Essay Question # 2



Essay Question #1

William G. Lycan responded to the anti-materialist Knowledge Argument (KA) by Frank Jackson with a new type of materialism called Perspectivalism in his article “Perspectival Representation and the Knowledge Argument.” Lycan reconstructs the KA, which attempts to disprove materialist claims that all sense-experiences can be explained solely through the understanding of physical, chemical, and biological means, to allow for materialism to be believed. Lycan begins his reconstruction of the KA by explaining the problems with one of the premises, otherwise termed the Leibnizian Principle. This premise states that if Mary knows all scientific knowledge of color (fact one), then Mary must know what it is like to see color (fact two). The premise initially fails because of representation dependent properties (Lycan 3). The meaning of the Lebnizian principle in KA can be derived through the understanding that if a person knows some fact, and there is another fact that is equivalent to the first, then the second fact must be known to the person. The problem with this premise is that while a person may realize they know the first fact, they may not realize they know the second fact, nor that the two are equivalent. For example, a person may observe that water is splashing but not understand that they are actually looking at the molecular construction of the bond of two hydrogen atoms with an oxygen atom linking the two.

The Leibnizian Principle or premise provides an essential premise in the argument as it begins to explain the idea of perspective and its integral part in understanding the meaning of Lycan’s reconstruction. Lycan disproves the counter of the water example does not serve as a valid counter and if the idea of scientific ignorance is added to the premise, the argument stands. After the overpaid counter argument is presented, Lycan also adds that ‘baring no pronominal discrepancies’ and the premise stands.

Lycan explains that part of the reason for the problematic nature of understanding and being able to explain the concept color before being released from the black and white room, is dependent on perspective. Lycan explains that the ‘introspective perspective’ cannot be understood or explained by outside parties because of the fact that internal monitors (which decode meaning for us personally) are ineffable to ourselves, as well as others. Through Mary’s scientific omnipotence she learns of all there is to know about color, and would therefore learn something about color experience. As Lycan delineated a rebuttal of the KA centered upon the notion that while Mary may not have possessed all the knowledge about what it is like to experience color, specifically red, “before she was cured, Mary could represent other people’s experiences of red, but only from the various public perspectives and not introspectively” (Lycan 9).

Essay Question # 2

Bertrard Russell delineated an argument for understanding sense-data as intermediaries in ordinary perception in Chapter 1 of Problems of Philosophy. While the argument is not put forth in a logically progressive manner, the premises of the argument can be found throughout the text to form a logically deductive argument. Russell explains that all sensations derived from sense-data cannot be trusted as informative of the construct of reality, but instead only offer an “appearance, which we believe to be a sign of some ‘reality’ behind” (Russell 5).

Russell begins the chapter explaining why various pieces of sense-data, or what John Locke terms primary qualities, are problematic with regard to understanding objects in reality. Russell explains that we use our senses to conceptualize object’s primary qualities or sense-data (such as color, shape, texture, etc.). All these pieces of sense-data are perspectival dependant, meaning that sense-data is variable dependant on view point and perspective. For example, while one might immediately see a red apple on a purple rectangular table, upon inspection one would find that the colors that compose the apple and table’s appearance are as variable as the exam week is long.

The perspective of the colors that compose an object are dependant upon where one is standing with relation to the object. The perspective is prone to change not only if one moves but also if one sees an object in artificial light, with colored glasses, or is colorblind (Russell 2). It seems only logically to deduce from this premise that no two perspectives are the same, thus no two pieces of sense-data that a person experiences can possibly be the same. Russell explains that there is no reason to believe that one perspective or one understanding of sense-data can represent the reality of the object. As Russell states, “there is no reason for regarding some of these as more really its colour than others” (Russell 2). The reason for the belief that no one piece of sense-data could possibly represent what is real is due to sense-data being dependant on the object, the spectator, and external forces exerted on the object of perception (Russell 2).

While “experience has taught us to construct the ‘real’ shape from the apparent shape” the real shape is not what we immediately see (Russell 3). Instead the ‘real’ shape is inferred from “what is immediately known” (Russell 3) which is the sense-data. Thus due to variable perspectives inherent to our humanity (considering we are moving entities that can never share the full perspective of another) we cannot assume that the sense-data we derive from an object can “reveal directly any definite property of the table [or any external object], but at most [can be taken] to be signs of some property which perhaps causes sensations” (Russell 3). For Russell sense-data is defined as “things that are immediately known in sensation: such as colours, sounds, smells, hardness, roughness, and so on” (Russell 3). Sensations are not the sense-data, but are derived from it. To conclude, the sense-data that we derive meaning from “may depend on us, yet their occurrence is a sign of something existing independently of us, something differing, perhaps, completely from our sense-data whenever we are in a suitable relation to the real table [or any external object]” (Russell 5).

Essay Question # 3

John Locke explains the distinction between primary and secondary qualities of an object in Chapter 2: Book 8 of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. The distinction between primary and secondary qualities can be understood by distinguishing “ideas or perceptions in our minds; and as they are modifications of matter in the bodies that cause such perceptions in us” (Locke Ch.8, Sec. 7). The distinction between ideas and modifications that cause such perceptions provide an important understanding that continues to be explained through the delineation of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.

Primary qualities are “utterly inseparable from the body. . . the mind finds inseparable from every particle of matter, though less than to make itself singly be perceived by our senses” (Locke Ch8., Sec. 8). These primary qualities exist no matter how large or small the object is, can never be taken away from the object, and can be perceived regardless of the conditions that it is perceived in. These qualities can be understood as qualities such as “solidity, extension, figure, or mobility” (Locke Ch8., Sec. 8). These primary qualities “produce simple ideas in us, viz. solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number” (Locke Ch. 8, Sec. 8). Primary qualities can be understood as objective qualities inherent in the object with or without being experienced or mentally grasped by a human being. For example,

Secondary qualities do not possess meaning on their own their own but instead come to fruition as thoughts or sensations connoted by primary qualities. These secondary qualities are produced in the mind when a primary quality is apprehended. Secondary qualities include things such as colors, tastes, sound, etc. (Locke Ch.8., Sec. 10). While it may immediately seem as though these qualities are inherent to an object, this is not necessarily so because secondary qualities are of a subjective nature. For example, snow causes thoughts of white and coldness in us.

The notable distinction between the two kinds of qualities is understood by Locke’s inseparability thesis in Chapter 8, Section 9. The inseparability thesis is with relation to the fact that secondary qualities are subject to change and can be taken away (are separable), whereas primary qualities persist within the object despite change in its composition (are inseparable). For example, a grain of rice has the same solidity even when divided into the minutest particles. Locke explains that primary qualities retain their character and “all the forces can used upon it, it constantly keeps; and such as sense constantly finds in every particle of matter which has bulk enough to be perceived.”

Whereas secondary qualities can change or disappear given a particular force, for example a rock with the color red in it could lose all appearance of color in a room with no light (Locke Ch.8, Sec. 19). The distinction is crucial to the understanding of the two types of qualities within external objects because it explains how from different perspectives people might have differing experiences with the same stimulus. Locke used the example of two bowls of water that are the same temperature, yet conger different sensations in a person who places their hands in the bowls. The sense difference comes from the fact that the person placed their hands in warm and cold water prior to the bowls of the same temperature water, thus creating differing sensations in his hands.

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