Mr



Mr. Ramienski

World War II

Homework

Student Name: ______________________ Seat number: ___________

Period: ____________________________

Date Turned In: ____________________

Unit 2, Seeds of War: the Rise of Fascism

Day 0, Thursday, 24 September 2015

Lesson 0

Due date, Thursday, 1 October 2015

If turned in on Friday, 2 October 2015, -10%

If turned in on Monday, 5 October 2015, -20%

If not turned in by Monday, 5 October 2015, NO CREDIT “0”.

Homework HW12

Directions: Read the article, “The Nazi Road to Power” by Professor Gerhard Rempel. Then answer the questions on a separate sheet of paper using full sentences and complete thoughts.

Value: 50 points, TEST/Quiz grade. Each question is worth 2 points. (5 stars required to be exempt)

The Author

1. Who is “Professor Gerhard Rempel”? See what you can find out on him.

Introduction

2. What does the term “Center of Gravity” mean in this article? What was Weimar Germany’s “CoG”?

3. Who were the “SA” and the “Stahlhelm”?

I. Presidential Election of 1932

4. Why did Hindenburg stand for reelection?

5. Who were the top finishers in the Presidential election?

6. Why was the election a Nazi “moral victory”?

7. What was a “Lander”? –use the internet to research.

8. Why did Bruning finally resign as Hindenburg’s chancellor? What caused the resignation?

9. Who replaced Bruning? Why was he not a great choice?

II. The Prussian Coup

10. Why did Schleicher and von Papen attempt a coup in the Prussian State?

11. What actions did von Papen take after the “coup”?

III. The Reichstag Elections of 1932

12. Why did Hitler have the right to form a government after the Reichstag elections of 1932?

13. Why would Hitler and the Nazis HAVE to be part of the next coalition government?

14. What did von Hindenburg think about Hitler?

15. Who was the newly elected President of the Reichstag in 1932?

16. How did the November 1932 elections affect the Nazi power in the Reichstag?

17. Why was von Papen selected over Hitler to form a government?

18. How did Poland suddenly become a factor in the political calculations of this period?

IV. Schleicher Becomes Chancellor

19. How did Schleicher do as Chancellor? Why did he dissolve his government?

20. During this period what did Hitler do to consolidate his power over the Nazi Party?

21. What role did German industrial leaders play during the fall/ early winter at the end of 1932?

How pro Nazi were they? How much did “industry” do with Hitler’s rise to the Chancellor position?

22. How did von Papen present the need for Hitler to become Chancellor to von Hindenburg?

23. What role did the German Army play in helping von Hindenburg select Hitler as Chancellor?

V. Hitler's Accession

24. On what date was Hitler appointed to become the Chancellor of Germany?

25. Why does Dr. Rempel plainly state, “It was a timely reminder that Hitler had not seized power.” ?

In summary how did Hitler come to power?

The Nazi Road to Power

Professor Gerhard Rempel

Introduction

By the end of 1931 the center of gravity of German political life was rapidly moving away from the Reichstag (the German parliament) and chancellery to the streets, where the Nazis and their opponents came into frequent collision. Quasi-military formations and uniforms were back in fashion in the early 1930s. The Nazis had enrolled over 400,000 men in the SA, a huge private army which protected party meetings and intimidated political opponents. The Stahlhelm (largest veterans' organization-literally “The Steel Helmets”) representing the more conservative nationalities, had also become a considerable political force.

On the left Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold (Black Red and Gold-German Republican colors), trade unions and workers' athletic clubs formed the Eiserne republikanische Front zur Abwehr des Faschismus (Iron Republican Front for the Defeat of Fascism) in December 1931. Against this back-cloth of mounting tension and violence, which the Reichstag was powerless to stop, the presidency emerged as the stable point in a fluid political situation. Effective power resided partly in the presidential palace, partly on the streets, but less and less in the Reichstag or in the chancellery (with the Prime Minister).

I. Presidential Election of 1932

The crucial importance of the presidency was emphasized in the spring of 1932, when Hindenburg's term of office expired. The old man, now in a state of mental and physical decline, wanted to retire to Neudeck, his country estate, to end his days in peace. Brüning insisted that he remain at the head of affairs firmly convinced that Hindenburg was the only alternative to Hitler. Naturally, Brüning wished to avoid the excitement of a presidential election at a time of nationalist ferment when the Nazi vote was increasing at every Land (ie.: local government) election, so he tried to obtain the agreement of the parties to a constitutional amendment extending Hindenburg's term of office to 1934.

{AR Note: Dr. Heinrich Brüning (November 26, 1885 – March 30, 1970) was a German politician during the Weimar Republic. He served as Chancellor (Prime Minister) of Germany from 1930 to 1932.} {AR=Ramienski’s note.}

Neither Hitler nor Hugenberg would agree to this expedient, and reluctantly Hindenburg agreed to stand for re-election. That the Socialists and Center supported him, while the German Nationalists ran a candidate against him, greatly upset the old man, whose sympathies lay completely on the right. After some initial hesitation, Hitler agreed to stand. On the eve of the election Hitler hastily assumed German citizenship by accepting the post of Regierungsrat (government advisor) in the little Nazi-controlled Land (State/Province) of Brunswick. A bitter and frenzied campaign ensued, marked by further street violence. In effect it was a plebiscite for or against National Socialism, a contest between the power of the streets and the magic of an old warrior's name backed by the power of the Reichswehr.

On the second ballot in April 1932, Hindenburg received 19,359,000 votes, Hitler 13,418,000, and the Communist Thälmann, 3,706,000.

{AR Note: Alfred Wilhelm Franz Maria Hugenberg (19 June 1865 - 12 March 1951) was an influential German businessman and politician. He was a member of Adolf Hitler's first cabinet in 1933. Hugenberg held right-wing views and in 1919, he joined with Hugo Stinnes in establishing the German Nationalist Party (DNVP). The following year he was elected to the Reichstag and soon afterwards became Chairman of the party. His substantial fortune enabled him to fund his political campaigns against the Versailles Treaty, Locarno Treaty and the Young Plan. In 1929, Hugenberg began funding Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party. He also joined with Hitler to help oust Heinrich Brüning from power in December, 1932. When Hitler became chancellor in January 193, he appointed Hugenberg as his Minister of Agriculture and Economics. However, he resigned from office six months later in protest against the Nationalist Party being closed down. He survived the war and died in 1951}

Though defeated, the Nazis had won a great moral victory. Since 1930, their vote had nearly doubled, and between the first and second ballots, Hitler succeeded in capturing an extra two million votes. Nor had those republicans who reluctantly supported Hindenburg, as the only alternative to a reign of lawlessness under Hitler, much cause for congratulation. They had no guarantee that the weary octogenarian would respect the spirit of the constitution or display sound judgment in affairs of state. Within a matter of weeks, there was proof of his lack of political insight when Hindenburg dispensed with the services of his faithful and devoted chancellor Bruning who had worked zealously to secure his re-election.

The resignation of Brüning in May was very largely the work of Schleicher. In the course of 1931, Schleicher changed his mind about Brüning, once it was clear that the latter had failed to rally moderate opinion in defense of the presidential system. As radical nationalism grew in strength, Schleicher concluded that the only certain way of avoiding a Nazi uprising, likely to strain the loyalties of the Reichswehr (AR: Mainly the Army or Heer), was to come to terms with Hitler and include him in a presidential cabinet under a more right-wing chancellor. Immediately after the election, Brüning had yielded to pressure from several Länder, notably Prussia, and banned the SA and SS as a serious danger to state security. Schleicher was alarmed, not out of any respect for these ill-disciplined rowdies, but simply because he feared the reaction of the right wing to a ban on a nationalist organization. The time had come, he decided, to end "the drift to the left" and appoint a new chancellor who would show no favour to Socialists but would do his best to prepare the ground for a rapprochement with Hitler.

{AR Note: Kurt von Schleicher (7 April 1882 – 30 June 1934) was a German general and the last Chancellor of Germany during the era of the Weimar Republic. When on 30 June 1934 the Night of the Long Knives occurred, Schleicher was one of the chief victims. While in his house, he was gunned down)

Looking back over the years, it is only too apparent that Schleicher was a vain and self-confident intriguer, who grossly underestimated the nature of the Nazi party, lightly assuming that it was a healthy nationalist movement which he could tame and exploit by adroit political manipulation. The general was digging his own grave as he intrigued first against General Groener, Minister of Defense whom he forced to reign, and then against Brüning. The president was already out of sympathy with Brüning's policies and lent a ready ear tot he advice of Schleicher, eagerly reinforced by his son Oskar von Hindenburg. Early in May 1932, Schleicher overcame the president's lingering doubts by informing him that Hitler had now agreed not to oppose a new chancellor, on condition that the ban on SA and SS was lifted and new elections were ordered.

{AR Note: Karl Eduard Wilhelm Groener (November 22, 1867 - May 3, 1939) was a German soldier and politician. Groener subsequently oversaw the retreat and demobilisation of the defeated German army after World War I ended with the armistice of November 11, 1918.After his resignation from the army (September 30, 1919), Groener was in and out of retirement during the 1920s. He served as Transportation Minister between 1920 and 1923. He succeeded Otto Geßler as Defence Minister in 1928, a post he held until 1932. In 1931 he also became acting Interior Minister, and favoured the banning of the Nazi storm troopers (SA). His bad heart and diabetes finally killed him in 1939.}

The scene was set for Brüning's dismissal. Ironically enough, the chancellor was confident that the tide was turning at last, both at home and abroad. Well aware that his deflationary policies had failed to cure unemployment, now topping the six million mark, he was preparing cautiously to reflate the economy and had drafted a program of public works, including proposals for the break-up of some inefficient East Prussian estates and the resettlement of 600,000 unemployed on them. Landowning circles got wind of this and their spokesman, Oldenburg-Januschau, visited Hindenburg at Neudeck and easily persuaded the disgruntled president that Brüning was an "agrarian bolshevik" bent on socializing agriculture. When Brüning appeared with new emergency decrees the old man (Hindenburg) refused to sign, and insisted on the formation of a more right-wing cabinet. Brüning was deeply offended by Hindenburg's ingratitude when the government was allegedly "only a hundred meters from the goal," with reparations and disarmament likely to be resolved in Germany's favor. Characteristically, he made only a half-hearted attempt to justify himself, meekly tendering his resignation and that of his cabinet, which was at once accepted.

The fall of Brüning was a turning-point in these critical years. His dependence on Hindenburg hardly compensated for his lack of tactical ability and mass appeal. And though his deflationary policies contributed materially to the abolition of reparations, they did so only by deepening the domestic crisis. Still, Brüning was a man of integrity and a deeply patriotic German who won the respect of foreign statesmen. And once he had departed the prospects for the survival of even a mildly authoritarian regime suddenly looked much bleaker.

The eight months which came between the resignation of Brüning and the appointment of Hitler as chancellor were full of feverish political activity and complex political maneuvering. There could be no

clearer sign of the bankruptcy of the political system than the appointment of Franz von Papen as chancellor. A charming and accomplished socialite and close friend of Schleicher, Papen was a Westphalian aristocrat with industrial connections, a former general-staff officer in the old Prussian army, a Catholic with authoritarian views, a crafty intriguer certainly, but a man of little political insight or stature.

A storm of disapproval greeted the von Papen government of "national concentration," which represented the interests of business men and landowners so blatantly that contemporaries dubbed it "the cabinet of barons." The left was automatically against Papen. The center bitterly hostile to the man who had ousted Brüning. Event he nationalists were annoyed because Papen had been preferred to Hugenberg. And much to his surprise Schleicher discovered that Hitler was not a man of his word. Despite Hitler's promise, the Nazis attacked Papen as they had attacked Brüning before him. Clearly there was no hope of the Reichstag's "tolerating" Papen as it "tolerated" Brüning. So fresh elections were ordered at once and, in accordance with Schleicher's promise to Hitler, the ban on the SA was lifted, a step which resulted in a new wave of street violence sweeping through Germany in the high summer of 1932.

II. The Prussian Coup

To curry favor with the right wing before going to the polls, and also to strengthen the government's hand vis-a-vis Hitler by securing control of the police in the largest German state, Schleicher and Papen decided on a coup d'état to unseat the Prussian government. For years, the extreme right had resented the Socialist-Center government which had made Prussia a bulwark of the Weimar system. In April 1932, local elections destroyed the "red-black" majority, but as Nazis, Communists and Nationalists were not likely to reach agreement, the Braun-Severing government remained in office on a caretaker basis.

On 20 July 1932 Papen declared a state of emergency in Prussia, appointed himself Reichskommissar, and dismissed the Prussian ministers on the grounds that they had favored the Communists and had failed to prevent fresh street violence (for which Papen's raising of the ban on the SA was to blame). Neither Centrists nor Socialists were prepared to resist Papen. The Socialists acquiesced in the situation, as their predecessors had done when Stresemann struck at Saxony in 1923. One police captain and five men sufficed to remove Socialist ministers from office in the most industrialized and powerful Land in Germany.

Of course, they made out a compelling case for inaction. Resistance would have led to useless bloodshed because the Reichswehr, the Stahlhelm and the Nazis would have been thrown into battle against them, and the SA might well have seized power in the general confusion. There were legal doubts whether a mere caretaker government would be justified in offering resistance at all. Nor did it make sense to call a general strike with six million men unemployed. Instead, the Socialists turned to the Supreme Court and sought an injunction against Papen. "I have been a democrat for forty years and I am not going to become a condottiere (Mercenary) now..." remarked Minister-president Braun, as he rejected suggestions that he lead the resistance to Papen. An understandable attitude perhaps, in the light of the party's traditions of non-violence rational discussion and peaceful evolution.

But, whatever may be said for or against the decision of Braun and Severing and their trade-union colleagues, one thing is quite certain. The cause of democracy suffered a mortal blow when the Prussian

Government capitulated without a struggle. Papen followed up the coup d'état with a thorough purge of the Prussian civil service. Many loyal republican officials were retired and the Land completely integrated with the Reich.

III. The Reichstag Elections of 1932

The Prussian coup d'état pleased the right wing, but it did not enable Papen to woo nationalist support away from Hitler at the elections on July 31, 1932. The Populists lost over one million votes, the German nationalists nearly 300,000, whereas the Nazi vote actually showed a slight increase on that of the presidential election. With 13,745,000 votes, the Nazis held 230 seats in the Reichstag. As leader of what was by far the largest party, Hitler had a constitutional right to try and form a government. Schleicher and Papen agreed that he must come into their cabinet. The difficulty was Hitler, who was in a thoroughly intransigent mood, confident (as he had every reason to be) of ultimate victory in the near future. Called to the palace for consultations, he bluntly demanded full powers for his party.

President von Hindenburg was unimpressed by "the Bohemian corporal," refused to offer him more than inclusion in a presidential cabinet and warned him to exercise more control over lawless elements in the Nazi party. Shortly after the election Papen had been obliged to impose the death penalty for political murders and to set up special courts to deal with political offences. Hitler rejected Hindenburg's offer out of hand, but as he had no intention of seizing power, despite much wild talk, the political deadlock was complete.

When the Reichstag met in September 1932; Papen well aware that he had no hope of success promptly dissolved it, but not before Herman Goering newly elected Reichstag president, had humiliated him by allowing the deputies to carry a motion of no confidence in the Papen government by 512 votes to 42, a sufficient comment on Papen's unpopularity in the Reichstag and in the country as a whole.

The election on November 6, 1932 did not resolve the deadlock. But it revealed a significant fall in the Nazi vote. This time they polled only 11,730,000 votes - a loss of two millions - and returned with 196 seats. The decline, which was confirmed at subsequent Land elections, was due at least in part to the fact that Papen's withdrawal from the Disarmament conference, until Germany was conceded equality in armaments, had impressed nationalist opinion. For the first time since 1924, the German nationalists increased their vote by almost 800,000 and returned with fifty-two instead of thirty-seven seats.

This time Hitler was desperately short of funds and fighting hard for every vote. Some of the more restless supporters were undoubtedly disillusioned by the leader's failure to seize power in August and drifted over to the extreme left - this was partly the reason why the Communist vote increased by 700,000 to a total of nearly six millions, giving them 100 seats in the Reichstag. Some middle-class supporters were probably scared away by Hitler's vain attempts to capture the working-class vote. The Nazis reviled the Papen cabinet as "a class government of reactionaries" and actually collaborated with the Communists during the Berlin transport strike which paralyzed the great city in early November.

What Papen might have made of this changing political situation will never be known, for in November he fell victim to another Schleicher intrigue. As Papen had no support in the Reichstag, apart from nationalists and Populists, he tendered his resignation, a purely tactical maneuver, for he assumed that Hitler would not be able to form a government and that Hindenburg would then reinstate his old friend in office. As expected, Hitler still insisted on plenary powers which the president refused to give him. So Papen re-emerged from the wings, this time with a new plan. He proposed to declare martial law, dissolve the Reichstag, postpone elections and rule by decree until the constitution had been amended along authoritarian lines and the reflationary program given time to work.

Hindenburg was willing enough to support Papen in this but Schleicher was not. He believed that he could divide the Nazi party and cut off a section of some sixty deputies led by the left-wing National Socialist Gregor Strasser. With their support and the backing of sympathetic trade-union elements in the Socialist and Center parties, where he had been taking soundings, Schleicher hoped to build a Reichstag majority for a progressive social program within the framework of the constitution. While Hindenburg hesitated, Schleicher played an ace. He informed the cabinet that Papen's policy would lead to civil war, a general strike and probably a Polish invasion. To defend Germany against several perils simultaneously was simply beyond the Reichswehr's capacity. When Papen now tried to have Schleicher dismissed, Hindenburg refused and with tears rolling down his cheeks allowed "little Franz" to depart.

IV. Schleicher Becomes Chancellor

On December 2, 1932, Schleicher became German chancellor, rather reluctantly, as he would have much preferred to continue his intrigues behind cover. Nothing went right for him in office. It was soon apparent that he had grossly over-estimated his ability to divide the Nazis. Strasser was easily outmaneuvered by Hitler, who reasserted his control over the party and nipped signs of rebellion in the bud. Then Schleicher approached the left with a program of public works, price-fixing, restoration of wage- and relief-cuts, and land resettlement in East Prussia, measures which naturally turned the right wing against him. But he could not overcome the mistrust of Socialists and Centrists and had finally to return tot he presidential palace to take up where Papen left off. Admitting that he could not obtain a majority in the Reichstag, Schleicher proposed to dissolve it, declare a state of emergency, ban the Nazis and Communists and postpone elections indefinitely.

{AR Note: Gregor Strasser (also Straßer) (May 31, 1892 – June 30, 1934) was a politician of the German Nazi Party (NSDAP). He was murdered in Berlin during the Night of the Long Knives.}

The role of industry in the winter of 1932-3 in ousting Schleicher and helping Hitler to power has been the subject of much controversy. In the boom years, German industry had been uninterested in the Nazis. What support Hitler received before 1932 came from mavericks such as Fritz Thyssen and Emil Kirdorf. Industry was deeply suspicious of the anti-capitalist veneer of Nazism (National “Socialism”). In October 1930 just after their spectacular electoral victory, the newly arrived Nazi deputies introduced a bill to nationalize banks and control interest rates which Hitler obliged them to withdraw. Over the next two years as the crisis deepened Hitler - who had no interest whatsoever in socialism - redoubled his efforts to win industrial support but without success. Industrialists preferred Brüning and Papen to Hitler. Consequently, far from being in the "pocket of big business," the Nazis were desperately short of funds from June 1932 to January 1933, as Josef Goebbels lamented in his diary.

Certainly some (but not all) leading figures in the cartelized coal and steel industries, which were in dire trouble, sympathized with the Nazis for the latter promised to destroy parliamentary government, smash the trade unions (ensuring that wage-levels remained low) and dismantle the welfare system (lowering the employers' social contributions). Possibly Schleicher's willingness to cooperate with the trade unions, introduce labor legislation and public works program putting money in the hands of municipalities not big business worried industrialists. But, this turned them not to Hitler but back to Papen. Recent research suggests that although much of industry was ready enough to tolerate a Hitler cabinet and had little love for Weimar, nevertheless, heavy industry exerted only marginal influence on Hitler's appointment.

More important in this deadlocked political situation caused by the Reichstag's unwillingness to assume responsibility and by the unwillingness of both Nazis and Communists to seize power was the influence exerted by the president's political advisers. "Little Franz" was working assiduously to

encompass Schleicher's downfall. Hugenberg's decision to support a Hitler cabinet was equally crucial. When Hitler, worried by signs of disaffection in his own ranks, decided to accept office in a Nationalist-Nazi cabinet

provided he became chancellor the intrigue moved forward. Papen, a frequent and welcome visitor to Hindenburg's house, persuaded the old man that a viable alternative to Schleicher now existed. The Nazis and Nationalists would have a reasonable chance of obtaining a majority in the Reichstag. And the fact that Hitler seemed prepared to share power and had broken with the "left wing" Nazi Otto Strasser reassured

Hindenburg. On top of Papen's promptings came pressure from landowners alarmed by the plans of the "socialist general."

The Landbund (Lower house of Parliament) went into action accusing Schleicher, like Brüning, of "agrarian bolshevism," a serious charge in Hindenburg's mind. Disturbing rumor were circulating that the budget committee of the Reichstag had uncovered evidence of misuse of public money given to inefficient landowners under the Osthilfe. It was even alleged that relatives of the president were implicated, although whether this influenced Oskar von Hindenburg's decision to press Hitler's candidature on his father is uncertain. The Reichswehr inclined to Hitler's side. General von Hammerstein, the commander-in-chief, thought Hitler preferable to another Papen government whilst General von Blomberg, commander in East Prussia and the soldier earmarked for minister of defense in the new cabinet, reflected the views of younger officers in his enthusiastic advocacy oft he Nazi cause.

Whatever the decisive factor may have been, the old man determined to be rid of Schleicher. So when the general requested emergency powers at the end of January, Hindenburg turned him down. had not the chancellor argued seven weeks before that a military dictatorship meant civil war? There was nothing left for Schleicher but resignation on January 28, 1933.

V. Hitler's Accession

On January 30, 1933 Hindenburg received Hitler in audience and appointed him chancellor. That night and into the early morning Hitler stood on the chancellery balcony in salute as a huge torchlight procession of 100,000 excited supporters marched past in triumph, singing the Horst Wessel song (Nazi Party Anthem). This was a great hour for the rank and file. All the efforts of a handful of reactionary advisers in the presidential palace had failed to keep the leader from power. At last the long-awaited "National Revolution" would begin.

In fact, Hitler did not stand alone. A hundred meters away a slightly bewildered Hindenburg stood at an open window oft he presidential palace as the precession passed. It was a timely reminder that Hitler had not seized power. He had come to office by a sordid backstairs intrigue and with the president's consent. Hitler was chancellor, but in a government of "national concentration," surrounded by such orthodox reactionaries as Hugenburg and Seldte of the Stahlhelm. There were in fact only two Nazis in the cabinet, Frick, minister of the interior, and Goering, minister without portfolio and Prussian minister of the interior. Papen, vice-chancellor in the new cabinet, was elated by the success of his intrigue, believing that he had taken Hitler prisoner and succeeded where Brüning and Schleicher failed. "In two months we'll have pushed Hitler into a corner so hard that he'll be squeaking," Papen boasted to a friend.

{AR Note: Lieutenant-Colonel Franz Joseph Hermann Michael Maria von Papen zu Köningen (29 October 1879 – 2 May 1969) was a German nobleman, Roman Catholic monarchist politician, General Staff officer, and diplomat, who served as Chancellor of Germany in 1932 and as Vice-Chancellor under Adolf Hitler in 1933–1934. Papen was expelled from the United States during World War I for complicity in the planning of sabotage such as blowing up U.S. railroad lines. After WWI, he entered politics and joined the Catholic Centre Party (Zentrum), in which the monarchist Papen formed part of the conservative wing. He was a member of the parliament of Prussia from 1921 to 1932. A member of the Catholic Centre Party until 1932, he was one of the most influential members of the Camarilla – the group of courtiers or favourites which surrounded the German President Paul von Hindenburg in the late Weimar Republic. It was largely Papen, who believed that Hitler could be controlled once he was in the government, who persuaded Hindenburg to put aside his scruples and approve Hitler as Chancellor in a cabinet not under Nazi Party domination. However, Papen and his allies were quickly marginalized by Hitler and he left the government after the Night of the Long Knives, during which some of his confidants were purged by the Nazis.}

Source: Adapted from an article by Professor Gerhard Rempel, Western New England College.



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