Miami



Anonymous Grading Number____________________________

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI

School of Law

PROPERTY E Professor Fajer

Estates & Future Interests Examination March 21, 2013

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Read all instructions before beginning.

2. Write your anonymous grading number at the top of this page.

3. This is a completely closed book examination. During the exam, you may not consult any materials besides the examination itself and notes you write on scrap paper during the administration of the exam.

4. You have seventy minutes to complete your work on this exam.

5. The exam consists of twenty-four multiple choice questions. You must mark your answers to these questions on the Scan-Tron sheets provided during the exam. Answers marked on this examination booklet or on scrap paper will not count.

6. Each question has only one correct answer. You will receive credit for each question for which the correct answer is the only one marked on the Scan-Tron sheet. You will receive zero credit for any question where no answers are marked, where more than one answer is marked, or where an incorrect answer is the only one marked.

7. In the appropriate section of the Scan-Tron sheet, write your anonymous grading number and bubble in the corresponding numbers underneath. Do not write your name or your social security or C number on the Scan-Tron sheet, the examination booklet, or the scrap paper.

8. Please take the time to read the questions and possible answers carefully. As you know, slight differences in wording and punctuation can make an enormous difference in the proper interpretation of the grants we have studied.

9. Good Luck!

(1) Which of the following future interests is not initially held by a grantee?

(a) Contingent remainder in life estate.

(b) Possibility of reverter.

(c) Springing executory interest.

(d) Vested remainder in fee simple determinable.

(2) All of the following were true “at common law” except :

(a) Executory interests were not permitted.

(b) The default present possessory estate was the life estate.

(c) Courts recognized the traditional estate of fee tail.

(d) The Doctrine of Destructibility of Contingent Remainders applied.

Question 3 is based on the following information:

In 2013, Amelia grants Maroon-acre “to Brett for life, then to Chris so long as he grows marijuana on the property, otherwise to Donald.”

(3) At the time of the grant, Chris has

(a) A vested remainder in fee simple determinable, if growing marijuana is legal in the jurisdiction.

(b) A vested remainder in fee simple absolute, if growing marijuana is not legal in the jurisdiction.

(c) Nothing, if growing marijuana is not legal in the jurisdiction.

(d) A vested remainder subject to divestment, if growing marijuana is legal in the jurisdiction.

Questions 4-7 are based on the following information:

In 1975, Ed granted Hunter-acre “to Greg for life, then to Greg’s children, but if Greg is not survived by any children, then to Jordan and his heirs.” At the time, Greg had no children. In 1977, Greg has a child, Keaghan. In 1997, Keaghan dies leaving all his property in a valid will to the Kirkland-Cabrera Foundation.

(4) In 1975, the interest in Greg’s children is a

(a) Contingent remainder in fee simple.

(b) Contingent remainder in fee simple subject to divestment.

(c) Vested remainder in life estate subject to open.

(d) Vested remainder in fee simple subject to divestment.

(5) In 1975, the interest in Jordan and his heirs is a

(a) Contingent remainder.

(b) Shifting executory interest.

(c) Springing executory interest.

(d) Vested remainder.

(6) When Keaghan is born, which of the following is then correct?

(a) Keaghan has a contingent remainder in fee simple.

(b) Keaghan has a vested remainder in fee simple on executory limitation.

(c) Jordan’s interest fails.

(d) Ed’s reversion divests.

(7) When Keaghan dies, what happens to his interest?

(a) It is destroyed.

(b) It passes to his heirs.

(c) It passes to the Kirkland-Cabrera Foundation.

(d) None of the above.

Questions 8-10 are based on the following information:

In his valid will, Lance granted Axel-Acre “to Melis for life, then to Nate and his heirs, but if my daughter Samantha marries a public interest lawyer, then to Samantha and her heirs.” At the end of the will, he added, “I leave the rest of my property to William.”

(8) Which of the following is true?

(a) Nate has a vested remainder subject to divestment.

(b) Samantha has a contingent remainder.

(c) Samantha has a springing executory interest.

(d) William has a reversion.

(9) Which of the following facts would not be relevant to the determination of whether Melis’s interest is best characterized as a life estate on executory limitation:

(a) Lance repeatedly expressed concern that if Samantha (who thought of herself as a public interest lawyer) married another public interest lawyer, Samantha would starve to death.

(b) Melis is in very poor health.

(c) Nate is Melis’s husband.

(d) The grant to Samantha includes the word “then.”

(10) If the condition that Samantha marry a public interest lawyer is challenged as being against public policy, which of the following facts supports reaching a result in this case different from the result reached in Shapira?

(a) When Lance died, Samantha was engaged to be married to a lawyer who worked for a non-profit organization representing indigent clients.

(b) It might be very difficult for a court to determine which attorneys are “public interest lawyers”.

(c) There are thousands of attorneys who consider themselves “public interest lawyers” residing in the city where Samantha lives.

(d) All of the above.

Question 11 is based on the following information:

In 2006, Anthony granted Wolfe-acre “to Becky for life, then to Erik and his heirs, but if Erik ever allows Becky to be moved into a nursing home, then to Gerry and his heirs.” Becky died in 2010.

(11) Which of the following is true?

(a) At the time of the grant, Anthony had a reversion.

(b) At the time of the grant, Becky had a life estate on condition subsequent.

(c) At the time of the grant, Erik had a vested remainder subject to divestment.

(d) After Becky died, Gerry had a shifting executory interest.

Question 12 is based on the following information:

In her valid will in 2010, Grace granted River-acre “to Jenna for life, then to those of my children who survive me by at least one year.” At the end of the will, she left the residue of her estate to Kathy. Grace was survived by three children, Alex, Ali and Australia.

(12) Which of the following statements is correct?

(a) During the year after Grace’s death, Jenna could obtain a fee simple absolute by purchasing Kathy’s interest in River-acre so long as the jurisdiction allows the alienation of possibilities of reverter and rights of entry.

(b) During the year after Grace’s death, Grace’s children would have executory interests.

(c) If Alex and Ali survive Grace by a year, they then would have vested remainders subject to open.

(d) If Alex and Ali survive Grace by a year, then Kathy would not have any interest in River-acre.

Questions 13-16 are based on the following grant:

In 2001, Alyssa’s valid will granted Schultz-acre “to my friend Ben if he lights a candle in my memory once a week in a Christian church, but if he ever ceases to do so, the property should be retaken.”

(13) Which one of the following arguments supports characterizing Ben’s interest as a fee simple determinable (as opposed to a fee simple on condition subsequent)?

(a) The condition requires Ben to act on a continuing basis.

(b) The future interest was retained by the grantor.

(c) The grant uses the word “ever.”

(d) Most states have a presumption in favor of the fee simple determinable.

(14) All of the following arguments support characterizing Ben’s interest as a fee simple on condition subsequent (as opposed to a fee simple determinable) except:

(a) Under the reasoning of Mahrenholz, the property is not being conveyed just for one particular purpose.

(b) Most states have a presumption in favor of the fee simple on condition subsequent.

(c) It will be easy to determine at what point the condition has been violated.

(d) Saying that the property “should” be retaken seems to leave the holder of the interest more discretion than saying that it “will” or “must” be retaken.

Questions 15-16 are based on the same grant as Questions 13-14 (repeated below) and the additional information that follows:

In 2001, Alyssa’s valid will granted Schultz-acre “to my friend Ben if he lights a candle in my memory once a week in a Christian church, but if he ever ceases to do so, the property should be retaken.”

Erica is Alyssa’s legal heir and the holder of the future interest in Schultz-acre created by her will. In November 2005, Ben was hospitalized for a month and had Jason light the candles for him during that time.

(15) All of the following arguments support Ben’s claim that Erica is not entitled to retake Schultz-acre except:

(a) Erica knew that Ben had had Jason light the candles for him when Ben went out of town for three weeks in May 2003 and Erica had not indicated at that time that she objected.

(b) It would be against public policy to require the court to enforce any condition that has religious significance.

(c) It would be against public policy to require Ben to leave his hospital bed in order to retain ownership of Schultz-acre.

(d) Ben did the best he could to fulfill the grantor’s intent.

(16) Which of the following arguments support Erica’s claim that she is entitled to retake Schultz-Acre?

(a) Enforcing the condition does not require the court to engage in difficult inquiries about whether Ben’s actions and beliefs comply with a particular religion.

(b) The grant literally says that Ben has to light the candles himself.

(c) Ben had no right to receive property from Alyssa, so he should be subject to nearly any restrictions Alyssa chooses to impose.

(d) All of the above.

Questions 17-18 are based on the following information:

Justin died in 2002 leaving a valid will that included the following language: “I leave my sister Melanie my house so that she will always have a place to live, but if Melanie ever moves out of the house, then to my cousin Nicole. I leave my diamonds to Nicole. I leave the remainder of my property to my friend Perry.”

(17) Which of the following arguments support treating Melanie’s interest as a defeasible fee simple (as opposed to a defeasible life estate)?

(a) There is a presumption in favor of the fee simple.

(b) The grant of the house is worded differently from the grant of the diamonds.

(c) Melanie’s interest could be cut off by Nicole’s interest.

(d) All of the above.

(18) What is Perry’s interest in the house?

(a) If a court holds that Melanie has a defeasible fee, Perry has a possibility of reverter.

(b) If a court holds that Melanie has a defeasible fee, Perry has nothing.

(c) If a court holds that Melanie has a defeasible life estate, Perry gets both a possibility of reverter and a reversion that merge into a reversion.

(d) If a court holds that Melanie has a defeasible life estate, Perry has a vested remainder.

Questions 19-22 are based on the following grant:

Gus grants Swartz-acre “to John for life, then to Maria on the condition that she graduates from medical school, but if Maria never graduates from medical school, then to Stephen.”

(19) If the grant takes place in 2013, all of the following interests are created except:

(a) Reversion in Gus.

(b) Life estate in John.

(c) Contingent remainder in Maria.

(d) Shifting executory interest in Stephen.

(20) Assume that Maria graduated from medical school, then died leaving a valid will devising all her property to Mark. Subsequently John died intestate. If the grant took place “at common law,” who would then have the right to possess Swartz-acre?

(a) Gus, because of the Doctrine of Destructibility of Contingent Remainders.

(b) Gus, because of the presumption favoring life estates.

(c) Mark, because Maria’s interest vested before John’s death.

(d) Stephen, because of the Doctrine of Destructibility of Contingent Remainders.

Questions 21-22 are based on the same grant as Questions 19-20 (repeated below):

Gus grants Swartz-acre “to John for life, then to Maria on the condition that she graduates from medical school, but if Maria never graduates from medical school, then to Stephen.”

(21) Assume instead that John died while Maria was still alive, but Maria had not yet graduated from medical school. If the grant took place in 2013, which of the following would be true if the jurisdiction does not destroy contingent remainders?

(a) Gus would have a fee simple on executory limitation.

(b) Maria and Stephen would have alternate contingent remainders.

(c) Stephen would have a fee simple absolute.

(d) None of the above.

(22) Assume instead that shortly after the grant was executed, Gus repurchased John’s interest in Swartz-acre. If the grant took place “at common law,” and Maria was still alive but had not yet graduated from medical school, Gus would then have:

(a) Fee simple absolute.

(b) Fee simple on executory limitation.

(c) Life estate.

(d) Life estate pur autre vie.

Questions 23-24 are based on the following information:

In 2000, Gaby granted Berman-acre “to Marc for life, remainder to those children of Marc who live to age 21 and their heirs.” In 2000, Marc had one child, Sara, who was 14 years old.

(23) At the time of the grant, how should the interest in Marc’s children be characterized?

(a) Shifting executory interest.

(b) Vested remainder subject to open.

(c) Contingent remainder.

(d) Contingent remainder subject to open.

(24) Suppose Sara turns 21 in 2007, and dies shortly thereafter, leaving all her property to Bryan in a valid will. In 2012, Marc dies survived by no living children. Gaby is still alive. Who is entitled to possession of Berman-acre?

(a) It depends on whether Marc had any other children who were born between 2000 and 2012.

(b) Gaby.

(c) Sara’s heirs.

(d) Bryan.

.

Chapter 4. The Shadow of the Past: Estates and Future Interests

Exam Syllabus

A. The Law of Estates & Future Interests: Overview

1. Historical Overview (P563-70)

2. Instructor’s Overview (S67-68)

3. Workbook Overview (E1-8)

B. Introduction to Present Estates

1. Instructor’s Overview (S69-72)

2. Fee Simple Absolute (P570-74; E8-10, E39-41)

3. Finite Estates (P574-78, P587; E10-19)

4. White v. Brown (Tenn. 1977) (S77-81)

5. Discussion Questions 59-62 (S81-82)

C. Future Interests That Follow Finite Estates

1. Instructor’s Overview of Future Interests (S73-77)

2. Reversions (P588-89; E41-42)

3. Remainders (P595-96; E52-69)

4. Notes 2-3 (P600-01)

5. Problems 4A-4H (S82)

D. Conditional Interests

1. Conditional Interests Cutting Off Fees

a. Defeasible Fees (S70-72 (review)); P578-81; E21-37, E42-49)

b. Mahrenholz v. County Board (Ill. App. 1981)

i) Introductory Suggestions (S82)

ii) Appellate Opinion (P581-85)

iii) Notes 1-4 (P585-87)

iv) Discussion Questions 63-70 (S83)

e. Problem 4I (S84)

2. Conditional Interests Cutting off Remainders and Life Estates

a. Executory Interests (P590-93; S77; E71-84, E97-107)

b. Some Additional Complexities (E86-96; 108-27)

c. Problems 4J-4N (S84)

3. Impermissible Conditions

a. Note 1 (Restraints on Alienation) (P625)

b. Notes 1-3 (Impermissible Restraints) (P632-33)

c. Rabin & Kwall, Note on Restraints on Personal Conduct (S84-85)

d. Problem 4O (S84)

e. Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank (Ohio Com. Pleas 1974) (S85-89)

f. Discussion Questions 71-73 (S89)

4. Problems 4P-4S (S89-90)

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