Chapter I: The house of justice



Humanities III Prof. Boedeker

Worksheet on Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963): first worksheet, pp. 3-67

1. How did Adolf Eichmann end up in Jerusalem?

(The Diaspora is the “dispersion” of Jews beyond their original home of Palestine, and which was well underway by the 5th Century AD.)

2. What did the Israeli Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, want Eichmann’s trial to accomplish? What “lessons” did he want people to learn from the trial?

(The Judenräte [p. 11] were Jewish Councils set up in Eastern Europe under Nazi occupation, and who collaborated with the Nazis in their program of exterminating Jews.

Realpolitik [p. 11] is the view that only national interest, not morality, should determine a nation’s policies.)

3. What is Arendt’s explanation of the fact that so many Jews (and non-Jews) simply followed the Nazis’ orders, and aided in their own executions? (pp. 11-12)

(Konrad Adenauer [p. 13] was the Christian Democratic Chancellor of West Germany after World War II, from 1949 to 1963.

Einsatzgruppen were the 4 mobile killing police units, each containing about 2000-3000 men, that were part of the S.S. [Schutzstaffeln = protection corps], or “black shirts”, the elite branch of the Nazi Party.

“judenrein” [p. 15] means “free of Jews.”

“Immerwahr” [p. 16] means “always true”.

The “Bundesrepublik” [p. 16] is the Federal Republic of Germany, founded in 1949 after the Allied occupation and until 1990 known as West Germany.

Das Ausland [p. 16] is “the foreign world”.

Mens rea [p. 17] is a legal term meaning “criminal intent.”

Ministerialrat [p. 19] is something like a cabinet secretary;

Staatssekretär [p. 19] is an Undersecretary of State.)

4. What effect did the Eichmann trial have on Germans? What did this say about post-World-War-II Germany?

5. What charges were brought against Eichmann by the State of Israel (p. 21)?

6. What was Eichmann’s basic defense against these charges, as discussed throughout Chapter II?

7. Was Eichmann, according to psychiatric expert witnesses, either psychologically or morally abnormal (pp. 25-6)? Was he anti-Semitic?

8. What did the judges make of these psychiatrists’ testimony about Eichmann (pp. 26)? What “dilemma” (p. 27) does Arendt say this posed?

9. Why did Eichmann (in April 1932) join the Nazi party, then (in August 1933) the Army, and finally (in 1935) the S.S. (pp. 31-35)?

(Arbeitsfreude [p. 31] is someone’s joy in their work.

Modus vivendi [p. 40] is a way of living.

Der Judenstaat [p. 40] means The Jewish State.)

10. What were Eichmann’s personal qualities that made him a good worker in the S.S. bureaucracy (p. 45)? What were some of his “successes” as head of the Center for Emigration of Austrian Jews?

11. What does Arendt point out about the way Eichmann spoke (pp. 48-9)? What does she conclude about him from this (pp. 49)?

12. What is Arendt’s explanation for why so many Germans carried out their orders under the Nazi regime, and why so many post-World-War-II Germans still refuse to admit what occurred during the Holocaust (pp. 51-55)?

13. Why did Zionist leaders cooperate with the Nazi authorities during the first five years of the Nazi rule (1933-1938) (pp. 58-61)?

(The Reichsvertretung and Reichsvereinigung [p. 60] were Jewish representative political associations. The first was a Jewish-appointed group of Zionists and non-Zionists dissolved in 1939; the second was a Nazi-appointed group of only Zionists.

A plaidoyer [p. 65] is a lawyer’s speech in a court of law, usually for the defense.)

Humanities III Prof. Boedeker

Worksheet on Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963): second worksheet, pp. 68-150

14. Explain the three ideas that Eichmann called his own. How did they fare (pp. 73-82)?

15. What were the “language rules” adopted by high Nazi officials? What effect did they have (pp. 85-6)?

16. Once it had been established at Eichmann’s trial that he knew what he was doing – i.e., killing thousands of Jews – there were two ways to release him from criminal responsibility. What were these (p. 91)? Does Arendt think that Eichmann could claim either or these exceptions? Do you? Explain.

(Gerichtsfrei [p. 93] means “free of a court of law”.

Justizlose Hoheitsakte [p. 93] are acts of state beyond the reach of the courts.)

17. Why does Arendt claim that there was no real organized Leftist resistance to Hitler during the war years (pp. 98-99)?

18. What does Arendt claim were the real motivations of the conspirators in the plot to kill Hitler in July 1944?

19. What were some of the strategies that Himmler (Head of the S.S.) used in order to ease the consciences of those who carried out the mass killings of Jews and others (pp. 105-111)?

20. What was the Wannsee conference of January 1942, why was it called, what took place during it?

21. What was Eichmann’s “Pontius Pilate feeling” during the Wannsee conference?

22. What “stock excuse” (p. 116) was used to justify the Germans’ killing of civilians from 1942 onward?

23. In what ways did Jewish leaders aid in the extermination of Jews (pp. 115-119)? Why weren’t these mentioned during the trial (pp. 119-125)?

(Rassenschande is “racial shame”, i.e., sexual intercourse between Jews and non-Jews.)

24. The philosopher Immanuel Kant’s (1724-1804) “categorical imperative” is the moral principle that you should act only such that the principle of your action (i.e., the rule according to which you act) can be made a universal law (i.e., can be a rule that everyone always follows). How did the Nazi theorist and Governor General of Poland Hans Frank re-interpret this principle during the Third Reich (p. 136)? How could such a principle be used to justify committing atrocities?

(Schweinerei [p. 142] is foul play, literally “piggishness.”)

25. Describe what Arendt calls Eichmann’s last crisis of conscience (pp. 137-150). How does Arendt connect this with “the often-cited soldier who, acting in a normal legal framework, refuses to carry out orders that run counter to his ordinary experience of lawfulness and hence can be recognized by him as criminal” (p. 148)?

Humanities III Prof. Boedeker

Worksheet on Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963): third worksheet, pp. 151-219

26. Arendt describes Eichmann’s main job on p. 153. What was it, and how would you describe it in general terms? Did he witness the effects of his actions on Jews and other oppressed peoples?

27. What historical significance did Hitler’s Final Solution have for European Jews (pp. 153-4)?

(Sui generis [p. 171] means spontaneous, happening by itself.)

28. Why does Arendt write: “One is tempted to recommend the story [of the Danish resistance to deportation of Jews] as required reading in political science for all students who wish to learn something about the enormous power potential inherent in non-violent action and in resistance to an opponent possessing vastly superior means of violence” (p. 171)? How did deportation in Denmark differ from that in other Western European countries? How did the behavior of German authorities in Denmark differ from that in other countries? What lessons does Arendt draw from this (p. 175)?

(Pour se débrouiller [p. 172] means “in order to get out of difficulty”.)

29. Italy, although Germany’s military ally, did not help much in deporting Jews. What reasons does Arendt give for this (pp. 176-180)?

30. How did Italian resistance to deportation differ from Danish resistance to deportation (p. 179)?

31. How did the Nazis play on the ethnic situation as they moved into the Balkans and Eastern Europe (pp. 181-2)?

32. How did the situation of Jews in the East differ from that of Jews in Western Europe (pp. 182-3)?

(Numerus clausus [p. 186] means a numerical limit of applicants accepted to a given field, such as medicine.

Mutatis mutandis [p. 188] means “making the appropriate changes”.

The Sonderkommando für Judenangelegenheiten [p. 188] is the Special Command for Jewish Affairs.)

33. In Eichmann’s trial, the prosecution focused mainly on his alleged participation, not in events within Germany, but in the killing in the East (i.e., Poland, occupied Russia, and the Baltic states). This is because most of the suffering of Jews occurred in the East, and all extermination camps toward the end of the war, when most of the killing occurred, were in the East. Arendt claims that that the evidence relating Eichmann to the East was scanty (p. 206). (Nevertheless, as she points out [p. 219], Eichmann would still have been executed even if the judges had completely cleared him of the counts connected with the killing in the East.) What were the four points concerning Eichmann’s dealings in the East, and what does Arendt argue was the extent of his involvement in each?

(In dubio contra reum [p. 214] means “when in doubt, act against the defendant”.)

Humanities III Prof. Boedeker

Worksheet on Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (1963): fourth worksheet, pp. 220-252, 276-279, 287-298

(PLEASE NOTE CHANGE FROM ORIGINAL SYLLABUS!)

34. Arendt concludes Chapter XIV with the story of German Sergeant Anton Schmidt (pp. 230-231), and with the account of former German Army physician Peter Bamm about how futile it would have been for any German soldier to have “seriously protested or done anything” (p. 232) against atrocities they knew were being committed. What did Schmidt do? What happened to him? Does Arendt agree with Bamm that rare acts like Sergeant Schmidt’s were really in vain? Explain.

35. What crimes was Eichmann convicted for? In particular, what was meant by his conviction for “crimes against the Jewish people” (p. 244)? Do you find him guilty of these crimes? Are there any charges of which you find him innocent? Explain.

36. How did the judgment of the Appeals Court (May 22, 1962) differ from the original judgment of the District Court (December 15, 1961) (p. 249)?

37. What do you think Arendt means when she says that the ultimate lesson of Eichmann’s life and death was the banality of evil (p. 252)? Do you regard the actions for which he was executed as indeed banal? Explain.

38. In the Epilogue (of which you only have to read pp. 276-279), Arendt makes a sophisticated case that there was a lot of confusion amongst the prosecutors, the defense, and the judges about the exact nature of the crimes for which Eichmann was being tried and eventually convicted. Basically, her argument amounts to this. On the one hand, if Eichmann was tried under a specifically Israeli law of “crimes against the Jewish people”, then the Israelis would have had no right to kidnap him (who was then a legal resident of Argentina) and convict him at all. Doing so would have been no better than simply having the Israeli Secret Service kill him on the spot in Argentina. On the other hand, if Eichmann was tried for the international crime of crimes against humanity, then Eichmann should have been tried in an international court, as occurred in the Nuremberg Trials.

39. On pp. 276-279, Arendt then tries to get at the real reason why Eichmann was kidnapped, tried, convicted, and executed in Israel. She argues that this real reason was at odds with what she takes to be the hallmark of modern legal systems: that someone must be able to tell right from wrong in order to be commit a crime, and that the intentions of the accused must therefore be taken into account in conviction and sentencing. On pp. 277-279, she gives an alternate speech that she believes the judges would have given if they “had dared” to tell the defendant the real reasons for his conviction and sentence. (On this topic, see also p. 294.) This raises 2 questions:

39a. What does Arendt take to be the “real reasons” for Eichmann’s trial and execution? How do these square with the modern legal notion that someone can commit a crime only if s/he is able to tell right from wrong?

39b. Do you think that someone can commit a crime only if s/he is able to tell right from wrong? For example, if someone is legally insane – i.e., unable to tell right from wrong at the time of the act – should s/he still be regarded as a murderer? Or if someone is mentally ill but still able to tell right from wrong (such as Andrea Yeats, the Texas woman who was convicted for drowning her five children in a bathtub), should s/he still be convicted of a crime? Explain your reasoning for your answer.

40. In the Postscript (of which you only have to read pp. 287-298), Arendt responds to some of the criticisms that have been made of the first edition of her controversial book. On pp. 287-8, she clarifies what she meant by the provocative claim that Eichmann’s evil, like much of the Nazi evil, was “banal”. What does she mean by this? From what you know about Eichmann, were his actions in fact banal in this sense?

41. On pp. 289-290, Arendt dismisses the argument made by Eichmann’s defense that he was merely a cog in a machine. What is her argument for rejecting this defense? What do you make of it? Explain.

42. What is an “act of state”, and why does Arendt argue that it really doesn’t adequately apply to the cases of Nazi war criminals, such as Eichmann (pp. 290-292)?

43. After discussing so-called acts of state, Arendt then (pp. 292-294) turns to the other legal category available for use in trials of the Nazis: “acts performed on superior orders”, together with the notion that “manifestly criminal [or unlawful] orders must not be obeyed”. What reasons does Arendt give in arguing that this category also fails to apply adequately to Eichmann’s case? What do you make of her reasoning here?

44. Arendt concludes the book (pp. 294-298) with a rejection of many reasons why people find it difficult to pass judgment on such heinous acts as those that occurred under the Nazis. She dismisses the following objections:

- that judges are arrogant (pp. 295-6),

- that the perpetrators were tempted (p. 295),

- that we cannot judge unless we were actually present at the deed (pp. 295-6),

- that the judges themselves might have done wrong under the same circumstances and thus deserve to be forgiven (p. 296),

- that no one has the right to judge anyone else since somehow everyone is equally guilty (pp. 296-297),

and

- that people are determined to do what they did by sociological or psychological factors (p. 297).

She ends by distinguishing between political questions of laws and governments, and criminal questions of an individual’s guilt or innocence. What conclusion does she come to? What do you make of this conclusion? Explain.

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