HEADQUARTERS, USMEDCOM



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HEADQUARTERS, CFC 9518

Seoul, ROK

1June 19XX

TAB D TO APPENDIX 3 TO ANNEX C TO CFC OPLAN (KOREA) 9518X-XX

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

REFERENCES: Joint Pub 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations,” 10 July 1996.

1. Situation. See basic plan.

a. Overview

(1) The United States and Republic of Korea (ROK) currently seek ways to convince the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) that is should forego the manufacture of nuclear weapons, initially by allowing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conduct full inspections of suspected facilities. North Korea thus far has refused, although it did agree to an incomplete examination of declared sites early in March 1994. This plan reviews military planning since there are constant threats of war from Pyongyang.

(2) North Korean armed forces, with few exceptions, greatly exceed the size of ROK counterparts: twice as many active uniformed personnel and main battle tanks, five times as many self-proprelled artillery pieces, air defense suites that dwarf South Korean analogues, plus many more submarines, torpedo boats, and antiship missile craft. Neither Korea possesses a large air force. The U.S. 2d Infantry Division, deployed on a main invasion route, primarily symbolizes U.S. resolve, but U.S. air and naval power (a small part which now is in place) provides capabilities that the DPRK cannot match. There is little qualitative difference between North and South Korean military personnel. Both sides are well organize, thoroughly professional, dedicated, tough,and highly motivated, although one may question how large a share on North Korea’s rank and file would welcome orders to initiate large-scale offensive operations. Both deploy he bulk of their best ground forces near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in well-prepared positions, but technological superiority and synergistic U.S. relations with ROK allies confer unique advantages on our side.

(3) The PSYOP goal. Convince the people of South Korea to support CFC operations because it will eventually result in stability on the Korean peninsula.

(4) The Chief, PSYOP Tasks

4.

(a) Promote a favorable image of US forces to gain acceptance of US objectives.

5. (b) Build confidence in the South Korean military and among the population that victory will be achieved on allies terms.

(c) Convince the military and UN that the US will stay the course until military victory is achieved.

(d) Assist in stabilizing the political and military situation in South Korea and the Korean peninsula.

(e) Cause DPRK forces to feel isolated, inadequately supported by the people and doubtful of eventual success.

b. US Perspective

(1) Intentions. The US strategic intention is to conduct international information activities to influence foreign attitudes, perceptions and behavior to support US goals and objectives, especially in Asia, and before the South Eastern Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the United Nations (UN). The operational intention is to promote CFC’s objectives within South Korea, while at the tactical level reduce the ability of the DPRK’s military forces to interfere with friendly military operations.

(2) Capabilities. With assistance from US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), a PSYOP assessment team (POAT) deploys to South Korea to assess the situation, develop detailed objectives and recommend appropriate actions. It is anticipated that a Joint PSYOP Task Force (JPOTF) OPCON to CFC will be required to execute PSYOP tasks.

c. Neutral Perspective. The US National Command Authorities (NCA) will be subject to international pressure to stop the operation.

(1) With the exception of Vietnam and China, the other nations in the Asia region can be expected to support US operations in South Korea. The countries bordering South Korea will assist with overflight rights and limited basing. China will support the populous political goals of the DPRK for reunification with diplomatic discussions under the current four party talks. Outside the region, most nations will support our objectives.

(2) International organizations such as the UN and SEATO will support CFC objectives. However, rogue states may follow the lead of Iraqi and Iran ; stress goodness of the political goals of the DPRK while ignoring their aggressive military operations. The SEATO will support the operations, although some of the nations will oppose the military operations for internal political reasons. There will be cries of “US-sponsored aggression” and “Yankee imperialism.”

d. Enemy Perspectives

(1) Decision-maker and Staff. DPRK senior leaders do expect direct military action by the US against their activities in South Korea. DRPK leadership is vested in a small inner circle of DPRK Principals who exerts total control of all facets of life in North Korea. The organizational structure is very flat and facilitates quick decision-making.

(2) Intelligence Systems. The DPRK leadership has a series of highly sophisticated telecommunications and intelligence centers that allow Army Commanders to coordinate their military operations throughout the peninsula. They routinely use computer equipment and satellite phones to communicate and monitor friendly activities. They possess complex intelligence networks with the best equipment to gather information on South Korea and US military installations and units, including photographs of senior ranking personnel, equipment and installations. DPRK infiltration of South Korean infrastructure permits them to operate an extensive human intelligence (HUMINT) network composed of both full time and part time operatives.

(3) Target Audiences. There are three target audiences of US PSYOP efforts: the North Korean military and student radicals, the South Korean people, and the DPRK senior leadership. Efforts aim to reassure the military and National Police leadership and rank-and-file, and the rural population that they can depend on US support. And at the same time undermining the confidence of adversary leadership and lowering the morale and combat efficiency of DPRK military forces. Secondarily, PSYOP efforts must encourage the international community that the application of military force will hinder DPRK efforts to seize the Korean peninsula by military force.

(4) Command Systems. The highly sophisticated telecommunications and intelligence systems are used primarily for military communications, but they also use them to command and control the North Korean military forces when they are engaged in tactical operations against the Republic of Korea government’s military forces. Activities to degrade the communications systems and reduce confidence in them will contribute to mission success.

2. Mission. When directed, CFC conducts psychological operations in support of US national and theater objectives to assist the government of South Korea in the defeat of the DPRK aggressive military attacks across the DMZ.

3. Execution

a. Concept of Operations

(1) Overview

(a) Intent. PSYOP efforts must contribute directly to our gaining and maintaining information dominance in the Joint Operations Area (JOA). The US will not ignore this transition of South Korea into a communist state. We must convince military and police forces that the United States is willing to accept the international political risk of direct action in South Korea because our nation is in this for the long haul. CFC will stay in South Korea with overwhelming force until the job is done. When we achieve this task, others, such as building a favorable image of US forces and the isolation of the DPRK, will follow. At the same time we must be recognize Japanese sensitivity to US use of the Kadena and other Air Bases. Remain good neighbors at the ISB. I see the end state as the defeat of DPRK military forces in the field and a strengthened South Korea and UN ability to combat the DPRK military aggressive actions.

(b) Prehostilities Strategic PSYOP. US governmental agencies conduct an international information campaign to influence foreign attitudes, perceptions and behaviors in support of US goals and objectives in South Korea and the region. While these actions occur outside the military sphere, they will use selected Department of Defense assets, including strategic assets from USSOCOM. This is ongoing and will continue until the beginning of Phase I at D-28.

(c) Strategic and Theater PSYOP. PSYOP must be closely coordinated with tactical operations, public affairs (PA) and civil affairs (CA) activities. In instances where national policy and military operations conflict, national policy objectives take precedence. The PSYOP campaign will be designed to strengthen US and South Korean military and police operations in theater and facilitate mission accomplishment, especially in Phase II (Establish ISBs, D+40 through D+60) and the beginning of Phase III (Decisive Combat, D+60 through D+100).

(d) Joint Tactical PSYOP. Joint Tactical PSYOP will provide an effective information program directed at enhancing support for the tactical mission with the goal of manipulating the attitudes and behavior of DPRK leadership and high-ranking field commanders. They will believe that overwhelming US military power is being brought to bear, and that direct confrontation is hopeless, and that SOF terrorist tactics will also prove useless. As applied in Phases III and IV (Lodgment and Follow-Through, D+75 through D+120), PSYOP activities will facilitate reorganization and control of liberated areas in conjunction with civil-military operations, while continuing to obtain cooperation of the South Koreans in the ISB and the ROK military and police forces.

(2) Guidance

(a) Themes to be Stressed

1. DPRK Forces

a. The isolation and ultimate annihilation of DPRK military forces when in combat with US units is certain.

b. Great social and economic disparity exists between the DPRK leadership and the average North Korean soldier and civilian.

2. DPRK Sympathizers. Instill doubt and fear relating to support of the DPRK and their chances of success.

3. South Korean Military and National Police. The US cares about South Korean and wants to work with its Government for the defeat of the DPRK military forces.

4. Okinawans. While extensive, the US presence at Kadena Air Base will be temporary until peace is restored on the Korean peninsula.

5. South Korean Population

a. The futility of hostile action against South Korea and the US.

b. The DPRK and its military forces are aggressors who have brought misery to millions of people on the Korean peninsula through their aggressive military action.

c. Reducing the military threat and reunification will bring about political, economic, and social activity in a one Korea that will benefit the entire population.

d. Improved relations with the US will result in increased social and economic benefits for the people of a one Korea. That situation can best be achieved by eliminating the totalitarian, isolated, xenophobic, belligerent, and backward, and tactically unpredictable DPRK leadership.

e. The only US interest is to ensure the sovereignty of South Korea and the stability of the region .

(b) Themes to be Avoided

1. South Korea Government. Many in the government are corrupt and take money from businesses.

2. South Korea Military and National Police. Military forces do not support civilian leadership .

3. South Korea Population. The South Korean culture will be slow to change and that social, political and economic transformations will not necessarily happen as a result of the US military effort.

(3) Planned PSYOP Operations

(a) Military Operations that will contribute to the success of US Forces.

1. Destruction of major DRPK base and LOC’s.

2. Destruction of critical DPRK telecommunications and intelligence centers.

3. Destruction of missile production and transshipment facilities.

(b) Behavior that will inspire emotions, attitudes, and behavior contrary to the objectives of a successful operation.

1. Making derogatory comments to local civilians concerning national heritage or religion.

2. Occupation of places of sanctity and worship.

3. Harassing the civilian population by causing unnecessary interruptions in their daily lives.

4. Heavy drinking and lewd, boisterous behavior.

(4) PSYOP Objectives Matrix

|Phase |PSYOP Objectives |Support |

|I -Prehostilities |1. Promote favorable image of US military operations in South |Deception |

|(D-28 to D-24) |Korea. |2. CFC readiness |

| |2. Build confidence in South Korea military and National Police. |3. Liaison w/ South Korea |

| | |military |

|II – Establish ISB (D+40 to D+60) |1. US deployments to Japan and South Korea are training exercise |Deception |

| |related. |2. CFC deployment |

| |2. Promote favorable image of US military operations in South |3. Establish ISB |

| |Korea. |4. Train for force entry |

| |3. Build confidence in South Korea military and National Police. | |

| |4. Cause DPRK not to feel threatened by US presence in Japan and | |

| |South Korea. | |

|III – Decisive Combat (D+60 to D+100 |1. Promote favorable image of US military operations in South |1. Deception |

| |Korea. |2. Execute NEO |

| |2. Build confidence in South Korea military and National Police. |3. JTF KOREA tactical |

| |3. Assist in stabilizing the military situation in South Korea. |operations |

| |4. Encourage civilian compliance with government to isolate the |4. Secure US installations |

| |DPRK leadership. |5. Establish forward support |

| |5. Isolate DPRK senior leadership from field military commanders. |bases |

|IV – Lodgment & Follow-through (D+100 |1. Promote favorable image of continued US military operations in |JTF Korea |

|to D+180) |South Korea. |Tactical |

| |2. Build confidence in South Korea military and National Police to|operations |

| |defeat DPRK military forces. |3. Civil-military operations |

| |3. Assist in stabilizing the improving military situation in SOUTH|in areas liberated from DPRK |

| |AND NORTH KOREA. |forces |

| |4. Encourage continued civilian compliance with government to | |

| |isolate the DPRK. | |

| |5. Further isolate DPRK senior leadership from field military | |

| |commanders. | |

| |6. Inform the international audience of the success of US/South | |

| |Korean operations against the DPRK. | |

|V – Posthostilities & Redeployment |TBP |TBP |

|(D+180 to D+240) | | |

b. Situation Monitoring. The CFC CJG3 is responsible for monitoring the success of PSYOP efforts in all phases of the operation, assisted by USSOCOM and DoD and interagency feedback. Subordinate commands report IAW SOP.

c. Control. Assisted by USSOCOM, the PSYOP campaign is a CFC’s responsibility. If established, the JPOTF will remain OPCON to CINCKorea while is supports JTF Korea. The CJG3 is responsible for coordinating and monitoring PSYOP efforts. Commander, JTF Korea has the responsibility to coordinate all JTF PSYOP efforts with appropriate headquarters, maintain up-to-date PSYOP estimates, and monitor and review component PSYOP plans and operations.

d. Tasks

(1) All subordinate commands incorporate PSYOP into operations plans.

(2) Prepare to conduct counter propaganda campaigns.

(3) Support deception operations.

(4) Coordinate with USSOCOM and the JPOTF for support such as leaflet dissemination, loudspeaker broadcasts, audiovisual products, television broadcasts, computer home pages, and face-to-face communications.

(5) Evaluate and report reactions of target groups and recommend themes to be stressed or avoided.

(6) Direct liaison authorized between with cells coordinating deception, operations security, intelligence, public affairs, and civil affairs to support PSYOP operations.

4. Administration and Logistics. See Annex D, Logistics.

5. Command and Control

a. Command. See Annex J, Command Relationships.

b. Signal. See Annex K. Command, Control and Communications Systems.

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