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The Myth of Entangling AlliancesReassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense PactsMichael BeckleyAPPENDIXCases are drawn from the Correlates of War (COW) Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset 4.rmation presented in the columns labeled “DATES,” “COW #,” and “PARTICIPANTS” are taken from the COW dataset. “COW #” coincides with the dispute numbers listed in the COW dataset. “ALLY” denotes the effect of alliances on U.S. involvement in each conflict and is coded according to the following scheme:0=Alliances reduced the level of U.S. involvement 1=Alliances are unnecessary to explain the observed level of U.S. involvement and there is no evidence that they played a role in U.S. decisionmaking.2=Alliances are unnecessary to explain the observed level of U.S. involvement but alliance concerns featured in U.S. decisionmaking. 3=Alliances are necessary to explain the observed level of U.S. involvement. “INV” denotes the extent of U.S. military involvement in each conflict and is coded according to the following scheme: 0=U.S. forces were uninvolved.1=U.S. forces were placed at a higher risk of attack but did not take actions of their own.2=U.S. forces were involved in non-military operations (e.g. resupply operations, transport, preplanned exercises etc.).3=U.S. forces were involved in military operations (e.g. shows of force, blockades, combat). Note that the purpose of this coding effort is not to create a database suitable for statistical analysis, but rather to aid in identifying potential cases of entanglement for further process-tracing. “DESCPRIPTION” provides a narrative for each case. General information for each case comes from Clodfelter (2008), Cohen (2013), Herring (2008), LaFeber (1994), Leffler and Westad (2010), government documents from the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, and news articles from Proquest’s Historical Newspapers database. For many cases, I consulted additional sources, which are cited in the text and listed at the end of this appendix. NAMEDATESCOW #PARITICPANTSALLYINVDESCRIPTIONBerlin Blockade21 Mar 1948 - 25 Jul 194926UKG, FRN, USR12The only alliance that the United States was a member of at the time of the Berlin crisis was the Organization of American States (OAS), which did not influence U.S. decisionmaking. Instead, U.S. actions were driven by relative power concerns. A sharp increase in Soviet relative power between 1946 and 1948 caused the United States to abandon a sphere-of-influence policy toward the Soviet Union in favor of containment (Avey 2012). Part of this strategy entailed rejecting Soviet proposals for establishing a unified Germany. By January 1948, the United States and Britain were establishing governing bodies within their respective zones in Berlin and, in July, the United States announced plans for currency reform in the Western occupation zones, a step toward a West German state. In response, the Soviet occupation authorities blockaded Berlin. The Truman administration, wanting to deter future Soviet aggression and contain Soviet expansion without catalyzing a war, chose to pursue an “unprovocative” but “firm” response by airlifting supplies and food to the Western districts of Berlin (George Marshal quoted in Fish 1991, 204). For eleven months, U.S. planes flew 250 missions per day, moving an average of 2,500 tons of food, fuel, raw materials, and goods into Berlin. German anger at the Soviets undermined Soviet hopes of preventing the division of Germany. In the spring of 1949, Stalin backed down. The blockade added urgency to western European calls for a military alliance linking the United States to western Europe and led to formal talks in Washington in July 1948, which Folly (1988, 75) describes as "the crucible in which NATO was formed." Korean War27 Jun 1950 -27 Jul 195351NEW, PHI, NTH, GRC, BEL, COL,THI, ETH, CAN, FRN, AUL, TUR,UKG, CHN, ROK, PRK23South Korea was not an American ally in June 1950, and during the previous year the Truman administration had explicitly excluded South Korea from the U.S. “defensive perimeter” in Asia and withdrawn all U.S. forces from the peninsula, actions that we now know encouraged North Korea to attack (Christensen 2011, ch. 2). Nevertheless, entanglement dynamics may have featured in the U.S. decisionmaking process (McMahon 1991, 459-460). Specifically, declassified documents show that U.S. officials worried that inaction would “cause significant damage to U.S. prestige in Western Europe,” (quoted in “Intelligence Estimate Prepared by the Estimates Group,” June 25, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7, 148-154) where the United States had recently signed the North Atlantic Treaty, and that losing the war would “handicap efforts to maintain U.S. alliances” (CIA report quoted in Matray 1979, 319).Yet, alliance politics were neither necessary nor sufficient to explain U.S. actions. First, alliance ties were unnecessary to cause U.S. involvement in the Korean War. Instead, U.S. intervention was driven primarily by perceptions of relative decline and a pervasive sense of insecurity. Historians have characterized the U.S. decisionmaking environment in 1950 as a “crisis atmosphere,” (Kaufman 1986, viii) a “short fuse period,” (Gardner 1983, 58) and a “time of increasing alarm” (Stueck 1995, 41) set off by a “vortex” (Accinelli 1996, 57) of emerging security threats. In 1949, the Soviet Union tested a nuclear bomb and China fell to Communism, and in 1950 the two powers formed an alliance and supported communist insurgents throughout Asia. These developments fueled an already widespread belief in Washington that the United States was experiencing rapid relative decline (Avey 2012). To reverse these trends, the Truman administration drew up NSC-68, a “blueprint for waging the Cold War,”(LaFeber 2008, 105) which entailed a massive military buildup and a firm commitment “to check and to roll back the Kremlin’s drive for world domination” (On NSC-68, see ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite><Author>Trachtenberg</Author><Year>1988/89</Year><RecNum>235</RecNum><Suffix>`, pp. 11-18. </Suffix><DisplayText>Marc Trachtenberg, &quot;A &quot;Wasting Asset&quot;: American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949-1954,&quot; <style face="italic">International Security,</style> Vol. 13, No. 3 (Winter 1988/89), pp. 11-18. </DisplayText><record><rec-number>235</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="aw52vrat2zze03edepvpfrwtsfrvfftv59tw">235</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Journal Article">17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Trachtenberg, Marc</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>A &quot;Wasting Asset&quot;: American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949-1954</title><secondary-title>International Security</secondary-title><short-title>A &quot;Wasting Asset&quot;</short-title></titles><periodical><full-title>International Security</full-title></periodical><pages>5-49</pages><volume>13</volume><number>3</number><dates><year>1988/89</year><pub-dates><date>Winter</date></pub-dates></dates><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Trachtenberg 1988/89, 11-18. On containing the USSR in Asia, see NSC 48/2, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia,” December 30, 1949, FRUS, Vol. VII, 1215-1220). Although NSC-68 was not official policy in June 1950, it was at the very least a “policy in search of an opportunity” (LaFeber 2008, 105). When that opportunity arrived on June 25, U.S. officials “barely hesitated before taking extensive military action” (Stueck 1981, 173). In a meeting that night, Truman and his top advisors agreed that the North Korean invasion was a Kremlin-orchestrated test of U.S. resolve and that the United States had to intervene militarily to deter further Soviet expansion in Eurasia (“The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State,” June 25, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7, 139-140; “Intelligence Estimate Prepared by the Estimates Group,” June 25, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7, 148-154; “Memorandum of Conversation,” June 25, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7, 157-161; Paige 1968). They also “had the lessons of Munich on their minds”(Leffler 1992, 361) and were determined to counter an attack that they characterized as Hitler-style aggression (May 1973, 52-86). Given these concerns, “large-scale military intervention was the logical and – in retrospect – the predictable [U.S.] response to North Korean action” (Stueck 1981, 1973). Security concerns also explain the U.S. decision to cross the 38th parallel. Specifically, U.S. officials believed that conquering North Korea would deal a strategic and psychological blow to the Soviet Union, deter future Communist aggression, and reduce long-term U.S. security burdens in Asia (Matray 1979; Foot 1985, 70-74). They also believed that China would not intervene (Foot 1985, 74-87). Thus, when U.S. forces landed at Inchon in September 1950 and split North Korean forces half, the temptation to press on and destroy North Korea once and for all became “nearly irresistible” (Stueck 1981, 231).In the absence of these security considerations, it is doubtful that alliance ties would have been sufficient to spur U.S. involvement in Korea. In June 1950, the United States had no treaty allies in Asia, and NATO was “in no sense a functioning organization” (Foot 1985, 40). NATO had little funding, no unified command structure or joint military planning, and “nothing automatic about the cooperation expected under the treaty” (Kaplan 2013, 151. See also, Kaufman 1986, 62; Stueck 1995, 349). Perhaps for this reason, U.S. officials did not explicitly discuss NATO or any other formal alliance commitments when they decided to intervene in Korea. Instead, policy discussions focused overwhelmingly on the need to maintain a reputation for resolve vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Far from entangling the United States, NATO allies actually sought to extricate the United States from the conflict and prevent it from escalating the war. From November 1950 until the end of the war, U.S. officials repeatedly considered striking the Chinese mainland with nuclear weapons. NATO allies, however, discouraged the Truman and Eisenhower administrations from acting on these impulses, arguing that escalation would, at best, bog the United States down in Asia and, at worst, start World War III by prompting a Soviet attack in Western Europe. By persistently opposing U.S. escalatory measures and dragging their feet on various UN resolutions that would have imposed punitive measures on China, “the allies were a major deterrent to an expanded war” ( ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite><Author>Foot</Author><Year>1985</Year><RecNum>230</RecNum><Suffix>`, p. 242. See also`, pp. 99`, 123-127`, 136-137`, 148`, 152`, 154 159`, 215-219`; </Suffix><DisplayText>Foot, <style face="italic">Wrong War, p. 242. See also, pp. 99, 123-127, 136-137, 148, 152, 154 159, 215-219; </style>Stueck, <style face="italic">The Korean War: An International History, pp. 130-138, 142, 148-152, 172-175, 181-182, 283-303, 320-325, 331.</style></DisplayText><record><rec-number>230</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="aw52vrat2zze03edepvpfrwtsfrvfftv59tw">230</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Foot, Rosemary</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953</title><short-title>Wrong War</short-title></titles><dates><year>1985</year></dates><pub-location>Ithaca, N.Y.</pub-location><publisher>Cornell University Press</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite><Cite><Author>Stueck</Author><Year>1995</Year><RecNum>5</RecNum><Suffix>`, pp. 130-138`, 142`, 148-152`, 172-175`, 181-182`, 283-303`, 320-325`, 331.</Suffix><record><rec-number>5</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="0xpsawr9d9zzr2esx0ov0fdidzzr2aa2edva">5</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Stueck, William </author></authors></contributors><titles><title>The Korean War: An International History</title></titles><dates><year>1995</year></dates><pub-location>Princetone, N.J.</pub-location><publisher>Princeton University Press</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Foot 1985, 242. See also, Ibid., 99, 123-127, 136-137, 148, 152, 154 159, 215-219; Stueck 1995, 130-138, 142, 148-152, 172-175, 181-182, 283-303, 320-325, 331; Tierney 2010). 7th Fleet to Taiwan Strait27 Jun 1950 -27 Jul 1953633TAW, CHN23This MID was part of the Korean War. In response to North Korea’s invasion of South Korea, Truman ordered the 7th Fleet into the Taiwan Strait to prevent the Korean conflict from spreading into China. See the analysis on the Korean War above on the decisionmaking process.U.S.-China Battles in Korea16 Feb 1951 -16 Oct 19522052CHN, TAW03This MID was also a direct outcome of the Korean War. After U.S. forces crossed the 38th parallel and pushed on toward the Chinese border, China intervened, resulting in massive battles between U.S. and Chinese forces. America’s European allies played a major role in encouraging the United States not to escalate the war by attacking the Chinese mainland with nuclear weapons. See the analysis on the Korean War above on the decisionmaking process.Yugoslav-Hungarian skirmishes16 Apr 1951 -24 Nov 19511286USR, BUL, HUN, RUM, YUG13When border clashes erupted between Yugoslavia and Hungary in 1951, the United States provided limited economic and military aid to Yugoslavia. In November, a U.S. C-47 transport plane flew off course and was fired on by Hungarian forces and disappeared. Relative power concerns drove U.S. involvement. Specifically, after the outbreak of the Korean War, the Truman administration struck up a military relationship with Yugoslavia in order to create a schism within the Communist bloc and deny eastern Europe to the Soviet Union (Leffler 1992: 417-418). First Taiwan Straits Crisis11 Feb 1953 - 19 Jan 195650CHN, TAW33See main textCzech MIG incidents10 Mar 1953 - 31 Mar 1953208USR, CZE, UKG13A Czech MIG-15 shot down a U.S. Air Force F-84 over Germany. The U.S. government claimed the plane was patrolling the U.S. zone of Germany when attacked. The State Department issued a formal protest to the Czech government, but the United States did not take additional action. Days earlier, another MIG-15 had shot down a British Royal Air Force bomber in the Berlin-Hamburg air corridor. U.S. Downs Soviet Plane1 Aug 1953 - 2 Sep 19532035CHN, USR13U.S. fighters shot down a Russian transport plane flying over northern Chinese territory. The Soviet government issued a formal complaint, but the U.S. State Department replied by blaming the Soviet Union for allowing its plane to fly over a war zone. Korean War cease-fire violations1 Feb 1954 – 10 Nov 19562244TAW, ROK, PRK23U.S. and South Korean planes and troops skirmished with North Korean forces several times between 1954 and 1956 over or in the newly established DMZ. China Downs British Airliner23 Jul 1954 - 27 Jul 19542033CHN13Chinese patrol planes shot down a British airliner near Hainan island. In response, the United States, which by this point was intent on containing China and countering perceived Chinese aggression, sent two aircraft carriers to the South China Sea. The Chinese government later apologized, claiming the Chinese fighter pilots mistook the British plane for a Chinese Nationalist plane. Nicaragua-Costa Rica Border Dispute1 Aug 1954 - 1 Aug 19541193NIC, COS22On August 1, 1954, Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza sent a force of several hundred troops made up of Costa Rican exiles toward the Nicaragua-Costa Rica border, where they allegedly engaged in skirmishes with Costa Rican forces. On January 11, 1955, this same group of exiles entered Costa Rica in an attempt to overthrow the government. The invasion stalled just beyond the border, and the conflict was referred to the OAS, which set up a security zone on both sides of the border and orchestrated a withdrawal of the exile forces. To help deter further attacks and thereby preserve stability in the Western Hemisphere, the United States sold Costa Rica several fighter planes but ruled out U.S. military intervention (Aydin 2012, 103). Swiss Jet Incident4 Oct1954 - 4 Oct19543209SWZ13Swiss fighters pursued a U.S. F-80 jet that violated Swiss air space and chased it back across the border. The U.S. plane was patrolling the Western defense line against potential Soviet incursions.U.S.-Chinese Air Battle11 May 1955 - 11 May 19552032CHN13U.S. fighters engaged and shot down three Chinese MIG jet fighters. The Chinese government claimed the U.S. planes had violated China's air space.DC-3 Incident 19 Apr 1956 - 19 Apr 19562843EGY13An Egyptian military plane forced a U.S. DC-3 transport plane flying from Tehran to Cairo to land in the Suez Canal Zone.China Shoots Down U.S. Plane22 Aug1956 - 23 Aug 195653CHN23Chinese air force planes shot down a U.S. navy patrol plane off the coast of China. The Chinese government claimed that Chinese pilots mistook the plane for a Chinese Nationalist plane and expressed regret for the attack, which killed all sixteen members of the crew. The attack did not lead to escalatory acts by either side. Suez Crisis6 Nov1956 - 6 Nov 1956200FRN, UKG,USR, EGY, ISR10In July 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the British-run corporation that managed the Suez Canal. The move threatened Britain’s oil supplies and a vital international transit route. Britain rejected U.S. attempts to resolve the dispute via an international consortium and formed a secret military plan with France and Israel to attack Egypt and take the canal. On October 29, 1956, Israel attacked Egypt in the Sinai and Gaza while Britain and France launched air and naval attacks. The Eisenhower administration worried that the attacks would stoke Arab nationalism and catalyze Soviet intervention in the Middle East. To halt the attacks, the U.S. threatened to impose sanctions on Israel and refused to bolster British currency reserves and oil supplies. The Eisenhower administration also sought UN condemnation of Israel’s actions and sent Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion a note demanding immediate withdrawal from all Egyptian territory (Little 2008: 91). In a speech before the UN, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles dissociated the United States from Britain, France, and Israel and proposed a cease-fire and the withdrawal of all forces. All three states eventually withdrew under U.S. pressure (Louis 1990: 152-158; Hahn 1991: 200-213)Jordanian and Syrian Crises25 Apr 1957 - 19 Nov1957607JOR, EGYIRQ, USR, TUR, SYR13On January 1, 1957, the Eisenhower administration determined that the November 1956 withdrawal of French and British forces from the Middle East had greatly increased the danger of communist encroachments throughout the region. Eisenhower requested that a joint resolution be passed by Congress that would provide economic assistance to non-communist governments in the Middle East and authorizing the President to use force in the area in the event of communist aggression. Eisenhower announced the policy in a speech on January 5, and the congressional resolution, which became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, extended the policy of containment in the Middle East to the countries directly flanking the Soviet Union’s southern border (George and Smoke 1974, 309-362). The first major test of this Doctrine occurred in Jordan (George and Smoke 1974, 329-333). When Britain withdrew from the region in 1956, the Jordanian government lost its main source of economic and military support. Within Jordan, the popularity of anti-Western parties, including the National Socialists, rose, and in October 1956, these parties made large electoral gains in parliament and formed a new government headed by Sulei-man Al-Nabulsi, who advocated closer relations with Egypt and Syria. However, the Jordanian King, Hussein bin Talal, concluded that Egypt and Syria could not fill the fiscal vacuum left by British withdrawal and that they would attempt to use their aid to dominate Jordan politically. Hussein was also alarmed by the policies of the al-Nabulsi Cabinet, which called for diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the acceptance of Soviet aid. Hussein dismissed Nabulsi on April 15, 1957, precipitating political unrest. To garner U.S. support, Hussein claimed publicly that the integrity of Jordan was threatened by “international communism.” On April 24, the Eisenhower administration responded to this call, announcing that the independence and integrity of Jordan was a vital U.S. interest. On April 26, the U.S. Sixth Fleet sailed to the eastern Mediterranean to show U.S. support for King Hussein. And on April 29, the administration granted $10 million in emergency aid to Jordan. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia and Iraq mobilized troops and pledged to intervene if Syria or Egypt entered Jordan’s domestic political struggle. Syria, Egypt, and the Soviet Union did not intervene, and King Hussein suppressed political opposition and consolidated his power within Jordan. In Washington, the incident was widely viewed as a successful application of the Eisenhower Doctrine.As the crisis in Jordan subsided, the Eisenhower administration turned its attention to Syria, which was cultivating close relations with the Soviet Union. In early August, the Syrian Defense Minister visited Moscow and received a large loan package from the Soviet Union. The Soviets also announced that they would help supply the Syrian military. On August 13, the Syrian government expelled three U.S. diplomats living in Damascus after allegedly discovering an American plot to overthrow the Syrian government. A few days later, the Syrian army’s Chief of Staff was replaced by a general suspected by the Eisenhower administration of being a communist. As Eisenhower explained, “the entire action was shrouded in mystery but the suspicion was strong that the Communists had taken hold of the government” (Quoted in George and Smoke 1977, 333). Fearing that Syria was falling to Communism, the Eisenhower administration compelled Iraq, Turkey, and Jordan to mobilize their armed forces on the Syrian border in an attempt to destabilize the Syrian regime (Walt 1987, 70). The United States also sent the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean and redeployed some aircraft from Western Europe to Turkey. The Syrian government, however, remained in power and continued to receive Soviet assistance. Moreover, Soviet leaders made public statements supporting Syria, and two Soviet warships visited the Syrian port of Latakia as a signal of Soviet commitment. In response, Iraq, Turkey, and Jordan pulled their forces back. At a press conference on September 10, Dulles announced that the administration would not take further actions against Syria and expressed his belief that the situation would work itself out peacefully (George and Smoke 1974, 336). He also outlined three requirements that would have to be met before the Eisenhower Doctrine would be implemented: the administration had to have clear evidence that a regime was dominated by international communism, there had to be an act of aggression by that country, and there had to be a request by the country attacked for U.S. aid. China Fires on U.S. Jets12 Jun 1957 - 13 Jun 19572049TAW, CHN13Chinese forces fired on U.S. fighter jets off the Chinese coast. China claimed the U.S. planes were violating Chinese airspace, U.S. officials maintained that the aircraft were 8 miles off China's coast and conducting a routine training flight. Czechoslovakian Air Space Violation29 Jul 1957 - 29 Jul 19572849CZE12Czechoslovakia accused the U.S. Air Force of violating Czech air space and spying on Czech military installations.Chilean Fishing Dispute13 Dec 1957 - 18 Dec 19572845CHL10The U.S. warned Chile against any attempt to interfere with U.S. fishing vessels on the high seas after the Chilean government announced it was sending armed ships after a group of U.S. vessels that allegedly invaded Chilean waters. Korean demilitarized zone (DMZ) Incidents 17 Mar 1958 - 17 Oct 19612187ROK, PRK23After the Korean War, South Korea became a central piece of the U.S. anti-communist forward defense zone and a base for U.S. forces in Asia (Levin and Sneider 1983). As Secretary of State Dulles explained, the United States would not again “make the mistake of treating Korea as an isolated affair. The Korean war forms on part of a worldwide effort of communism to conquer freedom” (quoted in Roehrig 2006, 130). This perceived link between South Korean security and the U.S. global containment strategy persisted throughout the 1950s, as did the large U.S. presence in South Korea and operations along the DMZ. The resulting close contact between U.S. and North Korean forces led to several serious incidents. The first occurred on March 7, 1958, when North Korean forces shot down a U.S. fighter plane that had strayed over North Korean territory. On June 16, two MIG fighters, believed to be either North Korean or Chinese, attacked a U.S. Navy patrol plane, which managed to return to Japan despite being badly damaged. On March 10 1961, and again on April 22, 1961, U.S. and North Korean guards engaged in fistfights at Panmunjon. On September 16, 1961, a UN patrol boat sunk a North Korean vessel that was reportedly attempting to land spies in South Korea. Over this time period, the UN Command accused North Korea of hundreds of truce violations, most involving North Korean soldiers stepping over the DMZ line. Lebanese Civil War14 May 1958 - 24 Oct 1958125IRQ, USR, UKG13The civil war in Lebanon in 1958 was fought between the largely Maronite Christian government of Lebanon and Muslim rebels who supported the Pan-Arabism of Nasser of Egypt. The Lebanese government was one of the staunchest supporters of the Eisenhower Doctrine and had issued a joint communiqué with the United States on March 16, 1957 declaring that the two countries were in full agreement on resisting the spread of international communism in the Middle East. When civil war erupted on May 8, 1958, therefore, the Eisenhower administration viewed it as part of a communist plot (Walt 1987, 74). As Eisenhower later explained, “Behind everything was our deep-seated conviction that the Communists were principally responsible for the trouble” (quoted in George and Smoke 1974, 342). On May 13, therefore, the administration began to supply the Lebanese government with tear gas and small arms, moved the Sixth Fleet into the eastern Mediterranean, and announced that it was considering whether to send American troops to defend the Lebanese regime.The civil war dragged on until July 14, when the Iraqi monarchy, which was the linchpin of the anti-communist Baghdad Pact and financial backer of the Lebanese regime, was overthrown. The Eisenhower administration concluded that the Iraqi coup would bolster the rebels in Lebanon and jeopardize U.S. influence in the region. Thus, when the Lebanese President requested U.S. assistance hours after the Iraqi coup, Eisenhower responded by landing 13,000 U.S. troops in Lebanon the next day (Little 2008, 134-135). The U.S. intervention met no resistance and effectively suppressed the fighting. The United States then negotiated a compromise agreement with Lebanese rebels that allowed for a special election on July 31 in which a candidate amenable to both sides was elected. The U.S. military operation (Blue Bat) is generally regarded as the first major military intervention carried out under the Eisenhower Doctrine.East Germany Detains U.S. Soldiers8 Jun 1958 - 19 Jul 19582854GDR23East Germany detained nine U.S. Army officers after their helicopter was forced down over East Germany.Second Taiwan Crisis22 Jul 1958 - 19 Dec 1958173USR, TAW, CHN22On August 23, 1958, China resumed shelling Jinmen and Mazu. The United States avoided direct clashes with Chinese forces, but provided naval escorts for Nationalist resupply vessels headed to Jinmen. On September 6, the PRC requested diplomatic talks with the United States, and on October 6 the PRC declared the siege over. As in 1954/55, U.S. involvement was driven by security interests, and Nationalist attempts to entrap the United States ultimately failed.There is little mention in U.S. government documents of alliance concerns. Policymakers worried about maintaining U.S. credibility as a resolute actor, but it was credibility vis-à-vis China, the Soviet Union, and “small countries along the Sino-Soviet periphery” (e.g. Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaya, Cambodia, Laos, Burma), not vis-à-vis U.S. treaty allies, that most preoccupied Eisenhower and his advisors (“Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to Secretary of State Dulles,” August 20, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 19, p. 63). In fact, according to some scholars, alliances may have “acted as a constraint on [U.S.] decisionmaking” and “contributed to Eisenhower’s aversion to the use of nuclear weapons and his attraction to an amphibious lift deal” (Accinelli 2001, 139). Western allies, especially Britain, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada, pressured the United States to stay on the sidelines, and U.S. intelligence assessments warned that the United States would “probably not have the endorsement of [its] main allies and would severely strain [its] alliances [by intervening]” (“Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith) to Secretary of State Dulles,” September 3, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 19, pp. 122-123). As in the 1954/55 crisis, the Nationalists tried to entrap the United States by deploying a large chunk of their forces on Jinmen and Mazu, but this time the Eisenhower administration did not commit to defending them. The United States provided escorts for Nationalist supply ships, but only in international waters at least three miles from China. At the same time, U.S. officials discouraged the Nationalists from bombing the mainland (Garver 1997, 136) and reminded them that the United States would not defend Taiwan if they instigated further conflict (FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 19, pp. 154, 160, 179, 253-254, 274-275). In late September, Dulles, without consulting the Nationalists beforehand, announced that the United States favored withdrawing Nationalist forces from the islands in exchange for a ceasefire, and in October Dulles compelled the Nationalists to back this bargain by removing 15,000 troops from the islands and issuing a statement promising not to use force against the PRC (Garver 1997, 139).If China had escalated its attacks, the United States might have been sucked into a larger conflict. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) advocated striking the Chinese mainland with tactical nuclear weapons if China invaded Jinmen or Taiwan. Eisenhower, however, never authorized such plans and expressed disapproval of any contingency plans that involved nuclear weapons (Memorandum of Meeting, August 29, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 19, pp. 96-99) or strikes against the Chinese mainland (Change 1990, 189). More important, declassified Chinese documents reveal that China never planned to invade the islands or Taiwan. As Thomas Christensen has shown, Mao launched the attacks to mobilize domestic support for his ambitious economic policies (ie. the Great Leap Forward); he and wanted a crisis, but not a war (Christensen 1996, ch. 6). The risk of escalation, therefore, was always low. As in 1954/55, U.S. involvement in the 1958 crisis was driven primarily by a long-standing perceived U.S. interest in containing the PRC (Accinelli 2001, 139; Eliades 1993, 344; George and Smoke 1974, 364). In 1958, the Eisenhower administration “remained hostile to the PRC and persisted in its hard-line policy of military containment combined with diplomatic and economic isolation”(Accinelli 2001, 108). Intelligence analysts consistently depicted China as a rogue state (NIE 13-57, “Communist China Through 1961,” March 19, 1957, FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. 3, pp. 498, 505; NIE 13-2-57, “Communist China’s Role in Non-Communist Asia,” December 3, 1957, FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. 3, pp. 649-652; NIE 13-58, “Communist China,” May 13, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 19, pp. 25-26) and described the U.S.-China relationship as one of “semi-warfare” (“Address by Secretary of State Dulles in San Francisco,” June 28, 1957, FRUS, 1955-57, Vol. 3, pp. 558-573). The peace talks from the 1954/55 crisis failed to ease the Sino-American antagonism. In fact, in the eyes of the Eisenhower administration “the first crisis confirmed that Communist China was the most dangerous power in Asia and a continuous threat to U.S. interests in the Far East” (Zhang 1992, 238). Throughout the period between the two Taiwan Straits crises, U.S. policy documents consistently depicted Taiwan as a vital strongpoint in America’s anti-Communist containment barrier,( NSC 5723, “U.S. Policy toward Taiwan and the Government of the Republic of China,” October 4, 1957, FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. 19) and Eisenhower signed off on numerous Nationalist raids against the mainland (Garver 2001, 135-136). When China began shelling the offshore islands in 1958, U.S. officials assumed it was the opening salvo in a Sino-Soviet plot to bully the United States out of Asia and determined that U.S. action was necessary to deter Chinese and Soviet expansion (“Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower,” August 12, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 19, p. 50; “Memorandum Prepared by Secretary of State Dulles,” September 4, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 19, p. 131-134; SNIE 100-11-58, “Probable Chinese Communist and Soviet Intentions in the Taiwan Strait Area,” FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. 19, pp. 205-206; ADDIN EN.CITE <EndNote><Cite><Author>Zhang</Author><Year>1992</Year><RecNum>155</RecNum><Suffix>`, p. 243. </Suffix><DisplayText>Zhang, <style face="italic">Deterrence and Strategic Culture, p. 243. </style></DisplayText><record><rec-number>155</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app="EN" db-id="aw52vrat2zze03edepvpfrwtsfrvfftv59tw">155</key></foreign-keys><ref-type name="Book">6</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Zhang, Shu Guang</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1948-1958</title><short-title>Deterrence and Strategic Culture</short-title></titles><dates><year>1992</year></dates><pub-location>Ithaca, N.Y.</pub-location><publisher>Cornell University Press</publisher><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote>Zhang 1992, 243). In sum, Alliance politics featured in U.S. decisionmaking during the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis, but are unnecessary to explain U.S. involvement, which was itself quite limited. Instead, U.S. decisionmaking was driven by a perceived national interest in containing China, and Nationalist attempts to extract U.S. security guarantees for the offshore islands failed. In fact, the Eisenhower administration called publicly for a Nationalist withdrawal from the islands and a renunciation of the use of force. Had China invaded Jinmen or Taiwan, the United States might have retaliated by striking the Chinese mainland, although it is not clear that Eisenhower would have approved such measures. Regardless, Mao never planned to launch an invasion and, in fact, went to great lengths to avoid escalation. The risk to U.S. forces and, therefore, the potential extent of U.S. entanglement were always minimal. 1958 Berlin Crisis7 Nov 1958 - 23 Jun 1959608FRN, UKG, USR01In November 1958, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev demanded that West Berlin be made a free city (governed autonomously under international agreement) and claimed that if the Western allies did not comply within six months, he would conclude a separate peace with East Germany that would terminate the four-power division of the city and leave the question of access to West Berlin in the hands of the East German government. In effect, Khrushchev was demanding that Western soldiers leave Berlin and that access to the city be controlled by East Germany. Scholars have identified two main motives for Khrushchev’s demand (Gavin 2012, 62): first, he wanted to stop thousands of skilled workers from fleeing East Germany via West Berlin; and second he wanted to pressure western powers to prevent West Germany from becoming too powerful and acquiring a nuclear arsenal. As Trachtenberg (1999, 253) explains: “a strong Germany – and that meant a nuclearized Germany – was a danger…The western governments needed to be made to feel the brunt of Soviet displeasure. So the Soviet leadership decided to put pressure on the western powers where they were most vulnerable, and where the level of tension was easiest for the Russians to control – and that, of course, meant Berlin.” The resulting crisis would last until 1962. Both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations decided to stand firm in the face of Soviet demands and risk escalation to nuclear war because they viewed the crisis as an important test of U.S. resolve and worried that U.S. capitulation would embolden the Soviet Union to expand its sphere of influence in Europe (Trachtenberg 1999, 256-263). They also believed that the United States had nuclear superiority and could thus coerce the Soviet Union through nuclear threats and, if necessary, defeat it in a nuclear war (Gavin 2012, 65-70). As Trachtenberg (1999, 258) explains, U.S. military leaders “wanted a confrontation with Russia over the issue,” because they believed a “show-down” with Russia was inevitable and that it was preferable to have it while the United States enjoyed nuclear superiority, and “the consensus view [in late 1958], shared by both military and civilian leaders, was that America’s whole position in Europe depended on her willingness to defend her rights [in Berlin], and that the country therefore had to be prepared in the final analysis to risk general nuclear war over the issue.” NATO allies, however, objected to these plans and resisted U.S. demands to make preparations to implement them (Press 2005, 103-110; Trachtenberg 1999, 258-274). The British in particular insisted that no ground operations could be launched without the full consensus of all NATO members and the British Commonwealth and with full NATO mobilization, a process that British leaders knew would take several months and would therefore buy the western powers time to deescalate the crisis. As Trachtenberg (1999, 256, 258) concludes, “the U.S. government was in the final analysis far more willing than any other western power to fight a general nuclear war rather than capitulate over Berlin”; the Eisenhower administration considered moderating its policy because “the western alliance had to be kept together, the views of the major European countries had to be taken into account, and the fact was that those governments were leery of military action.” Ultimately, Eisenhower did not wholly adopt the moderate positions favored by allies, explaining that if the United States was unwilling to risk nuclear escalation over Berlin, “we would first lose the city itself and, shortly after, all of Western Europe. If all of Western Europe fell into the hands of the Soviet Union and thus added its great industrial plant to the USSR’s already great industrial might, the United States would indeed be reduced to the character of a garrison state if it was to survive at all” (quoted in Green 2012, 30). As a result, the crisis persisted in varying degrees of intensity until the end of 1962 (Gavin 2012, chap. 3; Trachtenberg 1999, chaps. 7-8). Swiss Air Space Incident19 Mar 1959 - 20 Mar19592870SWZ12Swiss fighter jets escorted a U.S. reconnaissance plane to Zurich airport after it drifted into Swiss air space. The plane was patrolling the western defense line against Soviet incursions.Bay of Pigs22 Apr 1960 -26 Apr 1961246USR, CUB13The United States attempted to overthrow the communist Cuban government led by Fidel Castro. This attempt culminated in the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961. U-2 Crisis (USSR)1 May 1960 - 18 Jul 1960253PAK, JPN, NOR, TUR, USR13Soviet surface-to-air missiles brought down a U.S. U-2 spy plane. Turkey, Pakistan, and Norway provided bases for the plane as it flew missions over the Soviet Union. U-2 Crisis (China) 27 May 1960 - 27 May 19602002CHN13China charged that a U.S. naval patrol plane violated Chinese airspace.Austrian Air Space Incident8 Oct1960 - 8 Oct 19602876AUS22A U.S. military helicopter based in West Germany accidently violated Austrian airspace and landed in Austria. The crew of three was held for a day before being released. Laotian Counter-Coup Jan 1961 - 20 Apr 19611363LAO, DRV, THI, CHN, USR00Under Eisenhower, the United States had backed a pro-American regime in Laos under Phoumi Nosavan. By the end of 1960, the Phoumi government faced imminent military defeat by the communist-backed Pathet Lao. In January 1961, John F. Kennedy became president. In a meeting the day before Kennedy’s inauguration, Eisenhower stressed to Kennedy the strategic importance of Laos, calling it the “cork in the bottle” preventing Southeast Asia from falling to Communism (quoted in Herring 2008, 708). “It would be fatal,” Eisenhower warned, “for us to permit Communists to insert themselves into the Laotian government” (quoted in Logevall 1999, 23). Once in office, however, Kennedy spurned the advice of Eisenhower and many of Kennedy’s own advisors and decided against sending U.S. ground forces to Laos, opting instead for a diplomatic solution. In making this decision, Kennedy was influenced “by the misgivings expressed by America’s leading allies,” who helped convince Kennedy that the West’s stake and chance of success in Laos were minimal (Logevall 1999, 24). After thirteen months of negotiations, Phouma and the Pathet Lao concluded a power-sharing agreement and established a “neutral and independent Laos.” Dominican Crisis2 May 1961 - 25 Nov 19611801DOM11After the assassination of Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo, U.S. Naval units were placed on “increased alert” status in case they needed to evacuate American citizens and to provide stability while the OAS investigated the assassination. 1961 Berlin Crisis25 Jul 1961 - 28 Oct 196127CZE, POL,UKG, FRN, GDR, USR, GFR01At the Vienna summit in June 1961, Khrushchev renewed the six-month ultimatum and threat of a separate peace with East Germany that he had issued in 1958. Kennedy, who’s reputation had been badly damaged by the Bay of Pigs fiasco and his decision not to intervene militarily in Laos, was determined to respond firmly to Khrushchev’s demands. “If he thinks I’m inexperienced and have no guts” he told his advisors “we won’t get anywhere with him” (Herring 2008, 709). On July 25, Kennedy delivered a speech making clear the U.S. determination to defend Western rights in Berlin and proposing a major hike in defense spending, an increase in draft calls, and extended enlistments in the armed forces. Khrushchev denounced Kennedy’s speech as a “preliminary declaration of war” and decided to resume nuclear testing and build a wall to seal off East Germany from West Berlin. Construction began on August 13. As in the 1958 Berlin crisis, NATO allies pressured the United States to soften its stance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and adopt a policy of gradual pressure that would avoid forcing Russian leaders to choose between total capitulation and total war (Press 2005, 106). Unlike in 1958, however, U.S. officials in 1961 worried that U.S. nuclear superiority was waning and that the Soviets might not back down if confronted with the prospect of nuclear escalation (Press 2005, 106-107). In August 1961, therefore, the Kennedy administration began to moderate its contingency plans for Berlin. By September, the United States had abandoned the notion of forcing the Soviets to decide between backing down and nuclear war in favor of plans involving non-military means to break a potential Soviet blockade of Berlin. Nuclear war was still considered, but the new contingency plans entailed a more drawn out process of crisis escalation. Throughout the crisis, the United States drove NATO policy rather than the other way around. The Kennedy administration acted as an “executive agent” for NATO and “set [Berlin] policy for the West as a whole” (Trachtenberg 1999, 304). Indeed, as Press (2005, 110) explains, the United States displayed “astonishing callousness with regard to the well-being of the European allies,” drawing up nuclear war contingency plans that deliberately sacrificed European lives to increase the chances saving American lives by substituting strikes on Soviet medium-range nuclear delivery systems for strikes on Soviet long-range nuclear systems. Press (2005, 110) concludes: “the U.S. willingness to pursue policies that would obliterate its allies…is shocking in its total departure from the image of friendly democratic allies cooperating together in a spirit of community.”Initial Military Support for South VietnamDec 1961 - 26 Feb 19623361DRV, USR, CHN33See main text Berlin Tensions3 Dec 1961 - 14 Aug 19622219USR, GDR, GFR23After the construction of the Berlin Wall, the United States sent troops to garrison its side of the wall and engaged in talks with the Soviet Union to resolve West Berlin’s political status. Border guards shoot and kill several refugees. Cuban Missile Crisis28 Jan 1962 -12 Dec 196261USR, CUB13A U.S. U-2 aircraft found Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. The Kennedy administration considered attacking Cuba via air and sea, but decided on a military blockade instead. 1962 Taiwan Strait Crisis 25 Feb 1962 - 19 Dec 1962172TAW, CHN20In early 1962, Taiwan began prepare forces on the offshore islands for a military attack against mainland China. By June, the preparations had alarmed the Chinese government, which alerted the country for an invasion from Taiwan. To reassure the Chinese and restrain Taiwan, the United States told the Chinese government (via their ambassador in Warsaw) on June 26, that the United States would not support “any Nationalist attempt to invade the mainland.” The Taiwanese government then determined that American resistance to the use of force was irreversible and refrained from attacking the mainland (Gordon 1985: 656-658). Intervention in Laos12 May 1962 - 15 Feb 19731353THI, DRV, LAO, NEW, UKG, AUL, USR, CHN13U.S. military operations in Laos were driven by U.S. involvement in Vietnam (Herring 2002, 340-341). I discuss the role of entanglement dynamics in the Vietnam War in the main text. The flimsy Laotian coalition government discussed above was nominally neutral during the Vietnam war, but the North Vietnamese used Laotian territory with virtual impunity for their infiltration routes into South Vietnam and provided the communist Pathet Lao with supplies and soldiers. From 1962 to 1973, the United States backed the Laotian government and waged a secret war against North Vietnamese positions in Laos. In February 1971, President Nixon approved a major ground operation into Laos involving South Vietnamese troops backed up by U.S. air power to disrupt North Vietnamese supply lines. When the two South Vietnamese divisions crossed the border, they were attacked by 36,000 North Vietnamese troops supported by Russian-made tanks. After six weeks of bloody fighting, the South Vietnamese forces retreated back into South Vietnam. By 1973, the United States had dropped more than two million tons of bombs on Laos while the CIA sponsored attacks carried out by Hmong militias against North Vietnamese forces on the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. When the United States withdrew from South Vietnam in 1973, the Pathet Lao assumed power and slaughtered 100,000 Hmong tribespeople. Korean DMZ Incidents 22 Jun 1962 - 22 Nov 19622188ROK, PRK,23In July, seven North Korean soldiers fired on a South Korean work detail in the DMZ. In September, South Korean forces killed six North Korean troops on the south side of the DMZ. Available sources do not indicate that American troops were involved in either skirmish. Yemeni Revolution15 Nov 1962 - 15 Nov 19621108SAU, JOR,EGY, YAR13Forces loyal to Abdullah as-Sallal overthrew the newly crowned Yemeni Imam and declared Yemen a republic. The new regime was supported by Egypt, which sent 70,000 troops into Yemen, and the Soviet Union. The U.S. military, concerned about instability spreading throughout the region, conducted shows of force, but recognized the new regime and refrained from direct involvement in the fighting. Haitian Crisis 28 Apr 1963 - 3 Jun 19631002UKG, CAN, DOM, HAI13The Kennedy administration cut off U.S. aid to Haiti in 1962 after accusing the regime, led by Francois Duvalier of stealing funds and of brutalizing its own people. As a result, the Haitian economy deteriorated, and the Kennedy administration feared that a collapse of the regime would result in a Communist take-over (Herring 2008, 717). Kennedy considered but ultimately ruled out sending U.S. marines to Haiti to stabilize the government. Instead, the United States deployed a navy task force to the vicinity of Haiti and gave Duvalier an economic aid package in return for Haiti’s vote to expel Cuba from the OAS. Korean DMZ Incidents 317 May 1963 - 15 Jan 19642189ROK, PRK23Throughout the 1960s U.S. intelligence estimates consistently reported that Korea and Southeast Asia were at risk of falling to Communism (Roehrig 2006, ch. 2). In July 1961, the Soviet Union and China signed security agreements with North Korea, which the U.S. State Department in a statement to the press characterized as another “military link in the Communist colonial empire” and a “sign of ‘militancy’ shown by the Communists throughout the world” (Roehrig 2006, 44). At the same time, incidents between North Korean and South Korean forces along the DMZ increased steadily and peaked in 1968 at 629. U.S. troops were involved in several of these incidents. The first major incident occurred on May 17, 1963, when North Korean forces shot down a U.S. helicopter violating North Korea's airspace, took the two pilots hostage, and refused to return them for months. Soviet Fighters Down U.S. Planes28 Jan 1964 - 27 Mar19642220USR13On January 28, a U.S. training plane was shot down by Soviet fighter planes over East Germany. On March 10, a U.S. reconnaissance plane was shot down by a Russian fighter over East Germany. Vietnam War23 Feb 1964 - 27 Jan 1973611CHN, USR, NEW, AUL, ROK, RVN, THI, PHI, CAM, DRV33See main textCambodia-South Vietnam Border Dispute19 Mar 1964 - 25 Oct 19641213CAM, RVN13As in Laos, U.S. military involvement in Cambodia stemmed from the war in Vietnam, which I discuss in the main text. In March 1964, the Johnson administration conducted a major policy review of its Indochina policy and concluded that the United States must preserve a stable, non-Communist South Vietnam and, to accomplish that goal, needed to conduct “border control” operations in Cambodia and Laos (Herring 2002, 139). In October, South Vietnamese forces strafed a Cambodian village purportedly because Cambodia was providing refuge for Viet Cong forces that were attacking across the border into South Vietnam. On October 22, the U.S. government claimed that Cambodian troops crossed over into South Vietnam and seized a U.S. officer, who was found dead several days later just inside South Vietnam. On October 26, Cambodian forces shot down a U.S. Air Force C-123 cargo plane that had accidently strayed over Cambodian territory. Eight U.S. soldiers were killed. Korean DMZ Incidents 49 Aug 1964 - 19 Oct 19691379PRK, ROK23Sporadic clashes among North and South Korean forces along the DMZ. Much of the fighting stemmed from North Korea's efforts to ignite an insurgency in the South. According to UN Command reports, the number of incidents along the border increased from 50 in 1966 to 543 in 1967 and peaked in 1968 at 629 (Roehrig 2006, 46). The most serious infiltration occurred on January 21, 1968 when 31 North Korean commandos attempted to assassinate South Korean President Park at his residence in Seoul. The frequency and intensity of these clashes declined dramatically in 1969 after North Korea largely abandoned its hopes of igniting an insurgency in the South. Chinese MIG Incident9 Apr 1965 - 9 Apr 1965251CHN13U.S. and Chinese fighter jets skirmished over the South China Sea. No planes were shot down, but one Chinese fighter was damaged. China accused the United States of violating its airspace; the U.S. government insisted the American planes were in international air space and were clearing the way for bombing raids in North Vietnam. North Korea Attacks U.S. Spy Plane28 Apr 1965 - 2 May 19652916PRK13Two North Korean jet fighters attacked and damaged a U.S. spy plane over international waters in the Sea of Japan. The plane, though damaged, landed safely at the Yokota Air Base in Japan. The U.S. government said the plane was part of routine patrolling outside the borders of Communist countries by the United States. ?12 Jun 1965 - 12 Jun 19652910USR?China Air Battle5 Oct 1965 - 23 Nov 19672929CHN13Chinese air force planes shot down an American fighter plane in a dogfight near the China-Vietnam border. The U.S. fighter was part of a bombing raid on North Vietnam. Cambodian Border Dispute26 Dec 1965 - 2 Aug19661216CHN, CAM,RVN, THI13U.S. and South Vietnamese forces clash with North Vietnamese forces along the border between South Vietnam and Cambodia. These clashes were direct outcomes of the war in Vietnam, which I discuss in the main text.Airstrikes on North Vietnam5 Feb 1967 - 24 Feb 19671217CAM, ROK,RVN, 13?U.S. planes bombed targets in North Vietnam, including a North Vietnamese army barracks near Hanoi and infiltration routes on the Vietnamese borders with Laos and Cambodia. See main text for U.S. decisionmaking process. Soviet Fishing Dispute 12 Mar 1967 - 22 Mar 19672934USR12A U.S. Coast Guard cutter seized a Soviet fishing boat accused of violating U.S. territorial waters.Soviet Ships Incident 28 Apr 1967 - 28 Apr 19672931USR13U.S. air force plane buzzes two Soviet navy ships in the Karpathos Strait Six-day War 10 Jun 1967 - 19 Jun 1967345ISR, USR23On June 5, 1967 Israel attacked Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt, the latter of which had mobilized forces near the Israeli border and announced the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping in late May. Although U.S. policymakers were concerned that an Arab victory would enable Soviet encroachments in the Middle East, they were confident that Israel would win the war and thus decided to stand on the sidelines of the conflict. The United States failed to fulfill its 1957 pledge to guarantee Israel’s access to the Straits of Tiran (Walt 1987, 101). When Israeli leaders implored Johnson to honor the U.S. security commitment and reopen the Straits of Tiran, Johnson rebuffed them, explaining that Congress would not allow him to order a U.S. intervention and that he would instead work with the UN to establish a multinational flotilla to reopen the Straits (Quandt 1977, 53). The Johnson administration’s subsequent efforts to organize such a flotilla “proceeded, if at all, at a snail’s pace” (Gat 2003, 147). A recent study concludes that U.S. policy during the war “boiled down to throwing the onus of resolving the crisis on to the shoulders of someone else” Gat (2003, 133). Several factors explain the lack of U.S. action. First, the Johnson administration and, in particular, the Pentagon, was focused on Vietnam and reluctant to get bogged down in another military conflict (Pressman 2008, 95). In addition, Johnson was mindful of the furor over his handling of the Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964 after which he had ordered the use of force without a formal declaration of war by Congress (Quandt 1977, 45). Finally, U.S. officials generally believed Israel could fend for itself without any U.S. assistance (Gat 2003, 143). Consequently, “unilateral U.S. action was ruled out without much consideration” (Quandt 2001, 29), and the United States “remained an intensely interested bystander throughout the brief conflict” (Walt 1987, 102). The only exception occurred on May 10. That day, a cease-fire went into effect, but Soviet leaders feared that Israeli forces were still fighting in Syria and were planning to invade Damascus. The Soviet government sent a message at 9am (EST) to Johnson warning they would take necessary actions, “including military,” if Israel did not halt its advance. Johnson responded by assuring the Soviets that Israel would abide by the cease-fire and by ordering the U.S. Sixth Fleet to sail toward the Syrian coast in order to deter the Soviets from carrying out their threat. By noon (EST) the cease-fire went into effect, and the Sixth Fleet stopped its eastward movement. Operation MENU and the Cambodian Incursion18 Jan 1968 - 28 Apr 1969 1806CAM, RVN,CHN13A direct outcome of the Vietnam War. Throughout 1968, North Vietnamese forces used Cambodia as a supply route and base camp. In March 1969, the United States began an intensive bombing campaign (Operation MENU) in Cambodia, dropping more than 100,000 tons of bombs in 15 months, to destroy North Vietnamese sanctuaries (Herring 2008, 276). After a coup in Cambodia in March 1970 in which a pro-American clique led by Prime Minister Lon Nol overthrew the neutralist Prince Sihanouk, Nixon sent U.S. ground forces into Cambodia, again to destroy North Vietnamese sanctuaries and to sustain a non-Communist government. As Herring (2002, 293) concludes: “from beginning to end, the Nixon administration viewed its new ally as little more than a pawn to be used to help salvage the U.S. position in Vietnam.” Nixon pulled U.S. troops out of Cambodia in late June 1970 but continued to bomb Viet Minh sanctuaries. USS Pueblo Incident23 Jan 1968 - 22 Dec 1968347PRK13On January 23, 1968, North Korea seized the U.S. intelligence ship Pueblo in the Sea of Japan and imprisoned its officers and crew. The ship had left with orders to intercept and conduct surveillance of Soviet naval activity in the Tsushima Strait and to gather signal and electronic intelligence from North Korea. The capture occurred only a week before the start of the Tet Offensive in Vietnam and ignited an 11-month prisoner drama between the United States and North Korea. North Korea stated that the Pueblo strayed into their territorial waters, but the United States maintains that the vessel was in international waters at the time of the incident. On January 24, the U.S. ambassador to South Korea advised the South Korean government “in strongest terms against any attempt at action against North Korea” for the seizure or the January 6 North Korean raid on the Blue House in which North Korean commandos attempted to assassinate President Park and killed his wife (Lee 2006, 57). The United States then initiated secret negotiations with the North Koreans. In response, President Park urged the United States to launch air strikes on North Korean naval ships and expressed his willingness to cooperate in such an attack, and the South Korean National Assembly issued a statement denouncing the United States for conducting the “diplomacy of humiliation” and warning that such a “sell-out” would be an open invitation to future Communist aggression (Nahm 1999, 107). The Johnson administration, however, preoccupied by the Vietnam War, rejected President Park’s request and maintained peaceful negotiations with the North Korean government. North Korea eventually freed the crew, but the Pueblo is still held by North Korea today and used as a museum. Egyptian Plane Incident13 Feb 1968 - 13 Feb 19682924EGY13An Egyptian Air Force plane buzzed a U.S. Navy intelligence-gathering ship in the Mediterranean 50 miles north of Alexandria.EC-121 Incident15 Apr 1969 - 27 Apr 19692941USR, PRK13North Korea shot down a U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance plane flying 60 miles from the North Korean coast in the Sea of Japan on April 15, 1969. The 31 crewmembers were based in Japan and conducting electronic surveillance and gaterhing intelligence about North Korean troops movements along the east coast of North Korea at the time of the attack. North Korea claims the plane had intruded deep into North Korean air space, while the United States maintains the plane was at least 90 miles offshore. The U.S. Department of Defense immediately suspended all reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and the Mediterranean Sea. Nixon, who was seeking a negotiated settlement to the Vietnam War and preparing to issue his so-called Guam Doctrine lowering the U.S. military profile in Asia, condemned the attack and resumed reconnaissance flights with fighter escorts, but made clear that the Untied States would make a greater effort for peaceful coexistence with its communist adversaries and would not be solely responsible for peace and stability in East Asia (Nahm 1999, 109). The administration did not demand an apology from North Korea or threaten retaliation (Lee 2006, 66). Following the voices of moderates in the U.S. Congress, Nixon first reduced the size of the Task Force 71 and then withdrew it from the Sea of Japan because of “cost effectiveness” (Nahm 1999, 109-110). On July 25, Nixon announced the Guam doctrine, stating that the United States would not be “dragged into conflicts such as the one that we have in Vietnam” and “is going to expect that this problem will be increasingly handled by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves” (Levin and Sneider 1983). President Park indirectly criticized Nixon’s handling of the EC-121 incident and the Guam doctrine in August, stating that “superior strength” and the “principle of responsive actions” were necessary to contain Communism in Asia (Lee 2006, 67-68). China Nuclear Threat19 Sep 1969 - 4 Oct 19692936CHN10The Chinese government released a statement denouncing U.S. and Soviet nuclear proliferation and claiming that aggression by either power against China would be met with a worldwide revolutionary war. Jordanian Black September Crisis11 Jun 1970 - 26 Sep 19701039USR, UKG, IRQ, JOR, SYR, ISR13Since 1967, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasser Arafat had established a virtual Palestinian state within Jordan from which he staged raids against Israel and assassination attempts against Jordan’s pro-Western King Hussein. Fearing that the end of the War of Attrition would bring about a peace deal between Egypt and Israel, a radical PLO faction hijacked three airliners to Jordan and blew them up. In response, King Hussein initiated a thorough crackdown against the PLO in Jordan. During the week of fighting that followed, Syrian armored units invaded Jordan. Nixon, interpreting Syria’s actions as a direct challenge from Moscow (Quandt 1977, 105, 114-115), dispatched naval and airborne forces into the area and asked Israel to ready its forces in the Golan heights and its air force for strikes along the Syria-Jordan border. Jordanian forces, however, repulsed the Syrians without American or Israeli assistance, and the Soviet Union did not act; in fact, Soviet officials assured U.S. officials that they were trying to restrain the Syrians (Walt 1987, 113). Soviets Hold Two U.S. Generals21 Oct 1970 - 10 Nov 19702221USR12A U.S. transport plane holding two generals and a Turkish official strayed off course and was forced to land in Soviet Armenia because of poor weather. The officials were held for several weeks before being released. Operation Lam Son 7199 Feb 1971 - 9 Mar 19712947CHN13Another MID directly related to the Vietnam War. South Vietnamese forces backed by American logistical, aerial, and artillery support invaded southeastern Laos to disrupt North Vietnamese supply lines (the Ho Chin Minh trail). The Nixon administration also hoped to use the operation to demonstrate the ability of South Vietnamese forces to defend their nation and thus pave the way for a U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam. In debating the operation, Nixon officials recognized that U.S. allies would oppose the operation (“Tab A: Tchepone,” FRUS, Vietnam, July 1970-January 1972, Vol. 7, 343), but Kissinger encouraged Nixon to go ahead in order to reestablish his control over the foreign policy bureaucracy (“Diary Entry by the White House Chief of Staff,” FRUS, Vietnam, July 1970-January 1972, Vol. 7, 344-345). China denounced South Vietnam's invasion of Laos and said it would provide assistance to Laos. It also accused the United States of sending ground troops.Cuban Fishing Dispute24 Feb 1971 - 6 Jul 1971 2946CUB13The U.S. Coast Guard seized three Cuban fishing boats accused of fishing in U.S. waters. The boats were later released for lack of evidence. Cuban Gunboat Attack15 Dec 1971 - 28 Dec 19712943CUB13A Cuban gunboat strafed and seized a U.S. freighter. In response the U.S. warned Cuba that it would take "all measures under international law" to protect American and other ships in the Caribbean from any new attacks by the Cubans. Soviet Fishing Dispute 217 Jan 1972 - 22 Jan 19722949USR12U.S. coast guard boats escorted two Soviet fishing vessels to a U.S. naval base after they violated U.S. waters off the coast of the Aleutian islands.U.S. Sinks Chinese Boat22 Aug 1972 - 22 Aug 19722948CHN13Related to Vietnam War. U.S. planes sank a Chinese lifeboat off the Vietnamese coast. The U.S. military command in Saigon issued a statement explaining that the boat was a 30-foot water supply craft carrying supplies to North Vietnam. China did not pursue the dispute further.October War6 Oct1973 - 31 Oct 1973353SYR, ISR,EGY, USR22Since the Six-Day War, the Soviet Union had increased considerably its support for Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, providing these countries with loans, arms shipments, and military advisers and basing Soviet air and naval units on their territories (Walt 1987, 105-118). Nixon and Kissinger both believed that a strong U.S. relationship was “the key to combating Soviet influence in the Arab world,” (Quandt 1977, 106. See also, Walt and Mearsheimer 2007, 51-52), but they also believed that the Arab-Israeli conflict “drove the Arab need for Soviet support and arms” and that an Arab-Israeli peace settlement would help limit Soviet influence in the region (Pressman 2008, 104; Quandt 2002, 69-70, 92-94). During the October War, therefore, the administration attempted to walk a fine line between supporting Israel and avoiding antagonizing Arab countries (Quandt 1977, 170-176). Confident in Israeli military superiority, the Nixon administration, led by Kissinger, initially restrained Israel from striking preemptively and withheld all forms of military assistance for the first week of the war (Pressman 2008, 100-105). When Israeli leaders complained to Kissinger about the lack of U.S. support, Kissinger blamed it on the reluctance of the Defense Department to intervene (Quandt 1977, 175). Between October 9 and October12, however, U.S. policy began to shift as Arab military gains exceeded expectations, Egypt rejected a U.S. cease-fire proposal, and the Soviet Union initiated a massive airlift of military supplies to Egypt and Syria. As Quandt (1977, 184) explains, the main driver of the shift in U.S. policy was the perceived need “to demonstrate to the Kremlin that the United States was capable of matching Soviet military deliveries to the Middle East.” Indeed, Kissinger underlined this objective by arguing that U.S. forces should send at all times 25 percent more equipment than the Soviets were sending (Quandt 1977, 187). On October 14, the United States began to airlift supplies to Israel. Over the course of the war, the U.S. Air Force delivered a total of 22,300 tons of materiel, including 19 M-60 tanks, at a cost of $2.2 billion (Parker 2001, 7). To avoid direct U.S. involvement in the conflict, however, the supplies were dropped at Tel Aviv airport and then transported by Israeli units to the frontlines on the Sinai (Parker 2001, 7). On October 22, the United States and Soviet Union arranged a cease-fire. On October 24, Egypt asked both superpowers to send troops to uphold the cease-fire, and the Soviet Union warned that if the United States did not enforce Israeli compliance that the Soviet Union would take “appropriate steps unilaterally” to do so. The historical record suggests the Soviet Union had no intention of intervening unilaterally, but this threat convinced Kissinger to raise the alert status of U.S. forces from DefCon IV to DefConIII, which indicates a state of increased readiness but not a determination that war is likely (Boyne 2002, 253). Kissinger later claimed to have orchestrated a “deliberate overreaction” to send a stern message to the Soviets. The Soviet Union did not take additional actions, and on October 25 the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for an immediate and complete cease-fire and creating a UN Emergency Force composed of nonpermanent members of the Security Council to monitor compliance. The cease-fire took hold and the war officially ended. However, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) retaliated for the U.S. airlift to Israel by initiating an oil embargo against the United States, Britain, Canada, Japan, and the Netherlands. The embargo lasted until March 1974 and quadrupled the price of oil, imposing major economic costs on the United States and its allies.Draft Evader Arrest14 Sep 1974 – 14 Sep 19742952CAN10U.S. Customs officials arrested an American draft evader living in Canada at the border (Fordham and Sarver 2001, 459).Mayaguez Incident12 May 1975 - 15 May 1975356CAM13The new revolutionary government of Cambodia seized the Mayaguez, a U.S. merchant ship, claiming that it had ventured into its territorial waters. Suffering from the loss of South Vietnam and haunted by memories of North Korea’s capture of the Pueblo in 1968, Ford and his advisers agreed to act decisively: There “wasn’t a dove in the place,” one official recalled (Herring 2008, 823). Kissinger argued that the United States needed to “look ferocious” (Herring 2008, 824). President Ford declared the seizure an act of piracy and sent 220 U.S. marines on a rescue mission and bombed Cambodia. U.S. and Khmer Rouge forces engaged in heavy fighting in which 41 U.S. marines were killed. The navy recovered the Mayaguez, and when the marines landed in Cambodia the government released the prisoners. It was the only known engagement between U.S. ground forces and the Khmer Rouge. Kim Il Sung Speech18 May 1975 - 20 Nov 19751472PRK, ROK21As South Vietnam fell, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung travelled to China and delivered a bellicose speech in which he alluded to a North Korean invasion of the South. U.S. policymakers were concerned that Kim was in Beijing seeking Chinese backing for such an invasion. Chinese leaders in turn for the first time recognized North Korea as the sole legitimate sovereign state of the Korean nation. However, Chinese leaders also communicated to U.S. leaders that they would not condone or assist a North Korean invasion of the South. In November, Kim backtracked from this rhetoric and announced that North Korea would not invade the South, but also called for the immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea as a precondition for the reunification of Korea. Puerto Rican Independence Dispute17 Aug 1975 - 22 Aug 19752954CUB10The UN, under U.S. pressure, agreed to put off consideration indefinitely of a Cuban-sponsored proposal to grant Puerto Rico self-determination.?2 Sep 1975 – 2 Sep 19752953CAN?Cuban Baseball Boycott7 Jan 1976 - 7 Jan 19762958CUB, 10The U.S. canceled an exhibition baseball game between all-star teams of the U.S. and Cuba because of Cuba's involvement in the Angolan civil war. Axe Murder Incident18 Aug 1976 - 31 Aug 1976362PRK, ROK23On August 18, 1976, a group of North Korean guards attacked with axes U.S. and South Korean soldiers that were trimming a tree on the UN side of the joint security area. Two U.S. soldiers were killed and several UN soldiers were wounded. The United Nations Command immediately sent another work crew to cut down the tree in a show of force. The United States, along with South Korea, placed its forces on full alert, dispatched several squadrons of F-4 Phantom fighters and F-111 bombers to South Korea and a naval task group to Korean waters. The U.S. government stressed that the moves did not foreshadow military retaliation but were aimed to deter possible North Korean military action. Four hours after the incident, Kim Il-Sung sent a letter of regret to the UN Command at the Korean Military Armistice Commission meeting and offered a conciliatory proposal for new security measures in the neutral area (Lee 2006, 80). The United Sates then called back its additional military forces. The incident was “generally regarded as an isolated event caused without high-level authorization by an extremely anti-American North Korean officer” (Nahm 1999, 115). The South Korean reaction was angry, and President Park declared: “our patience is limited. From now on, if they commit unlawful provocations against us, we will have to take immediate punitive actions, whether small or large, and all responsibility for this shall be borne by North Korean Communists themselves” (Lee 2006, 80). The United States rejected these measures and excluded South Korea from a negotiated settlement of the crisis between the United States and North Korea (Lee 2006, 80). Saudi and Iranian Arms Sale Reduction31 Aug 1976 - 6 Sep 19762335ISR20The U.S. substantially reduced the volume of missile sales to Saudi Arabia and Iran after Israel and members of the U.S. Congress strongly criticized the original arms package for arming enemies of Israel. North Korean Reconnaissance Incident15 Oct 1976 -15 Oct 19762960PRK22North Korea accused the U.S. of conducting reconnaissance flights over its territory. Soviet Fishing Dispute 39 Apr 1977 - 10 Apr 19772222USR13The U.S. military seized two Soviet fishing vessels within 200-miles of the U.S. eastern seaboard. North Korea Helicopter Incident 13 Jul 1977 - 17 Mar 19782192ROK, PRK23North Korean forces shot down a U.S. helicopter that had strayed over North Korean territory, killing three of the four crewmembers. Soviet Ray Gun Threat19 Nov 1978 - 2 Jan 19792223USR10Reports indicate that the Soviet Union was developing ray weapons that could destroy nuclear-armed missiles. South Korean Military Exercises 110 Mar 1979 - 27 Mar 19802193PRK, ROK22North Korea charged that United Nations (UN) military exercises in South Korea showed that the UN Command had clear intentions to start a war. The U.S. government declared that U.S.-led United Nations military exercises in South Korea would continue despite strong North Korean protests. In February 1980, the North and South resumed talks, begun in 1972, on potential Korean reunification. Soviet Sea Border Dispute9 Aug 1979 - 10 Aug 19792224USR10The Carter administration announces that U.S. ships and planes will challenge coastal sea claims that exceed 3 miles. Soviet sea claims extend 12 miles from Soviet shores. ?13 Aug 1979 - 13 Aug 19793021LIB??Soviet Troops in Cuba31 Aug 1979 - 20 Nov 19792225CUB, USR13In September 1979, Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman Frank Church of Idaho, facing a strong conservative challenge for reelection, announced that he had discovered a brigade of Soviet troops in Cuba. In fact, the troops had been there since 1962. Carter, who’s political reputation was being sullied by the ongoing Iranian hostage crisis, decided to show toughness toward the Soviets and increased U.S. military forces in the Caribbean. This move infuriated the Soviets and undermined the SALT talks. Iranian Hostage Crisis4 Nov 1979 - 21 Jan 19813020IRN13The new revolutionary Iranian government seized 66 Americans from the U.S. embassy in Tehran and held them hostage for more than a year. On April 24, 1980, the U.S. military attempted a rescue operation, which failed and resulted in the deaths of 8 U.S. soldiers and the destruction of two U.S. aircraft. On July 27, 1980, the former Shah died, and in September, Iraq invaded Iran. These events encouraged the Iranian government to release the hostages, which it did minutes after Ronald Reagan was sworn into office on January 20, 1981. Carter Condemns Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan4 Jan 1980 - 4 Jan 19802227USR12In response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter gave a speech in which he condemned Soviet “aggression” and warned of the danger to Persian Gulf oil fields. Over the next year he took a number of steps against the Soviets, including stepping up U.S. covert aid to the mujahedeen rebels and approving PD-59, which increased military spending. Export Controls on USSR13 Mar 1980 - 19 Mar 19802226USR, UKG, NTH,NOR, ITA, GFR, CAN10The Carter administration tightened controls on high-tech exports to the Soviet Union.Soviet Airliner Incident 12 May 1981 - 14 May 19812228USR13U.S. law enforcement agents detained a Soviet plane at Dulles International airport and seized several items of its cargo on suspicion of violation of export-control laws. It was later determined that the radio navigation equipment seized by the agents had been properly licensed. USSR Arms Cuba17 Jul 1981 - 30 Jul 19812972CUB10U.S. Secretary of State Haig announced that Soviet arms shipments to Cuba had increased sharply. SR-71 Incident (North Korea)14 Aug 1981 - 14 Aug 19812971PRK23North Korea fired a surface-to-air missile at a U.S. SR-71 high altitude spy plane.Libya Air Battle18 Aug 1981 - 21 Aug 19813099EGY, LIB13U.S. Navy jets flying exercises over the Gulf of Sidra shot down two Libyan jets after being attacked. Libya claims the Gulf area as Libyan territory, the U.S. maintains that it was international waters. The United States had conducted the exercises to challenge Qaddafi's claim to a 120-mile "Zone of Death" off Libyan shores. Libyan Assassination Attempt9 Nov 1981 - 6 Dec 19813098SOM, LIBSUD, OMA, EGY13A Libyan gunman fired six shots at the U.S. charge d'affaires in Paris. The diplomat was unhurt. The U.S. linked the attack to Libya. In November, Libya's leader announced that he would send a force of 4,000-11,000 troops to any Arab country that needed it to counter the United States. In December, the U.S. government announced it had hard proof that Libyan agents had entered the U.S. with plans to assassinate President Reagan and other senior U.S. officials. North Korean Air Space Dispute9 Jan 1982 - 9 Jan 19822979PRK20North Korea accused the United States of violating its airspace with a high-altitude SR-71 reconnaissance plane. Libyan Airliner Incident3 Feb 1982 - 3 Feb 19822978LIB10Libyan government radio accused two U.S. jet fighters of buzzing a Libyan jetliner over Greece. The U.S. government denied the accusation claiming that the two F-14s did not get close to the airliner. Nicaraguan Bridges Incident17 Mar 1982 - 17 Mar 19822977NIC10Nicaragua placed its forces on full alert after accusing the U.S. CIA of dynamiting two bridges in Nicaragua. F-16s Dispute30 Sep 1982 - 24 Jan 19832229JPN, USR22The U.S. announced that it would deploy up to 50 F-16 fighter-bombers on the main Japanese island of Honshu, 375 miles from the Soviet Pacific coast, in 1985 to confront the Soviet Union more directly. The Soviet government called the decision a "hostile and provocative act." Exercise in Oman3 Dec 1982 - 7 Dec 19823613YPR, OMA13About 2,500 U.S. soldiers held maneuvers in Oman, testing defense in the event of a Soviet or other foreign attack on the Persian Gulf region. South Korean Military Exercises 21 Feb 1983 - 10 Feb 19832195ROK, PRK22North Korea put its entire armed forces on a "semi-war state" after the United States and South Korea started a major military exercise involving 188,000 troops in the South. AWACS Deployment (Egypt)17 Feb 1983 - 20 Feb 19833072EGY, LIB, SUD13Egyptian and U.S. government officials learned that Libya was plotting to overthrow the Government of the Sudan. President Mubarak of Egypt asked the U.S. for help in stopping the Libyan actions, and the U.S. responded by dispatching four AWACS planes to Egypt and positioning an aircraft carrier to waters off Egypt and Libya. Lebanon Embassy Bombing26 Feb 1983 - 26 Jul 19833071IRN13A suicide bomber bombed the U.S. embassy in Beirut, killing 63 people, mostly embassy and CIA staff. It was the deadliest attack on a U.S. diplomatic mission up to that time. A pro-Iranian group calling itself Islamic Jihad Organization claimed responsibility. In May 1983, a U.S. District Court in Washington, D.C. determined that the bombing was carried out by Hezbollah militants with the approval and financing of senior Iranian officials. Contra Rebellion 1Mar 1983 - 6 Jun 19852347HON, NIC12In 1979, the leftist Sandinistas took power in Nicaragua. Although they professed commitment to a pluralist democracy, they often took vocal anti-U.S. positions. Reagan officials expressed grave concerns about a new “Soviet beachhead” in the hemisphere and “another Cuba” (Herring 2008, 886). In February 1981, the State Department released a white paper purporting to contain “definitive evidence” that Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Soviet Union were making El Salvador a Cold War battleground. The administration increased military aid to El Salvador to $25 million and launched a major military buildup in Honduras in order to defeat the leftist insurgency in El Salvador. Military assistance grew to more than $196 million in 1984. Even with this aid, however, the Salvadoran military could gain no more than a stalemate. In December 1981, Reagan authorized $20 million for a covert operation to organize and train in Honduras a 500-man army of Nicaraguan “contras.” The stated purpose was to interdict Sandinista assistance for the Salvadoran insurgents, but documents show that the administration also intended to topple the Sandinista government. The war against Nicaragua expanded steadily from 1981 to 1984. Reagan came to see Nicaragua as the major front in a global struggle “to repeal the infamous Brezhnev Doctrine, which contends that once a country has fallen into Communist darkness, it can never be allowed to see the light of freedom” (Herring 2008, 889). The contra force grew to ten thousand, but never threatened the Nicaraguan government. The CIA took over operational control in 1982, and the U.S. military in the summer and fall of 1983 conducted military operations in Honduras involving 4,000 troops in an effort to intimidate the Sandinistas. Americans, skeptical of the urgency of the alleged Sandinista threat, strongly opposed deepening involvement in Nicaragua. In October 1982, the Congress forbade the use of U.S. funds to overthrow the Sandinistas. The administration dismissed this restriction by insisting that was not its intention. In October 1984, Congress passed another measure effectively cutting off funding for the contras. Reagan responded by instructing his subordinates to “do whatever you have to do to help these people keep body and soul together” (Herring 2008, 890). NSC staffer Oliver North solicited $50 million from friendly governments (e.g. Taiwan, Brunei, and Saudi Arabia) and from right-wing U.S. citizens and diverted funds from arms sold to Iran in order to finance the contras. This funding scheme was exposed on 1986. The war in Nicaragua ended when the Costa Rican president, a staunch anti-Communist, devised a plan in which Nicaraguan would be democratized and outside aid for insurgents would be stopped. The Reagan administration hoped the Sandinistas would reject the proposal, but they accepted, as did the contras, who had few options after the U.S. Congress again rejected aid for them. Despite U.S. efforts at sabotage, a cease-fire was approved in March 1988. Cuban Spy Dispute19 Apr 1983 - 19 Apr 19832981CUB10The U.S. accused two Cuban diplomats in the UN delegation to the U.S. of spying and ordered them to leave the country.Greek Base Protests20 May 1983 - 10 Mar 19842176GRC, TUR20Greek and U.S. officials bicker over the future of U.S. bases in Greece. The Greek government demanded assurances that Turkey would not receive greater military support from the United States than Greece.Libya Air Battle 21 Aug 1983 - 10 Aug 19833065SUD, LIB13Libya was supporting rebel forces in Chad to overthrow the government. In response, the U.S. sent military forces to the eastern Mediterranean and supplied Chad's army with antiaircraft guns. On August 2nd, U.S. Navy F-14s chased away two Libyan MIG-23s from the vicinity of the carrier Nimitz. AWACS Deployment (Sudan)2 Aug 1983 - 24 Aug 19833634ZAI, FRN,LIB, CHA12Libya rushed troops to Chad to help rebels attempt to topple the government in what was announced as part of Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi's goal of unifying all African Muslims under the Libyan banner. The U.S. supplied military aid to Chad's government and flew two AWACS reconnaissance planes to the Sudan for possible use if France, which has a security treaty with Chad, decided to commit fighter planes in defense of its former colony. The planes carried out a single training flight before being withdrawn on August 24. Lebanon Peacekeeping Mission and Marine Barracks Bombing3 Sep 1983 - 1 Apr 19843062SYR23Israel invaded Lebanon in June 1982 to eliminate the bases of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and rollback Syrian influence there. As Israeli forces besieged the capital of Beirut, U.S. Ambassador Philip Habib negotiated an agreement calling for all parties to withdraw forces from Beirut and establishing a multinational peacekeeping force made of hundreds of soldiers from the United States, France, Italy, and Britain. The peacekeepers arrived in Lebanon in late August. After each of the belligerents began to withdrawal their forces, the peacekeepers withdrew to ships in the Mediterranean Sea. However, on September 14, Lebanese President-elect Bachir Gemayel was assassinated by the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (according to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation) and hostilities resumed. Israeli-backed Christian militias killed hundreds (perhaps thousands) of Palestinian refugees in Beirut ostensibly in retaliation for Gemayel’s assassination. This massacre prompted Reagan to organize another peacekeeping force with France and Italy to stabilize Lebanon and ensure the full withdrawal of all the parties, both of which would hopefully pave the way for an enduring Arab-Israeli peace settlement. The U.S. presence in Lebanon, however, became a target of terrorist attacks. On April 14, 1983, the U.S. embassy in West Beirtu was bombed, killing 63 people. Then, on October 23, a truck bomb destroyed barracks in Beirut housing U.S. and French soldiers. 241 American soldiers and 58 French soldiers were killed. The incident ignited calls in the United States for the withdrawal of peacekeepers. Reagan, however, delayed the withdrawal until February 1984. During that time, U.S. fighters patrolling Lebanese airspace exchanged fire with Syrian anti-aircraft batteries. Two U.S. planes were shot down and one American pilot was killed. On December 4, 1983, eight U.S. Marines were killed when Syrian-backed militias shelled their observation post, and on December 14, a battleship in the U.S. 6th fleet fired on targets in Lebanon. Why was the United States involved in this conflict? Historians generally conclude that U.S. senior officials (most notably Reagan and his Secretary of State Alexander Haig) viewed the Lebanese conflict through the prism of the Cold War and believed they could “piggy-back” on Israel’s invasion, using it as an opportunity to expel Soviet influence from the Middle East. For example, Hallenbeck (1991, 139) concludes that U.S. involvement was driven by a belief that orchestrating a peace settlement “would result collectively in an outcome highly advantageous to U.S. regional and strategic interests. Put simply, a successfully negotiated compromise would significantly advance the Middle East peace process and would do so under terms that would increase U.S. influence with all parties at the expense of Soviet influence.” Hallenbeck (1991, 9) further points out that U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig tacitly sanctioned Israel’s invasion and then pushed for U.S. involvement because he “was predisposed to viewing the Israeli-PLO-Syrian-Lebanese conflict as an indivisible whole, with implications for the future of U.S. Soviet influence in the Middle East.” As a top State Department official explained, the Arab-Israeli conflict should be put in a “strategic framework that recognizes and is responsible to the larger threat of Soviet expansionism” (quoted in Herring 2008, 871). Reagan officials reasoned that Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia could be united in a “strategic consensus” to check Soviet advances in the region (Schoenbaum 1993, 273-274). Similarly, Glad (1988, 200, 223) concludes that “Reagan’s emphasis on the Soviet threat” spurred U.S. involvement; specifically Reagan and his aides “saw [Israel’s] invasion of Lebanon as opening up new strategic opportunities. Ideologically inclined to see the Soviets as the source of all disturbances in the area and the PLO and the Syrians simply as their surrogates, the Reagan administration could not refrain from taking advantage of early Israeli military victories.” Thus, Reagan ultimately “f[e]ll in with Haig’s view that the civil war in Lebanon was the result of Soviet meddling via its support of Syria and the PLO” (Glad 1988, 211). Although Israel instigated the conflict by invading Lebanon in 1982, after tepid attempts by the United States to restrain Israel from invading (Pressman 2008, 106-109), it is doubtful that the U.S.-Israeli tacit alliance would have been sufficient to compel U.S. intervention in the absence of the strategic concerns discussed above. After all, the United States intervened in large part to prevent further Israeli military routs of Arab forces and in the face of explicit Israeli opposition (Hallenbeck 1991, 13, 16, 35). Moreover, with the exception of Haig, most Reagan officials (e.g. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and National Security Advisor William Clark) favored “rebuking Israel in the clearest possible terms” by getting the UN to condemn the Israeli invasion and by suspending U.S. arms sales to Israel (Hallenbeck 1991, 8-9). Reagan himself pressured Israel to abide by various ceasefires and proposed a peace initiative calling for an immediate freeze on Israeli settlements in contested areas and Palestinian self-government in the West Bank and Gaza strip, all while strengthening ties with Arab regimes (Hallenbeck 1991, 12, 16-17; Glad 1988, 212-213, 216-219). Ironically, U.S. policymakers’ discussions of U.S. “credibility” revolved Lebanon, not Israel; once U.S. forces were deployed, U.S. policymakers felt they had to stand by the Lebanese government to avoid a humiliating U.S. retreat (Hallenbeck 1991, 144). This U.S. support for Lebanon, and partial opposition to Israeli policies, suggest that formal alliance ties were neither necessary nor sufficient to generate U.S. credibility concerns or compel U.S. involvement in the conflict. Grenada Invasion21 Oct 1983 - 1 Nov 19833058SLU, BAR,DMA, JAM,SVG, AAB, CUB, GRN13The American military intervention in 1983 unfolded against a background of high U.S.–Soviet tensions (For a succinct summary of U.S. decisionmaking on Grenada, see Hall, Hendrickson, and Polak 2013, 38-43. See also Raines 2010). Upon assuming office in 1981, the Reagan administration adopted a “roll-back” strategy in which the United States aimed to topple communist regimes. Given this new strategy, the political orientation of Grenada came to be viewed as a potential threat to U.S. national security. In 1979, Maurice Bishop, a self-proclaimed communist, overthrew Grenada’s democratically elected Sir Eric Gairy, forged a close relationship with the Soviet Union and Cuba, and initiated programs aimed at bolstering Grenadine military capabilities, including building a runway with Cuban aid and granting permission for the Soviet Union to use it. As a result, many U.S. officials became concerned that the Grenadine government would invite the Soviet Union to establish military bases in Grenada (Schultz 1993, 324) and turn the island into a “Soviet beachhead” in the Caribbean (Herring 2008, 888). These American fears were fueled when communist extremists in the Grenadine government arrested Bishop on October 12, 1983 and then executed him on October 19. On October 25, the Reagan administration decided to invade Grenada with several thousand U.S. troops to rescue American citizens (mostly students) stranded on the island and to install a pro-Western democratic regime. Nearly all of America’s allies opposed the intervention and issued statements criticizing the American decision to use force. Collapse of SALT II24 Nov 1983 - 1 Nov 19832231USR, GFR, CZE10The Carter administration had re-escalated the Cold War after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Reagan administration further fueled this process, openly repudiating détente. In a 1983 speech, Reagan branded the USSR “the evil empire” and accused it of being the “focus of evil in the modern world.” The administration took an especially hard line on arms control. Reagan refused to resubmit to the Senate a “fatally flawed” SALT II agreement and he openly rejected the doctrine of mutual assured destruction in favor of a strategy of deterrence through military superiority. The administration increased defense spending by 7 percent per year from 1981 to 1986, a hike which enabled improvements in existing missiles and delivery systems, the addition of new systems such as the MX mobile land-based missile, the B-1 bomber, and a six-hundred ship navy capable of attacking Soviet ports. Regarding intermediate nuclear forces (INF) stationed in Europe, the administration proposed an agreement that was “loaded to Western advantage and Soviet disadvantage” and “was clearly not a basis for negotiations aimed at reaching an agreement” (Garthoff 1985, 1024). The proposal set forth a so-called zero option, exchanging a U.S. pledge not to deploy intermediate-range missiles in Europe if the Soviets would dismantle their intermediate-range missiles aimed at Western Europe. British and French missiles were exempted, as were all sea- and air-based missiles, where the United States had a huge advantage. When the United States went ahead and deployed intermediate-range missiles in Europe in late 1983, the Soviets walked out of the talks. Iranian Frigate Incident19 Feb 1984 - 20 May 19843541IRN13A U.S. destroyer fired warning shots at an Iranian frigate and an Iranian patrol plane that had come within 2.5 miles of the destroyer in the Straits of Hormuz. Iran had earlier threatened to close the Strait if Iraq attacked its oil resources. Libya Bombs Sudan 19 Mar 1984 - 19 Mar 19843051SUD, EGY, LIB10Libya bombs Omdurman, Sudan's main city. In response, the U.S. and Egypt consider an emergency airlift of military equipment to Sudan. South Korea Military Exercises 31 Feb 1985 - 6 Feb 19852196PRK, ROK22U.S. and South Korean forces performed military exercises; North Korea denounced them as a "war rehearsal" and cancelled reunification negotiations with South Korea. Soviet Shooting24 Mar 1985 - 7 Sep 19852232GDR, UKG,USR13A U.S. Army Major on a reconnaissance mission in East Germany was fatally shot by a Soviet guard near a Soviet military installation. Soviet officials asserted that the officer had been in a prohibited area and had been shot after he disregarded warnings to halt. The U.S. rejected the Soviet account, calling the shootings totally unjustified, but still planned to attend talks with the Soviets on closer ties. ?24 Sep 1985 - 30 Sep 19853620LIB, EGY??Iran Searches U.S. Ship 116 Nov 1985 - 14 Mar 19863625SAU, UKG, IRN, KUW11Iranian sailors stopped and searched an American merchant ship in international waters near the Persian Gulf on suspicion that the ship was carrying arms for Iraq. The U.S. did not protest the search and no weapons were found. Iranian sailors also searched shipsIran Searches U.S. Ship 213 Jan 1986 - 14 Jan 19862578IRN11Armed Iranian sailors stopped and searched an American merchant ship for more than an hour in international waters near the Persian Gulf. There were no injuries or loss of property in the incident. Libyan Bombing 13 Jan 1986 - 15 Apr 19863636LIB13U.S. warplanes bombed multiple Libyan targets, described by President Reagan as an act of self-defense and proportionate to the sustained use of terror against Americans by Qaddafi's Libya. Contra Rebellion 2Feb 1986 - Mar 19882353HON, NIC12See dispute #2347Nuclear Test Ban Dispute13 Mar 1986 - 13 Mar 19862233USR10The U.S. government rejected Soviet calls for it to agree to stop testing nuclear weapons. Iran Detains U.S. Journalist27 Jan 1987 - 3 Jul 19882740IRN20Iran detained an American journalist, accusing him of being a "spy of the Zionist regime." SR-71 Incident (Cuba)1 May 1987 - 1 May 19872742CUB10Cuba accuses the U.S. of sending an SR-71 reconnaissance jet streaking over Cuba in early December during Cuban military exercises. Stark Incident17 May 1987 - 18 May 19872739IRQ13In May 1987, during the Iran-Iraq war, an Iraqi aircraft mistakenly attacked the USS Stark, killing 37 sailors. The United States had sent an armada of roughly thirty ships to the Persian Gulf to defend the freedom of the seas, keep the oil flowing through the Gulf, and deflect Soviet influence from the region (Herring 2008: 879-880). Prelude to Invasion of Panama24 Sep 1987 - 8 Aug 19882741PAN13U.S. sends more than a thousand soldiers to Panama, joining 10,000 troops already on the ground to threaten the Panamanian government and attempt to force Noriega to step down. Iranian Airliner Incident2 Jul 1988 - 2 Jul 19882834DEN, IRN13A U.S. cruiser shot down an Iranian Airbus a day after two Iranian F-14s flew within seven nautical miles of another U.S. Navy ship. All 290 passengers and crew aboard the Iranian airliner were killed. Libyan Chemical Weapons Threat30 Dec 1988 - 4 Jan 19892775LIB10The U.S. accuses Libya of building a chemical weapons plant.Invasion of Panama12 Jan 1989 - 22 Dec 19893901PAN13U.S.-Panamanian relations deteriorated in the late 1980s. In 1988, Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega, accused by the U.S. of drug-trafficking, appeared to shift his Cold War allegiance towards the Soviet bloc, receiving military aid from Cuba, Nicaragua, and Libya. In 1989, Noriega declared the Panamanian election null and void after results suggested that his party lost the election. President Bush called on Noriega to honor the will of the Panamanian people and started to increase forces in the Canal Zone. In October 1989, Noriega survived a coup attempt by members of the Panamanian Defense Forces. On December 16 four U.S. military personnel were stopped at a roadblock in Panama City. Panamanian security forces claimed the U.S. soldiers were on a reconnaissance mission and opened fire on them as they attempted to flee, killing one of the soldiers. On December 20, U.S. force invaded Panama to, according to President Bush, safeguard the lives of U.S. citizens, defend democracy and human rights, combat drug trafficking, and protect the integrity of the Torrijos-Carter Treaties, which mandated Panamanian neutrality with respect to the Panama Canal. Some scholars dispute the importance of these strategic factors and instead argue that Bush intervened to boost his domestic political standing (Cramer 2006). Iranian Kidnapping2 Aug 1989 - 2 Aug 19893903IRN23On February 17, 1988 a U.S. Army officer was kidnapped by Lebanese Hezbollah and tortured. A year and a half later, a video of his body hung by the neck was released. In August 1989, the U.S. and Israel made overtures to the Iranian Government and pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon to secure the release of other prisoners. Iran rebuffed the request, saying the kidnappings had nothing to do with Iran. Cuban Freighter Incident 31 Jan 1990 - May 19903950CUB13Cuba accused the U.S. Coast Guard of firing on a Cuban-chartered freighter off the coast of Mexico. The U.S. Government claimed the attack was intended to disable the Panamanian-registered vessel after it refused to stop for a drug search. The freighter was hit twice but managed to steam into Mexican waters and the Coast Guard stopped its pursuit. Gulf War24 Jul 1990 - 3 Mar 19913957JOR, TUR,SIE, SEN,PAK, NIR,MOR, BNG,NTH, ARG,SPN, BEL,GRC, GMY,QAT, OMA,AUL, BAH,SYR, CAN,UAE, UKG,EGY, FRN,ITA, SAU, KUW, IRQ13In the spring of 1990, the Iraqi regime was short of cash after an eight-year war with Iran and accused Kuwait of exceeding production quotas and driving down the price of oil. In a miscalculation, the Bush administration guessed that Saddam would refrain from rash actions, and in July, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq told Saddam that the United States had “no opinion” on its border dispute with Kuwait. Iraqi forces quickly seized the Kuwaiti capital in August, giving Saddam control of 20 percent of the world’s oil supply. The United States responded forcibly, first slapping sanctions on the Iraqi regime and then assembling a large coalition to remove Iraq from Kuwait. Throughout the fall of 1990, the Untied States mobilized in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf a massive array of air, sea, and land power. On November 29, the UN Security Council approved a resolution authorizing the use of “all necessary means” if Iraq did not leave Kuwait by January 15, 1991. On January 12, the U.S. Congress endorsed the use of force to uphold the UN resolution, and on January 16, the U.S.-led coalition attacked Iraq and within a hundred hours, the Iraqis were defeated. The Bush administration did not depose the Iraqi leader and allowed much of his Republican Guard to escape, instead choosing to contain Saddam. Iraq Air Battle 15 Mar 1991 - 31 Dec 19913974IRQ, FRNUKG13The U.S. threatened to attack Iraqi military targets if Iraqi units attacked rebels or violated the ban on Iraqi military flights. On February 27, a U.S. F-15 shot down an Iraqi fighter plane to enforce the ban. In March, the U.S. shot down several more Iraqi jets but ruled out help to rebels. Iranian Boat Incident21 May 1991 - 21 May 19913973IRN13A U.S. naval vessel exchanged fire with two Iranian boats in the Persian Gulf. The incident took place where Western vessels were enforcing the embargo on Iraq and came four days after Iran announced it had begun naval exercises in the gulf. Canadian Fishing Dispute29 Jul 1991 – 29 Jul 19913972CAN13The U.S. Coast Guard seized a Canadian fishing vessel (Fordham and Sarver 2001, 459). Bosnian War16 Jul 1992 - 2 Oct 19963551BEL, CANDEN, FRNGMY, GRCITA, NTHPOR, RUMSPN, TURUKG, YUG33See main textIraqi Inspections Dispute27 Jul 1992 - 23 Dec 19933552IRQ, UKG, FRN, KUW, RUS, SAU10Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein repeatedly refused to allow a UN inspections team access to sites suspected of housing information about Iraq's ballistic missile program and weapons of mass destruction programs. U.S. Strikes Iraqi Radar11 Jan 1993 - 20 Jan 19933568IRQ, KUW,FRN, UKG13On January 21st, two U.S. warplanes struck a radar for an Iraqi surface-to-air missile after concluding that the radar was directed at allied planes patrolling the northern no-flight zone. Iraqi antiaircraft batteries fired at the planes. During the prior two weeks, U.S. and allied forces had struck targets in Iraq: a U.S. cruise missile struck an Iraqi indsutrial complex eight miles south of Baghdad in response to Iraq's attempts to impose conditions on the flights of weapon inspectors; U.S., British, and French warplanes attacked antiaircraft guns and missiles in the air-exclusion zones over northern and southern Iraq.North Korea NPT Crisis3 Mar 1993 - 24 Mar 19934021PRK, ROK11Upon assuming office, the Clinton administration elevated non-proliferation to a vital U.S. national interest. As Lee (2006, 159) explains, in early 1993 the administration “expressed its firm commitment to halting the spread of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, to strengthen the functions of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and to enforce strong sanctions against governments that violated international agreements…the United States believed that if a country successfully withdrew from the NPT system without incurring any cost, it might encourage other signatories to follow suit and might eventually destroy the integrity of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty that the United States had assiduously nurtured since 1968.” North Korea delivered the first direct challenge to this policy when it rejected an IAEA request to inspect suspected nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and announced on March 12, 1993 that they would withdraw from the NPT. On April 1, the 35-member IAEA Board of Governors found North Korea in noncompliance with its obligations under its nuclear safeguards agreement. The North Koreans rejected the IAEA’s request for inspections. On April 8, the president of the UN Security Council issued a statement expressing concern and reaffirming the importance of the NPT, and on May 11 the Council adopted a resolution asking North Korea to reaffirm its NPT commitments. Meanwhile, the United States pursued a dialogue with North Korea and sought to employ a “carrot and stick” approach, offering economic assistance and the cancellation of U.S.-South Korean military exercises in exchange for commitments to abjure nuclear weapons. These talks resulted in a joint statement on June 11, in which the United States and North Korea disavowed hostile intention towards each other and committed themselves to a nuclear-free Korean peninsula (backed up by “full-scope safeguards”) and the goal of peaceful reunification. Iraq Cruise Missile Strikes26 Jun 1993 - 28 Jun 19934299IRQ13On June 26, the U.S. launched a missile attack against Iraq in retaliation for an attempt to assassinate former President George Bush while he visited Kuwait in April. U.S. ships in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf fired 23 Tomahawk cruise missiles at the main headquarters of the Iraqi intelligence service in downtown Baghdad. Three days later an American warplane fired a missile at an Iraqi antiaircraft artillery site as Iraqi forces continued to interfere with U.S. patrols of the no-flight zone in southern Iraq. Haitian Intervention18 Oct 1993 - 29 Sep 19944016HAI, ARG,CAN, DOM,FRN, NTH,UKG13On September 30th, 1991, Haiti’s first democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was overthrown in a bloody coup led by General Raoul Cedras. This happened to be poor timing on the part of the generals, because just a few months earlier members of the Organization of American States (OAS) had met in Santiago, Chile and pledged to protect all democratic governments in the region from internal and external subversion. Not surprisingly, Aristide used the OAS to rally international support behind the use of coercive measures to restore his regime to power. Over the next two years, the international community, led by the United States, ratcheted up pressure on the illegitimate military government in Haiti, eventually imposing sanctions. While the sanctions had little effect on the generals’ resolve to hold onto power, they decimated Haiti’s economy causing thousands of Haitians to seek a better lifein the United States.As the economic and humanitarian situation worsened, and with thousands of refugees drifting towards the United States, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted (China and Brazil abstained) resolution 940 on July 31st 1994, authorizing the United States to “use all necessary means” to remove the military leadership. On September 17, as the initial deployments of the American invasion force were on their way to Haiti, former President Jimmy Carter, former Chairman of the Join Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, and Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn persuaded the junta to give up. The coup leaders were forced to leave Haiti, and Aristide returned to power in mid-October.Agreed Framework Crisis5 Nov 1993 - 2 Nov 19944022AUL, CAN,JPN, ROK,PRK22On November 5th, 1993, President Clinton announced that he would seek to impose sanctions on North Korea via the UN Security Council if North Korea refused to allow inspections of its nuclear facilities. North Korea agreed to limited inspections at Yongbyon, and the United States and South Korea suspended their annual “Team Spirit” military exercises, but subsequent negotiations failed to produce a deal. On March 21, 1994, the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution holding North Korea to be in “further non-compliance” with its safeguards agreements and referred the matter to the UN Security Council. On March 31, the Security Council asked North and South Korea to renew discussions for implementing a joint declaration on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. North Korea denounced the statement as containing “unjustifiable demands” and threatened to regard sanctions as a declaration of war. In May, the United States resumed joint military exercises between U.S. and South Korea, augmented U.S. offensive capabilities based on South Korea, and updated a war-plan for surgical strikes on Yongbyon and a massive U.S. and South Korean attack to capture Pyongyang (Lee 2006, 170). In June, the UN Security Council drafted a resolution to impose economic and diplomatic sanctions against North Korea. North Korea initially threatened to wage war than yield to international pressure, but Chinese leaders, alarmed at the escalating crisis, urged North Korea to resume negotiations with the United States and suggested that it might refrain from vetoing the sanctions resolution. In mid-June, former president Jimmy Carter traveled to Pyongyang with the Clinton administration’s tacit approval and negotiated a deal in which the United States would commit not to launch a nuclear attack against North Korea and provide light-water reactors in exchange for a North Korean pledge to freeze its nuclear program and allow inspectors to remain at Yongbyon. U.S.-North Korean negotiations resumed in Geneva and culminated in the Agreed Framework signed by both sides on October 21. NATO Airstrike Threat23 Apr 1994 - 5 May 19944046MAC, YUG13NATO allies warned Bosnian Serb forces that they would face air strikes within a 12-mile radius of the Bosnian city of Gorazde unless they immediately stopped their attacks. See analysis of Bosnian War in main text for description of U.S. decisionmaking process.Iraq Coercion2 Aug 1994 - 9 Oct 19954269IRQ, BAH,FRN, KUW,OMA, UAE,UKG 13U.S. policy moved from containing Iraq to one of outright strangulation and attempting to topple Saddam Hussein. The change in policy included stepping up military maneuvers and sending U.S. diplomatic delegations to try to persuade Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait to help isolate Iraq. These countries refused to close their border with Iraq, and meanwhile Saddam Hussein reorganized his Government, shifting some power from his family circle to old figures of the governing Baath party. Iraq Ships Incident1 Dec 1994 - 1 Dec 19944270IRQ13The U.S. Navy stopped and boarded two Iraqi vessels in the Persian Gulf suspected of violating the embargo imposed after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. After the Iraqi vessels refused to stop, U.S. commandos forced their way on board. The two ships were not carrying oil or contraband and were let go.North Korea Helicopter Attack17 Dec 1994 - Jun 19994087JPN, ROK, PRK23A U.S. helicopter strayed over North Korea and was shot down, killing one of the two pilots. North Korea refused to release the surviving pilot, leading to a diplomatic standoff, which threatened to undermine the ongoing nuclear negotiations. After 13 days, the pilot was released after the U.S. signed an apology for violating North Korea’s territory. The U.S. government claimed the helicopter had inadvertently veered off course into North Korean airspace; North Korea accused the United States of spying. 1995/96 Taiwan Straits Crisis19 Dec 1995 - 28 Mar 19964064TAW, CHN33See main textSyria BombingsJun 1996 - Jun 19964190TUR, SYR10Syria denied that there were a series of explosions in Damascus in May, which U.S. and other countries' diplomats said took place. There was speculation that the blasts were carried out by people loyal to Turkey. Iraq Invades Kurdish Region30 Aug1996 - 4 Nov19964271IRQ, KUW,UKG13After detecting threatening movements by Iraqi troops against Kurdish districts in the north, the United States stepped up its military activity in the region on August 30th, ordering its forces to be ready to deploy if needed. Intelligence reports suggested that Iraq had amassed 30,000 to 40,000 troops inside the Kurdish zone in northern Iraq, which is under United Nations protection. On August 31st, Iraqi armored divisions seized an important city in the Kurdish enclave. President Clinton sent in U.S. reinforcements on the 31st, and U.S. forces began launching missile strikes against Iraq's southern air defenses days alter (For a brief analysis of U.S. decisionmaking in this crisis, see Hall, Hendrickson, and Polak 2013, 43-46). Russian Nuclear Test15 Aug 1997 - 15 Feb 19984174RUS10Russian detonated a nuclear weapon on a remote Arctic island in spite of its support for an international moratorium on nuclear tests. Russian officials denied having tested a weapon, but U.S. scientists reported a seismic event that could not be explained as a natural phenomenon, such as an earthquake. Iran-Iraq Crisis3 Oct 1997 - 3 Oct 19974216IRN13To prevent a war between Iran and Iraq, the U.S. sent an aircraft carrier to the Persian Gulf ahead of schedule. The Clinton administration described the move as a warning to Iran against launching another round of air attacks on Iraq in violation of an American-enforced no-flight zone over southern Iraq. 2003 Iraq War10 Oct 1997 - 2 May 20034273IRQ, TUREGY, FRNGMY, GRCITA, JORNTH, UAEISR, KUWSAU, UKGISR, KUWAUL, UAESAU, BAHNTH, OMAQAT, POL13On March 19, 2003, U.S. and British forces launched Operation Iraqi Freedom, an invasion intended to remove Saddam Hussein’s regime from power. Since the mid-1990s, the United States had sought to weaken Saddam’s regime through sanctions, occasional bombings, and financing of various Iraqi opposition movements. After the terrorist attacks on 9/11, however, the administration concluded that Saddam’s regime, believed to be developing weapons of mass destruction, constituted a vital threat to the United States. Numerous studies attempt to explain why the Bush administration launched what is generally regarded as a costly war of choice, though none characterize it as a case of entanglement. Mearsheimer and Walt (2007, ch. 8), argue that pressure from the “Israel lobby” was a critical factor in pushing the United States to invade Iraq. In this view, prominent Israeli officials joined forces with American neoconservatives in government (e.g. Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feithe, Richard Perle, Kenneth Adelman, John Bolton, David Wurmser, Elliot Abrams, and Scooter Libby) and in the media (e.g. Robert Kagan, Charles Krauthammer, and William Kristol) to help sell the invasion to the Bush administration and the American people by lobbying members of Congress and by writing intelligence reports, open letters, and op-eds that hyped Iraq’s nuclear weapons program and portrayed Saddam Hussein as irrational and undeterrable. This activity increased significantly in the spring of 2002, but Mearsheimer and Walt also show that many of these same figures had worked assiduously since the 1990s to bring U.S. pressure on Iraq and to make regime change there official U.S. government policy. According to Mearsheimer and Walt, it was the efforts of the Israel lobby combined with the shock of 9/11 that explains why President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney became strong proponents of invading Iraq. The Israel lobby was thus a necessary, though not sufficient, cause of the Iraq War. Mearsheimer and Walt do not characterize the Israel lobby’s influence as a form of alliance entanglement, but one could argue that the lobby is an appendage of the de facto U.S.-Israeli alliance and that the existence of the alliance itself made it easier for the lobby to sell the Bush administration on invading Iraq. On the other hand, it is not clear that Mearsheimer and Walt themselves would agree with such a characterization. After all, they point out that the neoconservatives, who they regard as the “driving force behind the Iraq war” (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007, 238), genuinely believed that their grand strategic worldview served U.S. interests: “The prowar faction believed that removing Saddam would improve America’s and Israel’s strategic position and launch a process of regional transformation that would benefit the United States and Israel alike…to be clear, the individuals and groups that pushed for war believed it would benefit both Israel and the United States, and they certainly did not anticipate the debacle that ultimately occurred.” (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007, 230-231). Subsequent studies have reinforced this claim by showing that neoconservates prioritize U.S. national interests over the concerns and interests of other countries, including U.S. allies (Flibbert 2006; Lind 2012). Waxman (2009, 5-6), for example, surveys neoconservative literature as well as secondary studies on the evolution of the neoconservative movement and concludes: “While neoconservatives are deeply committed to Israel’s security and well-being—as are many other Americans of different political orientations (especially, most American Jews)—this does not mean that the foreign policies they favor are derived from this commitment. The ‘‘war for Israel’’ critique exaggerates the importance of Israel to neoconservatives, placing Israel’s security at the top of the neoconservatives’ foreign policy agenda. This is a serious misunderstanding of the neoconservative worldview. Israel is not the focus of neoconservative thought (Jewish or otherwise). However much neoconservatives may care about Israel, it is American interests rather than Israeli ones that matter most to them. Neoconservatism is a profoundly American political ideology. It is concerned above all with the United States, its interests, values, power, and global role. It is based upon a belief in American goodness and in America’s global mission (in a moralistic sense). It regards the United States as the ‘‘benevolent global hegemon’’ with unrivaled power which is must wield—unilaterally and forcefully if necessary—to spread its values around the world.” Moreover, while Mearsheimer and Walt claim that the Israel lobby played a necessary role in convincing Bush and Cheney to invade Iraq, subsequent research suggests that Bush and Cheney wanted to invade Iraq all along and needed little convincing to do so after 9/11 (Slater 2012; Betts 2006; Gelb 2007; Jervis 2003; Record 2008). Recent studies do not agree on why both leaders were intent on removing Saddam from power – some stress Saddam’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction (Debs and Monteiro 2014; Jervis 2010; Jervis 2012; Lake 2010/11); others stress Cheney’s longstanding interest in asserting U.S. primacy (Cramer and Duggan 2012b), still others emphasize Bush’s personal characteristics, such as his personal grudge against Saddam for trying to assassinate his father, George H.W. Bush, his desire to “finish the job” that his father started, and his belief that God had put him on earth to transform the Middle East (Lake 2010/11, 27; Jervis 2006, 15; Haar 2010 979-980; Renshon 2005; Rothkopf 2005), still other studies stress oil interests (Klare 2012; Duffield 2012. For a critique, see Mearsheimer and Walt 2007, 253-255), and finally others focus on American liberal culture (Monten 2005; Desch 2007). All of these studies, however, conclude that Bush and Cheney had been interested in toppling Saddam’s regime for at least a decade before coning to power and that 9/11 was sufficient to cause them to prioritize this goal and enable them to rally public and congressional support for an invasion (On 9/11 as a sufficient condition for causing Bush and Cheney to push for invasion, see Recchia 2011, 368-376). Further casting doubt on the relevance of entanglement in the Iraq case is the fact that many pro-Israel groups and the Israeli government did not lobby the Bush administration particularly hard for an invasion. As Mearsheimer and Walt (2007, 241-242) point out, “there was disagreement [among pro-Israel groups in the United States] about how vocal they should be in backing [a U.S. invasion of Iraq]. The main concern was the fear that too open support for an invasion would make it look like the war was being fought for Israel’s sake…Organizations like AIPAC and the ADL also supported the war, but they did so with minimum fanfare.” Some Israeli government officials, such as Shimon Peres and Ariel Sharon, also limited their support for an invasion because they did not want to create the perception that Israel was pushing the United States into a war and, perhaps, because they felt Iraq provided a valuable counterweight to Iran, which posed a much greater threat to Israeli security at the time (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007, 235). Several studies have corroborated these points (Slater 2012, 106-109; Waxman 2010). For example, Waxman (2009, 9) concludes: “There was no effort made to rally the legions of pro-Israel activists and no concerted media campaign to drum up support for the war. Instead, there were a few public state- ments in favor of war made by prominent individuals in the American Jewish community and allegedly some quiet behind-the-scenes lobbying of members of Congress to vote in favor of the resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq in October 2002 (this has been denied by AIPAC officials; Frankel 2006). This hardly amounts to a major attempt to push for war. At most, American Jewish organizations and the pro-Israel Lobby gave their backing to the Bush administration’s Iraq policy in the run-up to the war; they were not responsible for this policy, nor did they convince Congress, let alone the American public, to support it... Israel’s attitude toward the Iraq war, however, was actually more ambivalent than the ‘‘war for Israel’’ critique suggests. Instead of being a ‘‘cheerleader’’ for a war with Iraq, Israel was a halfhearted supporter. To be sure, some Israeli leaders publicly advocated the need for regime change and a pre-emptive military attack against Iraq; yet, privately, Israeli officials counseled caution to their American counterparts and tried to shift their attention to the threat of Iran. Unlike the Bush administration, the Sharon government was not fixated on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Iran, not Iraq, was of much greater concern for Israel. Nevertheless, perceiving the Bush administration’s determination to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime, Sharon’s government supported the war out of a combination of loyalty and hope. All the while, Israel harbored serious doubts and misgivings about the U.S. plan for regime change in Iraq. It went along with the war, but it certainly did not actively seek it.” In sum, the existing literature on the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq focuses overwhelmingly on the threat perceptions of the Bush administration after 9/11 rather than alliance concerns. The editors of a recent volume on the war conclude that the literature “has largely moved on from a focus on neoconservatives to a “second draft” of history, much more concerned with understanding the top leaders of Cheney, Rumsfeld and Bush, including their strong desires to invade Iraq prior to 9/11….From our view today we believe that while there was significant support for Israel lobby-type arguments in 2006 and beyond, this support seems to have significantly faded…It is not that Israel was not important to many neoconservatives, it is more that assessments of the importance of the top leaders of Cheney, Rumsfeld and Bush has increased, especially as it has become clear that the top leaders likely very much wanted to invade Iraq prior to 9/11 and were thus not likely persuaded by neoconservatives after 9/11 to invade. Instead, it appears the top leaders did not have a way to build support for this project before 9/11, and 9/11 created an opportunity” (Cramer and Thrall 2012a, 3, 13). Kosovo Intervention3 May 1998 - 10 Jun 19994137YUG, CZR,HUN, LIT,POL, RUS,GRC, LUX,MAC, BEL,CAN, DEN,FRN, GMY,ICE, ITA,NOR, NTH,POR, SPN,TUR, UKG, ALB33See main textSudan Cruise Missile Strikes20 Aug 1998 - 20 Aug 19984217SUD13The U.S. launched roughly 75 cruise missiles from ships in the Arabian and Red Seas at targets in Afghanistan and the Sudan. The targets were terrorist bases and a factory near the Sudanese capital that the Clinton administration maintained produced important components for making chemical weapons. Afghanistan Cruise Missile Strikes 20 Aug 1998 - 20 Aug 19984227AFG13The U.S. launched roughly 75 cruise missiles from ships in the Arabian and Red Seas at targets in Afghanistan and the Sudan. The targets were terrorist bases and a factory near the Sudanese capital that the Clinton administration maintained produced important components for making chemical weapons. Liberian Leader CrisisSep 1998 - Nov 19984254LBR11A Liberian opposition leader took refuge in the American embassy compound, setting off a weeklong standoff in which Liberian troops sprayed the embassy with gunfire. U.S. officials had the opposition leader airlifted out of the country. Korean Fishing Dispute16 Jun 1999 - 18 Jul 19994125ROK, PRK23South Korean Navy ships attempted to push North Korean fishing boats from South Korean to North Korean waters. After a standoff lasting several days, South Korean ships sank a North Korean torpedo boat and killed at least 20 North Korean sailors. The U.S. sent an Aegis-class cruiser and a guided-missile destroyer to the region in a display of force. Chinese Missile Test30 Jul 1999 - Mar 20004088TAW, CHN30China announced that it successfully test-launched a new type of long-range missile, and then it excoriated the United States for selling military equipment to Taiwan in the middle of a major diplomatic crisis, started on July 9 when Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui asserted that Taiwan would only talk with China on the basis of special "state-to-state relations." Russian Tanker Incident2 Feb 2000 - 26 Apr 20004213RUS13Two U.S. warships enforcing UN sanctions against Iraq seized a Russian tanker in the Persian Gulf after boarding it and discovering evidence that it might be smuggling oil out of southern Iraq. NATO threatens to abandon Albanians21 Feb 2000 - 3 Apr 20004186YUG, AUS,AZE, BUL,EST, FIN,GRG, IRE,JOR, LIT,MOR, POR,RUS, SLO,SLV, SWD,SWZ, UAE,UKR, BEL,CAN, CZR,DEN, FRN,GMY, GRC,HUN, ICE,LUX, NOR,SPN, TUR,UKG, ARG,ITA, NTH,POL, RUM10This MID stems from the Kosovo War, which I discuss in the main text. Eight months after the NATO alliance claimed victory in halting Serbian repression of Kosovar Albanians, Kosovo was succumbing to an increase in violence and tension. U.S. officials accused Albanian leaders of failing to stem ethnic violence and hinted that NATO support for peace was weakening as violence increased. The U.S. did not undertake any military action.Yugoslav Elections 26 Sep 2000 - 29 Sep 20004298CRO, YUG10This MID stems from the Kosovo War, which I discuss in the main text. The Clinton administration welcomed the election of the Yugoslav opposition candidate, Vojislav Kostunica, and suggested that U.S. sanctions could be dropped, but warned that it expected Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic to step down peacefully. ?17 Oct 2000 - 9 Nov 20004220RUS??Venezuelan Naval Incident21 Oct 2000 - 21 Oct 20004261VEN10The Venezuelan Foreign Ministry accused two U.S. Coast Guard cutters of incursions into Venezuela's waters. The U.S. Embassy denied the accusation, saying that both ships, which were used in counter-narcotics operations, were operating in accordance with international maritime law. Russia Espionage Incident26 Nov 2000 - Dec 20004197CAN, RUS10A Moscow judge sentenced a U.S. businessman to 20 years at a hard labor camp for spying. The man was a former naval intelligence officer and was accused of obtaining secret plans and technical reports for Russia's rocket-propelled torpedo. The verdict marked the first espionage conviction against a Westerner in Russia since the end of the Cold War. The Clinton administration condemned the decision, and orchestrated the prisoner's release a month later. EP-3 Incident1 Apr 2001 - 3 Jul 20014280CHN13A U.S. Navy spy plane on a routine surveillance mission near the Chinese coast, about 50 miles southeast of China's Hainan island, collided with a Chinese fighter jet. The U.S. plane and its 24 crew members made an emergency landing in China; the Chinese jet crashed and the pilot was killed. The American crew was held until the U.S. Government delivered a statement. The phrasing of the statement was intentionally ambiguous, allowing both sides to save face and defusing a potentially volatile situation. Taiwan Arms Sales25 Apr 2001 - 17 Aug 20014281TAW, CHN30The Bush administration decided to offer Taiwan a range of advanced weapons, including eight diesel submarines and four guided-missile destroyers that China had long sought to block. The U.S. did not offer the Taiwanese Aegis-equipped destroyers. Afghanistan War15 Sep 2001 - 15 Nov 20014283AFG, GMY,GRC, NTH,POR, SPN,TAJ, CAN,FRN, TUR,PAK, RUS,UKG, UZB,AUL13In retaliation for the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, U.S., British, Australian, French, and Afghan Northern Alliance forces launched an invasion to dismantle the Al Qaeda organization and topple the Taliban regime from power. North Korean Ship Searched10 Dec 2002 - 11 Dec 20024451SPN, PRK1?2Two Spanish warships stopped a North Korean vessel suspected of carrying Scud missiles to Yemen. The Spanish warships escorted the ship to a Yemeni port where it was searched by the US Navy. The ship was released after it was cleared by US officials. Afghan-Pakistan Border Skirmishes30 Dec 2002 - 22 May 20054552AFG, PAK1?3The Afghanistan-Pakistan border was a source of tension for Pakistani forces and Afghan-American forces. In several instances, the Afghan military deployed additional troops to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border to secure the frontier against incursions by rebels from Pakistan. These border troops periodically exchanged small-arms fire with Pakistani troops, but it appears the localized conflicts were simple exchanges of hostilities and not part of larger offensives. At the end of 2002, the US military became increasingly involved, deploying its own troops to the border with Pakistan and beginning direct attacks against rebels in Pakistani territory. North Korean Air Space Violation21 Feb 2003 - 23 Sep 20034455PRK1?3Tension between the US and North Korea increased over North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. The US military increased its naval presence around the Korean peninsula with several additional warships. North Korea responded with its own shows of force in the waters of the Yellow Sea. In one incident, North Korea mobilized several planes to chase off American planes that had entered North Korean airspace. Iranian Air Space Violation22 Mar 2003 - Jul 4 20034512UKG, IRN1?3During the USA-IRQ war of 2003 (MID 50202), there was a concurrent MID between USA, UKG, and IRN. The MID began on 3/22 when two USA missiles landed in Iranian territory and US planes violated Iranian airspace while conducting combat operations. This was met with the Iranian response that it would use military force to repel any further incursions or transgressions against the state. Later, on June 1, Iranian authorities detained four US soldiers and 2 boats overnight. About a month later, US forces detained two Iranian reporters due to suspicious activity, which was protested by Iran. It is unclear when or if the reporters were released. Indonesian Waters Violation3 Jul 2003 - 3 Jul 20034460INS1?2On July 3, USA warships and planes briefly violated Indonesian waters near the island of Java. Turkish Arrests5 Jul 2003 - 6 Jul 20034516TUR1?3USA arrested 11 Turkish soldiers who were allegedly planning to attack a Kurdish governor in northern Iraq. The soldiers were released to the Turkish military the next day. Iraqi-Syrian Border Skirmishes I? Mar 2004 - 16 Apr 20044518SYR13US forces in Iraq exchanged fire with Syrian border troops over the Iraq- Syria border. No one was killed in the clash. A few days later, US military forces increased the US troop presence along the Iraq-Syria border to prevent incursions into Iraq by Syrian troops and foreign fighters. U.S.-Iranian Skirmishes14 Mar 2004 - 14 Mar 20044519IRN13While questioning potential smugglers near the Iraqi town of Tikrit, US forces were fired upon by Iranian border troops from Iranian territory. US forces returned fire, killing one of the Iranian troops. U.S.-ROK Air Defense30 Apr 2004 - 30 Nov 20044465PRK32The US deployed new air defense batteries to the Korean DMZ and sent a squadron of fighter jets for training. North Korea also accused the US of repeated airspace violations by American spy planes. Iranian Territory Violation19 Aug 2004 - 1 Jan 20054524IRN12The underlying issue of this MID is the increasing hostilities between the US and Iran over the Iranian nuclear program. In August 2004, US warplanes violated Iranian airspace, apparently to test the sensitivity of Iran’s anti- aircraft defense system. In November, both a US cruiser and US warplanes simultaneously violated Iranian territorial waters and airspace briefly. In January 2005, US warplanes violated Iranian airspace near Afghanistan, apparently spying on potential Iranian nuclear sites. This prompted the Iranian military to threaten force to repel all future incursions into Iranian territory. Drone Attack in Pakistan I8 May 2005 - 8 May 20054568PAK13US military drones attacked a suspected Al-Qaeda site in the Waziristan region of northern Pakistan, resulting in multiple militant and civilian casualties. Iraqi-Syrian Border Skirmishes II15 Jun 2005 - 22 Jul 20054527SYR, IRQ13This MID is largely comprised of border skirmishes between Syrian troops and US/Iraqi border forces, and various border violations and shows of force by US forces hunting Iraqi terrorists in Syria. In April, 2005, US and Iraqi forces clashed with Syrian border troops who were apparently attempting to provide covering fire for terrorists crossing the border into Iraq. Following this incident, the US stepped up its operations in Syrian territory, which resulted in both sides massing troops at the Syrian-Iraqi border to stop crossings from either side. In July 2005, US and Iraqi forces again clashed with Syrian border troops briefly across the border, possibly mistaking the Syrian troops for terrorists. Drone Attack in Pakistan II30 Nov 2005 - 14 Jan 20064571PAK13US military drones attacked several suspected Taliban and Al-Qaeda sites in the Waziristan region of northern Pakistan, resulting in multiple militant and civilian casualties. Drone Attack in Pakistan III30 Oct 2006 - 17 Dec 20104575PAK13In a continuation of MID 4571/70509, US military drones routinely attacked suspected Taliban and Al-Qaeda sites in the Waziristan region of northern Pakistan. These attacks resulted in multiple militant and civilian casualties, but no military fatalities. Raid on Iranian Consulate11 Jan 2007 - 11 Jun 20074535IRN13This MID is largely comprised of a continuation of the underlying issue between the US and Iran over Iran’s proposed nuclear program. On January 11, US forces raided the Iranian consulate in Iraq, seizing five of its staff and confiscating documents. It is unknown when or if the Iranian officials were released. Later, in March 2007, the US conducted combined troop, naval, and aerial operations in the Persian Gulf as a show of force against Iranian military operations in the area. A few days later, on April 1, two US planes flew over southwestern Iran at low altitudes. Pakistani Air Space Violation I22 Jan 2007 - 27 Feb20074577PAK13American warplanes violated Pakistani airspace on two occasions in operations against rebels based in Pakistan. During one of the violations, the planes bombed Pakistani territory, killing a paramilitary soldier. U.S. Arrests in Iraq28 Aug 2007 - 29 Aug 20074538IRN13US forces in Iraq detained 8 Iranian men in Baghdad due to their possession of unauthorized weapons. The men were invited to Baghdad to discuss the building of a power plant. The weapons were confiscated by US forces and the men were released the next day following questioning. Iran protested the seizure as an act of US aggression toward Iran. Drone Attacks in Afghanistan29 Jan 2008 - 12 Mar 20094581PAK13During 2008 and 2009, US forces carried out several attacks against suspected Taliban and Al-Qaeda hideouts in the mountainous regions of Pakistan near the Afghanistan border. These attacks were mostly carried out through unmanned drones, although, in some rare instances, the attacks were conducted by manned helicopter gunships. On a few occassions, Pakistani troops fired at these aerial forces, resulting in brief, but deadly, clashes. AC-130 Attacks in Somalia2 Mar 2008 - 2 Mar 20084397SOM13On March 2, 2008, US AC-130 gunships launched a missile attack on a suspected Al-Qaida hideout in Doblai, Somalia, killing 4 civilians. Iraqi-Syrian Border Skirmishes II26 Oct 2008 - 26 Oct 20084540SYR13US helicopters and troops fired at several buildings five miles inside Syrian territory near Syria’s border with Iraq in a bid to root out insurgents operating in the region. According to Syrian reports, several civilians were killed in the attack. Iranian Drone Incident25 February 2009 - 25 February 20094543IRN, IRQ13US forces in Iraq shot down an Iranian drone that violated Iraqi airspace for over an hour. USS Impeccable Incident9 Mar 2009 - 19 Mar 20094486CHN13Chinese vessels harassed a US oceanographic survey ship, prompting the US to deploy a destroyer to escort and protect the survey ship. In response, China deployed several warships to both follow the US vessels and patrol the larger South China Sea. Venezuelan Airspace Violation8 Jan 2010 – 8 Jan 20104506VEN12On 1/8/2010, Venezuela scrambled military jets to intercept a U.S. military plane that it claimed violated Venezuelan airspace for a total of 34 minutes on two occasions. Cheonan/Yeonpyeong Incident25 Jul 2010 - 26 Nov 20104483ROK, PRK32The impetus of this particular MID was the joint US-ROK military maneuvers in 2009, which North Korean strongly protested. However, the larger underlying issues remain the demarcation of the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea and continuing tension around the DMZ between PRK and ROK (see MID 30201 and 30802). The majority of incidents involve shows of force by North and South Korea, mostly via North Korean warships crossing over the NLL. Several threats were also made about increasing hostilities should such shows of force happen. The MID reached a height when North Korean forces shelled the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong, killing several soldiers and resulting in an artillery clash between the two sides. Ultimately, the hostilities between the countries subsided to their normal level of intensity. Pakistani Air Space Violation II27 Sep 2010 - 26 Nov 20104598PAK13NATO air forces routinely entered Pakistan to launch air strikes on suspected Taliban hideouts. In one incident, a NATO helicopter engaged Pakistani soldiers at a border outpost after the soldiers began firing, killing 3. REFERENCESAccinelli, Robert. Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy toward Taiwan, 1950-1955. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.———. Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy toward Taiwan, 1950-1955. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.———. ""A Thorn in the Side of Peace": The Eisenhower Administration and the 1958 Offshore Islands Crisis." 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