Azerbaijan Military - WikiLeaks



Azerbaijan Military

ARMY

AUG04 JUL05 JUN06 JUL07 GROUND COMBAT VEHICLES

Tanks

120 120 120 # T-72 heavy

100 100 100 100 T-55/54 medium

Armored Combat Vehicles

44 44 44 44 BMP-1 IFV

41 41 41 41 BMP-2 IFV

1 1 3 1 BMP-3 IFV

28 28 20 20 BMD-1/2 IFV

21 21 21 21 BRM-1 combat reconnaissance vehicle

Armored Personnel Carriers

25 25 25 25 BTR-60

28 28 28 28 BTR-70

11 11 11 11 BTR-80

11 11 N/A N/A BTR-A amphibious

393 393 393 393 MT-LB

11 11 BTR-D

ARTILLERY

Guns

22 22 22 22 152-mm 2A36 "Giatsint" (M1976) towed

# 26 26 26 120-mm 2S9 NONA gun/mortar

# # N/A N/A 100-mm T-21 anti-tank

# # N/A N/A 85-mm D-44 anti-tank

# # N/A N/A 73-mm SPG-9 recoilless

# # N/A N/A 23-mm ZSU-23-4 SP anti-aircraft

(truck-mounted)

Howitzers

# # N/A N/A 152-mm 2S3 "Akatsiya" self-propelled

30 30 30 30 152-mm D-20 towed gun/howitzer

92 92 80 80 122-mm D-30 towed howitzer

# 12 12 12 122-mm 2S1 "Gvozdika" self-propelled

Multiple Rocket Launch Systems

53 53 53 53 122-mm BM-21 Grad SP

# BM-30 300-mm MRL (Ukraine 9A52)

Mortars

47 47 47 47 120-mm PM-43

# 120-mm PM-38

MISSILES

Anti-tank

(250 of the following:)

# # # # AT-3 Sagger (Russian 9K11 Malyutka)

# # # # AT-4 Spigot (Russian 9K111 Fagot)

# # # # AT-5 Spandrel (Russian 9K113 Konkurs)

# # # # AT-7 Saxhorn (Russian 9K115 Metis)

Surface-to-Air

(40+ of the following:)

# # # # SA-4 Ganef (Russian 2K11 Krug)

# # # # SA-8 Gecko (Russian 9K33 Osa)

# # # # SA-13 Gopher (Russian 9K35 Strela-10

AUG04 JUL05 JUN06 JUL07 AIRCRAFT

Fighter/attack

8 8 6 6 Su-25A Frogfoot attack

4 4 4 4 Su-17 Fitter attack

5 5 5 5 Su-24MR Fencer attack

4 4 4 4 MiG-21PF Fishbed fighter

(plus 1 in storage)

26 23 23 MiG-25 Foxbat (plus 9 in storage)

Transport

1 1 1 1 An-12 Cub

3 3 3 3 Yak-40 Codling

Trainer

28 28 28 28 L-29C Delfin trainer/light attack

(Czech Rep.)

12 12 12 1 2L-39A Aero trainer/light attack

(Czech Rep.)

1 1 1 Su-17U Fitter

3 3 MiG-25U Foxbat

2 2 SU-25UB Frogfoot

Helicopters

15 15 15 15 Mi-24R Hind attack

13 13 13 15 Mi-8C Hip transport

7 7 7 7 Mi-2 Hoplite utility

MISSILES

Surface-to-Air (100 of the following)

# # # # SA-2 Guideline (Russian S-75 Dvina)

# # SA-3 Goa

# # N/A N/A SA-4 Ganef (Russian 2K11 Krug)

# # SA-5 Gammon

# # N/A N/A SA-8 Gecko (Russian 9K33 Osa)

# # N/A N/A SA-9 Gaskin (Russian 9K31 Strela-1)

# # N/A N/A SA-13 Gopher SP (Russian 9K35 Strela-10)

Anti-Aircraft Guns

40 40 N/A N/A ZSU-23-4 SP

AUG04 JUL05 JUN06 JUL07 SHIPS

Small Combatants

2 2 2 2 STENKA-class patrol (Border Guard)

1 1 1 N/A OSA II-class missile patrol (no SSM)

1 1 1 1 ex-AK-55 (Russian ZHUK class)

1 1 1 N/A SVETLYAK class

1 1 1 Turkish AB-25 class (Turkey)

2 N/A ACG.1 class

1 1 POINT class (ex-U.S. Coast Guard)

Mine Countermeasures

3 3 3 0[0] Sonya class coastal minesweepers

(no longer in service)

2 2 2 2 ex-YEVGENYA-class inshore minesweepers (Russia)

Amphibious

2 2 1 1 POLNOCNY B-class medium landing ship

(Russia)

2 2 POLNOCNY A-class medium landing ship

(Russia)

2 2 2 N/A VYDRA class

1 1 T-4-class landing craft (Russia)

Support

1 1 1 N/A VADIM POPOV (research)

1 1 1 N/A BALERIAN URYVAYEV (research)

1 N/A 1 1 LUGA-class cadet training (Russia)

1 1 EMBA-class cable layer (Russia)

1 1 SHELON-class torpedo retriever

(Russia)

1 1 PETRUSHKA-class training cutter

(Russia)



Manpower available for military service:

males age 16-49:2,278,888

females age 16-49:2,291,770 (2008 est.)

Manpower fit for military service:

males age 16-49:1,696,167

females age 16-49: 1,923,556 (2008 est.)

Manpower reaching military service age annually:

males age 16-49:94,402

females age 16-49: 89,686 (2008 est.)

Military expenditures - percent of GDP:

2.6% (2005 est.)



7/20/08 - A senior Turkish bureaucrat said on Friday that Azerbaijan might join Turkeys project to manufacture new tanks.

• The bureaucrat expressed thought that a related agreement could be signed and the project could be launched within this month.

• Bayar enumerated the areas in which Turkey and Azerbaijan could cooperate as manufacturing military ships, unmanned aircraft and infantry rifle. Source

7/16/08 - Azerbaijan and Jordan intend to develop military technical co-operation.

• possibilities of developing co-operation will be discussed during the visit of the Chief of General Headquarter of Army of Jordan, Khalid al Sarayr, who arrives in Baku on 16 July

• A question on possibility of training military personnel and purchasing armaments will be considered.

07/01/08 - Azerbaijan’s Defense Ministry denies reports of leasing two unmanned jets from Georgia

• According to media reports defense bodies of the two countries began the talks a month ago. It is planned to lend air scouts to Azerbaijan for six months.

• Spokesman for Azerbaijani Defense Ministry, Lieutenant-Colonel Eldar Sabiroghlu told APA that they were unaware of it.

05/06/08 - Defence Minister of Azerbaijan, will participate in the training of Kazakhstan Air Force assault crew on 6 May.

• The Azerbaijani and Kazakhstan Defence Ministers are expected to discuss further cooperation in the defence sphere. Source

04/29/08 - Azerbaijan is pursuing a military agenda for its future that does not rely on NATO or Russian sponsorship

• Despite the benefits of three consecutive years of defense spending of more than USD1 billion, Azerbaijan accomplished little in terms of procuring advanced weapons systems or investing in modern equipment

• The $2bill 2008 defense budget failed to include the planned outlays necessary to procure the arms and equipment essential to building a real fighting force

• both the army and air force have continued to suffer from neglect, with continued shortages of spare parts and poor maintenance of existing stocks

• The one exception has been the Azerbaijani navy, which has significantly increased its capabilities

• The Azerbaijani army, traditionally the core service of the armed forces, also lacks power projection capabilities and is far from attaining even a minimum level of combat readiness

• Despite increases in Azerbaijans budget recently, the military still remains largely ineffective, as was evidenced by the last skirmish in Nagorno-Karahakh.

• there is a more obscure, structural obstacle stemming from a deeper problem of nepotism and outright corruption among the more senior ranks, and a deep-seated desire among the elite not to allow the military to ever play the role of a challenger to the political status quo.

• even with the enormous state budgets for defence, a relatively small proportion of defence spending has actually been spent on weapons, training and essential equipment.



................
................

In order to avoid copyright disputes, this page is only a partial summary.

Google Online Preview   Download