AC 3 – public blocks german nukes The german republic would never tolerate nukes – that’s volpe – 93 percent of germans favor a complete ban on nukes and 85 percent supported the US withdrawling nuclear missiles from Germany The block says markel has acted against public opinion on immigration – that’s 1] DISTINCT from military foreign policy and 2] not related to german lawmakers opinions, which tertrais says is OPPOSED to german prolif 2AC 4 – N/L Zero link – Germany would just seek protection from European allies – that’s fix – when senior officials were asked what they’d do if the US withdrawled from nato, they said they’d actually prefer a nuclear umbrella from France and the UK Either way other countries fill in – the French and british have both said they’d provide nuclear protection to Germany if the US left The block says the US has more nukes than France and britian – it doesn’t matter – they’ve said article 5 withdrawl triggers the link, not reduction in warheads – proves that Germany would be equally assured by near by allies France/UK nuclear deterrent would be perceived as credibleTertrais, 2019, <Deputy Director of the Paris-based Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (Foundation for Strategic Research), Bruno>, Washington Quarterly, Will Europe Get Its Own Bomb?, Summer, vol. 42, #2, p. 60, JPK****NCC’20 Novice Packet****Would it be credible? Some claim that a France and/or UK-based nuclear deterrent would not have the necessary credibility. But it is widely considered that a smaller arsenal can deter a major power provided it has the ability to inflict damage seen as unacceptable by the other party. This has always been the premise of “deterrence of the strong by the weak”—and is not connected with the size of the other party’s nuclear arsenal as long as deterrence does not rely on a “counterforce” strategy, or on the ability to destroy the equivalent territory or population of the defender. It is also not connected with the size of the other party’s conventional military capabilities as long as one does not rely on any war-fighting or nuclear defense strategy—concepts that even NATO no longer applies. Most importantly, again, deterrence exercised by a European power might be seen as more credible than when it is exercised by a distant protector; the idea is that “be ready to die for Helsinki” could be a more credible proposition for a European nuclear power than for the United States.2AC 6 – no NPT impxFrench nukes don’t violate the NPT – that’s tetrais – a new nato deterrent would be similar to the current arrangement, which is compliant with the treaty The block says Germany arming would cause turkey and Poland to do so – soloski says that’s inevitable and those countries have already moved to do so – so no impx German prolif won’t collapse the NPT or lead to global prolifHorovitz, 2015, <Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, Switzerland, PhD candidate at the ETH Zurich & former research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Liviu>, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Beyond Pessimism: Why the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Will Not Collapse, vol 38, No. 1-2, pp. 141-2, JPK, ****NCC’20 Novice Packet****Both the historical record and a plethora of theories suggest that additional states might, over time, become interested in acquiring nuclear weapons, and therefore withdraw from the NPT. Some accounts posited that, with proliferation begetting more proliferation, the NPT would quickly collapse. Others argued that a treaty which is unable to stop the further spread of nuclear weapons would soon be considered useless and ultimately abandoned by all its members. However, little evidence supports these pessimistic assessments. First, additional nuclear proliferation appears to jolt only a few into slowly acquiring their own nuclear devices. On the one hand, recent scholarship has questioned reactive proliferation theories that build upon the realist paradigm. On the other hand, a number of theories do suggest that proliferation incentives for actors in a nuclear newcomer’s immediate environment would increase. Thus, a state might start on the path to nuclear acquisition. Global, regional, and domestic costs might be endured: the likely sanctions might be counterbalanced, the neighbours’ mistrust might be compensated, and institutional investments might be shouldered. Having absorbed these costs, and in the absence of a change of heart, no less than a decade later, a first atomic weapon might be fielded. Arguably, this slow cycle might start anew. However, for innumerable reasons, such a threatened state might decide that the security of nuclear weapons was not worth the price, or it might consider these arms to be – at least partially – replaceable by other means. For instance, US policies involving coercion, security assurances, or various political benefits prevented a number of ‘tilting dominoes’ from falling. In even starker contrast, any state outside of the new proliferator’s immediate vicinity or reach would have little additional security incentive to start its own nuclear programme. Such a non-threatened state might fear that regional instability in the proliferator’s neighbourhood or a nuclear exchange might have global repercussions. However, withdrawing from the NPT or sabotaging the agreement would surely not put these concerns to rest. ................
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