The Macro-Micro-Link in Demography Explanations of ...

[Pages:21]Johannes Huinink, Institute for Sociology and Demography, University of Rostock The Macro-Micro-Link in Demography ? Explanations of Demographic Change

Presentation at the EuroConference ,,The Second Demographic Transition in Europe", 23-28 June 2001 in Bad Herrenalb, Germany

1. Introduction

The concept of the second demographic transition is well on the way to gain the prominence of its precursor ? the model of the first demographic transition ? in regard to describe demographic change in developed countries during the last 35 years and the near future (Lesthaeghe 1995; van de Kaa 1987, 1997). As its precursor this approach is a genuine macro-level approach ? that is why I also see weaknesses in regard to the explanation of fertility trends.

In his discussion of theories of social change Raymond Boudon from my point of view convincingly argued that macro-level theories fail by principle (Boudon 1986). By and large they underestimate the variety and heterogeneity in demographic change in the past and will do so for the future. Counter examples to their models are easy to find. Coale and others were very successful in showing this studying the first demographic transition in the Princeton fertility project (Coale et al 1986). Others show in their analyses of European fertility in the last decades that rough trends can be assured but it is hard to see a concise European pattern of family development (Dorbritz 2000, Kuijsten 1996).

Not to say that there is no irreversible societal change underlying the demographic change. Not to say that we experience a decline of fertility by mean in developed countries under the level of reproduction. Not to say that the age at family formation is increasing by mean. Not to say that is seems unlikely that in developed countries we can expect a return to fertility on the reproduction level. However, we saw a rise of fertility in previous low fertility countries during certain time periods. We see very low fertility in countries like Italy, Spain that do not meet essential characteristic features of a country at the outset of the second demographic transition. In some countries looking at average levels of fertility makes no sense because of polarization phenomena.

In the latest conceptual reconstruction of the idea of the second demographic transition van de Kaa or Lesthaeghe and Willems proposed a three-phase model (Lesthaeghe/ Willems 1999: 227; van de Kaa 1997). In the first phase one can regard a general decline in fertility over all ages ? just a further restriction of the number of children in the families in continuation of the first demographic transition (Cliquet 1991). The second, the intermediate phase is characterized by an ongoing delay of the entry into parenthood during the life course ? due to gains in female education and employment. In the cross-sectional perspective this

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leads to considerably low fertility rates. In the third phase the delay of family formation comes to an end and one can expect an incomplete recuperation of fertility in the life course and therefore considerably lower cohort fertility. Looking at the CFR, the completed fertility rate for different cohorts born between 1955 and 1965 in different European countries Lesthaeghe and Willems indeed can show a decline, even though a quite small one in most countries. Where will it end? What is the rationale regarding the current change? Lesthaeghe and Willems only assume that in Europe, in contrast to the US fertility, will remain well below the replacement level. The driving forces of the development are ,,female education, female labor force participation, ideational changes, and patterns of union formation and especially union instability" (Lesthaeghe/ Willems 1999: 226). This, however, is not theoretically elaborated.

Recently Ron Lesthaeghe discussed explanations of the trends of the second demographic transition by integrating some well known theories in the field of family formation ? the approaches of Becker and Easterlin and what he calls the theory of ideational shifts (Lesthaeghe 1998). As far as fertility is concerned "... compatible with Becker's thesis is that fertility during the 1970s and much of the 1980s was strongly inversely related to female employment. This continues to be so in many countries. Evidently, opportunity cost weight heavily in the cost-benefit calculus. But this evidence is equally compatible with Easterlin's position in which female employment has become essential to compensate for the weaker earning position of men and to safeguard the material standards of living. With further increasing consumption aspirations, dual earners are far better able to satisfy their material needs. In this fashion the competition between consumption and children continues. But the link between fertility and female employment is equally compatible with that the third theory, that of ideational shift" (Lesthaeghe 1998: 7).

Lesthaeghe argues to bring these theories together in a "multi-causal theory with strong contextual variations". This means that explaining fertility decline ? and other trends of the second demographic transition ? by a big deal can be brought about by linking them all together. However, there is room for each theory special explanation of the (same) proposed trends in different social contexts. "When combined, they argue in favor of a stabilization of the features of the second demographic transition, and against a cyclical return to the patterns of family formation and dissolution that the West experienced until the 1960s" (Leasthaghe 1998: 10). "Working" together they serve for an proposed, irreversible trend of family change. Each theory takes its special part in that or one effects proposed by one are assumed to trigger effects proposed by the other.

Here I will step in and discuss some aspects of current and future fertility trends on the basis of a multilevel approach of explanation the second demographic transition theory is rather quite about. I will proceed in four steps.

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In the first step, very briefly a multi-level approach as proposed by Boudon, Coleman, Lindenberg, and particularly for demography by de Bruijn, and others is presented. This serves for a theoretic basis to start with when explaining individual decision and behavior in regard to fertility. In the second step, I will discuss a (pre) assumption concerning individual preferences regarding fertility. I assume that there is an ongoing, but ,,modern" motivation to have children, which probably is not changing to that degree as the observed results do. Over more, it can be argued that the pretentiousness and the felt responsibility towards children and parenthood increased. This leads to a change of the scope of the focus from asking ,,Why having no children anymore?" to ,,Why and under which conditions having one or more children?". In my third and fourth step I try to show some differentiated views on the fertility change connecting two macro-level aspects with micro-level behavior orientations. In the third step I will refer to a macro level condition of fertility behavior, which today from my point of view is the most crucial one: the question of compatibility of family and non-family activities. In the fourth step I address the relevance of the anticipated material conditions of young people facing family formation. The requirements to be fulfilled before people feel ready for parenthood and the engagement in a long term and costly commitment of raising a child increase and the same is true for the felt pretentiousness and responsibilities as a parent. The hypothesis of Ron Lesthaeghe and Dirk van de Kaa that the step from the first to the second demographic transition meant a shift from altruism to individualism as the driving force of fertility change can be questioned as well as Lesthaeghe?s particular approach of the multi-causal theory thou.

In my conclusions I will consider some consequences for methodological innovations needed to get a sound basis of empirical research.

2. Theoretical concept of a dynamic multi-level-schema

Fertility has to be seen as a change in the living arrangement, or more general, in the biographical status of individuals as a consequence of fertility related action. This kind of action by actor A is related to action in other life domains Y. It is also strongly related to the behavior of another actor B. These actions again are embedded in a differentiated structure of conditions of different kinds (restrictions and opportunities). There many concepts proposed you all know (Coleman 1990, Esser 1993, de Bruijn 2000). Please regard figure 1 for this.

Figure 1: A multi-level model of social change

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Actor A and B act pursuing preferred goals ? at the end serving for subjective optimal living conditions in different life domains: Final goals might be physical and psychic well-being, social approval, personal security etc. (Lindenberg 1989; Nauck 2000) People act in a way that from their subjective perspective is most instrumental for these goals taking into account the conditions of relatively scarce resources to spend and calculating the probability of the materialization of the expected consequences. Regarding the consequences of their action, they take into account not only the immediate consequences for their life course, but also more and more the medium and long-term future effects. This is very important.

There are many concepts proposing different dimensions of a general incentive/ disincentive structure regarding fertility (Nauck/ Kohlmann 1999). Mainly the following dimensions are emphasized, which can be considered regarding the choice of living arrangements in general. As far as the incentives are concerned:

,,psychic and emotional benefits" ,,socio-normative benefits" ,,economic benefits" ,,assurance benefits"

As far as the disincentives are concerned:

,,investment (direct) cost" ,,opportunity cost" ,,cost of social control" ,,negative externalities from the action of the partner and/or children". ,,separation cost"

The specific incentive / disincentive structure of a particular actor is molded by three dimensions of conditions of action.

First, there are the objective structural conditions of action (,,external" opportunity structure): cultural, social, political, economic and ecological conditions that favor or disfavor a certain kind of action (opportunities and restrictions) in the sense that it has different effects on incentives resp. disincentive from the point of view of the actor. Second, we have to regard the resources the individuals have access to or control: economic capital, human/cultural capital, psychic capital, biological/genetic capital and achieved biographical status. Third, there are the individual psycho-social dispositions that could be seen as an ,,inner" opportunity structure with elements that are differently stable in time: expectations, orientations, and emotions. Beliefs, convictions, values, subjective needs establish a preference structure of individual goals saying what is important and what is unimportant for a person from the subjective perspective.

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On the background of my schema now three aspects are discussed, which are most important for explaining today's stability and change in fertility trends.

3 Motivation to parenthood

The second demographic transition approach is correct, traditional social and cultural factors determining fertility lose relevance. We also have to deal with a fundamental change in gender roles. People have got efficient technical means to plan and conduct family formation and development beyond traditional patterns of behavior. However, does this inevitably lead to a steady decline of cohort fertility ? which means no or only small recuperation in Lesthaeghe's model not to talk about a possible reversal of the age at family formation?

The family can be conceptualized as an action system of purposeful actors A, B, and so on. It is characterized by a joint production of goods, for example raising children and giving emotional satisfaction. Following Coleman's model, the family is an action system of a particular kind. The elements of families are persons and not positions like in modern purposeful corporate actors building the purposeful social structure (Coleman 1990). During the process of modernization many kinds of activities moved from the family to the pusposeful social structure (production, education, care and nurturing etc.). Also the amount of time actors spend together in the family shrank. The male and to an increasing extent the female adults engage more and more in the purposeful social structure. Coleman argues that the motivation to uphold family relations decreases and family specific social capital disappears (Coleman 1990: 590ff). Children are no more private goods, but public ones.

Coleman's description of the consequences of modernization on the family is correct and quite instructive. However his conclusion with regard to the family are not convincing. We realize a specialization of inner family relations as a source of particular psychic and emotional satisfaction. The kind of social capital the family provided changed during the process of modernization. It is not serving for skill and material oriented support anymore but psychological and identity sustaining support. The relationship between parents and children now can be expected to be more and more characterized by ,,dialogical", i.e. non-strategical communication and personal exchange. Getting children means creating a social relation or social capital of a particular kind with advantages for the parents, which cannot be purchased. There is no substitution for this in the market. Schoen and his co-authors discuss parenthood in this respect also using the concept of social capital (Schoen et al. 1997). Using data of the NSFH they investigated fertility intentions. They conclude:

,,Most significantly, we found strong support for the hypothesis that persons for whom relationships created by children are important considerations in childbearing decisions are more likely to intend to have a (another) child. The `social capital' effect is strong across

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parity, union status, gender, and race. The theoretical and empirical evidence presented here provides strong justification in social resource value of children as a prime motivator of childbearing in low-fertility countries" (Schoen et al. 1997: 349).

Economic factors (employment career and economic costs) play a less prominent role. They find this, even though the operationalization of the ,,social capital"- or ,,social resource"hypothesis is far from ideal, because it combines instrumental and non-instrumental aspects.

Following the VOC-theory, one can propose non-material benefits, such as, emotional satisfaction, stimulation and fun, the "expansion of ones' self" and social identity. It is argued that a mere list of potential benefits of parenthood, as in the VOC theory, is of dubious value (Friedman/ Hechter/ Kanazawa 1994: 380). As long as no theoretical reason is provided for the relevance of those benefits, this criticism is correct. That is why I tried to derive the need for the specific benefit of dialogical relations from a short reflection on a theory of the self in modern societies (Huinink 1995). I do not argue that it is the only one which meets the requirements of dialogical interaction, however it is a privileged one because there are good reasons to suppose additional psychological benefits of parenting.

Now one can argue that particularly in advanced modern societies people need this kind of social settings with closed network structure characterized by trustful and ,,authentic" social relations. There is a motivation for setting up those relations (Huinink 1995, Schoen et al. 1997). Coleman does not stress this ? as it is not the case in the second demographic transition theory. It proposes that the incentive to have children should become weaker during this development (Coleman 1990: 585), arguing with the shift from altruism to individualism.

Studies of the desire for children show remarkably stable patterns over time and between different age groups. Empirical evidences come from Bongaarts and others. Bongaarts argues that the gap between the desired family size and period fertility is caused by the ongoing delay of family formation and an effect of demographic translation (Bongaarts 1998). This is a demographic reason but by no means substantial. Results from the FFS show that the expected number of children in nearly all European countries is well above 2 and that it is not very different between different educational groups. See for this also figures 2 and 3. The data are taken from standard tables of country report of the FFS (comp. Bongaarts 1999).

Figure 2: Average number of children ultimately wanted in different European countries (Age Group 35-39).

In higher age groups the expected number is somewhat more realistic and decreasing, probably counteracting a positive cohort effect. In figure 3, a younger age group is chosen. The latter makes some difference, but in most countries these differences are not too large. Also the ranking of the countries changed quite a bit.

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Figure 3: Average number of children ultimately wanted in different European countries (Age Group 20-24).

How weak these indicators ever might be ? we need much more research on the intention issues ? they show a fairly high level of fertility intentions and with only a small percentage of women expecting to stay childless over time. As we know, the realized number of children will be well below the expected ones for the cohorts presented here. Contrary to the realized figures expected family size presumably does not differ very much between different groups in the populations.

To summarize: There is a particular ,,modern" or even ,,postmodern" motivation for children and parenthood. Therefore the very low birthrate in many Western societies might be an expression of an unintended adaptation to the structural recklessness of societal conditions with respect to the family (Kaufmann 1994: 169) ? by delaying and often as a consequence of this by giving up further fertility.

4 Explaining fertility from a multi-level perspective

In many European countries becoming parents today biographically is not an unconditional task anymore. It has to fit into other dimensions of the life course to a sufficient level in the long-term perspective. I argued elsewhere that particularly three ,,problems" have to be solved before young people feel ready for a family: gaining certainty about the personal biographical future, gaining certainty about the long-term economic affordability of a family tasks and the question of compatibility of family with non-family activities. Then fertility is a matter of autonomous decision-making in the life course perspective and competing with other life goals. Increasing autonomy in planning and conducting life means that structural factors gain relevance as well as individual characteristics. Only studying the individual level logic of family formation in advanced modern societies helps to identify the (subjectively) relevant macro dimensions of societal conditions of fertility behavior.

Let us look at two of these problems. We consider two macro-micro links explaining fertility behavior and showing remarkable deviations from a macro-level based trend hypothesis of the kind the second demographic transition theory proposes. They can be connected to two of the three theories Lesthaeghe uses to support his approach: Becker's theory of the effects of improved prospects of women in the labor market and Easterlin's theory of the effects of relative income deprivation on fertility behavior (Becker 1991, Easterlin 1980). Both are multi-level theories because they connect macro conditions with individual decision-making. Both are quite different and I will argue that Lesthaeghe?s concept to combine them with the theory of ideational shifts for the theoretical basis for the second demographic transition (multi-causal theory with strong contextual variations) can be questioned, because important aspects are not considered enough.

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4.1 The compatibility question and polarization in family formation

Referring to Becker's conclusions and the assumed ideational change, Ron Lesthaeghe writes: ,, This joint occurrence constitutes a major interaction term with considerable predictive power: as long as we have equal education standards for both sexes and as long as the highly educated also form a cultural elite in tandem with being an economic one, chances are that fertility will remain below replacement level and that the other outcomes of the second demographic transition will continue" (Lesthaeghe 1998: 9). I will discuss that in my third step.

It is true that many people, well educated in particular, are reluctant to become parents because of their improving prospects in the labor market. However one important aspect is not taken into account in this context. If it is true that we have still high motivations for children, these people might have problems to solve the problem of the combination of work, engagement in other market activities and parenting. This is particularly true if we assume that the outcomes of different life domains are not completely substitutable against each other. I argued that this is the case for the experiences with children. Therefore we should expect a high motivation to combine family and non-family activities.

Friedman, Hechter, and Kanazawa (1994) instead argue, "that the impetus for parenthood is greatest among those whose alternative pathways for reducing uncertainty are limited or blocked" (Friedman/Hechter/ Kanazawa, 1994: 383). Missing prospects for a stable work career, for example, should strengthen the readiness for parenthood. Good prospects should have negative effects on the propensity to parenthood. The same is even proposed in regard to the relation between prospects for marriage and parenthood. The core assumption of this theory is that marriage, parenthood, and a stable work career are alternative means of reducing uncertainty in the long run. Therefore, if following one of these perspectives is sufficient to satisfy the need for reduction of uncertainty, the incentive to intend any of the others should be small.

The authors do not consider that combining two tracks, say marriage and parenthood, might be rational from the uncertainty point of view. And they do not take into account that the benefits of one dimension cannot be substituted completely by another. The mentioned life plans should not be real alternatives. People want to have both, a family and a gainful work experience, because it might be rational to try to reduce uncertainty concerning the future life course by gaining stable economic prospects of both partners and therefore being confident in regard to the affordability of a subsequent parenthood. The motivation to invest into the quality of the children is high. This means, labor force participation of both partners is supportive for a family ? if the compatibility problem is solved. Then there is no relation of substitution but of complementarity!

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