WikiLeaks



Talk with Yerevan—reach out with kurds and shia

Old model- baathist infrastructure-

Shiite Goal is to create an anti-baathist intelligence. To get all of those with experience in old structure to pledge loyalty to new one or be purged

Kurdish party asking for MNS—rapport with shia?

INSIGHT questions

1.  What detail do we know about what happened to Iraqi intelligence officers after 2003?  There were 26,000 or more based on Jane's estimates.  A few thousand were probably brought back into new organizations, and others into insurgent groups, others recruited by Iran or Syria or the US.  Are there are a large number that simply took on other jobs that don't involve intelligence/security? 

2. What do we know about PUK and KDP intelligence?  Has it been included within the national government at all?  How well has it cooperated, or conversely, faced crackdowns from the Iraqi state?

3.  What do we know about this new INIS chief, whose name is either Gen. Zuheir Fadel or Zuheir al-Ghreibawi.  I got that later name from an interesting critique [LINK] to Washington Post's David Ignatius' two articles on Iraqi intelligence developments.  Ignatius is a direct CIA mouthpiece, but extremely well-sourced. 

4.  The critic in the question above is a dude named Nibras Kazimi, from the Hudson Institute.  Seems like a major guy in the INC, so I assume Chalabi connections (he's not in the index of Chalabi's biography though).  And he was involved in the de-Baathification commission.  I wouldn't assume Ignatius' is right on (he has his own source problems), but I have no idea how to evaluate Kazimi's contradictory information.  I guess the problem here is a lot of recent information on Iraqi intelligence is limited to a few sources, many who cite Ignatius. 

So that leads back to the foundational questions for sources (a lot of this in OS, but mostly based on anonymous sources, so let's see what yours say and compare)

5.  How many people are employed by the Iraqi National Intelligence Service?  What do you know about it's structure, operations and sectarian make-up?

6.  Same for the Ministry of National Security

7.  Same for the GSD.  Which, by the way, what do we know about it.  I've seen it mentioned as created in July, 2004 by Allawi within the Ministry of Interior, and another piece that implies within the Ministry of Justice.  I assume it stands for General Security Directorate or department and functions much like Saddam's GSS, or Amn al-Amm.

8. How involved are the Iraqi National Police in intelligence collection?  Does the INP liaise with the other intelligence agencies in order to make arrests?  Or does the operational intelligence go over to US forces and/or Iraqi military for operations?

9.  What's Sherwan Al-Waili's (head of MNS, multiple spellings), background?

10. How does the INIS, MNS or others treat foreign intelligence operatives in Iraq?  There is both competition and cooperation here, so any details on that would be interesting. 

11.  Are any of the intelligence orgs working to collect intelligence farther abroad than its neighboring states?  Are there any networks set up in the neighboring states?

12.  What about the insurgent groups own intelligence organizations---from AQI to the Badr Brigades, to reformed militias they all must have them

Iraqi Intelligence Services

INTRO

[Here the actual piece will require a paragraph discussing the current situation of Iraqi government formation. I could use some help from MESA on this, but will no matter what have to wait until we know when this might publish, since the Iraq gov’t changes on an almost daily basis]

The Iraqi intelligence apparatus is currently setting its own foundations. Previous STRATFOR reports analyze how the bureaucratic, institutional and personal battles of a new intelligence community create an operational, analytical, and decision-making protocol that shifts little as leaders change. Those are largely based on the broader geopolitical situation and take time to develop cohesion. Iraq’s new intelligence community will be more similar to Saddam’s then one might expect, but at this moment is still based on sectarian rivalries. Iraqi intelligence’s current priority is to build a functioning set of intelligence services, separate from patrons—primarily the U.S. CIA but also the Iranian IRGC/MOIS. Iraq faced the same issues after independence from the British in 1932.

Its next priority is developing extensive intelligence networks for maintaining internal security. The ruling government will have to carefully watch and police its opponents, who are often ethnic before political. The restive Kurdish population in the North has always attempted to maintain some amount of autonomy, which must be monitored for major steps towards independence. Currently, Iraq is dealing with an insurgency that requires monitoring jihadist, tribal, and other groups that violently oppose the Iraqi government. All of these threats are a major counterintelligence, rather than just counterinsurgency, issue because they infiltrate security forces and the government in order to weaken it or use it to take out their rivals.

As it develops a strong handle on the security environment, Iraqi intelligence will have to monitor foreign counterintelligence threats that have become larger than at any other time in Iraq’s history. Upon the US invasion, the largest CIA station in the world was placed in Baghdad. Though the U.S. is drawing down militarily, some intelligence presence will be maintained to compete with Iranian influence. The current Iraqi intelligence service was built as an outgrowth of the CIA, and it will have to develop its own independence.

Iraq will then need to develop strategic military intelligence on its neighbors, and could potentially develop an intelligence presence throughout the world in line with Saddam’s robust apparatus. But Iraqi intelligence is still in its teething stage, and behind the scenes internecine battles will decide how it develops international intelligence capabilities.

Pre-Ba’ath intelligence and security services

In 1921 under the newly founded British Mandate, Iraq’s first intelligence agency was created, the Amn al-Amm or General Security Service (GSS). A purely domestic intelligence agency, it helped the British rule Iraq through an elite Sunni minority government. It was foremost responsible for detecting, monitoring and disrupting dissent from political, ethnic or religious groups. It also became responsible for investigating political corruption and major economic crimes. Its purpose and responsibilities remained unchanged until 2003, though it lost significance to competing organizations established by Saddam Hussein. The General Security Service was always the largest of the intelligence agencies, and still handled most investigations, even after the establishment of superseding organizations.

Iraq’s military intelligence service was established upon its 1932 independence. It generally followed similar developments to the rest of [LINK: ]. Known as al-Istikhbarat al-‘Askariyya, the Military Intelligence Directorate (MID), it was more outwardly focused than the other security services, all of which developed their own paramilitary units. While the military was vital for maintaining a stable government in Iraq, its domestic intelligence functions were limited. The MID, however, was the prime agency monitoring Kurdish groups in the north and Shia groups in the South. This was primarily because those groups, created their own militias and thus the security response was a counterinsurgency rather than police activity.

MID’s activities in the border regions were also useful in developing militant groups to oppose and distract Iraq’s neighbors. Until 2003, the most well-known group, the anti-Iranian Mujahideen-e-Khalq [LINK: ] was maintained by MID on the Iranian border. MID’s broader responsibility in this case was collecting tactical and strategic military intelligence on neighboring countries. It had reconnaissance units, human intelligence networks, and security units. Unit 999, its most infamous, was responsible for long term penetration operations of neighboring countries and their militaries. This unit developed sources for military tactical military intelligence, such as adversaries’ order of battle, but also aided local militant groups. MID also developed its own internal security branch, which later became a separate unit, the Military Security Service explained below.

Both the GSS and MID were inherited by the Baathist government that ruled Iraq from 1968 to 2003. In that time, Iraq developed some of the most potent security services and largest militaries in the world. But rather than external influence and domination, their development was mainly a response to internal instability. Only at their peak did the security services have significant capabilities abroad.

Saddam Hussein and the anti-coup obsession

Given that Saddam Hussein’s Baath party came to power in a series of coups, he had personally been involved in both successful and failed coups and his party had already lost power once in a coup, it was hard for him (or anyone) to imagine any security concern greater than, a possible coup. Unlike the birth of foreign intelligence services in other countries, such as during China’s civil war [LINK: ], or Iran’s revolution [LINK: ], Iraq’s intelligence body developed out of a need for internal party security.

The Baath party developed Iraq’s first foreign intelligence organization after failing to hold power in 1963. The imperative of developing internal security became clear to Saddam Hussein, who was a young and aspiring party leader, at this time. In 1964, he was given the authority to create the Jihaz al-Khas, the Special Apparatus. It was known for monitoring any threats to the party leadership- both from within and outside and is rumored to have been involved in multiple assassinations of party members. In 1968, it grew to become the Jihaz al-Hanin, the Yearning Apparatus and soon after the Baathists retook Iraq’s government.

In 1973 the Jihaz officially became the Da’irat al- Mukhabarat al-’ Amma, the General Intelligence Department (GID). The GID’s establishment was a direct response to a failed coup attempt by GSS director Nadhim Kazzar. Saddam recognized the need to have a parallel unit watching the GSS, and the GID became the first of many. Most states have parallel functioning services for the purpose of limiting a monopolized intelligence process as well as serving as a check on potential threats to the government. The GID took the latter concern to the extreme by giving priority by investing resources in policing other intelligence offers and their own.

The GID was given a wide-range of domestic intelligence responsibilities, in order of priority:

-Monitoring the Ba’ath party for security threats

-Monitoring, infiltrating and disrupting political opposition

-Policing minority groups, specifically Shia and Kurds

-Counterintelligence, monitoring embassies and other foreigners.

But over time, it became Iraq’s primary foreign and other agencies took more control domestically. Its responsibilities abroad were typical of an intelligence organization, with a focus on its neighbors and their potential threats as well as exile Iraqi opposition groups. By 1991, it developed capabilities to collect significant intelligence on the United States, United Kingdom, and other powers further abroad. After the Gulf War, however, many believe its international capabilities were limited. We can partially verify this because many intelligence covers, such as embassies and Iraqi Air offices were shut down, and there were no longer major accusations of Iraqi clandestine operations abroad (serious work with militia/terrorist groups, assassinations, sabotage, etc).

Going back to 1979, Saddam Hussein became President and invaded Iran in 1980. He then began to expand and consolidate control over an internal intelligence apparatus. His fear of being overthrown, be it by grassroots dissidents or foreign-backed movements, ethnic groups or his closest confidants, developed a paranoid intelligence apparatus. In 1980 the MID no longer reported to the Ministry of Defense, but rather directly to the Office of the Presidential Palace (OPP). The GID and MSS were already wired in to Saddam’s headquarters, but the potential threats still remained.

In 1982, after two intelligence failures, Saddam created the Amn al-Khass, or the Special Security Service (SSS). The first was the failure to protect the Osirak Reactor from an Israeli air strike. The second was an assassination attempt carried out by presumably Shia gunmen on his convoy leaving the town of Dujail after giving a speech praising local arm conscripts (executions of Dujail residents carried out after this event was the main charge for which he was executed in 2006). Headed by his son Qusay, the SSS essentially became the presidential, or regime intelligence service. Its top and absolute priority was to protect Saddam Hussein. The SSS had officers and informants in every other intelligence service. It also served as the President’s main protection detail along with the Special Republican Guard. The security branch of the SSS called the Jihaz al-Himaya al-Khasa or Special Protection Apparatus was the only unit allowed to carry arms in Saddam’s vicinity. It was responsible for his personal security both at the Presidential Palace and while travelling to public engagements.

The SSS’ internal security units, however, were the brunt of the organization. It was authorized to infiltrate any and every organization in the Iraqi state, as well as track security threats abroad. It was given oversight responsibility for the rest of the security services, but not command authority. This meant that the SSS had intelligence from a broad range of other sources, on top of its own 5,000 officer force. Moreover, it placed officers and informants in every intelligence service and government organization to monitor any potential threats to the regime.

A final organization was created in 1992 to further protect Saddam from threats in the military. This followed the Gulf War and a heightened fear of coups. The MID’s security branch was made independent and became known as the Al-Amn Al-‘Askari, or Military Security (MS). Its only responsibility was to detect and disrupt any opposition within the military services. Like the SSS, but even more expansive, it placed officers within every single military unit.

All of this was nominally overseen by the al-Majlis al-Amn al-Qawmi, the National Security Council (NSC), which functioned as a coordinating body for all national security issues. As Saddam had more agencies report directly to the OPP or Qusay’s SSS, the National Security Council lost some influence. It was used more as a coordinating body to make sure different issues and targets were covered, rather than an oversight or executive body over the intelligence services.

Even with a slightly weakened regime after the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein still had a powerful intelligence and security apparatus to maintain his power. This was further demonstrated in 1996, when the United States CIA attempted to overthrow the Iraqi regime through a military uprising. In one of the largest attempts since Saddam’s rise to power, the CIA worked with a former Air Force General, Mohammad Abdullah Shahwani who fled to exile in London in 1990. Shahwani later became instrumental as a CIA asset and part of the Iraqi National Accord when the United States invaded Iraq in 2003. Shahwani recruited as many as 200 mid-level officers throughout the Iraqi military, including three of his sons. In June, 2006 the plot was exposed and 80 of the officers were soon executed.

Saddam’s intelligence and security apparatus proved too robust for Iraqi opposition, and many recriminations followed the failure. But the attempted coup did create a precedent for the designer of Iraq’s next intelligence service, the CIA.

Post-2003: Creating a new intelligence apparatus

In the fallout from the complete destruction of the Iraqi government, the United States, along with its Iraqi allies, needed to rebuild the state. Intelligence and security services are obviously vital to any sovereign government and that need only became more pressing as an insurgency developed. While the [Link: ] developed quickly into Shia-majority (even dominated) institutions, the foreign intelligence service remained a bulwark for nationalist Sunni officers, and only since 2007 has it faced serious sectarian competition and divides.

In April, 2004 the Coalition Provisional Authority announced the creation of the Jihaz al-Mukhabarat al-Watani, known as the Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS. After much anticipation amongst Saddam opposition groups, the CIA’s stalwart Iraqi ally, Mohammad Abdullah Shahwani, was chosen to run the CIA’s proxy. The INIS was ran and funded by the CIA, at a cost of 1 billion dollars per year between 2004 and 2007. Shahwani was partly chosen due to his experience in the Iraqi military and special operations before 1990, intelligence activities for the INA and CIA during exile, and for his connections with new Prime Minister Iyad Allawi and the CIA upon their return to Iraq. On the surface he also offered an ethnic background that the Americans thoughts would break the mold of ethnic competition over government institutions. Shahwani is a Sunni, ethnic Turkmen from Mosul, married to a Shia who chose a Kurd as his deputy.

The INIS was established, however, in secret meetings in the Washington area. In December, 2003 Iyad Allawi and his soon-to-be Minister of Interior Nouri Badran spent a week in the Washington, DC area, some portion of that at the CIA’s Langley, Virginia headquarters. It is rumored that then U.S. President George W. Bush authorized the creation of an Iraqi intelligence service during these meetings. The time spent by the two INA members at Langley likely created the blueprint for the service. The INIS’ charter enables it to collect intelligence both domestically and abroad. The first priority was infiltrating and understanding the various insurgent groups in Iraq. Some of the insurgents were thought to be commanded by officers purged from the Iraqi military and security services in 2003. While the CIA created its largest overseas station in Baghdad, it had little capability to reach outside the Green Zone, and this is where the INIS became instrumental. INIS officers were capable of travelling throughout Iraq and recruiting sources to fight insurgent groups.

Unlike the new Iraqi military and police, Shahwani was able to recruit a range of Iraqi nationalists to his service, including former Baathists. Ahmed Chalabi, a Shia politician who opposed Allawi, presented a report that said the INIS in June, 2004 was two-thirds Sunni and one-quarter Shia. Given Iraq’s ethnic make-up (60% shia), even taking Chalabi’s bias into account, it is evident that a large number of former Sunni officers from Saddam’s GID were recruited. While the chance of them also working for the insurgency as double agents was higher, it also meant that loyal service members would be most adept and capable at identifying and disrupting former Baathists involved in the insurgency. This double edged sword paid off by 2007 as insurgent violence decreased markedly. While many factors were involved, there is no doubt that intelligence collected by the new INIS, and often passed to the US, played a role.

The INIS mandate was wholly different from its predecessors in that it had no powers of arrest or interrogation in Iraq. It was modeled on the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service or the British MI5 as an intelligence rather than investigative agency. It also required a warrant before it could collect information on Iraqi citizens. While this pleased western observers, it remains to be seen if these rules were followed or if they were effective. The director of the INIS would serve 5-year terms and report to the Prime Minister while also facing oversight from a Parliamentary committee.

The INIS quickly recruited 1,000 officers, many of whom were trained in Jordan and Egypt. One of its most important recruits for counterintelligence purposes was many of the old officers from GID’s Department 18- the Iranian operations unit. This was partly out of necessity, as Iranian influence was the strongest in Iraq after the US. Due to Iran’s support for different Shia militias, stemming the insurgency meant monitoring and disrupting Iran’s clandestine influence.

Along with that, it was imperative for the INIS, and the CIA more broadly, to track down former GID officers. Former members of Iraqi intelligence services had access to great deals of intelligence, as well as sources, making them a prime recruitment target for any other country developing intelligence networks within Iraq. In counterintelligence efforts, the INIS needed to recruit these former officers at least as agents, before Iranian, Syrian, or al-Qaeda recruiters contacted them.

The operational security role was taken over by the Ministry of the Interior and its various police forces. At a national level, the Iraqi National Police is responsible for security issues, made up mostly of paramilitary units. From an intelligence perspective, the INP took the responsibilities of the multitude of internal security services developed under Saddam.

The GSD [General Security Department?? Directorate?] was also created by Allawi in July, 2004, but little is known about its function. Set up within the Ministry of Interior [or MOJ?], it was specifically tasked with counterterrorism, through monitoring different tribes and ethnic groups.

[need to find out more about this.]

In June, 2004 when Ayad Allawi was appointed prime minister of the Iraqi Interim Government, he created the Ministerial Committee on National Security. Chaired by the prime minister and including the INIS director, National Security adviser, and the Ministers of Defense and Interior, its purpose was to coordinate national security and intelligence activities at the highest level, much like the Iraqi National Security Council before it.

Other coordinating bodies included the, al-Hay’at al-Wataniya li al- Tansiq al-Istikhbari or National Intelligence Coordination Council (NICC) and the Khaliyat al-Istikhbarat al-Wataniya or the National Intelligence Cell (NIC). The NICC is meant to be the highest level intelligence coordination body and includes Prime Minister, National Security Adviser and the heads of all intelligence agencies except the Office of Information and Security. The point was to serve as a dissemination mechanism from the intelligence heads to the Prime Minister, rather than each one reporting individually. The NIC handles this on a day-to-day basis. It was formed in early 2010 to serve as a sort of clearing house for intelligence on nationwide operations, or of vital importance to Iraq’s top leaders. But in reality, the NICC and NIC have often been avoided by each intelligence agency, which has instead reported to its sectarian allies and met directly with the prime minister. There have been many complaints about the lack of coordination of tactical intelligence- such as wanted insurgent databases. One individual may be wanted in the North, but authorities in Baghdad or the South are left unawares. Part of the problem is that each agency doesn’t trust its information in other hands for fear of leaks. Moreover, they want to take the acclaim for a successful capture or kill. Often in reviews after major attacks it is found that one of the multiple agencies had information on the perpetrators and their plans. It remains to be seen if these organizations will be able to create a functioning intelligence bureaucracy, but at this point it seems blocked by political interests.

The Battle for Control

When Nouri al-Maliki became Prime Minister in 2006, the coalition leader of Iraq’s majority Shia decided to confront the US-controlled and Sunnia-dominated INIS. Ibrahim al-Jaafari, a leader in the Shia Dawa party that is closely aligned to Iran had previously described the INIS as riddled with insurgent sympathizers, spies, saboteurs, and former Baathists with blood on their hands. Maliki gave Sherwan al-Waili the responsibility of handling intelligence matters. Al-Waili was once a colonel in the Iraqi army under Saddam, and is rumored to have received training in Iran prior to taking his new position.

Al-Waili developed his own intelligence service within the previously impotent Ministry of State for National Security Affairs (MSNS) (Wizarat al-Dawla li-Shuoun al-Amn al-Watani). Al-Waili’s predecessor, Abdul Karim Anizi, previously lobbied for such power and began developing sources but was not allowed to expand his staff. By 2009, al-Waili expanded a staff of 26 to somewhere between 1,000 and 5,000 intelligence officers (depending on whose estimate you believe), a force rivaling that of the INIS and with networks in all of Iraq’s provinces. The MSNS still is only an informal intelligence network- it has no legal grounds for domestic intelligence collection or arrests. While INIS officers criticize their competitors’ inexperience, they have lost ground in the behind-the-scenes clandestine intelligence battle.

Both agencies are deeply involved in spying and reporting on each other. Shahwani was accused of using his agents to help kidnap an Iranian diplomat believed to be working with Shia insurgents, while al-Waili’s officers were criticized for spying on Sunni politicians suspected of involvement with Sunni insurgents. In the meantime, other intelligence agencies developed in Baghdad- within the police and military forces. They include the National Information and Investigation Agency (Wikalat al-Maalumat wa al-Tahqiqat al-Wataniya), which is responsible for domestic criminal investigations; the Directorate General for Intelligence and Security (Al-Mudiriyat al-Aama lil-Istikhbarat wa al-Amn), which is part of the Ministry of Defense and is similar to the Saddam-era MS; the Office of Information and Security (Maktab al- Maalumat wa al-Amn), an agency within the prime minister’s office, reporting solely to him and responsible for unknown intelligence collection; and the Military Intelligence Directorate (Mudiriyat al-Istikhbarat al-Askariya) or M2, which carries out the same functions as the Saddam-era MID.

Shahwani resigned from the INIS in 2009, leaving Gen. Zuheir Fadel, a former pilot in Saddam Hussein's air force, the new Director of the INIS. Though this was also the time when Shahwani’s 5-year term should have ended, so the test of turning the INIS into an institution will lie with Fadel.

[STILL need to doublecheck this guy’s name and who the hell he is]

But the competition between the INIS and the MSNS due to factional allegiances has only grown. When the INIS was first established, and run directly by the CIA, Iranian intelligence officers and their agents began an assassination campaign to eliminate its officers. INIS officers claim that 290 of their colleagues were assassinated in the 5 years from 2004. Another 180 had arrest warrants issued by Maliki’s government. While the INIS claims they were just doing their job, they very well could have been involved in sectarian violence and abuse (the recent wikileaks documents underscore the growth of abusive Iraqi interrogations). But in 2009, a response began. Shia sources within the INIS and others at MSNS reported that their counterparts were also being assassinated. They claim that the culprits were the hardline former Baathist officers reinducted into the INIS.

Non-State Intelligence

While multiple intelligence agencies are battling for state control, other groups within Iraq have their own sources in order to protect their own interests. The Kurdish groups especially have longstanding intelligence networks. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) runs Ajansi Parastini Kurdistan (Kurdistan Protection Agency), headed by Masrur Barzani, son of the KDP leader Massud Barzani. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan’s intelligence service is Dazgai, Zanyari, the Information Apparatus. Since both parties have had a hand in governing an autonomous or semi-autonomous Kurdish region throughout Iraqi history, and they needed to develop their own power base, intelligence apparati became a requirement. They are primarily active as a sort of secret police in the Kurdish region, but extend their collective activities all the way to Baghdad. IN some ways, Parastin, the more powerful of the two, is feared to the same extent as Iraqi internal security services. They both compete in their activities throughout the region and spy on each other as well.

Various insurgent groups maintain their own intelligence capabilities as well. This is primarily reflected in their ability to infiltrate Iraqi security forces, acquire armaments and uniforms and infiltrate secure neighborhoods for attack. While insurgent attacks are down, and more limited to groups like Al-Qaeda in Iraq [LINK:--] then the Sunni groups that joined Awakening Councils, the prospect of operatives with intelligence experience being members is still there. While little is known about the internal workings of the insurgent groups, they no doubt have had to develop intelligence capabilities to be effective.

As this report highlights, every powerbase is incomplete without its own intelligence capability. In Iraq, where sectarian, ethnic and political divides are rife, having the best information to compete with rivals is the only way to gain control. And that is the challenge the burgeoning state intelligence apparatus will have to deal with.

Challenges to Come:

The Iraqi intelligence services are a key battleground in gaining control of the Iraqi state. Both the United States and Iran have major stakes in Iraq [LINK to recent diary/weekly], and Iraq’s neighbors all favor an Iraqi government friendly to their interests. At the same time, Iraq needs to develop an independent government. While it may rely on a patron- be it Iran or the US- establishing an independent and functional intelligence apparatus is vital to its own security. Its two current priorities are maintaining intelligence on insurgent or opposition groups—from the Kurds to Shia to Sunni, as well as Jihadists-- while at the same time monitoring and influencing or disrupting foreign intelligence operations within Iraq.

To some extent, post-2003 Iraq will have to develop the strong internal security bodies that it has maintained since its borders were defined in the early 20th century. This does not mean another Saddam in Iraq, but rather the ability to monitor and police various familial, tribal, ethnic and religious groups as they establish Iraqi identity. Still, the Iraqi intelligence services face an even larger challenge than before as the country is completely infiltrated by U.S., Iranian, Syrian, Jordanian, Saudi and no doubt other intelligence services. The ability that Ba’athist intelligence officers developed to police each other for counterintelligence threats would actually be more useful in today’s Iraq- where all the agencies will need to be monitored as possible foreign assets.

As the Iraqi government comes to some sort of compromise in choosing its leaders, certain events can be tracked closely to monitor influence behind the scenes. First, can the INIS maintain its attempted role as a non-sectarian broad-based intelligence agency? Or will one group and patron come to control it? If the latter happens, the battle for influence will eventually be won or lost between MSNS and the INIS. While Sherwan Al-Waeli has believes the current situation is “normal…in the current phase of our existence.” It is difficult to sustain. They could remain in perpetuity as a check on each other. But Saddam’s intelligence agencies were not able to do that and instead he created a hierarchy. It remains to be seen how that hierarchy will develop.

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