Why Did Britain Follow A Policy Of Appeasement Towards Hitler



Why Did Britain Follow A Policy Of Appeasement Towards Hitler?

It was clear that Hitler would challenge the European balance of power in 1933. He committed Germany to a programme of rearmament, breaking Versailles and the inclusion in Germany of all German speaking peoples. In Mein Kampf he also spoke of winning Lebensraum in Russia. So why did Britain decide to follow a policy of appeasement towards Hitler in the 1930s?

Continuation of Revising The Treaty of Versailles:

Hitler certainly inherited a strong moral position from Stresemann, and there was a widespread feeling in Britain that Germany had been hard done by at Versailles and had legitimate grievances. Justice was justice despite the fact it was demanded by a dictator. Britain had spent much of the 20s revising the Versailles settlement so appeasement was in many ways a continuation of this. For British policy-makers this revision of the Treaty was a normal step to take. Furthermore Hitler had won much public respect for his anti-Communist stance once first elected. A stronger Germany would be a useful “buffer” against the Soviet Union, and Hitler was certainly preferred to Stalin. Britain remained deeply suspicious of the USSR.

As well as the Rhineland, and the Anchluss (self-determination), a good example of appeasement being dictated by revision of Versailles was the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Treaty. Britain argued it was better for Germany to have a limited navy rather than allow its expansion to go unchecked. There was certainly an argument that Hitler’s policy up until 1938 was “reasonable”.

Rejection Of Pre-1914 Diplomacy:

There was also a feeling that an Entente policy (as followed before WW1) towards Germany might be counter-productive as had been the case in 1914. Grey’s policy of encircling Germany through alliances and agreements might cause her to lash out. A much more understanding approach was needed which took into account German grievances. This had shown itself in the 1920s;

• Reluctance to offer military guarantees to France

• Refusal to ally with USSR

• Reluctance to guarantee Germany’s eastern borders.

The rejection of this policy left only appeasement as a viable alternative.

The Attitudes of Other Countries:

The USA was wedded to isolation in the 1920s-30s so there was no chance of her wanting to get involved in European affairs, let alone European war if it broke out. The USA had played a crucial role in defeating Germany in 1918 but Britain could not rely on this again. In fact Neville Chamberlain once said;

“…count on nothing from the Americans but words.”

Furthermore;

• The USA passed a series of Neutrality Acts in the 1930s stating it would not sell arms or loans to other countries involved in war.

• USA did not even get involved when Japan threatened her commercial interests in the Far East.

More importantly the attitude of the Empire made appeasement an attractive option. Most of the Dominions were reluctant to help Britain in another war, particularly after the heavy costs in lives paid by both Australia and South Africa in WW1. All of this would only contribute to the feeling of weakness in Britain.

With France being ruled by a series of weak governments in the 1930s, GB was alone in seeking to influence Germany’s government. It is perhaps unrealistic to expect Chamberlain’s government to risk war in this situation.

Dislike For Bolshevik Russia:

The historian Ruth Hethog suggests that a British pact with the USSR would have done more than anything else to avert war. However this was unlikely;

• Chamberlain and the Tories continued to distrust Communism, especially Stalin. This was unsurprising given that Stalin had killed far more of his own people than Hitler through his purges and gulag camps.

• Britain saw the USSR as a liability. Again unsurprising since Stalin had greatly weakened his army in the purges; e.g. 80% of senior army officers killed or imprisoned.

The Russian Foreign Secretary Litvinov and his successor Molotov were repeatedly snubbed by the British. As a result Britain left it too late to explore a deal with the USSR and was finally beaten to it by Hitler when he signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact in August 1939.

Economic Slump:

The post-war slump had the impact of making GB feel vulnerable. Despite some recovery this decline continued raising the prospect of bankruptcy if war was declared;

• Britain’s share of world manufacturing declined from 13.6% in 1914 to 10% in 1938.

• The collapse of British exports after WW1 led to a crisis in the balance of payments causing a reduction in gold and currency reserves.

Defence Cuts:

After WW1 Lloyd-George introduced the Ten Year Rule which allowed defence spending to be pared to the bare minimum. So much so that GB was at its lowest military strength in 1931/2. All governments had been responsible for this including Baldwin’s 1924-29 administration which included Winston Churchill as chancellor;

• Army drastically reduced – from 3.5 million men in 1918 to 370,000 in 1920. Furthermore, by 1930 defence spending was below that of 1910 and armed forces manpower below that of 1914.

• Naval supremacy had been sacrificed in the 1922 Washington Naval Agreement which gave parity to USA – 5:5:3:2:2 – USA, GB, Japan, France, Italy.

• The RAF had scrapped large numbers of planes but due to the high rate of obsolescence this was less relevant.

British Public Opinion:

There certainly was a great fear of war and of Germany in Britain during the 1930s. There was no jingoism or patriotism as in 1914. Instead Britain’s population understood the full horrors of modern war which had cost them close to 1 million lives in WW1.

• War poets such as Wilfred Owen, and Siegfried Sassoon had demonstrated the horrors of trench warfare so there was little desire for a repeat of this.

• Due to the popular belief that “The bomber will always get through…” there was a widespread belief that thousands (if not millions) of civilians would die in a future war, either by explosions or poisonous gas. This was reinforced by the bombing and destruction of Guernica in the Spanish Civil War in 1936.

• As Hitler built up his Luftwaffe, these fears seemed justified and only increased. Appeasement seemed more appropriate than another war.

• There is further evidence of the public dislike for war in the creation of the Peace Pledge Union in 1935. This was a non-government organisation set up in London and called for an end to war. It was extremely popular and soon attracted 135,000 members.

• In the East Fulham by-election of 1935, the defeat of the Conservatives by Labour (in a previously safe Conservative seat) was seen as further proof that pacifism was increasingly popular.

Certainly appeasement was popular with the British public until 1938. Chamberlain was cheered by crowds on his return from the Munich Conference and his words of “…peace in our time…” were greeted with approval. However, Hitler’s breaking of the Munich Agreement by occupying the rest of Czechoslovakia changed public mood;

• Hitler had broken a signed agreement with Chamberlain.

• He had dismembered a small state without warning or provocation.

• He could not claim that he was uniting Germans within one German state as with his previous gambles.

Most of the public felt a firmer stance was required before Hitler controlled the whole of Europe. There were calls for tougher words, the inclusion of Winston Churchill (a major critic of appeasement) in the government, faster rearmament as well as an alliance with Russia.

Buying Time For Britain:

There was certainly a feeling of vulnerability in Britain caused by both the effects of war and the economic slump in the 1930s. After Hitler left the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference, it became clear that Britain needed to rearm. The Rhineland only added to this call. But, she needed time to catch up based on the British government’s assumptions about Germany’s military capability and her own vulnerability;

• In 1937 the Chiefs of Staffs reported that Britain’s military forces were insufficient to meet Britain’s defensive commitments and imperial defence.

• In September 1938 defence advisors stated that Britain’s air defences were insufficient and a year was required to improve them.

• Britain’s new Radar system would not be ready until 1939.

Certainly, Britain did carry out a number of reforms and policies in order to prepare herself for war during the period of appeasement which backs up this argument;

• In 1932 the Ten Year Rule was abandoned.

• In 1933 defence spending was only £100 million (3% of GNP). By 1939 it had grown to £700 million (18% of GNP).

• In 1936 an Air Raid Precautions Department was created.

• In 1937 the call for air raid wardens attracted over 1 million volunteers.

• In 1937 a major rearmament programme commenced based on the pessimistic view of Britain’s military strength. There was a focus on increased fighter aircraft and naval production. The 1938 Munich Agreement was partly inspired by Chamberlain’s fear of German bombing of London and the RAF’s inability to prevent it.

• The 1938 Air Raid Precautions Bill gave local authorities responsibility for detailed contingency plans including mass evacuations from cities. 50 million gas masks were distributed.

• In 1939 120,000 volunteers joined the Auxiliary Fire Service.

Britain was much more prepared for war than she had been in 1933. In particular Chamberlain could now be more confident of Britain’s defence against air attacks. He would be more willing to take a firmer line in 1939, yet he still hoped for peace.

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