Contents



Contents TOC \o "1-4" \h \z \u 1.TRUST ACCOUNTING PAGEREF _Toc340049137 \h 51.1Introduction PAGEREF _Toc340049138 \h 61.1.1 Trust accounting PAGEREF _Toc340049139 \h 61.1.2 Purpose of Trust Accounts PAGEREF _Toc340049140 \h 61.1.3 Basic Principles PAGEREF _Toc340049141 \h 61.2Trust Money PAGEREF _Toc340049142 \h 71.2.1 Trust money PAGEREF _Toc340049143 \h 71.2.2 Not trust money PAGEREF _Toc340049144 \h 71.2.3 Responsibilities: PAGEREF _Toc340049145 \h 71.2.4Irregularities PAGEREF _Toc340049146 \h 81.2.5 Trust account records PAGEREF _Toc340049147 \h 91.2.6 Basic rules – depositing trust money PAGEREF _Toc340049148 \h 91.3Trust Account PAGEREF _Toc340049149 \h 101.3.1 Flow of trust account information PAGEREF _Toc340049150 \h 101.3.2 Steps in the recording process PAGEREF _Toc340049151 \h 101.3.3 Trust account documents PAGEREF _Toc340049152 \h 111.4Trust Account Receipts PAGEREF _Toc340049153 \h 121.4.1 Trust receipts generally PAGEREF _Toc340049154 \h 121.4.2 Receipts – Corrections and Cancellations PAGEREF _Toc340049155 \h 121.4.3 Tips and Pitfalls PAGEREF _Toc340049156 \h 121.5Steps upon receiving Trust Money PAGEREF _Toc340049157 \h 131.5.1 Trust payments – must be by cheque PAGEREF _Toc340049158 \h 131.5.2 Payment authority PAGEREF _Toc340049159 \h 141.6Steps for Payment of Trust Money PAGEREF _Toc340049160 \h 151.6.1 Transfer by journal entry PAGEREF _Toc340049161 \h 151.6.2 Trust account cash books PAGEREF _Toc340049162 \h 151.6.3 Trust ledgers (r 42 LPR) PAGEREF _Toc340049163 \h 151.6.4 Section 285 LPA deposits PAGEREF _Toc340049164 \h 151.7Trust Account Reconciliation PAGEREF _Toc340049165 \h 151.8External Examination PAGEREF _Toc340049166 \h 161.8.1 Appointment (s 267): PAGEREF _Toc340049167 \h 161.8.2 Notice to QLS (s 270) PAGEREF _Toc340049168 \h 161.8.3 Qualifications of examiner PAGEREF _Toc340049169 \h 161.8.4 Period of audit PAGEREF _Toc340049170 \h 161.8.5 Power of examiner (s 272) PAGEREF _Toc340049171 \h 161.9Outlays and Disbursements PAGEREF _Toc340049172 \h 171.6.1 Service company: PAGEREF _Toc340049173 \h 171.6.2 Tips and Pitfalls PAGEREF _Toc340049174 \h 171.11 Cases PAGEREF _Toc340049175 \h 182.THE LEGAL PROFESSION PAGEREF _Toc340049176 \h 212.2Ethics PAGEREF _Toc340049177 \h 212.2.1Parker & Evans, Inside Lawyers’ Ethics, Ch 2 ‘Alternatives to Adversarial Advocacy’ PAGEREF _Toc340049178 \h 212.3The Legal Profession PAGEREF _Toc340049179 \h 212.4Advertising PAGEREF _Toc340049180 \h 222.4.1Personal Injury PAGEREF _Toc340049181 \h 223.ADMISSION PAGEREF _Toc340049182 \h 253.1Who can engage in legal practice? PAGEREF _Toc340049183 \h 253.2Procedure for Admission PAGEREF _Toc340049184 \h 253.3The Board PAGEREF _Toc340049185 \h 263.4.1 Early Application to Board PAGEREF _Toc340049186 \h 263.4Eligibility & Suitability for Admission PAGEREF _Toc340049187 \h 273.3.1 Eligibility for admission PAGEREF _Toc340049188 \h 273.3.2 Suitability for admission PAGEREF _Toc340049189 \h 273.3.3 Specific problematic behaviour affecting admission PAGEREF _Toc340049190 \h 273.3.4 Behaviour that will NOT be grounds for refusal PAGEREF _Toc340049191 \h 294.DUTIES OWED TO THE CLIENT PAGEREF _Toc340049192 \h 354.1Introduction PAGEREF _Toc340049193 \h 354.1.1 Common Law PAGEREF _Toc340049194 \h 354.1.2 Equity PAGEREF _Toc340049195 \h 354.2Duty to Supervise PAGEREF _Toc340049196 \h 364.3Costs Disclosures PAGEREF _Toc340049197 \h 374.3.1Purposes PAGEREF _Toc340049198 \h 374.3.2Costs disclosure generally PAGEREF _Toc340049199 \h 374.3.3Specific types of cost disclosures PAGEREF _Toc340049200 \h 384.3.4Legal costs recoverable PAGEREF _Toc340049201 \h 384.3.5Setting aside agreements which are not “fair and reasonable” PAGEREF _Toc340049202 \h 394.3.6Overcharging PAGEREF _Toc340049203 \h 404.4Duty of Competence and Diligence PAGEREF _Toc340049204 \h 434.4.1Communications with clients PAGEREF _Toc340049205 \h 434.4.2Duty and Standard of Care Owed PAGEREF _Toc340049206 \h 444.4.3Liability in Negligence PAGEREF _Toc340049207 \h 454.5Duty of Confidentiality PAGEREF _Toc340049208 \h 474.5.1Guilty or delinquent clients (r 20 ASCR) PAGEREF _Toc340049209 \h 474.5.2Legal Professional Privilege (LPP) distinguished [see p 125 Dowse] PAGEREF _Toc340049210 \h 484.5.3Consequences for breach PAGEREF _Toc340049211 \h 484.6Conflicts of Interest PAGEREF _Toc340049212 \h 494.6.1Conflict of duty and interest Client v Practitioner PAGEREF _Toc340049213 \h 494.6.2Conflict of duty and duty (concurrent clients) Current client v Current client PAGEREF _Toc340049214 \h 514.6.3Sexual relationship with a client PAGEREF _Toc340049215 \h 524.6.4Conflict between current and former clients Current client v Former client PAGEREF _Toc340049216 \h 534.7Termination of Retainer PAGEREF _Toc340049217 \h 575.DUTY TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE PAGEREF _Toc340049218 \h 595.2Paramount Duty PAGEREF _Toc340049219 \h 595.3Aspects of the duty PAGEREF _Toc340049220 \h 605.3.1General duties PAGEREF _Toc340049221 \h 605.3.2Communications PAGEREF _Toc340049222 \h 605.3.3Unlawful conduct of client PAGEREF _Toc340049223 \h 605.3.4Independence PAGEREF _Toc340049224 \h 605.3.5Frankness and candour – advocates (incl. binding authorities; ex parte apps; errors) PAGEREF _Toc340049225 \h 605.3.6Abuse of process PAGEREF _Toc340049226 \h 615.3.7Inadvertent disclosure PAGEREF _Toc340049227 \h 615.3.8Responsible use of court process and privilege (see ASCR r 21) PAGEREF _Toc340049228 \h 615.3.9Undertakings PAGEREF _Toc340049229 \h 615.3.10Other aspects PAGEREF _Toc340049230 \h 615.4Right to Representation PAGEREF _Toc340049231 \h 645.5Refusal to Call a Witness PAGEREF _Toc340049232 \h 645.6Barrister’s Duties PAGEREF _Toc340049233 \h 655.6.1Assisting judge to identify all issues in a case PAGEREF _Toc340049234 \h 655.6.2Ongoing duty to disclose PAGEREF _Toc340049235 \h 655.6.3Prosecutor’s Duties PAGEREF _Toc340049236 \h 65CASES PAGEREF _Toc340049237 \h 656.DISCIPLINE PAGEREF _Toc340049238 \h 676.1Notice to Practitioner PAGEREF _Toc340049239 \h 676.1.1Practitioner’s response to notice PAGEREF _Toc340049240 \h 676.2Standards of Professional Conduct PAGEREF _Toc340049241 \h 676.2.1Unsatisfactory professional conduct (UPC) PAGEREF _Toc340049242 \h 676.2.2Professional Misconduct (PM) PAGEREF _Toc340049243 \h 696.2.3Mitigating Factors PAGEREF _Toc340049244 \h 716.2.4Penalties PAGEREF _Toc340049245 \h 726.2.5Remedies PAGEREF _Toc340049246 \h 726.3Role of LSC PAGEREF _Toc340049247 \h 756.4Who deals with what PAGEREF _Toc340049248 \h 776.5Cases PAGEREF _Toc340049249 \h 79 HYPERLINK \l "_Toc340049137" 1.TRUST ACCOUNTING PAGEREF _Toc340049137 \h 51.1Introduction PAGEREF _Toc340049138 \h 61.1.1 Trust accounting PAGEREF _Toc340049139 \h 61.1.2 Purpose of Trust Accounts PAGEREF _Toc340049140 \h 61.1.3 Basic Principles PAGEREF _Toc340049141 \h 61.2Trust Money PAGEREF _Toc340049142 \h 71.2.1 Trust money PAGEREF _Toc340049143 \h 71.2.2 Not trust money PAGEREF _Toc340049144 \h 71.2.3 Responsibilities: PAGEREF _Toc340049145 \h 71.2.4Irregularities PAGEREF _Toc340049146 \h 81.2.5 Trust account records PAGEREF _Toc340049147 \h 91.2.6 Basic rules – depositing trust money PAGEREF _Toc340049148 \h 91.3Trust Account PAGEREF _Toc340049149 \h 101.3.1 Flow of trust account information PAGEREF _Toc340049150 \h 101.3.2 Steps in the recording process PAGEREF _Toc340049151 \h 101.3.3 Trust account documents PAGEREF _Toc340049152 \h 111.4Trust Account Receipts PAGEREF _Toc340049153 \h 121.4.1 Trust receipts generally PAGEREF _Toc340049154 \h 121.4.2 Receipts – Corrections and Cancellations PAGEREF _Toc340049155 \h 121.4.3 Tips and Pitfalls PAGEREF _Toc340049156 \h 121.5Steps upon receiving Trust Money PAGEREF _Toc340049157 \h 131.5.1 Trust payments – must be by cheque PAGEREF _Toc340049158 \h 131.5.2 Payment authority PAGEREF _Toc340049159 \h 141.6Steps for Payment of Trust Money PAGEREF _Toc340049160 \h 151.6.1 Transfer by journal entry PAGEREF _Toc340049161 \h 151.6.2 Trust account cash books PAGEREF _Toc340049162 \h 151.6.3 Trust ledgers (r 42 LPR) PAGEREF _Toc340049163 \h 151.6.4 Section 285 LPA deposits PAGEREF _Toc340049164 \h 151.7Trust Account Reconciliation PAGEREF _Toc340049165 \h 151.8External Examination PAGEREF _Toc340049166 \h 161.8.1 Appointment (s 267): PAGEREF _Toc340049167 \h 161.8.2 Notice to QLS (s 270) PAGEREF _Toc340049168 \h 161.8.3 Qualifications of examiner PAGEREF _Toc340049169 \h 161.8.4 Period of audit PAGEREF _Toc340049170 \h 161.8.5 Power of examiner (s 272) PAGEREF _Toc340049171 \h 161.9Outlays and Disbursements PAGEREF _Toc340049172 \h 171.6.1 Service company: PAGEREF _Toc340049173 \h 171.6.2 Tips and Pitfalls PAGEREF _Toc340049174 \h 17TRUST ACCOUNTINGIntroductionThe requirement to deal with trust moneys and to maintain trust accounting records is an integral part of legal practice. Old Method: until 1/04/2008 – Trust Accounts Act 1973 and Trust Accounts Regulations 1999New Method: from 1/07/2007 – Legal Profession Act 2007 – Part 3.3 and Legal Profession Regulation – Part 3.3Aim of legislation: to protect lawyers, protect the client and protect the profession. Lawyers are in a higher position of trust than most members of the community1.1.1 Trust accountingTrust accounting is a form of bookkeeping used exclusively for trust transactions; it is the recording by a law practice of the receipt and payment of other people’s money. Account: money in a bank account that is not your moneyTrust: relationship of trust, someone is trusting you with their money2 types of accounts:General account: wages / expenses are paid – can go into debitTrust account: one account with the bank, many subtrusts in law – eg, 50 clients and 83 matters, will have 83 subtrusts in accountEach of subtrusts must have credit or zero balance (must never go into debit!)1.1.2 Purpose of Trust AccountsPurpose is to “ensure trust money is held… in a way that protects the interests of persons for whom money is held (s 236(a) LPA)236 Main purposes of pt 3.3The main purposes of this part are as follows--(a) to ensure trust money is held by law practices in a way that protects the interests of persons for whom money is held, both inside and outside this jurisdiction;(b) to minimise compliance requirements for law practices that provide legal services within and outside this jurisdiction;(c) to ensure the law society can work effectively with corresponding authorities in other jurisdictions in relation to the regulation of trust money and trust accounts.1.1.3 Basic PrinciplesMoney held on trust must:Be recorded in a transparent and accessible mannerNever be intermingled with business fundsNot have deficiencies (ie. Not go into debit) (s 259 LPA) – Breach = 200 PUNot be received or recorded under a false name (can be money laundering) (s 262(1) LPA)Never be transferred or withdrawn for a purpose other than for which it was receivedOnly be used for another purpose if written authority of the client is receivedOnly be withdrawn in certain ways (ie. Not by ATM)Trust Money1.2.1 Trust moneyMoney entrusted to a law practice in the course of or in connection with the provision of legal services and includes (s 237 LPA):Money received on account of legal costs in advance of providing the services (Gen Tr A/C)Controlled moneyMoney received for which the law practice has a written direction to deposit the money in an account over which the practice will have exclusive controlTransit moneyMoney received subject to instructions to pay or deliver it to a third party (other than an associate of the practice)Power money1.2.2 Not trust moneyMoney received is not trust money if connected with financial services, including (s 238 LPA):Where an Aus financial service licence is required;As a rep of a licence holder; Managed investment schemeMortgage schemeIf in doubt whether it’s a financial service – put it in trust! (or can contact QLS for guidance)1.2.3 Responsibilities: Exclusivity: Firm must hold trust money deposited in a general T/A exclusively for the person on whose behalf it is received and disburse the money under a direction given by the person (s 249)Breach = 50 PU No mixing: To not mix trust funds with other money unless authorised by QLS (s 257 LPA)Breach = 100 PU Statement: Must provide to client a T/A statement (r 53 LPR):After completion of the matter;ASAP after a reasonable request; orASAP after June 30 each year except: if ledger less than 6 months OR balance is $0 and no transactions in 12 months OR previous statement in 12 months and no transactionsIrregularitiesStart with s 249: A law practice must hold trust money deposited in a general T/A exclusively for the person on whose behalf it is received and disburse the money under a direction given by the person (s 249 LPA) 50 PUNotifying QLS: ASAP after legal practitioner/associate becomes aware of / suspects irregularity in a T/A, they must give written notice of irregularity to QLS and any corresponding authority (s 260 LPA)NB. Clerk / secretary not under statutory obligation to disclose^^ 50 PUAn Aus LP is not liable for loss/damage suffered by another person as a result of the LP’s compliance with s 260 (s 260(3) LPA)Practice debts: Money in T/A not to be used to pay debts of practice (s 256 LPA) No mixing: Law practice must not mix trust money with other money unless authorised by QLS (s 257 LPA)Definitions: A legal practitioner associate is an associate who is an Australian legal practitioner (s 7(2) LPA)An Australian legal practitioner is an Australian lawyer who holds a current local practising certificate or a current interstate practising certificate (s 6(1) LPA)An associate of a law practice is (s 7(1) LPA):(a) an Australian legal practitioner who is:(i) a sole practitioner if the law practice is constituted by the practitioner; or(ii) a partner in the law practice if the law practice is a law firm; or(iii) a legal practitioner director in the law practice if the law practice is an incorporated legal practice; or(iv) a legal practitioner partner in the law practice if the law practice is a multi-disciplinary partnership; or(v) an employee of, or consultant to, the law practice; or(b) an agent of the law practice who is not an Australian legal practitioner; or(c) an employee of the law practice who is not an Australian legal practitioner; or(d) an Australian-registered foreign lawyer who is a partner in the law practice; or(e) a person who is a partner in the multi-disciplinary partnership but who is not an Australian legal practitioner; or(f) an Australian-registered foreign lawyer who has a relationship with the law practice, that is a class of relationship prescribed under a regulation.External examiner: Law practice must for each financial period and within 60 days of the end of the period, have its trust records externally examined by the ext examiner (s 268(1) LPA)If a practice has its trust records examined by an external examiner under s 268(1), the practice must, within 60 days after the end of the period to which the examination relates, give to QLS a copy of the examiner’s report (s 274 LPA) 50 PU Can become an ethical legal issue, as QLS may not know about it (if clerk/employee)– but ethical and indeed statutory obligation if legal practitioner, to inform QLS. Should talk to partner/s; QLS guidance officerNB. UPC / PM (ss 418, 419, 420 LPA) NB. If legal practitioner – will also owe fiduciary duties to client!!1.2.5 Trust account recordsMust keep trust records (s 261 LPA):In a permanent formPrinted or capable of printing (ie. Computer records), in English and on paperIn manner prescribed by regulationsThat disclose the true positionIn a way that allows them to be conveniently and properly examined (ie. Can’t put passwords on and not tell auditors)Breach = 100 PU = $11,000Time to keep: Must keep records for 7 years [same time as ATO] (r 59(2) LPR)Breach = 100 PU, NB. Need prior AG ok to destroyCompulsory records (s 237 LPA):ReceiptsCheque butts or cheque requisitionsRecords of authorities to withdraw by EFT transfer (if authorised by QLS)Deposit recordsT/A ADI statements (authorised deposit-taking institution)T/A receipts and payments cash booksTrust ledger accountsRecords of monthly trial balancesRecords of monthly reconciliationstrust transfer journals;statements of account required to be given under a regulation;registers required to be kept under a regulation;monthly statements required to be kept under a regulation;files relating to trust transactions or bills of costs or both;written directions, authorities or other documents required to be kept under this Act or a regulation;supporting information required to be kept under a regulation in relation to powers to deal with trust money.Recommended other records: register of T/A receipt forms; special clearance register; post-dated cheque register; 30/7 (old/new) day fee register1.2.6 Basic rules – depositing trust moneyControlled money: must be deposited into a controlled money account maintained exclusively for the person on whose behalf it is received, as soon as practicable after it is received (ss 248(1)(b); 251; 255(3) LPA)Set up bank account called “[Law firm] on trust for John Smith”All other cash trust money: must be deposited into the general T/A (s 255 LPA)All other non-cash trust money: must be dealt with:In accordance with a written direction given (ss 248(1)(a); 248(2) LPA)If transit money, in accordance with instructions given (ss 248(1)(c); 253 LPA)If power money, deposited to client’s account (s 248(1)(d) LPA)Trust AccountGeneral trust account: must establish a general T/A if receiving trust money, that is (s 247; r 33):Established in QldKept according to the LPRBreach = 100 PUReg 33 (r 33 LPR): must: be with an approved ADI (authorised deposit-taking institution)include the name of the practiceinclude “law practice trust account” eg. “Freehills Lawyers Law Practice Trust A/C”must be the type approved by QLSList of Approved ADIsANZBNZBOQBank WestBendigo Bank LimitedCBAMackay Permanent Building SocietyMacquarie Bank LimitedNABQueensland Police Credit Union (QPCU)Suncorp BankSt George Bank LimitedThe Rock Building Society LimitedWestpac Banking Corporation (WBC)1.3.1 Flow of trust account information1.3.2 Steps in the recording processPrepare source documents to record details of the transaction and verify that trans occurredAnalyse the transaction to determine whether it is money that should be record in T/A or elsewhereRecord the transaction in the cash book:Enter opening balance (total as per closing balance of ledger)Enter T/A receipts and paymentsTotal cash receipts / total cash paymentsSubtract cash payments from cash receipts to determine cash book balanceRecord any adjustments required in trust journalPost debit and credit entries from cash book or journal to relevant indiv trust ledger a/cTotal each ledger account and prepare a listing of these balances = trial balanceCompare total balance of trust ledger to cash book balancePerform an approved ADI reconciliation to agree the trust ledger to the balance held in T/A1.3.3 Trust account documentsType of MoneySource & supporting RecordsSecondary RecordsReportsGeneral trust money? Receipts? Initiating record for withdrawal (cheque butts or cheque requisitions or EFT requisitions)? Deposit records? ADI statements? Trust Transfer Journals? Trust Account authorisations? Bills of costs? Invoices? Correspondence? Trust Receipts cashbook? Trust Payments cashbook? Trust Ledgers? Trust trial balance? Reconciliation statements(bank & cashbook)? Trust Account StatementControlled Money? Written direction? Controlled money receipts? Initiating record for withdrawal? Deposit records? ADI statements? Invoices? Correspondence? Bills of costs? Controlled Money Register made up of Controlled Money Movement records.? Controlled Money AccountsListing? Trust Account statementTransit Money? Copies of cheques? Settlement sheet? Written direction (if any)NilNilWritten Direction Money? Written direction? Copies of chequesNilNilPower Money? Power of attorney or other power document? Bank statements? Initiating record for withdrawal? All supporting documents in relation to the dealings? Power Money Record? Register of Powers & Estates? Trust Account StatementInvestment of trust money? Written direction authorising the investment? Initiating record for withdrawal? Bank statements? General trust account payments cashbook? General trust account receipts cashbook? Register of Investments? Trust Account StatementTrust Account ReceiptsRequirements: each receipt must be in duplicate and show (r 34 LPR):The date it is made and date of receiving the money (if different – eg a transfer / DD & ADI informs later)Amount of money receivedForm in which money was receivedName of person from whom money was receivedDetails clearly identifying name of clientMatter description and referencePurpose for which money was receivedName of law practiceExpression “trust account” or “t/a”Name of person who made out receipt Number of receiptReceipt must be issued immediately upon receiving trust money (r 34(2) LPR)Original receipt to be delivered: on request, to person trust money was received from (r 34(6))Receipts must be consecutively numbered and issued in consecutive sequence (r 34(7))Cancellation: If a receipt is cancelled or not delivered, the original receipt must be kept (r 34(8))1.4.1 Trust receipts generallyIf unsure whether money is trust money, bank it to trust account to be safe, or discuss with QLSReceipts must not be back dated!Money should be banked daily or as soon as reasonably practicable (s 248(1) LPA)Breach = 100 PUChq payable direct to a third party, no need to bank or issue a receipt1.4.2 Receipts – Corrections and CancellationsCorrections: rule through the error of the mistake; issuing person initials; correct details added to both copiesCancellations (r 34(8) LPR): retain both copies in receipt book, write “Cancelled” on both receipts and why 1.4.3 Tips and PitfallsClearance: banks have std time of 3 clear business days before funds from ALL cheques can be treated as cleared – money cannot be withdrawn from trust until clearedIf it is, another client’s money is being spent = breach of LPA (ss 418, 419(1)(a))Special clearance: establish a register, record all detailsTT, credit card or direct deposit: get written confirmation from bank to avoid errors in receipt – including amount, who paid, is it cleared, before issuing the receiptSteps upon receiving Trust MoneyIssue trust receipt immediatelyBank trust money daily or as soon as practicablePost entries within 5 days including the day of receipt of the trust money to (r 40(4)):Cash receipts bookClient’s individual trust ledger card as a credit1.5.1 Trust payments – must be by chequeWithdrawals from T/A can only be made by cheque or EFT (if approved by QLS) (s 250(1) LPA)Withdrawal of cash by ATM / telephone banking / EFT is specifically prohibited unless authorised by QLS (s 250(2) LPA)Cheque butt (r 37 LPR): each cheque butt must contain:Date and number of the cheque; The amount; Name of the person to whom the payment is to be made (& if an ADI for bank chq then who that bank chq is payable to);Details identifying person’s name on whose behalf payment was made and matter reference;Details identifying ledger account to be debited;Particulars sufficient to identify purpose for which payment was made;Can have 1 cheque for multiple matters, but info must then be entered into A/C Payment Cash Book 1.5.2 Payment authority Old method: could not withdraw money from trust in payment to practice or general a/c except for:Costs, duties, outlays, charges, other proper outlays supported by an authorisation in writing by person entitled ie. Pre-existingWhere no authorisation, deliver a bill and if no objection by client in 1 month can transfer, OR if trust money received for that purposeBreach = 100 PU or 1 year (s 8(1) TAA)Current method: Money in T/A not to be used to pay debts of practice (s 256 LPA)Can withdraw money from T/A to pay legal costs owing to the practice provided comply with reg 58 LPR (s 258(1)(b) LPA):Withdrawal WITH authority (r 58(3)): Send a written notice of withdrawal (letter) OR request for payment (bill) ANDThe practice has already spent money from general account; ORThere is a complying costs agreement; ORThere are instructions to withdraw that authorise the withdrawalInstructions can be written OR can be verbal but if so they must be confirmed by client in writing within 5 days (r 58(3) LPR)Withdrawal WITHOUT authority (r 58(4)): The practice has given the client a bill ANDThere is no objection with 7 days ORThere is an objection by the client, but they have not applied for a review within 60 days after the bill was given thenproceed with the withdrawalNB. Prudent to allow breathing space – 10 days for objection / 65 days for application for reviewBreach: There are no stated penalties for breaches, but non-compliance with r 58 may amount to unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct (UPC / PM)Steps for Payment of Trust MoneyDo I have signed authority from the client OR did I receive the funds for this purpose?Are the funds cleared?Write the cheque (or undertake the EFT if authorised by QLS)Post entries within 5 days of the payment of trust money (r 41(4) LPR):Cash payments bookClient’s individual trust ledger as a debt 1.6.1 Transfer by journal entry Trust money can be transferred from one trust ledger to another by way of journal entry (r 43 LPR)Eg. Where one client has several mattersReg 58 must still be complied with! [see above]Without this, a trust cheque and receipt would have to be issued and entries in cash books1.6.2 Trust account cash booksMust have 2 cash books (r 39) – a cash receipts book (r 40) and a cash payments book (r 41)Books are considered only books of original entry for trust accountingDetails to be entered are taken directly from receipt and cheque buttDetails are recorded in cash books in strict date order, as well as order [or number] pf receipt or cheque as the case may beNew details to be entered – form of the money, matter reference, purpose of receipt or payment and BSB of ADI1.6.3 Trust ledgers (r 42 LPR)An individual ledger must be established for each matter (eg. If 1 client, 3 matters = 3 ledgers) Only 1 ledger may have debit balance = one established to record the s 285 LPA deposit Each ledger is to contain detail to be able to identify the client, their address, the matter and all aspects of the transaction undertaken Eg. ‘The Estate of Norma Jean (deceased) re Administration’1.6.4 Section 285 LPA deposits The account is in the name of the ‘Chief Exec Dept of Justice & AG Special Deposit A/C’each January the practitioner does the calculation:work out lowest combined balance [LCB] for the previous year for ever dayLCB = T/A balance at the bank + money already held in account by Chief ExecMultiply LCB x 2/3 , round down to next $100, make deposit by January 21Trust Account ReconciliationWithin 15 working days after the end of each month, practitioner must (r 44 LPR):Balance and reconcile the T/A cash booked at month end with T/A ledger; andReconcile the month end ADI statement with T/A cash book balance at month endAlso, record date of reconciliation (r 44(2), (4))External ExaminationAn independent examination of the financial info with a view to expressing an opinion1.8.1 Appointment (s 267): Law practice must, within 14 days of becoming a law practice, appoint an external examiner (s 267(1))If examiner removed law firm must, within 14 days after examiner stop being examiner, appoint new examiner (s 267(2) LPA)Breach = 50 PU1.8.2 Notice to QLS (s 270)Law practice must within 30 days of becoming law practice, give QLS notice of examiner (s 270(1))Law practice must, on examiner’s removal, immediately give QLS written notice (s 270(2))Breach = 50 PU1.8.3 Qualifications of examinerMust be CPA / CA / member of Nat Institute of Accountants; must be registered as auditor under Corps Act (r 65 LPR)1.8.4 Period of auditAudit must relate to each 12 month ‘financial period’ – ends 31 March, must be done within 60 days of end of period (s 268 LPA)Breach = 100 PU NB. Used to have to conduct surprise audit during period under TAA – no requirement anymore1.8.5 Power of examiner (s 272)Examiner may examine the affairs of the practice (s 272 LPA)In carrying out examination, if examiner becomes aware of matter that (s 275 LPA):is reasonably likelyto adversely affect the financial position of the law practice to a material extent; ORto constitute a breach of Pt 3.3 by the practice; ORis otherwise an irregularity in relation to the trust records or trust accounts of the law practice of which QLS ought reasonably to be made awarethe external administrator must, within 7 days after becoming aware of the matter, give QLS a written report on the matter [= positive obligation on examiner]Penalty = 100 PUUnder old method – s 16 TAA – auditor had right to access all accounts / require production of books / had to report failure to comply to QLSOutlays and DisbursementsFirm must only charge for actual outlays not for undisclosed mark-ups or surcharges such as:Client registration feesFile opening / closing / archive / retrievalIn-house stamping / Citec admin feesProfessional indemnity insuranceSettlement fees where no agent is usedStationery / printing / email charges [not outlays]If want to charge for postage eg, would have to specify how many letter – can’t just say “$40 for postage and incidentals”If firm does want to charge more it needs to disclose (LSC Guildelines):Amount of mark up in $ or %; In plain English; andNot bury the disclosure in fine print1.6.1 Service company: For charges to a service company, also need to disclose to client as above AND state any interest the practice or you has/have in the company, even if indirect (eg. Family member / spouse)Eg. If have FB Law, and MB Pty Ltd (service company) which leases photocopier and it’s husband’s law firm and wife’s company, MB provides photocopying at really high margin – must be disclosed!1.6.2 Tips and PitfallsNot waiting 7 days / 60 days from delivery of account to client before transferring money from trust to general account – prudent to allow breathing space just in case (as above) – because no ruling on when time should start accruingWhere possible have client sign authority early in matter to transfer from trustWhen money has been received for specific purpose (eg. Stamp duty) it can only be used for that and no other purpose (eg. Land tax / searches) Drawing on uncleared funds = badBank fees and charge – debit to practice’s general a/c1.11 CasesNAMEISSUEINFOLSC v Twohill [2005]p37Unauthorised transfersTwohill’s client (husband) and the wife deposited $44,166.87 into T/A – deposited on basis it would not be dispersed with except in accordance with joint written instructions of husband and wife or order of Family CourtPractitioner transferred funds ($11,586.25) for costs and outlays on family matter without written instructions from clientWhen Family Court made order in 2003, trust deficiency came upLater in 2003, husband restored deficiency amount= professional misconduct, fine $5,000 and trust a/c trainingLSC v Ferguson [2006]p38Admin incompetPractitioner acting for vendor in sale of businessAmount received from purchaser on trust awaiting settlementClerk paid trust money to vendor without authorisation of the purchaser on assumption matter was finalised (but it wasn’t)Contract fell through, trust money immediately repaid= unsatisfactory professional conduct, fine $1,000AG Qld v Priddle [2002]p39Unauthorised transactionsBackgroundGuilty of 2 charges of unprofessional conduct in October 2001; suspended until June 2002 (approx 9 months) and pay costs of the societyFactsPriddle was trustee for trust which invested trust money from sale of rural propertyAbout $85,000 of the trust money and some of Priddle’s was invested in unprofitable companies and ultimately lostOver 10 year period very few a/c records were kept tracking the movement, investment and manner the money was dealtHeldPriddle’s conduct in prevaricating about the trust accounts and other records and in avoiding contact with the beneficiaries was not deceitful or dishonest and the money was not used for his own purposeThe grossly unsatisfactory conduct was to some degree explained by a hostage situation, health, financial and marital difficultiesThe initial suspension was sufficientCommentsSuspension from practice rather than striking from the Roll of Solicitors is an appropriate order in cases of unprofessional conduct where a legal practitioner's behaviour has fallen below the high standards expected of such a practitioner but not in such a way as to indicate that the practitioner is lacking the necessary attributes of someone entrusted with the important responsibilities of a legal practitioner; at [9] per McMurdo P, citing Re a PractitionerIt was open to the Tribunal to be satisfied that at the expiry of the suspension period, having suffered public disgrace and humiliation as well as the economic loss resulting from his inability to practise his profession during this time, the respondent will have learnt his lesson; at [14] per McMurdo P. Williams v QLS [2005]p39Unauthorised transactionsHad committed a number of offences, include: failure to undertake monthly trust account reconciliations as soon as practicable; received or transferred clients funds directly to this general account; drew on trust account when the withdrawal was more than the cleared funds availableHeldThe difficulties were created by William’s continued and persistent failure to reconcile his trust accounts, issue receipts, a failure to bank, and to post transactions to trust account ledgersWilliams was required to undertake the trust accounting module, pay $10,000 to the fidelity fund, install and operate a computerised trust account system and given a 12 month suspension IF he defaulted on any termsWilliams had difficulty meeting the fine imposed and the suspension was invoked, and upheld on appeal, but reduced to 6 monthsLSC v Chapin [2011]Technical breachChapin 56 facing 4 charges, one that he had paid money from his account that was: In accordance with intention and wishes of client; BUT was without authorisation imposed by TAAHad unblemished record, cooperated with LSC and QLS, had not renewed practising certificateHeld: ‘technical breach’ did not warrant disqualification from practice = publicly reprimanded, $7,500 fine & costsQLS v Carberry [2000]p185Number of breachesSolicitor charged with: Acting in conflict of interest; Failing to provide adequate explanations of his dealings when requested by QLS; Unauthorised withdrawal of funds; Failed to maintain adequate trust money records; Failing to provide auditor’s report to QLSTribunal found this constituted PM and suspended him for 12 months.The QLS appealed to the QCA stating the penalty was too light.HeldThe Tribunal should have found that Carberry was unfit to practise.It would be inconsistent with the court's duties to preserve the standards of professional practice not to conclude that what has been found against the respondent demonstrates unfitness to practice (@ [39]).The orders of the Tribunal that the respondent be suspended from practice for 12 months effective from 1 May 2000 and that he attend and successfully complete a practice management course conducted by the QLS prior to applying for a practising certificate should be set aside. The name of the respondent should be struck off the Roll of Solicitors of the Supreme Court of Queensland and the respondent should pay the appellants' costs of and incidental to the appeal to be assessed (@ [42]).QLS v Wakeling [2004]p36FraudPractitioner fraudulently misappropriated funds by transferring funds from T/A to general account then applying to own useMisrepresented T/A transfers on trust statementsAmounts grossly exceeded what would be reasonable for professional services= professional misconduct, removed from rollLSC v Clair [2008]p36Fraud – very young personClair admitted at 25 in 2004In 2006 requested $4,247.11 from client – used for personal useIn 2007 pleaded guilty in Mags Court to 3 charges of fraud, receives a conviction and 12 month GB bondIn 2008, LPT accepts that he co-operated, was young and inexperienced, stress from family break upHeld: struck off for seriously dishonest conduct of criminal character committed 3 times over 3 month period – unfit for legal practice (de Jersey)LSC v Rowlands [2010]Failure to issue receiptMr Rowlands faces a total of twelve charges. Four of them related to his competence and diligence as a practising lawyer. Seven involved a failure to respond to communications from the QLS / LSC, and one a charge of making a misleading statement or representation to QLS. They cover a period of nine years.Mr Rowlands also failed to comply in a timely manner with respect to six separate investigations. That in itself is a very serious matter.Mr Rowlands has engaged, consistently and over an extended period, in conduct which falls far short of, or offends, important tenets of good professional practice as a lawyer – not isolated incidents, no remorse or recognition of the seriousness of his conduct. Rather he has, in recent years at least, simply failed to acknowledge or respond to disciplinary proceedings or communications about them.When considering the appropriate orders regard will be had, primarily, to the need to protect the public, and to the reputation of the legal profession. The practitioner’s repeated departures from the standards required of Australian lawyers are serious and fundamental. The inevitable conclusion is that he is not a fit and proper person to be a legal practitioner. The appropriate order is that his name be removed from the local roll. No lesser penalty would satisfy the statutory exhortations to protect the public, and the reputation of the profession.QLS v Cummings [2004]p40Unauthorised transactionsBackgroundCummings admitted guilt on 8 charges before the tribunal in 2003Cummings agreed to restore deficiencies, suspended for 12 months and pay costs of the QLSAttorney-General and Minister for Justice appealed the suspensionCummings was 63 years old and has held a practising certificate for 33 years, generally self-employed in South-East QueenslandFrom original tribunal hearing ‘On the orders that this Tribunal makes, the Tribunal is reasonably satisfied that the practitioner will be a fit and proper person to practise after the period of suspension."FactsEight counts Cummings guilty under:1. Failure to ensure trust accounts were audited and the report submitted to QLS 2. Instances (10) of failing to undertake monthly trust reconciliation as soon as practicable at the end of the month3. Paying 9 clients receipted money directly to the general account or transferring money to the general account without authorisation ($2,720)4. Wrongfully drawing against or causing payments (85 offences, relating to 75 clients) to be made totalling $19,575.80 from the trust account and transferring the money to the general account or dispersing to 3rd parties without authorisation – maximum penalty was $7,500 per offence ($637,500) or 1 year imprisonment5. Causing payments to be made ($4,421.92) from the trust account to the general account where payments not posted to the trust ledger6. Paying $2,780.51 directly to his general account (3 offences)7. Paying $2,011.96 to his general account without authority (3 offences)8. Failure to keep, operate and conduct trust accounts in a proper professional manner with more than 150 particulars disclosing numerous offencesHeldThe failure to properly supervise staff and meet obligations was a serious breach of professional standards constituting professional misconductCummings undertaking to repay the deficiency suggested good character and some sense of honour, responsibility and commitment to his professionThere was no suggestion of dishonesty or personal gain in the offences or that the offences affected his professional duties and obligationsCummings has never committed any other types of professional breachesCummings acceptance not to take a principle level practising certificate, an otherwise good character, and undertaking to repay deficiency were criticalThe suspension was a sufficient penalty imposedTHE LEGAL PROFESSIONEthicsMoral approach to ethics: some lawyers feel obliged to act ethically out of a sense of moral conviction, may also be because of religious / spiritual convictionEconomic approach to ethics: professional conduct can be conceived of as being neither intrinsically good or bad, but as giving rise to costs and benefitsParker & Evans, Inside Lawyers’ Ethics, Ch 2 ‘Alternatives to Adversarial Advocacy’Parker & Evans specify four main strands of ethical reasoning available for lawyers in the context of Australian legal institutions. The approaches should complement each other and lead to agreement on the ‘right’ thing to do:Adversarial AdvocateLawyers bound by ethical principles enshrined in the law - opinionated, loyal and zealous in pursuit of their client’s interests and have little concern for the effect their actions will have on societyResponsible lawyerThese lawyers consider themselves an officer of the court and a trustee of the legal system. Their ethics are governed by their role as a facilitator of the administration of justice, and they take note of the public interest in just law. Their duties of advocacy are tempered by their duty to ensure the integrity of the law and the legal system, and they suggest alternative options to their client to ensure that the client’s actions are consistent with lawyers’ ethics. Moral activistThese lawyers are part of the legal system to ensure reform and movement towards a more just legal system. They attempt to improve justice by performing public interest legal duties such as pro bono services, law reform activities and counselling their clients to be moral. They do not consider themselves bound by a law which is unjust, and can be zealous and behave like an adversarial advocate where they believe it is in the morality or justice of their client’s case (which can be dangerous for the legal system). Ethics of care/relational lawyeringThese lawyers feel that the responsibilities of a lawyer are to the relationships he or she has with a client, people and communities. The aim of the lawyer/client relationship is the moral worth and goodness of both the lawyer and the client. They have a holistic view of their client, that is, they are concerned with emotional and financial wellbeing and consider non-legal and non-financial consequences (e.g. reputation, relational, psychological).The Legal ProfessionIs the legal profession in crisis? Susain Daicoff has indicated there is a tripartite crisis facing the profession consisting of:a lack of professionalism amongst lawyers – evidenced by frequent complaints; low public opinion of lawyers and the legal profession; andlow levels of job satisfaction and mental well-being among lawyersAdvertisingA person must not represent or advertise that they are entitled to engage in legal practice unless they are a registered Aus legal practitioner (s 25(1) LPA)Any advertising must comply with ACL and FTA – cannot be misleading / deceptive (s 18 ACL), cannot be vulgar / defamatoryA solicitor / principal of a law practice must ensure that any advertising in connection with the practice is not false, misleading or deceptive, offensive or prohibited by law (PIPA) (r 36.1 ASCR)Personal InjuryRestrictions on advertising: Practitioners cannot advertise personal injury services except for a publication that states the name and contact details of the practitioner / law practice and info about the area of practice (s 66(1) PIPA)Example: of advertising that contravenes s 66(1) PIPA – advertising personal injury services on a 'no win, no fee' or other speculative basis Penalty - 300 PU; and possible misconduct charge: s 66(3) PIPACan advertise to: A practitioner/anyone can advertise to (s 66(2)(a) PIPA):existing clientsanyone at their practiceunder a court orderWebsite: A firm can advertise on their website if the ad is limited to (s 66(2)(b) PIPA):the operation of negligence and a person’s legal rights under that lawthe conditions under which they are prepared to provide personal injury services NB. Okay if before 18 June 2002: s 66(4) PIPA“No win no fee”Can only be used on law practice’s own website (s 66(1) PIPA)Without a qualification this will generally be misleading / deceptive (r 36 ASCR; s 18 ACL) (LPCC and Browne)Have to take care to ensure clear disclosure in ad of any sums that could be payable by the client regardless of outcome of case – eg. Disbursements / third party costsCrime/family: “no win no fee” prohibited for criminal and some family matters (s 323(2) LPA)Ambulance chasing There are prohibitions on touting and referrals (ss 67-68 PIPA; r 34.2 ASCR)r 36 ASCR - Advertising36.1 A solicitor or principal of a law practice must ensure that any advertising, marketing or promotion in connection with the solicitor or law practice is not:36.1.1 false36.1.2misleading or deceptive or likely to mislead or deceive [NB. S 18 ACL]36.1.2offensive; or36.1.4prohibited by law36.2 A solicitor must not convey a false, misleading or deceptive impression of specialist expertise and must not advertise or authorise advertising in a manner that uses the words “accredited specialist” or a derivative of those words (including post-nominals), unless the solicitor is a specialist accredited by the relevant professional body.66 Restriction on advertising personal injury service(1) A practitioner or another person, whether or not the other person is acting for a law practice, must not advertise personal injury services except by the publication of a statement that—(a) states only the name and contact details of the practitioner or a law practice of which the practitioner is a member, together with information as to any area of practice or speciality of the practitioner or law practice; and(b) is published by an allowable publication method.Example of advertising that contravenes subsection (1)—advertising personal injury services on a ‘no win, no fee’ or other speculative basisMaximum penalty—300 penalty units.(2) However, for a practitioner or a person acting for the practitioner or a law practice of which the practitioner is a member, the practitioner or person does not contravene subsection (1) only because—(a) the practitioner or person advertises personal injury services—(i) to any person who is already a client of the practitioner or law practice; or(ii) to any person at the practitioner’s or law practice’s place of business; or(iii) under any order by a court; or(b) the practitioner or person advertises personal injury services on the Internet website of the practitioner or a law practice of which the practitioner is a member if the advertisement is limited to a statement about—(i) the operation of the law of negligence and a person’s legal rights under that law; and(ii) the conditions under which the practitioner or law practice is prepared to provide personal injury services.(3) A practitioner who contravenes subsection (1) may be charged with misconduct in addition to being liable to the penalty provided under the subsection for the contravention.BANNED:‘the No Win No Fee Lawyers’; ‘the Sue Now Pay Later Lawyers’; ‘the Home Visit Lawyers’; or‘the We Come to You Lawyers‘competitive rates’;‘free initial consultation’;‘home consultations by arrangement’;‘we can come to you’; and‘personal and thorough service’.‘serving all Queensland’;‘industry leaders’;‘over 20 years experience’;‘call our legal help line’; and‘relax - we have you covered’.s 67 PIPA - Prohibition on touting at scene of incident or at any time(1) At the scene of an incident at which a person allegedly suffered personal injury or at a hospital after an incident at which a person allegedly suffered personal injury—(a) a prohibited person must not solicit or induce a potential claimant involved in the incident to make a claim; or(b) a person, other than a prohibited person, must not solicit or induce, in a way that would be unreasonable in the circumstances, a potential claimant involved in the incident to make a claim.Example for paragraph (b)—A person who lives near the scene of the incident helps a potential claimant immediately after the incident. If the person, without being asked to do so, telephones a law practice and insists the potential claimant speaks with a practitioner at the law practice about making a claim, the person is acting in a way that would be unreasonable in the circumstances.Maximum penalty—300 penalty units.r 34.2 ASCR – Dealing with other personsIn the conduct or promotion of a solicitor’s practice, the solicitor must not seek instructions for the provision of legal services in a manner likely to oppress or harass a person who, by reason of some recent trauma or injury, or other circumstances, is, or might reasonably be expected to be, at a significant disadvantage in dealing with the solicitor at the time when the instructions are soughtADMISSIONThe legal profession is regulated to protect:Clients; The profession; andThe public at large.To achieve these objectives, legal practitioners must be appropriately educated, trained and supervised. Who can engage in legal practice?A person can only engage in legal practice if they are Australian legal practitioner (s 24(1) LPA)An Australian legal practitioner is an Australian lawyer who holds a current practising certificate (s 6(1) LPA)Legal practice is not defined in the LPA, some examples include:Conduct of litigation in court; preparation of pleadings; drawing up contracts; drawing up transfers of interests in land etcGrey areas: giving advice re tax liability (legal vs financial?); use and development of resources including land; family law issues (rights of parents etc)Penalty = 300 PU or 2 years imprisonment (s 24(1) LPA)SO: To engage in legal practice, one must be an Australian legal practitioner (s 24(1) LPA), that is:Be admitted to the legal profession (s 5(1));Hold a current practising certificate (s 6(1));Hold professional indemnity insurance (s 353(1) & (2)); andBe a contributory for a fidelity fund (s 368(1)). Procedure for AdmissionApplication to Qld SC: apply to QSC to be admitted (s 34(1) LPA) Must be in approved form an comply with rules (s 34(2))QSC can consider application however it sees fit (s 35(1))May admit app if satisfied they are eligible and fit and proper person (s 35(2)(a))May refuse applicant if not satisfied of ^^ (s 35(2)(b))QSC can admit a person unconditionally, or on conditions considered appropriate (s 35(3))The court cano vary the conditions (s 36(2)(a))The court can remove person’s name from roll for a breach of condition (s 36(2)(b))Also, a breach of a condition can constitute UPC or PM (s 36(3))Eg. if there were alcohol-induced indiscretions, admission could be granted conditional on attending AA meetings: (XY v Board of Examiners)In deciding application, QSC may rely on a recommendation of the board under s 39 (s 35(4)) QSC can hear and decide an application for a direction under s 32(3)(b) and give a direction to the board as the court considers appropriate (s 35(5))Board’s role: to help SC by making recommendation about each application, which can be relied on by the court (ss 35(4), 39 LPA)[see p 86 Dowse and ]The roll: kept by SC (s 37(1)); person’s admission takes effect when they sign the local roll (s 37(4)); person becomes officer of SC once admitted (s 38(1)); person ceases to be member of legal profession if name removed from roll (s 38(3))The Board3.4.1 Early Application to BoardApplication to the BoardPerson may apply at any time for declaration that a particular matter will not adversely affect Board’s recommendation for admission: s32(2) Board may—Make declaration: s32(3)(a)→ Decision binding on board unless applicant did not fully disclose: s32(4)Refer to QSC: s32(3)(b)→ QSC may give direction to the Board as it considers appropriate: s33(1) Refuse declaration: s32(3)(c)→ can appeal to QSC w/i 28 days: s32(5) appeal is by way of rehearing: s33(2) QSC can make any order it considers appropriate: s33(3) Legal Practitioners Admissions BoardContinued from 2004 Act: s659Composition— (s660(1))2 barrister and 2 solicitors Appointed by the CJ: s660(2)Legal practitioners must have at least 5 years standing before being appointed: s660(3)1 solicitor nominated by QLS 1 barrister nominated by BAQ the Brisbane registrar a person nominated by the Minister Quorum (min number to be valid meeting) = 4 members: s670Operation—Conducts business in any way it deems appropriate: s668Conflict of interest—Generally, cannot be present or vote on things where board member has direct or indirect interest unless board directs otherwise: s674(3)Practising certificateWhen granting—court considers— Suitability matters above: s46(2)Whether obtained PC because of incorrect or misleading information: s46(2)(a)Whether contravened a condition of PC: s46(2)(b)relevant law: s46(2)(c)whether contravened order of a disciplinary body or the Supreme Court: s46(2)(d)whether failed to pay an amount: s46(2)(e)whether contravention re professional indemnity insurance: s46(2)(f)Court has discretion to Consider other matters: s46(2)(g)award regardless: s46(3)Can’t be used as basis to refuse PC if raised at admission & didn’t prevent admission: s46(4)Eligibility & Suitability for Admission3.3.1 Eligibility for admissionA person is eligible for admission only if (s 30 LPA):Natural person 18 years or older;Has approved academic qualifications; andHas completed PLT. 3.3.2 Suitability for admissionA person is suitable for admission if they are a fit and proper person taking into account suitability matters in s 9 LPA (s 31 LPA) Chief suitability matter: good fame and character (s 9(1)(a) LPA)Good fame: focuses on person’s reputationGood character: concerns person’s quality judged mainly by considering former acts / motives Evidence concerning honesty is particularly important NB. PlagiarismNB. The QSC may consider a person fit and proper to be admitted despite a suitability matter because of the circumstances (s 31(3) LPA)3.3.3 Specific problematic behaviour affecting admission1. Lack of candour / franknessAn applicant must be candid and act with utmost good faith in disclosing issues reasonably regarded as concerning whether they are fit and proper under s 31 LPA (Re Bell)App’s candour (openness and honesty) in disclosing past conduct or lack thereof will affect the outcome of admission application (Re Davis) Full and frank disclosure shows app recognises prior conduct as dishonest and has since rectified their behaviour – relevant to whether currently fit and properCourts expect even ancient incidents to be disclosed (Re OG)Board takes lack of candour very seriously; app more likely to have app approved if disclose prior conduct at admission that if don’t disclose (Re Bell; Re Liveri; Re Davis; Re H)Court can use app’s lack of candour as guide to app’s present character!Failure to fully disclose / seeking to minimise / blaming on others: more significant than collusion itself (Re OG)Late disclosure: Re Bell; Re Liveri2. PlagiarismGoes to good fame / character = dishonesty (s 9(1)(a) LPA)Repeat instances: of academic misconduct without remorse = denial of admission (Re Liveri)Re Liveri - several incidents of plagiarism, failed to disclose and refused to acknowledge importance shows lack of insight, admission refusedOne-off instance of academic misconduct: in Re AJG this was grounds for delayed admission3. Contempt for court systemGoes to good fame / character (s 9(1)(a) LPA)This behaviour is likely to be viewed as demonstrating an inability to distinguish between vigorous but legitimate advocacy of a position and a reaction to an adverse decision of the courts that is unacceptable in an officer of the court. Such behaviour undermines confidence in the court system and was inconsistent with the functions of a legal practitioner in the administration of justiceThreats to court officers (Re Bell) Re Bell: threats to officers of court in affidavits | unresolved allegation of contempt of court | public claims about court system (gov pro-paedophilia) | failure to comply with QSC order to readvertise intention to seek admission refused || also failure to fully disclose | bankruptcy | 12 breaches of DVOsBreach of court order (Re Bell – breach of DVOs – also subject of unresolved complaint (s 9(f))Groundless allegations (Wentworth)False allegations (Vic Lawyers v X)Falsifying evidence (Singh)Taking money from prisoner to stand in bail application (Bacon)Vexatious litigation (Wentworth – feminist suing judge)NB. A “not guilty” plea is not dishonesty as not a statement of fact – entitled to put Crown to proof4. Current / previous insolvencys 9(1)(b) LPA; Re Bell5. IndiscretionsPrevious improprieties, even in another profession, trade or occupation, are relevant if reflecting aspects of the applicant’s character which may be pertinent to the practice of law (Re Hampton)Improprieties in another profession (Re Hampton)Re Hampton: failed to disclose inappropriate conduct in touching females while a nurse, taking patient details and going to her home [misuse of professional power] which led to his de-registration as a nurse, subsequently convicted of acting as nurse whilst unregistered → reflection of character → admission refused as not fit to practiceFailed to disclose!Criminal conduct (s 9(1)(c) LPA): In Aus or elsewhereConsider nature, how long ago, age when committed (s 9(1)(c) LPA)Repetition may indicate a blatant disregard for the lawMay not prevent admission if:So remote that irrelevant, eg. If acquitted (Del Castillo)Del Castillo: tried & acquitted of murder of friend - did not disclose admitted anyway - so remote from legal practice that irrelevantMinor and not premeditated (Ziems)Traffic offence or theft (Davis)Debbie Kilroy: was admitted; drug trafficking, sisters inside, order of Aus, Human rights medal, 40 character refs incl ex gov, SC judgesNB. Apps must disclose any contraventions (not just convictions!) 6. Time passed / YouthTime passing: can indicate rehabilitation (Re Owen – 2 burglaries when in mid-20s, admitted)Especially when taken out of environment of poor conduct (Lenehan – worked as clerk at firm where stealing commonplace, admitted)Where experienced, may not get admitted (Re Cohen 2008 – director, criminal and bankrupt history – tried to become lawyer, not admitted) NB. Re Cohen (No 2) 2012: finally found to be a suitable person to be admitted to practice in QCA – due to work experience and employer vouching for him etc3.3.4 Behaviour that will NOT be grounds for refusalDepression: not a ground to refuse admission in itself (S v LPB of WA; Skerritt)Alcoholism: may not be a ground to refuse but conditions may be imposed, eg. Attend AA meetings (XY v Board of Examiners)Political outlook, race, colour, religion etc: Selling communist literature, not sufficient to prevent admission (Julius)Unless indication that might break the law (Re B – journalist with contempt for law, evidence showed would break law if considered something unjust = refused admission)9 Suitability mattersEach of the following is a suitability matter in relation to a natural person—whether the person is currently of good fame and character;whether the person is or has been an insolvent under administration;whether the person has been convicted of an offence in Australia or a foreign country, and if so—the nature of the offence; andhow long ago the offence was committed; andthe person's age when the offence was committed;whether the person engaged in legal practice in Australia—when not admitted to the legal profession, or not holding a practising certificate, as required under a relevant law or a corresponding law; orif admitted to the legal profession, in contravention of a condition on which admission was granted; orif holding an Australian practising certificate, in contravention of a condition applicable to the certificate or while the certificate was suspended;whether the person has practised law in a foreign country—when not permitted under a law of that country to do so; orif permitted to do so, in contravention of a condition of the permission;whether the person is currently subject to an unresolved complaint, investigation, charge or order under any of the following—a relevant law;a corresponding law;a corresponding foreign law;whether the person—is the subject of current disciplinary action, however expressed, in another profession or occupation in Australia or a foreign country; orhas been the subject of disciplinary action, however expressed, relating to another profession or occupation that involved a finding of guilt;whether the person's name has been removed from—a local roll but has not since been restored to or entered on a local roll; oran interstate roll, but has not since been restored to or entered on an interstate roll; ora foreign roll;whether the person's right to engage in legal practice has been suspended or cancelled in Australia or a foreign country;whether the person has contravened, in Australia or a foreign country, a law about trust money or trust accounts;whether, under a relevant law, a law of the Commonwealth or a corresponding law, a supervisor, manager or receiver, however described, is or has been appointed in relation to any legal practice engaged in by the person;whether the person is or has been subject to an order under this Act, a previous Act, a law of the Commonwealth or a corresponding law, disqualifying the person from being employed by, or a partner of, an Australian legal practitioner or from managing a corporation that is an incorporated legal practice;whether the person currently is unable to satisfactorily carry out the inherent requirements of practice as an Australian legal practitioner;a matter declared under an Act to be a suitability matter.Note—See, for example, the Criminal Organisation Act 2009, section 133(3).A matter under subsection (1) is a suitability matter even though it happened before the commencement of this section.Re Bell TA \l "Re Bell" \s "Re Bell" \c 1 [2005] QCA 151 – lack of candour / franknessBell made an application for admission as a legal practitionerThe suggestion was that the applicant had failed to disclose information which should have been disclosed and had in addition made statements and conducted himself in such a way that made him inappropriate to be admitted as a legal practitioner.Bell had a number of circumstances in his past –Bankruptcy (discharged in 1995)12 breaches of domestic violence ordersMade threats to officers of the Family Court and the Federal Magistrates Court in affidavits e.g. “If this court countenances any continuation of such a travesty, there will be the most severe consequences for the officers concerned”Unresolved allegation of contempt of court for breaching Family Court ordersMade scandalous public claims about the court system, saying the opposition to his admission could be traced to pro-paedophilia stance of govtFailed to comply with a Supreme Court order that he re-advertise his intention to be admittedHeld: Bell’s application for admission was refused Applicant must be candid and act with the utmost good faith in disclosing issues which are reasonably regarded as touching on whether the applicant is a fit and proper person under s 31 LPAThe court held that his conduct was inconsistent with being an officer of the court – to be admitted, the person must –Be able to distinguish between vigorous but legitimate advocacy and inappropriate behaviour (thinking any court adverse to him was persecuting him)Not be prone to using any means to achieve an objective, instead must show an intention to act according to the lawNot act in contempt of court, and must follow orders of a court etcNot act in such a way as to undermine the court systemHave regard for justice systemHaving regard to the above, it was held that Bell was not a fit and proper personComments:This Court has consistently affirmed the important principle that an applicant for admission as a legal practitioner must be candid and act with the utmost good faith in making comprehensive disclosure of issues relevant to any matter which might reasonably be regarded as touching on the applicant's fitness to become a legal practitioner. The obligation is closely related to the ethical duty of a legal practitioner as an officer of the Court not to mislead the Court at [5] per McMurdo P, Keane JA and Wilson J.Mr Bell's conduct is inconsistent with the unique and indispensable functions of a legal practitioner in the administration of justice at [14] per McMurdo P, Keane JA and Wilson J.He presently lacks proper regard for the authority of the judicial system and that he is prepared to act improperly to achieve an end which he believes is desirable at [18] per McMurdo P, Keane JA and Wilson J.Re Cohen [2008] QCA 63 – NB. Was found suitable for admission in 2012 in Re Cohen (No 2) TA \l "Cohen" \s "Cohen" \c 1 Application to be admitted as legal practitionerCohen TA \s "Cohen" had a range of previous indiscretions including:Criminal history, Bankruptcy, Driving offencesCompany’s failure to lodge BAS statementsEvasive and equivocal when questioned by ASIC board over his company’s actionsHeld:Denied his company had been engaged in misleading conductCohen TA \s "Cohen" not fit for practiceComments:At his mature age especially, his attitudes to these matters are a matter for considerable concern, when this court comes to assess his suitability for admission as a legal practitioner. Consistently with those attitudes, his disclosure was not initially comprehensive, leading to the Board’s not being satisfied as recently as 22 January 2008 that he had made full and frank disclosures of all suitability matters at [9] per de Jersey CJ, MacKenzie AJA and Chesterman J.We appreciate the gravity of refusing an application for admission, but the court’s obligation to protect consumers of legal services transcends the personal interest of an applicant in cases like these at [11] per de Jersey CJ, MacKenzie AJA and Chesterman J.Re OG TA \s "Re OG" [2007] VSC 520 – lack of candour / plagiarismOG submitted an assignment as part of his unit, Strategic Marketing and Planning, was accused of collusion with his friend, GL; OG and GL were awarded a mark of zero for their assignmentGL had failed the subject and had to repeat it, whereas OG passed with a grade of 51Following the completion of their degrees, OG and GL both undertook their Practical Legal Training courseLecturer discussed obligation of each student to disclose to the Board of Examiners any matter relevant to the question of whether the student was a fit and proper person to be admitted to practice as an Australian lawyerGL recalls that the lecturer specifically referred to allegations of plagiarism and other incidents resulting in disciplinary action at university as examples of the sorts of matters needed to be disclosed. GL wanted to disclose the matter, but OG said that there was no need as the incident was never referred to the University Board as a formal incident of collusionGL disclosed the matter at admission and OG did not, OG was admitted and GL wasn’tOG accused GL of plagiarising, Judges asked 3 times why he didn’t tell GL that he thought GL had copiedAs part of OG’s admission, he misrepresented the circumstances that led to him receiving the zero mark. He said that he had “incorrectly approached the paper” because he “did not attend the tutorial at which the examination was discussed and therefore misunderstood the assessment requirements” = misrepresentationHELD:Took into account OG’s obvious education in finding that he was lying“We have concluded that we should revoke the order admitting OG to practise. As we have found, he deliberately or recklessly misrepresented to the Board the circumstances in which he came to be awarded zero for his second assignment. His actions were the antithesis of a ‘realisation… of his obligation of candour to the court in which he desire[s] to serve as an agent of justice’. We say nothing of what has happened since, including his evidence in this court and his attempt to shift the entire blame onto GL by alleging that GL had copied by utilising his access to OG’s computer and also changed OG’s own assignment on that computer. It cannot be doubted that the Board would not have granted OG a certificate if it had been aware of the misrepresentation. He should not be permitted to benefit from the fact that he managed to mislead them.”Held: Orders admitting OG to practise be revoked and that he be struck off the roll.OG not prepared to swear that fellow student had copied and likely that OG copied from fellow student or both colluded because assignment similarities striking.OG’s failure to disclose for admission was seen to be dishonest Not possible on evidence to say that either of two possibilities more probable that other however court inclined to find collusion rather than copying.OG knew collusion suspected and mark reduced to zero for that reason and by representing mark reduction for other reasons respondent guilty of deliberate or reckless misrepresentation.OG required to make full disclosure regarding anything which might reflect adversely on fitness and propriety to practise and candour did not include deliberate and reckless misrepresentation pretending to be disclosure therefore respondent appropriately struck ments:Increasingly, there is an expectation that even ancient peccadilloes should not be left out. In the past, perhaps, the obligation was not always seen as going quite so far. But the need for honesty has never been in doubt. Admission to practise is conditioned upon an applicant having a “complete realization … of his obligation of candour to the court in which he desire[s] to serve as an agent of justice”. An applicant must at least disclose anything which he or she honestly believes should not be left out. Plainly, candour does not permit of deliberate or reckless misrepresentation pretending to be disclosure at [123] per Warren CJ, Nettle JA and Mandie J.Re Liveri TA \s "Re Liveri" [2006] QCA 152Liveri applied for admission as a legal practitioner. The Board opposed the application, on the basis that Liveri has not demonstrated she is fit for admissionShe submitted an optional assignment in relation to the subject the Law of Trusts. There were findings against her that involved serious plagiarism, committed more than once, namely –L submitted, as her own work, with only minor adjustment (omitted a few paragraphs), an article published online by an Adjunct Professor of Law at Bond University. When it was brought before the uni board she swore that she accidentally submitted the article instead of her own assignment. She then asked to submit her “real” assignment, which was of very poor quality and hastily written (obviously after she got found out).Due to her academic dishonesty and the fact that she misled them about them, she was suspended from the law firm she worked at.Initially denied having plagiarised, on second application admitted itThe NSW Legal Practitioners Board also denied her admission as a legal practitioner.Despite the findings of academic misconduct against them and the strong foundation for them, she maintained that she didn’t do it and refused to acknowledge its significance.Held: The QCA said – “Her unwillingness, subsequently, to acknowledge that misconduct, establishes a lack of genuine insight into its gravity and significance: for present purposes, where the Court is concerned with fitness to practise, that aspect is at least as significant as the academic dishonesty itself. It could not presently be concluded the applicant is fit for admission as a legal practitioner… If and when the application does again come before the Court, the Court will need to be persuaded on appropriately cogent material that a finding of fitness is warranted. The mere lapse of time would not, without more, in a case of this overall concern, warrant the Court's concluding that fitness has been demonstrated. It is especially the applicant's subsequent attitude to the established misconduct which warrants a circumspect approach.” @ [21].it is inappropriate to accept to practice a person who reacts to stress by acting dishonestly to ensure his personal advancementto be admitted must exhibit a degree of integrity which engenders in Court and in clients unquestioning confidence in the completely honest discharge of their professional commitmentsCheating so close to the time of admission in the course which qualifies you for practice is unacceptable and makes you unfit for ments:The findings against the respondent involve serious plagiarism, committed more than once. At relevant times, she was a person of mature years — 25 and 27 years old. Her unwillingness, subsequently, to acknowledge that misconduct, establishes a lack of genuine insight into its gravity and significance: for present purposes, where the Court is concerned with fitness to practise, that aspect is at least as significant as the academic dishonesty itself. It could not presently be concluded the applicant is fit for admission as a legal practitioner at [21] per de Jersey CJ, McMurdo P and Williams TA \s "Williams" JA.The mere lapse of time would not, without more, in a case of this overall concern, warrant the Court’s concluding that fitness has been demonstrated. It is especially the applicant’s subsequent attitude to the established misconduct which warrants a circumspect approach at [24] per de Jersey CJ, McMurdo P and Williams TA \s "Williams" JA.DUTIES OWED TO THE CLIENTIntroductionPractitioners owe duties to clients under common law and equity4.1.1 Common LawContract: The retainer agreement is a contract between practitioner and client for the provision of legal services for a fee (Beach Petroleum)Practitioner is under a contractual duty to render services with due care and skill; failure to do so may give rise to action for breach of contract or negligence4.1.2 EquityLawyers owe fiduciary duties: Equity imposes fiduciary obligations on someone who undertakes to act in the interest of another person; a solicitor is in a position of confidence and trust re a client and so owes fiduciary duties to their client (Hospital Products v USSC)Rationale: vulnerability of client, dependence on lawyer (LSC v Baker)Specific dutiesScope will be determined by terms of the retainer (Maguire v Makaronis)May include the following specific duties which are aspects of obligations to act in the interests of and act for the benefit of the client:Not to mislead clientAct in utmost good faithCommunicate everything solicitor knows which may be of assistance; not withhold infoNot to make personal profit (apart from fees)Protect client from risk of lossNot to be in a position where solicitor’s duty to client conflicts with solicitor’s own interestsTo account for moneys entrusted by client / received for clientTo avoid concurrent conflicts (acting for current clients with conflicting interests) To avoid successive conflicts (conflict between duty of loyalty owed to existing client and obligation of confidentiality owed to former client)Duty to SuperviseResponsible principal: The principal responsible for a matter must exercise reasonable supervision over employees and solicitors assisting with that matter (r 37 ASCR)Supervision required: varies according to the employee’s expereicne, qualifications and role, and with the type and complexity of the work (LSC v Baker [2005])If inexperienced: principal must maintain a sufficiently close oversight to be satisfied adequate supervision is being provided (LS of NSW v Foreman)Fiduciary duties: the principal’s fiduciary duties are not diluted by delegating (Sims v Craig, Bell and Bond; LSC v Baker [2005])Vicarious liability: for breaches of person being supervised (Lloyd v Grace Smith & Co)Other principals: liability may extend to other principals of a firm (s 13 Partnership Act 1891 (Qld))Costs DisclosuresPurposesThe main purposes of Part 3.4, which regulates costs disclosures, billing and assessments, are (s 299 LPA):To provide for law practices to make disclosures to clients regarding legal costs (Div 3);To regulate the making of costs agreements relating to legal services (Div 5) To regulate the billing of costs for legal services (Div 6);To provide a mechanism for assessment of legal costs & setting aside of particular agreements (Div 7); To provide for the max payment for a practice’s conduct of a speculative PI claim, other than practice as a barrister. Costs disclosure generallyThe best way to avoid costs disputes is to require disclosure of certain matters in writing as soon as practicable after instructions have been accepted (s 310). Costs agreement: may be made between a client and a law practice and must be in writing (s 322 LPA)Void: a cost agreement that contravenes Div 5 of Pt 3.4 (“Cost Agreements”) is void (s 325)Cost disclosure requirements: found in s 308; a breach can enable the client to avoid payment of legal costs under s 316(1) (Marminta)Requirements include:Basis of calculation: Law practice must disclose in writing the basis on which legal costs will be calculated including whether a scale of costs applies (s 308(1)(a) LPA)Rights of client (s 308(1)(b)): To negotiate costs agreement;To receive a bill; To request itemised bill;To be notified of any substantial changes to disclosure already made.To progress reports (s 308(1)(g))Other info to be provided to client in writing (s 301(1) LPA): Estimate of costs;Billing intervals;Rate of interest on overdue fees;Client’s contact to discuss costs;Details of avenues to client under LPA re a dispute over costs (costs assessment etc) and time limits.Disclosure is NOT required if (s 311(1)):Total legal costs (excl disbursements) are not likely to exceed $1,500 (s 80 LPR) (must disclose if become aware likely to exceed $1500 (s 311(2))Client has received disclosure and then agrees to waive disclosureIf the client is a sophisticated client:Law practice; public company; large pty company; foreign company; financial services licensee; liquidator, administrator or receiver; p/ship with 20+ members etcIf costs agreed as result of tender processIf it’s a pro bono matterFailure to disclose: can result in client not having to pay fees unless assessed under Div 7 (s 316)Contingency fees prohibited: a law practice cannot enter into an agreement where costs payable are calculated in relation to a settlement value etc (s 325) Penalty 100 PUSpecific types of cost disclosuresLitigious mattersClient must be given an estimate of the range of costs that may be recovered/payable if the client is successful/unsuccessful (s 308(1)(f))If settlement is negotiated: before it is executed, client must be given (s 312(1)): estimate of amount of legal costs payable by the client; andany contributions towards legal costs likely to be received from another party Conditional costs agreement Agreement in which lawyer only paid if client is successful (s 323(1)) (cf. contingency fees prev p)May relate to any matter except criminal or under Family Law Act 1975 (s 323(2))Must (s 323(3)): be in writing, signed by client; set out circumstances that constitute the successful outcome; may provide for disbursements to be paid irrespective of outcome;contain cooling off period of not less than 5 business days etcWon’t be a win unless client actually recovers something themselves (ie. lawyer can’t charge client $20,000 if only settled for $10,000) (Baker Johnson v Jorgensen)Uplift fees Additional legal costs, excl disbursements, payable under a costs agreement on the successful outcome of the matter (s 300)Valid, but practice must disclose:its legal costs;the uplift fee or basis of calculation; andreasons why uplift fee is warrantedUplift fees must not go beyond the range of what would be charged by a reasonable solicitor in the circumstances (Council QLS v Roche)Speculative personal injury A claim for damages for personal injury if the right to charge and recover costs is dependent on the client’s success in pursuing the claim (s 346)Max fees: no more than half the settlement amount after deductions (s 347)Legal costs recoverableLegal costs are recoverable under a costs agreement (s 319(1)(a))Barristers: s 319(1)(a) does not apply in relation to recover of legal costs by a barrister retained to perform workHowever, under s 322(1)(c) a costs agreement may be made between a firm and a barrister. Disbursements and misc expensesFirm must only charge for actual outlays not for undisclosed mark-ups or surcharges such as:Client registration feesFile opening / closing / archive / retrievalIn-house stamping / Citec admin feesProfessional indemnity insuranceSettlement fees where no agent is usedStationery / printing / email charges [not outlays]If want to charge for postage eg, would have to specify how many letter – can’t just say “$40 for postage and incidentals”If firm does want to charge more it needs to disclose (LSC Guildelines):Amount of mark up in $ or %; In plain English; andNot bury the disclosure in fine printCannot charge for (Council QLS v Roche) [see p 185 of text for more]:Making phone calls that are unansweredPutting an appointment in a diaryMaking phone calls and leaving a messageSearching for documents and files in the firm’s possession that were unable to be located readily Arranging accommodation for counselSetting aside agreements which are not “fair and reasonable”The SC can set aside an agreement which is not fair or reasonable and it can make orders it considers appropriate regarding payment of legal costs (s 328). In doing so, the SC may consider:The advertised prices of the practice’s costsAny skill, labour and responsibility displayed on the part of the legal practitioner responsible The complexity of the matter Circumstances in which the work was doneTime within which the work was doneTest of reasonableness: requires an objective assessment; the test is unreasonableness re circumstances, terms and effect upon the client (Brown v Talbot)Generally rate of charging tends to be the main focus of reasonableness (and if client doesn’t know rate of charging = prima facie unreasonable because client can’t make an assessment of reasonableness)Matters re reasonableness: listed in s 328(2): any fraud / misrepresentation; any UPC or PM on part of practitioner to which agreement relates; etcFairness: relates to process involved in reaching the agreement – proper disclosure etcOverchargingCharging excessive fees can result in disciplinary action (s 343 LPA)However, LPA provides little guidance re an appropriate method of charging clients – just that “the charging of excessive legal costs…” is capable of constituting UPC or PM (s 420(1)(b))LSC’s jurisdiction: LSC has no jurisdiction to assess whether a bill is ‘fair and reasonable’; the LSC only has jurisdiction if a costs assessor finds there has been gross overcharging:Reduction by 15% or more: if costs assessor reduces costs payable by 15% or more, they may direct registrar to refer matter to LSC for disciplinary action (s 343(2))Grossly excessive costs: if cost assessor find costs are grossly excessive, they must refer matter to LSC for disciplinary action (s 343(3))Breach of fiduciary duty: overcharging is a breach of fiduciary duty owed by the solicitor to the client as solicitor preferred his own interests to that of client; client is in a vulnerable position etcASCR: Also a breach of r 4.1.1 ASCR to act in best interests of the clientCan be struck off the roll for overcharging (Baker)Baker: Baker was dishonest to clients, put his interests ahead of theirs and attempted to use his position to overwhelm clients. Even after he was charged he ‘still had a lack of appreciation of the impropriety of his conduct and its consequences for the clients, the legal profession and the public interest at large.’His behaviour was not an isolated occurrence of overcharging but was systematic and he bought the legal profession into disrepute (see ASCR 5).Client should: consider costs mediation and/or apply for a costs assessment under Part 3.4, Div 7 LPA (s 316). Legal Services Commissioner v Towers TA \l "Legal Services Commissioner v Towers" \s "Legal Services Commissioner v Towers" \c 1 LPT 2005The respondent was the attorney of WhiteWhite could not look after his own affairs, so the respondent was given power of attorneyThe solicitor was charging $300 per hour for non-professional services, such as shopping and talking to WhiteHeld: Overcharging White was professional misconduct – the solicitor was taking advantage of White’s condition for his own benefitThe court ordered that instead of the solicitor being struck off, he should be removed and it should be annotated that he ask to be removed himselfThe solicitor had a medical condition and other personal issuesAsking to be removed showed a degree of insight into his behaviour and the fact that it was unacceptableIt would look favourable to him if he were to seek re-admissionBaker TA \s "Baker" v Legal Services Commissioner [2006] QCA 145Offensive and insulting language held to amount to unprofessional conductCourt preserved findings of LPT that conduct in respect of the first three clients held to constitute professional misconduct. Each of the client retainers were made expressly on the footing of “no win no fee”. First Client - Mr NutleyThe first charge against the practitioner concerned a retainer received from Mr Keith Nutley. He had previously consulted a firm of solicitors, about a claim against his former medical practitioner Dr Sykes. On the strength of medical advice, those solicitors recommended that he abandon the claim on the terms of settlement offered by Dr Sykes. Mr Nutley consulted the practitioner for a second opinion. The practitioner was provided with a copy of the medical advice, but was nevertheless optimistic about Mr Nutley’s prospects of success in the action Further medical advice sought essentially confirmed the prior advice. On the strength of this opinion, counsel advised that the prospects of success in the action were “virtually nil”. The action eventually settled on the same basis as previously offered. Practitioner claimed he had incurred a substantial amount in the way of professional costs which it was then asserted Mr Nutley was liable to pay. On construction of the retainer the fees claimed were not owing. The practitioner denied authorising the account being sent to the client. However, it was established in cross-examination that in fact the practitioner had written on a draft copy in identical terms “this is fine”. Second Client – Mrs JorgensenMrs Jorgensen was prevailed on by an employed solicitor of the firm to retain the firm in an action against her employer arising out of a workplace injury sustained in 1995.A week before trial the claim was settled on 6 March 2000 on terms that the insurer reimbursed $9,324.23 to WorkCover and paid a further $10,000 to or on account of Mrs Jorgensen. When, in reliance on the “no win no fee” agreement, Mrs Jorgensen refused to pay, a bill of costs for $19,699.65 was rendered by the firm. The fees claimed were not properly chargeable. An outcome could not properly be characterised within the meaning of the retainer “as a ‘win’ from the point of view of the client unless the client actually recovers something herself – i.e that the client will not have to pay the solicitor other than from proceeds of the claim. The firm’s advice to settle was “bad” advice, and that, in recommending to the client a settlement that was financially disadvantageous to the client, the firm was “plainly in breach of its fiduciary duty to the client”.Partner claimed he was not involved in this file. He was, however, the partner of Baker TA \s "Baker" Johnson who was designated in respect of the file and who dealt with it as shown by the bring-up notations on the file. It was “highly probable” that the decision to sue for the fees in the magistrates court and the consequent appeal to the District Court was taken with his knowledge or endorsement.Third Client – Ms RobertsonInvolved as a pedestrian in a motor accident in which she sustained personal injury and property damage about which she consulted the firm, whom she retained. She filled in a questionnaire and signed a client agreement concerning the payment of fees. Essentially that was the only occasion on which she consulted the firm. She heard from them when she received a latter advising her that they had unwittingly commenced to act for the other party & that it was not now possible for the firm to act for either party in connection with this matter. The firm issued a plaint in the magistrates court claiming $1,829.20, representing a total of $1,312.57 for work and outlays on the personal injury claim, and $516.63 for the property damage claimThe fees here were not due and payable when the firm discovered the conflict of interest - the retainer was frustrated when the conflict of interest aroseFor the few items of work for which charges might have been legitimately been made, an amount of $1300 for taking instructions on initial consultation, carrying out computerised CITEC search was grossly overstated. There was no evidence at all of any work conducted on the property claim for which $500 was charged. Fourth Client – Mrs HajistamoulisIssue was whether practitioner failed to adequately supervise a solicitor who had written a letter responding to the law society in which it was falsely claimed that the client retainer was not on a “no win no fee” basis. On any view of it, the conduct of the firm in the matter was misleading and deceptive.If either of the partners of the firm was guilty of a failure to adequately supervise it was, on the evidence not the practitioner but Mr JohnsonIn the case at least of a firm with only two or a few partners like Baker TA \s "Baker" Johnson, the excuse that it was the other partner who dealt with a complaint from the Law Society will not be so readily accepted hereafter. A system will have to be instituted in such firms to ensure that something as serious as a complaint having the potential to produce a charge against a member of the firm is considered by all partners of the firm before a response to it is sent. ConclusionIt is accepted that the criterion by which professional misconduct falls to be judged is whether the conduct violates or falls short of the standard of professional conduct observed or approved by members of the profession of good repute and competency: Adamson TA \s "Adamson" – Now not applicableIt is also accepted that the sanction for violation is not intended to punish but is designed for the protection of the public and to maintain confidence in the profession in the estimation of the public and of the profession as a whole. In determining the sanction to be applied the Tribunal or Court is entitled to take account of the persistence with which the conduct has been pursued and the degree of candour displayed by the practitioner in the course of the disciplinary hearing. He has an unduly aggressive response to clients who fail to pay what he conceives is due to the firm irrespective of the reservations of other practitioners around him. The culture that emerges is that a claim for fees is made, and, if not immediately paid and irrespective of the reason why it is not, it is then remorselessly pursued and the amount is escalated on each occasion when a further account or bill for the same matter is sent to the client. The clients were all in poor financial circumstances and were unsophisticated persons inexperienced in legal matters. He used his authority, position and facilities as a solicitor and partner in the firm in order to overwhelm themThe practitioner showed a notable want of that form candour expected of a solicitor confronting such serious charges. He persisted before the Tribunal in assertions that were shown to be falseOrder that the practitioner’s name be removed from the local roll.Queensland Law Society v Roche TA \s "Roche" [2004] Qd R 574 TA \l "Queensland Law Society v Roche [2004] Qd R 574" \s "Queensland Law Society v Roche [2004] Qd R 574" \c 1 QLS brought two charges against Roche TA \s "Roche" Tribunal found Roche TA \s "Roche" guilty of professional misconduct and suspended for 12 monthsFactsRoche TA \s "Roche" ’s firm agreed to act for the client on a ‘no win, now fee’ basis in pursuing a claim for damages for injuries by his daughterA retainer was signed (1996) providing payment of fees on graduated hourly rate of $250/hr for partners and personal injury specialists to $100 for paralegalsThe firm could also charge for care and consideration, a supplement not to exceed 30% and it could increase its hourly rate once per year by no more than 10%, however 30 days notice needed to be givenA second retainer was executed (2000) which provided fees of $300 per hour for all employees of the firm, and a premium of 30%The firm agreed to take on the client’s second claim at $300 per hour, but only if the client agreed to pay $300 per hour with respect to the first claim (majority of the work of the first claim had been done by paralegals at only $100 per hour)First Charge – Failed to discharge his fiduciary obligation to his clientThe tribunal found that Roche TA \s "Roche" had not advised the client to seek independent legal advice on the matterThe conduct of Roche TA \s "Roche" did not come close to an acceptable standard for the carrying out of their fiduciary dutySecond Charge – Gross overchargingThe gross overcharging was in particular relating to charging $300 per hour for paralegals, described as being ‘unusually high’Majority of the work was ‘fairly mundane nature’ including wrapping a box of chocolates and discussions about the nature of the chocolates’ which were both chargedLevying grossly excessive charges amounts to professional misconduct whether or not other charges for the work have been forgoneHeldFinding of professional misconduct on both chargesCourt was concerned that Roche TA \s "Roche" showed a lack of contritionComments... a concerning feature of this respondent, distinguishing his position from that of those other solicitors, is his apparent lack of contrition, and the absence of an acknowledgement of his wrongdoing. But then one must give due weight to the view of the Tribunal that the respondent was basically honest and that with the salutary lesson of this suspension behind him, he could confidently be expected to conduct himself appropriately; at [42] per de Jersey CJIt should however be unequivocally affirmed that the respondent’s conduct exhibited an intolerable rapacity, and a blinkered, self-serving approach to the discharge of his fiduciary duty. That he has avoided being struck off in no degree diminishes proper recognition of the reprehensible character of his professional misconduct; at [43] per de Jersey CJIn light of the clear statements made by the Court in this case, practitioners who continue to breach their fiduciary duty by placing their own and their firm’s interests before those of clients, importuning them to enter into costs agreements charging exorbitant fees, whether or not in speculative cases, can expect heavier deterrent penalties for their professional misconduct; at [57] per McMurdo PDuty of Competence and DiligenceSolicitors must act competently and diligently (r 4.1.3 ASCR)Competence: ability to do something successfully or efficiently; scope of person’s knowledge or ability [see below ‘Accepting outside area of competence’]Diligence: careful and persistent work or effortDishonest and disreputable conduct: Solicitors must not engage in dishonest or disreputable conduct which (r 5.1 ASCR): demonstrates they are not a fit and proper person to practise law; oris likely to be prejudicial to, or diminish public confidence in, the administration of justice; oris likely to bring the profession into disreputeMere mouthpiece: Solicitors must not be a mere mouthpiece of the client (r 17.1 ASCR)Clear and timely advice: Solicitors must give clear and timely advice to assist clients to understand relevant legal issues and to make informed choices (r 7.1)Alternatives available: Solicitors must inform clients about alternatives to a fully contested adjudication available to the client (r 7.2)Communications with clientsThe failure to communicate effectively with clients is a major source of complaints against practitioners. The practitioner’s duty to communicate is an aspect of the overriding fiduciary duty owed by the practitioner to the client.Practitioners should assist in their clients’ understanding of the issues involved in the matter, by explaining their rights and obligations. The level of communication required should be consistent with the client’s knowledge and sophistication (Baker TA \s "Baker" at [32]-[34] per Moynihan J), the nature of the matter, and the level of importance the client attaches to the matter.Who is the client?Whether or not a client-solicitor relationship exists falls to be determined according to the ordinary principles of contract law: Maxwell v Chittick & Ors and Apple v Wily.Thus, a signed costs agreement between a solicitor and a person for the provision of legal services by the solicitor or firm to or for the benefit of that individual is evidence that the individual would be a client. In the absence of a written client agreement, one needs to examine the conduct of the parties as a retainer may be implied by conduct if all essential elements of a binding contract are satisfied.Where the client is a corporate entity, it is possible for a solicitor to be retained by a holding company to advise about its corporate structure and the inter-relationship with its subsidiaries, but the solicitor is not necessarily in a solicitor-client relationship with any of the subsidiaries, even though the advice might affect them. The question of the existence of a retainer is to be determined by reference to the objective facts, not by the belief of the solicitor as to the companies for whom s/he is acting: Beach Petroleum NL v Kennedy TA \l "Beach Petroleum NL v Kennedy" \s "Beach Petroleum NL v Kennedy" \c 1 & Ors.Merely providing instructions on behalf of the company is not sufficient to establish a confidential relationship towards the provider-employee: Gainers Inc v Pocklington TA \l "Gainers Inc v Pocklington" \s "Gainers Inc v Pocklington" \c 1 (1995) 125 DLR (4th) 50). The right of a client to have the services of a lawyer of its choice should not be unnecessarily restricted: Rakusen v Ellis, Munday & Clarke TA \l "Rakusen v Ellis, Munday & Clarke" \s "Rakusen v Ellis, Munday & Clarke" \c 1 [1912] 1 Ch 831.Every discussion with a client, whether by telephone or in conference, should be recorded in a contemporaneous file note summarising the principal matters discussed and what action was agreed to be taken.Legal Services Commissioner v Voll TA \l "Voll" \s "Voll" \c 1 [2008] LPT 001A dispute arose as to whether a solicitor had, in fact, sent an important letter advising the clients that they needed to be at court.The clients denied receiving the letter.The clients sent a fax to the solicitor on 10/09 advising they would be in Sydney from 12 Sept until 02 Oct.Solicitor said he rung the clients after receiving the fax, but there was no diary note or any other record of that phone call. The clients denied this.HELD:The bald assertion of fact with no supporting evidence put the telephone call into a unique position in the case.The clients were keen to progress the case so it would be highly unlikely that they’d go to Sydney if they knew they had to be in court.Solicitor only mentioned phone call for the first time in his second affidavit.The finding that that conversation did not occur reflects seriously on the solicitor’s credibility.Conduct involved a substantial and consistent failure to reach or keep a reasonable standard of competence and diligence, and trust.Amounted to professional misconductDuty and Standard of Care OwedWhere the practitioner fails to carry out the retainer, the practitioner will be liable to the client in tort for negligence, or in contract for breach of an implied term that they would perform their services with reasonable care and skill. This is analogous to the tortious duty of care (Astley v Austrust). The standard of care expected is of a reasonably competent and diligent practitioner in the circumstances of the case. There may be a higher standard of care if the solicitor is specialising in a particular branch of the law, even if it does not say so in the contract/retainer (Yates v Boland). Failure to adhere to a published standard is evidence, though not conclusive, of a breach of the requisite standard of care.The scope of the duty would not ordinarily extend beyond the terms of the retainer and the provision of legal advice, but not other forms of advice such as financial or investment; Citicorp v O’Brien. A solicitor exercising reasonable care and skill in the context of the retainer would:Advise clients on all matters relevant to the retainer, so far as may be reasonably necessary;Carry out instructions by all proper means;Consult with clients on all questions which do not fall within the express or implied discretion left to the solicitor;Keep clients informed to such an extent that may be reasonably necessary; andCarry out defendants’ instructions by all proper means within a reasonable time.Olympic Holdings v Lochel TA \l "Olympic Holdings v Lochel" \s "Olympic Holdings v Lochel" \c 1 Duty to Third PartiesLiability to a 3rd party might accrue where advice was given negligently and it is reasonably foreseeable that a 3rd party might suffer loss or damage if the advice was incorrect (Hill v Van Erp TA \l "Hill v Van Erp" \s "Hill v Van Erp" \c 1 ).Eg. A solicitor might be liable to a third party, the beneficiary of the deceased client’s estate (Hill v Van Erp TA \s "Hill v Van Erp" ). If the solicitor’s carelessness results in the loss of a testamentary gift intended to be given to a beneficiary, it is eminently fair, just and reasonable that the solicitor should be liable in damages to the intended beneficiary (Hill v Van Erp; White v Jones).Liability in NegligenceLiability in negligence arises only in relation to activities associated with the provision of legal services. Again this is subject to any particular arrangement between the parties.DelayThe application of diligence implies that a client’s matter will be attended to promptly. Accepting, however, that no client commands the complete attention of their practitioner, failure to attend to a client’s matter in a timely fashion is framed in terms of undue or unreasonable delay (Little v Ryland TA \l "Little v Ryland" \s "Little v Ryland" \c 1 ). Therefore, in most cases, mere delay (other than delay leading to loss of rights or opportunity for the client) are unlikely to be negligent because the essential element of damage will be lacking. Nevertheless, delay itself may result in a complaint to the LSC and discipline.Accepting Work outside the Practitioner’s Field of CompetenceBarristers must accept briefs within their capacity, skill and experience unless there is a valid reason not to (r 21 BR)Solicitors should only agree to act for a client where they can serve the client with competence and diligence (r 4.1.3 ASCR)Similar requirements in negligence (Vulic v Bilinsky TA \l "Vulic v Bilinsky" \s "Vulic v Bilinsky" \c 1 ). Damage confined to financial losses.In Vulic v Bilinsky: a solicitor inexperienced and lacking knowledge in the field should inform the client of his lack of experience and given the client the alternative to instruct another solicitorLoss of OpportunityIn some instances, a client’s losses are easily quantifiable. However, in situations where a practitioner’s inattention to a client’s matter results in a limitation period expiring or a claim being struck out for want of prosecution such that the client loses the opportunity of prosecuting their claim, the losses are not easily quantifiable. In such situations that the appropriate course of action is for the client to pursue their loss through an action against the practitioner rather than by relaxation of the limitations provisions.A lost chance to succeed in a negligence action is compensable: Sweeney v Attwood TA \l "Sweeney v Attwood" \s "Sweeney v Attwood" \c 1 . A court will take into account the reasonable prospects of success, and the likely quantum awarded by a hypothetical judge.Examples of ConductSome examples of allegations of professional negligence against solicitors in Queensland include:Failure to advise of the need to commence action within a limitation period under the Warsaw Convention 1929; Gaffney v Cranston McEachern TA \l "Gaffney v Cranston McEachern" \s "Gaffney v Cranston McEachern" \c 1 & CoFailure to give notice under the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994; Perham v Connolly TA \l "Perham v Connolly" \s "Perham v Connolly" \c 1 Failure to make adequate enquiries as to factors relevant to quantum of damages; Valencia v Wlodarcyzk TA \l "Valencia v Wlodarcyzk" \s "Valencia v Wlodarcyzk" \c 1 & CoSettling a distribution of assets under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) for an inadequate sum; Luadaka v Dooley TA \l "Luadaka v Dooley" \s "Luadaka v Dooley" \c 1 & AnorFailing to advise on the availability of possible remedies under judicial review; Island Link Pty Ltd v Thynee & Macartney TA \l "Island Link Pty Ltd v Thynee & Macartney" \s "Island Link Pty Ltd v Thynee & Macartney" \c 1 Failure to advise as to the absence of guarantees with respect to the purchase of an investment unit; Walker v Richards & Ors TA \l "Walker v Richards & Ors" \s "Walker v Richards & Ors" \c 1 Failure to serve or give notice of an application for family maintenance provision in relation to the administration of an estate; Holdway v Acuri TA \l "Holdway v Acuri" \s "Holdway v Acuri" \c 1 Citicorp Australia Ltd v O’Brien TA \l "Citicorp Australia Ltd v O’Brien" \s "Citicorp Australia Ltd v O’Brien" \c 1 (1996) 40 NSWLR 398The O’Briens brought a property, and got a mortgage from Citicorp for a loan of $60,000The O’Briens were unable to keep up the payments and had to sell the propertyO’Briens sued Citicorp and the solicitor Eliades, for relief against each defendantEliades was retained without any specific contractual stipulations in the retainerMr Eliades acted as solicitor for Hooker Homes and the O'Briens on the purchase and for Citicorp and the O'Briens on the mortgage.They lacked economic sophistication and, in his Honour's opinion, were very strongly in need of guidance from a professional person with some insight into the nature of their business when they entered into their transaction with Citicorp.no evidence that the O'Briens looked to Mr Eliades to advisethem about the financial wisdom of buying the house or of the financeagreement or mortgage HELD: There was no obligation on the solicitor to provide advice outside the retainerNo evidence that the plaintiff looked to Eliades for financial advice in any event. There were no special terms in the retainer which required Eliades to provide the O’Brien with financial advice To require a duty would require solicitor’s to give their opinion on financial matters, which they would not be qualified to givesolicitors, when retained to act on a purchase or mortgage for their skill in the law, have no duty to inform clients for whom they so act of their views about the financial prospects of the purchase or mortgage where they feel, or ought reasonably to feel, that there is a risk of cost to the clients, nor can the fact that a contract for sale contains special conditions making it subject to the client obtaining evidence, impose such a dutyHill v Van Erp TA \s "Hill v Van Erp" (1997) 188 CLR 159Solicitor Hill, had the deceased’s husband, Van Erp, witness the willThis made the gift invalid under s 15(1) of the Succession Act 1981 (Qld) HELD:Per Brennan CJ – The duty of a solicitor is to their client, and where there was a third party interest that was consistent with those of the client, duty could be owed to third party person.Per Dawson and Toohey JJ –applied the proximity test and said that a solicitor took on the responsibility, when drafting a will, of carrying out the client’s testamentary intentions. The duty therefore existed to the intended beneficiary, if in fact and not law only.Per Gaudron J – The relationship of proximity existed between the intended beneficiary and solicitor, as the solicitor controlled whether or not the beneficiary would get their gift. Per Gummow J – The relationship exists because the retainer was designed to give a financial boost to the beneficiary and the solicitor controlled the beneficiary’s ability to claim the benefitSweeney v Attwood TA \s "Sweeney v Attwood" [2003] QCA 348appellant was injured by a truck owned by incorporated association appellant a member ofAlthough it commenced proceedings on the appellant's behalf within time, it failed to give notice under s 37 of the Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 until a month after the expiry of the limitation periodcommon ground between the parties that thereby it breached the duty of careHELDHis Honour found that in respect of each of the particulars of negligence the plaintiff's prospects were poor - assessed the value of the plaintiff's lost chance at "about one third”Damages = prospects of success, deduction for contributory negligenceDuty of ConfidentialityThe efficient administration of justice requires that clients fully disclose information without the fear that their lawyers will disclose it (Esso Aus v CT)In addition to specific duties arising out of fiduciary obligation, practitioner owes a separate duty of confidentiality to the client which arises out of common lawThe law implies a term into the retainer that communication between the lawyer and client will be kept secret (Crowley v Murphy) – subject to overriding duty as officer of court Duties owed:Contractual duty of confidentiality may terminate when retainer expiresEquitable duty will survive the termination of the retainerPrevents lawyer acting against former client In equity, there is a relationship of trust and confidence that survives the end of the retainer (Hospital Products)ASCR 9: A solicitor must not disclose any information which is confidential to a client and acquired by the solicitor during the client’s engagement to any person who is not an employee of the practice or a barrister/other person engaged by practice (ASCR 9.1). BUT: A solicitor may disclose confidential information if (ASCR 9.2.___):the client expressly/impliedly authorises it;the solicitor is permitted/compelled by law to disclose;eg. suspicions of child abuse (s 67ZA(2)) - lawyer representing child’s intereststhe solicitor discloses the information in a confidential setting, for the sole purpose of obtaining advice in connection with the solicitor’s legal or ethical obligations; the solicitor discloses the information for the sole purpose of avoiding the probable commission of a serious criminal offence; NB. Must be probable commission – is it better for lawyer not to disclose and protect themselves given no obligation to disclose!?the solicitor discloses the information for the purpose of preventing imminent serious physical harm to the client or to another person; or the information is disclosed to the insurer of the solicitor, law practice or associated entity.Guilty or delinquent clients (r 20 ASCR)Lied/Falsified documents: Where a client has lied or falsified a document, or procured someone else to do so, the solicitor must:Advise the client that the court should be informed of the lie/falsification and request authority to inform the court (r 20.1.4 ASCR); andRefuse to take any further part in the case unless the client so authorises (r 20.1.5); andPromptly inform the court if given authorisation (cannot inform if not given authorisation) (r 20.1.5)Confession but maintains plea of not-guilty: Where a client confesses guilt to the solicitor but maintains a plea of not guilty:The solicitor may cease to act if there is enough time for another solicitor to take over properly, and the client does not insist on the solicitor continuing to appear (r 20.2.1)If the solicitor continues to act, they (r 20.2.2):must not falsely suggest some other person committed the offence; must not set up an affirmative case inconsistent with the confession; may argue that the evidence as a whole does not prove that the client is guilty; andmay argue that for any other reason not prohibited the client should not be convictedthe solicitor must not continue to act if the client insists on giving evidence denying guilty or requires the making of a statement asserting innocence (r 20.2.3) Client intends to disobey court order: If a client intends to disobey a court order, solicitor must:advise the client against that course and warn the client of its dangers (r 20.3.1); not advise the client how to do so (r 20.3.2); andnot inform the court or the opponent of the client’s intervention unless (r 20.3.3):the client has so authorised; orthe solicitor believes on reasonable grounds that the client’s conduct constitutes a threat to any person’s safetyIntegrity of evidence: a solicitor must not advise or suggest to a witness that false or misleading evidence should be given, or condone doing so (r 24.1.1)NB. Barrister’s rules 108-114 (Confidentiality & Conflicts; 78-81 (Delinquent or guilty clients) Legal Professional Privilege (LPP) distinguished[see p 125 Dowse]The duty of confidentiality is difference from the privilege attaching to disclosed information. LPP attaches to (CT v Pratt Holdings):Confidential communications between a client and lawyer for the dominant purpose of obtaining or giving legal advice (legal advice privilege); andConfidential communications passing between a client, their lawyer and third parties in relation to litigation, either pending or in contemplation (litigation privilege)NB. Wider than legal advice privilege – covers third partiesLegal professional privilege encourages full and frank disclosure between the client and legal practitioner, supporting the public interest in the administration of justice (Esso Aus v CT TA \s "Esso Australia Resources Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation" ). Exceptions to LPPUnlawful activity: LPP does not extend to advice sought or given to facilitate criminal, fraudulent or other unlawful purposes (Kearney v AG (NT) TA \l "Kearney v Attorney-General (NT)" \s "Kearney v Attorney-General (NT)" \c 1 )Whether or not the lawyer was party to or ignorant of those purposes is immaterial; the client’s purpose is the relevant inquiryConsequences for breachBreach of the duty of confidentiality can constitute UPC or PM under the LPA (ss 418-420) and liability can arise in tort (negligence) and for breach of contractKearney v Attorney-General (NT) TA \s "Kearney v Attorney-General (NT)" (1985) 158 CLR 500The administrator of Northern Territory was attempting to extend regulations over a large area, in order to prevent an Aboriginal native title claim being made over the areaIn discovery, the administrator claimed that legal documents that pertained to the matter were privilegedHeld: The documents were not protected by legal professional privilegeLegal documents that are concerned with perpetrating a deliberate use of a statutory power would be against the public interestYou must have a reason for suggesting that they relate to an illegal purposeConflicts of InterestThe fiduciary nature of the position and status of a legal practitioner regarding clients is the fundamental source of their obligations to:Maintain clients’ confidential information; andAvoid conflictsPrimary sources of conflict: The primary sources of conflict are:Conflict between clients and the practitioner (conflict of duty and interest); Conflict between concurrent clients;[Sexual relationship with a client]Conflict between former and current clients; Conflict of duty and interestClient v PractitionerLawyers, as fiduciaries, have duty not to prefer their own interests to those of the client (Spincode)The duty of the lawyer not to prefer their own interest to that of the client rests upon understanding and applying the ordinary concepts of fair dealing (LS of NSW v Harvey):LS of NSW v Harvey: “where there is any conflict between the interests of the client and… of the practitioner, the duty of the solicitor is to act in perfect good faith and to make full disclosure of his interest.”Business opportunities: the price of being solicitor whose duty to his client ought not to be prejudiced to any degree, is that he is denied the freedom to take benefit of any opportunity to deal with persons whom he has accepted as client (LS of NSW v Harvey)If the lawyer is going to benefit there must be fully informed consent (Maguire v Makaronis) (p67 text)ASCRsFundamental duties: A solicitor must act in the best interests of their client (r 4.1.1)Conflict – solicitor’s own interests: A solicitor must not act for a client where there is a conflict between the duty to serve the best interests of a client and the interests of the solicitor (or associate) (r 12.1)A solicitor must not exercise any undue influence intended to dispose the client to benefit the solicitor in excess of the solicitor’s fair remuneration (r 12.2)Mere mouthpiece: A solicitor must not act as the mere mouthpiece of a client and must exercise forensic judgments independently after consideration of the clients instructions (r 17.1)BarristersA barrister must refuse to accept or retain a brief on instructions if:the barrister has a material financial or property interest in the outcome of the case, apart from the prospect of a fee (r 95(g)) Barristers Rules)the client’s interest in the matter is/would be in conflict with the interests of the barrister (or associate) (r 95(b)) Barristers Rules)Common situations of solicitor-client conflict (see p 273 of text)LoansSale of property between practitioner and clientGifts and other bequests: Any gifts given should be disclosed; receipt of a gift can suggest undue influence by the solicitor on the client (Johnson v Buttress) or vice versa (NB. Mere mouthpiece ASCR r 17.1)Consequences for breachWhere a solicitor abuses the lawyer-client relationship to derive a personal advantage, there is a breach of fiduciary duty and professional misconduct.Disciplinary action under a regime and a liability under equitable principles may exist concurrently (Maquire & Tansey) LS of NSW v Harvey TA \l "The Law Society of New South Wales v Harvey" \s "The Law Society of New South Wales v Harvey" \c 1 The practitioner was a director and shareholder of a number of companies which borrowed money from the practitioner’s clients – lots of money involved and speculation in real estateHarvey suggested his clients invest money into these companies which subsequently failed.In some cases he made partial disclosure of his interests however, in many the clients had no idea of his interests.Harvey failed to explain to many clients how their moneys were invested and many of his clients were inexperienced and relied heavily upon him.Harvey failed to advice his clients to seek independent advice as to the wisdom of such investments.HELD: Court of AppealFound him guilty of serious professional misconduct involving many clients and large sums of money and struck him off the role of solicitors Deliberately caused the clients affairs to be intermingled with his affairs and that, while acting for the client, he grossly preferred his own interest to those of his clientUsed his position of solicitor to channel the money of his clients as the risk money in his own ventures in which he could lay little and involved substantial speculations in land. Recklessly disregarded clients interests – invested in speculative land and on terms that no reputable solicitor acting independently could have contemplated. CJ Street: Where there is any conflict between the interests of the client and the interests of the practitioner, the duty of the solicitor is to act in perfect good faith and to make full disclosure of his interest. There must be a conscientious disclosure of all material circumstances and all material known to him relating to the proposed transaction which might influence the conduct of the client or anybody from whom they might seek advice. To disclose all that is less than material may positively mislead, for a solicitor to merely disclose that he has an interest without identifying the interests may serve only to mislead the client and to enhance confidence that the solicitor will be in a position better to protect the clients interests. The conflicts of interest may and usually will be such that it is not proper or impossible for the solicitor to continue to act and advise his client. If conflict, should take independent advice.Maher v Millennium Markets TA \l "Maher v Millennium Markets" \s "Maher v Millennium Markets" \c 1 Solicitor retained to aid in paying back a debt of 6.5milBank had agreed to accept 5.8mil as full payment The purchasers of the property agreed to pay the solicitor $150,000 in commission for introducing them to the vendors – he obtained the consent of his clients to receive the fee in a Deed of Agreement dated 1 March 1999 ISSUEThat’s a position of conflict – he was a making a profit from his client’s case For this to be ok the vendors would have had to get independent legal advice in relation to the commission giving/allowing – he they are signing it because the solicitor said so then that could cause problems even if they really were ok with it Then onus was on the solicitor to show that the consent was fully informed Maguire v Makaronis TA \l "Maguire v Makaronis" \s "Maguire v Makaronis" \c 1 (1997) 188 CLR 449Husband and wife were clients of a solicitorSolicitor did not mention that he was also acting for the mortgageeThey defaulted on the loan and the solicitors took possession of the premisesCLAIMThat the mortgage was void HELDThat the mortgage should be set aside Solicitor had breached fiduciary duty by entering into a mortgage with the clients in the absence of informed consent (even if they would have entered into the mortgage if they had have known otherwise re the solicitors acting for the bank) It is not enough for a client to consent to a transaction The client must be fully informed. Conflict of duty and duty (concurrent clients)Current client v Current clientSolicitors owe undivided loyalty to their clients to carry out the terms of their retainer effectivelyLoyalty cannot occur where a lawyer is acting at the same time for more than one client whose interests differ (eg. acting for both parties to a dispute)Fully informed consent: can act if have fully informed consent (may be a need for indpt legal advice) (Maguire v Makaronis)ASCRsA solicitor must act in the best interests of their client (r 4.1.1)Solicitors must deliver services competently, diligently and promptly (r 4.1.3)11. Conflict of duties concerning current clientsA solicitor and a law practice must avoid conflicts between the duties owed to two or more current clients, except where permitted by this rule (r 11.1)If a solicitor seeks to act for two or more clients in the same matter where the clients’ interests are adverse, the solicitor must not except where permitted by r 11.3 (r 11.2)The solicitor may act in these circumstances, subject always to the solicitor discharging their duty to act in the best interests of their client, only act if each client (r 11.3):Is aware the solicitor is acting for another client; andHas given informed consentWhere solicitor holds confidential info of a client material to the other client and detrimental to the first client if disclosed, there is a conflict of duties and solicitor must not act for the other client unless (r 11.4):There is informed consent; orEffective information barriers have been establishedBarristersA barrister must refuse to accept or retain a brief on instructions if the barrister has information which is confidential to any other person in the case other than prospective client; and The info may be material to prospective client’s case; andThe person entitled to the confidentiality has not consented to the using of the info (r 95(a)) Barristers Rules)Consequences for breachDuty: Where a solicitor cannot act for both parties, their duty is to inform each party that they cannot act and that they should seek legal advice from other solicitors, starting afresh and not relying on advice from the first solicitorBreach of ASCRs: a breach of the ASCRs, here r 11, is capable of constituting UPC or PM (r 2.3; s 420(1)(a) LPA)Sexual relationship with a clientIn BAQ v Lamb, the HCA held that a legal practitioner, who had maintained a sexual relationship with a client, did not engage in unprofessional conduct showing an unfitness to practise (although his conduct was dishonourable and reprehensible).It was suggested, however, that in special cases like family law cases, an obligation should be imposed on the lawyer to not get involved in a relationship with the client because of the emotional vulnerability at this period of hardship. In LPCB v Morel, Morel was with 3 of her prisoner clients; conflicts arose and she was struck offReasons why sexual relations with a client are inappropriateThe client is sometimes in a vulnerable position both emotionally and economically and easily coerced or unduly influenced into a sexual relationshipSexual relations with a client can lead to incompetent legal servicesSolicitor’s judgment will be cloudedLawyers need to remain detached and objective in representing a client - There will be no impartiality or independence if a person is in asexual relationship with the client they are representing. There will be no detachment & high chance of advice going further than legal advice Power imbalance; vulnerability of client; dependence on practitioner; breach of trustMorel TA \s "Morel" (2004) 88 SASR 401Ms?Morel TA \s "Morel" was admitted to practice in 1987She was a mature age graduate, having commenced studies for her law degree when aged 32 yearsShe took employment with the Legal Services Commission and then with Aboriginal Legal Rights MovementShe developed a criminal law practice, attended Yatala Prison and other correctional institutionsMorel TA \s "Morel" became involved with 3 of her clients who were prisonersConflict of interest arose from personal relationships – she used her legal position to maintain contact with her clients/partners and said that they were subject to legal professional privilegeConversations were being monitored – one client made admission to a very serious crime during the phone conversationLegal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal (LPDT) made a finding that the respondent solicitor was guilty of unprofessional conductThe application was made by the Legal Practitioners Conduct Board for an order that the name of Claire Morel TA \s "Morel" be struck off the roll of Legal PractitionersIssue: Whether unprofessional conduct sufficient to warrant removal from roll?Held: found not to be fit and properClient’s position compromised by their personal relationshipConcealed the relationship to the board, showing insufficient insight into her behavioura personal relationship to interfere with her professional duties to a client who was charged with serious criminal conductlegal advice not independentmatter of considerable concern that Ms Morel TA \s "Morel" lacked the basic understanding of legal professional duties to understand the nature of the conduct that she engaged in and the way in which it disadvantaged her clientstarting undertaking psychiatric treatment, though 50 and late in the piece so unlikely to have much of an effectEven if the deception and dishonesty were occasioned by Ms Morel TA \s "Morel" 's borderline personality condition, the misconduct is seriousRe reinstatementif Ms Morel TA \s "Morel" is serious about seeking readmission to practise the law she will also need to ensure that she has had access to the services of a professional mentor of the type suggested by Ms Tiggeman. Ideally that would be in conjunction with some employment in legal practice. Her being struck off does not preclude her from making an application to the TribunalConflict between current and former clientsCurrent client v Former clientWhile the duty of loyalty terminates at the end of the first retainer, the equitable duty of confidentiality subsists so long as the info remains confidential (Parry-Jones v Law Society)Therefore, while a solicitor is not prohibited from acting against a former client they will be required to maintain the duty of confidentiality owed to the former client (Bolkiah v KPMG)Test articulated in Bolkiah The court should intervene unless it is satisfied there is no risk of disclosure of confidential information; the risk must be a real one, not merely fanciful, but it need not be substantial (Bolkiah v KPMG; endorsed in Qld in Flanagan v Pioneer)Qld favours Bolkiah approach: In Flanagan v Pioneer there was not a real risk of disclosure of confidential information and so an injunction was refusedLower threshold than test expressed in Rakusen v EMC that a solicitor should be restrained from acting for the new client only if the former client could demonstrate ‘that real mischief and real prejudice will in all human probability result if the solicitor is allowed to act’If there is no communication of confidential information and there is no real risk of disclosure of confidential information, likely to be fine (firm should probably give undertaking to act as though two separate firms) (Fruehauf Finance)Fruehauf Finance - Adopted Rakusen: As a general rule, the court will not interfere unless there is such a probability of mischief that the court feels it ought to interfere and say that a solicitor shall not act.Onus: on former client to identify confidential info the solicitor possesses that could be used to disadvantage the former client; onus then falls to solicitor /firm to demonstrate the threshold of risk as to disclosure is not met (Bolkiah v KPMG)Bokiah v SpincodeIn Spincode v Look Software, the VCA reviewed the authorities regarding alternative sources of the jurisdiction of the court to restrain a practitioner from acting against a former client (ie. in Bolkiah, sole basis was protection of confidential info)Spincode (position in Victoria, not favoured position in Qld):Position in Aus has diverged from that in England; danger of misuse of confidential info is not the sole basis for intervention where a solicitor acts against a former clientOther sources of the duty include:Equitable obligation: of loyalty which prohibits not only concurrent holding of inconsistent engagements by clients in the same matter; but also the holding of successive inconsistent engagements; Contract of retainer: possible approach to say it was an implied term of the contract of retainer, in the present case, that the solicitors would not act against the client in the dispute in relation to which they had been retained by it;Officer of court: a solicitor as an officer of the court may be prevented from acting against a former client even if danger of misuse of confidential information is unlikely – courts may exercise authority over their own officers as to the propriety of their behaviourASCRsA solicitor and a law practice must avoid conflicts between the duties owed to current and former clients, except as permitted by r 10.2 (r 10.1)A solicitor/law practice who holds confidential info of a former material to another client and detrimental to the former client if disclosed, must not act for the current client unless the former client has given informed written consent and an effective information barrier has been establishedChinese WallsThere is no rule of law that Chinese Walls are insufficient to eliminate risk, but courts should restrain a firm from acting unless satisfied on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that effective measures have been taken to ensure no disclosure will occur (Bolkiah). In Bolkiah, the Chinese walls were established ad hoc and erected within a single department; effective Chinese walls must be established as part of the organisational structure of the firm, not created ad hoc (Bolkiah)Chinese walls generally involve some combination of the following organisational arrangements:The physical separation of the various departments in order to insulate them from each otherAn educational programme to emphasise the importance of not improperly or inadvertently divulging confidential informationStrict and carefully defined procedures for dealing with a situation where it is felt that the wall should be crossed and maintaining of proper records where this occursMonitoring by compliance officers of the effectiveness of the wallDisciplinary sanctions where there has been a breach of the wallEffectiveness: other factors in determining the effectiveness of Chinese walls include:Sustainability of clientsNumber of lawyers in the companySize of the firmLength of time between taking instructions from former client and current clientHow long walls were in placeProcedures for when wall should be crossed and maintenance of proper records when this occursDisciplinary sanctions for breach of the wallProvide physical separation (include dining arrangements)EducationPosition in AustraliaNotwithstanding differences as to the potential nature of the jurisdiction which might be invoked to restrain a practitioner from acting in a situation of successive client conflict, the test enunciated by Lord Millett in Prince Jefri has been generally accepted as a more appropriate benchmark than the more lenient test which had emerged in Rakusen. The High Court has not had the opportunity to consider the precise terminology which will define the threshold to be reached before an injunction will be granted to restrain solicitors from acting in circumstances of successive client conflict.Neither has the court decided whether, or in what circumstances, Chinese Walls might offer an acceptable mechanism for allowing firms to act for successive clients where there is a potential for the disclosure of information confidential to the former client.In Qld it seems likely that Prince Jefri will prove the dominant view as to the appropriate test where the jurisdiction invoked is that of protecting the confidences of a former client. Other CasesMSJ v KPMG: If, by a solicitor acting for a new client there is a real and sensible possibility that advancing the case of the new client might conflict with his duty to keep information given to him by the former client confidential, or to refrain from using that information to the detriment of the former client, then an injunction will lie to restrain the solicitor from acting furtherPott v James Mitchell & Anor: Decide on the basis of whether there is a ‘real possibility that confidential information possessed by a solicitor has or will pass to a future client’.-4762568580Consequences for breach: A breach of the ASCRs, here r 10, is capable of constituting UPC or PM (r 2.3; s 420(1)(a) LPA)00Consequences for breach: A breach of the ASCRs, here r 10, is capable of constituting UPC or PM (r 2.3; s 420(1)(a) LPA)Bolkiah v KPMG (see p 130 of Dowse for more info)Pl retained KPMG to provide forensic accounting advice and litigation support in major lit relating to his financial affairs and KPMG were given access to confidential informationLitigation was settledGov of Brunei retained KPMG to investigate affairs of an agency of which pl had been chairmanKPMG erected a Chinese Wall to avoid disclosure of confidential informationPl sought an injunction against KPMG restraining it from actingHeld:Pl was granted injunction against KPMG restraining it from actingObservations: The court’s juris cannot be based on any conflict of interest… for there is none. The fiduciary relationship which subsists between solicitor and client ends with the termination of the retainerTherefore solicitor has no obligation to defend and advance the interests of the former clientHowever, the duty to the former client which survives the termination of the relationship is a continuing duty to preserve the confidentiality of information imparted during its subsistenceSpincode Pty Ltd v Look Software Pty Ltd TA \l "Spincode Pty Ltd v Look Software Pty Ltd" \s "Spincode Pty Ltd v Look Software Pty Ltd" \c 1 A firm of solicitors had acted for Look Software since its incorporationThe firm continued to act for Look Software when disputes arose among the shareholders and also covertly gave advice to two of the shareholders in relation to those disputesOne of those shareholders, Spincode Pty Ltd, brought proceedings to wind up the company and the solicitors acted for it in those proceedingsThe trial judge, Warren J, granted the defendants an injunction restraining the solicitors from acting or continuing to act in the proceedings for SpincodeSpincode appealed against the injunctionHELD:Appeal dismissed and injunction upheldBrooking JA recognised further grounds on which the court had a jurisdiction to prevent a solicitor from acting against a former clientConfidential information was not the only ground on which a court’s jurisdiction to issue an injunction against a solicitor acting against a former client could be invoked. There was an equitable obligation of “loyalty”, which forbids a solicitor from acting against a former client, and this obligation of loyalty is separate from the duty not to misuse confidential information. Although this view acknowledges that solicitors have a continuing duty not to disclose confidential information, it widens the scope of that duty and imposes a negative equitable obligation which reaches far beyond a duty not to disclose confidential information. Solicitors should be restrained from acting against former clients to ensure the due administration of justice and to protect the integrity of the judicial process. They should, as officers of the court, be restrained even if they have not infringed any legal or equitable right.Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee v Clark TA \l "Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee v Clark" \s "Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee v Clark" \c 1 [2006] WASAT 119The Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee asserted that the practitioner was guilty of unsatisfactory conduct in February 2004 when he acted for an elderly and vulnerable client in a position of conflict of interest by preparing and arranging for the execution of a codicil to her will. Under the codicil, the practitioner and his wife were to receive a gift of $50 000, with priority of payment ahead of other gifts.HELDIt was incumbent on the practitioner not only to ensure that independent legal advice was given to the client, but also to ensure that the independent legal advisor was fully apprised of all relevant facts including relevant allegations against the practitioner himself. The practitioner did recognise this duty. Indeed it was not possible for the practitioner to be satisfied that there had been the opportunity for any independent advice to have been given at all at the time of arranging the execution of the codicil.Guilty of unsatisfactory conduct by acting for an elderly client in conflict of interest, in preparing and arranging for the execution of a codicil to the client's will under which the practitioner and his wife would receive a gift of $50 000 with certain priorities of payment.Legal Services Commissioner v Madden (No 2) TA \l "Legal Services Commissioner v Madden (No 2)" \s "Legal Services Commissioner v Madden (No 2)" \c 1 [2008] QCA 52Accepted following facts (kind of 3 & 4): guilty of neglect and delay, as the settlement conference took place more than six years after Mr?Kampf had retained the applicant, largely due to long periods in which the applicant did nothing to progress the claimcompromised the defendant's application for an order for delivery of a statement of loss of damage without his client's authority or knowledge, part of the compromise requiring the client to pay the defendant applicant's costs which were later agreed to be fixed at $1,125.70Withdrew the necessary money from his Trust Account without the authority or knowledge of his client, and paid it to the defendant's solicitors in breach of the Trust Accounts Act 1973.Rendered an invoice for his professional fees including charges for 2 applications where he had not obtained instructions to provide those services.?failed to maintain a reasonable standard of competence in the preparation of a financial agreement between Mr?Portch and his future wife, for both of whom the applicant acted. Despite the conflict and notwithstanding objection, he acted in an application before the Family Court for financial orders against Mrs?Portch where he had previously acted for both Mr?and Mrs?Portch in preparing the financial agreement and for Mrs?Portch in taking instructions for the revision of her will following their separation; during which he had obtained a detailed account from her of the separationnotice of appeal contended that the order that the name of the applicant be removed from the local roll, was manifestly excessivejust because the LSC didn’t argue re public interest ≠ not enlivenedSurrounding CircumstancesOffice 50km south of Toowoomba - elderly clients will be inconvenienced if a stay is not ordered because of the absence of a close legal practice other than the applicant's.53 years, and in his financial position in that event, he would never be in a position to recover from the loss of his clients The significance of these matters is diminished by the serious findings against him in the TribunalMr?Davies (trusted solicitor) deposes to having personally reviewed each of the applicant's files, and found that each of them is up to date and in order.other factors to be taken into account include those listed in by Chesterman J in?Legal Services Commissioner v Baker TA \s "Baker" , at para?31.They include:I.? The seriousness of the misconduct found.II.?The likely prejudice to public confidence both in the integrity of the discipline processes themselves and the reputation of the profession if the practitioner is granted a stay.The importance of the protection of the public interest and the reputation of the legal profession is a factor of particular significance in a case such as thisIII.? The means available to mitigate the prejudice alleged.IV.? The expedition with which the appeal can be heard.Granted an order to stay proceedings because:Queensland Law Society has appointed a supervisor to the applicant's Trust Accountsa reputable independent solicitor, Mr?Davies, is willing to attend the applicant's office to supervise his staff and to monitor each file?These conditions are, in my opinion, more effective to mitigate damage to the integrity of the disciplinary processes than were the conditions criticised by Justice Chesterman in?Baker TA \s "Baker" 's?case at para?31Flanagan v Pioneer Permanent [re solicitor v client interest see p 136 Dowse]Involved Flanagan’s solicitors acting against them in a subsequent action and whether they were entitled to use information gained in the first dealingHeldPosition in Queensland is that it is sufficient if the plaintiff demonstrates that there is a real and not a fanciful risk of disclosure of confidential information thought it is not necessary to show that the risk is substantial – more in line with Prince Jefri, than Spincode.Pott v James Mitchell TA \l "Pott v James Mitchell" \s "Pott v James Mitchell" \c 1 & AnorA solicitor who had never acted for Pott, and nor had they been a partner or employee of the firm previously retained by Pott, however, the solicitor had had an association with the firm in a ‘consultancy’ relationshipHeld: is a real possibility that confidential information will come into the possession of the solicitorThere is no possibility that the proceedings can be affected by the previous relationshipTermination of RetainerA solicitor is entitled to accept or reject instructions as they see fit BUT once a solicitor has been retained, they must continue the relationship until the matter has been completed or the client terminates the relationship (r 13 ASCR)Lawyer is under a contractual obligation to complete the work they have undertaken to perform. Termination prior to completion would result in a breach of contract. ASCR r 13: 13.1 A solicitor with designated responsibility for a client’s matter must ensure completion of the legal services for that matter UNLESS:13.1.1 the client has otherwise agreed;13.1.2 the law practice is discharged from the engagement by the client;13.1.3 the law practice terminates the engagement for just cause and on reasonable notice; or13.1.4 the engagement comes to an end by operation of law.13.2 Where a client is required to stand trial for a serious criminal offence, the client’s failure to make satisfactory arrangements for the payment of costs will not normally justify termination of the engagement UNLESS the solicitor or law practice has:13.2.1 served written notice on the client of the solicitor’s intention, a reasonable time before the date appointed for commencement of the trial or the commencement of the sittings of the court in which the trial is listed, providing the client at least seven (7) days to make satisfactory arrangements for payment of the solicitor’s costs; and13.2.2 given appropriate notice to the registrar of the court in which the trial is listed to commence.13.3 Where a client is legally assisted and the grant of aid is withdrawn or otherwise terminated, a solicitor or law practice may terminate the engagement by giving reasonable notice in writing to the client, such that the client has a reasonable opportunity to make other satisfactory arrangements for payment of costs which would be incurred if the engagement continued.“Just cause”Just cause can include:Client commits significant violation of written agreement re fees/expenses; Client has made material misrepresentations about the facts of the matter; Client insists that the lawyer committed a breach of the law/professional rules; Continued representation would require the lawyer to commit a breach of the rules, eg. conflict of interest; LPA: s 320(b) LPA allows a law practice to refuse to act or to stop acting for a client who does not provide reasonable security for legal costs. DUTY TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICEThe responsibilities of a practitioner, particularly those of an advocate, are influenced very much by the adversarial system within which justice is administered in the common law jurisdictions in Australia. The adversarial system depends upon a very clear understanding of the role of the advocate and the role of the judge. The function of the judge is to ensure as an impartial umpire that proceedings are conducted fairly and that the rules of law are applied to the circumstances as they arise. For the adversarial system to work effectively, there must be full and frank disclosure of information by the client to the practitioner and the independent and objective presentation of the case by the advocate on behalf of the client to the court. The rules of confidentiality of information and conflict of interest are designed to achieve these objectives. However, the administration of justice is designed to ensure a fair trial. Therefore, the way in which an advocate conducts a case is constrained by the duties owed to the court and to the administration of justice. While this is true of advocates, the way in which solicitors and other legal practitioners conduct themselves in relation to their clients’ activities are also constrained by these principles. As the administration of justice requires speedy, efficient and expeditious settlement of disputes, the duty to the client may conflict with the achievement of these objectives.Generally, lawyers must:Advance their client’s interests unhindered by personal beliefs: BR 5(f)(i)Not be a mere ‘mouthpiece’ for the client: r 17.1 ASCR; BR 41Inform the Court of binding or relevant authorities: r 19.6; BR 31Paramount DutyA solicitor’s duty to the court and the administration of justice is paramount and prevails to the extent of any inconsistency with any other duty (r 3.1 ASCR); the practitioner must not harm the administration of justice during the promotion of the client’s need (White Industries TA \l "White Industries" \s "White Industries" \c 1 v Flower & Hart TA \l "White Industries v Flower & Hart (a firm)" \s "White Industries v Flower & Hart (a firm)" \c 1 )In Tuckiar v the King, the court held the practitioner’s duty to the court and the client was the same; the duty was to push for rational arguments and ensure the Crown was put to proofThe conviction was quashed but no disciplinary proceedingsInexperience: is not a valid defence for breaching this duty (Milu v Smith)Lawyers as officers of the courtAcknowledgement of the role of servant of a public institutionThe peculiar feature of counsel’s responsibility is that he owes a duty to the court as well as to his client, with the duty to the client subject to the overriding duty to the court (Giannarelli v Wraith)A person becomes an officer of the court on being admitted to the legal profession (s 38(1) LPA)Enforcement of duty to the court: The LPT in Qld makes findings and imposes penalties in relation to breaches of duties owed to the courtAspects of the dutyGeneral duties The most general aspect of the duty to the court is to obey the law and to avoid being associated with conduct or practices undermining the law and the justice system. ASCR r 4.1 (Other fundamental ethical duties): Solicitors must:Be honest and courteous in all dealings in the course of legal practice (r 4.1.2); Deliver legal services competently, diligently and as promptly as possible (r 4.1.3); andAvoid any compromise to their integrity and professional independence (r 4.1.4)ASCR r 5 (Dishonest and disreputable conduct): Solicitors must not engage in dishonest or disreputable conduct which:demonstrates they are not a fit and proper person to practise law (r 5.1); oris likely to be prejudicial to or diminish public confidence in the administration of justice (r 5.1.1); oris likely to bring the profession into disrepute (r 5.1.2)CommunicationsA solicitor, in all dealings with other practitioners, must take all reasonable care to maintain the integrity and reputation of the legal profession by ensure that they are courteous and devoid of offensive or provocative language or conduct (r 21).Unlawful conduct of clientThis aspect of the duty is linked to practitioners being complicit in fraudulent activities of their clientsIn addition to ensuring their own conduct does not bring the profession into disrepute, a practitioner should not encourage a client or other person to act unlawfully, and if they cannot satisfy their duties to the client legally, the practitioner should cease to actThe mere fact a solicitor has done work for a client who is involved in unlawful activity does not imply the duty has been breached (Re Moage – solicitors may act for all sorts of clients whose real motives may be concealed)NB. LPP won’t attach to advice offered or sought for unlawful or fraudulent purposes (4.5.2)IndependenceA solicitor must make their own independent and forensic judgments about a matter (r 4.1.4), not merely be a mouthpiece for the client (r 17.1)Frankness and candour – advocates (incl. binding authorities; ex parte apps; errors)Not mislead the court: Practitioners must not deceive or knowingly or recklessly mislead the court and must take all steps to correct any misleading statement made (r 19.1-2; NSW Bar Ass v Punch)Binding authorities: Practitioners have a duty to assist the court, requiring advocates familiarise themselves with all relevant primary authorities, including binding authorities or, if none, authorities decided by an Australian appellate court, and applicable legislation (r 19.6)Ex parte applications: a solicitor seeking relief in an ex parte application must disclose all matters within the solicitor’s knowledge, which are not protected by LPP and which the solicitor has reasonable grounds to believe would support an argument against granting relief etc (r 19.4)Failing to correct an error: a solicitor will not mislead the court by failing to correct an error made by the opponent or another person (r 19.3)Abuse of processPractitioners should not be complicit in any abuse of the judicial process, ie. making allegations or claims the lawyers know to be without substance, or which are designed to intimidate or pressure the other party ASCR: solicitor should not be mere mouthpiece of the client! (r 17.1)Inadvertent disclosureASCR r 31.1: A solicitor to whom material known or reasonably suspected to be confidential is disclosed by another solicitor, or by some other person and who is aware that the disclosure was inadvertent must not use the material and must (r 31.1):return, destroy or delete the material (as appropriate) immediately upon becoming aware that disclosure was inadvertent (r 31.1.1); andnotify the other solicitor or the other person of the disclosure and the steps taken to prevent inappropriate misuse of the material (r 31.1.2).A solicitor who reads part or all of the confidential material before becoming aware of its confidential status must (r 31.2):notify the opposing solicitor or the other person immediately (r 31.2.1); andnot read any more of the material (r 31.2.2).If a solicitor is instructed by a client to read confidential material received in error, the solicitor must refuse to do so (31.3)Responsible use of court process and privilege (see ASCR r 21)Invoking court process: Solicitor must take care to ensure their advice to invoke powers of a court is justified etc (r 21.1)Privilege: Solicitor must take care to ensure decision by them to make allegations or suggestions under privilege against any person are reasonably justified etc (r 21.2)Alleging matters of fact: Solicitor must not allege any matter of fact unless they believe on reasonable grounds the factual material already available provides a proper basis to do so (r 21.3)Alleging criminality / fraud / other serious misconduct: Solicitor must not allege any matter of fact amounting to criminality, fraud or other serious misconduct against a person unless (r 21.4): reasonable grounds that available materials supports it; and client wishes allegation to be made, informed of consequences if case not made out etcUndertakingsA solicitor who has given an undertaking in the course of legal practice must honour that undertaking and ensure the timely and effective performance of the undertaking, unless released by the recipient or by a court of competent jurisdiction (r 6.1)Other aspectsPre-trial negotiations: Advocates owe the same duty of candour in pre-trial mediations as to the court: LSC v MullinsGuilty or delinquent clients [see 4.5.1]Client using false name (p 326)Making false statements to improve client’s financial position (p 328)Duty to be civil in relationships with judges and others (p 330)Tuckiar v The King TA \s "Tuckiar v The King" (1934) 52 CLR 335Aboriginal person had been charged with the murder of a policeman He confessed through an interpreter to the barristerAfter interviewing the accused, his counsel in open court said that he was in the worst predicament that he had encountered in all his legal career and asked to go to ChambersJudge, the Protector of Aborigines and counsel for the defence went into the Judge's Chambers, told the judge that he had confessed & the judge then told the barrister to continue with the trial?After the prisoner was convicted his counsel made a public statement in court to the effect that the accused admitted that the evidence called by the Crown of a confession made by the accused to a witness was correct.?HELD Conviction quashedThe barrister had both the duty to the client and the court to push for rational arguments and to ensure that the Crown was put to proofCounsel should not have divulged the information thus acquireCounsel’s duty to the court and client was the sameCounsel should not deprive Tuckiar of the chance to make arguments for his acquittalThe subsequent action of the prisoner's counsel in openly disclosing the privileged communication of his client and acknowledging the correctness of the more serious testimony against him is wholly indefensible. It was his paramount duty to respect the privilege attaching to the communication made to him as counsel, a duty the obligation of which was by no means weakened by the character of his client, or the moment at which he chose to make the disclosureMilu v Smith TA \s "Milu v Smith" & Ors AG was seeking orders that a barristers representing a client in an application for judicial review in the corners court pay their costs on an indemnity basis The barrister had made serious allegations in relation to both breaches of natural justice and bias on the part of the coroner Moynihan J stated that any competent barrister would have known that there was no reasonable basis for the review That meant that the barrister had either ignored his duty to the court or acted recklessly The fact that he was young, inexperienced and acting in a prob bono capacity did not matter – that didn’t mean that you had a lower obligation to the court.Legal Services Commissioner v Mullins TA \l "Legal Services Commissioner v Mullins" \s "Legal Services Commissioner v Mullins" \c 1 Advocates owe same duty of candour in pre-trial mediations as to the courtBarrister, is guilty of professional misconduct in connection with negotiations for the compromise of a claim for compensation for personal injuries respondent knowingly misled an insurer and its lawyers about his client’s life expectancy. By continuing to call the Evidex reports in aid as information supporting his client’s claim after learning the cancer facts and recognizing their significance for the validity of the life-expectancy assumption, the respondent intentionally deceived the other parties about the accuracy of the assumption Good Character + penaltyDespite the stance adopted in resisting this application, the references indicate that there is good reason for optimism that the respondent will not set about deceiving a colleague again. And his misconduct was not designed to derive a personal advantage: an anxiety to advance his client’s interests accounts for his grave misjudgement misconduct warrants a public reprimand and a substantial fine NSW Bar Association v Punch TA \l "NSW Bar Association v Punch" \s "NSW Bar Association v Punch" \c 1 John Patrick Punch led alibi evidence from an accused (his client) and four supporting witnesses knowing that evidence to be untrue. knew his client had been present when an assault and robbery occurred at a house in Roselands because, in a conversation Punch had with his client and a co-accused in the cells of Bankstown Police Station, following service of the brief of evidence the client told Punch he had been present.Knew this because police investigating a different crime had obtained an order under the Listening Devices Act 1984 (NSW), permitting a listening device to be placed in the cell in which Punch’s client and his co-accused were placed.Sidenote: The tribunal ruled that Listening Devices Act 1984 (NSW) did not prohibit use of the evidence of the conversation in the proceedings before it: New South Wales Bar Association v Punch [2006] NSWADT 191. That decision was upheld in the Court of Appeal: Punch v NSW BA [2007] NSWCA 93Re CharacterThe respondent has not placed before the tribunal any evidence as to the circumstances, which motivated him to lead the evidence in 1995. not acknowledged that he acted improperly, shown any contrition, led any evidence of rehabilitation. Evidence on each of these matters would to a greater or lesser extent, be relevant to the question of the respondent’s fitness to practise at the present time Held:The respondent’s misconduct shows that at that time he lacked the qualities of character and trustworthiness which are necessary attributes of a person entrusted with the responsibilities of a legal practitionerName removed from the rollWhite Industries TA \s "White Industries" v Flower & Hart (Qld) Pty LtdCaboolture Park,(Flower & Hart’s client) filed an application supported by a statement of claim claiming damages against White for conduct alleged to have contravened s 52 TPA arising out of a building contract between White & Caboolture ParkAfter consulting a Queen’s Council, a partner M at Flower & Hart advised CP that although the claim was weak, proceedings could be brought against White to obtain a better bargaining positionThis course of procedure was referred to as “a temporary bargaining stance”. “I do have to make it clear however that you could not win any litigation if put to the test”. CP instituted a claim, the claim was dismissed and costs were awarded to WhiteAs CP insolvent, White sought to recover costs on an indemnity basis against Flower & HartWhite alleged that the claim against them was commenced and continued in the knowledge that it had no worthwhile prospects of success and was commenced for the ulterior purpose of delaying action by White against CP to recover monies repayable under the building contract and putting the applicant under pressure to comprise such claimWhite alleges that this conduct was in breach of the duty which Flower & Hart owed to the courtMr Meadows, partner of Flower & Hart, had carried out substantial work for Caboolture Park and knew that the MD always took an optimistic view of litigation. HELD:Practitioners have a duty to the court to ensure that the court’s process is not abused and used for improper or ulterior purposes. The concept of abuse of process in this context involves a party using court proceedings and procedures for a purpose unrelated to the objectives which the court process is designed to achieve. The proceedings were not brought to vindicate any legal right – their sole purpose was delay as an end in itself and that constituted an abuse of process (64)It is not necessary before a finding can be made that proceedings were instituted or continued for an improper purpose that it be found that the proceedings are based on a cause of action that is not arguable. The power to prevent an abuse extends to proceedings that raise a prima facie case; Williams TA \s "Williams" v SpautzFlower & Hart breached the duty it owed to the Court to conduct proceedings before the Court with propriety, not to be a party to an abuse of process and not to obstruct or defeat the administration of justiceIn order to fix liability for costs to solicitor there must be more than unreasonably initiating or continuing proceedings that have substantially no chance of success – it is where there is deliberate or conscious decision to use proceedings for an ulterior purpose with a disregard of any proper consideration of the prospects of successRe Counsel’s AdviceM could not shelter behind advice received from counsel, especially where the limits of the factual basis for such advice were set by the contents of the brief provided by the appellant to counselAs a solicitor, Meadows was obliged to make his own independent assessment of whether proceedings should be instituted without further investigation, or delivery of a full brief to counselRight to RepresentationThere is no right or requirement for a party in judicial proceedings to be represented (Dietrich TA \l "Dietrich" \s "Dietrich" \c 1 v R). However, there is a right for a fair trial, and where there is no representation, that right may be lost (Dietrich v R). Dietrich TA \s "Dietrich" (1992) 177 CLR 292Dietrich TA \s "Dietrich" was charged with importing a trafficable quantity of heroin He applied to Legal Aid for representation, but was declinedHe also asked the Minister, but counsel was not provided He was unrepresented at a jury trialDietrich TA \s "Dietrich" was convicted. Held: There is no right to have representation paid for out of public money in a caseHowever, there is a right to a fair trialWhere someone who, through no fault of their own, does not have counsel, the court can order a stay of proceedings to prevent a miscarriage of justice HCA ordered a new trial because Dietrich TA \s "Dietrich" had been convicted without representation – and there had been a miscarriage of justice in this case, as the accused did not receive a fair trialRefusal to Call a WitnessOne of the features of the adversarial system is the function of the judge to act as an impartial umpire rather than to intervene in the way the case is presented (R v Apostilides)NB. Duties differ for prosecution v defence – prosecution must call all relevant witnesses (r 29.7 ASCR)R v Apostilides TA \s "Apostilides" (1984) 154 CLR 563Apostilides TA \s "Apostilides" charged with rape and found guilty2 witnesses who were present at the time of rape were not called as witnesses, but copies of statements were made available by the prosecutor to defence counselDefendant called these 2 people as witnessesDefendant was found guilty and convicted themHeld: Retrial ordered because the verdict was unsafe or unsatisfactoryThe court made some basic propositions: It is the sole responsibility of the Crown to call their own witnesses when prosecutingJudge can request the Crown to call a witness, but the Crown is not obliged to call the witness (judge cannot order)Judge can question Crown as to why they refused to call a key witness and ask them to reconsider their decision not to call a witnessIf the Crown still refuses to call a witness, the judge can comment to the jury on the Crown Prosecutor’s failure to call the witnessIt is only in exceptional circumstances that can a judge call a witness of their own volitionA failure of the Crown to call a witness will only be grounds to set aside a conviction if it amounts to a miscarriage of justiceOnly a ground to set aside a trial where there has been a miscarriage of justice, on the wholeBarrister’s DutiesAssisting judge to identify all issues in a caseCounsel has a duty to identify to the judge the relevant issues in a case whether in a jury trial or a non-jury trial (R v Ion – p 172 Dowse TA \l "R v Ion" \s "R v Ion" \c 1 ). Ongoing duty to discloseThere is an ongoing duty to disclose something to the accused continues until the prosecution ends, whether by the accused person being discharged, acquitted or convicted etc (s 590AL(2) CC)If the thing is something exculpatory (clearing of guilt), the obligation to disclose continues until the person is discharged or acquitted or until they die (s 590AL(3) Criminal Code 1899 (Qld))Prosecutor’s DutiesContained in r 29 ASCR (and r 82-94 Barristers Rules)Prosecutor must disclose to the opponent as soon as practicable all material available to it which could constitute evidence relevant to guilt or innocence of accused (r 29.5; BR 86)Prosecutor must call all relevant witnesses (r 29.7; BR 88)The defence has no such similar duty – they are entitled to put the prosecution to their case, however they cannot lead a false case (see ‘Guilty and delinquent clients’ – 4.5.1)CASESQueensland Law Society v Carberry TA \l "Carberry" \s "Carberry" \c 1 [2000] QCA 450Solicitor charged with:Acting in conflict of interest;Failing to provide adequate explanations of his dealings when requested by QLSUnauthorised withdrawal of funds;Failed to maintain adequate trust money records;Failing to provide auditor’s report to QLSTribunal found that this constituted professional misconduct and suspended him for 12 months.The QLS appealed to the QCA stating the penalty was too light.HELDThe Tribunal should have found that Carberry TA \s "Carberry" was unfit to practise.It would be inconsistent with the court's duties to preserve the standards of professional practice not to conclude that what has been found against the respondent demonstrates unfitness to practice (@ [39]).The orders of the Tribunal that the respondent be suspended from practice for 12 months effective from 1 May 2000 and that he attend and successfully complete a practice management course conducted by the Queensland Law Society Incorporated prior to applying for a practising certificate should be set aside. The name of the respondent should be struck off the Roll of Solicitors of the Supreme Court of Queensland and the respondent should pay the appellants' costs of and incidental to the appeal to be assessed (@ [42]).Bar Association of Queensland v Lamb TA \l "Lamb" \s "Lamb" \c 1 a solicitor was not disqualified from admission to the Queensland Bar, despite engaging in a "reprehensible" sexual relationship with a client." the applicant solicitor had had extramarital intercourse with his client in a matrimonial cause, after decree absolute but before questions of custody and maintenance had been determined.The solicitor sought admission as a barrister, against the opposition of the Bar Association. The report does not make clear whether the applicant desired to change the nature of his practice, because, as a solicitor, he had found the demands of his clients to be excessive or because, as a barrister, he hoped to increase his scoring rate. HELDIn any event, the High Court merely observed that his conduct, though "improper"and "unprofessional", fell short of amounting to unprofessional conduct which would render him unfit to remain a solicitor or become a barrister.Sande TA \s "Sande" Guy was doing conveyancing in QLD and he didn’t have a practising certificate Sande TA \s "Sande" applied to the Queensland Law Society in December 1993 for a conveyancer’s practising certificate so that he could conduct land transactions in Queensland. The Law Society refused this certificate, although the refusal was challenged unsuccessfully, in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. However, before the AAT decision, Sande TA \s "Sande" opened a conveyancing business on the Gold Coast. Through 1994 he and his company were prosecuted by the Law Society under the Queensland Law Society Act for unlawful legal practice, and were convicted.Sande TA \s "Sande" nevertheless had also begun to apply for admission as a solicitor, albeit subject to conditions that would restrict his work to that which can be undertaken by conveyancers in South Australia or NSW.The first application was made in July 1994 under the Mutual Recognition Act for ‘admission to the roll of conveyancers’ or as a solicitor.In August, the Supreme Court Registrar refused both applications. This was challenged, first, by an application to the Supreme Court in Re Sande TA \s "Sande" (‘Sande 1A’).89 Fryberg J refused that application in March 1995. However, the Registrar’s decision was also challenged by federal proceedings for administrative review. At that point, the Law Society again intervened and sought a declaration in the Supreme Court that the Registrar’s decision was correct. In May 1995 in Re Queensland Law Society Incorporated (‘Sande TA \s "Sande" 1B’),90 Derrington J refused this declaration simply because, at that stage, to grant it would subvert the application for administrative review. However, in August 1995 in– the Full Court of the Federal Court dismissed the appeal.The Sande TA \s "Sande" 1 series was still underway when, in April 1995, Sande re-applied for admission as a solicitor in identical terms to the application in Sande 1A. The Registrar refused this in May 1995, but later that month Sande TA \s "Sande" applied for admission a third time. While these applications were made, Sande TA \s "Sande" was still being paid for conveyancing he was undertaking on the Gold Coast. At that point (before Sande 1C was heard), the Law Society sought an injunction to restrain Sande from working as a conveyancer. In this case, Queensland Law Society Inc v Sande TA \s "Sande" (‘Sande 2A’),93 it became clearer that the reason for these repeated applications for admission was that, although Sande knew they were destined to fail, he thought he could take advantage of the ‘deemed registration’ provisions of the Mutual Recognition Act.These stated that someone was deemed to be registered in an occupation in the State while their application for registration was pending.Sande TA \s "Sande" repeatedly applied for admission as a solicitor on the understanding that, while any single application before the Registrar was still undecided, he was deemed to be registered as a conveyancer under the Mutual Recognition Act. In June 1995, Thomas J accepted that the second and third applications for admission were being made for an ulterior purpose, and that they were an abuse of the court’s process. A declaration was made to that effect. Thomas J also restrained Sande TA \s "Sande" from doing any conveyancing work in Queensland (regardless of Sande’s interpretation of the Mutual Recognition Act), but gave him the benefit of the doubt on the third application for admission that was still on foot. The injunction was therefore made conditional on the Registrar’s refusal ofthe third application for admission.From the proceedings that followed, the Registrar apparently did refuse Sande TA \s "Sande" ’s third application for admission. Sande TA \s "Sande" nevertheless continued to offer conveyancing services in Queensland, and so the Law Society moved to have him cited for contempt. These proceedings – again came before Thomas J. He accepted that the Society had proved 14 instances of conveyancing by Sande TA \s "Sande" in breach of the injunction issued in Sande 2A, and that there were continuing breaches of the Supreme Court Act 1867 and the Queensland Law Society Act. Sande TA \s "Sande" was in contempt of court, and given a suspended sentence of three months imprisonment and a $5,000 fine.DISCIPLINENotice to PractitionerThe investigating entity (LSC, QLS or BAQ) is required to give notice to a practitioner whose conduct is being investigated. S 437 LPA states that the notice must include:Notice that a complaint has been made, or that an investigation is being conducted;The nature of the complaint/matter;Identity of the complainant;Action which the investigating entity has taken prior to giving notice to the respondent;The respondent practitioner must also be given an opportunity to make submissions and be given a reasonable time in which to do so.Notice need not be given until the investigating entity has had time to consider the complaint and to seek further details/conduct preliminary enquiries. Practitioner’s response to noticeThe investigating entity may require that the practitioner give a full explanation of the matter complained about, attend a hearing or produce relevant documents (s 443 LPA).A practitioner may refuse to comply with such requirements on the grounds that it would breach the requirement of an indemnity insurance policy or that an explanation would incriminate the practitioner. But if neither of these grounds apply, the practitioner may be fined for refusing to comply.Standards of Professional ConductThe standards of conduct reflect the interest:of the client;in ensuring the effective administration of the judicial system; and of the community in ensuring a legal profession of integrity. The court aims to ensure compliance with the values upheld by the legal profession – candour, justice and competency rather than apply a detailed set of rules. However, the LPA does provide guidance as to what conduct constitutes UPC or PM.When the LSC receives a complaint about a legal practitioner that is not a consumer complaint, it must decide whether the conduct amounts to UPC or the higher threshold of PM Absence of a conviction does not mean no disciplinary action will be taken: Re Sawley TA \l "Re Sawley" \s "Re Sawley" \c 1 Unsatisfactory professional conduct (UPC)Defined non-exhaustively in the s 418 LPA as includding: Conduct of a… practitioner happening in connection practising law that falls short of the standard of competence and diligence that a member of the public is entitled to expect of a reasonably competent practitioner…The conduct complained of must happen “in connection with the practice of law”Standard is that of a member of the publicCompetence = the ability to do something successfully or efficiently; scope of person’s knowledge or ability; Diligence = careful and persistent work or effortConduct likely to be UPC includes:Negligence with no dishonest intent (Re R and Re A);Acting for both sides in a transaction (Re A Barrister TA \l "Re A Barrister" \s "Re A Barrister" \c 1 );Misappropriating money (Smith);Supplying dangerous drugs (Darveniza TA \s "Darveniza" );Misleading conduct (Clough TA \l "Clough" \s "Clough" \c 1 );Inadequate control of trust money (Priddle TA \s "Priddle" );Lack of diligence (Ferguson TA \s "Ferguson" );Using trust money with no authorisation (Towers TA \s "Towers" );Contravention of a law or rule (s 420(a));Charging of excessive legal costs (s 420(b); Baker);Committing a serious offence, tax offence or offence involving dishonesty (s 420(c));serious offence means an offence whether committed in or outside this jurisdiction that is: (Sch 2 defn)(a) an indictable offence against a law of the Commonwealth or any jurisdiction, whether or not the offence is or may be dealt with summarily; or(b) an offence against a law of another jurisdiction that would be an indictable offence against a law of this jurisdiction if committed in this jurisdiction, whether or not the offence could be dealt with summarily if committed in this jurisdiction; or(c) an offence against a law of a foreign country that would be an indictable offence against a law of the Commonwealth or this jurisdiction if committed in this jurisdiction, whether or not the offence could be dealt with summarily if committed in this jurisdiction.Becoming insolvent (s 420(d));Being disqualified from managing a corporation (s 420(e));Failing to comply with a disciplinary order (eg fine etc) (s 420(f));Failing to comply with a compensation order (s 420(g)).Disrespect: It is a contempt of court by being insulting towards and showing disrespect for a Magistrate: AG v Lovitt TA \l "Attorney-General v Lovitt" \s "Attorney-General v Lovitt" \c 1 This does not automatically mean disciplinary sanction will follow: not all cases of contempt are the same, and must be judged according to the surrounding circumstances: Garde-Wilson v Legal Services Board TA \l "Garde-Wilson v Legal Services Board" \s "Garde-Wilson v Legal Services Board" \c 1 Courteous: practitioner must be courteous in all dealings (r 4.1.2 ASCR)Single transgression: A single transgression such as missing an appointment with another practitioner would be likely to be viewed as no more than a breach of professional courtesy. Missing important meeting twice for eg: However, much depends on the circumstances and missing an important meeting twice, for example, indicates a failure to deliver legal services competently and diligently, and maintain the reputation of the legal profession that warrants a disciplinary response (ASCR r 4.1.3; 5.1.2).It also constitutes professional negligence and a failure to exercise the expected degree of diligence and competence (s 418 LPA; r 4.1.3).459740579120Must not bring profession into disrepute! (r 5.1.2)Must not bring profession into disrepute! (r 5.1.2)Professional Misconduct (PM)PM is defined non-exhaustively as including:UPC (above) involving a substantial or consistent failure to reach / keep reasonable standard of competence and diligence (s 419)(1)(a)); andSo it is UPC + substantial/persistent failure in competence/diligenceCompetence = the ability to do something successfully or efficiently; scope of person’s knowledge or ability; Diligence = careful and persistent work or effortConduct of a practitioner, whether in connection with law or otherwise, that would show they are not a fit and proper person to practise (s 419(1)(b)).Court can take into account the suitability matters in s 9 LPA (s 419(2)).See “Admission – Suitability matters”So this will catch any conduct of the practitioner – even that occurring in their personal life and wholly unconnected with anything to do with the lawConduct likely to be PM includesSharing receipts (Adamson TA \s "Adamson" );Nothing in the LPA prevents an ALP from sharing with an ILP receipts, revenue or other income arising from the provision of legal services (s128(1)) (except that they must not be shared with a disqualified person (s128(2))).‘Disqualified person’ is defined in schedule 2 to the LPA as, inter alia, a person: whose name has been removed from and not restored to an Australian roll; whose practising certificate is cancelled/suspended; who has been refused a renewal of a practising certificate and has not since been granted one; who is the subject of an order prohibiting law practice from employing him/her; and/or who has been disqualified from managing a legal practice under s133.Influencing witnesses (Gregory TA \s "Gregory" )Overcharging (Roche TA \s "Roche" ; Baker TA \s "Baker" );Indecent assault (Re A Solicitor TA \l "Re A Solicitor" \s "Re A Solicitor" \c 1 );Sexual relationships with clients (Morel TA \l "Morel" \s "Morel" \c 1 ; cf BAQ v Lamb – see 4.6.3 Sexual Relations with client);Inadequate control of trust money (Williams TA \s "Williams" );Using trust money with no authorisation (Twohill TA \s "Twohill" );Scandalous and obscene submissions (Turley TA \l "Turley" \s "Turley" \c 1 );Forgery (Mackereth TA \l "Mackereth" \s "Mackereth" \c 1 );Wrongful advice (Kincard TA \l "Kincard" \s "Kincard" \c 1 );Failure to manage trust accounts (Dwyer TA \l "Dwyer" \s "Dwyer" \c 1 );Forging documents (Wherry TA \l "Wherry" \s "Wherry" \c 1 );Failure to lodge tax (Cain TA \l "Cain" \s "Cain" \c 1 );Abusing court process (instituting claims with no legal foundation (ulterior motive):620848621980100The concept of abuse of process in this context involves a party using court proceedings and procedures for a purpose unrelated to the objectives which the court process is designed to achieve. The proceedings were not brought to vindicate any legal right – their sole purpose was delay as an end in itself and that constituted an abuse of process (Flower & Hart)In Flower & Hart, the following factors were in play in finding an improper purpose:DishonestyMaking allegations for strategic reasons when have insufficient foundationConflict of duty between client and the courtCommencing proceedings without evidenceFurthering a client’s case dishonestlyAbuse of processUsing delaying tactics and unnecessary expenditureThis judgement links with Justice Ipp’s Article, where he stated that practitioners cannot act as a mere mouthpiece for the client, as there is a dual duty to the court as well as the client (ASCRs 3.1; 4.1.1; 17.1). Contravention of a law or rule (s 420(a));Charging of excessive legal costs (s 420(b));Committing a serious offence, tax offence or offence involving dishonesty (s 420(c));serious offence means an offence whether committed in or outside this jurisdiction that is: (Sch 2 defn)(a) an indictable offence against a law of the Commonwealth or any jurisdiction, whether or not the offence is or may be dealt with summarily; or(b) an offence against a law of another jurisdiction that would be an indictable offence against a law of this jurisdiction if committed in this jurisdiction, whether or not the offence could be dealt with summarily if committed in this jurisdiction; or(c) an offence against a law of a foreign country that would be an indictable offence against a law of the Commonwealth or this jurisdiction if committed in this jurisdiction, whether or not the offence could be dealt with summarily if committed in this jurisdiction.Offence involving dishonesty includes misappropriation of money:As an offence involving dishonesty, the misappropriation of money is an offence which may constitute unprofessional conduct: s 420(1)(c)(iii) LPA 2007. In QLS v Smith (2000), a practitioner was struck off following a string of misappropriation offences, despite these offences not occurring in the course of the practice of law – key issue was that they were offences involving dishonesty, suggesting the solicitor was not a fit and proper person.Becoming insolvent (s 420(d));Being disqualified from managing a corporation (s 420(e));Failing to comply with a disciplinary order (eg fine etc) (s 420(f));Failing to comply with a compensation order (s 420(g)).Other information:A legal practitioner must not act as the mere mouthpiece of the client (r 17.1 ASCR; BR 41). Further, a practitioner must not make an allegation which he or she does not then believe on reasonable grounds will be capable of support by the evidence (r 21.3 ASCR) Instigation of a baseless prosecution designed to undermine or intimidate an opponent would be regarded as fundamentally inconsistent with the trust that needs to be maintained between a practitioner and the court and amount to professional misconduct: Clyne TA \s "Clyne" v NSW Bar Association (1960) 104 CLR 186. Cf Flower & Hart (a firm) v White Industries TA \s "White Industries" (Qld) Pty Ltd TA \l "Flower & Hart (a firm) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd" \s "Flower & Hart (a firm) v White Industries (Qld) Pty Ltd" \c 1 [1999] FCA 773.459740220345Must not bring profession into disrepute! (r 5.1.2)0Must not bring profession into disrepute! (r 5.1.2)Case examples – see belowMitigating FactorsCertain mitigating factors will justify a reduction in the severity of the sanction imposed these include:Age at which the misconduct occurred and any subsequent redemptionIf the improper act was committed at a young age, and since that time the applicant’s behaviour has been redeeming, then this is likely to be a good thing.LenehanCommitted a number of dishonest acts relating to misappropriation of money 20 years before admission whilst working as an articled clerk.Did not disclose at admission.Employment record for last 20 years has been respectable.Admission had been denied in two previous attempts.HELD:Admitted.Present case discloses early manhood under bad influences without proper guidance and a fully adult life of seemingly correct and exemplary conduct.Re B TA \s "Re B" Applicant had during her university days been convicted for various offense including obscene publication, trespass, damage to property and using obscene wordsShe had also published material that evidenced her defiance of the law This alone would not have been enough to prevent her admission however right before admission she was a party to a dummy bail agreement where she pledged money of a prisoner pretending that it was her own HELDShe was not admitted – Held that the question was whether a person who aspires to serve the law can be said to be fit to do so when it is demonstrated that in the zealous pursuit of political goals she will break the law External stressors at time of improprietyThat the applicant was subject to external stressors that are not likely to appear in the legal environment may allow for admission despite otherwise unfavourable acts.Prothonontary v Del Castillo TA \l "Prothonontary v Del Castillo" \s "Prothonontary v Del Castillo" \c 1 Applicant had been tried for murder but found not guiltyHad lied to his solicitor and given a series of bad instructionsHe had also lied to policeRejected by ACT admission board but allowed in NSWHELDConduct stemmed from an unforeseeable set of circumstances which placed extraordinary pressures on him nearly ten years ago.Re Bell TA \s "Re Bell" Although there were external pressures, the same types of pressures would occur in legal practice, so rather than mitigating, it actually shows an unfitness to practice.Lapse of time between impropriety and admissionMere passage of time would not ordinarily, without more, show a fitness to practice (Re Liveri TA \s "Re Liveri" ).Not necessarily a mitigating factor.Otherwise of good fame and characterThe cases clearly demonstrate that even a single course of conduct, limited to a certain period and never again repeated can still impede admission (Thomas v Legal Practitioners Admission Board TA \s "Thomas v Legal Practitioners Admission Board" )ContritionBeing remorseful can only go some way to repairing prior impropriety (Re Liveri TA \s "Re Liveri" )That the applicant cooperated with police, repaid the money and pleaded guilty is not enough to outweigh the initial impropriety (Thomas v Legal Practitioners Admission Board TA \s "Thomas v Legal Practitioners Admission Board" ).No temptation to reoffendWill be difficult to overcome initial impropriety (Thomas v LP Admission Board TA \s "Thomas v Legal Practitioners Admission Board" ).Character references from othersHelpful but not enough to outweigh (Thomas).Mental illnessMust be used carefully to mitigatePoor health at time of impropriety (Hope)Deteriorating financial position due to bad health (Hope)Conduct occurred in isolation, uncharacteristic (Hope)Full cooperation with investigative/prosecuting authorities (Hope)Repayment of lost money (Hope)PenaltiesS456 LPA outlines the penalties that pertain to a breach. The consequences from a finding of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct include:Removal from the Roll: s 456(2)(a) LPAPractising Certificate suspended: s 456(2)(b)Practising Certificate cancelledPublicly reprimanding the practitioner: s456(2)(e) LPA by LPT or s 458(2)(a) if by LPCPractitioner pay a penalty or compensationa monetary fine (s 456(4)(a) (LPT - not more than $100,000) or s 458(2)(b) (LPC – not more than $10,000)),a compensation order (s456(4)(b) (LPT) or s 458(2)(c) (LPC)), or a costs order (s 462(1); White Industries TA \s "White Industries" (Qld) Pty Ltd [1998] FCA 806).Notices not to employ: s 456(2)(e) LPT or 458(4) LPCTake a further course of legal education: 456(4)(c) LPTPractice be inspected for a timeContempt of Court: Misconduct may in certain circumstances constitute contempt. For example, Salvator Di Carlo, Barrister-at-law, was held in custody for several hours in November 2005 for making irrelevant comments and showing no respect for the Court.RemediesRules of law remain relevant particularly in the context of what remedies are available to secure the interest that has been affected by the alleged conduct of the practitioner these include:Common law actions of damages to compensate for a loss sustained by a client as a result of the practitioner’s negligence – an issue linked with compulsory professional indemnity insuranceThe statutory claims of clients who have suffered financial loss as a result of financial dishonesty on the part of practitioners through the fidelity guarantee fund Criminal proceedings under the general criminal law particularly in relation to unacceptable personal conduct on the part of practitionersCriminal proceedings under the criminal law related specifically to offences against the legislation that governs the legal professionProceedings before the Supreme Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction over members of the legal professionDisciplinary proceedings in accordance with the legislation that regulates the legal profession The remedies and standards are set by the Supreme Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction or in accordance with the LPA. Section 456 LPAIf, after the tribunal has completed a hearing of a discipline application in relation to a complaint or an investigation matter against an Australian legal practitioner, the tribunal is satisfied that the practitioner is guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct, the tribunal may make any order as it thinks fit, including any 1 or more of the orders stated in this section. The tribunal may, under this subsection, make 1 or more of the following in a way it considers appropriate-- an order recommending that the name of the legal practitioner be removed from the local roll; an order that the practitioner's local practising certificate be suspended or cancelled; an order that a local practising certificate not be granted to the practitioner before the end of a stated period; an order that-- imposes stated conditions on the practitioner's practising certificate granted or to be issued under this Act; and imposes the conditions for a stated period; and specifies the time, if any, after which the practitioner may apply to the tribunal for the conditions to be amended or removed; an order publicly reprimanding the practitioner or, if there are special circumstances, privately reprimanding the practitioner; an order that no law practice in this jurisdiction may, for a period stated in the order of not more than 5 years-- employ or continue to employ the practitioner in a law practice in this jurisdiction; or employ or continue to employ the practitioner in this jurisdiction unless the conditions of employment are subject to conditions stated in the order. The tribunal may, under this subsection, make 1 or more of the following-- an order recommending that the name of the practitioner be removed under a corresponding law from an interstate roll; an order recommending that the practitioner's interstate practising certificate be suspended for a stated period or cancelled under a corresponding law; an order recommending that an interstate practising certificate not be, under a corresponding law, granted to the practitioner until the end of a stated period; an order recommending-- that stated conditions be imposed on the practitioner's interstate practising certificate; &that the conditions be imposed for a stated period; and a stated time, if any, after which the practitioner may apply to the tribunal for the conditions to be amended or removed. The tribunal may, under this subsection, make 1 or more of the following-- an order that the legal practitioner pay a penalty of a stated amount, not more than $100000; a compensation order; order that the practitioner undertake and complete a stated course of further legal education; an order that, for a stated period, the practitioner engage in legal practice under supervision as stated in the order; an order that the practitioner do or refrain from doing something in connection with the practitioner engaging in legal practice; an order that the practitioner stop accepting instructions as a public notary in relation to notarial services; an order that engaging in legal practice by the practitioner is to be managed for a stated period in a stated way or subject to stated conditions; an order that engaging in legal practice by the practitioner is to be subject to periodic inspection by a person nominated by the relevant regulatory authority for a stated period; an order that the practitioner seek advice from a stated person in relation to the practitioner's management of engaging in legal practice; an order that the practitioner must not apply for a local practising certificate for a period. the tribunal may make any number of orders mentioned in any or all of subsections (2), (3) and (4). The tribunal may make ancillary orders, including an order for payment by the practitioner of expenses associated with orders under subsection (4), as assessed in the order or as agreed. The tribunal may find a person guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct even though the discipline application alleged professional misconduct. Role of LSCThe Legal Services Commissioner (LSC) monitors the conduct of members of the legal profession by receiving complains, investigating them and bringing disciplinary proceedings where appropriate. The Law Society/Bar Association manages the granting, suspending and cancelling of practising certificates. The responsibility of responding to complaints was given to the LSC under the 2004 LPA.Role in Relation to Complaints:The Commission receives and deals with complaints about the conduct of other people too—people who purport to be lawyers, for example, when they are not. The Commissioner is responsible for ensuring complaints are dealt with thoroughly, fairly and transparently.Importantly, the Commissioner can also initiate an investigation of his own accord in cases of possible unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct. The Commissioner also has responsibility for dealing with complaints about, or otherwise investigating possible breaches of the ‘touting’ provisions and the restrictions on the advertising of personal injury services under the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld).The Commission is the sole body authorised under the Act to receive and deal with complaints about lawyers and law practice employees but we don’t, and can’t deal with all and any complaints we may receive—some complaints are simply beyond the powers given to us under the Act and are beyond our jurisdiction.We decide how to deal with a complaint based on the nature of the complaint. We try to mediate complaints we assess to be consumer disputes, but we must investigate complaints we assess to be conduct complaints—that is to say, complaints which, if proven, would show that a lawyer's conduct amounted to either unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct.We can either mediate or investigate complaints ourselves or decide to refer them for mediation or investigation to the Queensland Law Society or the Bar Association of Queensland.Importantly, while the Queensland Law Society and Bar Association of Queensland play an important role in investigating complaints, the Commissioner oversees and, where necessary, directs these investigations. If the Commissioner refers a complaint to one of these professional bodies for investigation, they are required to report back to the Commissioner who will then review their findings and recommendations before deciding what action, if any, to take on the complaint. The Commissioner and the Commissioner alone can decide what action to take on a complaint after investigation.When the evidence warrants it, the Commissioner will initiate disciplinary proceedings in one of two disciplinary bodies; the Legal Practice Committee or, for more serious matters, QCAT.The LSC:answers enquiries about making a complaint against a legal practitioner or law practice employee. We can answer questions about how complaints are dealt with and, if you need assistance, can help you to fill in the complaint formreceives complaints from legal consumers, other legal practitioners and the Queensland Law Society or Bar Association of Queensland about the conduct of legal practitioners and law practice employeesdecides whether it has legislative authority to deal with a complaint and, if the answer is yes, assesses it as either a consumer dispute or a conduct complaint (see below for the sorts of complaints the Commission does not accept)mediates or otherwise tries to resolve consumer disputes or refers them to the Queensland Law Society or Bar Association of Queensland for mediation or resolutioninvestigates conduct complaints or refers them to the Queensland Law Society or Bar Association of Queensland for investigationinitiates investigations of its own accord, in the absence of a complaint, if the Commissioner believes an investigation is warrantedoversees how the Queensland Law Society and Bar Association of Queensland investigate referred conduct complaints, reviews their findings and recommendations, and decides what further action should be takeninitiates disciplinary proceedings against legal practitioners if, after investigation, there is a ‘reasonable likelihood of a finding by a disciplinary body of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct’ and ‘it is in the public interest to do so’. The Commissioner prosecutes them before the Legal Practice Committee or, for more serious matters, the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT).The Commission does not:give legal advice or provide legal representation—complainants need to seek their own legal advice about what civil remedies are available to them (for legal advice, contact Legal Aid Queensland, the Queensland Public Interest Clearing House or the Queensland Law Society referral service).accept complaints that are frivolous or vexatious, or complaints that have been dealt with previously when there is no good reason to reconsider the matter.accept complaints about the conduct of an individual if, at the time, they were not acting as a legal practitioner or law practice employee but in some other capacity such as an investment adviser, immigration agent or member of parliament.accept complaints about decisions of courts or tribunals or review past proceedings in courts or tribunals. The Commission is not an alternative means of appeal. Complainants who are unhappy about decisions of courts or tribunals should seek independent legal advice about their prospects of successfully appealing those decisions in a higher court.accept complaints about government legal officers unless the complaint is made by the chief executive officer of the government department or agency that employs them, the Queensland Law Society or the Bar Association of Queensland, or another legal practitioner.have power to decide whether legal practitioners have overcharged their clients or alternatively whether their fees were fair and reasonable. For more information go to Complaints about legal costs.have power to decide whether legal practitioners have been negligent. The disciplinary scheme under the Legal Profession Act 2007 is not intended to be an alternative forum to the courts for hearing and deciding claims of negligence against lawyers. The Commission might consider taking disciplinary action against legal practitioners who have been obviously and demonstrably negligent but, generally speaking, legal consumers who believe their lawyers have been negligent will have to take them to court to prove they were negligent and should take independent legal advice accordingly. As a rule the Commission will consider taking disciplinary action only after negligence has been proved in a court. Having said that, there are some circumstances in which the Commission might be able to help legal consumers who believe their lawyer was negligent. It might be possible to resolve things to both the consumers and their lawyer’s satisfaction in circumstances in which, for example, the practitioner has made an honest or careless mistake of some kind such as losing a title deed or miscalculating a rates adjustment in a conveyance. In the Commission’s opinion, practitioners in these circumstances should be expected to make good their mistake.Who deals with whatMaking a ComplaintEssentially, anyone who is concerned about the conduct of a legal practitioner or a legal practice employee can make a complaint. This includes:A client;A member of the public;Another legal practitioner;A law practice employee;The QLS;The Bar Association;The LSC.However, if the complaint is about a government legal officer, a complaint can only be made by:An Australian legal practitioner;A regulatory authority (aka QLS or Bar Association);The CEO of the agency/department where officer is employed.Managing a ComplaintThe LSC is generally limited to complaints that have been made within 3 years of the conduct complained of (s 430(1)).There is a discretion to consider complaints occurring outside the timeframe if it is:Just and fair to receive it (s 430(2)(b)(i)); orInvolves professional misconduct (distinct from unsatisfactory professional conduct) and it is in the public interest to pursue it (s 430(2)(b)(ii)).Complaints can be made to the LSC, the QLS or the BAQThe QLS/BAQ can only give advice and can take no further action, unless they refer the complaint to the LSC.The LSC itself receives complaints, investigates them and brings disciplinary proceedings where appropriate.The LSC’s powers in relation to minor misconduct are limited when it does not refer them to a disciplinary body. Can only go to mediation – that’s it.QLS can make rules about legal practise in QLD, in addition to regulating the granting, suspension and cancellation of practising certificates. It can also intervene in the management of law practises in the case of inadequate practice or financial mismanagementA supervisor, manager or receiver can be appointed to manage the practiceQLS does NOT have any prosecutorial rights as these are with the LSC, though it can assist in its investigations.The LSC will only refer something on to a disciplinary body where: there is a reasonable likelihood that there will be a finding that either the conduct standards have been breached; and the reasonable likelihood test requires the Commission not to make a discipline application unless there is reliable evidence capable of supporting a finding on the balance of probabilities that a legal practitioner’s conduct amounts to unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct (Guideline 17)it is in the public interest to proceed.It is well established in law that ‘the object of disciplinary action against legal practitioners is not to exact retribution: it is to protect the public and the reputation of the profession’ (Baker TA \s "Baker" ).15 factors LSC will consider: (Guideline 22)seriousness of offence and need to protect public from practitioner;the likely prejudice to public confidence in the integrity of the disciplinary process and to the reputation of the profession if the Commission exercises its discretion not to make a discipline application;prevalence of conduct and need to ‘send a message’ (deterrence);whether conduct raises a matter of law of importance;dishonesty involved or not, or taking advantage of vulnerable clients;whether it was a genuine mistake and unlikely to be repeated;whether the respondent acknowledges his or her error, or has shown remorse or apologised or made good any loss or harm his or her conduct has caused to others;whether the person has cooperated fully and frankly;whether a finding of unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct would entitle the complainant or others who may have been adversely effected by the conduct to compensation;practitioner’s age, health or infirmity;any previous disciplinary findings against the practitioner;likely length and expense of the hearing;whether practitioner undertakes to self-educate;any grounds for leniency; andvoluntarily come forward with relevant evidence of conduct that contravenes the Act but that the Commission has either no knowledge of or insufficient evidence to make a discipline application; andprovide the Commission with full and frank disclosure of the conduct in question and any documentary or other evidence that may be available or known to them; andundertake to cooperate throughout the Commission’s investigation and comply with that undertaking; andhave not compelled or induced any other person to take part in the conduct in question or been a ‘ringleader’ in instigating the conduct.any other relevant consideration.Generally speaking, the more serious the alleged unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional conduct, the less likely the Commission will exercise its discretion to dismiss a complaint or investigation matter in the public interest (Guideline 23)At this point, the LSC can either:Summarily dismiss the complaint; orNo further action is taken.Categorise it as a “consumer dispute”; orThis is a genuine dispute between a client and a practitioner but which does not constitute a breach of the conduct standards (s 440).Only option is for them to conduct mediation. They can take no further action.Categorise it as a “conduct matter.”Under this limb, the LSC will continue its investigation and will decide what further action, if any, to take on the matter.If it decides to prosecute, it will refer the matter to the Legal Practice Committee or to QCAT, depending on the severity and type of conduct complaint.The LPC or the QCAT will make its decisions and the QLS will prosecute the action.CasesConcealing Client’s GuiltIn Re Meagher TA \l "Meagher" \s "Meagher" \c 1 (1896) 17 NSWR 157Meagher TA \s "Meagher" defended a person charged with murderThe person was convicted of that murderIt later turned out that the accused person had confessed his guilt to Meagher TA \s "Meagher" A commission was appointed to investigate the accused’s guilt or innocence, and Meagher TA \s "Meagher" was involved in thisMeagher TA \s "Meagher" took steps to imply that the accused was not guilty, even though his client had told him otherwiseThis became public knowledgeThe issue was whether Meagher TA \s "Meagher" had the capacity to be and remain a member of the legal professionHELD: Meagher TA \s "Meagher" was struck off the RollThe test to be applied was whether the practitioner was fit to be on the RollThere was a 2 step approach in this case –Not punishment, but rather reassurance to the publicDetermination of whether the practitioner was a ‘fit and proper person’NSW Bar Association v Punch TA \l "NSW Bar Association v Punch" \s "NSW Bar Association v Punch" \c 1 [2008] NSWADT 78John Patrick Punch led alibi evidence from an accused (his client) and four supporting witnesses knowing that evidence to be untrue. knew his client had been present when an assault and robbery occurred at a house in Roselands because, in a conversation Punch had with his client and a co-accused in the cells of Bankstown Police Station, following service of the brief of evidence the client told Punch he had been present.Knew this because police investigating a different crime had obtained an order under the Listening Devices Act 1984 (NSW), permitting a listening device to be placed in the cell in which Punch’s client and his co-accused were placed.Sidenote: The tribunal ruled that the Listening Devices Act 1984 (NSW) did not prohibit the use of the evidence of the conversation in the proceedings before it: New South Wales Bar Association v Punch [2006] NSWADT 191. That decision was upheld in the Court of Appeal: Punch v New South Wales Bar Association [2007] NSWCA 93Re CharacterThe respondent has not placed before the tribunal any evidence as to the circumstances, which motivated him to lead the evidence in 1995. not acknowledged that he acted improperly, shown any contrition, led any evidence of rehabilitation. Evidence on each of these matters would to a greater or lesser extent, be relevant to the question of the respondent’s fitness to practise at the present time Held:The respondent’s misconduct shows that at that time he lacked the qualities of character and trustworthiness which are necessary attributes of a person entrusted with the responsibilities of a legal practitionerName removed from the rollActing for Both Sides to a TransactionEx parte Attorney General for the Commonwealth: Re a barrister and solicitor TA \l "Ex parte Attorney General for the Commonwealth: Re a barrister and solicitor" \s "Ex parte Attorney General for the Commonwealth: Re a barrister and solicitor" \c 1 A solicitor acted for both sides to a sale and purchase of a houseOrder made by the AG to show cause why an order should not be made by the court that he be not entitled to practise as a barrister and solicitor in the ACT, or alternatively, why an order should not be made that his entitlement to practise as a barrister and solicitor in the ACT be suspended for such period as the court may deem fitHELD: That reprimand was appropriate:the solicitor’s conduct was more than mere negligence, but arose from inexperience, mistakes of law and the general lack of understanding of solicitors’ duties to clientsHe overestimated his ability to be able to separate his interestsHe was clearly negligent – the client’s remedy lay in common law negligenceHe did engage in unprofessional conduct, but it was not of such a degree to justify the suspension or removal from the RollThe only relevant question when considering removal from the Roll is whether the legal practitioner who has been charged is a fit and proper person to remain a member of the professionEarlier cases are relevant – although behaviour may be viewed differently at different timesFailure to Act on Client’s Instructions / Lying About Progress of CaseIn Re R, a practitioner of the Supreme Court TA \l "In Re R, a practitioner of the Supreme Court" \s "In Re R, a practitioner of the Supreme Court" \c 1 and in Re A, a practitioner of the Supreme Court 2 practitioners in South Australia were held to be guilty of unprofessional conduct by the Statutory Committee of the Law Society in SA which had jurisdiction to deal with disciplinary mattersPractitioner R neglected to prepare bills of sale for several months without excuse and had concealed the true state of facts from his client and had also received moneys for costs and fees connected therewith and had not returned the samePractitioner A was instructed to institute an appeal from a conviction, but took no steps to do so in the time allowed, and after the time expired wrote to his client untruly stating that he had instituted the appeal, demanding costs from his clientHELD:: Both practitioners were found guilty of unprofessional conductNB: unprofessional conduct is wider than professional misconductHistorically, the question for professional misconduct is whether anything that has been done by the practitioner in the pursuit of his profession would be reasonably regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by other professionals of good conduct, competency and reputeThis test for professional misconduct connotes immorality and ethical considerations, and is tested by the standard of others in the legal profession (c.f. LPA which also considers the standards of society)The question for unprofessional conduct is conduct which may be reasonably be held to violate or to fall short of, to a substantial degree, the standard of professional conduct observed or approved of by members of the profession of good repute and competencyThis test for unprofessional conduct has less ethical considerations, and assesses the standards of competencywhich may reasonably be held to violate, or to fall short of, to a substantial degree, the standard of professional conduct observed or approved of by members of the profession of good repute and competency’.Sharing ReceiptsAdamson TA \s "Adamson" v Qld Law Society [1990] 1 Qd R 498A practitioner had shared receipts with an unqualified personThe scheme was that the unqualified person worked as a conveyancer in her own business and had the practitioner sign off on the work she brought inThe profits were split 75% to 25%The practitioner knowingly breached one of the QLS rules about the sharing of receiptsThe unqualified conveyancer eventually left his business and she took the files and clientsThe practitioner then made a complaint to the QLS and covered up his misconduct by making false and misleading statements and they said that the practitioner did not exercise supervisionThe practitioner tried to argue that the conveyancer was employed by him, but she was not receiving wages or bonuses for her work – she was getting 75% of the receipts, so it was more like a partnership The Statutory Committee of the Queensland Law Society Incorporated ordered that the appellant's name be struck off the roll of solicitors and that he pay the costs of the Society.The allegations brought before the Statutory Committee were that the appellant had shared receipts from his practice with an unqualified person, that he had knowingly breached r 67(1) of the Rules of the Queensland Law Society, that he endeavoured to cover up his misconduct by making false and misleading statements to the Society and its officers and that he had failed to exercise satisfactory supervision over the unqualified person who was permitted to perform the duties of a solicitor in relation to the conduct of clients’ affairs.The Statutory Committee was not satisfied of the allegations concerning unsatisfactory supervision, but was satisfied of the substance of the remaining allegations. The Committee, in reaching its conclusion that such behaviour constituted professional misconduct, did not give reasons or set out all the facts upon which its conclusion was based.HELD: allowing the appeal:That disciplinary proceedings before a professional tribunal could not generally be regarded as criminal proceedings whether or not the tribunal had the power to impose a fine. Consequently the civil standard of proof applied.That the test of professional misconduct was whether the conduct violated or fell short of, to a substantial degree, the standard of professional conduct observed or approved by members of the profession of good repute and competency.Tribunal’s Obligation to give Reasons: The Statutory Committee, in exercising the important a function of striking professionals off the role, had to give reasons where was necessary to enable the matter to be properly considered on appeal. The duty arose whenever there was conflicting evidence and whenever the Committee had a view that might help to explain why it concluded that professional misconduct had been established.Having regard to the limited basis on which the findings of professional misconduct had been sustained, the penalty of striking off and of the payment of all of the costs of the Society of and incidental to the proceedings was not warranted but the appellant should have been suspended from practice for twelve months.Conclusion – the striking off was not warranted, but the practitioner did get a 12 month suspensionThe practitioner was sufficiently punished by paying the Crown costs and costs of appealBribe WitnessAttorney General and Minister for Justice v Gregory TA \s "Gregory" [1998] QCA 409The practitioner was found guilty of contempt of the District Court by deliberately seeking to influence a Crown witness, in the trial of the accused for whom the practitioner actedHe walked over to two important witnesses during adjournment outside court room and spoke to a man about how woman’s evidence was crucialWhen the man said jokingly “is there $10K in it for us?” another jokingly said “that’s an idea” then Gregory TA \s "Gregory" said “ We can arrange something”Held: The only appropriate order was that he should be struck off from the roll of solicitorsde Jersey CJPrincipal consideration – holding out to the public as persons fit to practice as solicitors only those who may reasonably be expected to display appropriately high standards of integrity and competenceAttempting to suborn witness is striking at the heart of the judicial process, whether on the spur of the moment or pre-meditated, and will constitute unfitness to practiceIt shows the absence of critically important qualities – honesty, objectivity, respect for the court and respect for the processStriking off will always occur, unless exceptional circumstancesWhite J (with whom McMurdo P agreed)Governing principle – protection of the public and the standing of the professionTribunal not to consider issues of punishmentEncouragement of a witness to engage in perjury goes right to the heart of the administration of justiceA practitioner of mature age and 10 years experience even without a great deal of litigation work, who makes such a basic error of judgement is not a fit and proper person to practiceAn understanding that a witness’ evidence should have integrity and be honest does not come through experience – it is a fundamental part of our legal systemEvidence of taking medication for anxiety not sufficientLeave open possibility of him reapplying when he can prove to the satisfaction of the court that his state of health and other factors make him fit to practiceSupplying False and Misleading Material to CourtClough TA \s "Clough" v Queensland Law Society Inc; Attorney-General v Clough [2000] QCA 254The practitioner acted on behalf of the client in the claim for damages in the District Courtallegations were made against the practitioner that he attempted to further the case of the client by unfair and dishonest meansthe statements of loss and damage prepared and delivered were false and misleading (omitted reference to earnings through self employment and so put across idea that person had not worked since accident)HELD Practitioner suspended from practice for the period of 12 months, prior to applying for a new practising certificate had to attend a legal education program in civil litigationAll involved in proceedings entitled to expect that practitioners will comply with rules of the courtSupplying false and misleading material was also to fall of the standards of professional conduct to a substantial degree – it was a failure to maintain reasonable standard of competence and diligenceThis was more than mere negligence, it was unprofessional conductMuir J – legislative provisions are not the exhaustive of power of court to approach issues of professional responsibility – common law concepts remain relevantThe basic question is always whether person is a fit and proper person to practice in interests of public and maintenance of legal professionLegal Services Commissioner v Voll TA \l "Voll" \s "Voll" \c 1 [2008] LPT 001A dispute arose as to whether a solicitor had, in fact, sent an important letter advising the clients that they needed to be at court.The clients denied receiving the letter.The clients sent a fax to the solicitor on 10/09 advising they would be in Sydney from 12 Sept until 02 Oct.Solicitor said he rung the clients after receiving the fax, but there was no diary note or any other record of that phone call. The clients denied this.HELD:The bald assertion of fact with no supporting evidence put the telephone call into a unique position in the case.The clients were keen to progress the case so it would be highly unlikely that they’d go to Sydney if they knew they had to be in court.Solicitor only mentioned phone call for the first time in his second affidavit.The finding that that conversation did not occur reflects seriously on the solicitor’s credibility.Conduct involved a substantial and consistent failure to reach or keep a reasonable standard of competence and diligence, and trust.Amounted to professional misconductOvercharging – “No Win No Fee”Baker TA \s "Baker" v Legal Services Commissioner [2006] QCA 145Solicitor Baker TA \s "Baker" was struck off by the Legal Practice Tribunal over several cases of his overcharging4 retainers: Nutley – about negligence for a doctor – based on speculative fees of ‘no win, no fee’ – on a successful conclusion. Held: Baker TA \s "Baker" attempted to charge on the basis that there was professional fees incurred, despite the fact that no ‘successful conclusion’ was reached. Therefore, no right to claim fees had been created. Jorgensen – case where there was suing employer for workplace injury on ‘no win, no fee’, and the litigation would not cost Jorgensen anything. Settlement was reached for $10,000, which the firm suggested she take; firm claimed over $19,000 from the client in costsHeld: Baker TA \s "Baker" , as partner in charge, was guilty of professional misconduct – as it was the firm who suggested she take the settlement, it was a breach of fiduciary duty to suggest she take it where it would mean it would cost her more money. Robertson – involved in negligence case – she was a pedestrian struck by a driver. Retained Baker TA \s "Baker" Johnson lawyers, which also subsequently retained the other party and therefore couldn’t represent either. They sent her a bill. Contract also included stipulation about ‘successful conclusion’. The bill was grossly overstated for the cost of the events, and some things hadn’t been provided at all. Held: As it was on a ‘no win no fee’ basis, Baker TA \s "Baker" could not claim anything back from RobertsonHajistamoulis – agreed to a ‘no win, no fee’ – Baker TA \s "Baker" Johnson still sent her an invoice for charges. Held: This was misleading or false. However, Baker TA \s "Baker" was responsible for this on other grounds – namely failure to supervise. Held also, practitioner must supervise and is liable for any legal and fiduciary duties that are avoided by employees (whether legally qualified or not)Held that where conflict arose between his client’s interests and his own, he preferred his ownConclusion: The Legal Practice Board’s decision to strike Baker TA \s "Baker" off the Roll was upheld by the Queensland Court of AppealConviction of an OffenceZiems v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales TA \l "Ziems v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales" \s "Ziems v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales" \c 1 (1957) 97 CLR 279After his day’s activities in court, he got involved not on his initiative in a fight in the hotel, he ended up being attacked and punched and was advised to go to the hospital by the policeHe left the hotel, and within an hour of driving his car he collided with a motorcycle by being on the wrong side of the road, the driver of the cycle died and the barrister was charged with manslaughterSeamen had thrown beer bottles against a wall and said disgusting things to 2 women, Ziems led him by the hand then copped a punchThere was some evidence but not conclusive at the time that he was under influence of alcohol, but he gave evidence that he was not intoxicated and that he was suffering from the shock and concussion as a result of the fighthe was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced for 2 years imprisonmenthe was removed from the Barristers Roll in NSW and eventually ended up appealing the matter in the High CourtHeld: The majority of the High Court allowed the appeal to the extent that he was suspended from practice during the continuance of his imprisonment rather than being struck offFullager JMust look at every fact that throws light on whether a good and proper person, 288 – look beyond just the fact of the conviction itselfconcerned not only with the standing of a member of the profession within a community but also the consequences of potential disbarment to the individual concerned. The conviction was deprived of practical significance given that:Appellant was placed at a material disadvantage by the Crown’s decision to call a witness who said that Ziems was not intoxicated Trial judge misdirected juryProbable that blows were the material contributing factor to the accident Kitto JIn the present case, it was the conviction not the conduct that led to disbarment (SC probs should have had better reasoning – in any event, I think that if it did look at the conduct it would have come to the same conclusion, at least if it were tried today)Okay because: Not a conviction of a premeditated crime Does not indicate a tendency to vice or violence. has neither connexion with nor significance for any professional function. Such a conviction is not inconsistent with the previous possession of a deservedly high reputation (??wtf – purely 1950s Judge? Born in 1903, different era)In the circumstances of this case the barrister may have had something to drink, he appeared to be under effect of blows that he received, one of these factors might have aggravated another factor, he might not be totally fit to drive a motor car at the time, perhaps he should not have allowed himself to become involved in a fight with a drunk person, but putting it all together Fullagar J said ‘but to say that it follows from this that he ought to be disbarred would appear to me an untenable proposition’. The appellant (Ziems) was affectively suspended from practice while he was in prison because of an ordinary operation of a legal system, in this case criminal liability, and that is separate from the disciplinary proceedingsIt is not a necessary conclusion that he his not a fit and proper person due to manslaughter: Kitto JPeculiar Position of a Barrister in the Legal SystemThe answer must depend upon one's conception of the minimum standards demanded by a due recognition of the peculiar position and functions of a barrister in a system which treats the Bar as in fact, whether or not it is also in law, a separate and distinct branch of the legal profession. A barrister is more than their client's confidant, adviser and advocate, and must therefore possess more than honesty, learning and forensic ability. They are, by virtue of a long tradition, in a relationship of intimate collaboration with the judges, as well as with their fellow members of the Bar, in the high task of endeavouring to make successful the service of the law to the community. That is a delicate relationship, and it carries exceptional privileges and exceptional obligations. If a barrister is found to be, for any reason, an unsuitable person to share in the enjoyment of those privileges and in the effective discharge of those responsibilities, they are not a fit and proper person to remain at the Bar: Kitto JDissent (Dixon CJ and McTiernan J)held guilty of a grave crime deserving of severe and degrading punishmentno doubt of the moral blameworthiness of the conduct of a man who drives a motor car while under the influence of liquor, a consideration brought home by the fact that he caused the death of a fellow creature Dixon CJ’s approach is the focus upon the standing of the member of the legal profession on the one hand and before the public on the other. When a barrister is justly convicted of a serious crime and imprisoned the law has pronounced a judgment upon him which must ordinarily mean the loss by him of the standing before the court and the public If counsels are to adequately perform their functions and serve the interests of their clients, they should be able to command the confidence and respect of the court and of fellow barristers and of professional and lay clientsThe conviction included a loss of standing before the court and the public, and so could not longer be entrusted with the duties, privileges and responsibilities of an advocatePerhaps conviction for some minor offences would not require striking offSexual Relationships with ClientsMorel TA \s "Morel" (2004) 88 SASR 401Ms?Morel TA \s "Morel" was admitted to practice in 1987She was a mature age graduate, having commenced studies for her law degree when aged 32 yearsShe took employment with the Legal Services Commission and then with Aboriginal Legal Rights MovementShe developed a criminal law practice, attended Yatala Prison and other correctional institutionsMorel TA \s "Morel" became involved with 3 of her clients who were prisonersConflict of interest arose from personal relationships – she used her legal position to maintain contact with her clients/partners and said that they were subject to legal professional privilegeConversations were being monitored – one client made admission to a very serious crime during the phone conversationLegal Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal (LPDT) made a finding that the respondent solicitor was guilty of unprofessional conductThe application was made by the Legal Practitioners Conduct Board for an order that the name of Claire Morel TA \s "Morel" be struck off the roll of Legal PractitionersIssue: Whether unprofessional conduct sufficient to warrant removal from roll?Held: found not to be fit and properClient’s position compromised by their personal relationshipConcealed the relationship to the board, showing insufficient insight into her behavioura personal relationship to interfere with her professional duties to a client who was charged with serious criminal conductlegal advice not independentmatter of considerable concern that Ms Morel TA \s "Morel" lacked the basic understanding of legal professional duties to understand the nature of the conduct that she engaged in and the way in which it disadvantaged her clientstarting undertaking psychiatric treatment, though 50 and late in the piece so unlikely to have much of an effectEven if the deception and dishonesty were occasioned by Ms Morel TA \s "Morel" 's borderline personality condition, the misconduct is seriousRe reinstatementif Ms Morel TA \s "Morel" is serious about seeking readmission to practise the law she will also need to ensure that she has had access to the services of a professional mentor of the type suggested by Ms Tiggeman. Ideally that would be in conjunction with some employment in legal practice. Her being struck off does not preclude her from making an application to the TribunalAssaults (Failing to Disclose)A Solicitor v Law Society of NSW TA \l "A Solicitor v Law Society of NSW" \s "A Solicitor v Law Society of NSW" \c 1 (2004) 204 ALR 8A admitted as a solicitor in NSW in 1987. In 1997 committed 4 offences of aggravated indecent assault on two daughters of the person who he was living withIn 1998 after pleading guilty he was sentenced for 3 month imprisonment but appealed to the District Court against the sentence and in May 1998 the appeal was allowed and the sentence was deferred on condition that the appellant would enter into a period of good behaviour for 3 years – largely because the judges at that stage regarded the offences to be isolatedThen the victim of one of the offences made further allegations against the defendantAfter pleading not guilty he was convicted of aggravated indecent assaultHe appealed to the District Court and the District Court quashed the conviction and the sentenceTwo charges of professional misconductFor original chargesFor not disclosing later charges Court of Appeal NSWtook a very strict view of eventsthat there were aspects in the appellant’s conduct in 1997, the activities that constituted indecent and aggravated assault, that disclosed what the Court of Appeal described as qualities of character which were incompatible with the qualities of legal practice and that the conduct constituted a serious breach of trust on the appellant’s part given the paternal like role he had with the victimsSo the Court of Appeal eventually decided that the appellant was guilty of professional misconduct in two respects:That he was convicted in 1998 for aggravated indecent assault That he failed to disclose to the Law Society that he has being convicted in 2000 of further charges of aggravated indecent assaultSecond determination by the Court of Appeal was that he was not a fit and proper person to be a legal practitionerthe court of appeal held that the “qualities of character which were incompatible with the conduct of legal practice” was that “the conduct constituted a most serious breach of trust on the [appellant's] part given the paternal like role he had with the victims.High CourtPersonal misconduct, even if it does not amount to professional misconduct, may demonstrate unfitness, and require an order of removal. Fitness is to be decided at the time of the hearing. The misconduct, whether or not it amounts to professional misconduct, may have occurred years earlier.Here…The personal misconduct (child abuse, abuse of trust of parental position etc) was so far removed from conduct as a legal professional to be irrelevantHowever, the failure to disclose being charged with offences was professional misconduct – it was a breach of duties of candour to the Law Society of NSWShould note isolated nature of original convictionsAppellant was not removed from the Roll but was suspendedThe Court of Appeal gave insufficient weight to the isolated nature of the 1998 convictions and the powerful subjective case made on behalf of the appellant, including evidence of the appellant's character and rehabilitation and the extensive support he was receiving from his familyAlthough the 2000 convictions were ultimately set aside, the failure to disclose them was said to be a breach of the appellant's duty of candour to his professional association. As part of the investigation, he was engaged in correspondence with the law society.Frankness required the disclosure of the convictions and sentence, even if he regarded them as unjust, and hoped (or even expected) that they would be overturned on appealCourts in this respect have statutory jurisdiction, they also have an inherent jurisdiction and, most important, that the statutory jurisdiction does not in fact oust the inherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The inherent jurisdiction basically raises the question whether a person is fit a proper person to be a member of a legal professionThe statutory jurisdiction of course is restricted by the terms of the provisions of the legislation whatever they might beDrug Dealing, Money Laundering, False Statements ThereofBarrister’s Board v Darveniza TA \s "Darveniza" [2000] QCA 243Defendant was a barrister in Qld for 2-4 years standingThe issue of his continuation on the roll arose because of information he failed to disclose to the Bar Association of NSW (who he got his Certificate of Practice from)He was convicted by a magistrate after summary trial of 2 offences of supplying dangerous drugsHe was fined, with a further order that no conviction be recorded – the view was taken that these were not particular serious examples of the offences in questionA Certificate of Admission in NSW was based upon the failure to disclose these convictions and the statement to the effect that he ceased the illegal drugs activities (but this was a lie, he was still involved in drugs)In addition, he offered money laundering services to various peopleHELD: (lead judgement – Thomas J) – the barrister be struck off – this was the only appropriate orderConduct which undermines trustworthiness of barrister very damningIt suggests a lack of integrity and a suggestion that the practitioner cannot be trusted to deal fairly within the legal system (i.e. with courts, other practitioners, clients etc)Lack of trustworthiness can come from private life as well as practice of lawBarrister’s conduct showed a serious disrespect for law and was enough to demonstrate that his character was not fit for practicePlus money laundering could readily transgress into his professional activitiesRelationship Between Defence Counsel and ProsecutorMichael Carl Szabo TA \l "Michael Carl Szabo" \s "Michael Carl Szabo" \c 1 [2000] QCA 194Szabo was convicted of burglary and rapeSzabo appealed to the Court of Appeal on the ground of miscarriage of justice involving a number of claims, including a ground regarding the relationship between the defence counsel and the prosecutorThe defence counsel and the prosecutor have been in a relationship for a period of 11 months, living effectively as de facto partnersThis relationship terminated a few months before the commencement of the trialImmediately after the trial finished, defence counsel and the prosecutor occupied the same room in the motel where the proceedings were taking place and their relationship was resumed a few months laterThe accused was not informed of this set of circumstances and one of the grounds of appeal was the failure on the part of defence counsel to advice his client of his relationship with the prosecutorHeld: Appeal allowed, conviction set aside and a retrialThe question was whether, notwithstanding the apparently robust defence, would a fair minded informed observer nevertheless entertain a reasonable suspicion or apprehension that the defence counsel may not have done soCounsel’s failure to disclose the relationship created a reasonable apprehension or suspicion that the independence of counsel may have been compromisedTherefore, the conviction was quashedIt will not always mean that married persons cannot oppose each other in court – not necessarily true that would not be zealous for client, some risk of improperly looking at each other’s briefs if they live together (but no more than counsel in same chambers)Ethical duty on counsel to disclose, and then leave it up to the client to assess the riskDuty does not arise for counsel in the same chambers – a greater suspicion arises from sexual intimacy than friendship. The assumption is that persons are more likely to do each other a favour if they are in a sexual relationship.It is important to maintain independence and impartiality of barristers who play a vital role in the administration of justiceVarious TestsHeld: By de Jersey?CJ — The test is whether the circumstances of the case would engender reasonable suspicion or apprehension in a fair-minded, informed observer as to whether defence counsel necessarily acted with fearless independence in promoting the client's cause. The failure to disclose lead to a reasonable apprehension. Davies?JA — The test to be applied is whether a fair-minded person, in the position of either the appellant or a member of the public, might reasonably apprehend that, because of defence counsel's relationship with the prosecutor or its consequences, the appellant was deprived of a fair trial. Thomas?JA — The question is whether, with knowledge of all relevant circumstances, an ordinary fair-minded citizen in the position of the appellant would entertain a reasonable suspicion that justice had miscarried. Such a conclusion however does not necessarily follow from the mere fact that the Crown prosecutor and defence counsel have an association or even a sexual relationship. All relevant circumstances have to be considered, including the conduct displayed by defence counsel which might feed or rebut any suspicion of unfairness.This can be contrasted with Bar Association of Queensland v Lamb TA \s "Lamb" .Bar Association of Queensland v Lamb TA \s "Lamb" [1972] ALR 285extramarital intercourse with his client, after the decree absolute, but before questions of custody and maintenance had been determined.The lawyer maintained a sexual relationship with a clientHELD:although the lawyer’s conduct was dishonourable and reprehensible, he did not engage in unprofessional conduct showing an unfitness to practiseThe High Court did not feel it necessary to refuse to admit the barrister as a member of the BarConsiderations –Power imbalance ; Psychological issues or vulnerability on the part of the client ; Dependence on practitioner/ taking advantage ; Breach of trust? ; Whether practitioner should suggest client gets independent legal adviceMisappropriation of MoneyAs an offence involving dishonesty, the misappropriation of money is an offence which may constitute unprofessional conduct: s 420(1)(c)(iii) LPA 2007. In QLS v Smith (2000), a practitioner was struck off following a string of misappropriation offences, despite these offences not occurring in the course of the practice of law – key issue was that they were offences involving dishonesty, suggesting the solicitor was not a fit and proper person.Queensland Law Society Inc v Smith TA \l "Queensland Law Society Inc v Smith" \s "Queensland Law Society Inc v Smith" \c 1 [2000] QCA 109The practitioner in this case had a background of incidents of professional misconduct as well as personal misconduct (on the assumption that it is appropriate to make this distinction)Several years earlier he had been suspended from practice by the Law Society, first of all for providing information about the proceedings to the client, and secondly voluntary mixing his affairs with those of the client with the result of a loss to the clientSubsequent events were unrelated to his professional practice, he was convicted for dishonestly applying to his own use a sum of $12,000 which was property of another for the purpose of purchasing three amusement machines which were to be placed in a shopping centreHe was later convicted on three charges for misappropriating amounts totalling $156,000 for an ostrich farming scheme which he made optimistic representations about, when the scheme had no real prospects of successHe was sentenced to 3 years jail and was suspended after 1 yearHELD The practitioner was struck off of the roll of solicitorsThe common law was originally concerned with the issue whether a person is a fit and proper person to be admitted and whether such a person should remain on the rollThe offences he committed were not offences related to the practice of the profession – the money was not misappropriated in the course of the practice of the lawThe money which has been dishonestly misappropriated was not client’s money – it was a third party’s moneyThere was clearly a contemplation in the legislation that the commission of offences, serious offences generally and the offences relating to legislation about legal profession (e.g. trust accounts) may well in appropriate circumstances constitute conduct unacceptable for the purpose of the act in accordance with various interpretations of professional misconductThese offences in particular were strongly in favour of the conclusion that Smith was not a fit and proper person to be a legal practitioner – offences of dishonestyThe conduct revealed was sufficiently serious to require removal of the respondent's name from the roll in the interests and protection of the public. It revealed him to be unfit to be held out to members of the public as an officer of the court.Instituting Claims with no Legal Foundation (Ulterior Motive)The concept of abuse of process in this context involves a party using court proceedings and procedures for a purpose unrelated to the objectives which the court process is designed to achieve. The proceedings were not brought to vindicate any legal right – their sole purpose was delay as an end in itself and that constituted an abuse of process.White Industries TA \s "White Industries" v Flower & Hart (Qld) Pty LtdCaboolture Park,(Flower & Hart’s client) filed an application supported by a statement of claim claiming damages against White for conduct alleged to have contravened s 52 TPA arising out of a building contract between White & Caboolture ParkAfter consulting a Queen’s Council, a partner M at Flower & Hart advised CP that although the claim was weak, proceedings could be brought against White to obtain a better bargaining positionThis course of procedure was referred to as “a temporary bargaining stance”. “I do have to make it clear however that you could not win any litigation if put to the test”. CP instituted a claim, the claim was dismissed and costs were awarded to WhiteAs CP insolvent, White sought to recover costs on an indemnity basis against Flower & HartWhite alleged that the claim against them was commenced and continued in the knowledge that it had no worthwhile prospects of success and was commenced for the ulterior purpose of delaying action by White against CP to recover monies repayable under the building contract and putting the applicant under pressure to comprise such claimWhite alleges that this conduct was in breach of the duty which Flower & Hart owed to the courtMr Meadows, partner of Flower & Hart, had carried out substantial work for Caboolture Park and knew that the MD always took an optimistic view of litigation. HELD:Practitioners have a duty to the court to ensure that the court’s process is not abused and used for improper or ulterior purposes. The concept of abuse of process in this context involves a party using court proceedings and procedures for a purpose unrelated to the objectives which the court process is designed to achieve. The proceedings were not brought to vindicate any legal right – their sole purpose was delay as an end in itself and that constituted an abuse of process (64)It is not necessary before a finding can be made that proceedings were instituted or continued for an improper purpose that it be found that the proceedings are based on a cause of action that is not arguable. The power to prevent an abuse extends to proceedings that raise a prima facie case; Williams TA \s "Williams" v SpautzFlower & Hart breached the duty it owed to the Court to conduct proceedings before the Court with propriety, not to be a party to an abuse of process and not to obstruct or defeat the administration of justiceIn order to fix liability for costs to solicitor there must be more than unreasonably initiating or continuing proceedings that have substantially no chance of success – it is where there is deliberate or conscious decision to use proceedings for an ulterior purpose with a disregard of any proper consideration of the prospects of successRe Counsel’s AdviceM could not shelter behind advice received from counsel, especially where the limits of the factual basis for such advice were set by the contents of the brief provided by the appellant to counselAs a solicitor, Meadows was obliged to make his own independent assessment of whether proceedings should be instituted without further investigation, or delivery of a full brief to counselRe Bell TA \l "Re Bell" \s "Re Bell" \c 1 [2005] QCA 151Bell made an application for admission as a legal practitionerThe suggestion was that the applicant had failed to disclose information which should have been disclosed and had in addition made statements and conducted himself in such a way that made him inappropriate to be admitted as a legal practitioner.Bell had a number of circumstances in his past –Bankruptcy (discharged in 1995)12 breaches of domestic violence ordersMade threats to officers of the Family Court and the Federal Magistrates Court in affidavits e.g. “If this court countenances any continuation of such a travesty, there will be the most severe consequences for the officers concerned”Unresolved allegation of contempt of court for breaching Family Court ordersMade scandalous public claims about the court system, saying the opposition to his admission could be traced to pro-paedophilia stance of govtFailed to comply with a Supreme Court order that he re-advertise his intention to be admittedHeld: Bell’s application for admission was refused Applicant must be candid and act with the utmost good faith in disclosing issues which are reasonably regarded as touching on whether the applicant is a fit and proper person under s 31 LPAThe court held that his conduct was inconsistent with being an officer of the court – to be admitted, the person must –Be able to distinguish between vigorous but legitimate advocacy and inappropriate behaviour (thinking any court adverse to him was persecuting him)Not be prone to using any means to achieve an objective, instead must show an intention to act according to the lawNot act in contempt of court, and must follow orders of a court etcNot act in such a way as to undermine the court systemHave regard for justice systemHaving regard to the above, it was held that Bell was not a fit and proper personComments:This Court has consistently affirmed the important principle that an applicant for admission as a legal practitioner must be candid and act with the utmost good faith in making comprehensive disclosure of issues relevant to any matter which might reasonably be regarded as touching on the applicant's fitness to become a legal practitioner. The obligation is closely related to the ethical duty of a legal practitioner as an officer of the Court not to mislead the Court at [5] per McMurdo P, Keane JA and Wilson J.Mr Bell's conduct is inconsistent with the unique and indispensable functions of a legal practitioner in the administration of justice at [14] per McMurdo P, Keane JA and Wilson J.He presently lacks proper regard for the authority of the judicial system and that he is prepared to act improperly to achieve an end which he believes is desirable at [18] per McMurdo P, Keane JA and Wilson J. TOC \h \z \t "Heading 5,5" LSC v Twohill [2005] PAGEREF _Toc340048931 \h 18LSC v Ferguson [2006] PAGEREF _Toc340048932 \h 18AG Qld v Priddle [2002] PAGEREF _Toc340048933 \h 18Williams v QLS [2005] PAGEREF _Toc340048934 \h 18LSC v Chapin [2011] PAGEREF _Toc340048935 \h 19QLS v Carberry [2000] PAGEREF _Toc340048936 \h 19QLS v Wakeling [2004] PAGEREF _Toc340048937 \h 19LSC v Clair [2008] PAGEREF _Toc340048938 \h 19LSC v Rowlands [2010] PAGEREF _Toc340048939 \h 19QLS v Cummings [2004] PAGEREF _Toc340048940 \h 20Re Bell [2005] QCA 151 – lack of candour / frankness PAGEREF _Toc340048941 \h 31Re Cohen [2008] QCA 63 – NB. Was found suitable for admission in 2012 in Re Cohen (No 2) PAGEREF _Toc340048942 \h 31Re OG [2007] VSC 520 – lack of candour / plagiarism PAGEREF _Toc340048943 \h 32Re Liveri [2006] QCA 152 PAGEREF _Toc340048944 \h 33Legal Services Commissioner v Towers LPT 2005 PAGEREF _Toc340048945 \h 40Baker v Legal Services Commissioner [2006] QCA 145 PAGEREF _Toc340048946 \h 41Queensland Law Society v Roche [2004] Qd R 574 PAGEREF _Toc340048947 \h 42Legal Services Commissioner v Voll [2008] LPT 001 PAGEREF _Toc340048948 \h 44Citicorp Australia Ltd v O’Brien (1996) 40 NSWLR 398 PAGEREF _Toc340048949 \h 46Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159 PAGEREF _Toc340048950 \h 46Sweeney v Attwood [2003] QCA 348 PAGEREF _Toc340048951 \h 46Kearney v Attorney-General (NT) (1985) 158 CLR 500 PAGEREF _Toc340048952 \h 48LS of NSW v Harvey PAGEREF _Toc340048953 \h 50Maher v Millennium Markets PAGEREF _Toc340048954 \h 50Maguire v Makaronis (1997) 188 CLR 449 PAGEREF _Toc340048955 \h 50Morel (2004) 88 SASR 401 PAGEREF _Toc340048956 \h 52Bolkiah v KPMG PAGEREF _Toc340048957 \h 55Spincode Pty Ltd v Look Software Pty Ltd PAGEREF _Toc340048958 \h 55Legal Practitioners Complaints Committee v Clark [2006] WASAT 119 PAGEREF _Toc340048959 \h 55Legal Services Commissioner v Madden (No 2) [2008] QCA 52 PAGEREF _Toc340048960 \h 56Flanagan v Pioneer Permanent PAGEREF _Toc340048961 \h 56Pott v James Mitchell & Anor PAGEREF _Toc340048962 \h 56Tuckiar v The King (1934) 52 CLR 335 PAGEREF _Toc340048963 \h 62Milu v Smith & Ors PAGEREF _Toc340048964 \h 62Legal Services Commissioner v Mullins PAGEREF _Toc340048965 \h 62NSW Bar Association v Punch PAGEREF _Toc340048966 \h 63White Industries v Flower & Hart (Qld) Pty Ltd PAGEREF _Toc340048967 \h 63Dietrich (1992) 177 CLR 292 PAGEREF _Toc340048968 \h 64R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563 PAGEREF _Toc340048969 \h 64Queensland Law Society v Carberry [2000] QCA 450 PAGEREF _Toc340048970 \h 65Bar Association of Queensland v Lamb PAGEREF _Toc340048971 \h 65Sande PAGEREF _Toc340048972 \h 66In Re Meagher (1896) 17 NSWR 157 PAGEREF _Toc340048973 \h 79NSW Bar Association v Punch [2008] NSWADT 78 PAGEREF _Toc340048974 \h 79Ex parte Attorney General for the Commonwealth: Re a barrister and solicitor PAGEREF _Toc340048975 \h 79In Re R, a practitioner of the Supreme Court and in Re A, a practitioner of the Supreme Court PAGEREF _Toc340048976 \h 80Adamson v Qld Law Society [1990] 1 Qd R 498 PAGEREF _Toc340048977 \h 80Attorney General and Minister for Justice v Gregory [1998] QCA 409 PAGEREF _Toc340048978 \h 81Clough v Queensland Law Society Inc; Attorney-General v Clough [2000] QCA 254 PAGEREF _Toc340048979 \h 81Legal Services Commissioner v Voll [2008] LPT 001 PAGEREF _Toc340048980 \h 82Baker v Legal Services Commissioner [2006] QCA 145 PAGEREF _Toc340048981 \h 82Ziems v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (1957) 97 CLR 279 PAGEREF _Toc340048982 \h 83Morel (2004) 88 SASR 401 PAGEREF _Toc340048983 \h 84A Solicitor v Law Society of NSW (2004) 204 ALR 8 PAGEREF _Toc340048984 \h 84Barrister’s Board v Darveniza [2000] QCA 243 PAGEREF _Toc340048985 \h 85Michael Carl Szabo [2000] QCA 194 PAGEREF _Toc340048986 \h 86Bar Association of Queensland v Lamb [1972] ALR 285 PAGEREF _Toc340048987 \h 86Queensland Law Society Inc v Smith [2000] QCA 109 PAGEREF _Toc340048988 \h 87White Industries v Flower & Hart (Qld) Pty Ltd PAGEREF _Toc340048989 \h 87Re Bell [2005] QCA 151 PAGEREF _Toc340048990 \h 88 ................
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