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2015 Illinois Philosophical Association Conference Eastern Illinois UniversityPaper AbstractsHow Improbable is Our Finely-Tuned Universe? In a famous paper titled “Why is There Anything at All?” (1996) van Inwagen argues that all possible worlds are equally probable a priori. In this paper, we argue that if multiverses are possible, then it follows that there is a 100% probability that a randomly selected possible world would include at least one physical universe fine-tuned for the evolution of intelligent biological life. Thus, if van Inwagen is correct and all possible worlds are equally probable a priori, then we would expect the actual world to include at least one finely-tuned universe if the actual world came to exist by random chance. Dr. Jason Waller- Eastern Illinois University Bob Milnikel – Kenyon CollegeCommentator: Dr. Grant Sterling – Eastern Illinois UniversityTwo Arguments Against Indirect Mathematical Empiricism: Indirect mathematical empiricists aim to provide a completely a posteriori account of justified mathematical belief. To do so, they argue that (a) mathematical propositions are expressed by indispensable sentences of our best current scientific theories and (b) we are justified in believing mathematical propositions in virtue of their theoretical indispensibility. Since scientific theories are justified a posteriori, it follows that any belief justified in virtue of a scientific theory is also justified a posteriori. I raise two concerns about whether indirect mathematical empiricists can achieve their aim. First, I argue that since some mathematical beliefs are more justified than any scientific theories, they must possess a degree of theory-independent justification. Second, I argue that a potential defeater for all scientific theories (namely, the pessimistic meta-induction) is not a defeater for many mathematical beliefs. This too suggests that such beliefs possess a degree of theory independent justification. Dr. Robert M Farley – Hillsborough CollegeCommentator: Ryan Ross - University of Illinois Urbana-ChampaignApology and Empathy: In this paper I argue for a new analysis of apology that interprets them as a particular type of empathy (or sympathy) expression. Currently, apologies are contrasted to empathetic expressions of “I’m sorry,” which are taken to be philosophically uninteresting. Or, expressions of empathy are positioned opposite of genuine apologies, as when expressions of empathy (i.e. I’m sorry that you feel that way) are used to replace or obfuscate responsibility (i.e. I’m sorry that I did that to you.) But if we understand apologies as a particular kind of empathy claim, a view of apology emerges that is better, as I will explain here. Dr. Teresa Britton – Eastern Illinois UniversityCommentator: Sungwoo Um - Duke UniversityEvidential Evil & Epistemic Possibility: Since theists haven’t yet provided a logical proof of God’s existence compelling to atheists, and vice versa for atheists and disproof, focus has shifted towards what it is reasonable to believe. In “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” atheologian William Rowe argues that because evil appears to serve no God-justifying good, evil is evidence against God’s existence. Theists respond that because God’s reasons are inconceivable to us, instances of apparently pointless evil are not evidential—it is epistemically possible that they have a hidden justification. I briefly explain epistemic possibility, then recount Rowe’s Evidential Argument from Evil and outline theistic responses framed in epistemic possibility, examining Stephen Wykstra’s CORNEA—a suggested semantics of “It appears that p.” I then demonstrate through an extended example how CORNEA is inclusive enough to reasonably permit theistic belief, but is too inclusive, inviting global skeptical explosion. Jonathan York - Northern Illinois UniversityCommentator: Timothy Kirschenheiter - Wayne State UniversityDebunking Arguments Needn’t Make Us Insecure: ?Evolutionary debunking arguments are meant to convince us that we cannot rationally retain our moral beliefs, by way of convincing us that there is no explanatory connection between the moral facts and our moral beliefs. A growing number of respondents maintain the arguments can be blocked *without denying* that there is such an explanatory disconnect. We present what we take to be the central problem with these lines of response. Much of the discussion will focus on attempts to vindicate these responses, by showing that the debunking arguments fail to threaten the "security" of our moral beliefs. Dr. Dan Korman – University of Illinois Dustin Locke - Claremont McKennaCommentator: Nethanel Lipshitz - University of ChicagoA New Paradox in Lewis’ Paradise: In this paper, I have presented a paradox to argue that the unrestricted principle of recombination leads to the implausible conclusion, given a plausible assumption, that there can be neither the aggregate, nor the class of all Lewisian possible worlds. While a restriction on the size of possible worlds would effectively prevent the paradox, any such restriction could not be free from criticism that it was objectionably arbitrary. It should also be noted that the paradox argument addressed in this paper undermines exclusively GMR (or any modal theory which considers possible worlds as concrete entities), for the property of automorphy could only be instantiated by concrete objects. Unless the proponent of GMR finds a way to deal with no aggregate or class of all possible worlds, GMR should be rejected as untenable.? Seungil Lee – University of Illinois Commentator: Milo Crimi - UCLAMoral Concerns About Responsibility Denial and the Quarantine of Violent Criminals: In recent years, a number of philosophers have argued that human beings lack the kind of free will that makes us morally responsible for our actions.? Some of these philosophers are Derk Pereboom, Gregg Caruso, and Bruce Waller.? Each of these philosophers realizes that insofar as no one is morally responsible for their actions this presents a problem concerning what should be done with dangerous criminal offenders.? In response to this, they endorse a quarantine approach to the issue to justify the nonpunitive detention of criminals who pose a threat to society.? In my essay I explain their view and argue that it falls prey to a problem of quarantining the innocent.? Thus, I conclude that we should have deep moral reservations about such views.Dr. John Lemos - Coe CollegeCommentator: Dr. Christopher Pynes – Western Illinois UniversityModality for Moderate Empiricists: On Some Problems and Prospects for Structural Counterfactuals: We consider some problems and prospects for marrying two recent research programs – Williamson’s?counterfactualist approach to the epistemology of modality and Pearl’s causal modeling approach to counterfactuals – to provide an epistemology acceptable to moderate empiricists. We consider some?problems already noted in the literature arising from counterfactuals with disjunctive antecedents and?embedded counterfactuals. Adam Edwards – University of IllinoisJonathan Livengood - University of Illinois Commentator: Meagan Phillips - Northern Illinois UniversityFriendship and Epistemic Partiality: My aim in this paper is to closely examine the relationship between friendship and epistemic partiality. First, I argue that what good friendship involves as its constituent part is not epistemic partiality per se, but what I call friendly hope, which is the source of the former. Second, I address the worry that friendship can be an epistemic vice, since, even assuming that it does not demand epistemically objectionable partiality, it frequently gives rise to such partiality. I argue that the sort of epistemic partiality from friendship is not as epistemically objectionable as it first appears. I conclude that friendship as such is neutral from an epistemic point of view.? Sungwoo Um – Duke UniversityCommentator: Dr. Peter Boltuc - University of Illinois, SpringfieldEpistemic Possibility: Contextualism or Relativism? There are two dominant theories regarding epistemic modals: relativism and contextualism. Both theories share the idea that sentences involving epistemic modals have truth-values and are context-sensitive. The main difference between relativism and contextualism is what determines the truth-conditions of a modal claim. For relativism, the context of assessment establishes the truth- conditions of a modal claim; meanwhile, for contextualism, the truth- conditions are determined by the context of utterance. The aim of this paper is to show that John MacFarlane’s relativism provides a better account of epistemic modals than Keith DeRose’s contextualism. To develop this argument, I have organized the paper as follows: first, I examine the contextualist treatment of epistemic modals, and then explain the relativist approach. Afterwards, I defend the thesis that relativism has a better explanatory power for epistemic modals than contextualism. In the last section, I present a potential objection to relativism and a reply to it.?Nathaly Garcia – Northern Illinois University Commentator: Caley Howland - Northern Illinois UniversityIn Defense of Biological Normativity: This essay aims to show that the rejection of biological normativity on the ground that it is inconsistent with our best science generates a reductio against the very epistemic commitments that undergird the move to reject biological normativity in the first place. I also briefly outline an Aristotelian approach to normativity that avoids the reductio while remaining broadly in line with naturalist sympathies. Embracing this approach to biological normativity unifies normativity across biology, epistemology, and metaethics. Insofar as simplicity and explanatory unification are theoretical virtues that constitute evidence of a theory’s truth, there is at least some reason to believe in the existence of objective biological norms. Jeff Wisdom – Joliet Junior College Commentator: Graham Renz – University of MissouriIs the proponent of neo-Darwinian theory committed to the existence of a Designer? Drawing inspiration from Plantinga’s seminal work, we will argue that the proponent of neo-Darwinian theory is committed to the existence of a Designer. Fales’ convincingly makes the case that Plantinga is incorrect to hold that neo-Darwinian theory makes globally reliable belief forming mechanisms unlikely. In this paper we will argue that a purely neo-Darwinian account of evolution makes it very unlikely that simplicity, a local belief forming mechanism, is a reliable guide to truth. Given the role simplicity plays in science, if simplicity is not a veridical method of theory selection, scientific realism is likely false and we should, concomitantly, refuse to treat neo-Darwinian theory realistically. Scientific realism and neo-Darwinian theory can be saved if we are willing to posit the existence of a Designer responsible for our preference for simplicity. Dr. Abraham Graber and Luke Golemon – Western Illinois University Commentator: Dr. Jason Waller – Eastern Illinois University The Assertion of Epistemic Possibilities: In this paper I consider two departures from truth-conditional semantics of epistemic modals like relativism: radical invariantism and expressivism. I argue that neither offers a fully satisfactory account of epistemic modals. I do so by first outlining three formal features of relativism that, when rejected or revised, present problematic consequences for each theory. In the second section, I present Kent Bach’s radical invariantism and argue that it fails to properly capture our belief states when making assertions about epistemic possibilities. In the third section, I briefly argue that while expressivism might fare better, it is ultimately unable to fully establish itself against the relativist position. The upshot of my discussion is that three formal features—concerning semantic completeness, factualism, and the informational content of truth-evaluable epistemic modal sentences—seem necessary for any theory seeking to model assertions of epistemic possibilities. Ali K. Aenehzodaee - Northern Illinois University Commentator: Timothy Buchanan - Northern Illinois UniversityObjects as Processes: Dissolving the Problem of Collocated Objects: The author finds “traditional” accounts of the collocation of objects unacceptable, i.e. it is denied two objects can be located in the exact same region of space-time. This paper argues the basic distinction between conventional and non-conventional objects, grounded in the characteristic actions of objects, allows for an intuitive and parsimonious solution to collocation. First, the distinction between conventional and non-conventional objects is explicated and defended. Next, the notion of non-conventional, intrinsically unified objects (processes) is explored and unpacked. In the final section, that account is put to work dissolving the problem of collocated objects by locating conventional objects in the mind, and non-conventional objects in the external world. Graham Renz – University of Missouri Commentator: Kristin Seemuth Whaley – University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign A Moral Argument against the Existence of God: In this paper, I argue against the existence of a perfect God by arguing that if a perfect God exists, then this God is performing a wrongful inaction by withholding the crucial information of God’s existence and love. This wrongful inaction derives from the fact that God knows that many of us lack this crucial information, God could easily supply this information, and this information is likely to lead to us changing our minds concerning whether we should be performing immoral actions or not. I consider objections to this argument that claim that God has already sufficiently revealed God’s self, that God revealing God’s self in this manner would limit our free will, and that God remains hidden in order to achieve some greater good(s). Timothy Kirschenheiter – Wayne State University Commentator: Dr. Mylan Engel – Northern Illinois UniversitySituationism and the Discerning Situation:? The Need for Robust Character Traits: Situationists argue given that situational factors have great influences on our actions, trying to rely on robust virtues is futile.? Rather, we should refocus our moral energies on discerning what situations we enter into. This paper shows the tension between these two claims.? If situational factors greatly influence our behavior, such factors will also greatly impact our ability to choose which future situations to enter into.? A possible solution is proposed: Perhaps situations vary in the extent of their psychologically influencing factors and we can choose our future situations when these factors are absent.? Situationists, such as John Doris, allow for local traits – ones indexed to specific situations.? One might argue that a consistent trait exhibited in situations which lack influencing factors is just a type of local trait.? However, I argue that if this is the case, then traits developed is these cases look more robust, rather than local. Maria Altepeter – Northern Illinois University Commentator: Joseph Spino – University of Illinois at Urbana-ChampaignDisagreement, Internalism and Genuine Predicates of Personal Taste: The problem of lost disagreement is seen as a problem for contextualists when it comes to providing an account of predicates of personal taste (further referred to as PPTs).? Michael Glanzberg believes that a contextualist account, motivated by the semantics of gradable adjectives, can escape such a problem.? However, a problem remains for Glanzberg in that the only disagreement his account allows for arises in cases where both speakers are not asserting genuine PPTs. After developing an account of genuine PPTs based on R.M. Hare's judgment internalism and arguing why we should accept such an account, I argue that Glanzberg’s account does not give us disagreement in cases involving them. Viewed in such a way, we find that Glanzberg has not given us a contextualist account that can overcome the problem of lost disagreement. Brendan Learnihan-Sylvester – Northern Illinois UniversityCommentator: Ben Cilwick - Northern Illinois UniversitySeeking a Cartesian Contextual Definition of 'Life': According to Descartes, non-human animals, as well as human bodies, are automata — that is, self-moving machines — lacking both vegetative and sensitive souls. Such a view raises an intriguing question: what, for Descartes, is the difference between living and non-living things? At various places, Descartes’ account suggests two distinct proposals for a principle of life, one of which appears too restrictive and the other of which appears too permissive. MacKenzie and Ablondi have each attempted to reconstruct a Cartesian contextual definition of ‘life’ that avoids these problems. Here I argue against certain aspects of both MacKenzie’s and Ablondi’s interpretations of Descartes. I then propose an alternative, hybrid view that combines features of both MacKenzie’s and Ablondi’s accounts. Milo Jon-Christopher Crimi - UCLA?Commentator: Dr. Andrew Youpa - Southern Illinois UniversityThe Weight of Evidence: Joshua Cohen argues Thomas Pogge’s Strong Thesis fails to empirically establish that minor changes to the global order since 1980 would have eliminated global poverty. I argue Pogge’s responses are compelling. He maintains there is strong, though not definitive, evidence. Further, current research methods limit the extent of relevant data. Finally, Cohen relies on questionable assumptions. In addition, I consider alternative responses Pogge has available including suggesting that historical events prior to 1980 are relevant to the current global order and that Pogge’s project is justified as a pragmatic proposal. Nonetheless, I suggest Cohen’s critique could defeat negative duty claims. Given this, I briefly consider ideas for future inquiry. Twigz (Jim) McGuire – Northern Illinois University Commentator: Haley Dutmer - Northern Illinois UniversityWould, Might, and the Bite of Skeptical Arguments from Possibility: In the Southwest Philosophy Review, Mylan Engel Jr. argues that the skeptical argument from possibility (AP) is equivocal, invalid, unsound or question-begging. One version of AP (XA2) is unsound by virtue of its dependence on a false principle (MEP), to wit, that for any proposition if it is metaphysically possible then it is epistemically possible. My purpose in this essay is to show that XA2 avoids Engel's critique and thereby provides a seemingly sound argument for external world skepticism. I begin by introducing the general form of AP, and then clarify AP by disambiguating the modal operators at work in it. Secondly, I argue that the metaphysical possibility of P -- where P is representative of a subset of propositions (X) of MEP -- entails the epistemic possibility of P. Finally, I end by illustrating that a suitable skeptical hypothesis is a member of set X, and thereby conclude that XA2 provides a seemingly sound argument for external world skepticism.?Dan Dake – Northern Illinois University Commentator: Dr. Todd Stewart - Illinois State UniversityShape Phenomenology and Shape Perception: The reports of individuals who have had their vision restored as adults after becoming blind early in life suggest that they are often unable to recognize even simple shapes by vision alone.? It is often assumed that the empirical literature on sight restoration tells us something important about the relationship between visual and tactile representations of shape.? But this assumption is mistaken if the initial visual experiences of newly sighted individuals do not represent the shapes of objects.? I maintain that the initial visual experiences of at least some newly sighted individuals do not represent shape but do instantiate the phenomenal properties characteristic of shape experience.? Consequently, the empirical literature on sight restoration tells us something important about the relationship between perceptual phenomenology and perceptual content—it tells us that perceptual content is not determined by or “built into” perceptual phenomenology. Dr. Boyd MillarCommentator: Jonathan York - Northern Illinois UniversityScientific Models, (Anti-)Fictionalism, and the Distinct Questions of Representation and Mediation: A trend in the recent philosophy of science literature has been to compare scientific models to artistic products: like paintings, models are imperfect depictions of the world; like works of literature, they are descriptions of an imagined world or of what this world might have been like. In contrast with this popular view that treats modeling as fiction-making, Margaret Morrison (2015) has offered a moderate perspective, reserving the adjective “fictional” to models of imaginary targets. Despite the differences, however, both extreme and moderate versions of fictionalism presuppose representationalism about models and thus inherit the problems inherent to that view. By adopting the alternative (anti-representational) artifactual view of models, I reject fictionalism and the comparison between science and art, favoring instead the analogy with engineering: like scaffolds, models facilitate engaging with the world without representing it. Accordingly, treating models as (non-representational) intermediaries motivates distinguishing between the questions of representation and mediation. Guilherme Sanches de Oliveira – University of Cincinnati Commentator: Dr. Brandon Polite - Knox College ................
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