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US Nuclear Policy Under Trump – Strategic Cultures, Continuities and Change?Dr Valentina Cassar, Lecturer – Department of International Relations, University of Malta?ABSTRACT?This paper argues that the United States’ global outlook and strategic culture have been underpinned by the possession of nuclear capabilities and nuclear policy. ? ?It is argued that the United States has sustained a posturing and strategic culture based on several variables, namely:??considerations of the prevailing geopolitical context; the influence of US identity and democratic beliefs in advancing an international liberal order; the maintenance of its primacy; the pursuit of multilateralism and an engaged extended deterrence; the influence of technology, and the presence of subcultures.??The symbiotic and inextricable relationship that exists between US Strategic Culture and nuclear policy has in turn ensured that, whilst undergoing occasional shifts between sub-cultures in strategic approach, continuity in US policy has persisted despite the broader systemic changes that have taken place over the past decades.??Such trends have augured for greater continuity in US policy despite successive domestic political changes.?This paper reviews the evolution of US strategic culture and US nuclear policy under successive presidential administrations since the end of the Cold War, tracing the continuities that have prevailed according to the variables along which US strategic culture has been described.??It is argued that nuclear capabilities largely reinforced the strategic culture of the United States that they strengthened and reasserted the outlook and perspectives and means through which to achieve their strategic objectives.?The Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy, Nuclear Posture Review, and broader strategic outlook will be assessed within this context, examining the shifts and continuities therein in comparison with policies adopted by previous presidential administrations.??It is argued that broader consistencies have been maintained despite the diverging political rhetoric that has characterised the Trump administration, and will argue that shifts have been reflective of the subcultures that are characteristic within US Strategic Culture.Paper title: ‘Defending Forward’ through ‘Persistent Engagement’: Assessing the Role of Strategic Culture in US Cyber Security StrategyAuthor: Dr Joe Burton, Universite libre de Bruxelles (Marie Curie Fellow) and University of Waikato (Senior Lecturer, New Zealand Institute for Security and Crime Science).Abstract: This paper seeks to shed light on the strategic cultural determinants of two connected components of the 2018 US DoD/US Cyber Command cyber security strategy: ‘persistent engagement’ and ‘defending forward’.? The paper begins by outlining how strategic culture can be used to understand cyber security policy and strategy, outlining the latest research on 'strategic subcultures' that exist both within national security establishment and transnational military communities.? The paper then proceeds to an analysis of the key ideas, framings, discourses and behaviours that inform the latest DoD US cyber security strategy, which include a tendency to securitise cyber threats, use of Cold War analogies to frame contemporary cyber issues, the conflation of cyber threats with nuclear threats, the tendency to talk about cyber as territory (‘domains’ of warfare in which ‘effects’ are achieved) and an excessive focus on state actors in cyberspace.? The paper argues that the latest US approach to cyber security is a product of a more hawkish military subculture which incorporates historical streams of behaviours and ideas in US defence policy that (a) seek to project power away from the US homeland, (b) create offence/defence binaries (c) are overly reliant on traditional concepts of deterrence in framing responses to emerging technologies.? The paper concludes by reflecting on how strategic cultural concepts can be used to reframe ‘cyber warfare’ as a sociocultural enterprise and help us understand the connections between military security cultures and global cyber instability.? The paper draws on an extensive review of the theoretical literature on strategic culture, an analysis of US policy documents, and interviews with US cyber security experts.?Jeffrey WhyteI begin by supplying the context and content of contemporary cybersecurity discourses. I consider especially how Black political activism, notably the Black Lives Matter movement, has been identified in cybersecurity discourse as a vehicle for malicious foreign cyberattacks that seek to destabilize American democracy through exploitation of ‘racial tension’ on social media. I argue that cybersecurity discourse attempts to depoliticize and subordinate questions concerning racialized violence and inequality to superseding matters of national security. In taking ‘democracy’ as its referent object, I argue that cybersecurity’s drive to depoliticization constitutes a hypersecuritizing aporia in which ‘the political’ itself becomes the object of depoliticization. I suggest that, while attempts at ‘securing democracy’ employ a technifying rhetoric of digital expertise (Huysmans 2006), closer analysis reveals the prevalence of non-technical, political questions concerning race and class.“A Political Pearl Harbor” It is difficult to overstate the extent to which political imaginations of rupture and cataclysm have structured popular coverage of cyberwarfare since 2016. Longform popular essays have stressed the novelty of “The New Cold War,” and the “New Theory of War” that animates it. Rep. Jackie Speier?(D-CA) claims that Russian interference in the presidential election was “an act of hybrid warfare.” Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD), and soon many others, called it a “political Pearl Harbor.” Hillary Clinton’s characterization of Russian operations as “a kind of cyber 9/11” meanwhile carried similarly implications of an epochal shift in national security priorities. While these imaginaries situate cyberwarfare in different times and places, they are all deeply suggestive of fundamental changes to political reality. However, unlike previous imaginations of cyberattacks on digital and electronic infrastructure, the 2016 cyberattacks are said to represent, as The Atlantic put it, a “political cyber-Pearl Harbor” (emphasis in original).In this ‘new’ cybersecurity discourse, it is the political that is decisive: cyberwarfare is said to be an “information war against global democracy,” “a form of war on our fundamental democratic principles,” its “long-run objective to have democracy break down,” and to “destroy democracy from the inside out.” While these formulations beg numerous questions concerning the form and nature of democracy, they starkly illustrate the proposition that, in the ‘new world’ of cyberwarfare, democracy must be defended. In these formulations, threats to democracy do not appear as secondary or spinoff effects of primary attacks on social, financial, or military networks. Instead, ‘democracy itself’ becomes not only the target, but the medium of attack: “the Russians have always used the openness of democracy against us,” a former British official told WIRED magazine. “Russia knows how to effectively exploit the seams and systemic weaknesses in Western democracies.” These discourses build upon the axiom that “cyberspace makes us vulnerable” (Kaiser 2016; Barnard-Wills & Ashenden 2012), suggesting a complementary inversion of the 21st century geopolitical script that “disconnectedness defines danger” (Barnett 2005). In the ‘new world’ of cyberwarfare, rather, the openness of global communication has produced a porous world of connectivities and flows “deeply at odds with imaginative geographies of security and exclusion” (Bialasiewicz et al 2007: 418). This looming sense of radical openness has raised questions concerning state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and community identity (Toal 1996: 180). Indeed, Russia’s purported ‘hacking’ of the 2016 US presidential election is said to have produced a “constitutional crisis,” while geographical imaginations (Gregory 1994) of “cyber invasion” have challenged the presumed integrity of US territory. In this imagination it is the inherent ‘openness’ of democracy that constitutes vulnerability to cyberattack. To advance ‘democracy’ as a referent object, cybersecurity discourse therefore proceeds through a contradictory logic in which an ‘excess of democracy’ must be curtailed to protect democracy itself (see Toal 1996 on Huntington 1975). In naming ‘democracy’ as a referent object, cybersecurity discourse thus reaches an aporia in which the depoliticiziation of the object to be secured appears as ‘the political’ itself. “The Divided States of America”In the fall of 2017, National Football League (NFL) players readied for a second season of on-field protests, drawing attention to issues of racialized violence and inequality in the United States. Begun the previous season by San Francisco 49ers Quarterback Colin Kaepernick, the protests were widely associated with the Black Lives Matters (BLM) movement. As the new season began, social media hashtags like #taketheknee and #boycottNFL quickly reached viral status. Reports soon began to circulate, however, that the online controversy was being stoked by covert Russian operatives seeking to “stir up divisions in the United States.” Invoking classified intelligence briefings, Senator James Lankford (R-OK) claimed that Russian “internet trolls” — paid or state-sponsored social media users — had been exploiting the controversy to “create doubt and sow chaos in U.S. institutions and government.”After attending a Senate Homeland Security Committee hearing with heads of US intelligence agencies on Sept 27, Lankford “made an individual decision to start talking publicly” about Russian propaganda, releasing an example of what he said was a Russian Twitter account posing as “Boston Antifa,” a purportedly anti-fascist protest group. The image he circulated [fig. 1] was notable for its geolocation in Vladivostok, reported widely as evidence of the account’s Russian origin. In fact, the tweet was a joke: “Boston Antifa” had been previously identified in the press as parody account based in Oregon State, with a manually set geolocation meant to satirize so-called ‘Russiagate’ discourse. Nevertheless, Lankford’s claims about the tweet’s Russian origins, backed by intelligence authorities, were widely reported in the popular press. The claims came amidst revelations a month earlier that the Moscow-based Internet Research Agency (IRA) had spent $100,000 to purchase 3,000 Facebook advertisements in the lead up to, though mostly in the aftermath of, the 2016 US presidential election. Though a small sum compared to the $6.5 billion spent by both parties on the election, the ads were framed in the US press as the tip of the ‘Russiagate’ iceberg that would lead to further revelations. While reporting on ‘Russiagate’ to this point had largely stressed Russian efforts to bolster Donald Trump’s xenophobic ‘alt-right’ base, the Facebook revelations combined with the NFL controversy to mark a turning point in emphasis upon left-wing and Black political activism as vehicles for Russian cyberwarfare. Figure 1: A joke tweet from an Oregon-based twitter account makes light of perceived “culture war” issues. Senator Lankford claimed there was “a high likelihood it was connected to some Russian entities.”Indicative of this shift, The Washington Post reported that the Facebook ads revealed “a deep understanding of social divides in American society,” with some ads “promoting African American rights groups, including Black Lives Matter.” In the following days, congressional leaks to the press revealed that “at least one” Facebook ad had targeted the cities of Ferguson and Baltimore, locations of major Black Lives Matter protests in 2014 and 2015.? Descriptions of the ads circulated widely in the press, stressing the point that they “may have been designed to encourage African American militancy.”A former CIA analyst suggested that the “sophistication” and “granular nature” of Russia’s targeting of “certain communities and issues” was “consistent with [Russia’s] overall goal of creating discord.” Meanwhile, stories emerged placing the Black Lives Matter movement within a “history of Russian involvement in America’s race wars.” The Atlantic identified Russian efforts to exploit protests as “just another page from the old Soviet handbook,” which included infamous cases like the 1931 Scottsboro Boys trials and the 1957 Little Rock crisis. Several writers supportive of the Black Lives Matter movement objected to the cynicism and chilling effects of these characterizations, but they made little impact against the rising tide of ‘Russiagate’ sensationalism (Ford 2019).After two months of intense press coverage, in an October 31, 2017 Senate Judiciary Subcommittee hearing on Extremist Content and Russian Disinformation Online, US Senators lambasted representatives of Facebook, Twitter, and Google for failing to curb Russian interference into US political life. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) stressed that Russia “sought to sow discord and amplify racial and social divisions among American voters.” Chuck Grassley (R-FL) claimed that Russia had “spread stories about abuse of black Americans by law enforcement” to “worsen racial tensions and possibly violence.” The Russians “take a crack in our society and turn it into a chasm,” argued Angus King (I-ME). In another House Intelligence Committee hearing, Adam Schiff (D-CA) noted the “Kremlin objective” of “sowing discord” by “inflaming passions on divisive issues.”One expert witness, Clint Watts, made the incredible claim that Russia had “perpetrated the largest and most successful information attack in world history.” In his testimony, Russian cyberwarfare assumed an almost supernatural dimension, executing its “dark arts of manipulation and subversion” to “destroy our democracy from the inside out.” Perhaps the most prominent ‘cyberwarfare expert’ in US media, Watts stressed the matter of war: the Russians “use information as a weapon of warfare.” Invoking a ballistic imagery of “information missiles,” Watts claimed that information leaks now gave Russia “nuclear fuel for information atomic bombs,” and that “America’s war with itself has already begun.” He warned that we all must act now on the social media battlefield to quell information rebellions that can quickly lead to violent confrontations and easily transform us into the Divided States of America.The Senators agreed. “This is about?national security,” said Committee Chairman Richard Burr (R-NC). “I don’t think you [tech companies] get it,” Feinstein inveighed, “what we're talking about is a cataclysmic change. What we're talking about is the beginning of cyberwarfare.” Sites of CybersecurityAs noted above, the identification of the NFL players’ protest as a source of ‘division’ in American society marked a turning point in cybersecurity discourse toward the identification of left-leaning, social justice, and especially Black political activism as targets of cyberwarfare. Indeed, issues of race and protest have loomed large in contemporary cybersecurity discourse: in addition to the NFL protests, coverage of Russian-bought Facebook ads stressed the significance that “at least one” of the ads targeted the cities of Ferguson and Baltimore, sites of major Black Lives Matter protests in 2014 and 2015. Even Senator Lankford’s mistaken “Boston Antifa” twitter account suggests the significance of protest movements in contemporary imaginations of cyber-in/security. While traditional answers to questions concerning the spaces to which cybersecurity belongs have appropriately emphasized the network and cyberspace, the broadening of cybersecurity’s referent objects suggests the need to consider how spaces of cybersecurity are being politically reconstituted. In this light, ‘the protest’ has emerged as a privileged site of cyber-in/security ‘beyond the computer’.The prevalence of ritualized military pageantry during sporting events has been a central feature of US military public relations, especially pronounced in the post-9/11 context of the ‘war on terror’ (Silk 2013). Drawing upon the rise of the Black Lives Matters movement, however, the NFL players’ protest challenged these affirmations of US militarism and nationalism, drawing attention to the country’s ongoing problems with racialized violence and inequality. In the political imaginary of cybersecurity, however, the sportsground becomes a site of insecurity through which foreign antagonists launch ‘divisive’ attacks on presumed American unity. Maintenance of ideological hegemony is thus transformed into a matter of cybersecurity in which spaces of political protest appear as fronts for a new kind of socially mediated war between nations. Central to this reconstitution of the space of protest has been a stress on race and ‘racial tension’ as sources of insecurity. In the wake of reporting on the NFL protests, stories emerged in the press reporting on Black political activists who had been ‘duped’ into organizing political protests by covert Russian actors on social media. “Targets seem to primarily have been black activists,” reported Vanity Fair. Headlines like “These Americans Were Tricked Into Working for Russia” stressed that through Black political organizers, “foreign powers were able to land and manipulate boots on American ground.” While reporting sympathetically framed the organizers as victims whose “racial grievances” had been exploited, they nevertheless scripted them as the dupes and ‘useful idiots’ of foreign influence. The details of the stories belie the hype. Operating social media pages under the name ‘BlackMattersUS’ – meant to appear as a spinoff or affiliate of Black Lives Matter – Russian agents are purported to have contacted Black American political organizers, offering them advice and/or petty cash to cover costs of organizing protests. However, of the three ‘dupes’ identified, one did not organize protests or activities at all, breaking contact with his interlocutor after several exchanges. A second activist organized local self-defense classes for several weeks, but similarly stopped when the arrangement began to seem strange. A third organizer, Conrad James, organized two protests, one in September, and another in October of 2016. Both protests were in response to the killing of Keith Lamont Scott, a Black man shot to death by police in Charlotte, North Carolina. While popular reporting stressed that James had been ‘duped’ into organizing the protests, they were in fact part of a series of national protests, many of which had been organized by the ACLU and NAACP, organizations with long histories of protest around issues of race and equality.Through the lens of cybersecurity, however, the context of these protests is radically distorted, with racialized inequality, police violence, and Black political agency all receding from view. In their place, Russian cyberwarfare appears as an overdetermining impetus for the protests, enabled by the presumed malleability and credulity of Black political activists. Cybersecurity discourse thus calls into question the wider legitimacy of Black political activism as such, framing spaces of protest as vehicles for Russian cyberwarfare. Black activism thus becomes an ‘excess of democracy’ that threatens moderate and therefore secure politics. While it is possible to envision a response to the insecurities of racial inequality through political projects of recognition and redistribution, this remains a foreclosed possibility. On the contrary, the logic of cybersecurity consists not in redress of the hierarchical structures that produce ‘racial tension’ qua insecurity, but in policing and pacifying the effects those structures produce. This has been achieved through an imaginative transposition of local dissent to the scale of geopolitical contest. Through Black political activism, Russia is said to “land boots on American soil,” a geopolitical imaginary placing Black political activism outside the domestic community, casting it as an invading alien force. In this formulation, Black Americans do not properly belong to the political community, reflecting what Alves (2014) has called the “placelessness” of Black communities in white political imaginaries. While ostensibly concerned with technical questions, recent cybersecurity discourses have ultimately advanced a political logic that turns the structure of US race relations upside down. In this formulation, the victims of American racism are those to whom calls for racial justice are addressed, and the crisis of American racism consists not in the violence of inequality, but in the ‘tension’ produced when the oppressed seek redress. Through cybersecurity discourse, Black political activism therefore appears as an ‘excess of democracy’ whose political horizons require foreclosure in the name of superseding national security. Furthermore, popular emphasis on the novelty of Russian cyberwarfare obscures the historical continuity of this foreclosure of Black political activism in the United States.While ‘the old Soviet Playbook’ and ‘Russia’s history in America’s race wars’ supply historical frames for cybersecurity, these frames ignore the fact that, as Fig. 2 illustrates, association with foreign subversives has long been used to menace and intimidate black Americans participating in political projects for recognition and redistribution. Attending to this history, James Baldwin (1961) wrote that “when the South has trouble with its Negroes…it blames ‘outside’ agitators and ‘Northern interference.’ When the nation has trouble with the Northern Negro, it blames the Kremlin.” Such was the case when president Lyndon Johnson ordered the CIA to conduct illegal surveillance of the Black Power and anti-war movements, premised upon his conviction that they were fomented and financed by the Soviet Union (Harris 2005: 538). Similarly, and despite failure to uncover these connections, president Nixon expanded both the CIA’s Operation Chaos and the FBI’s COINTELPRO, both of which attacked activist movements and insinuated their foreign origins (Jeffrey-Jones 1989: 199; Weiner 2007: 285).Figure 2: A 1930s Ku Klux Klan poster threatens Black Americans against participating in redistributive political projects (Alabama Department of Archives and History c1930). Under cover of digital esoterica, cybersecurity discourse has revived this tradition of placing Black political activism outside the “homogeneous and virtuous domestic community” underwriting imaginative geographies of the American ‘homeland’ (Bialasiewicz et al 2007: 417). As Dalby (2000: 13) notes, the “the ability to specify matters of danger” is central to the politics of security. Identifying the enemy Other inside domestic political space, cybersecurity discourse specifies for whom and against whom democracy must be secured. Uncritical embrace of this ‘new world’ of cybersecurity therefore serves not only to marginalize Black and dissident political movements, it cultivates amnesia toward longer histories and tactics of repression within the United States. Ideas surrounding the ‘normal politics’ against which exceptional cybersecurity circumstances arise therefore reveal themselves to be deeply racialized, drawing into question the bounds of what is permissible through democratic politics, and for whom. Failure to redress this foreclosure will give Americans, as James Baldwin (1961) observed, “yet another means of avoiding self-examination.” At the time of writing, protests against the Minneapolis police killing of George Floyd are ongoing. Yet within a week of Floyd’s death, former Obama administration National Security Advisor Susan Rice had already appeared on CNN’s The Situation Room to suggest that the protests were “right out of the Russian playbook.” The Subject of Cybersecurity In its emphasis on defending ‘democracy,’ contemporary cybersecurity has become increasingly ‘human centric’ (Le Cheng et al 2019). Contrasting cybersecurity’s traditional objects, one recent trade conference suggested that “cyber operators from military and government are now faced by a new question: who, not what, will be targeted by hostile cyber operators?” While the status of the individual as a referent object of cybersecurity has been debated in existing scholarship (Hansen & Nissenbaum 2009; Carr 2016; Collier 2018), in this final section I consider how cybersecurity’s emphasis on the individual has been reconstituted with respect to the new referent objects of ‘democracy’. In this section, I consider how cybersecurity’s new objects can also be understood to produce a corresponding ‘subject of cybersecurity.’ If as Walker (1997: 78) contends, “the subject of security is the subject of security,” I follow him in asking “how the modern subject is being reconstituted and what security could possibly mean in relation to it.” I argue that this subject of cybersecurity is defined neither through its possession of digital rights (Deibert 2018), nor through humanitarian discourses of human security (Watson 2011). Rather, I suggest that the subject of cybersecurity is defined by a relationship to truth that stands as the basis of a ‘secure’ political subjectivity. For the subject of cybersecurity, matters of fact have been subordinated to what Foucault (2014a: 19) calls “the strange truth that the individual must produce about himself.” As befits the singulatim of pastoral power, the subject of cybersecurity is one for whom contingent knowledge becomes the basis of a secure political subjectivity. A strange truth indeed: as one former CIA analyst sees it, “if we are confident in ourselves, these Russian attacks have little effect.” For Politico, “understanding how the Kremlin has tried to achieve [its goals] is absolutely essential.” “If it sounds alarming,” advises TIME magazine, “it helps to understand the battlespace of this new information war.”This suggestion of talismanic knowledge-as-security against cyberattack appears widely in popular cybersecurity discourse, often taking the form of direct second-person address. Though rare in journalistic style, cybersecurity discourses often address a quotidian you, stressing the individual scale of cyberwarfare and its targets. As Politico addressed its reader: “if you understand what the Kremlin is up to, the news is grim, but it also gives us a clear path to fight back” [fig. 3]. The imperative to ‘understand what the Kremlin is up to’ here appears as a kind of “obligation to know” (Foucault 2014a: 256; 2014b: 93) for the subject of cybersecurity. To be secure, one must know. In this formulation, truth is not only an object whose contingent circulation must be secured, it is a possession which of itself secures the subject of cybersecurity. ‘Securing truth’ therefore appears in a double sense: as a verb parsing ‘good’ information circulation from ‘bad,’ but also as an adjective describing the quality of truth to make the subject of cybersecurity secure.Figure 3: The obligation to know: hailing the subject of cybersecurity (McKew 2017).Here the pastoral scales of cybersecurity’s governmental structure converge upon this double meaning of ‘securing truth.’ In both cases, the relationship between security and truth consists not in parsing the true from the false, but in tying the security of nation to the individual’s obligation to know the truth about the threat that faces it. Thus securing the contingent circulation of information at the level of population has its counterpart in the subject of cybersecurity whom truth secures. The subject of cybersecurity therefore understands itself as a ‘double subject’ who is both subject to, but also an actor in, the operation of power (Foucault 2014b: 81). It apprehends its thoughts and feelings, not as coherent aspects of an autonomous or intersubjective self, but as dislocated objects made accessible and vulnerable to foreign manipulation. The subject of cybersecurity is therefore a site of radical convergence for enemy technique, liable for defeats, and obligated to possess the knowledge that makes it secure. Special stress upon the ‘psychological’ nature of cyberwarfare reinforces the scale of the individual as a key terrain (Farish 2007; Whyte 2018a, 2018b). As Timothy Snyder warns, “Russia was always better than us when it came to penetrating their enemies and breaking them down from within.” Mirroring anxieties surrounding the porous and permeable nation, cybersecurity discourse stresses the penetrability of the individual; of what Deutsche (1991: 27) identifies as the otherwise assumed “complete masculine subject.” To secure the nation, one must secure oneself. The individual and the state therefore collapse in the production of cybersecurity as a kind of ‘scaled intimacy’ (Cowen 2004; Jones & Fowler 2007). That the individual as such should appear central to popular understandings of cybersecurity reflects the wider neoliberal disposition to make the modern autonomous subject the hegemonic terrain of politics, and the “desideratum in contemporary discussions of both security and economy” (Dalby 2000: 14). This follows, as Walker (1997, 74) suggests, the modern’s state’s aspiration to “resolve all contradictions between universality and particularity through the body of the modern subject.”Disarticulated and atomized, the subject of cybersecurity ironically requires further retreat, since popular non-individualized political action, like participation in protest movements, is precisely the condition of insecurity that only personal awareness can mitigate. To be secure, one must be politically moderate, trust in institutions, and disavow racialized excesses of democracy. Thus, contemporary cybersecurity “tells us who we must be” (Walker 1997: 71) and lays out the conditions under which we become secure. However, this emphasis upon the individual as the singulatim of cybersecurity also relates to the omnes of an assumed national community, and to Others outside it whose political possibilities must be foreclosed. For the model subject that truth secures, insecurity lurks in the ‘useful idiots’ and racialized Others who fail in their obligation to know. Cybersecurity therefore materializes Others as threats (Campbell 1992), while “maintaining certain collective identities, certain senses of who we are” (Dalby 2002, 163). Addressing the subject of cybersecurity Clint Watts insists that “you cannot counter back…unless you know what your nation’s policies are, what your belief systems are.” In this strange formulation, vulnerability to foreign attack consists in not knowing who you are. Despite its presumptively technical nature, cybersecurity ultimately concerns more fundamental, non-technical questions concerning subjectivity and truth;?about “who are we and to what space we belong” (Harvey 1990, 426-7). These turn out to be political questions. Bibliography Alabama Department of Archives and History (c1930). Negros beware / Do not attend communist meetings. , J. A. (2014). 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