{p
Ex-Ambassador Henry Morgenthau, who carried some weight with the Wilson administration, has been implicated by anti-Semites and anti-Zionists in nefarious schemes to inveigle the US into World War I in return for British support for a Jewish state. However, America joined the war before the Balfour declaration was issued. Morgenthau himself initiated a US mission, which he eventually aborted, that was to have tried to get Turkey out of the war by promising that it could keep Armenia, Palestine and other territories if it left the Central Powers alliance. ==
5. Morgenthau was the former American ambassador at Istanbul. He was on his way to Switzerland on a mission to explore the possibilities of a separate peace with the Ottoman Empire. Weizmann succinctly summed up what happened at Gibraltar in the first days of July in a letter to Scott some weeks later:
The Americans arrived without any plan, instructions or even knowledge of the great issues involved. Morgenthau had an idea that he could try and influence Talaat or Enver, to detach themselves from their mentors. But how it is going to be done, under what conditions and whether the Turks are really ready for such a step, all that Mr M. did not know. It was therefore not difficult to dissuade him and he has abandoned all his plans.
William Yale, ‘Ambassador’s Henry Morgenthau’s special mission of 1917’, World Politics, 1/3 (1949), pp. 309−10,
and
Weizmann to Scott, 30 July 1917, Stein, Letters and Papers, Vol. VII, p. 475. ==
TRIAL AND ERROR
The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann
Harper & Brothers, New York 1949
{p. 195} ONE morning early in June of that year (1917) I received a cable from Mr. Brandeis to the effect that an American commission was traveling to the East and that I should try . to make contact with it somewhere. Who the members of the commission were, what its purpose was, to what point of the East it was traveling, and where I could establish contact, were details not mentioned. That it had something to do with us was obvious; I would not have received the cable otherwise.
Everything else was a complete mystery. I immediately consulted Sykes and Ormsby-Gore. From them I learned that attempts were being made to detach Turkey from the Central Powers. America was taking the lead in the move, with the cognizance of the other Powers. Ex-Ambassador Henry Morgenthau would be leaving New York shortly for Switzerland, to be met there by French and English groups.
The Foreign Office did not attach much importance to the maneuver.
I did-at first. There was, I thought, the possibility that the negotiations might be conducted on the basis of an integral Turkey, leaving the Jews, the Arabs and the Armenians in the lurch. I put this question point blank to the Foreign Office; they replied that it was axiomatic that no arrangements with Turkey could be arrived at unless Armenia, Syria and Arabia were detached from Turkish rule.
I was not satisfied. A fortnight later I learned that Mr. Morgenthau was to be accompanied on his mission by "some Zionists!" Nor was I assured by the names suggested as the English envoys. They did not seem to me to be the proper persons for such a mission. It seemed to me that the only man by whom the British Government could be adequately represented, who thoroughly understood the Near East, and enjoyed the full confidence of the representatives of the Arabs, Jews and Armenians, was Sir Mark Sykes, the man who had had this particular question in his hands for the last three years. I knew that there
{p. 196} were influences in the Foreign Office working against Sir Mark precisely because of the views he held and because, as I wrote to the ever-helpful Mr. Scott, "he is much more broadminded than some bureaucrats."
A few days later I was asked to call on Balfour. He took up the subject of the commission, but seemed to be almost as much in the dark as myself with regard to its exact purposes and plans. However, Mr. Morgenthau had obviously obtained President Wilson's blessing for his scheme, whatever it was, and the French were apparently keen on. it. The British did not like the smell of it, and they wanted Mr. Morgenthau to be turned back before he reached Egypt. But how was this to be done without making a bad impression on President Wilson? I looked rather blank, suspecting that Mr. Balfour already had some plan in mind, but quite unable to guess at it. Then, to my complete astonishment, he suggested that, without giving the affair an official character, I was to be sent to Gibraltar as the British representative. I was to talk to Mr. Morgenthau, and keep on talking till I had talked him out of this mission.
{p. 197} On the fourth the French representative arrived. He was a Colonel Weyl, a charming and well-informed man who had been for many years the head of the Turkish tobacco monopoly, knew the country, and spoke Turkish. The French, it soon transpired, were taking the American mission seriously. After all, here was an ex-Ambassador, who had come across the ocean with the blessings of the President, and accompanied by a whole suite. Besides, the wish may have been father to the thought: the French were prepared to consider a separate peace with Turkey, on tbe basis of the inviolability of the Turkish Empire.
{p. 199} Morgenthau had been withdrawn from Turkey. He had returned to find all his friends with big jobs, and himself rather out of things. It would have been only natural for him to go to Wilson, and to say: "Look here, Mr. President: I know the Turks, I know Enver Bey, Taalat Pasha and the others. If I could only get to see them, I could persuade Turkey to quit." I can imagine Mr. Wilson replying: "All right, go ahead." No other explanation will fit the picture.
I never saw Mr. Morgenthau again, but I did come across Mrs. Morgenthau years later at a great garden party which Samuel Untermyer gave at Greystone. Taken off my guard I exclaimed rather clumsily: "Oh, Mrs. Morgenthau, I haven't seen you since Gibraltar!" Mrs. Morgenthau said, coldly: "Yes!" and turned her back on me.
How the story of this mission got out I do not know, and it hardly matters now. But get out it did. When the Lodge Committee brought its resolution before the American Congress, in support of the Jewish Homeland in Palestine, in 1922, and a Senate committee looked into its merits, someone-I think it was Senator Reed-objected strongly to its passage. He said that the leaders of the Zionist movement were unworthy men, and that I in particular had prolonged the war for two years by scuttling the Morgenthau mission!
{p. 462} I am certain that the world will judge the Jewish State by what it will do with the Arabs ... ==
World Politics vol 1, issue 3, 1949, pp. 308-320
Ambassador Henry Morgenthau’s Special Mission Of 1917
By William Yale
Earlier negotiations with the Turks thus may have led Mr. Morgenthau to believe that the Turkish leaders in 1917 would consider peace terms which would be acceptable to the Zionists as well as to the Allies.
On the afternoon of May 16, 1917, Mr. Morgenthau had a conversation with Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, in which he expressed the opinion that there was a possibility of prevailing upon the Turks to make a separate peace.7 Mr. Lansing was the more impressed with Mr. Morgenthau’s idea because that very morning the Secretary had had an interview with the private secretary of the American Ambassador to Turkey, who had left Constantinople on April 6 and who held the same views that Mr. Morgenthau did.8 Furthermore, Mr. Lansing had just recently asked Mr. Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, what chance there was of making a separate peace with Turkey; and Mr. Balfour had replied that though he had nothing very definite on the subject, he had been advised that the Turks were “nibbling.”9
Feeling that this might be an opportune time to get Turkey out of the war, and convinced that such negotiations should be attempted by the American Government because of Turkey’s friendly attitude toward the United States, Mr. Lansing promptly reported to President Wilson on May 17, 1917.10 He told the President that Mr. Morgenthau could get in touch with Enver, Talaat, and Djemal, the triumvirate who then ruled Turkey, by going himself to Switzerland where he felt sure that he could contact two former members of the Turkish Cabinet.11 Mr. Lansing stated his own doubts about the success of such an attempt but said that if there were one chance in fifty of its succeeding, it ought not to be missed. The Secretary of State then asked the President whether he thought it worth while to send Mr. Morgenthau to Switzerland to make the attempt.12
The prospect of negotiating a separate peace with Turkey evidently interested the President, for after giving the matter further thought, he had a talk with Mr. Morgenthau on May 28 and again on June 7 when the question of the desirability of having Felix Frankfurter accompany him was discussed.
Mr. Morgenthau records in his memoirs that “In June, 1917, the President asked me to go abroad upon a secret diplomatic errand. . . .”13 Interestingly enough it was Justice Brandeis, one of the leading American Zionists, who suggested that Mr. Frankfurter should accompany Mr. Morgenthau on his secret mission.14 Justice Brandeis was even at that time playing a leading role in directing the affairs of the Zionists in the field of international diplomacy. He had had one or two interviews with Balfour, during the latter’s visit to the United States in May, 1917, at which Zionism had been discussed. [...]
Influential British leaders had long since begun to realize that the sympathy of American Jews for the Allied cause could be won by promising to try and obtain Palestine for the Zionists; and in this connection it had been suggested that Justice Louis Brandeis, as an intimate friend of President Wilson, should be approached.17
[...] Justice Brandeis was at that time in close touch with the Zionist leaders in England and it is possible that it was he who informed Dr. Weizmann of Mr. Morgenthau’s Special Mission to make a separate peace with Turkey.19 On learning from America of this mission, Dr. Weizmann went to see Mr. Balfour and insisted that the attempt to negotiate a separate peace with the Turks should not be made.20
[...] Justice Brandeis may also have suggested that Mr. Felix Frankfurter should accompany Mr. Morgenthau to see that the former Ambassador did not do anything that would run counter to the plans of the Zionist leaders in the United States and Great Britain.
Naturally the President and the Department of State did not want the Germans and their allies to learn in advance that an attempt was going to be made by Mr. Morgenthau to sound out the Turkish leaders in regard to a separate peace. Consequently, rather devious means were used to camouflage the Special Mission. The American press was informed that Henry Morgenthau, Felix Frankfurter, and Mr. Lewis Epstein were going to the Near East on an important mission connected with the prevention of massacres of Jews in Palestine and elsewhere.21
Nevertheless, there were those besides Justice Brandeis and Dr. Weizmann who knew of the somewhat romantic and quixotic nature of the Special Mission. Colonel House carefully recorded in his diary that Henry Morgenthau was leaving on a mission of his own devising. According to the latest plan Mr. Morgenthau intended to go to Egypt and endeavor to obtain an invitation from Turkish leaders to enter Palestine, on the excuse of aiding the Jews there. His real purpose, however, remained that of negotiating a separate peace.24
Shortly before Mr. Morgenthau sailed from New York the Colonel wrote him to say that those who knew the real nature of his Special Mission were looking forward eagerly to word from him.26 Already arrangements had been made for Mr. Morgenthau to meet two leading Zionists en route to Egypt. This House considered inadvisable, and warned Mr. Morgenthau that the Zionists would not agree to his plan to make a separate peace with the Turks. Such, in fact, were the Colonel’s doubts that he suggested that it would have been a better plan to see these two emissaries on the way back from Palestine.26
[...] Learning of Mr. Morgenthau’s proposed trip to the Near East, Dr. Weizmann went to see Mr. Balfour and told him that Mr. Morgenthau’s mission must be circumvented.30 Mr. Balfour was surprised to hear that Dr. Weizmann knew of Mr. Morgenthau’s plan and jokingly asked whether the Zionist leader had spies in the Foreign Office. Dr. Weizmann told the Foreign Secretary that friends in America had informed him of Morgenthau’s mission.31 Mr. Balfour said that an attempt to negotiate peace with Turkey at this time did not fit in with the plans of the British Government, which was as anxious to frustrate it as were the Zionists. But, said Mr. Balfour, this was a pet project of President Wilson’s which the British Government could not openly oppose because Great Britain was so completely dependent upon aid from the United States. He added, however, that he would do everything he could to help Dr. Weizmann and his friends sidetrack Mr. Morgenthau. Dr. Weizmann replied that he could stop Morgenthau if Mr. Balfour would arrange to have Mr. Morgenthau stopped en route to Spain, and if he would make it possible for Monsieur Weyl, the French Zionist, and Dr. Weizmann to meet Mr. Morgenthau at Gibraltar.
Mr. Balfour had the British commander at Gibraltar instructed to invite Mr. Morgenthau on his arrival in Spain to inspect the fortress, where a banquet in his honor, at which Monsieur Weyl and Dr. Weizmann would be present, was planned. In the meantime, Monsieur Weyl and Dr. Weizmann were secretly smuggled on muleback across the Franco-Spanish frontier by an obscure pass in the Pyrenees. They waited in Algeciras for Mr. Morgenthau’s arrival at Gibraltar. Dr. Weizmann called the conference at Gibraltar a historical meeting, taking place, as it did, on America’s national holiday in Britain’s greatest fortress. There, he recounted, three Jews,— Weyl, a French Jew, Morgenthau, a German Jew by birth, and Weizmann, a Russian Jew by origin—decided whether or not the Allies should attempt to make a separate peace with the Turks. Dr. Weizmann said that the meeting was the more dramatic because their only common language was German.
After the banquet, the British commander and his staff withdrew, leaving the three men alone. Dr. Weizmann explained to Morgenthau that an attempt to make a separate peace with Turkey was foolish and would result in a failure which would make Mr. Morgenthau appear ridiculous. Dr. Weizmann said that he threatened Mr. Morgenthau with the opposition of the Zionist Organization because the plan ran counter to those of the Zionists, and proposed to Mr. Morgenthau that he give up his mission and make a visit to the Allied front in France where due honors would be accorded him. As a result, Dr. Weizmann said, Mr. Morgenthau abandoned the Special Mission.
[...] The New York Times published on August 15 a news item from the Foreign Affairs News Service to the effect that Mr. Morgenthau, on reaching the British lines in Palestine, intended to seek conferences with Turkish officials and to discuss with them the possibilities of a separate peace with Turkey.88 But by this time the Special Mission was definitely at an end. The conference with Dr. Weizmann and Monsieur Weyl at Gibraltar on July 4, 1917, had terminated it effectively.
Mr. Morgenthau remained in France during July and August, and visited the British front there in August.86 Mrs. Morgenthau received the ribbon of the Legion of Honor on August 15.87 Dr. Weizmann had successfully accomplished the mission which he had been sent on by Mr. Balfour, and had sidetracked President Wilson’s Special Mission to make a separate peace with Turkey.
Mr. Morgenthau never forgave the Zionist leader, and some years later publicly announced his opposition to the Zionist Movement in a statement issued by several prominent Jews, wherein they said: “We reject the Zionist project of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine.”58
It is well-known that pressure groups influence foreign policy in its formative stages. It is equally well understood that such groups frequently endeavor, and sometimes contrive, to reverse policies once publicly announced. It is also a matter of historical record that foreign governments, even intimate allies, do not always accept the American lead. What is unusual about this episode is the fact that the leaders of a private interest group not only succeeded in circumventing the objects of secret diplomacy, but did so without attempting to mobilize public opinion. ==
The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann
GENERAL EDITOR
MEYER W. WEISGAL
VOLUME VII • SERIES A
August 1914-November 1917
Edited By LEONARD STEIN
in collaboration with DVORAH BARZILAY and NEHAMA A. CHALOM
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS LONDON
ISRAEL UNIVERSITIES PRESS JERUSALEM
1975
{p. 51} 45. To Dorothy de Rothschild, London.
Manchester, 22November 1914
{p. 52}I would like you to realise that the 6 millions of Russian Jews who suffer daily in an atmosphere of lawlessness are not frightened of their bodies, they can bear heroically physical torture*, but what they want is freedom, Jewish freedom, not merely “rights” for which one has to beg the Russian government, but a Jewish pied a terre, a spot in the world where we can be masters of our own destiny. And in this respect we the “beggars” from the East are freer men and women than our “happy” coreligionists in the West, who have lost the taste for Jewish freedom, who don’t believe in it, who have exchanged this freedom for “meat-pots of Egypt”. There are great and glorious exceptions and I bless the hour, when I have realised that I probably can speak to you, that you, who knows Baron Edmond’s work, would understand.
{p. 55} 47. Summary of a conversation with Baron James de Rothschild.
25 November 1914
{p. 56} Baron James expressed his opinion that it is dangerous to go to America at present and agitate in favour of Palestine for the Jews. He thought that the leading American Jews are considered in this country as pro-German in their sympathies, and therefore their support at present would do harm.
{p. 387} 364. To Yehiel Tschlenow, Moscow. London, 29 April 1917
{p. 389} The young Rothschilds11 are with us but the Conjoint is still causing trouble although I don’t think it matters.
{footnote 11} " Lord Rothschild, Mr. and Mrs. Charles Rothschild, Mr. and Mrs. James de Rothschild, as contrasted with the leading surviving member of the older generation, Leopold de Rothschild, an out-and-out anti-Zionist.
{p. 436} 431. To Harry Sacher, Manchester. London, 11 June 1917
Dear Harry,
It came to my notice yesterday that attempts are being [made] to detach Turkey from the Central Powers.1 These attempts are made chiefly by America with the cognizance of the other Allies.
{p. 437} Morgenthau will be leaving New York shortly for Switzerland.2 A group of people from here and also from France will meet Morgenthau in Switzerland.
I have seen the Foreign Office on that matter just now and have discussed this question with them.3 They do not seem to attach very much value to this move, but they countenance it. The negotiators, whose names are known to me,4 are pro-Turks, and although they have no mandate and would not commit their respective Governments, there is still a danger that these negotiations may be carried out on the basis of an integral Turkey. I have put this question point blank to the F.O.; the reply was that it is axiomatic that no arrangement with Turkey can be arrived at unless Armenia, Syria and Arabia are detached.5
{p. 438} 432. To Sir Ronald Graham, London. London, 13June 1917
{p. 439} It is noteworthy that only about two or three months ago the German press wrote comparatively little about the Zionist Movement, although there is a very powerful Zionist Organisation in Germany and Austria which has increased in strength and vitality still more since
{p. 440} the occupation of Poland and Lithuania; but lately articles of an extraordinary character have begun to appear in the German press which all deal with the great importance of the Zionist Movement, the importance of a Jewish Palestine for Turkey and the great danger which a Jewish Palestine under England would represent to the Central Powers.6 Such articles appeared chiefly in the conservative semi-official German Press and also in some of the more liberal papers like the Frankfurter Zeitung. Another interesting fact in connection with this is the attitude of the Neue Freie Presse.1 This paper had for a long time as one of its editors Dr. Herzl, the founder of the Zionist Movement, but it never wrote a single line about Zionism in its columns. Recently it has opened its columns not only to Zionist articles but it publishes regularly the weekly subscriptions to Zionist funds like the Jewish National Fund. There can be no doubt therefore that a change of front has taken place and orders have been given to treat Zionism as an important political factor in the policy of the Central Empires. That in conjunction with the above mentioned attempts can have only one effect and that is to drive a wedge into the Zionist Organisation.
It is a policy which is calculated to influence Jewish public opinion in America and in Russia which will be utilised by German propagandists in both countries against the Entente. That Germany is uneasy about the work of the Zionists in the Entente countries and especially in England and America may be seen from the following two facts. Dr. Zimmermann declared in the secret session of the Reichstag two months ago that Turkey was ready to sell Palestine to America and the bargain was almost completed but he, Zimmermann, succeeded in undoing it and Germany had to advance a very considerable sum of money to the Turks;8 this also has hastened the breach of diplomatic relations between America and Turkey.9
{p. 441} When the news about the evacuation of Jaffa10 was telegraphed over to The Hague one of the Dutch Zionists interviewed von Rosen, the German Ambassador. Von Rosen said he could do very little for the Jews in Palestine, firstly because the Germans are not masters of Turkey and could scarcely interfere with the internal questions of Turkey, and secondly that both the Turks and the Germans are very annoyed by the Zionist propaganda which is entirely pro-English, that the Zionists in Palestine and the Zionists in Germany are almost openly pro-English, and as to the English Zionists they were of course paid by the British Government. There is very little doubt that the German Government would gladly welcome any weakening of the Zionist Movement here and in America.
As you are well aware we have endeavoured here to unite all great Zionist Organisations in the Entente countries on one definite scheme and that is a Jewish Palestine under a British Protectorate. I think that from the letters and telegrams that I have had the honour to submit to you at various times it is evident that this work is going on very successfully. An All Jewish Congress of eight Russian Provinces in the south of Russia took place recently in Kiev and by 333 votes against 36 votes the Zionist platform has been adopted.11 These eight provinces represent a population of two million Jews. Considering that the whole of Poland and part of Lithuania are occupied by Germans we can take it that more than half of the actual Jewish population of Russia has declared for Zionism.
{p. 450} 442. To Charles P. Scott, Manchester. London, 26June 1917
As you may perhaps have heard from Mr. Sacher,3 the Americans are sending a Commission out to Egypt. The object of this
{p. 451} commission is not clearly defined, possibly the Foreign Office here knows more about it than they choose to tell me; there is no doubt that it is certainly an attempt to detach Turkey from the Central Powers, but on what conditions I could not say. Candidly I do not like Morgenthau as a negotiator. He is I think rather pro-Turkish and it is inconceivable that he could offer Turkey conditions which would satisfy the various nationalities now under the heel of the Turk. I am very concerned about the fact that apparently Morgenthau is accompanied by some Zionists; in fact these Zionists wired to me to join their party somewhere en route.4 The meeting place is fixed now in Gibraltar and I hope to go out there as soon as we hear that the American party has sailed.5 But I would like before leaving to see Mr. Lloyd George and hear his views on this subject which I think is of paramount importance. The reasons why I attach such importance to it are the following.
Firstly it is inconceivable that the Turks should attempt to negotiate with the Allies via America or with America alone but certainly with the consent of the Allied Belligerents, without the Germans knowing it. The Germans have got such a hold over Turkey that they would not permit such a move unless they agreed _ to it and considered it favourable to them, a priori what is favourable to them is bad for us. Moreover it is possible that it is only a screen behind which a much bigger movement for an inconclusive peace can be initiated and a peace in which the integrity of Turkey will be preserved.
From the Zionist point of view I see the following danger; Morgenthau accompanied by some Zionists will try and negotiate some concessions on paper from the Turks for the Zionists and will therefore propose to the American Jews, Zionists and non- Zionists, that from a Jewish point of view everything desired can be obtained and he may succeed in rallying round him a considerable body of opinion consisting of anti- or non-Zionists, pacifists, pro-Turks and even pro-Germans, both in America and in Russia; he would say that from a Jewish point of view they are satisfied and this would demoralise our present Zionist plans in which we have succeeded in uniting the largest Jewish organisations. In short this
{p. 452} movement is fraught with great dangers and must be very carefully watched. Personally I do not think that Morgenthau is capable of understanding the Zionist aspirations, he belongs to quite a different school of thought.
{p. 461} 453. To Sir Ronald Graham, London. Gibraltar, 6 July 1917
Dear Sir Ronald Graham,
You will have received by now my two telegrams which gave a very brief resume of our discussions with Mr. Morgenthau and his party. The discussions began on Wednesday (4th June)1 and were continued on Thursday. The first day was occupied by Mr. Morgenthau’s exposition of the situation in Turkey. Mr. Morgenthau’s information was not quite new and not very recent, but Mr. Shmarvonian (his Secretary) left Turkey on the 29th May and he was, of course, able to give a picture of the more recent situation there. I am sending you this information in a special report.2 But to briefly summarise what has transpired, one could say that the military position in Turkey seems to be very precarious, especially round Sivas.3 This gentleman is of opinion that, if the Russians were to attack on that front they would find no difficulty in reaching Sivas and holding it. They know very little about the Syrian front, but in their estimation the actual effectives of Turkey on all fronts cannot be more than 700,000 all told. With regard to the financial position, Mr. Shmarvonian quoted a speech made by Djavid Pasha4 in the Turkish Parliament, where he stated that it is no use hiding the truth that Turkey is practically bankrupt. There is a great lack of coal, and therefore the manufacture of ammunition and the running of the necessary industries, as well as the waterworks, telephones, etc., is greatly handicapped. The relations between the Germans and the Turks are not good. The Turks
{p. 462} resent German interference in Turkish affairs, and they think that Germany should be very grateful to Turkey for all Turkey has done for her. They feel that they are not under any obligation to the Germans. It seems from the facts quoted by this man that there is friction and jealousy between the two strongest personalities who rule Turkey at present, namely Talaat Pasha and Enver. Enver owes his power and his position entirely to German influence, which is resented by Talaat, who is a Turkish Nationalist and is popular amongst the masses. Enver is corrupt and is interested in the continuation of the war which affords him many possibilities to obtain large sums of money. Talaat is honest and poor.5
I am not aware whether this information is quite new to the Foreign Office or not, but I am giving this resume because I consider that these are the only real facts which Mr. Morgenthau was able to communicate to us.
When the discussion turned on Mr. Morgenthau’s plans and intentions, he became very vague, and no amount of discussion and question could elucidate any definite plan or programme. Roughly his intentions were the following: To ulitize his connections with the Turkish Rulers in order to, firstly, induce Talaat (who is a personal friend of Mr. Morgenthau) to break with Enver Pasha, and secondly, after this has been achieved, to break with the Germans. We asked Mr. Morgenthau two questions:
1) "Does he think that the time has come for the American Government, or for the Allies through the American Government, to open up negotiations of such a nature with the Turkish authorities? In other words, whether he thinks that Turkey realises sufficiently that she is beaten or is likely to lose the war, and is therefore in a frame of mind to lend itself to negotiations of that nature?"
2) "Assuming that the time is ripe for such overtures, has he (Mr. Morgenthau) a clear idea about the conditions under which the Turks would be prepared to detach themselves from their present masters?"
The French representative (Mr. Weyl) was particularly anxious to obtain a precise answer from Mr. Morgenthau. Precise as these
{p. 463} questions were, it was utterly impossible for us to obtain a definite answer. In fact, Mr. Morgenthau, who first thought that he could easily enter into negotiations with the Turks, had afterwards to change his opinion and agree that he does not know fully the position, and he is not justified in saying that the time has arrived to negotiate with Turkey.
With regard to the conditions of a separate peace with Turkey, he has received no instructions from the President about this and has not considered the matter at all. I ventured to submit that from what I know of the views of the British Government, it appears to me that the British Government would not consider a peace with Turkey unless it were satisfied that Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine are to be detached from the present Turkish Empire. Neither Mr. Morgenthau nor his advisers nor M. Weyl thought that such conditions would be acceptable at present to the Turks. I would like to remark at this point that from various private and informal conversations which I have had with M. Weyl it clearly appears to me that the French are prepared to enter into peace negotiations with the Turks on conditions which are much more favourable to the Turks than those the British are prepared to offer them. In other words, that the French would not insist on detaching the territories named from Turkey and would, in order to shorten the war, go a great length towards meeting the Turks and even towards preserving the integrity of the Turkish Empire. I am only giving that as an impression which has been corroborated partly by a statement of Mr. Frankfurter who expressed his astonishment at the text of the telegram which M. Ribot sent to the President insisting with great emphasis on the necessity of Mr. Morgenthau’s mission,6 and insisting in terms which made it clear that the French must be very anxious to embark upon peace negotiations with the Turks. Still, M. Weyl,
{p. 464} the French representative, concurred in the view that it would be useless now to approach Talaat or Enver, and that any attempt to do so would be misinterpreted and made capital of both by the Turks and the Germans.
As a result of these discussions, Mr. Morgenthau has completely changed his intentions. [...]
{p. 465} 454. Gibraltar Conference Report dated 6 July, 1917.
The undersigned beg to report to their respective governments as follows:
Our conference began on July 4th and lasted two days. Their scope was set forth in the following statement made by the American representatives:
“President Wilson received intimations indicating Turkish dissatisfaction with the war, weariness of its continuance, and signs of readiness, once conditions became ripe, of releasing herself from the German grip. This, it was conveyed to the President, is not the prevalent feeling of the present Turkish rulers, but it does represent the feeling of some of the leaders in Turkey. The President is, of course, wholly alive to the difficulties of detaching Turkey. He realizes that the chances of immediate success are distinctly unfavorable. But the intimations which the President received were of such a character that he deemed that he could not leave the opportunity they suggested unneglected, in view of the great enhancement to the Allied cause, felt by all the Allies, if such detachment should come to pass. The President, therefore, sounded England and France, and found cordial support for the idea of sending a mission abroad to search the ground in an endeavor to see if an opening existed on the Turkish side. Contemporaneous concern in the United States about the alleged distressing conditions of the Jews in Palestine furnished a ready instrument for the appointment of a mission and to despatch it abroad. [...]
{p. 473} 461. To Sir Ronald Graham, London. Paris, 16 July 1917
Dear Sir Ronald Graham,
I am sending a line by the diplomatic bag to say that there is nothing new to report from here. Mr. Morgenthau saw several people here, but he practically abandoned his original idea of trying to enter into negotiations with the Turks. [...] Sokolow will be interested to hear that Baron Edmond de Rothschild, whom I have
{p. 474} seen several times, attaches the greatest possible value to Sokolow’s speediest departure for Russia. Baron Edmond told me today that he has heard that Kerensky2 expects support from the Jews. [...]
{p. 475} 463. To Charles P. Scott, Manchester. London, 30July 1917
Dearest Mr. Scott,
It is a long time since I wrote to you. Once I wrote from Algeciras but I doubt whether you have received this letter,1 as I find that Mrs. Weizmann has received only a very, few of my letters from Spain. Arrived here on Saturday the 20th.2 I found a letter from the F.O. asking me to go back to Paris3 and the following Monday I was in the train again. Now I am here and I hope to stay at home again for some time. Mr. Sacher will have told you no doubt—I asked him to do so—about the mission to Gibr. The Americans arrived without any plan, instructions or even knowledge of the great issues involved. Morgenthau had an idea that he could try and influence Talaat or Enver4 to detach themselves from their mentors. But how it is going to be done, under what conditions and whether the Turks are really ready for such a step, all that Mr. M. did not know. It was therefore not difficult to dissuade him and he has abandoned all his plans. But that does not mean, that there are not others trying to get a “Paix blanche” with Turkey. It seems to me however that all these attempts are doomed to failure although they have to be watched. [...]
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