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ToTHE OFFICERS AND MENwho fought and diedat Pearl HarborAdmiralKIMMEL'SSTORYby Husband E. KimmelHENRY REGNERY COMPANYChicago, 1955Copyright 1955 by Henry Regnery Company. Copyright under Interna-tional Copyright Union. Manufactured in the United States of America.Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 55-6520.First Printing, December, 1954Second Printing, December, 1954FOREWORD NO LAWYER can claim that he undertook thedefense of Admiral Kimmel. Counsel merely furnished thelegal auxiliaries in the Admiral's unremitting quest that his-tory record the truth about Pearl Harbor. When one comparesthe copious data now available with respect to that historicoccurrence, with the sparse and garbled information in thepublic domain in the years immediately following the attack,one must conclude that Admiral Kimmel's determined effortto preserve for posterity as much of the evidence as could beunearthed has been productive. There is a story within the Pearl Harbor story. That is theaccount of the Admiral's struggle to discover and to preservethe facts. It must be remembered that Admiral Kimmel wasnever formally charged with dereliction of duty or errors ofjudgment by any instrumentality or agency of his governmentunder circumstances which afforded him the opportunity ofdefending his name. The technique adopted was to relegatehim to the category of forgotten men with the criticisms of theRobert's Commission hanging over him like a vague indict-ment whose allegations were never to meet the test of trial. In the days immediately following the attack the public wasled to believe that court martial proceedings were ultimatelyto be commenced. However, the wartime emergency and pub-lic absorption with the crucial tides of battle were advancedas continuing pretexts for not instituting them. Thus mattersstood as of December 7, 1943, two years after the attack. Admiral Kimmel therefore sought the advice of counsel invFOREWORDorder to prevent the possibility, then verging on a probability,that he would be permanently deprived of an opportunity torecord those facts about Pearl Harbor which were within hisknowledge and to have recorded for history all other factswhich diligent inquiry might reveal. He was anxious to doeverything within his power to insure that the Statute of Lim-itations applicable to such cases was extended so that its bar-rier could not be invoked as a pretext for permanent officialinaction in his case. His personal waiver of this defense, cheer-fully given, might not cure a jurisdictional defect. Legislationwas probably a necessity. In extending the Statute of Limitations in 1944 Congressadded in substance a directive to the Secretaries of War andNavy to investigate the Pearl Harbor disaster. This was em-bodied in the legislation with Admiral Kimmel's enthusiasticapproval. Indeed the thought originated with him. The Naval Court of Inquiry which convened in the summerof 1944 as a result of this Congressional directive was the onlytribunal of all those investigating Pearl Harbor at whose pro-ceedings the Admiral was permitted the traditional right tohave counsel, to introduce testimony, to examine and cross-examine witnesses. The proper scope of an introductory note such as this per-mits only a sketch of the dramatic developments in the proceed-ings of the Naval Court. It was there that the Admiral and hiscounsel first secured authorization for access to the Japaneseintercepted messages withheld from the Fleet. One can stillrecall the shock, amounting almost to physical revulsion, atone's first appreciation of the magnitude of useful intelligencewithheld from Admiral Kimmel and General Short. One canstill vividly remember the long frustrating days of the hearingswhen a directive from higher authority prevented the Admi-viFOREWORDrals who were members of the Naval Court from having intro-duced in evidence before them these vital documents, and theexpressions of horrified amazement which came over theircountenances when they were finally permitted to read the in-tercepted messages. It was also during the days of this hearingthat Admiral Kimmel received word of the death of his eldestson, a naval officer, in action in the far reaches of the Pacific.Those of us who were with him when this news came won-dered whether so tragic a blow would crush his spirit. Hecarried on. The findings of the Naval Court constituted a complete vin-dication of the Admiral and its records preserved for historyevidence of lasting importance as to the responsibility for thePearl Harbor tragedy. Certain of the developments subsequentto the Naval Court hearing were revolting to fair play, substan-tial justice and human decency. Ex parte secret inquiries wereinstituted by both services. From the subsequent naval pro-ceedings Admiral Kimmel and his counsel were excluded de-spite repeated requests that they be allowed to participate.The Admiral was denied access to the findings of the NavalCourt clearing his name. When a part of those findings werefinally released for publication along with those of the ArmyBoard, there were so many additional endorsements by "higherauthority" that it was with difficulty one could ascertain whatfacts had been found and by whom. This unsatisfactory condi-tion in turn led to the Congressional investigation of PearlHarbor where more significant documents and testimony wereleft as a fruitful legacy for the research of the future historian. Had Admiral Kimmel accepted passively the assignment ofthe Pearl Harbor disaster to an obscure footnote in Americanhistory, and permitted the early "official" version to go un-challenged, the facts which he now records would probably viiFOREWORDnever have been available to the American people. His un-swerving fortitude and determination produced dramatic andstartling revelations. It was the privilege of a lifetime to servean honest and courageous man striving against what seemedoverwhelming odds to emerge from the shadows of unde-served humiliation into the light of historic truth. CHARLES B. RUGG EDWARD B. HANIFYNovember, 1954viiiPREFACE IN JANUARY 1944, on the advice of my trustedlong-time friend. Captain Robert A. Lavender, U.S. Navy, Isucceeded in obtaining the services of Mr. Charles B. Rugg ofthe Boston law firm of Ropes, Gray, Best, Coolidge and Rugg. It was largely through Mr. Rugg's efforts that the Congressin June 1944 demanded, by a joint resolution, that the Execu-tive Department conduct an investigation of the Pearl Harborattack. At the Naval Court of Inquiry held pursuant to thisresolution, Mr. Rugg succeeded in placing on record the sup-pressed translations of the Japanese intercepts and other vitalinformation which until that time had been buried in thesecret files. Mr. Rugg had much to do with congressional action whichresulted in the joint congressional investigation of the PearlHarbor attack. His assistance to the Republican members ofthe joint committee served to place in the record much per-tinent and valuable evidence. I shall regret always that thecommittee rules prevented Mr. Rugg from examining wit-nesses. I am confident that a much clearer picture would haveresulted had he been permitted to do so. The American people may be thankful for men like CharlesB. Rugg who fight for truth and justice and have the abilityto win their fights. Throughout all this campaign Mr. Edward B. Hanify ofthe same firm was Mr. Rugg's indispensable assistant. As one of my counsel, Admiral Harry E. Yarnell attended allthe secret sessions of the Naval Court of Inquiry and most of ixPREFACEthe sessions of the joint congressional investigation. AdmiralYarnell's naval service included a detail as commandant of thenaval station at Pearl Harbor and also a detail as commander-in-chief of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet. His intimate knowledge ofthe conditions and problems which confronted me, and hiswide knowledge of naval and governmental affairs coupledwith his sound judgment, made his advice invaluable. Withthe detailed knowledge of the Pearl Harbor attack acquired atthese investigations. Admiral Yarnell has expressed his opin-ion forcibly and fearlessly on many public occasions. His con-tinued encouragement and support have inspired me to writethe account which I am now presenting to the public. As an associate counsel Captain Lavender gave his assistancewhich was soundly based on an extensive knowledge of civil,naval and military law and a detailed knowledge of the navalcommunication system. Mr. John J. Phelan was another able assistant to Mr. Rugg. During the past year Vice Admiral John F. Shafroth by hisencouragement and by his comment on the manuscript hasassisted greatly. I am also indebted to Dr. Charles Callan Tansill and Cap-tain Miles Du Val for their constructive comments, whichhelped me materially. Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey has never wavered in hisconviction that I was left "holding the bag" for something Idid not know and could not control. His outspoken loyalty onall occasions, both public and private, sustained me throughthe difficult years immediately following the Pearl Harbordisaster. When Captain Laurance Frye Safford, U.S. Navy, disclosedto me the data which had been buried in the secret files ordestroyed, he put in jeopardy his whole naval career. This stepxPREFACEtook courage, honesty, and a high standard of duty. Before thedisclosures to me I had known Captain Safford only casually.He had my respect for his attainments in his chosen field,cryptoanalysis, in which he was tops. HUSBAND E. KIMMELGroton, ConnecticutOctober, 1954XiCONTENTS PAGEFOREWORD, by Charles B. Rugg and Edward B. Hanify ..........vAUTHOR'S PREFACE ..........................................ix CHAPTER IBACKGROUND TO PEARL HARBOR .................................1 1. Responsibility .....................................1 2. My Appointment to Command the Fleet...................5 3. At Battle Station When Japs Attacked..................7 4. General Short.........................................8 5. Relations with General Short..........................9 CHAPTER IIDEFICIENCIES IN PACIFIC FLEET AND HAWAIIAN BASE 1941.......11 1. Relation of the Fleet to the Base....................11 2. Pearl Harbor as a Fleet Base.........................12 3. Local Naval Base Defense Forces......................13 4. Fleet Patrol Planes and Local Air Defense............14 5. Security of Fleet in Port............................17 6. Information Regarding Aircraft Torpedoes.............19 7. Detachment of Ships from Pacific Fleet...............21 8. Comparison with Japanese Navy........................22 9. Tasks Assigned to the Pacific Fleet..................23 10. Fleet Personnel and Training.........................25 xiii CONTENTS-continued PAGE 11. The Fuel Problem in the Fleet......................28 12. Relations between the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet and His Staff and Task Force Com- Manders.............................................29 13. Security of the Fleet at Sea.......................30 CHAPTER III INFORMATION-ORDERS AND ACTIONS PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941.........................................33 1. Information and Dispatches, January- October 16, 1941....................................33 2. Ambassador Grew's Report............................35 3. The 1940 Alert......................................37 4. Courses of Action Open to Navy Department...........38 5. Dispatches from October 16, 1941 to and Including November 27, 1941..........................40 6. Analysis of the So-Called War Warning Dispatch of November 27, 1941, and Related Information........45 7. Vagaries of Radio Traffic Analysis..................52 8. Action Taken and Decisions Made after November 27, 1941....................................59 CHAPTER IVINFORMATION WITHHELD AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE.................78 1. Attempts to Base the Fleet in California............78 2. Decoding Equipment..................................82 3. This Means War.....................................103 4. Memory Failures....................................103 5. Captain McCollum's Testimony.......................104xivCONTENTS-continued PAGECHAPTER VSECRET POLITICAL COMMITMENTS.............................113 1. Secret Promise of Armed Support to British.........113 2. Faulty Assurances..................................118CHAPTER VISUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE..................................122 1. Japanese Intercepts................................122 2. The White House File...............................125 3. Senator Thomas' Bill...............................127 4. Important Communications...........................128 5. Three Incidents: a Summary.........................129 6. Captain Safford and Admiral Pye....................130 7. Why the Fleet Was Not Kept Indefinitely at Sea.....132 8. Some Strange Testimony.............................133 CHAPTER VIIADMIRAL STANDLEY'S COMMENTS ON COMPOSITIONAND PROCEDURE OF THE ROBERTS COMMISSION..................135 CHAPTER VIIIINVESTIGATIONS...........................................146 1. The Roberts Commission.............................146 2. Statement of Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald, U.S. Navy, Dated March 20, 1944, Concerning the Proceedings of the Roberts Commission...............151 3. The Hart Investigation.............................158 4. The Naval Court of Inquiry.........................159 xv CONTENTS- continued PAGE 5. The Hewitt Investigation...........................165 6. The Congressional Investigation....................166 CHAPTER IXVILIFICATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT...........................170 CHAPTER XTHE STORY ENDS...........................................186APPENDIX.................................................189NOTES....................................................202Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan, May 30, 1941.....207The Pacific Theater......................................208xvi CHAPTER I Background to Pearl Harbor The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.-Constitu- tion of the United States. 1. RESPONSIBILITYIt is now more than a decade since the tragic news fromPearl Harbor made millions of Americans aware that somepeople in high office had committed blunders of such mag-nitude that our national security was gravely imperiled. Thequestion immediately arose as to the best procedures to befollowed in the matter of fixing responsibility for these blun-ders. Quite obviously. Congress bore no burden of responsi-bility for the disaster. The attack on the morning of December7, 1941, was a fiery answer to Secretary of State Cordell Hull'sultimatum to Japan of November 26, which, in Hull's ownwords to Secretary of War Stimson had "broken the whole mat-ter off....I have washed my hands of it and it is now in thehands of you and Knox-the Army and the Navy."1 As CaptainOliver Lyttleton, British Minister of Supplies, remarked onJune 20, 1944, "America provoked Japan to such an extentthat the Japanese were forced to attack Pearl Harbor." And asStimson himself said, "The question was how we should ma-neuver them into firing the first shot without allowing toomuch damage to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition."2 The1 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYreal story of that policy of pressure upon Japan was largely re-vealed in the hearings before the joint congressional commit-tee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack. Needlessto say, neither General Short nor I had any clear perception ofthe fact that the Roosevelt Administration was pursuing acourse of action that made war with Japan inevitable. We didknow that in the Atlantic a state of undeclared war existed. Itseemed obvious to us that conflict in the Pacific was neithernecessary nor desirable. War on two fronts would present agrave question that our best military minds would find difficultto answer. At Pearl Harbor, General Short and I knew only a small partof the political story behind the Japanese attack. Care was takennot to send us the intercepted Japanese messages which told ingreat detail each step in the Japanese program. The revealingpassage in the Diary of Secretary Stimson, November 25, 1941,in which he outlines to Roosevelt the strategy of maneuveringthe Japanese into striking the first blow at America, was, ofcourse, unknown to us. But we did know, after December 7,that some one in Washington in high office had either blun-dered badly or had consciously pursued a policy that ledstraight to Pearl Harbor. Until this day I have kept silence on the subject of PearlHarbor and the historical facts centered around Washingtonthat made such a tragedy possible. When these facts were firstbrought out, I could not bring myself to the point of actuallywriting about them. Nor could I bring myself to set down thedetails of the abuse and maltreatment heaped upon me bywhat appeared to be an organized effort, at first quite success-ful, to place the entire blame on General Short and myself. Now however I deem it my duty to speak out. What tookplace in Washington must be so clearly placed on the public2 BACKGROUND TO PEARL HARBORrecord that no group of persons in administrative power willever dare again to invite another Pearl Harbor and then placethe blame on the officers in the fleet and in the field.The actions in Washington, which for a time so tragicallyimpaired the national security, made our own officers and en-listed men a decoy for a desperate and resourceful nation.Those individuals in Washington charged with the duty ofsupplying orders and information to the commanders at PearlHarbor can not evade their responsibility for the completesuccess of the attack and its terrible consequences. For three months prior to the attack on the Fleet a wealth ofvital information received in Washington was withheld fromthe commanders in Hawaii. The information received duringthe ten days preceding the attack clearly pointed to the fleet atPearl Harbor as the Japanese objective, yet not one word ofwarning and none of this information was given to the Hawai-ian commanders. When Mr. Frank Knox, the Secretary of the Navy, arrivedin Pearl a few days after the attack, his first question to mewas: "Did you receive my message on Saturday night?" He wasconvinced a warning message had been sent to me the nightbefore the attack. Repeated efforts by various investigationsfailed to find any trace of such a message. Secretary Knox's question is of great significance, for it clear-ly shows that he had been aware of the seriousness of the situa-tion and firmly believed that a warning message had been sentthe night before the attack. Who or what stopped the Secre-tary's message has never been determined but certainly it musthave been a result of action by someone in high authority. In a succeeding chapter of this account I have set forth thesubstance of the tremendously significant Japanese intercepts,received and decoded in Washington on December 6 and3 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYDecember 7, 1941, that were withheld from Pearl Harbor.3 General George C. Marshall's warning,4 belatedly dis-patched at 11:52 A.M. Washington time-6:22 A.M. Pearl Har-bor time on Sunday, December 7, was sent in a non prioritystatus by commercial circuit when he had on his desk a tele-phone with a direct connection to the headquarters of the com-manding general in Hawaii! The Chief of Naval Operations,Admiral Harold R. Stark, made no attempt to send informa-tion about the intercepts or a warning to me by the highlydependable and rapid naval communication service, whichcould also have been used to transmit Marshall's message. Therewere no delays in the transmission of messages between Wash-ington and Pearl Harbor over the naval communication cir-cuit. During the interval when Marshall's message was in trans-it, a routine message was received at my headquarters, decodedand delivered within less than one hour after it was filed inthe Navy Department in Washington. An urgent priority mes-sage would have been transmitted, decoded and delivered inless than half an hour. This lack of action on the part of both the War and NavyDepartments must have been in accordance with high politicaldirection, because the officers in both these departments re-peatedly demonstrated both before and after Pearl Harbor thatthey were not careless, inefficient or incompetent. One or twoof them might have slipped up, but certainly not all of themconcertedly. The two prime agencies responsible for keepingthe field commanders informed and giving them orders werethe War Department and the Navy Department. These twoagencies were responsible only to the President of the UnitedStates. It is impossible to believe that both these agencies ofsuch proved reliability and competence should simultaneouslyand repeatedly fail in such a crisis. 4 BACKGROUND TO PEARL HARBOR 2. MY APPOINTMENT TO COMMAND THE FLEET Near dusk on a Sunday afternoon in mid-January, 1941, Ireturned to the naval base at Pearl Harbor after a game of golf.At that time, as a rear admiral, I was in command of the cruisersof the battle force consisting of three divisions of light cruis-ers. Back of that particular assignment stretched a forty-yearperiod since I had first left my native Kentucky to enter theNaval Academy at Annapolis in 1900. As a junior officer I hadserved in destroyers, battleships and cruisers. I had been a tur-ret officer and a gunnery officer of battleship and cruiser, asquadron and fleet gunnery officer, and production officer ofthe U.S. naval gun factory in Washington, D.C. I had sailedaround the world in the "white fleet" of sixteen battleshipssent forth by President T. R. Roosevelt in 1907, and I had beenan aide to Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roose-velt when the latter visited the Pacific coast to help commem-orate the opening of the Panama Canal. I had taken part inthe pacification-of-Cuba campaign, and I had served oft thewest coast of Mexico during the troubled times when ourforces were landing at Vera Cruz. I had demonstrated to theBritish Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow a photographic system forthe analysis of gunnery scores which I had a major part indeveloping. Afterwards I served as squadron gunnery officerwith the American battleships assigned to the British GrandFleet in 1917 and 1918. As executive officer of the U.S.S.Arkan-sas, I was present at the surrender of the German fleet at Rosythin 1918. I had seen service in the Far East as captain of theyard at Cavite in the Philippines, and as a destroyer divisioncommander in our Asiatic Fleet on patrol duty during theChinese revolution with a special detail to guard the flight ofthe round-the-world Army planes on their leg between Hong5 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYKong and Calcutta. I commanded a squadron of destroyers,the battleship New York, and a heavy cruiser division in thePacific Fleet. I served as chief-or-staff to the commander battle-ships of the battle force. My shore duty included the Naval War College at Newport,assistant director of fleet training, officer in charge of the policysection, and director of ship movements in the office of thechief of naval operations in Washington, and a tour as budgetofficer of the Navy Department. In 1939 I had made a goodwill trip around South America with three heavy cruisers,visiting Venezuela, Brazil, the Argentine, Chile and Peru. With this background of long service, I was still totally inthe dark as to what awaited me when I came in from the golfcourse in January 1941 to be met at the fleet landing by one ofmy staff with the word for me to report immediately aboardthe fleet flagship, then alongside one of the docks. When I cameaboard I was escorted to the quarters of the chief-of-staff whoshowed me a dispatch from the Navy Department informingAdmiral James 0. Richardson that I was to relieve him ascommander-in-chief about the first of February. My reactionsat the time are stated in a letter to the Chief of Naval Opera-tions dated January 12,1941: When I got the news of my prospective assignment, I was per- fectly stunned. I hadn't any intimation that Richardson's relief was even being considered; and even had I known that his relief was being considered, I did not in my wildest dreams really think that I would get the job. Nevertheless, I am prepared to do every- thing I can when I take over on about the first of February. Admiral Richardson was and is a friend of mine. I knew himto be a thoroughly capable officer. His summary removal wasmy first concern. I could see then and can see now no adequate 6 BACKGROUND TO PEARL HARBORreason for his removal from command in such a manner. I wentimmediately to his quarters in Honolulu to inform him thatfrom my knowledge of his efficient command of the fleet therewas no justification for his being relieved. I assured him that Idid not know his relief was even being contemplated and thatI had made no effort whatsoever to get the appointment. I feltvery badly about Richardson's dismissal. Months later I was informed that Richardson had been re-moved from command because he hurt Mr. Roosevelt's feel-ings by some forceful recommendations presented personallyto the President in October 1940. At this time, Richardson hadurged that the Fleet be based on the West Coast where he be-lieved it could be prepared for war much more efficiently andexpeditiously than if it remained based on Pearl Harbor. 3. AT BATTLE STATION WHEN JAPS ATTACKED My assigned living quarters at Pearl Harbor, on a hill over-looking the fleet anchorage, were about two hundred yardsfrom the administrative headquarters of the fleet. I spent the forenoon of December 6, 1941, in my office atfleet headquarters going over dispatches and reviewing thesituation with Vice Admiral William S. Pye, the second incommand of the fleet. In the afternoon I worked with CaptainC. H. McMorris, the war plans officer, and Captain Walter S.De Laney, the operations officer. In the evening I went to din-ner with Rear Admiral H. F. Leary at the Halekulani Hotelin Honolulu. I returned to my quarters and went to bed about9:30 P.M. I was called to the telephone about 7:30 A.M. December 7,1941, to receive a report that the destroyer "Ward" had con-tacted and bombed a strange submarine. The "Ward" action7ADMIRAL KIMMEL’S STORYappeared to be in compliance with my order of November 27,1941, but because we had had so many fake contact reports Iwas waiting for an amplifying report from the "Ward" whenthe Jap planes began their attack on the fleet about 7:55 A.M.,Honolulu time. I came out of my quarters in time to see the Jap planes mak-ing their first attack on the battleships. I immediately boardedmy waiting car and arrived at the fleet headquarters in less thanten minutes after the attack commenced. By this time all theantiaircraft guns in the fleet were in action. 4. GENERAL SHORT General Walter C. Short arrived in Honolulu a few daysafter I relieved Admiral Richardson in command of the fleet.I had never met General Short. Mindful of the necessity ofmutual understanding and cooperation between the two serv-ices in a situation where their interests were so intertwined asthey were at Hawaii, I called upon General Short in civilianclothes at the quarters in Honolulu he was temporarily occupy-ing before he took over the duties of commanding general. Ifound him then and later to be a man of sound judgment anda competent soldier. My liking and respect for him increasedas I came to know him better. In the next few months he andAdmiral Bloch, the commandant of the naval district, workedout and put into effect a plan to coordinate the efforts of theArmy and Navy air forces operating from Hawaiian air sta-tions. I was convinced General Short greatly improved the effi-ciency of his command. He, like myself, was handicapped bypersonnel and material shortages and the influx of large num-bers of untrained officers and enlisted men. General Short and I were not "opposite numbers" in the8 BACKGROUND TO PEARL HARBORsense that our total concerns and duties were coextensive. Theresponsibilities of the fleet under "War Plans" were far flungand offensive. Those of the Hawaiian Department were localand defensive. Because I was interested in the security of thefleet and the Hawaiian Islands, I gave General Short all theassistance I could, even in connection with local defensivemeasures which were exclusively under the Army's control.The aircraft warning service is a case in point. I took Armypersonnel to sea with the fleet so that they could be trained asradar operators. I assigned to the Army a naval officer, who hadhad experience in Britain with radar, to give any advice andassistance he could in connection with the aircraft warning netin Hawaii. General Short informed me his radar was operatingand could give a l00-mile coverage. In joint Army-Navy drillsit did perform satisfactorily. In the period before December 7,I was informed that the Army's radar was manned. It was somanned. It was only the day before the attack that a subor-dinate Army officer gave the permission to shut down at 7 A.M.on Sunday. Even despite this, one of the stations was operatingafter 7 A.M. on the morning of December 7, and obtained in-formation about both the incoming and outgoing Japaneseplanes. This information was not passed on to the Navy be-cause the subordinate Army officer to whom it was reported didnot deem it important. 5. RELATIONS WITH GENERAL SHORT My relations with General Short, which were once the sub-ject of considerable confusion in the public mind, have nowbeen clarified by exhaustive investigations. I need not labor it.It has been established that our official and social relationswere friendly, that we frequently conferred on official matters 9 ADMIRAL KIMMEL’S STORYof common interest and invariably did so when either of usreceived messages which had any bearing on the developmentof the United States-Japanese situation, or on our severalplans in preparing for war. As the Naval Court of Inquiry sum-marized the matter: Each was mindful of his own responsibility and of the responsi-bilities vested in the other. Each was informed of the measuresbeing undertaken by the other in the defense of the Base to adegree sufficient for all useful purposes.510 CHAPTER IIDeficiencies in Pacific Fleetand Hawaiian Base 1941 Strategic freedom of Action of the Fleet must be as- sured. The Fleet must have no anxiety in regard to the security of its base.- "Joint Action Army and Navy,1935." 1. RELATION OF THE FLEET TO THE BASEA NAVAL BASE exists primarily for the support of the fleet.The Naval Court of Inquiry in paragraph VIII of itsfindings states: A Naval Base exists solely for the support of the Fleet. The fundamental requirements that the strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured demands that the defense of a per- manent Naval Base be so effectively provided for and conducted as to remove any anxiety of the Fleet in regard to the security of the Base, or for that of the vessels within its limits.... To super- impose upon these essentials the further requirement that the seagoing personnel shall have the additional responsibility for security from hostile actions while within the limits of a per- manent Naval Base, is to challenge a fundamental concept of naval warfare. This principle has long been recognized by both the Armyand the Navy. In the "Joint Action Army and Navy, 1935," 11 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYthe responsibility for the defense of Pearl Harbor was vestedin the Army. That specifically provided: Strategic freedom of action of the Fleet must be assured. TheFleet must have no anxiety in regard to the security of its base. When I took command of the fleet, the exchange of lettersbetween the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navyindicated that the provisions of the agreement would be car-ried out and that existing deficiencies in the defense of PearlHarbor would be corrected.1 However, it was never my dispo-sition to assume that high echelon agreements or correspond-ence were panaceas. At all times in 1941 I was concerned withthe security of the fleet base at Pearl Harbor. I did everythingwithin my power to strengthen and improve the base defense. 2. PEARL HARBOR AS A FLEET BASE Pearl Harbor was the only refueling, revictualing, and re-pair point for ships operating in the Hawaiian area. There wasno other point where fuel could be obtained. Our four tankersfitted for fueling at sea were completely inadequate. This wasin marked contrast to the conditions under which our AsiaticFleet was operating. In addition to the repair, supply and re-fueling facilities available in Manila Bay in the Philippines,our Asiatic Fleet had a number of refueling ports available tothem in the British and Dutch East Indies where limited re-pair and supply facilities were likewise available. The AsiaticFleet could base on Singapore even as the Japanese fleet didthroughout the whole war from 1942 to 1945. Pearl Harbor had but one entrance. Because of the topog-raphy of the island and the narrowness of the channel, the cap-12 PACIFIC FLEET AND HAWAIIAN BASE 1941 ital ships were obliged to move in and out in single file. We had frequent training in this maneuver even at night under war conditions without lights. To complete a sortie of the fleet required at least three hours. The danger that the channel would be blocked was always present. The defense of such a base before the outbreak of hostilities is quite different from its defense in war. During hostilities, when the fleet is not required to wait un- til the potential enemy commits the first overt act, our own offensive operations protect the base. Pearl Harbor was included within an area defined as the"Hawaiian Coastal Frontier" in Annex 1, page 9, Joint Armyand Navy War Plan Rainbow 5.2 The defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, which in-cluded Oahu and all the land and sea areas required for thedefense of Oahu, was entrusted by this plan to the commandersof the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, who were designated asfollows: Army-The Commanding General Hawaiian Department Navy-The Commandant, i4th Naval District, who is desig- nated as the Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier. This officer also commands the assigned Naval local defense force and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army.3 3. LOCAL NAVAL BASE DEFENSE FORCES The local naval base defense forces under the commandantof the 14th Naval District were negligible. On October 17,1941, the commandant wrote requesting the Navy Departmentto send a number of small fast craft, equipped with listening 13 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY gear and depth charges, and two squadrons of patrol planes. He said: The only increment that has been made to these forces during the past year, exclusive of net vessels, is the USS SACRAMENTO which has no batteries, to speak of, with which the vessel can fight, and no speed with which she can run.4 I forwarded the commandant's letter with the following en-dorsement: There is a possibility that the reluctance or inability of the De- partment to furnish the Commandant, 14th Naval District, with forces adequate to his needs may be predicated upon a concep- tion that, in an emergency, vessels of the United States Pacific Fleet, may always be diverted for these purposes. If such be the case, the premise is so false as to hardly warrant refutation. A fleet, tied to its base by diversions to other purposes of light forces necessary for its security at sea is, in a real sense, no fleet at all. Moreover, this Fleet has been assigned, in the event of war, certain definite tasks, the vigorous prosecution of which requires not only all the units now assigned but as many more as can be possibly made available. The necessities of the case clearly war- rant extraordinary measures in meeting the Commandant's needs.5 4. FLEET PATROL PLANES AND LOCAL AIR DEFENSE The commander of the Hawaiian Department, GeneralShort, and the commander of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier,Admiral Bloch, had no means to conduct distant air recon-naissance from the Island of Oahu. The War Department hadallocated on paper 180 flying fortresses to the Hawaiian De-partment. General Short had only twelve of these planes inHawaii prior to the attack. Only six were in flying condition.14 PACIFIC FLEET AND HAWAIIAN BASE 1941 The Navy Department had allocated on paper l00-oddpatrol planes to the commandant of the i4th Naval District.He never received a single patrol plane. As a consequence, the base defense against air attack waspredicated on borrowing fleet patrol planes for distant searches.Under the war plans these fleet patrol planes were earmarkedfor operations with the fleet thousands of miles from Hawaiishould war come. Their primary mission was always connectedwith fleet operations. They were frequently based on the out-lying islands-Midway, Wake, Johnston, and Palmyra. Theyhad to train with the fleet and search areas in which the fleetoperated. Under these circumstances, they were available fordistant search from Oahu only when and if the fleet did notneed them for its own operations, actual or impending. Theywere not at any time sufficient in number to cover in distantsearches more than one-fourth of the area through which ahostile force could approach Pearl Harbor. And this coveragecould be maintained for a few days only. Search was to be instituted only when there was informationfrom other sources that a carrier strike against the islands wasprobable within narrow time limits.6 This was a makeshiftplan, but none better was possible with the means at hand. In the estimate prepared at Pearl Harbor and submitted tothe Navy Department the type of air attack the Japs actuallymade was considered the most probable form such an attackwould take. At this time the department was informed thatdue to our limited forces we must know within narrow limitswhen to expect the attack if our defensive measures were to beeffective. The commandant of the 14th Naval District wrote lettersto the chief of naval operations December 30, 1940,7 May 7th,1941,8 and on October 17, 1941,9 pointing out that he had no 15 ADMIRAL KIMMEL’S STORYplanes and that he needed planes. Each of his letters was strong-ly and favorably endorsed by the commander-in-chief of thefleet. On November 25, 1941, two weeks before the attack, thechief of naval operations informed the commandant: The Department has no additional airplanes available for assignment to the 14th Naval District. Allocations of new air- craft squadrons which become available in the near future will be determined by the requirements of the strategic situation as it develops.10 Much has been made of the fact that Secretary Knox warnedof an air attack on Pearl Harbor in a letter to the Secretary ofWar in January 1941.11 This was a timely letter, instigated bymy predecessor Admiral Richardson in an attempt to inducethe War and Navy Departments to improve the totally inade-quate defensive power against an air attack on the fleet base atPearl Harbor. Largely as a result of Richardson's efforts the War Depart-ment allocated 180 B-17 flying fortresses to the Hawaiian De-partment and the Navy allocated more than 100 PBY patrolplanes to the commandant of the 14th Naval District. Thesewere the types of planes the local base defense forces had torely upon to locate and destroy enemy aircraft carriers. On December 7, 1941, as we have seen, the Army Hawaiianair force had twelve B-17 flying fortresses out of the 180 prom-ised in the Spring of 1941 and the command of the 14th NavalDistrict had not received a single patrol plane. The followingtable is a graphic illustration of the astounding but little real-ized patrol and bombing plane situation that existed in Oahuimmediately prior to the Pearl Harbor attack.16PACIFIC FLEET AND HAWAIIAN BASE 1941________________________________________________________________________Planes capable of locating and destroying enemy aircraft carrierspromised and supplied to the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.________________________________________________________________________Total toTo CommandantHawaiianTo Army Hawaiian 14th NavalCoastal_______________Department_____________District___________FrontierPromised180 B-17 bombers100 Patrol Planes280Supplied 12 B-17 bombers None12In operatingConditionDecember 7,1941 6 B-17 bombersNone 6==================================================================== No one has ever explained why the weaknesses so clearlydescribed in the Secretary of the Navy's letter of 24 January,1941,12 were permitted to continue during all these months atthis outlying station whose security was vital to the safety ofthe fleet and of the United States. 5. SECURITY OF FLEET IN PORT Under my standing orders I placed the guns of the fleet atthe disposal of the local antiaircraft defense. My security or-der 2CL4113 prescribed a plan for berthing ships in sectors todevelop in each sector the maximum antiaircraft fire. I desig-nated the commandant of the 14th Naval District naval basedefense officer because he was permanently stationed in PearlHarbor and would always be familiar with local conditions. Idelegated to him the duty of advising the senior officer presentafloat (exclusive of the commander-in-chief) just what condi- 17 ADMIRAL KIMMEL S STORYtion of readiness to maintain in the ships in port. This was aflexible system designed to use the fleet's resources in port inthe base defense. In addition, I issued standing orders for all ships that am-munition for all antiaircraft guns, 5", 3", 1.1 and 50 calibre,be kept available in the ready ammunition boxes at the gunsat all times, day and night. These orders also required thatthere be on board at all times a sufficient number of trainedpersonnel to man completely all the guns of the antiaircraftbattery. All double bottom and lower deck compartments ofthe ships in harbor were to be kept closed except when workrequired they be temporarily opened. No higher state of mate-rial readiness could long be continued without serious reduc-tion in the morale and physical condition of men and the ac-complishment of necessary work on the ships. At the time of the attack, the orders in effect required thatone-fourth to one-half of the antiaircraft guns, depending uponthe type of ships, be manned at all times in port. At the time ofthe attack, the guns were so manned. Admiral Inglis has testi-fied that on the morning of the attack, all the antiaircraft bat-teries on all the ships were manned and firing within four toseven minutes.14 The men of the fleet on December '7, 1941,made the transition from peace to war with speed and courage. My security order 2CL41 of October 14, 1941, was a revisionof an order of the same title issued shortly after I took com-mand of the fleet in February 1941. This order provided con-ditions of readiness to be constantly maintained and thosewhich were to be placed in effect when ordered. With all meas-ures prescribed in effect, the base was on a condition of com-plete alert. I have been informed that this order was retainedby my successor without change for at least one year after theattack. A copy of this order is included as an Appendix.18 PACIFIC FLEET AND HAWAIIAN BASE 1941 6. INFORMATION REGARDING AIRCRAFT TORPEDOES In his letter to the Secretary of War on January 24, 1941,the Secretary of the Navy listed an air torpedo plane attack asone of the possible forms of hostile action against Pearl Har-bor. Subsequently, the Chief of Naval Operations forwardedto the Pacific Fleet and the commandant, 14th Naval District,detailed technical advice which practically eliminated fromconsideration an air torpedo plane attack as a serious dangerto ships moored in the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor. The depth of water in Pearl Harbor is thirty feet or less, ex-cept in the channels where it is generally forty feet. On Feb-ruary 15, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations wrote to me onthe subject of antitorpedo baffles for protection against torpedoplane attacks on Pearl Harbor, stating: Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T [anti-torpedo] baffles within Pearl Harbor for protection against tor-pedo plane atack. It is considered that the relatively shallowdepth of the water limits the need for anti-torpedo nets in PearlHarbor. In addition, the congestion and the necessity for maneu-vering room limit the practicability of the present type ofbaffles. . . . ... A minimum depth of water of 75' may be assumed neces-sary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. 150' of water isdesired. The maximum height planes at present experimentallydrop torpedoes is 250'. Launching speeds are between 120 and150 knots. The desirable height for dropping is 60' or less. About200 yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding deviceis armed but this may be altered.15 In the same letter the Chief of Naval Operations under- 19 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYlined the fact that the depths of water in which torpedoes werelaunched in the successful attacks at Taranto were betweenfourteen and fifteen fathoms; that is, eighty-four to ninety feetof water. A letter of similar tenor was sent by the Chief of Na-val Operations to the commandants of various naval districts,including the 14th Naval District.16 On June 13, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent an-other letter on the same subject to the commandants of thevarious naval districts, including the commandant of the 14thNaval District. A copy of this letter was sent to me.17 Afterreading it my staff and I, as well as the commandant of the 14thNaval District, believed that the danger of a successful airplanetorpedo attack on Pearl Harbor was negligible. The Naval Court of Inquiry concluded that the torpedoeslaunched by the Japanese in the shallow water of Pearl Harborconstituted, in effect, a secret weapon in the category of therobot bomb, which was unknown to the best professional opin-ion in Great Britain and the United States at the time.18 TheSecretary, in his endorsement to that report, stated that theNavy Department had information from British sources thataircraft torpedoes were successfully launched in forty-two feetof water in the year 1940. Such information was never sup-plied to me, and was apparently unknown to the Chief of Na-val Operations. In any event, the Navy Department apparently decided thattorpedo baffles in Pearl Harbor were not required and exhib-ited no concern at their absence. In his letter to me of February 15, 1941, the Chief of NavalOperations stated, in effect, that existing torpedo nets were socumbersome that their installation in Pearl Harbor would in-terfere with the movement of ships and the ability of the fleetto get away on short notice. He said:20 PACIFIC FLEET AND HAWAIIAN BASE 1941 There is apparently a great need for the development of a light efficient torpedo net which could be laid temporarily and quickly within protective harbors and which can be readily removed. The fleet did not have facilities in Hawaii to manufactureantitorpedo nets or baffles. If the light efficient net described bythe Chief of Naval Operations was ever developed by the NavyDepartment in 1941,1 never heard of it or received it. AdmiralKing, in his endorsement to the record of the Naval Court,tersely stated: "The decision not to install torpedo baffles ap-pears to have been made by the Navy Department." 7. DETACHMENT OF SHIPS FROM PACIFIC FLEET On May 24, 1941, Admiral Stark wrote me that he had "anoverall limit of thirty days to prepare and have ready an expe-dition of 25,000 men to sail for, and to take the Azores." Inconnection with this proposed expedition in May and June of1941, practically all the trained and equipped marines on theWest Coast, several small transports, and some other smallcraft, were transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic.19 Theywere never returned. In April and May of 1941, one aircraft carrier, three battle-ships, four cruisers, and eighteen destroyers were detachedfrom the Pacific Fleet and transferred to the Atlantic.20 In aletter to me on April 19, 1941, Admiral Stark advised me ofthis proposed transfer. He described the fleet units to be de-tached as "the first echelon of the Battle of the Atlantic." Headded: "I am telling you; not arguing with you." This transfertook away approximately one-fourth of the fighting ships ofthe Pacific Fleet and resulted in a striking reduction in itspower. 21ADMIRAL KIMMEL’S STORY The details of the transfer must have been quickly known inJapan. When I was in Washington in June 1941, it was serious-ly proposed to transfer from the Pacific to the Atlantic an addi-tional detachment of three battleships, four cruisers, twosquadrons of destroyers, and a carrier. I opposed this strenu-ously. The transfer was not made. The war plans never contemplated that the Pacific Fleet wasto be devoted exclusively, or even primarily, to the defense ofHawaii. The control of the seas surrounding the HawaiianIslands and the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean was its re-sponsibility but the actual defense of the shore base at PearlHarbor was the responsibility of the Army. 8. COMPARISON WITH JAPANESE NAVY It was recognized that the Pacific Fleet was inferior to theJapanese Fleet in every category of fighting ship.21 No one inauthority expected that the Pacific Fleet could meet the Jap-anese head on. Admiral King's official report, "Our Navy at War," trans-mitted to the Secretary of the Navy on March 27, 1944, com-pletely dispelled previous public misconceptions about thestrength of the Pacific Fleet prior to Pearl Harbor. Said Ad-miral King: Had we not suffered those losses [at Pearl Harbor], however, our fleet could not have proceeded to Manila as many people sup- posed and there relieved our hard pressed forces. Such an under- taking at that time, with the means at hand to carry it out and support it, would have been disastrous. Japan at the outbreak of hostilities, had nine aircraft carriersin commission and operating. We had three carriers in thePacific and those did not have their full quota of planes.2222 PACIFIC FLEET AND HAWAIIAN BASE 1941 Although the battleships of the fleet were all approximately the same age as the heavy ships of the Japanese Navy, our ships were particularly deficient in short-range antiaircraft weapons. 9. TASKS ASSIGNED TO THE PACIFIC FLEET The joint Army-Navy war plan formulated in Washingtonprimarily emphasized the defeat of Germany. Admiral R. K.Turner, war plans officer for the Chief of Naval Operations in1941, in his testimony before Admiral Hart, correctly describedthe objectives of the war plan in these words: The plan contemplated a major effort on the part of both the principal Associated Powers against Germany, initially. It was felt in the Navy Department, that there might be a possibility of war with Japan without the involvement of Germany, but at some length and over a considerable period this matter was dis- cussed and it was determined that in such a case the United States would, if possible, initiate efforts to bring Germany into the war against us in order that we would be enabled to give strong sup- port to the United Kingdom in Europe. We felt that it was en- cumbent on our side to defeat Germany, to launch our principal efforts against Germany first, and to conduct a limited offensive in the Central Pacific, and a strictly defensive effort in the Asiatic.23 In accordance with this statement of principles, the basicwar plan of the Army and Navy, Rainbow No. 5, provided insection 4, paragraph 13(a): Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theatre. The principal United States military effort will be ex- erted in that theatre, and operations of United States forces in other theatres will be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that effort.24 23 ADMIRAL KIMMEL S STORYAgain, section 4, paragraph 13(d) of the plan provided: Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against Jap- anese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the Military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States does not intend to add to its present Military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay Barrier by divert- ing Japanese strength away from Malasia. The United States in- tends so to augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East. The Navy basic war plan, W.P.L. 46, was issued by the NavyDepartment in Washington and prescribed the Pacific Fleet'stasks and theatre of operations. The Pacific Fleet's theatre ofoperations included the ocean area from the shore of Northand South America to within a short distance from the coast ofAustralia, and north of the equator to a line extending to thewestward of the Marianas up to latitude thirty degrees north,where the area was extended to the Asiatic continent. It wasin this vast expanse that the Pacific Fleet was to divert enemystrength from Malaya and the East Indian archipelago (1) bythe denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, (2) bydestroying Axis sea communications and (3) by protecting theterritory and shipping of the Associated Powers. It became apparent soon after I took command that theexisting organization of the U.S. Fleet was not a proper one tomeet the tasks which would be required in a Pacific war. Earlyin 1941, therefore, the vessels of the Pacific Fleet were reorgan-ized into three task forces, including one fast carrier task force,24 PACIFIC FLEET AND HAWAIIAN BASE 1941one amphibious task force and one battleship task force. Intheir movements at sea, these task forces were operated as un-der wartime conditions. Fueling at sea, a requirement forlong-range operations, was stressed. The operating schedule was so arranged that there was al-ways at least one of these task forces, and usually two, at sea.Frequently, during fleet maneuvers, the entire fleet was at sea.Periods in port were, of course, necessary for all ships. At notime during 1941 were all of the ships of the fleet in PearlHarbor. 10. FLEET PERSONNEL AND TRAINING On February 1, 1941, when I took command of the fleet,there was a serious shortage of both trained and untrained per-sonnel. For the preceding eight months target practice hadbeen practically suspended. Uncertainty as to whether the fleetwould be based at Pearl Harbor or on the West Coast had de-layed the transfer of target rafts and other essential equipmentfrom the West Coast to Hawaii. The transfer of these facilities,which had been started some time before I took command, wascompleted shortly thereafter. Due to these circumstances and through no fault of my pred-ecessor the fleet was not ready for war. I set out to make itready. This required an intensive training program. In carry-ing out this program we were handicapped by the constant de-tachment in large numbers of qualified officers and enlistedmen to meet the demands of the expanding procurement andtraining agencies on shore, and to supply trained personnel toman new ships. Competent officers and enlisted men were replaced by new-ly commissioned reserve officers and recruits from training sta- 25 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYtions. Excellent material, but they required training and in- doctrination, which takes time and effort. In the meanwhilethe ships they manned were not ready to fight. More than halfthe officers of the fleet were newly commissioned reserve offi-cers. There were times when three-fourths of the men in aship had never heard a gun fired. Aviation expansion required the fleet to supply large num-bers of trained officer and enlisted aviation personnel to manthe new ships and to provide instructors at aviation fields onthe mainland. Specialists in ordnance, engineering, and avia-tion were required for inspection, design and supervisoryduties in the procurement program of ships and planes. Thispersonnel had to be supplied from the fleet. There was noother source. There were other factors that made the training activitiesof vital importance. In addition to individual ship training,I had to provide for coordinated training of ships, divisionsand squadrons as part of the fleet as a whole. New weapons andnew techniques were an every day product of the war in Eu-rope. New methods had to be devised, tested and perfected tomeet new threats. For instance, the antiaircraft defense of largeformations had to be improved to meet possible Japanese airtactics in the event of war. Our previous training, chiefly dictated by safety considera-tions, had been largely confined to individual ship practices indefense against individual attacks. It was now necessary to de-velop means and methods of countering mass attacks by coor-dinated fire, in maximum volume, from as many ships as couldbring their guns to bear with reasonable prospect of hittingthe target and allowing for acceptable hazards to other ships. Again, the advent of radar with all of its implications, par-ticularly the necessity for wide extension of existing communi-26 PACIFIC FLEET AND HAWAIIAN BASE 1941cation channels required to take full advantage of its latentpossibilities, posed an entirely new problem for which no solu-tion was to be found in past experience. We had to visualizeand set up new situations in order even to indicate a solution.It was only through wide experience, covering a period ofmonths and crowding in as much work as possible, that newapparatus could be utilized to its fullest potential. We werehandicapped by the fact that we had only a few ships equippedwith radar making it all the more important that advantagebe taken of every opportunity that could be stolen from thefew days or weeks that might remain to us prior to actual hos-tilities. Among other things radar gave promise of completely revo-lutionizing the art of night warfare. This possibility was espe-cially important, as it was known that the Japanese attachedgreat importance to night action. Measures such as steamingand maneuvering in complete darkness in large and complexformations, with abridged accent on safety, had to be perfected.Most of this program was, for us, entirely experimental be-cause large scale and complicated maneuvering at night wasnew to our Navy. In addition to all this, we needed all the time we could get to try out and perfect the operations we had set up for the opening phases of the war, if it came, against Japan. These operations, too, were largely new and untried, and handi- capped by lack of facilities and personnel, particularly for am- phibious landings. These exercises gave birth to the fast carrier task force, later found so effective in the prosecution of the war. Our training activities were not just "routine training" or "peacetime training." They were intensified training activ- ities indispensable to the creation of fighting efficiency in the fleet. 27 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY 11. THE FUEL PROBLEM IN THE FLEET The fuel problem affected every decision. At this time boththe reserve stocks in the Hawaiian area and the facilities forgetting fuel from storage tanks into combatant ships were notadequate. The Pacific Fleet had only eleven tankers. Of these,only four had the speed and mixed cargo characteristics suit-able for fueling other ships at sea. It required from twenty-fourto thirty-six hours to refuel a task force in Pearl Harbor. Shortly after I organized the fleet in three major task forces,I attempted to keep two of the three forces at sea and only onein Pearl Harbor. I quickly found that fuel deliveries were fall-ing behind consumption. The reserves were being depleted ata time when it was imperative to increase them. It was this fact,and this alone, which made it necessary to have two task forcessimultaneously in Pearl Harbor at certain periods. It was high-ly inadvisable, unless an attack on Pearl Harbor was known tobe imminent, to keep the fleet at sea and fuel it by sendingdetachments into Pearl Harbor at night even if there had beenadequate fuel reserves in port. Operations at sea would havebeen then restricted to a small area, thereby unjustifiably in-creasing the risk of submarine attack. A destroyer at full power exhausts its fuel in thirty to fortyhours, at medium speed in four to six days. War experience hasproven the necessity of fueling destroyers every third day, andheavy ships about every fifth day, to keep a fighting reserve onboard. To have kept the entire fleet at sea for long periodswould have required not eleven tankers but approximatelyseventy-five, with at least twenty-five of them equipped for un-derway delivery instead of the four I had. I did not have adequate fuel reserves. There were no facil-ities at Pearl Harbor for delivering stored reserves to the ships28 PACIFIC FLEET AND HAWAIIAN BASE 1941at a rate which would permit fueling more than about one-fourth of the fleet in any one twenty-four-hour day or one-eighth of it in any one period of darkness. To keep the fleet atsea and exhaust our resources only to find that such expendi-tures were unnecessary, or still worse, to have the entire fleetshort of fuel when action was joined, were contingencies toograve to be accepted on indefinite information or conjecture.The fuel storage and the facilities for delivering the fuel toships were in process of extensive improvement prior to theattack. All of these changes have long since been completedand existing facilities bear little resemblance to those of 1941. We had one newly commissioned Navy troop transport inthe Pacific and a handful of partially trained marines at SanDiego. These, with the marines stationed at Pearl Harbor andthe outlying islands, constituted our landing force. We had nolanding craft. 12. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF PACIFIC FLEET AND HIS STAFF AND TASK FORCE COMMANDERS My relations with my staff, task force commanders and seniorflag officers were excellent. My staff was composed of superiorofficers whose records in the war have demonstrated their abil-ities. I was accessible to them. We had full and frank discus-sions about the various decisions which it was my responsibilityto make. The so-called "war-warning" dispatch I also discussedwith the senior task force commanders, Admiral W. S. Pye(commander of task force one). Admiral Halsey (commander oftask force two). Admiral Wilson Brown (commander of taskforce three). Admiral W. L. Calhoun (commander, naval baseforce), and Admiral Claude C. Bloch, the commandant of the 29 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY14th Naval District. I did not personally show that dispatch or discuss it with Admiral J. H. Newton or Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger. The orders sending Admiral Newton to Midway were issued by me to Admiral Brown, commander of task force three under whom Newton served. Admirals Newton and Brown conferred before the former set out for Midway.26 Admiral Newton proceeded under complete war conditions. As for Admiral Bellinger, Commander of Patrol Wing Two Pacific Fleet, he served directly under Admirals Bloch and Brown, who were familiar with all important developments. I was fully aware of the conditions in Admiral Bellinger's patrol plane force, knew and had approved his schedule of operations. Had I seen any need for him to change his course of action, I would have issued orders to him to that effect directly. 13. SECURITY OF THE FLEET AT SEA A description of the measures I took for the security of fleet units at sea remains to be given. The Naval Court of Inquiry has described them as follows: The task forces operating at sea were screened defensively by aircraft and destroyers. Torpedo defense batteries were manned day and night, ammunition was at hand, and depth charges were ready for use. Watertight integrity was maintained, horizon and surface battle lookouts were kept posted, radio was restricted to a minimum.27 The court concluded: "It is a fact that the precautions taken by Admiral Kimmel for the security of his Fleet while at sea were adequate and effective." 30PACIFIC FLEET AND HAWAIIAN BASE 1941 In summary, the Pacific Fleet in 1941 established and main-tained the highest degree of security measures at sea and inport consistent with our assigned mission of intensive prepara-tion for war. We had our difficulties with shifting personneland an exposed and inadequately defended base. We had muchto do in preparing a fleet then unready for war. We were proudof having a hard job to do. Admiral Hewitt, in his report tothe Secretary, made this finding: Throughout his incumbency as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel was energetic, indefatigable, resourceful and positive in his efforts to prepare the Fleet for war....28 We maintained as a regular procedure a high state of dailyalertness which, within a very short time, could be intensifiedto deal with a particular hazard when and if it developed. Weneeded one thing which our own resources could not makeavailable to us. That vital need was the information availablein Washington from the intercepted dispatches which toldwhen and where Japan would probably strike. I did not getthis information. With a fleet in the Pacific inferior in power to that of Japan,with detachments being made from that already inferior fleet,with a great dearth of defensive and offensive aircraft, withinsufficient tankers to keep the fleet at sea for any considerablelength of time, and with serious shortages and rapidly chang-ing personnel, I most certainly was entitled to and had everyreason to expect that all the latest and best information of thesituation that was available in the Navy Department wouldbe promptly supplied to me.31 CHAPTER IIIInformation-Orders andActions Prior toDecember 7, 1941 In spite of the risks involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people it was de- sirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones, so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors.-Henry L. Stimson, Sec- retary of War 1940-1945. 1. INFORMATION AND DISPATCHES, JANUARY TO OCTOBER 16, 1941During the year 1941, I received many dispatches andletters from the Chief of Naval Operations which canbest be described as "war warnings." On January 21, 1941, he sent a dispatch to the commander-in-chief which stated: The international situation continues to deteriorate. It now appears to me that if war eventuates its general character will be according to plan Dog my memorandum to the Secretary. If this estimate proves correct I contemplate ordering mobilization ac- cording to plan Rainbow Three with following modifications32 PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941 Atlantic Fleet principal concentration New England and Can- ada execute all tasks except affirm expect early reenforcement from Pacific and much stronger British Isles Detachment. Pacific Fleet awaiting attitude or execute assigned tasks in Area east- ward of 160 degrees east depending on action by Japan. Asiatic Fleet cannot expect early reenforcement alert status or carry out tasks according to circumstances.1 On February 3, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me a dispatch from the United States naval attaché in London, which stated: I have been officially informed that Japanese are apparently planning an offensive on a large scale presumed against Indo- China Malaya Peninsula of the Dutch East Indies no doubt to be coordinated with attack on Great Britain approximately Feb- ruary 10. It is definite that the Jap and German relations are becoming most intimate and that the Japs are conducting a hatred campaign against the British even in ordinarily pro-Eng- lish press also two large Japanese merchant vessel sailings have been cancelled. Reports believed reliable state, that all Jap ship- ping being called home to be taken over by the government. Re- quest your knowledge of this. The Japanese mediating Thai Indo China scene meeting aboard Jap cruiser. Price of umpire's services unreliably reported to be bases on the west coast of Siam that are usable by light craft for cutting Singapore communica- tions via the Malacca Straits.2 On July 3, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me adispatch which stated: The unmistakable deduction from information from numerous sources is that the Japanese Government has determined upon its future policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups. This policy probably involves war in the near future. An advance against the British and Dutch 33 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY cannot be entirely ruled out. However, CNO holds the opinion that Jap activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and development of Naval, Army and Air bases in Indo- China....3 The dispatch predicted that Japan's major military effort would be against Russian maritime provinces. It also stated that all Japanese vessels in United States Atlantic ports had been ordered to be west of the Panama Canal by the first of August. On July 3, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me an- other dispatch. This reported that the Japanese government had issued orders that certain Japanese vessels in the North Atlantic and Caribbean areas pass through the Panama Canal to the Pacific.4 Under these orders all Nipponese merchant vessels would be clear of the Caribbean and North Atlantic areas by July 22. It related information from unusually reli- able Chinese sources that within two weeks Japan would abro- gate the neutrality treaty with Russia and attack. The dispatch concluded as follows: The present strength and deployment of Nip Army in Man- churia is defensive and the present distribution of the Japanese Fleet appears normal, and that it is capable of movement either north or south. That a definite move by the Japanese may be expected during the period July 20-August 1 is indicated by the foregoing. [Italics supplied.] On July 25, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me a dis-patch in which the Chief of Staff joined. This advised that onJuly 25 the United States would employ economic sanctionsagainst Japan. It stated in part: ...The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff do34 PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7,1941 not anticipate hostile reaction by Japan through the use of mili- tary means but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against pos- sible eventualities. Action being initiated by the United States Army to call the Philippine Army into active service at an early date. This dispatch is to be kept secret except from immediate Army and Naval subordinates. . . .5 In addition to these dispatches the Chief of Naval Opera- tions' letters to me show recurrent tension in the international situation during 1941. His letters used such expressions as: "What will happen in the Pacific is anyone's guess." (Memo- randum of May 14, 1941.) An open rupture was described as a possibility on July 24, 1941. "Obviously, the situation in the Far East continues to dete- riorate; this is one thing that is factual." (July 31, 1941.) "... Also the seriousness of the Pacific situation which con- tinues to deteriorate." (August 21, 1941.) "I have not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific, but I could wish the thread by which it continues to hang were not so slender." (August 28, 1941.) "P.S. I have held this letter up pending a talk with Mr. Hull who has asked me to hold it very secret. I may sum it up by saying that conversations with the Japs have practically reached an impasse." (September 23, 1941.) 2. AMBASSADOR GREW'S REPORT None of these letters or dispatches warned of an attack inthe Hawaiian area, or indicated that an attack there was immi-nent or probable. None of these letters or dispatches directedan alert in the Hawaiian area against an overseas attack. 35 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY On the contrary, on February 1, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations wrote me on the subject of "Rumored Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor." He said Mr. Grew had telegraphed the State Department on January 27, 1941: The Peruvian minister has informed a member of my staff that he has heard from many sources, including a Japanese source that in the event of trouble breaking out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese intend to make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor with all of their strength and employing all of their equipment. The Peruvian minister considered the rumors fantastic. Nevertheless, he considered them of sufficient importance to convey this information to a member of my staff. The letter from the Chief of Naval Operations added: The Division of Naval Intelligence places no credence in these rumors. Furthermore, based on known data regarding the pres- ent disposition and employment of Japanese naval and army forces, no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future. [Italics supplied.]6 This estimate as to the improbability of a move against PearlHarbor was never withdrawn. Consider my situation as commander-in-chief of the PacificFleet at the time I received, by letter and dispatch, these omi-nous predictions of Japanese aggression in the Far East. I was carrying out an intensive training program to preparethe fleet for war. I was under specific injunction to continuethat program. In an official letter to me on April 3, 1941 (Serial038612), the Chief of Naval Operations wrote: In the meantime I advise that you devote as much time as may be available to training your forces in the particular duties which the various units may be called up to perform under your oper-36 PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941 ating plans. The time has arrived, I believe, to perfect the tech- nique and the methods that will be required by the special operations which you envisage immediately after the entry of the United States into War. On November 24, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me a dispatch stating that the chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan were very doubtful and that, in his opinion, an aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility.7 Ad- miral Stark testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry that he did not intend that the Pacific Fleet should discontinue its training program upon receipt of this dispatch, two weeks be- fore the attack.8 I was not expected to discontinue training for all-out secur-ity measures, concentrated on the defense of the HawaiianIslands, every time an alarming dispatch was received fromWashington predicting Japanese aggression in the Far East.Indeed, had I done so, the training program would have beencurtailed so drastically that the fleet could not have been pre-pared for war. During the time span covering the sending of these dis-patches the Navy Department knew just what my program inHawaii was. My fleet operating schedules were filed with theNavy Department, where the location and movement of sub-stantially every ship in the fleet was known at all times.9 Nodispatch or letter contained any order or suggestion for de-parture from my operating schedules. 3. THE 1940 ALERT When the War and Navy Departments wished to put theforces in Hawaii on alert against attack, they could and did 37 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY use appropriate language to that end. The dispatch of June 17, 1940, from the War Department to the Hawaiian garrison demonstrates this. That dispatch stated: Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with trans-Pacific raid to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or projecting undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until fur- ther orders. Instructions for secret communications direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge.10 In compliance with this order an alert was placed in effectwith special emphasis on possible carrier and plane attacks. Tobe sure, the overseas scouting was limited to such a small arcand range as to constitute no more than a token reconnais-sance. This alert was continued for about a month when ordersfrom Washington directed it be discontinued. At any time prior to the attack which commenced at about7:55 A.M. Hawaiian time on December 7, 1941, Washingtoncould have ordered an alert which would have been effectiveimmediately in Hawaii. As has been said, the chief of staff of the Army had on hisdesk in Washington a telephone with a direct connection tothe headquarters of the commanding general in Hawaii. Con-versations began over this circuit within twenty minutes afterthe attack commenced. An urgent priority message by naval communications wouldhave been received, decoded and delivered within less thanhalf an hour after it was filed in Washington. 4. COURSES OF ACTION OPEN TO NAVY DEPARTMENT Throughout 1941, the Navy Department had several coursesopen. It could furnish me directly with the best evidence of38 PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941Japanese intentions and plans, the intercepted Japanese mili-tary and diplomatic messages. This would have given me anopportunity to judge for myself the gravity and intensity of thecrisis as December 7, 1941, approached, and the probabilityof a Japanese attack on Hawaii. The Navy Department failedto do this. The Navy Department did not permit me to eval-uate for myself the intercepted Japanese military and diplo-matic messages. Another course of action then remained. That was to issuean order which would have directed disposition of the fleet toguard against an attack in Hawaii. The message of June 17,1940, "be on the alert against hostile overseas raid," was suchan order. It would have had the same effect in December of1941 as it had in June of 1940. Such an order was not given.Further, the War and Navy Departments could have orderedthe local commanders of the Hawaiian coastal frontier, Ad-miral Bloch and General Short, to execute the joint coastalfrontier defense plan. This was not done. The Navy Department could have given the order to mobil-ize under the War Plan. This order would have had a definitemeaning. It would have placed the fleet on an all-out war basis.The order to mobilize did not authorize acts of war.11 The dis-patch of January 21, 1941, indicated that mobilization wouldbe ordered when war was imminent.12 The order to mobilizewas not given. In the dispatches I received on and after October 16, 1941,I was not given available information as to the actual statusof Japanese-American negotiations and as to Japanese militaryplans; nor was I given orders for alert against an attack onHawaii. These dispatches had the same tenor as the warningswhich had previously been sent in February, June, and July,1941, predicting probable Japanese action thousands of milesfrom the Hawaiian area. 39 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY 5. DISPATCHES FROM OCTOBER l6, 1941, TO AND INCLUDING NOVEMBER 27, 1941 On October 16, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sentthe Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic, Asiatic and Pacific Fleets,the following dispatch: The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation. If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-American. If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the U.S. In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility. Since the U.S. and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possi- bility that Japan may attack these two powers. In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such pre- paratory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan.18 The term "preparatory deployments" used in this dispatchis nontechnical. It has no especial significance other than itsnatural meaning. After receiving this dispatch, I made certainpreparatory deployments. I ordered submarines to assume awar patrol off both Wake and Midway.14 I reinforced Johnstonand Wake, with additional marines, ammunition, and storesand also sent additional marines to Palmyra Island. I orderedthe commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District to directan alert status in the outlying islands. He did so and reportedhis action to me.15 I placed on twelve hours' notice certainvessels of the fleet which were in West Coast ports, held sixsubmarines in readiness to depart for Japan, delayed the sail-ing of one battleship which was scheduled to visit a West Coastnavy yard. I dispatched twelve patrol planes to Midway with40 PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941orders to carry out daily patrols within 100 miles of the Island,and placed in effect additional security measures in the fleetoperating areas.16 On October 22, I reported by letter all these dispositions tothe Chief of Naval Operations who specifically approved them,he wrote: "OK on the dispositions which you made in con-nection with the recent change in the Japanese Cabinet." The Naval Court of Inquiry found: He [Admiral Kimmel] did not interpret the dispatch of 16 Oc- tober as directing or warranting that he abandon his prepara- tions for war. He held daily conferences with his subordinate commanders and the members of his Staff, all experienced offi- cers of long service and sought by every means to ascertain wherein his interpretation might be incorrect. The consensus throughout was that no further steps were warranted by the information at hand. In the dispatch of October 16, 1941,1 was advised that there was a possibility Japan would attack the United States and Great Britain. I did not know, what I learned for the first time from testimony before the congressional committee in 1946, that my government had promised armed support to the Brit- ish if the Japanese attacked them." Furthermore, the fore- going advice was given a definite meaning by the Chief of Naval Operations in a letter to me on October 17, in which he said: Personally I do not believe the Japanese are going to sail into us and the message I sent you merely stated the "possibility"; in fact I tempered the message handed to me considerably. [Italics supplied.] This letter made it clear to me that when Admiral Stark 41 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYstated certain Japanese action to be "possible," he meant thatit was not probable. In his letter of October l7, 1941, the Chief of Naval Opera-tions enclosed a "Memorandum for the CNO" from CaptainR. E. Schuirmann, who was in charge of the Navy's liaisonwith the State Department. Admiral Stark stated in his letterthat this memorandum by Captain Schuirmann "sums up mythoughts better than I have been able to set them down." The dispatch of October 16 and the Schuirmann memor-andum were not consistent. The dispatch of October 16 be-gan: "The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created agrave crisis." The memorandum began: "I believe we are in-clined to over-estimate the importance of changes in theJapanese Cabinet as indicative of great changes in JapanesePolicy of thought or action." The memorandum further stated: "Present reports are thatthe new Cabinet to be formed will be no better and no worsethan the one which has just fallen." The memorandum wasto the effect that the Japanese military would determine Ja-pan's policy regardless of the cabinet in power. On November 24, I received a dispatch from the Chief ofNaval Operations which was addressed to me, the commander-in-chief of the Asiatic Fleet, and the commandants of theEleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, and Fifteenth Naval Districts.This dispatch read as follows: Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their Naval and Military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a pos- sibility. Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees to inform Senior Army Officers their areas.43 PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941 Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. Guam will be in- formed separately.18 Under date of November 25, the Chief of Naval Operationswrote me a letter which reached me on December 3. This let-ter contained a postscript added after a "meeting with thePresident and Mr. Hull today." The dates of the conferenceand the postscripts are not known to me. In the postscript hewrote: ... From many angles an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, India-China, Burma Road area as the most likely. I won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for: or we may do nothing-I think it more likely to be "anything." [Italics supplied.] On November 27, the Chief of Naval Operations sent tome and to the commander-in-chief of the Asiatic Fleet, thefollowing dispatch: This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japan- ese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate de- 43 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY fensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by War Department. SPENAVO inform British. Continental Districts Guam Samoa directed take appro- priate measures against sabotage.19 On the same day I received two other dispatches from the Chief of Naval Operations, which affected my current estimate of the situation, as well as my subsequent dispositions. The first of these dispatches was as follows: Army has offered to make available some units of infantry for reenforcing defense battalions now on station if you consider this desirable. Army also proposes to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops for advance bases which you may occupy but is unable at this time to provide any antiaircraft units. Take this into con- sideration in your plans and advise when practicable number of troops desired and recommended armament.20 The second of these dispatches was as follows: In order to keep the planes of the 2nd marine aircraft wing avail- able for expeditionary use OpNav has requested and Army has agreed to station 25 Army pursuit planes at Midway and a sim- ilar number at Wake provide you consider this feasible and de- sirable. It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier. Planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats essential spare parts tools and ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of regular Navy supply vessels. Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents. Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies. Stationing these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers to Philippines. Additional parking areas should be laid promptly if necessary. Can Navy bombs now at outlying44 PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941 positions be carried by Army bombers which may fly to those positions for supporting Navy operations. Confer with Com- manding General and advise as soon as practicable. [Italics supplied.]21 6. ANALYSIS OF THE SO-CALLED "WAR WARNING" DISPATCH OF NOVEMBER 27, 1941, AND RELATED INFORMATION The so-called "war warning" dispatch of November 27 didnot warn the Pacific Fleet of an attack in the Hawaiian area.It did not state expressly or by implication that an attack inthe Hawaiian area was imminent or probable. It did not repealor modify the advice previously given me by the Navy De-partment that no move against Pearl Harbor was imminentor planned by Japan. The phrase "war warning" cannot bemade a catch-all for all the contingencies hindsight may sug-gest. It is a characterization of the specific information whichthe dispatch contained. The dispatch warned of war-where? In the Far East. The dispatch stated: The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organ- ization of Naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or pos- sibly Borneo. Thus the Philippines, Thai, and the Kra Peninsula werestated to be expected objectives of Japan. When it came to"possible" objectives, Borneo was the only one specified.Hawaii was not mentioned. As the Naval Court of Inquirypoints out, "No reference was made to the possibility of anaggressive movement in any direction as had been done in 45 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYthe dispatch of 24 November." This indicated to us in thefleet that since the earlier dispatch, the Navy Department hadobtained later information, on the basis of which it couldspecify both probable and possible Japanese objectives. Moreover, the two other dispatches which I received onNovember 27, in addition to the so-called "war warning" dis-patch, were affirmative evidence that the War and Navy De-partments did not consider hostile action on Pearl Harborimminent or probable. One of these dispatches proposed that I send twenty-fiveArmy pursuit planes by aircraft carrier to each of the islandsof Wake and Midway.22 The other dispatch proposed the re-enforcement of Marine defense battalions on Midway andWake with Army troops.23 About the same time General Short received a dispatchfrom the War Department which stated that the Army pro-posed to take over the defense of these islands from the Ma-rines.24 Thus, the dispatches sent from the War and NavyDepartments were in disagreement on the very fundamentalsof the project. The proposed exchange of Army troops for Marines on theoutlying island bases was not feasible. General Short and Ihad extensive conferences on the subject. I learned that theArmy had no guns, either surface or antiaircraft, to equip anytroops which might relieve or reenforce the Marines. Thus,if the Marines were withdrawn, their equipment and armswould have to be left for the Army. I did not have sufficientadditional supplies to reequip and rearm the Marines re-moved. The Marines stationed on the islands were trained,acclimated and efficient beyond standards which could beimmediately obtained by Army troops relieving them. TheArmy had nothing in its organization comparable to a Marine46 PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1Q41defense battalion, so that the Army garrison would have re-quired a new table of organization. The proposed relief ofthe Marine garrisons by Army troops would necessarily disruptthe defense of the islands during the period that one garrisonwas preparing to depart and the other was being installed. Furthermore, at Wake, the most westerly of the two islands,there were no harbor facilities or anchorage. Material andpersonnel had to be landed from ships underway in an openseaway. Ships had been delayed in unloading at Wake for aslong as twenty-eight days due to bad weather. It was not un-usual for a ship to take as much as seven or eight days. Ex-tensive unloading of men and material from ships at Wake, inthe face of any enemy operation, would be impossible. I believed that responsible authorities in Washingtonwould not plan or propose a project for shifting garrisons un-der such circumstances, if they considered that enemy actionagainst these outlying bases was imminent. I promptly recommended to the Chief of Naval Operationsthat the Marines should not be withdrawn from the outlyingislands until the Army had received arms and equipment forits defense battalions and had adequately trained them.25 The replacement of Marine planes on the islands of Wakeand Midway with Army pursuit planes, as proposed by Wash-ington, was also impracticable. At conferences with the Armyon this matter, the commanding general of the Hawaiian airdetachment stated that the Army pursuit planes could notoperate more than fifteen miles from land, nor could they landon a carrier. Consequently, once they were landed on one ofthe outlying islands they would be frozen there. Their fifteen-mile limit of operation radically restricted their usefulness inthe island's defense. I so advised the Chief of Naval Operationsby dispatch and letter.26 47 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY The Army pursuit planes which it was proposed to send tooutlying islands from Oahu on November 27 constituted ap-proximately fifty per cent of the Army's pursuit strength onOahu. The very fact that the War and Navy Departments pro-posed their transfer from Hawaii indicated to me that respon-sible authorities in Washington did not consider an air raidon Pearl Harbor either imminent or probable. In brief, on November 27, subsequent to what was a virtualultimatum to Japan on November 26 the issuance of whichI was not informed, the Navy Department suggested that Isend from the immediate vicinity of Pearl Harbor the carriersof the fleet which constituted the fleet's main striking defenseagainst an air attack. On November 27, the War and Navy Departments sug-gested that we send from the island of Oahu, fifty per cent ofthe Army's resources in pursuit planes. These proposals came to me on the very same day of the so-called "war warning." In these circumstances no reasonable man in my positionwould consider that the "war warning" was intended to sug-gest the likelihood of an attack in the Hawaiian area. From November 27 to the time of the attack, all the infor-mation which I had from the Navy Department or from anyother source, confirmed, and was consistent, with the Japanesemovement in South East Asia described in the dispatch ofNovember 27. On November 27, 1941, General Short received the follow-ing message from the Army chief of staff in Washington: No 472 November 27, 1941 Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all prac- tical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japan-48 PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7,1941 ese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat, cannot be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil popula- tion or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostil- ities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers. [Italics sup- plied.] In reply to the order in the foregoing message to, "Reportmeasures taken," General Short sent this message: "Depart-ment alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy reuradfour seven two twenty seven." The words, "reurad four seven two twenty seven" are Armylanguage meaning "replying to your message number 472 ofthe 27th." Recorded testimony shows this report was read by the Secre-tary of War, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of WarPlans Army and the Chief of War Plans Navy. There can beno reasonable doubt this report was read and understood bythe responsible officials in Washington. After receipt of thisreport, Washington not only failed to indicate disagreementbut on November 28 sent two messages to the Hawaiian com-mand detailing the steps to be taken to prevent sabotage, es-pionage and subversive activity.27 For nine days the War De-partment failed to express any disapproval of this alert andlikewise failed to give General Short any information whichwas calculated to make him change the alert, although a wealth 49 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYof vital information obtained from decoded Japanese inter-cepts was received in Washington during these nine days, aswell as in the preceding two months, all of which was withheldfrom General Short. There is no doubt the alert prescribed by General Shortmet with the approval of the administration in Washingtonuntil clamor over the catastrophe of December 7 demanded ascapegoat. The administration provided two scapegoats. On November 30, the Navy Department sent, for informa-tion, a dispatch addressed to the commander-in-chief of theAsiatic Fleet. This stated there were indications that Japanwas about to attack points on the Kra Isthmus by overseasexpedition.28 The commander-in-chief of the Asiatic Fleetwas directed to scout for information of Japanese movementsin the China Sea. On December 1, the Navy Department sent me for informa-tion another dispatch which was addressed to the commander-in-chief of the Asiatic Fleet describing a Japanese intrigue inMalaya.29 Japan planned a landing at Khota Baru in Malayain order to entice the British to cross the frontier from Malayainto Thailand. Thailand would then call Britain an aggressor,and call upon Japan for aid. This would facilitate the Japan-ese entry into Thailand as a full-fledged ally, and give Japanair bases in the Kra Peninsula, and a position to carry outany further operations along Malaya. From the commander-in-chief of the Asiatic Fleet, from theChina coast, and other sources, we had reports of the develop-ment of a Japanese amphibious expedition headed south.Movements of troops, tanks, amphibian boats, landing craft,transports, and naval vessels had been sighted moving to theKra Peninsula.30 On December 6, 1941, the commander-in-chief of the Asi-50 PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941atic Fleet reported various large Japanese forces apparentlymaking for Kohtron.31 These consisted of one twenty-five-shipconvoy with an escort of six cruisers and ten destroyers, andanother ten-ship convoy with two cruisers and ten destroyers.The scouting force of the Asiatic Fleet had sighted thirty shipsand one large cruiser anchored in Camranh Bay in Indo-China. In short, all indications of the movements of Japanese mil-itary and naval forces which came to my attention confirmedthe information in the dispatch of 27 November that theJapanese were on the move against Thailand or the Kra Penin-sula in South East Asia. The fortnightly Summary of Current National Situationsissued by the office of the Chief of Naval Operations underdate of December 1, 1941, stated on page one: "Strong indica-tions point to an early Japanese advance against Thailand."32The same publication, on page nine, under the heading "TheJapanese Naval Situation," stated definitely: "Major capitalship strength remains in home waters as well as the greatestportion of the carriers." On December 3, 1941,1 received intelligence that Japaneseconsular and diplomatic posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Ba-tavia, Manila, Washington, and London, had been orderedto destroy most of their codes.33 This dispatch stated "most oftheir codes and ciphers"—not all—a point which was noted byme and my staff at the time. This information appeared tofit in with the information we had received about a Japanesemovement in South East Asia. Japan would naturally take pre-cautions to prevent the compromise of her communicationsystem in the event that her action in South East Asia causedBritain and the United States to declare war, and take overher diplomatic residences. 51 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY 7. VAGARIES OF RADIO TRAFFIC ANALYSIS In addition to actual observation, there was another way ofobtaining some indications of Japanese fleet movements. Thiswas the system of so-called traffic analysis. It rests on an at-tempted identification of call signs of various enemy shipsand of subdivision commanders in the enemy fleet. The callsign is a group of letters and numbers used by a ship to identifyitself much as a radio station announces itself as "StationWABC." The location of the ships from whence the call signsemanate is made by direction finders. In 1941 we had directionfinders at Manila, Guam and Pearl Harbor. We made a dailytraffic analysis. I went over the material with care. The charge has been made that the failure to identify andlocate the Japanese carriers by traffic analysis should have beentaken as evidence that they were on their way to attack thefleet at Pearl Harbor. There is no basis for such a charge. Under the best of circumstances the accuracy of estimatesof enemy fleet movements based upon traffic analysis is opento serious doubts. To illustrate: On December 8, 1941, afterthe attack, the commandant of the Sixteenth Naval Districtsent a dispatch to the Chief of Naval Operations, and to mefor information. This dispatch was based upon traffic analysismade by the communication intelligence unit in Manila. Itstated: The following Japanese distributions are based upon radio call recoveries since December first and are conservative: ...Radio bearings indicate that Akagi is moving south from Empire and is now in Nansei Islands area.34This dispatch therefore placed the Japanese carrier "Akagi"early on December 8 in Empire waters proceeding south from52 PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941Japan. As a matter of fact, we now know that the carrier"Akagi" was in the striking force that attacked Pearl Harborand could not possibly be moving south from Japan onDecember 8. I was familiar with the vagaries of traffic analysis, whichthis dispatch illustrates. May I point out how these mistakenestimates arise. Let us assume a radio call sign "KAGA" is heard, and thatdirection finders locate in the China Sea the ship from whichthis call sign issues. The crucial question still remains: Whatship is using the call sign "KAGA"? Is it a battleship, a cruiser,a destroyer, a carrier, or some auxiliary? The actual intelli-gence transmitted by the ship having the call sign "KAGA"affords the best clue to her identity. The analyst, however,does not have that intelligence unless he knows the text of themessage which the ship is sending. Until then his estimate ofthe identity of the ship from her call sign alone rests on as-sumptions which are open to question, and may be in error. When the call signs of the flagship and individual ships ina fleet are changed, there is a considerable period during whichthe location of the fleet units, through traffic analysis, is prac-tically impossible. The Japanese navy changed its call signs on May 1, 1941.It took about a month thereafter before sufficient signs hadbeen identified to make the location and identification ofships and subdivisions of the fleet sufficiently accurate to meritany real consideration. Again on November 1, 1941, the call signs of the Japanesenavy were changed. About the end of November we hadreached a point where the number of identified calls madethe data as reliable as such data can be. Then on December 1,1941, the call signs of the Japanese navy were again changed. 53 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYThis second change within one month was entirely consistentwith preparation for the anticipated movement to South EastAsia by Japan. From December 1 to December 7, 1941, as a consequenceof the change in call signs, the data which we obtained fromtraffic analysis was fragmentary. Out of twenty thousand callsinvolved in the change, only two hundred service calls hadbeen partially identified.35 After December 1, practically allJapanese naval traffic was in a code which we were unable toread. During the days from December 1 to December 7, 1941,there was a heavy volume of unidentified radio traffic of theJapanese fleet. The Japanese carrier calls were not identified,nor were the calls of the major part of the Japanese fleet. Thefailure to identify carrier traffic did not indicate that the car-riers were en route to Pearl Harbor. There was a similar failureto identify the calls on other major units of the Japanese fleet,which did not come to Pearl Harbor. The failure to identifythe carrier calls did not indicate that the carriers were not apart of the fleets which were known to be moving to SouthEast Asia. Nor did the failure to identify carrier calls mean that thecarriers were preserving radio silence. It was entirely possiblethat the carriers were originating traffic and that their trafficwas included within the great volume of unidentified traffic.Even on the assumption that the Japanese carriers were notoriginating radio traffic, it would not follow that the carrierswere engaged on a secret mission. When ships are within theimmediate location of shore stations, they do not ordinarilytransmit over long distances, because their traffic is handledthrough shore stations. Consequently, even radio silence may54 PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941merely mean that the ships are at anchor in some port in homewaters. The failure to identify Japanese carrier traffic, on and afterDecember first when the call signs changed, was not an un-usual condition. During the six months preceding Pearl Har-bor, there were seven periods of eight to fourteen days each,in which there was a similar uncertainty about the locationof the Japanese battleships. During the six months precedingPearl Harbor, there was an almost continual absence of posi-tive indications of the locations of the cruisers of the JapaneseFirst Fleet, and eight periods of ten to twenty days each, inwhich the location of the greater numbers of cruisers of theJapanese Second Fleet was uncertain. As to the Japanese car-riers, during the six months preceding Pearl Harbor, thereexisted a total of one hundred and thirty-four days-in twelveseparate periods, each ranging from nine to twenty-two days-when the location of the Japanese carriers from radio trafficanalysis was uncertain.36 In brief, in the week immediately prior to Pearl Harbor,I had no evidence that the Japanese carriers were en route toOahu. Radio traffic analysis did not locate their positions.But this was not a new or unusual condition. It was inherentin the changes of call signs. It had existed on twelve otheroccasions over a six months period. The dispatch of November 27 stated that Japanese-Ameri-can negotiations looking toward stabilization of conditions inthe Pacific had ceased. The Navy Department did not let thisstatement stand without modification. On November 29, twodays later, the Navy Department sent me a dispatch whichquoted the War Department's message to General Short ofNovember 27. This stated: "Negotiations with Japan appear 55 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYto be terminated with only the barest possibility of resump-tion." (Italics supplied.)37 This dispatch came to me near the end of "the next fewdays" set forth in the dispatch of November 27 as the periodwithin which the Japanese action would come. Further, therewas a public resumption of Japanese-American negotiationsafter November 27. The public press and radio news broad-casts contained accounts that negotiations were continuingafter November 27 and after November 29. In the absenceof more authoritative information, I took account of this pub-lic information as to diplomatic developments. This suggesteda lessening of the emergency which prompted the so-called"war warning" dispatch. The Navy Department did not inform me of the contentsof the American note to Japan on November 26, or that theprevalent opinion in the Navy Department was that the pro-posals contained in that note were so drastic as to make Japan-ese acceptance of them impossible.38 In a letter of November14, the Chief of Naval Operations sent me a copy of a memo-randum for the President signed by himself and General Mar-shall. This memorandum advised against direct United Statesintervention in China and recommended specifically that "noultimatum be delivered to Japan." I was not informed that the Japanese were continuing thenegotiations after November 26 only as a device to cover uptheir war plans. The Navy Department knew this to be thefact.39 I was not informed that, upon receipt of the Americannote of November 26, the Japanese considered that negotia-tions had not merely ceased but that relations with this countrywere ruptured. The Navy Department knew also this to bethe fact.40 The statement in the Navy Department's dispatch to me to56 PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941the effect that negotiations had ceased on November 27 wasa pale reflection of actual events; so partial a statement as tobe misleading. The parties had not merely stopped talking.They were at swordspoints. So far as Japan was concerned,the talking which went on after November 26 was play-acting.It was a Japanese stratagem to conceal a blow which Japanwas preparing to deliver. The stratagem did not fool the NavyDepartment. The Navy Department knew the scheme. ThePacific Fleet was exposed to this Japanese stratagem becausethe Navy Department did not pass on its knowledge of theJapanese trick. In the November 29th dispatch after quoting the Armymessage, the Chief of Naval Operations added the followingdirection: W.P.L.-58 is not applicable to Pacific Area and will not be placed in effect in that area except as now in force in South East Pacific Sub Area and Panama Naval Coastal Frontier. Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act. Be pre- pared to carry out tasks assigned in W.P.L. 46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur. W.P.L. 46 was the Navy Basic War Plan which assignedtasks to the Pacific Fleet. W.P.L.-52 was the Navy Western Hemisphere Defense PlanNo. 5. Under this plan the Atlantic Fleet had shooting orders.It was charged with the task of destroying German and Italiannaval, land, and air forces encountered in the area of thewestern Atlantic. The South East Pacific Sub Area coveredapproximately seven hundred miles of the Pacific Ocean, offthe coast of South America. Here the South East Pacific NavalForce had similar shooting orders and a similar task. In thedispatch of November 29, the Chief of Naval Operations in- 57 ADMIRAL KIMMEL’S STORYformed me that W.P.L.-52 was not applicable to the Pacific.This was to impress upon me the fact that I did not haveshooting orders and that I was not to shoot until Japan hadcommitted an overt act. Although this dispatch was sent mefor information I was as much bound by these orders as thoughI had been an action addressee. The same note of caution is in the dispatch of October 16,1941: You will take due precautions including such preparatory de- ployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan. Again in the War Department dispatch, quoted to me bythe Chief of Naval Operations in his message of November 29: The United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. . . . Measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent. The Pacific Fleet was based in an area containing over130,000 Japanese, any one of whom could watch its move-ments. You can appreciate the psychological handicaps ordersof this kind placed upon us. In effect, I was told: "Do take precautions." "Do not alarm civilians." "Do take a preparatory deployment." "Do not disclose intent." "Do take a defensive deployment." "Do not commit the first overt act." One last feature of the so-called "war warning" dispatch re-mains to be noted. This is the directive with which it closed:"Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory58 PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL-46." Under WPL-46the first task of the Pacific Fleet was to support the forces ofthe Associated Powers (Britain, the Netherlands, and theUnited States) in the Far East by diverting enemy strengthaway from the Malaya Barrier. The Navy Department emphasized this instruction by re-peating it on November 29. The dispatch of that date directed:"Be prepared to carry out the tasks assigned in WPL-46 so faras they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur." Thus, in two separate dispatches I was ordered by the NavyDepartment to have the Pacific Fleet ready to move againstthe Marshalls upon the expected outbreak of war in the FarEast. This was a determinative factor in the most difficult andvital decisions I had to make thereafter. There was not a hintin these two dispatches of any danger in the Hawaiian area norof the United States ultimatum to Japan. 8. ACTION TAKEN AND DECISIONS MADE AFTER NOVEMBER 27, 1941 The War Plan of the Pacific Fleet (W.P. Pac-46) prescribeda definite plan of operations to enable the fleet to carry outits basic task of diverting Japanese strength away from theMalay Barrier, through the denial and capture of positions inthe Marshalls. This plan was called the "Marshall Recon-naissance and Raiding Plan."41 We planned to send all three task forces of the fleet to com-mence the attacks on selected islands of the Marshall groupand to start the movement one day after hostilities with Japanbegan. The plans for this operation were worked out in detail.We were conscious of the great value of speed in setting the 59 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYoperation in motion. Any delay would decrease its effect, andits entire purpose would be frustrated if it were not under-taken promptly because its object was to divert Japanesestrength away from the so-called Malay Barrier, the Britishand Dutch East Indies. The patrol planes of the fleet were detailed to search outthe areas in which the fleet would operate in its raids on theMarshall Islands. Within five days after war commenced themaximum practicable number of patrol planes were to bebased on Wake, Midway, and Johnston Islands. Planes sobased were to make a reconnaissance of Taongi and Bikar onthe fifth day after hostilities commenced or as soon thereafteras practicable. Not less than two patrol plane squadrons wereto operate from Oahu. The mere recitation of these tasks demonstrates the vitalair reconnaissance required of the patrol plane force! Withoutit, the task forces might be exposed to surprise attack if theyentered the dangerous Marshall area. It was an indispensablefeature of the entire operation. I made a daily revision of a memorandum entitled "Stepsto be taken in case of American-Japanese war within the nexttwenty-four hours." The last form of this memorandum I re-viewed and approved on the morning of December 6, 1941. Init I attempted to keep the basic plan of the raid on the Mar-shall Islands up to date and in conformity with the existingdispositions of fleet units. The last issue of this memorandum,dated December 6, 1941, is as follows: 1. Send dispatch to Pacific Fleet that hostilities have com- menced. 2. Send dispatch to task force commanders: (a) WPL 46 effective (Execute 0-1A R5 except as indicated in (b) and (c) below). (The Submarine and Patrol Plane60 PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941 Plans will become effective without special reference to them.) (b) Commerce sweeping plan, including cruiser operations west of Nanpo Shoto, cancelled. (c) Raiding and reconnaissance plan effective, modified as follows: Delay reconnaissance until Task Forces Two and Three are joined; Batdiv One join Task Force One; Com- mander Base Force send two tankers with utmost dispatch to rendezvous with Task Force Three to eastward of Wake at rendezvous to be designated. (d) ComAirBatFor and units in company with him (TaskFor 8) return to Pearl at High speed, fuel and depart with re- mainder of TaskFor TWO, less BBs, to join Task Force Three. (e) Lexington land Marine aircraft at Midway as planned (p.m. 7 Dec) and proceed with ships now in Company (TaskFor 12) to vicinity of Wake. (f) ComTaskFor Three proceed to join Lexington group. Return DMS to Pearl. 3. (a) Do not modify the movements of Regulus at Midway (de- parting 9th), nor ships bound to Christmas and Canton. (b) Direct that William Ward Burrows continue to Wake but delay arrival until l0th. Direct that Lexington group send two destroyers to join Burrows prior to her arrival at Wake. (c) Do not withdraw any civilian workmen from outlying islands. (d) Provide two destroyers to escort Saratoga from longitude 150° west to Pearl Harbor. (e) Do not change passage of shipping to and from Manila, nor send any added escorts, nor dispose any cruisers toward California or Samoa until further developments occur. The provisions of the memorandum were coordinated withthe basic plan for the Marshall raid. The "VP Plans" whichwere to "become effective without special reference" were theplans for the operation of the patrol plane force. Paragraph2 (c), (d), and (e) had reference to the existing disposition of 61 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYfleet units on December 5 and 6. Admiral Halsey at that timewas returning from an expedition to Wake Island with a taskforce specially constituted for that purpose and called TaskForce 8. I planned to have him return to Pearl Harbor to re-fuel before joining Task Force 3 on the expedition to theMarshalls. The carrier "Lexington" on December 6 was enroute to Midway. She was in a task force specially constitutedfor that purpose and called Task Force 12. In the event ofhostilities I planned to have the "Lexington" carry out theMidway expedition and proceed to Wake there to be joinedby the commander of Task Force 3, of which the Lexingtonwas a regular component. Admiral Wilson Brown, the com-mander of Task Force 3, on December 5 was engaged in oper-ations in the vicinity of Johnston Island. I planned to havehim leave that area and join the Lexington group, therebybringing together all elements of Task Force 3. Task Force 3would then be joined by Admiral Halsey's Task Force 2.When these task forces joined, they would proceed with thereconnaissance features of the raiding plan as a preliminaryto the actual raids on the Marshall Islands. This initial expedition was to continue operating as longas we could supply it with fuel. We estimated that it wouldrequire continuous operation of maximum patrol planestrength from four to six weeks. Additional expeditions wereto be undertaken as rapidly as events and forces permitted. I shall now describe the nature and extent of distant recon-naissance from the Hawaiian area on and after November 27,1941. By dispatch on November 27, the Navy Department hadurged me to send Army pursuit planes to Midway and Wakeby aircraft carrier. I replied by dispatch that on November 28I was sending a carrier to Wake with Marine fighter planes,62 PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941and that I expected thereafter to send other Marine planes toMidway. I considered the Navy Department's suggestion that planesbe sent to Wake and Midway to be sound. It was desirablethat the defenses of these outlying islands should be as strongas possible. The planes which went to Wake were, of course,not enough to save that island. Together with its other de-fenses, they could make the capture of the island sufficientlycostly to justify sending them there. The actual results in thedefense of Wake after December 7 demonstrated that fact. The sending of the carrier task forces to Wake and Midwaydid more than reinforce the air defenses of the islands. It per-mitted a broad area to be scouted for signs of enemy move-ment along the path of the advance of these task forces to theislands and their return to Oahu. In addition, they were inan excellent position to intercept any enemy force whichmight be on the move. On November 28, Admiral Halsey left Pearl Harbor enroute to Wake in command of Task Force 8, consisting of thecarrier "Enterprise," three heavy cruisers and nine destroyers.He carried out morning and afternoon searches to three hun-dred miles with his planes for any sign of hostile shipping.42 On December 5, 1941, Admiral Newton left Pearl Harboren route to Midway in command of Task Force 12, consistingof the carrier "Lexington," three heavy cruisers, and fivedestroyers. Newton, like Halsey, conducted scouting flightswith his planes to cover his advance.43 On December 5, Admiral Wilson Brown left Pearl Harboren route to Johnston Island with Task Force 3 to conductlanding exercises. Thus by December 5 there were at sea three task forces ofthe fleet each deployed in a different area. The "Lexington" 63 ADMIRAL KIMMEL S STORYand the "Enterprise" were each conducting air searches. Itwas a more intensive search in the areas covered than couldhave been made by patrol planes based on Oahu. Further, asthey approached the outlying islands, these searches were con-ducted at a much greater distance from Oahu than any patrolplane based on Oahu could travel. In addition to the operations of these task forces, other dis-tant reconnaissance was conducted by the fleet after Novem-ber 27. Upon receipt of the so-called war warning dispatch of No-vember 27, I ordered a squadron of patrol planes to proceedfrom Midway to Wake and search the ocean areas en route.While at Wake on December 2, and 3, they searched to a dis-tance of 525 miles.44 I also ordered another squadron of patrol planes from PearlHarbor to replace the squadron which went from Midway toWake.45 This squadron of patrol planes left Pearl Harbor onNovember 30. It proceeded to Johnston Island. On the way toJohnston, it searched the ocean areas. It then proceeded fromJohnston to Midway, making another reconnaissance sweepon the way. Upon reaching Midway, this squadron of patrolplanes conducted distant searches of not less than five hundredmiles of varying sectors from that island on December 3, 4, 5,and 6.46 On December 7, five of these Midway-based patrolplanes were searching the sector one hundred twenty to onehundred seventy degrees from Midway, to a distance of fourhundred fifty miles. An additional two patrol planes of theMidway squadron left at the same time to rendezvous with the"Lexington" at a point four hundred miles from Midway.Four of the remaining patrol planes at Midway, each loadedwith bombs, were on ten-minute notice as a ready strikingforce.4764 PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941 When the "Enterprise" completed its delivery of planes to Wake, I withdrew a squadron of patrol planes from Wake. This squadron then proceeded to Midway, searching the ocean areas en route. It then moved from Midway to Pearl Harbor, conducting a reconnaissance sweep en route. In the week before December 7, these reconnaissance sweeps of the patrol plane squadrons-moving from Midway to Wake; from Pearl Harbor to Johnston and from Johnston to Mid- way; from Wake to Midway and Midway to Pearl Harbor- covered a total distance of nearly five thousand miles. As they proceeded, each squadron would cover a four-hundred-mile strand of ocean along its path. They brought under the cover- age of air search about two million square miles of ocean area. In addition to these reconnaissance sweeps, submarines of the fleet on and after November 27 were on war patrols from Midway and Wake Islands continuously. At Oahu before the attack, there were forty-nine patrolplanes which were in flying condition. Eight other planes wereout of commission and undergoing repair. In addition, on De-cember 5, a squadron of patrol planes returned to Pearl Har-bor after an arduous tour of duty at Midway and Wake. Thissquadron consisted of obsolete PBY-3 planes, approachingeighteen months' service and past due for overhaul. It wasnot available for distant searches. The forty-nine flyable patrol planes on Oahu were part ofthe planes which had arrived during the preceding four weeks(eighteen on October 28, twenty-four on November 23, andtwelve on November 28). These planes were of the PBY-5 type.They were experiencing the shake-down difficulties of newplanes. There was considerable difficulty due to the crackingof new engine sections, which required replacement. A pro-gram for the installation of leakproof tanks and armor on 65 ADMIRAL KIMMEL’S STORYthese planes was underway.48 The leakproof tanks and armorwere necessary to make these planes ready for war. That workhad to be carried out in Hawaii. Under War Plans the planeswere to operate from advance bases, Midway, Wake, Johnston,Palmyra Islands. There, they would operate from aircrafttenders. There were no facilities at those advanced bases tocomplete important material installations. The planes had tobe in the highest condition of fighting efficiency before theyleft Oahu. There was a total absence of spare parts for these planes. There were no spare crews. To insure an island base against a surprise attack from fastcarrier-based planes, it is necessary to patrol the evening be-fore to a distance of eight hundred miles on a three hundredsixty degree arc. This requires eighty-four planes on oneflight of sixteen hours. Of course, the same planes and thesame crews cannot make that sixteen-hour flight every day.For searches of his character over a protracted period, a poolof two hundred fifty planes would be required. These arefundamental principles. You will find them in the testimonyof expert aviation officers before the Naval Court; and in thevery comprehensive letter Fleet Admiral Nimitz wrote to theCommander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, on January 7, 1942,on the subject: "Airplane Situation in Hawaiian Area." It is clear that I did not have a sufficient number of planesto conduct each day a three hundred sixty-degree search fromthe island of Oahu. That fact is beyond controversy. A search of all sectors of approach to an island base is theonly type of search that deserves the name. The selection ofone sector around an island for concentration of distant searchaffords no real protection. After a while it may furnish someinsurance that the enemy, having knowledge of the search66 PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941plan will choose some other sector within which to make hisapproach. The search concentrated on the so-called "danger-ous sector" then ceases to offer much prospect of detecting theenemy. Admiral Nimitz put the matter clearly in his officialletter on the subject. He said: It cannot be assumed that any direction of approach may safely be left unguarded. The fuel problem is no deterrent for the ap- proach was made from the north on 7 December. Increase in difficulty of the logistic problem would not be proportionately great if even an approach from the east were attempted. At the same time, as discussed above, neglect of any sector is apt soon to be known.49 Tactical discussions now of what was the most dangerous sector around Oahu before December 7 do not reach the heart of the problem which I faced. The Secretary of the Navy in his endorsement to the Record of the Naval Court of Inquiry has stated: There were sufficient fleet patrol planes and crews, in fact, avail- able in Oahu during the week preceding the attack to have flown, for at least several weeks, a daily reconnaissance covering 128? to a distance of about 700 miles. This statement assumes a twenty-five-mile visibility for each patrol plane engaged in the search. It further assumes that I could have used all the patrol plane force for this type of search alone without keeping any planes in reserve for emergency searches or to cover movements of ships in and out of the har- bor and in the operating area. If I had instituted a distant search of any one hundred twenty-eight-degree sector around Oahu on and after Novem- ber 27, within the foreseeable future, I would have deprived 67 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYthe Pacific Fleet of any efficient patrol plane force for its pre-scribed war missions. In the secret investigation before Admiral Hewitt, fromwhich I was excluded. Vice Admiral Bellinger, who com-manded my patrol plane force, testified: Q. Assuming that on December 1, 1941, you had received a direc-tive from Admiral Kimmel to conduct the fullest possible partialreconnaissance over an indefinite period of time, could you havecovered 128 degrees approximately on a daily basis and for howlong? A. It could have been done until the failure of planes and lackof spare parts reduced the planes to an extent that it would havemade it impossible. Perhaps it could have been carried on fortwo weeks, perhaps, but this estimate is, of course, very vagueand it is all based on maintaining planes in readiness for flight.[Italics supplied.]50 This testimony reflected the conditions in the patrol planesquadrons as I knew them on November 27 and thereafter. Captain Ramsey, the executive officer of the patrol wing,testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry as follows: ... As nearly as I could estimate the situation and in view of our almost total lack of spare parts for the PBY-5 planes, I believe that three weeks of intensive daily searches would have been ap- proximately a 75 per cent reduction in material readiness of the entire outfit and we would have been placing planes out of com- mission and robbing them for spare parts to keep other planes going. The pilots, I believe, could have kept going approximate- ly a six-weeks period, but at the end of that time they would have all required a protracted rest period.51 The patrol planes in Oahu were not uselessly employedprior to the attack. They were not standing idle. There was adefinite program for their operation which was consistent with68 PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941creating and preserving their material readiness for war. Inthe week preceding the attack, there was a daily scout by patrolplanes on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, of asector to the north and northwest of Oahu to a distance offour hundred miles, after which the planes required main-tenance and upkeep.52 This was not distant reconnaissance, assuch, although the distance covered was greater than thatsearched at the time of the 1940 alert. In addition, there wasthe daily dawn patrol out three hundred miles to cover theareas where the fleet operated. I had been ordered, not once but twice, to be prepared tocarry out the raids on the Marshalls under WPL-46, whichmeant the extended use of the fleet patrol planes from advancebases in war operations. I had to decide what was the best use of the patrol planes asa matter of policy for the foreseeable future, and with theirwar tasks in front of me. Had I directed their use for intensive distant searches fromOahu, I would have faced the peril of having those planesgrounded when the fleet needed them and when the war planwas executed. I had no way of knowing that the war was to start on the7th of December. I could not decide the matter on the basisof five days or ten days of distant searches. I did not have the intercepted Japanese dispatches pointingto Pearl Harbor as a probable point of attack. I knew that any distant search I could make on an intensivebasis, straining the planes to the breaking point, would be inits nature partial and ineffective. I took account of my resources. They were slender. I took account of my probable future needs and of myorders from the Navy Department. 69 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY I decided that I could not risk having no patrol plane forceworthy of the name for the fleet's expected movement into theMarshalls. I considered the nature and extent of the distant recon-naissance I was effectuating with my task forces at sea and thepatrol plane sweeps to and from the outlying islands. I considered the necessity of permitting the essential re-placement and material upkeep program for the new patrolplanes in Oahu to be continued to get them into war condition. I considered the need for patrols of the fleet operating areasagainst the submarine menace and these I carried out. I considered the need for some reserve of patrol planes foremergency distant searches. I considered the need for patrol planes in covering fleetmovements in and out of the harbor-which might have to bequickly and unexpectedly executed. I considered the endurance of my patrol plane man power-and the absence of any spare crews. I decided I could not fritter away my patrol plane resourcesby pushing them to the limit in daily distant searches of onesector around Oahu-which within the predictable futurewould have to be discontinued when the patrol planes andcrews gave out. The three admirals who composed the Naval Court of In-quiry (Admiral Orin G. Murfin, former commander in chief,U.S. Asiatic Fleet, Admiral E. C. Kalbfus, former commanderbattle force, and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, formercommander of the scouting force) scrutinized my decision afterextensive testimony. Each of the admirals could view the mat-ter from the point of view of the commander in the field.They summarized the problem:70 PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941 The task assigned the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, wasto prepare his Fleet for war. War was known to be imminent-how imminent he did not know. The Fleet planes were beingconstantly employed in patrolling the operating areas in whichthe Fleet's preparations for war were being carried on. Diversionof these planes for reconnaissance or other purposes was not jus-tified under existing circumstances and in the light of availableinformation. If so diverted, the state of readiness of the Fleet for war wouldbe reduced because of the enforced suspension of Fleet opera-tions. The value of the Fleet patrol planes to the Fleet would bereduced seriously after a few days because of the inability ofplanes and crews to stand up under the demands of daily long-range reconnaissance. The Court concluded: (Finding XIII) The omission of this reconnaissance was not due to oversight or neglect. It was the result of a military decision, reached after much deliberation and consultation with experienced officers and after weighing the information at hand and all the factors involved. I shall now discuss the dispositions of the capital ships ofthe Pacific Fleet on and after November 27. On November 28,Admiral Halsey left for Wake with a carrier task force and onDecember 5, Admiral Newton left for Midway with anothercarrier task force. These missions were in pursuance of anexplicit suggestion from the Navy Department. When Ad-miral Halsey left for Wake on November 28, the three battle-ships of his task force accompanied him out of Pearl Harborso as to avoid creating the impression that there was anythingunusual about the movement of his task force. However, im- 7l ADMIRAL KIMMEL’S STORYmediately on clearing the channel, Admiral Halsey divertedhis battleships and instructed them to carry out exercises inthe Hawaiian area. He then headed west with the remainderof his task force. It would have been unwise for Admiral Halsey to have takenalong the battleships. The maximum speed of the battleshipswas seventeen knots. The fleet units which he took to Wakecould make thirty knots. To take his battleships with himwould have meant the loss of thirteen knots of potential speed.He was bound for dangerous waters where curtailed speedmight spell disaster. He needed all the mobility his forcecould attain. Three battleships did not furnish sufficient sup-porting strength to warrant the risks of reduction in speed andmobility which their presence in the expedition to Wakewould entail. Moreover, it was necessary to complete the Wakeoperation as quickly as possible so that the ships engagedmight be ready for further eventualities. Almost every disposition which I made in the Pacific withthe forces available to me had its cost. In sending the twocarriers to Wake and Midway, I took from the immediatevicinity of Pearl Harbor, for the time being, the fleet's airstrength. We had no carrier left in the Hawaiian area. The"Saratoga," the third carrier of the Pacific Fleet, had beenundergoing repair and overhaul on the West Coast. The ad-visability of using her to transfer a squadron of Marine fighterplanes from San Diego to Hawaii was suggested by the Chiefof Naval Operations on November 28.53 The absence of thecarriers from the Hawaiian area temporarily limited the mo-bility of the battleships which were left behind. While the carriers were absent on the assigned missions toMidway and Wake, the battleships force was kept in PearlHarbor. To send them to sea without air cover for any pro-72 PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941longed period would have been a dangerous course. The onlyeffective defense for vessels at sea from air attacks, whether it bea bombing attack or a torpedo plane attack, is an effective aircover. Surface ships, such as destroyers and cruisers, are muchless effective against an air attack. That is so today. It was themore so prior to 7 December because of the existing inade-quacies of antiaircraft guns. The carriers furnished air coverage for the battleships atsea. The few planes that battleships and cruisers carry for useby catapult are not fighters. Their function is only scoutingand reconnaissance. They are ineffective as a defense againstenemy air attack. The battleships at sea without carriers hadno protection from air bombing attack. In Pearl Harbor theyhad the protection of such antiaircraft defenses as the Armyhad, including shore based fighter planes. At sea, in deep wa-ters, there were no physical barriers to the effectiveness of tor-pedo plane attack. In Pearl Harbor, where the depth of waterwas less than forty feet, a torpedo plane attack was considereda negligible danger. The battleships of the fleet at sea, withoutcarriers, sighted by a force of such character as to have a chanceof a successful air attack on the Hawaiian Islands, appeared tobe more subject to damage than in port. Vice Admiral Pye, commander of the battle force, and Idiscussed these considerations in a conference after the receiptof the so-called war warning dispatch. At the time of our discussion-at that time and later-we didnot have before us the intercepted Japanese messages indicat-ing that the ships in port in Pearl Harbor were marked forattack. We had no information that an air attack upon PearlHarbor was imminent or probable. The fact that the NavyDepartment proposed at this time that our carriers be sent tothe outlying islands indicated to us that the Navy Department 73 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYfelt that no attack on Pearl Harbor could be expected in theimmediate future. All the dispositions of my task forces at sea, as well as thepresence of the battleships in port, were known to the NavyDepartment. Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations,testified before the Roberts Commission as follows: What we expected him [Admiral Kimmel] to do was to get more planes and personnel, and so on, out to Wake and Midway, if possible, and to send his task forces-some task forces to sea in readiness to catch any raiders, which he did. He did that. We knew it. We knew these task forces were at sea. He informed us that one was returning from having put the people ashore at Wake, that certain planes had been sent to Midway, and were expected to go on the fifth or sixth day down to Wake, and we knew the schedule of the ships that were in port, and at that par- ticular time out of the three task forces, there were two scheduled to be in port. Actually there was less than one and a half in port. He kept the others at sea. He had taken those measures which looked absolutely sound. It was a safe assumption that other measures had been taken of a similar nature.54Upon receipt of the so-called war warning dispatch of No-vember 27, 1941, I issued orders to the fleet to exercise extremevigilance against submarines in operating areas and to depthbomb all contacts expected to be hostile in the fleet operatingareas.55 My dispatch of November 28 to the fleet containingthis order was forwarded to the Navy Department on that day.On December 2, I wrote to the Chief of Naval Operationsdirecting his personal attention to this order. The Navy De-partment, in the ten days prior to the attack, did not approveor disapprove my action. For some time there had been reports of submarines in the74 PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941operating areas around Hawaii. During the first week of Feb-ruary 1941, a submerged submarine contact was reportedabout eight miles from the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys. Adivision of destroyers trailed this contact for approximatelyforty-eight hours, after which the contact was lost. The destroy-ers were confident it was a Japanese submarine. I was notfully convinced, but made a complete report to Naval Opera-tions, stating the action taken and adding that I would bedelighted to bomb every suspected submarine contact in theoperating area around Hawaii.56 I was directed by dispatchnot to depth bomb submarine contacts except within thethree-mile limit. A similar contact at approximately the same position wasmade about the middle of March. Again the destroyers wereconfident that they had trailed a Japanese submarine. Againthe evidence was not conclusive because the submarine hadnot actually been sighted. On September 12, 1941,1 wrote to the Chief of Naval Oper-ations and asked him "What to do about the submarine con-tacts off Pearl Harbor and the vicinity." I stated, "As youknow, our present orders are to trail all contacts but not tobomb unless they are in the defensive areas. Should we nowbomb contacts without waiting to be attacked?" On September 23, the Chief of Naval Operations replied tomy question in a personal letter. He said: The existing orders, that is not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea areas, are appropriate. If conclusive, and I repeat conclusive, evidence is obtained that Japanese sub- marines are actually in or near United States territory, then a strong warning and threat of hostile action against such sub- marines would appear to be our next step. 75 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY No conclusive evidence was obtained until December 7,1941. The files of the commander-in-chief, Pacific Fleet, containrecords of at least three suspicious contacts during the fiveweeks preceding Pearl Harbor. On November 3, 1941, a patrol plane observed an oil slickarea in latitude 20-10, longitude 157-41. The patrol planesearched a fifteen-mile area. A sound search was made by the"U.S.S. Worden," and an investigation was made by the"U.S.S. Dale," all of them producing negative results.57 OnNovember 28, 1941, the "U.S.S. Helena" reported that a radaroperator, without knowledge of my orders directing an alertagainst submarines, was positive that a submarine was in arestricted area.58 A search by a task group with three destroy-ers of the suspected area produced no contacts. During thenight of December 2, 1941, the "U.S.S. Gamble" reported aclear metallic echo in latitude 20-30, longitude 158-23. An in-vestigation directed by Destroyer Division Four produced noconclusive evidence of the presence of a submarine.59 On themorning of the attack, the "U.S.S. Ward" reported to the com-mandant of the 14th Naval District that it had attacked, firedupon, and dropped depth charges upon a submarine oper-ating in the defensive sea area. The commandant of the 14thNaval District directed a verification of this report with a viewto determining whether the contact with the submarine wasa sound contact or whether the submarine had actually beenseen by the "Ward." He also directed that the ready-dutydestroyer assist the "Ward" in the defensive sea area. Appar-ently, some short time after reporting the submarine contact,the "Ward" also reported that it had intercepted a sampanwhich it was escorting into Honolulu. This message appeared76 PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941to increase the necessity for a verification of the earlier reportof the submarine contact. Between 7:30 and 7:40, I received information from thestaff duty officer concerning the "Ward's" report, the dispatchof the ready-duty destroyer to assist the "Ward", and the ef-forts then underway to obtain a verification of the "Ward's"report. I was awaiting such verification at the time of the at-tack. In my judgment, the effort to obtain confirmation of thereported submarine attack off Pearl Harbor was a proper pre-liminary to more drastic action in view of the number of suchcontacts which had not been verified in the past.77 CHAPTER IV Information Withheld and Its Significance It is better to have useless knowledge than to know nothing.-Seneca. 1. ATTEMPTS TO BASE THE FLEET IN CALIFORNIAPrior to my taking command my predecessor. AdmiralJ. 0. Richardson, had recommended the fleet be basedon the West Coast where it could be more efficientlysupplied, repaired, modernized and trained. So based, the twothousand-mile haul by sea of all supplies, personnel, and, par-ticularly, fuel oil, would have been eliminated. Ample fueloil was available at the fleet base in California. With the com-plete lack of adequate tanker and supply ships, preparing thefleet for war would have been greatly expedited by basing itin California. The approach to the California base by sea is limited to anarc of one hundred and eighty degrees, just one-half of that forthe fleet base at Pearl Harbor. This means that only one halfthe sea area would have to be searched to detect the approachof a hostile force. California is two thousand miles more distant from Japanthan is Pearl Harbor. The hazards to the Japanese in an attackon a California-based fleet, including the hazard of our Pearl78 INFORMATION WITHHELDHarbor force on their flank, were so great that the attackwould never have been attempted. It is interesting to note that in all pre-1941 naval war plansfor a Pacific campaign the fleet was based on our West Coastuntil hostilities actually commenced. The deficiencies of Pearl Harbor as a fleet base were wellknown in the Navy Department. In an interview with Mr.Roosevelt in June 1941, in Washington, I outlined the weak-nesses and concluded with the remark that the only answerwas to have the fleet at sea if the Japs ever attacked. I accepted the decision to base the fleet at Pearl Harbor inthe firm belief that the Navy Department would supply mepromptly with all pertinent information available and in par-ticular with all information that indicated an attack on thefleet at Pearl Harbor. I knew in general, from my experiencein the Navy, of the sources from which the Navy Departmentmight derive such intelligence, including the decoded Japa-nese intercepted communications. The Pacific Fleet was de-pendent upon the Navy Department in Washington for in-formation derived from intercepted Japanese diplomaticmessages. Shortly after I took command. Vice Admiral Wilson Brown,upon his arrival in Hawaii from Washington, informed me ofsome confusion in the Navy Department as to whether theresponsibility of furnishing the commander-in-chief, Pacific,with secret information rested with Naval Operations orNaval Intelligence. I immediately added a postscript to a let-ter which I was writing to the Chief of Naval Operations,bringing this situation to his attention. I wrote Admiral Starkon February 18, 1941: I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI considers it the function of Operations to furnish the 79 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY Commander-in-Chief with information of a secret nature. I have heard also that Operations considers the responsibility for fur- nishing the same type of information to be that of ONI. I do not know that we have missed anything, but if there is any doubt as to whose responsibility it is to keep the Commander-in-Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on the subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, will you kindly fix that responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding. He replied in a letter of March 22: With reference to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and the responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to CinCUS, Kirk informs me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibilities in keeping you adequately informed con- cerning foreign nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal elements within the United States. On May 25, 1941, I wrote an official letter to the Chief ofNaval Operations on the subject of "Survey of Conditions inthe Pacific Fleet." In a separate paragraph entitled "Informa-tion," again I described my need for information of all im-portant developments affecting our foreign relations: The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, is in a very difficult posi- tion. He is far removed from the seat of government, in a com- plex and rapidly changing situation. He is, as a rule, not in- formed as to the policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations.80 INFORMATION WITHHELD It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, per- haps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely infor- mation, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of cur- rent policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to modify, adapt, or even re-orient his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific Situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic disposi- tions, or otherwise, to meet impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department it- self is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander-in- Chief, Pacific Fleet, be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions. It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available. I brought this official letter to Washington with me in Juneof 1941, handed it to the Chief of Naval Operations person-ally, discussed it with him, and received his assurance that Iwould be informed of all important developments as theyoccurred and by the quickest secure means available. A study of Japanese radio intercepts extending over manyyears permitted the Navy to read many of the interceptedJapanese messages. Information obtained in this manner wasreferred to as "magic" and was of the greatest value whenproperly used. 81 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY 2. DECODING EQUIPMENT Although the commanders at Hawaii were never suppliedwith the equipment and trained personnel to decode inter-cepted "magic" Japanese dispatches, I learned during theinvestigations in Washington that the commander-in-chief ofour Asiatic Fleet was fully equipped to decode the "magic"intercepted Japanese dispatches as received; also that the NavyDepartment in Washington maintained a check system andsupplied the Asiatic decoding unit with copies of importantintercepts which the organization failed to obtain with theirown facilities. I also learned that a fourth set of equipmentdestined for assignment to the commander-in-chief, U.S.Pacific Fleet, at Hawaii was diverted to the British in the sum-mer of 1941. The Navy and War Departments in Washingtonwere each supplied with equipment and personnel to decodetheir intercepts. The care taken to keep the commander-in-chief of ourAsiatic Fleet and the British in London informed of Japaneseintentions while withholding this vital information from ourcommanders at Pearl Harbor has never been explained. In the month of July, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operationssent me at least seven dispatches which quoted interceptedJapanese diplomatic messages from Tokyo to Washington,Tokyo to Berlin, Berlin to Tokyo, Tokyo to Vichy, Canton toTokyo. These dispatches identified by number the Japanesemessages they quoted and gave their verbatim text.1 I was never informed of any decision to the effect that intel-ligence from intercepted Japanese messages was not to be sentto me. In fact, dispatches sent to me by the Navy Departmentin the week before the attack contained intelligence from in-tercepted messages. On December 1, a dispatch from the Chief 83 INFORMATION WITHHELDof Naval Operations, sent to me for information, quoted areport of November 29 from the Japanese ambassador inBangkok to Tokyo which described a Japanese plan to enticethe British to invade Thai, thereby permitting Japan to enterthat country in the role of its defender.2 On December 3, adispatch to me from the Chief of Naval Operations set forthan order from Japan to diplomatic agents and expressly re-ferred to this order as "Circular Twenty Four Forty Four fromTokyo."3 Another dispatch from the Chief of Naval Opera-tions on December 3 referred to certain "categoric and urgentinstructions which were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomaticand consular posts."4 The Navy Department thus engaged in a course of conductwhich definitely gave me the impression that intelligence fromimportant intercepted Japanese messages was being furnishedto me. Under these circumstances a failure to send me im-portant information of this character was not merely a with-holding of intelligence. It amounted to an affirmative mis-representation. I had asked for all vital information. I hadbeen assured that I would have it. I appeared to be receivingit. My current estimate of the situation was formed on thisbasis. Yet, in fact, the most vital information from the inter-cepted Japanese messages was withheld from me. This failurenot only deprived me of essential facts. It misled me. I was not supplied with any information of the interceptedmessages showing that the Japanese government had dividedPearl Harbor into five areas and was seeking minute informa-tion as to the berthing of ships of the fleet in those areas whichwas vitally significant. On September 24, 1941, the Japanese government in-structed its consul general in Honolulu as to the type of reportit desired from him concerning vessels in Pearl Harbor. These83 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYinstructions divided Pearl Harbor into the five sub-areas. Eacharea was given an alphabetical symbol. Area A was the termprescribed to describe the waters between Ford Island and theArsenal. Area B was the term prescribed to cover the waterssouth and west of Ford Island. Area C described East Loch;Area D, Middle Loch; Area E, West Loch and communica-tion water routes. The dispatch stated: With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor, (those are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys, and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make men- tion of the fact when there are two or more vessels alongside the same wharf.)8 This dispatch was decoded and translated on October 9,1941. This information was withheld from me. On September 29, 1941, Kita, the Japanese consul generalin Honolulu, replied to his government's dispatch of Septem-ber 24. He described an elaborate and detailed system of sym-bols to be used thereafter in designating the location of vesselsin Pearl Harbor. The letters "KS" would describe the repairdock in the Navy Yard. The letters "KT" would describe theNavy dock in the Navy Yard. The letters "FV" would describethe moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island. The letters "FG"would describe vessels alongside Ford Island, the east and westsides to be designated by A and B, respectively. This dispatchof the consul general was decoded and translated on October10, 1941.6 This information was never supplied to me. In the critical period before the attack, the Japanese gov-ernment sent further significant instructions to Honolulu.On November 15, Togo sent the following dispatch:84 INFORMATION WITHHELD As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular but at the rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.7This dispatch was decoded and translated by the Navy inWashington on December 3, 1941. This information wasnever supplied to me. On November 18,1941, Togo sent the following dispatch toHonolulu: Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored there- in: Area N, Pearl Harbor, Mamala Bay (Honolulu), and the Areas Adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.)8This dispatch was decoded and translated on December 5,1941. This information was never supplied to me. On November 18, 1941, the Japanese consul general inHonolulu reported to Tokyo in accordance with the systemprescribed in the dispatch from Tokyo on September 24. Hereported that in Area A there was a battleship of the "Okla-homa" class; that in Area 0 there were three heavy cruisers atanchor, as well as the carrier "Enterprise" or some other ves-sel; that two heavy cruisers of the "Chicago" class were tiedup at docks "K.S". The symbol "KS" it will be recalled wasestablished by the consul general in his September dispatch toTokyo to designate the repair dock in the Pearl Harbor NavyYard. The consul general described in great detail the coursetaken by destroyers entering the harbor, their speed and theirdistances apart. He reported that they changed course fivetimes, each time roughly thirty degrees, from the entrance ofthe harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C at which85 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYthey were moored. This dispatch was decoded and translatedin Washington on December 6, 1941.9 This information wasnever supplied to me. On November 20, Togo in Tokyo dispatched instructionsto Honolulu to investigate comprehensively fleet bases in theneighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation. This dis-patch was decoded and translated on the 4th of December.10This information was never supplied to me. Again on November 29, Tokyo sent the following dispatchto Honolulu: "We have been receiving reports from you onship movements, but in future will you also report even whenthere are no movements." This dispatch was decoded andtranslated on December 5, 1941.11 This information was neversupplied to me. In the volume of intercepted Japanese dispatches elicitingand securing information about American military installa-tions and naval movements, the dispatches concerning PearlHarbor, on and after September 24, 1941, stand out, apartfrom the others. No other harbor or base in American terri-tory or possessions was divided into sub-areas by Japan. In noother area was the Japanese government seeking informationas to whether two or more vessels were alongside the samewharf. Prior to the dispatch of September 24, the informationwhich the Japanese sought and obtained about Pearl Harborfollowed the general pattern of their interest in Americanfleet movements in other localities. One might expect this typeof conventional espionage. With the dispatch of September 24, 1941, and those whichfollowed, there was a significant and ominous change in thecharacter of the information which the Japanese governmentsought and obtained. The espionage then directed was of anunusual character and outside the realm of reasonable sus-86INFORMATION WITHHELDpicion. It was no longer merely directed to ascertaining thegeneral whereabouts of ships of the fleet. It was directed to thepresence of particular ships in particular areas; to such minutedetail as what ships were double-docked at the same wharf. In the period immediately preceding the attack, the Japconsul general in Hawaii was directed by Tokyo to reporteven when there were no movements of ships in and out ofPearl Harbor. These Japanese instructions and reportspointed to an attack by Japan upon the ships in Pearl Harbor.The information sought and obtained, with such painstakingdetail, had no other conceivable usefulness from a militaryviewpoint. Its utility was in planning and executing an attackupon the ships in port. Its effective value was lost completelywhen the ships left their reported berthings in Pearl Harbor. No one had a more direct and immediate interest in thesecurity of the fleet in Pearl Harbor than its commander-in-chief. No one had a greater right than I to know that Japanhad carved up Pearl Harbor into sub-areas and was seekingand receiving reports as to the precise berthings in that harborof the ships of the fleet. I had been sent Mr. Grew's reportearlier in the year with positive advice from the Navy Depart-ment that no credence was to be placed in the rumored Japa-nese plans for an attack on Pearl Harbor. I was told then, thatno Japanese move against Pearl Harbor appeared "imminentor planned for in the foreseeable future." Certainly I was en-titled to know when information in the Navy Departmentcompletely altered the information and advice previouslygiven to me. Surely, I was entitled to know of the intercepteddispatches between Tokyo and Honolulu on and after Sep-tember 24, 1941, which indicated that a Japanese move againstPearl Harbor was planned in Tokyo. Knowledge of these intercepted Japanese dispatches would87 ADMIRAL KIMMEL S STORYhave radically changed the estimate of the situation made byme and my staff. It would have suggested a re-orientation ofour planned operations at the outset of hostilities. The warplans of the Navy Department and of the Pacific Fleet, as wellas our directives and information from Washington prior tothe attack, indicated that the Pacific Fleet could be most ef-fectively employed against Japan through diversionary raidson the Marshalls when the Japanese struck at the Malay Bar-rier. Knowledge of a probable Japanese attack on Pearl Har-bor would have afforded an opportunity to ambush the Japa-nese striking force as it ventured to Hawaii. It would havesuggested the wisdom of concentrating our resources to thatend, rather than conserving them for the Marshall Islandsexpedition. Attempts were made during the congressional investigationto indicate that the information demanded and supplied onthe berthing of ships at Pearl Harbor appeared to be evidenceof the Japanese passion for detail, that similar informationwas requested and supplied from other localities. Yet not oneshred of evidence to support this contention was ever pre-sented. Details of unimportant installations were demanded.But the details of the berthing of ships at Pearl Harbor whichwere useful only for an hour or a day were in an entirely dif-ferent category. It is interesting to note that General Willoughby on pagetwenty-two of his book, MacArthur: 1941-1951, quotes a staffreport from MacArthur's headquarters, ... It was known that the Japanese consul in Honolulu cabled Tokyo reports on general ship movements. In October his in- structions were "sharpened." Tokyo called for specific instead of general reports. In November, the daily reports were on a grid- system of the inner harbor with co-ordinate locations of Ameri-88 INFORMATION WITHHELD can men of war: this was no longer a case of diplomatic curiosity; coordinate grid is the classical method for pin-point target desig- nation; our battleships had suddenly become targets. Spencer Akin was uneasy from the start. We drew our own con- clusions and the Filipino-American troops took up beach posi- tions long before the Japanese landings. If MacArthur's headquarters which had no responsibilityfor Pearl Harbor were impressed by this information, it is im-possible to understand how its significance escaped all thetalent in the War and Navy Departments in Washington. The intercepted dispatches about the berthing of ships inPearl Harbor also clarified the significance of other inter-cepted Japanese dispatches, decoded and translated by theNavy Department prior to the attack. I refer particularly tothe intercepted dispatches which established a deadline datefor agreement between Japan and the United States. Whenthis date passed without agreement, these dispatches revealedthat a Japanese plan automatically took effect. The deadline date was first established in a dispatch. No.736, from Tokyo to Washington on November 5, 1941. In thisdispatch the Japanese government instructed its ambassadorin Washington as follows: Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please un- derstand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-United States relations from falling into a chaotic con- dition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you. This information is to be kept strictly to yourself alone.12This dispatch was decoded and translated by the Navy on the89 ADMIRAL KIMMEL S STORY date of its origin, November 5, 1941. This information was never supplied to me. The deadline date was reiterated in a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington on November 11, 1941. This dispatch stated: Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. The fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736 is absolutely immov- able under present conditions. It is a definite deadline and there- fore it is essential that a settlement be reached by about that time. The session of Parliament opens on the 15th (work will start on (the following day?)) according to the schedule. The government must have a clear picture of things to come in pre- senting its case at the session. You can see, therefore, that the situation is nearing a climax, and that time is indeed becoming short...13 This dispatch was decoded and translated by the Navy De-partment on November 12, 1941. This information was neversupplied to me. The deadline was again emphasized in a dispatch fromTokyo to Washington on November 15, 1941. This dispatchstated: . . . Whatever the case may be, the fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736 is an absolutely immovable one. Please, therefore, make the United States see the light, so as to make possible the signing of the agreement by that date.14This dispatch was decoded and translated by the Navy Depart-ment on the date of its origin, November 15, 1941. This infor-mation was never supplied to me. The deadline was again reiterated on November 16 withgreat emphasis upon its importance. A dispatch from Tokyoto Washington of that date was as follows:90 INFORMATION WITHHELD For your Honor's own information. 1. I have read your #1090 and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before. 2. ... In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the dead- line for the solution of these negotiations in my #736 and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals and do your best to bring about an immediate solution.15This dispatch was decoded and translated on November 17,1941. This information was never supplied to me. The deadline was finally extended on November 22 for aperiod of four days. On that date a dispatch from Tokyo toWashington instructed Nomura and Kurusu: It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736. You should know this, however, I know you are work- ing hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you-twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short, if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before.91 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambas- sadors alone.18This dispatch was decoded and translated on the date of itsorigin, November 22, 1941. This information was neversupplied to me. Again on November 24, 1941, Tokyo specifically instructedits ambassadors in Washington that the November 29th dead-line was set in Tokyo time." This dispatch was decoded andtranslated on November 24, the date of its origin. This in-formation was never supplied to me. In at least six separate dispatches, on November 5, 11, 15, 16,22, and 24, Japan specifically established and extended thedeadline of November 25, later advanced to November 29.The dispatches made it plain that after the deadline date aJapanese plan was automatically going into operation. Theplan was of such importance that, as the deadline approached,the government of Japan declared: "The fate of our Empirehangs by the slender thread of a few days."18 When the deadline date of November 29 was reached withno agreement between the United States and Japan, there wasno further extension. The intercepted dispatches indicatedthat the crisis deepened in its intensity after that day passed.On the first of December, Tokyo advised its ambassadors inWashington: "The date set in my message No. 812 has comeand gone and the situation continues to be increasinglycritical."19 This message was translated by the navy on thefirst of December. This information was never supplied to me. An intercepted Japanese dispatch from Tokyo to Washing-ton of November 28, 1941, made it clear that the Americanproposal of November 26 was completely unsatisfactory toJapan and that an actual rupture of negotiations would occur92 INFORMATION WITHHELDupon the receipt of the Japanese reply. A dispatch on No-vember 28, decoded and translated on the same day, stated: Well, you two ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and ex- tremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable....20This information was never supplied to me. The commanders at Pearl Harbor were not kept informedof the progress of negotiations with Japan. I was never sup-plied with the text of Mr. Hull's message of November 26,1941 to the Japanese government which has frequently beenreferred to as an ultimatum. This was a most important docu-ment. It stated the policy of the United States that would becarried out by force, if necessary. Mr. Stimson referred to thismessage as Mr. Hull's decision "to kick the whole thing over."Among other terms this note provided: The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and Indo China. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support-militarily, politically, economically- any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with Capital temporarily at Chunking. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific Area.2193 ADMIRAL KIMMEL’S STORY The Japanese reply to this message was delivered in Wash-ington within hours of the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor.Nor were the commanders at Pearl Harbor supplied with thetext of previous messages exchanged between the UnitedStates and Japanese governments. Their information on thissubject was obtained from the radio and newspapers. I nowbelieve that the Washington newspaper correspondents andthe editors of our leading newspapers were much more accur-ately informed of the seriousness of the situation than were thecommanders at Pearl Harbor. After receipt by Tokyo of the American note of Novem-ber 26, the intercepted Japanese dispatches show that Japanattached great importance to the continuance of negotiationsto conceal from the United States whatever plan automaticallytook effect on November 29. Thus, the dispatch from Tokyoto Washington of November 28 cautions the Japanese ambas-sadors in Washington: ... I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instruc- tions and that, although the opinions of your government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific....22This information was denied to me. Again the dispatch from Tokyo to Washington of Decem-ber 1, 1941, advising the Japanese ambassador that the dead-line date had come and gone and the situation continued to becritical, contains this further information: ... to prevent the United States from becoming unduly sus- picious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United94 INFORMATION WITHHELD States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information.)23This information was never supplied to me. Again in the trans-Pacific telephone conversation inter-cepted on November 27, and translated by the Navy Depart-ment on November 28, Yamamoto in Tokyo explicitly in-structed Kurusu: "Regarding negotiations, don't break themoff."24 In another trans-Pacific telephone conversation betweenKurusu and Yamamoto, intercepted and translated by theNavy on November 30, Kurusu noted the change in the Japa-nese attitude with respect to the duration of the American-Japanese negotiations. Before the deadline date Kurusu andNomura had been urged by Tokyo to press for a conclusion ofnegotiations. Now they were instructed to stretch them out.Kurusu asked, "Are the Japanese-American negotiations tocontinue?" Yamamoto replied, "Yes." Kurusu then said: "Youwere very urgent about them before, weren't you; but nowyou want them to stretch out. We will need your help. Boththe Premier and the Foreign Minister will need to change thetone of their speeches!!!! Do you understand? Please all usemore discretion."25 The information from these telephone conversations wasnever supplied to me. Again on November 29, an intercepted Japanese dispatchfrom Tokyo contains cautious representations to be addressedto the United States. The following instruction accompaniedthem: ". . . In carrying out this instruction, please be carefulthat this does not lead to anything like breaking off of nego-tiations. . . ."26 This dispatch was decoded and translated bythe Navy on November 30, and was never sent to me.95 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY The intercepted Japanese diplomatic dispatches show thaton and after November 29 a Japanese plan of action automat-ically went into effect; that the plan was of such importancethat it involved the fate of the empire; and that Japan urgentlywanted the United States to believe that negotiations werecontinuing after the deadline date to prevent suspicion as tothe nature of the plan. What was this plan? Why such elaborate instructions tostretch out negotiations as a pretext to hide the unfolding ofthis plan? Anyone reading the Japanese intercepted messageswould face this question. Certainly the concealed Japanese plans which automaticallywent into effect on November 29 would hardly be the Japa-nese movement in Indo-China. ". . . No effort was made tomask the movements or presence of the naval forces movingsouthward, because physical observations of that movementwere unavoidable and the radio activity of these forces wouldprovide a desirable semblance of normalcy."27 The troopmovements to southern Indo-China were the subject of formaldiplomatic exchanges between the governments of Japan andthe United States. On December 2, 1941, Mr. Welles handed to Mr. Nomuraand Mr. Kurusu a communication which the President of theUnited States wished to make to them. This communicationwas as follows: I have received reports during the past days of continuing Jap- anese troop movements to southern Indo-China. These reports indicate a very rapid and material increase in the forces of all kinds stationed by Japan in Indo-China. . . . The stationing of these increased Japanese forces in Indo-China would seem to imply the utilization of these forces by Japan for purposes of further aggression, since no such number of forces could possibly96 INFORMATION WITHHELD be required for the policing of that region. Such aggression could conceivably be against the Philippine Islands; against the many islands of East Indies; against Burma; against Malaya or either through coercion or through the actual use of force for the purpose of undertaking the occupation of Thailand. . . . Please be good enough to request the Japanese ambassador and Ambassador Kurusu to inquire at once of the Japanese govern- ment what the actual reasons may be for the steps already taken and what I am to consider is the policy of the Japanese govern- ment as demonstrated by this recent and rapid concentration of troops in Indo-China....28 Thus it was apparent to the Japanese government from thisformal representation of the United States that our govern-ment was aware of the movement in Indo-China. The UnitedStates expressed its concern about potential Japanese actionagainst the Philippines, the East Indies, Malaya, or Thailand.There was, therefore, very little reason for Japan to keep upa pretext of negotiations for the purpose of disguising theseobjectives. Consequently, as time went on after November 29, and asJapan insisted to her envoys upon the continuance of nego-tiations as a pretext to divert the suspicion of the UnitedStates, it must have been apparent to a careful student of theintercepted dispatches that Japan on a deadline date of No-vember 29 had put into effect an operation which was to con-sume a substantial time interval before its results were ap-parent to this government and which appeared susceptible ofeffective concealment in its initial phases. The messages as to the berthings of ships in Pearl Harborwould then have given the reader of these intercepted dis-patches an insight as to one of the probable directions of theplan which went into effect automatically on November 29,97 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYand which Japan was so anxious to conceal. All these dis-patches taken together would have pointed to Pearl Harbor asa probable objective of this plan. Yet, because I was not fur-nished with these intercepted dispatches, nor given in sum-mary form any indication of the deadline date, the automaticexecution of a plan by Japan on that date, and the continu-ance of negotiations thereafter as a pretext to hide that plan,I was deprived of the opportunity to make this deduction,which the dispatches as a whole would warrant, if not compel. After November 27, there was a rising intensity in the crisisin Japanese-United States relations apparent in the inter-cepted dispatches. I was told on November 27 that negotia-tions had ceased and two days later that they appeared to beterminated with the barest possibilities of their resumption.Then I was left to read public accounts of further conversa-tions between the State Department and the Japanese emis-saries in Washington which indicated that negotiations hadbeen resumed. The Navy Department knew immediately of the reactionsof Nomura and Kurusu to the American note of November26-"Our failure and humiliation are complete."29 The Navy Department knew immediately of the reactionsof the Japanese government to the American note of Novem-ber 26. Japan termed it: A humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extreme- ly regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable.30 The Navy Department knew that Nomura and Kurusu sug-98 INFORMATION WITHHELDgested to Japan on November 26 one way of saving the situa-tion-a wire by the President to the Emperor.31 The Navy Department knew that the Japanese governmentadvised Nomura and Kurusu on November 28 that the sug-gested wire from the President to the Emperor offered nohope: "What you suggest is entirely unsuitable."32 The Navy Department knew that on November 30, Japangave Germany a detailed version of the negotiations with theUnited States. Japan stated that "a continuation of negotia-tions would inevitably be detrimental to our cause," and char-acterized certain features of the American proposal of No-vember 26 as "insulting"-"clearly a trick." Japan concludedthat the United States had decided to regard her as an enemy.33 The Navy Department knew that Japan had instructed herambassadors in Berlin on November 30 to inform Hitler: The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April... now stand ruptured-broken. Say very secretly to them [Hitler and Ribbentrop] that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.34 All this vital information came from intercepted dispatches,decoded and translated in Washington, either on the day theywere sent or a day or two later. None of this information wassupplied to me. On November 19, 1941, the Japanese government set up asystem for informing its representatives throughout the worldof the time when Japan was to sever diplomatic relations35 orto go to war with the United States, Great Britain or Russia.36This decision was to be made known through a false weatherbroadcast from Japan. The words "east wind rain" in the99ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYbroadcast meant that Japan had decided to sever relations orgo to war with the United States. The words "west wind clear"would denote such action against England. The words "northwind cloudy" would denote such action against Russia. The interception of the false weather broadcast was con-sidered by the Navy Department to be of supreme importance.Every facility of the Navy was invoked to learn as speedily aspossible when the false weather broadcast from Japan washeard and which of the significant code words were used. Ex-traordinary measures were established in the Navy Depart-ment to transmit the words used in this broadcast to key of-ficers as soon as they were known.37 The Naval Court of Inquiry heard substantial evidencefrom various witnesses on the question of whether or notJapan gave the signal prescribed by the winds code. The NavalCourt of Inquiry found the facts on this matter to be as fol-lows: On 4 December an intercepted Japanese broadcast employing this code was received in the Navy Department. Although this notification was subject to two interpretations, either a breaking off of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, or war, this information was not transmitted to the Commander- in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, or to other Commanders afloat. It was known in the Navy Department that the Commanders- in-Chief, Pacific and Asiatic Fleets, were monitoring Japanese broadcasts for this code, and apparently there was a mistaken impression in the Navy Department that the execute message had also been intercepted at Pearl Harbor, when in truth this message was never intercepted at Pearl Harbor. No attempt was made by the Navy Department to ascertain whether this informa- tion had been obtained by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and by other Commanders afloat. Admiral Stark stated that he knew nothing about it, althoughAdmiral Turner stated that he himself was familiar with it and100 INFORMATION WITHHELDpresumed that Admiral Kimmel had it. This message cannot nowbe located in the Navy Department.38The findings of the Naval Court of Inquiry on this subject areconfirmed by the evidence presented to the joint congressionalinvestigating committee. From various intercepted Japanese messages it was appar-ent that the high point in the crisis in Japanese-American af-fairs would be reached when the Japanese reply to the Amer-ican note of November 26 was received. As the Naval Courtof Inquiry put it: The reply to this note was anxiously awaited by the high officials of the War and Navy Departments because of the feeling that Japan would not accept the conditions presented, and that diplo- matic relations would be severed or that war would be declared.39 On the afternoon of December 6, 1941, there was inter-cepted, decoded and translated in the Navy Department, adispatch from Japan to her ambassadors in Washington,known as the "pilot message." This stated: 1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my sepa- rate message #902 (in English). 2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. How- ever, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you to please keep it secret for the time being. 3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. How- ever, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.40101 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY The first thirteen parts of the Japanese reply were inter- cepted and received by the Navy Department at about 3:00 P.M., December 6, 1941, and were translated and made ready for distribution by 9:00 P.M., Washington time on that date. These thirteen parts contained strong language. The follow- ing expressions are fairly typical of their tenor: The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war (Part 9)... it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhumane than military pressure (Part 9). ... It is a fact of history that the countries (of East Asia for the past hundred years or more have) been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-Amer- ican policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice [them- selves] to the prosperity of the two nations. (Part 10.)41 Mr. Hull described the whole document on December 7: In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a docu- ment that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and dis- tortions-infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any government on this planet was capable of uttering them.42 The thirteen parts and the pilot message instructing theJapanese envoys that a specific hour was later to be fixed fortheir delivery could mean only one thing, that war with theUnited States was imminent. An hour had been fixed for thedelivery of the Japanese ultimatum and for the probable out-break of hostilities. The hour fixed would be communicatedto the Japanese emissaries in Washington in a separate mes-sage to be expected shortly. Not a word of these supremely102 INFORMATION WITHHELDcritical developments of Saturday, December 6, was sent tome. This vital information which was available at 9:00 P.M.,Washington time, was distributed to the most important of-ficers of the government in Washington by midnight, Wash-ington time. The President of the United States had it. TheSecretary of the Navy had it. The chief of military intelligencehad it. The director of naval intelligence had it. Apparently,the Secretary of War and the Secretary of State were apprisedof these momentous events on the same evening. Nine P.M.,in Washington was 3:30 in the afternoon in Hawaii. At mid-night in Washington it was early evening, 6:30 P.M., in Hawaii. 3. "THIS MEANS WAR" When thirteen parts of the fourteen-part Japanese inter-cepted message were delivered to Mr. Roosevelt about 9:00P.M. Washington time December 6, 1941,43 he turned to HarryHopkins and remarked, "This means war."44 Yet the Chief ofNaval Operations, who probably had the information con-tained in these thirteen parts Saturday evening, but who cer-tainly had it, and also the fourteenth part and the 1:00 P.M.time-of-delivery message, by 9:00 A.M. Sunday December 7,1941, more than four hours before the attack, made no moveeither to warn me or give me the information available. 4. MEMORY FAILURES General Marshall and Admiral Stark each states he cannotremember where he was on the evening of December 6, 1941.Each states he did not see the first thirteen parts of the four-teen-part message on that date. General Marshall states he firstlearned of the thirteen parts when he arrived at his office in the103 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYforenoon of December 7, 1941, when the fourteenth part andthe time-of-delivery message, which had been decoded before9:00 A.M., were also available.45 When Stark received thesemessages has never been definitely established. Captain Mc-Collum, U.S. Navy, testified that about 9:00 A.M. December 7,1941, or a little earlier, while he and Admiral Wilkinson werediscussing these messages with Stark, one of his officers de-livered the fourteenth part of the Japanese reply and also the1:00 P.M. time-of-delivery message.46 The significance of thedelivery hour was pointed out to Admiral Stark because 1:00P.M. Washington time was 7:30 A.M. at Honolulu and 2:00A.M. at Manila. 5. CAPTAIN McCollum's TESTIMONY Captain Arthur N. McCollum, U.S. Navy, was the head ofthe Far East section of the division of naval intelligence in theNavy Department in Washington from September 1939 untilOctober 1942. Captain McCollum: That was the night of the 6th-7th, yes, sir. By late Saturday night, we had, if I remember correctly, thir- teen of the parts. They were transmitted almost as soon as re- ceived, to the Secretary of State, to the President, to the Chief of Naval Operations, and to the people over in the War Depart- ment. Early, Sunday morning, when I arrived to take over the duty in my office, where we had a special watch set since early Novem- ber, the fourteenth part was coming in; and while Admiral Wilkinson and I were discussing the situation about 9 o'clock Sunday morning, or possibly earlier, nearer 8:30, with Admiral Stark, the instruction which directed the delivery of the note to the Secretary of State was brought in, shown to Admiral Stark, who immediately called the White House on the telephone and104 INFORMATION WITHHELD the draft was taken over to the Secretary of State and to the White House. At the time, the possible significance of the time of delivery was pointed out to all hands.-In other words, it was pointed out that 1 P.M. Washington time would mean about 8 o'clock in the morning Honolulu time. Admiral Hewitt: 7:30. Captain McCollum: 7:30, yes, sir, and very early in the morn- ing out in the Far East, that is, out in the Philippines and those places; and that we did not know what this signified, but that if an attack were coming, it looked like the timing was such that it was timed for operations out in the Far East and possibly on Hawaii at the time. We had no way of knowing, but because of the fact that the exact time for delivery of this note had been stressed to the Ambassadors, we felt that there were important things which would move at that time, and that was pointed out not only to Admiral Stark, but I know it was pointed out to the Secretary of State. I was present and assisted in pointing it out to Admiral Stark and it was taken over, with instructions to point that out to the Secretary of State.47 Captain McCollum also testified: 1) On December 1, he prepared and submitted a warningmessage to be sent to the fleet.48 It was not sent. 2) Again on four or five December he drafted anotherwarning message and Admiral Turner emasculated it.49 Themessage was not sent. 3) There was a change in the situation between November27, and December 4 which made him conclude that war wasmuch more imminent on December 4 than it had been onNovember 27.50 4) McCollum had an official report from Kramer betweeneleven and twelve Saturday night that proper deliveries ofthe thirteen parts had been made.51 Proper deliveries includedthe Secretary of State, the President, the Chief of Naval Oper-105 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY ations (Admiral Stark) and the War Department. Captain Alwin D. Kramer, U.S. Navy, then a lieutenant commander was assigned from June 1940 until June 1943 to the Far East section of the division of naval intelligence in the Navy De- partment in Washington under Captain McCollum, with a special assignment to the communication security group un- der Captain Laurance F. Safford. 5) McCollum thought Japs would attack fleet wherever it might be.52 6) If Japs were convinced we would come into the war if they attacked Kra (Malay States), then they would attack us.53 7) On Friday May 18, 1945, Captain McCollum informedme that he had made a complete statement of all that he knewabout the Japanese attack and this statement was filed in a safein the Office of Naval Intelligence; that the sealed package inwhich he had placed his statement, together with certain docu-ments in connection with it, had been broken open and thecontents distributed among other files. He felt some of thedocuments were missing, or at least he had been unable to findthem since his return to Washington. The documents whichhave disappeared include his statement and copies of the dailyand weekly summaries which were presented to AdmiralStark, the Secretary, and the President. When Senator Ferguson questioned Captain McCollum atthe congressional investigation, he noted the appreciation ofthe vital importance of the Japanese intercepts received anddecoded on December 6 and December 7, 1941, and the careand speed with which they were distributed to the variousofficials in Washington, but, said the senator, no one thoughtanything was going to happen in Washington. It was in Hawaiiand the Far East that action was expected. Why was immediateknowledge of these intercepts in Washington so important if106 INFORMATION WITHHELDno word of their content or significance was sent to the com-manders in Hawaii and the Philippines until too late to be ofany use? In May 1946 Stark appeared before a special session of thecongressional investigating committee, which had previouslycompleted taking testimony, to testify that his aide had be-latedly reminded him that he attended the theatre on thenight of December 6.54 This aide also reminded him that afterhe had returned to his quarters he, Stark, had had a conversa-tion by phone with the President about conditions in thePacific. Admiral Stark continued to maintain he had no inde-pendent recollection of this. It is one thing to warn commanders at a particular base ofthe probable outbreak of war in theaters thousands of milesaway, knowing and expecting that they will continue theirassigned tasks and missions after the receipt of such warning,and that the very nature of the warning emphasizes to themthe necessity for continuing such tasks and missions. It is quite another thing to warn commanders at a particu-lar base of an attack to be expected in their own locality. In 1941, we of the Pacific Fleet had a plethora of premoni-tions, of generalized warnings and forebodings that Japanmight embark on aggressive action in the Far East at any oneof the variously predicted dates. After receipt of such warn-ings, we were expected to continue with renewed intensity andzeal our own training program and preparations for war ratherthan to go on an all-out local alert against attack. In the year 1941 the international situation was grave and,at times, tense. However, preparing the fleet for war throughan intensive training program had to go on. There was a vitalelement of timing involved in determining when the fleetshould curtail training for all-out war measures. Maximum107 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYsecurity measures, consistent with the maintenance of thetraining program, were already in effect in the fleet. Whenwould Japanese-American relations reach the point that alltraining should cease and all-out war dispositions should bemade? This was what we needed to know in the Pacific in theyear 1941. The dispatch fixing the hour for the delivery of the Japa-nese ultimatum to the United States as 1:00 P.M., Washingtontime,55 was intercepted and decoded by the Navy Departmentby 7:00 on the morning of December 7-7:00 A.M., Washing-ton time, 1:30 A.M., Hawaiian time-nearly six and a halfhours before the attack.56 The translation of this short mes-sage from the Japanese was a two-minute job.57 Not later than9:00 A.M., the Chief of Naval Operations was informed of it.This information was not supplied to me prior to the attack. I cannot tell from the evidence that has been presented theprecise hours on the morning of December 7, when variousresponsible officers of the Navy Department knew that 1:00P.M., Washington time, was the hour fixed for the delivery ofthe Japanese ultimatum to this government. This much Iknow. There was ample time, at least an interval of approxi-mately three and one-half hours, in which a message couldhave been dispatched to me. Regardless of what argumentsthere may be as to the evaluation of the dispatches that hadbeen sent to me, I surely was entitled to know of the hourfixed by Japan for the probable outbreak of war against theUnited States. I cannot understand now-I have never under-stood-I may never understand-why I was deprived of theinformation available in the Navy Department in Washing-ton on Saturday night and Sunday morning. On November 28, 1941, the Navy Department could haveinformed me of the following vital facts:108 INFORMATION WITHHELD 1) Japan had set November 29 as an immovable deadline date for agreement with the United States. 2) The United States gave to Japan certain proposals for a solution of Japanese-American relations on November 26, which amounted to an ultimatum. I might remark paren- thetically that an authoritative statement from my govern- ment as to the general nature of these proposals would have been most enlightening but it was not supplied. 3) Japan considered the United States proposals of Novem- ber 26 as unacceptable and planned to rupture negotiations with the United States when her reply to them was delivered to this government. 4) Japan was keeping up a pretext of negotiations afterNovember 26 to conceal a definite plan which went into effecton November 29th. This was the type of information which I had stated in MayI needed so urgently in making the difficult decisions withwhich I was confronted. The question will arise in your minds, as it has in mine:Would the receipt of this information have made a differencein the events of December 7? No man can now state as a factthat he would have taken a certain course of action years agohad he known facts which were then unknown to him. All hecan give is his present conviction, divorcing himself from hind-sight as far as humanly possible, and re-creating the atmos-phere of the past and the factors which then influenced him.I give you my views, formed in this manner. Had I learned these vital facts and the "ships in harbor-messages on November 28th, it is my present conviction thatI would have rejected the Navy Department's suggestion tosend carriers to Wake and Midway. I would have ordered thethird carrier, the "Saratoga," back from the West Coast I109 ADMIRAL KIMMEL’S STORYwould have gone to sea with the fleet and endeavored to keepit in an intercepting position at sea. This would have per-mitted the disposal of the striking power of the fleet to meetan attack in the Hawaiian area. The requirements of keepingthe fleet fueled, however would have made necessary the pres-ence in Pearl Harbor from time to time of detachments ofvarious units of the main body of the fleet. On December 4, ample time remained for the Navy Depart-ment to forward to me the information which I have outlined,and in addition the following significant facts, which the NavyDepartment learned between November 27 and that date: 1) Japan had informed Hitler that war with the Anglo-Saxon powers would break out sooner than anyone dreamt; 2) Japan had broadcast her winds code signal using thewords "east wind rain," meaning war or a rupture of diplo-matic relations with the United States. Assuming that for the first time on December 5, I had all theimportant information then available in the Navy Depart-ment, it is my present conviction that I would have gone tosea with the fleet, including the carrier "Lexington" and ar-ranged a rendezvous at sea with Halsey's carrier force, andbeen in a good position to intercept the Japanese attack. At some time prior to December 6, 1941, the commandersof Hawaii could have been informed of the promise of armedsupport as detailed by the War Department in London to AirMarshal Brooke Popham in Singapore. This vital informationwas denied to them. On December 6, fifteen hours before the attack, ample timestill remained for the Navy Department to give me all thesignificant facts which I have outlined and which were notavailable to me in Hawaii. In addition, the Navy Departmentcould then have advised me that thirteen parts of the Japanese110 INFORMATION WITHHELDreply to the American proposals had been received, that thetone and temper of this message indicated a break in diplo-matic relations or war with the United States, and that theJapanese reply was to be formally presented to this govern-ment at a special hour soon to be fixed. Had I received thisinformation on the afternoon of December 6, it is my presentconviction that I would have ordered all fleet units in PearlHarbor to sea, arranged a rendezvous with Halsey's task forcereturning from Wake, and been ready to intercept the Japa-nese force by the time fixed for the outbreak of war. Even on the morning of December 7, four or five hours be-fore the attack, had the Navy Department for the first timeseen fit to send me all this significant information, and theadditional fact that 1:00 P.M., Washington time, had beenfixed for the delivery of the Japanese ultimatum to the UnitedStates, my light forces could have moved out of Pearl Harbor,all ships in the harbor would have been at general quarters,and all resources of the fleet in instant readiness to repel anattack. The Pacific Fleet deserved a fighting chance. It was entitledto receive from the Navy Department the best informationavailable. Such information had been urgently requested. Ihad been assured that it would be furnished me. We faced ourproblems in the Pacific confident that such assurance wouldbe faithfully carried out. It has been established that some three hundred and sixtyJapanese planes launched from carriers to the north of Oahuparticipated in the attack. The Army pursuit planes availablewere entirely inadequate to stop the attack. Nevertheless, hadwe had as much as two hours warning a full alert of planesand guns would have greatly reduced the damage. We couldpossibly have been able to locate the Jap carriers, and our own 1ll ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYcarriers "Lexington" and "Enterprise" already at sea to thewestward of Oahu might have been brought into the pictureinstead of expending their efforts to the southward as a resultof faulty information. The great intangible, the element ofsurprise, would have been denied the Japs.112CHAPTER VSecret Political Commitments Japan was provoked into attacking America at Pearl Harbor. It is a travesty of history to say that America was forced into the war.-Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, British Minister of Production in 1944. 1. SECRET PROMISE OF ARMED SUPPORT TO BRITISHAt Pearl Harbor, a few hours after the Japanese attack, adispatch from the commander-in-chief, U.S. AsiaticFleet, addressed to the Chief of Naval Operations andfor the information of the commander-in-chief, U.S. PacificFleet, was delivered to me. This dispatch read: "Learn fromSingapore we have assured Britain armed support under threeor four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instruc-tions from you."1 In 1944 I personally asked Admiral Hart about this mes-sage, particularly as to the nature of the eventualities referredto. He replied that the eventualities were inconsequential andhad to do with the detail of destroyers to the British, that hehad lost his files when the "Houston" sank, that he had nocopy of the dispatch from Singapore. When questioned in February 1946 by the joint congres-sional committee on this subject. Admiral Hart stated that hedid receive a dispatch in the early days of December 1941 fromCaptain John Creighton, U.S. naval observer at Singapore, to 113 ADMIRAL KIMMEL’S STORYthe effect that British Air Marshal Brooke Popham had beenadvised from London that in certain eventualities which hecould not recall the British had been assured of our armedsupport.2 Admiral Hart also stated that his files were lost andthe only source would be Captain Creighton himself. Captain Creighton stated before the joint congressionalcommittee that after Admiral Hart had testified he, Creigh-ton, called Hart and said he could not remember sending Hartthe subject message and that Hart replied, "Well you sent itall right because I can produce a copy of it."3 The next morning Creighton obtained from Hart's office acopy of the dispatch sent on December 6, 1941, which read: Brook Popham received Saturday from War Department Lon- don Quote-We have now received assurance of American armed support in cases as follows: (Affirm) we are obliged execute our plans to forestall Japs landing Isthmus of Kra or take action in reply to Nips invasion any other part of Siam. XX (Baker) if Dutch Indies are attacked and we go to their defense. XX (Cast) If Japs attack us the British. XX Therefore without reference to London put plan in action (first) if you have good info Japs expedition advancing with the apparent intention of landing in Kra. (Second) if the Nips violate any part of Thailand (Para). If N.E.I, are attacked put into operation plans agreed upon be- tween British and Dutch unquote.4 This definite promise (knowledge which was withheld fromthe commanders at Pearl Harbor) of armed support to GreatBritain in the event of specific eventualities increased enor-mously the probability that United States would be attackedin the event of any hostile move by the Japs. The efficiencyof the Japanese intelligence system practically insured thatthey would learn of the promise. Any hesitancy about attack-114 SECRET POLITICAL COMMITMENTSing us simultaneously with the British or the NetherlandsEast Indies disappeared. On the other hand, this commitment to supply armed sup-port to Britain made it imperative that Japan be induced tofire the first shot in order to convince the American peoplethat Japan was the aggressor and thereby unify the people insupport of our entry into the war. It also becomes easy to un-derstand Mr. Stimson's feeling of relief that the crisis hadcome in a way which united all our people. The commanders at Pearl Harbor were placed in the im-possible situation of being responsible for commitments andthe consequences thereof of which they were kept in ignorance. Mr. Stimson's various statements make interesting readingin this connection. He said: If war did come, it was important both from the point of view of unified support of our own people as well as for the record of history, that we should not be placed in the position of firing the first shot, if this could be done without sacrificing our safety, but that Japan should appear in her true role as the real ag- gressor.5 And again: In spite of the risks involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full sup- port of the American people it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in any one's mind as to who were the aggressors.6 Once more Mr. Stimson's statement: When the news first came that Japan had attacked us, my first feeling was of relief that the indecision was over and that a crisis had come in a way which would unite all our people. This con- 115 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY tinued to be my dominant feeling in spite of the news of catas- trophes which quickly developed.7 In the evening of December 6, 1941, Mr. Stimson demandedand received from the Navy Department a list showing thelocation of each ship in the Pacific Fleet. Why the Secretary ofWar should interest himself in such details of Navy Depart-ment administration at this particular time has never beenexplained. Mr. Stimson never appeared before the joint congressionalcommittee for questioning. In lieu thereof he submitted awritten statement which purported to be replies to questionsby the Democratic majority. Even with questions thus re-stricted his replies were far from complete. He was excusedfrom testifying on the plea of ill health from October of 1945to May of 1946. That a commitment to the British existed and that Wash-ington withheld vital information is further supported by Mr.Churchill's speech in the House of Commons as set forth inthe Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, (p. 27). His reac-tion to the speech was recorded on January 27, 1942. Churchill spoke to the British Commons today. And we learned something of very great importance over here in the U.S.A. In discussing events leading up to the war in the Far Pacific he said: What was the likelihood of the Far Eastern theatre being thrown into war by Japanese attacks? I will explain how deli- cately we walked and how painful it was at times-how very care- ful I was that every time we should not be exposed single-handed to this onslaught. On the other hand, the probability since the Atlantic Confer- ence, at which I discussed these matters with President Roosevelt, that the United States, even if not herself attacked, would come116 SECRET POLITICAL COMMITMENTS into the war in the Far East and thus make the final victory as- sured, seemed to allay some of these anxieties, and that expecta- tion has not been falsified by the events. In other words, Churchill said that when he met Roosevelt the first time-and wrote "The Atlantic Charter"-he talked with the President about the fact that Britain must not fight alone in the Far East, and got some sort of an assurance, evidently satis- factory to him, that the U.S. would go to war with Japan regard- less of whether Japan attacked us or not. In still other words, we were slated for this war by the President before Pearl Harbor. Pearl Harbor merely precipitated what was "in the cards." To whatever extent this is true, it indicated how both Congress and the country were in total ignorance of the American war-com- mitments made by the President and never disclosed. I saw the full text of the Churchill speech only in the New York Times.... Senator Danaher of Connecticut put this mate- rial in the Congressional Record for January 28. Not a paper mentioned it. Does this mean that censorship is now at work to complete the task of keeping the people in ignorance regarding what has happened to them? And if the implications of Churchill's statement are valid, is there not very high responsibility for not ordering Hawaii to be on "total alert" ahead of Pearl Harbor? [Italics and indentations as in the book.] Captain Russel Grenfell, Royal Navy, in his book, MainFleet to Singapore, published in 1952, says: No reasonably informed person can now believe that Japan made a villainous, unexpected attack on the United States. An attack was not only fully expected but was actually desired. It is beyond doubt that President Roosevelt wanted to get his coun- try into the war, but for political reasons was most anxious to insure that the first act of hostility came from the other side; for which reason he caused increasing pressure to be put on the Japanese, to a point that no self-respecting nation could endure without resort to arms. Japan was meant by the American Presi- 117ADMIRAL KIMMEL’S STORYdent to attack the United States. As Mr. Oliver Lyttelton, thenBritish Minister of Production said in 1944, "Japan was pro-voked into attacking America at Pearl Harbor. It is a travesty ofhistory to say that America was forced into war." 2. FAULTY ASSURANCES During the time I was in command of the Pacific Fleet Ireceived repeated assurances from the Chief of Naval Opera-tions, Admiral Stark, that our government was trying to avoida break with Japan, that Germany was the enemy to defeatand that our government would do our utmost to avoid a twofront war. When the administration closed the canal to Japanese ship-ping, froze Japanese assets in the United States and placedother publicized restrictions on Japan, it appeared to me thatby firm action we were avoiding any appearance of weaknessas a deterrent to Japanese aggression. Had I known, as the record plainly shows, that from Augustuntil December 7, 1941, the administration's policy was toenter the war through an incident in the Pacific or, as Secre-tary Stimson put it, to induce Japan to fire the first shot with-out too much injury to ourselves, my whole concept of thesituation would have been considerably altered. The inter-cepted Japanese messages which were withheld from me alsocontradicted Admiral Stark's assurances. Here are some of the assurances which appear in AdmiralStark's letters to me: February 10,1941 I continue in every way I possibly can to fight commitments or dispositions that would involve us on two fronts and to keep from sending more combatant ships to the Far East.118 SECRET POLITICAL COMMITMENTS February 25, 1941 Gallup polls, editorials, talk on the Hill (and I might add, all of which is irresponsible) constitute a rising tide for action in the Far East, if the Japanese go into Singapore or the Nether- lands East Indies. This can not be ignored and we must have in the back of our heads the possibility of having to swing to that tide. Extract from a copy of a memorandum for the President,from the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, enclosedwith his letter of February 25, 1941: There is a chance that further moves against Japan will pre- cipitate hostilities rather than prevent them. We want to give Japan no excuse for coming in in case we are forced into hostil- ities with Germany whom we all consider our major problem. If we are forced into the war our main effort as approved to date will be directed in the Atlantic against Germany. We should, if possible, not be drawn into a major war in the Far East. April 3,1941 For some time past, Japan has shown less and less inclination to attack the British, Dutch and ourselves in the Far East. What the effect on her would be were the United States to transfer a large part of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic can as yet be only surmised. The question as to our entry into the war now seems to be when and not whether. My own personal view is that we may be in the war (possibly undeclared) against Germany and Italy in about two months, but there is a reasonable possibility that Ja- pan may remain out altogether. August 19, 1941 If England declares war on Japan but we do not, I very much suppose that we would follow a course of action similar to the one we are pursuing in the Atlantic as a neutral. 119 ADMIRAL KIMMEL’S STORY August 23, 1941 I have not given up hope of continuing peace in the Pacific but I could wish the thread by which it continues to hang were not so slender. September 22, 1941 (Extract from a copy of a letter to Ad-miral Hart sent to me by Admiral Stark): Mr. Hull has not yet given up hope of a satisfactory settlement of our differences with Japan. Chances of such a settlement are, in my judgment, very slight. September 23, 1941 The situation in the Pacific generally is far different from what it is in the Atlantic.... The longer we can keep the situa- tion in the Pacific in status quo, the better for all concerned. October 17, 1941 We shall continue to strive to maintain the status quo in the Pacific. How long it can be kept going I don't know, but the President and Mr. Hull are working on it. 120 SECRET POLITICAL COMMITMENTS It should be noted that on November 26, 1941, our govern-ment did deliver a note to Japan which has frequently beenreferred to as an ultimatum, and which Mr. Stimson referredto as Mr. Hull's decision to kick the whole thing over. Theessentials of this note are set forth on page 93 of this account.The fourteen-part Japanese message decoded on December 6and December 7, 1941, frequently referred to as Japan's decla-ration of war, was a reply to Mr. Hull's ultimatum of Novem-ber 26, 1941. The provisions of this ultimatum were withheld from mealthough testimony given in the investigations indicates re-sponsible officials in the Navy Department believed our noteof November 26, 1941, would be the cause of immediate warwith Japan. The Army Pearl Harbor Board of Investigationconcurred in this opinion.121 CHAPTER VI Suppression of Evidence . . . every suppressed or expunged word reverberates through the earth from side to side.-Ralph Waldo Emerson. 1. JAPANESE INTERCEPTS In the findings of the Roberts Commission published in January 1942 and in the record of proceedings of the Rob- erts Commission of which I received a copy in January 1944, there were vague references which indicated that valu- able if not vital information in the Navy Department had never been supplied to me. When I obtained a copy of the Hart investigation I foundthat Captain Laurance F. Safford, U.S. Navy, had testified atlength in regard to these intercepts. His testimony here andsubsequently before the Court of Inquiry and before the jointcongressional committee is the most courageous, unselfish,honest, clear testimony I have ever seen recorded or heard pre-sented. The most brutal cross-examination failed to daunthim. The fact that his actions were dictated solely by his senseof justice and his personal integrity appeared incomprehen-sible to certain minds. In the summer of 1944 when the Naval Court of Inquirywas conducting its investigation, Admiral King, who was thenActing Secretary of the Navy, authorized Captain Robert A.122 SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCELavender, U.S. Navy, one of my legal staff, to inspect thesecret files containing the translated Japanese intercepts. Captain Lavender made his inspection the afternoon of thesame day the permission was granted and selected some forty-three messages which he had copied and authenticated thatsame afternoon. The next day General McNarney, then deputy chief of staffof the Army, telephoned to the director of naval communica-tions protesting Lavender's inspection and stating that ordersforbade such inspection. The director of naval communica-tions said he had received no such order whereupon McNarneysaid he meant that orders should forbid such inspection. The copies of the messages were not delivered to CaptainLavender but kept in the custody of the chief of naval com-munications. Our next step was to request officially the president of theNaval Court of Inquiry to have these messages placed in evi-dence before the court. The Navy Department refused to permit these messages tobe placed in evidence. At each session of the court we renewedour demand. I then wrote a letter to the Secretary of the Navyand after an interval of several days we inquired again andagain as to when we would receive an answer. I was then toldthat my letter had been misplaced and would I kindly supplythe Secretary's office with a copy. I then wrote another request,the first three paragraphs of which were a duplicate of myoriginal, and added a fourth paragraph which stated in sub-stance that (a) ten days ago I had delivered personally to ViceAdmiral Edwards, deputy commander in chief, the originalrequest and (b) I was now submitting this same request againas I had been informed that the original letter was lost. I de-livered this second letter personally to Admiral Edwards with 123 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY the statement that it would do no good to lose my letters be- cause from now on I would write the same letter daily to the Secretary of the Navy until I received an answer. While I was still talking to Admiral Edwards a clerk brought my original letter and presented it to Admiral Edwards, saying he had just found it. From various indications we concluded that some one in attendance at the court sessions was reporting the daily pro- ceedings to the Secretary. Our only hope to place the selected dispatches in evidence was that I make a statement to Laven- der in the presence of all those attending the court sessions (but not during the proceedings) to the effect that if we were not permitted to introduce this evidence, I proposed to hold a press conference and advise the press that vital information essential to a determination of the full responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster was being withheld from the Naval Court of Inquiry. The day after this statement was made, we were permitted to have the evidence before the court. Meanwhile the Army called me as the last witness to testifybefore the Army board of investigation. At the close of mytestimony I was asked the routine question of whether I hadany further statement to make. I then read to the board amemorandum which set forth the salient facts about the in-tercepted messages. It was immediately evident to me that noevidence on this subject had been placed before this board.Subsequently I learned that after I testified the Army boardstarted their investigation all over again, to cover the phasesin connection with the Japanese intercepts. Prior to this rein-vestigation Army witnesses had not mentioned the Japaneseintercepts when testifying before the board. During the congressional investigation it was disclosed that124 SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCEthe agency responsible for suppressing the testimony of allArmy witnesses in regard to the Japanese intercepts was theoffice of the chief of staff of the Army and that this suppressionwas ordered either by General Marshall himself or by hisdeputy chief of staff. General McNarney.1 The affidavit of Major General Miles stated that in his ear-lier testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, I avoided any statement concerning details of information and intelligence which I had derived from Top Secret sources then called "Magic," or any intimation that such sources ex- isted. The reason I so limited my testimony was because prior to my appearance before the board. Brigadier General Russell A. Osmun and then Colonel Carter W. Clarke of G-2 transmitted to me instructions from the Chief of Staff that I was not to dis- close to the Army Pearl Harbor Board any facts concerning the radio intelligence mentioned, or the existence of that form of information or intelligence in the period preceding 7 December, 1941. Accordingly, I obeyed that instruction.2 Witnesses are sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth, andnothing but the truth. The injunction laid upon GeneralMiles denied to the board information without which it wouldhave been impossible to arrive at a just and honest allocationof responsibility for the disaster. Whether this could be con-strued as instruction to commit perjury I leave to the lawyers. 2. THE WHITE HOUSE FILE In November of 1945 during the congressional investiga-tion, Captain Lavender remarked to the lieutenant in chargeof the secret file room that he had been searching Navy De-partment files for two years and had just discovered the onehe was examining. He inquired, "Is there any other file bear- 125 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYing on the Pearl Harbor attack that we have not seen?" The lieutenant replied, "Well, there is the 'White Housefile'." He explained the "White House file" contained messagestransmitted and received in Navy code for the President-principally messages to and from Mr. Churchill. Lavender promptly reported this to me, adding that hecould have access to the file only by permission of the Secre-tary of the Navy. He had scarcely completed his report whenEnsign John J. Phelan, U.S.N., a member of my legal staffcame in and reported that while in the office of Captain JohnF. Walsh, U.S. Navy, in charge of the security control section,security branch, office of naval intelligence, a lieutenantdashed in and excitedly exclaimed, "There is Hell to pay.Kimmel has found out about the 'White House file'." Walshquickly silenced him by pointing to Phelan and saying, "Hereis one of Kimmel's men." My requests to the Secretary and to the President to exam-ine this file were disapproved. We never found out what thefile contained. In testimony before the congressional committee a NavyDepartment representative testified that there were only a fewunimportant papers in the file. If this be true the anxiety ofthe lieutenant over my discovery of its existence is difficultto understand. It is possible that documents from the White House filethat would have been of vital interest to investigators of PearlHarbor were safely concealed in a box of documents and pa-pers from the Navy Department stored at the White Housefrom July 1943 to April 1947. Also this might have been theresting place of the "Winds Execute" message missing fromthe files of the Navy Department.126 SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE 3. SENATOR THOMAS' BILL On March 31,1945, I read in the New York Herald Tribunea five-line dispatch which indicated a bill had been introducedin the Senate to prevent the disclosure of any coded matterexcept by permission of the head of a government departmentor by the President.3 I wrote that day to Mr. Rugg, my chiefcounsel, and asked that he investigate. It took several days forhim to obtain a copy of the bill and to notify Senator Fergusonthat its passage would close the door to any investigation ofPearl Harbor. While I was in Washington on April 12, 1945, I receiveda message from Rugg in Boston stating this bill had been intro-duced by the chairman of the Senate military affairs commit-tee, Senator Elmer Thomas of Utah, on March 30, 1945,reported to the Senate on March 31, and passed by the Senateon April 5. When Senator Ferguson returned from a Caribbean triphe found the passage by the Senate an accomplished fact. Iwas desperate because if the House passed the bill, that wasthe end of all disclosures about Pearl Harbor. So I gave all the facts about the bill to the Washington Posttogether with my views of the effects of such a law. I also tele-phoned several members of the House of Representatives. The next morning the Post and the Times Herald gave thematter such publicity that when the bill came before theHouse committee they delayed action sufficiently to make athorough investigation. When through administrative pres-sure a couple of months later the bill was brought to the floorof the House, it was defeated by a vote of that body. Had this bill been made a law this account and AdmiralTheobald's recent book would never have been written. Had 127 ADMIRAL KIMMEL’S STORYI not read the obscure paragraph in the Herald Tribune theHouse would have passed the bill as the Senate did. This bill and the unprecedented haste with which it waspassed by the Senate is another indication of the administra-tion's determination to suppress all knowledge of the Wash-ington background to Pearl Harbor. 4. IMPORTANT COMMUNICATIONS When I was on duty in the Navy Department prior to thewar, there was in effect a system whereby each individual towhom a secret message or other important communication wasshown was required to sign some form of receipt showing thathe had seen the communication. I had such a system in effectat my headquarters in Hawaii. The report of the Hewitt Boardnotes that my receipts were still on file at those headquartersin 1945. Such a system is essential to insure delivery and toprotect the communication personnel who are responsible forthe routing and delivery to the officials whose duty requiresthem to see the communication. However, the various investi-gations failed to discover receipts signed by officers on duty inthe Navy Department. Many times naval officers who had occupied highly responsi-ble positions in the Navy Department in the months beforeand until Pearl Harbor, when confronted with a secret mes-sage from the files of the Navy Department, stated they had norecollection of ever having seen the message. One exampleamong many such claims is that of Admiral Richmond KellyTurner, who was in charge of Navy war plans and responsibleto the Chief of Naval Operations for preparing orders suchas the so-called "war warning" message of November 27, 1941.Admiral Turner testified that he had no recollection of ever128 SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCEhaving seen the ships-in-harbor Japanese intercept message4which has been referred to as the "bomb plot message."5 Othertestimony indicates this message was discussed among the com-munication personnel of the War and Navy Departments.The young naval officers assured their army counterparts thatthe fleet would be far from Pearl Harbor when the Japaneseattacked. Here is a message which demanded positive action by thehead of naval war plans but Admiral Turner in his testimonydisclaimed all knowledge of and responsibility for the message.He stated it was the duty of naval intelligence to furnish suchinformation to the naval commander in Hawaii. The "bomb plot" message was distributed on October 9,1941, to the President, to the Secretary of the Navy, to Ad-miral Stark as Chief of Naval Operations, to the director ofnaval communications, to Admiral Turner as the director ofwar plans, and to the director of naval intelligence.6 5. THREE INCIDENTS: A SUMMARY There were three incidents which disclosed the existenceand made possible the publications of the vital Japanese inter-cepted dispatches which clearly revealed Japanese intentionsto attack the fleet at Pearl Harbor. Had any one of these inci-dents not occurred, the investigations of Pearl Harbor wouldhave been conducted without benefit of the information con-tained in these dispatches and buried in secret file rooms inWashington. The first of these incidents was the visit of Captain LauranceF. Safford to my office in New York when he told me of theexistence of the Japanese intercepts and gave me a verbal sum-mary of their contents. 129 ADMIRAL KIMMEL’S STORY The second was the purely fortuitous circumstance thatAdmiral King was Acting Secretary of the Navy on the par-ticular day in the summer of 1944 when my request to exam-ine these files was presented and that he freely permitted thisinspection. The third was that, by the purest chance, I found that fiveline item buried on an inside page of the New York HeraldTribune on March 31, 1945, reporting the introduction of abill in the Senate to prevent the publication of any matter thathad been placed in code except by permission of the Presidentor a cabinet officer. As I have already stated, this bill passedthe Senate but was defeated in the House of Representativeswhen Mr. Charles B. Rugg, my chief counsel, convinced themembership of the true purpose of the bill. Had this bill beenenacted none of the intercepted Japanese messages would havebeen made public. I am convinced that the guiding hand which determinesthe fate of each and all of us intended that the responsibilityfor Pearl Harbor should be placed where it rightfully belongs. 6. CAPTAIN SAFFORD AND ADMIRAL PYE In February 1944 Captain Laurance F. Safford, U.S. Navy,came to my office in New York. In a three hour conferencehe told me that in the previous fall he judged I would soonbe brought to trial by general court martial and he would becalled as a witness. He therefore proceeded to collect the dataunder his cognizance as chief of the decoding and decryptingsection of the office of naval communications. For the firsttime he then discovered that the most vital information con-tained in the decrypted Japanese intercepts had never beensupplied to me.130 SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE When he realized the full extent of the vital informationthat had been withheld from me, his sense of justice compelledhim to come to me. He then outlined to me verbally the es-sence of the information available in the Navy Department inthe weeks prior to Pearl Harbor and which had never beensupplied to me. Even though the findings of the Roberts Commission pub-lished in January 1942 and the record of its proceedings, anabbreviated copy of which was supplied to me in December1943, guardedly intimated the Navy Department had certaininformation which had been denied me, I was appalled atSafford's disclosures. In early December 1941, even though Safford then believedthe withheld information was being supplied to me, he be-came so concerned over the situation that he seriously con-templated sending me a personal warning which would haveplaced his whole career in jeopardy. Vice Admiral William S. Pye, U.S. Navy, was the second incommand of the Pacific Fleet when I was the commander-in-chief. I had known Pye since Naval Academy days. We hadserved together many times. When I told Pye of the information available in the NavyDepartment which had been withheld from the Pacific Fleet,he listened intently but made no comment. When Pye completed his testimony before the Naval Courtof Inquiry he came to my office where I gave him a copy ofthe Hart investigation open at Safford's testimony. Pye has a calm, even disposition, but as he read he becameexcited, exclaiming, "Here it is, here it is!" I said, "What doyou mean?" He replied, "Why, here is what you told me lastApril. I thought you were crazy. I believed this thing hadpreyed on your mind so much that you had gone nuts." 131 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY That this information had been received in the War andNavy Departments in Washington over a period of monthsand withheld from the commanders of our armed forces inHawaii was so incredible to Pye that he simply could not be-lieve it. Here was a man whom I had known during all myadult life who concluded I was crazy when I told him of theevidence I had discovered. What chance had I to convince thepublic of these incredible facts except by indisputable evi-dence. 7. WHY THE FLEET WAS NOT KEPT INDEFINITELY AT SEA During the various investigations and particularly duringthe congressional investigation there was much talk of how Ishould have kept the fleet at sea for an indefinite period afterthe receipt of the dispatches of November 27. Such talk ig-nores the rigid limit imposed on fleet operations by the num-ber of tankers and the facilities for fueling the ships from thereserves on shore at Pearl Harbor. It was out of the questionto fuel all the ships of the fleet at sea from the only fourtankers we had fitted for this purpose. With the fueling facil-ities in Pearl Harbor it would have taken ninety-six hours torefuel the fleet. To immobilize the fleet or any considerableportion of it for four days or even two days was a risk thatcould not be accepted. The fleet had not been kept at sea dur-ing previous times of tension and the Navy Department knewit was not at sea this time. The Pacific Fleet had no place toreplenish fuel except at Pearl Harbor. Our Asiatic Fleet hada multiplicity of fueling ports in the British and Dutch EastIndies. Had the information which indicated a Japanese attack on133 SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE the fleet within a short time been given to me, I would have disposed the fleet as described in another section of this ac- count. 8. SOME STRANGE TESTIMONY Admiral Turner contends, in testimony before the congres-sional committee, that the Pacific Fleet was not ordered to per-mit Japan to commit the first overt act.7 In another part ofhis testimony he states: The decision as to when and where to consider that they had committed an attack or were about to commit an attack on us was felt to be within the province of the Commander-in-Chief and that we should avoid any details . . . and if they had brought a task force within 500 miles of Hawaii, under the circumstances that most assuredly would have been an overt act.8 The wording of the orders leaves no doubt that the PacificFleet was required to permit Japan to commit the first overtact.9 Turner's testimony is the first and only intimation Ihave had that the contrary was the case. The statement that a Japanese task force within five hun-dred miles of Hawaii would have been an overt act is com-pletely at variance with the interpretation placed upon theorders by myself and the competent officers who were advisingme. I had strict orders not to bomb submarines in the oper-ating areas outside the three mile limit. On November 28,1941,1 violated these orders by issuing instructions to the fleetto bomb strange submarines in all the operating areas. At thesame time I notified the Chief of Naval Operations of myaction. If the Navy Department intended the Pacific Fleet to attack 133 ADMIRAL KIMMEL’S STORYany Japanese task force within five hundred miles of Hawaii,what prevented them from so informing the fleet command? Testimony such as that just described, expressed for thefirst time after the tragic events leading to Pearl Harbor,further confirms the failure to alert the Pacific Fleet to themounting crisis. In this connection the instructions in a letter from AdmiralStark to Admiral Kimmel dated September 23, 1941, werenever changed. These instructions were: In reply to question (a) your existing orders to escorts are ap- propriate under the present situation. They are also in accord- ance with Article 723 U.S. Navy Regulations; no orders should be given to shoot at the Present Time, other than those clearly set forth in this article. I believe there is little possibility of an Italian or German raider molesting a naval ship, but there might be another "Robin Moore" incident in the Pacific, in which case the President might give orders for action in the Pacific similar to those now in effect in the Atlantic; but that is something for the future.134CHAPTER VIIAdmiral Standley's Commentson Composition and Procedureof the Roberts Commission ADMIRAL WILLIAM H. STANDLEY was a member of the Rob-erts Commission; the following paragraphs are extractsfrom a yet unpublished article that he has written.These extracts are quoted with Admiral Standley's permission. ". . . When I arrived at the Board Room in the MunitionsBuilding, the other four members of the Commission werealready in session. Justice Roberts sat at the head of the table,Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, a former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet and the first to base it at Pearl Harbor,on his right; Major General Frank McCoy, an able retiredArmy Officer who was then president of the Foreign PolicyAssociation; and across from him I was amazed to see JosephT. McNarney, a Brigadier General in the Army Air Corps,member of the Army General Staff and sort of Rear AdmiralKelly Turner's opposite number in the War Department asMajor General Leonard T. Gerow's assistant in War PlansDivision. Yet, there at the other end of the table as a witnessand, as I was soon to realize, a defendant, sat Kelly Turnersupporting the testimony of his boss. Admiral Harold R. Stark, 135 ADMIRAL KIMMEL’S STORYChief of Naval Operations, who was then testifying beforethe Commission.... "... I had not been seated there very long before I realizedthat either McNarney ought to be sitting beside Turner as adefendant or Turner ought to be in my seat as a member. . . . "It was a 'mixed'-and a very mixed up-Presidential Com-mission with civilian, naval and military members, for whichthere was no precedent in law, custom or jurisprudence. Mr.Walter Bruce Howe, a civilian lawyer with little or no mili-tary court-martial experience, was Judge Advocate. . . . "To express it in an extremely kindly fashion, the makeupof the Commission and the conduct of its proceedings weremost unusual. I personally knew of many Army, Navy andMarine Corps officers with wide legal experience as judge ad-vocates of service court and boards who would have beenmore logical selections as judge advocate than a lawyer withno such experience and no knowledge of naval and militarymatters, terms and phraseology. If it were a means of avoidingprejudice, then how could one account for the appointmentof General McNarney as a member? If this appointment werebecause of his knowledge of current activities in the ArmyGeneral Staff, then Kelly Turner or his principal assistantshould have been a member instead of either Admiral Reevesor myself, both of whom had been retired and out of touchwith naval affairs for some four or five years. We could notpossibly be expected to be as familiar with events leading upto the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor as Joseph McNarneyor Kelly Turner. "... I knew from first hand experience the shortcomingsof our base at Pearl Harbor, for which Short and Kimmel werein no way responsible. From the beginning of our investiga-tion, I held firm belief that the real responsibility for the dis-136 COMMENTS ON THE ROBERTS COMMISSIONaster at Pearl Harbor was lodged thousands of miles from theTerritory of Hawaii. "As I have said, I was shocked at the irregularity of the pro-cedure of the Commission and at the reliance placed upon un-sworn testimony. As a result of my protest, a Joint Resolutionwas rushed through Congress in a few hours authorizing usto subpoena witnesses and to administer oaths. We were nowsomewhat better equipped to do our job. "The first sense of shock at the Japanese outrage on that'day of infamy' was succeeded by a feeling of outrage; a risingof indignation in the country reflected in both Houses ofCongress nearly brought on a Joint Congressional investiga-tion there and then. In my opinion, our Presidential commis-sion was hurriedly ordered by the President on December 16to forestall just such a Congressional investigation at thattime. In support of this view, it is interesting to note the fol-lowing chronological sequence of events leading up to thePresident's action on December 16. "At eight A.M. December 8th, Secretary of the Navy FrankKnox left Washington in his own plane, 'conscious of his sharein the blame for the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor.'1 "Almost the first thing he asked Admiral Kimmel, Com-mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, at Pearl Harbor was,'Did you receive our dispatch the night before the attack?'Kimmel told the Secretary that he had not, to which Knoxreplied, 'Well, we sent you one-I'm sure we sent one to theCommander of the Asiatic Fleet.' Admiral Kimmel later testi-fied that he had checked the files and found no record of anysuch dispatch from the Secretary, in which his Chief of Staff,Admiral W. W. Smith, bore him out. Subsequent investiga-tion in Washington failed to reveal that any such dispatch hadbeen sent. 137 ADMIRAL KIMMEL’S STORY "Secretary Knox returned to Washington on December 15,and hurried to the White House. Although it would not beknown for another four years that Knox, in his private reportto the President, did not place exclusive or specific blame onAdmiral Kimmel and his opposite number in the Army, Ma-jor General Walter C. Short, I think that he was very sensitiveof the failure of the Navy Department and of himself properlyto alert the Commander-in-Chief in Pearl Harbor. SecretaryKnox returned from the White House to issue orders for theremoval of Admiral Kimmel as Commander-in-Chief of theUnited States Fleet. Then, he called the press to his office andannounced that a total of 2,897 Army and Navy had beenkilled, 879 wounded and 26 were missing in the Pearl Harbordisaster. Thus, two days before our Commission met, the deci-sion had been made and the commanders relieved of theirposts, although the announcements were held up for two moredays. Thus, in the eyes of citizens of the Republic, withouta thorough investigation and with no opportunity to defendthemselves, Kimmel and Short were held responsible for thedebacle at Pearl Harbor. "The activities of our Commission were long and frenzied.It first met in Washington on December 17.I sat in on Decem-ber 18. We took 2173 printed pages of evidence and exhibits,including that taken in the three days before we left Washing-ton for Pearl Harbor. The entire commission and staff flewto Pearl Harbor, arriving there on December 21, where weconvened and took more testimony. We made our report tothe President on January 24th. By then the peril to our coun-try was so evident and the pressure of other events was so ab-sorbing that I felt quite sure that nothing would be done tocorrect any inequities in punishment already administered orwithheld.138 COMMENTS ON THE ROBERTS COMMISSION "Because of inadequate reporters and inaccurate reporting,much of the recorded testimony was badly garbled, which ledto much dissatisfaction and to feelings of unfair treatment atthe hands of the Commission by a number of interested parties.Especially was this true of Admiral Kimmel, who later pro-tested that, although he had been treated as if he were adefendant before the Commission, he had not been informedthat he was on trial or that he was an interested party in theinvestigation. In contrast to General Short, who retained theservices of his staff to help him make up his complete and de-tailed report to the Commission, Admiral Kimmel's staff im-mediately put to sea with his temporary successor. Vice Admi-ral William S. Pye. As a result, he had no one but an aide tohelp him with his report nor any Fleet records to consult inpreparing it. That was why he had to make his report to theCommission orally and as factually as he could, answeringfreely and frankly and from memory such questions as wewished to ask. "The contrast between the testimony of the two command-ers created a very unfavorable reaction toward Admiral Kim-mel in the minds of some members of the Commission. Therewas even opposition when Admiral Kimmel asked permissionto have an officer, his aide, present to assist him in his appear-ance before the Commission. Of course, he was permitted nocounsel and had no right to ask questions or to cross-examinewitnesses as he would have had if he had been made a defend-ant. Thus to both Short and Kimmel were denied all of theusual rights accorded to American Citizens appearing beforejudicial proceedings as interested parties. "In spite of the known inefficiency of the Commission's re-porters, when Admiral Kimmel asked permission to correcthis testimony, in which he found so many errors that it took 139 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY him two days to go over it, the Commission voted to keep the record as originally made, although the answers recorded to many questions were obviously incorrect and many of them were even absurd. At my urgent insistence, the Commission did finally authorize Admiral Kimmel's corrected testimony to be attached to the record as an addendum. "Even we naval members did not see eye to eye as the facts adduced. At the beginning. Admiral Reeves indicated quiteopenly his opinion that Admiral Kimmel and General Shortwere entirely at fault. I could not subscribe to this view. I feltthat, with all the information available to them in Washing-ton, Admiral Stark and General Marshall were equally cul-pable and should share with Short and Kimmel the blame forfaulty judgment and for incorrect interpretation of informa-tion available to them. Otherwise, they should have issued pos-itive instructions for an all-out alert against a seaborne attackon the base and the Fleet, which they knew was assembled atthe moorings and anchorages in Pearl Harbor that fatal Sun-day morning. "For General Marshall and Admiral Stark knew that threetimes in history the Japanese had commenced war operationswith a sneak attack on their prospective enemies. On the nightof December 6, 1941, not only all of the information whichthey had passed on to General Short and Admiral Kimmelwas in their possession, but also they had considerable otherrecent intelligence, obtained by reading the coded despatchesof the Japanese, which indicated that Japanese military actionwas imminent. They also knew, or should have known, thestate of unreadiness which existed on the island of Oahu.With information that came in during the night of December6-7, both General Marshall and Admiral Stark should haverecognized that war was imminent and that an attack was on140 COMMENTS ON THE ROBERTS COMMISSIONthe way toward some American base. It was their responsi-bility so to inform General Short and Admiral Kimmel, aswell as the Far Eastern military commanders. "Even with Admiral Stark at the Theater the evening ofDecember 6 and General Marshall out for a canter in the parkfor two and a half hours on Sunday morning, December 7th,positive indication of the impending attack on Pearl Harborwas available to them when they reached their offices thatmorning. Stark had an opportunity to warn Kimmel any timeafter he read the intelligence despatches in his office at nineA.M. (3:30 A.M. Pearl Harbor time). When Marshall receivedthe same information at 11:25 A.M., there was still about twohours to go before the attack. A telephone with a scramblerattachment stood on his desk over which the War Departmenthad on previous occasions talked directly with General Short. "Admiral Stark felt that he had to confer with GeneralMarshall after his ride and so he did nothing, although theNavy had direct radio communication with the Commander-in-Chief in Pearl Harbor. Nor did General Marshall pick uphis telephone and call General Short. Later, the Chief of Staffgave as his reasons the danger of a breach of security if themessage were given over the telephone and fear of precipi-tating an overt act against the Japanese. Yet, a few hours, later,General Marshall talked by telephone with General Short. "General Marshall finally chose to alert General Shortagainst the expected attack by radio. Through some misadven-ture, his message was classified 'Routine' instead of 'Priority'or 'Extra Urgent.' Army radio communications with Hawaiihad not been working well for some days and so the warningof impending hostilities was encoded and sent to General Shortby Commercial radio. A strange delay ensued. A messengerboy was on his way to Fort Shatter with the message when the 141 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYJapanese struck. The message was finally decoded and deliv-ered to General Short at 3 P.M., December 7th. "On the civil side of government, the President, Secretaryof State, and Harry Hopkins were equally well-informed asto the trend of events and the critical current internationalsituation. They had been notified that the Japanese Fleet was'lost' from the radio air lanes. Yet no action was taken by highcivil authorities to ensure adequate readiness in our Fleetand at our overseas bases. The ugly terms ‘air attack’ and 'war'appear nowhere in the ineffective messages of warning des-patched under the close coordination and with the full knowl-edge of these high civil officials during the weeks before De-cember 7th. "An Army Board of generals convened to investigate PearlHarbor criticized General Marshall severely for the mishan-dling of his last message of warning to General Short. "It is important to observe that only one means of communica- tion was selected by Washington. That decision violated all rules requiring the use of multiple means of communication in emer- gency. In addition to the War Department telephone, there also existed the FBI radio, which was assigned a special frequency between Washington and Hawaii or vice versa. ... We find no justification for a failure to send this message by multiple secret means either through the Navy radio or FBI radio or scrambler telephone or all three. "On June 17, 1940, when conditions were much less menac-ing than in December 1941, Naval Intelligence lost radiotrack of the Japanese Fleet for a few days. General Marshallsent General Herron, General Short's predecessor, a messagewhich directed, 'Immediately alert complete defensive organi-zation to deal with possible terns-Pacific raid.'148 COMMENTS ON THE ROBERTS COMMISSION "How much such a warning would have meant to GeneralShort and Admiral Kimmel at any time during Novemberand the first week in December, 1941. How much even twohours warning would have meant to the 2,897 officers andmen who were killed in the Pearl Harbor raid, if such a mes-sage had been given by scrambler phone in code or in theclear to either General Short or Admiral Kimmel that morn-ing of December 7th. "Instructions precluded any investigation into the activitiesof high civilian officials in Washington before the Japanesewere committed to the attack and when it was known to be im-minent, as to information available to these civilian officialsand such decisions and actions as they may have taken to in-form the Hawaiian commanders as to their immediate dangeror to order them to assure an adequate state of alertness. Evi-dence as to the performance of duty of these officials came to usonly through testimony given before the Commission by Armyand Naval officers. The high civilian office officials, includingPresident Roosevelt, could not be summoned to testify beforeour Commission under the terms of the Executive Order estab-lishing it. "Upon my return from Pearl Harbor, I reported to Secre-tary of the Navy Knox. 'Mr. Secretary,' I told him, 'our investi-gation certainly confirms your statement that neither theArmy nor the Navy were properly alerted for an air attack onSunday morning, December seventh.' "Mr. Knox then asked me what I thought of the commandsetup in Hawaii. 'Mr. Secretary,' I replied, 'under the circum-stances, Admiral Kimmel and General Short had to be relievedof their commands. Yet, I can't help regretting that AdmiralKimmel had to go. I have never seen the Fleet in a higher state 143 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYof efficiency than was evidenced by my observations during thecourse of our investigations at Pearl Harbor.' "As far as Short and Kimmel are concerned, the tragedy ofPearl Harbor was the fact that they were, and had to be, re-moved from command without a hearing and that war condi-tions prevented bringing them to trial by general court-mar-tial before the end of the War. Thus, these two officers weremartyred, as it were, for in my opinion, if they had beenbrought to trial, both would have been cleared of the chargeof neglect of duty. The long delay in public investigation ofPearl Harbor served to identify them thoroughly in the publicmind as jointly responsible for the disaster, while other Armyand Navy officers and high civilian officials, equally or moreculpable, went on to serve their country in that War and towin promotion and distinction. I feel now, as I have alwaysfelt, that General Short and Admiral Kimmel would haverendered equally distinguished service in that great War, hadthey only been given the chance. "In time, history will register the fact that the United Statescommitted a much more overt act than use of the scramblerphone which General Marshall feared so greatly. AdmiralKimmel had established a 'training Sector' about the HawaiianIslands-had proclaimed and publicized it in the HonoluluPress (where the very efficient Japanese espionage agents cer-tainly noted and reported it), with a statement that any sub-marine found within the training area would be summarilysunk. Between 0633 and 0645 Sunday morning, Decemberyth, a submarine was discovered submerged within that train-ing sector, was attacked by the United States destroyer "Ward,"and was sunk. Although the Japanese attack planes were al-ready on their way to their sneak attack, they did not committhe first act of the war.144 COMMENTS ON THE ROBERTS COMMISSION "The 'incident' which certain high officials in Washingtonhad sought so assiduously in order to condition the Americanpublic for war with the Axis powers, had been found. Thecost, 3,023 Army and Navy men killed and excessive damageand virtual immobilization of our Fleet for months to come,was too high a price to pay for a war that was inevitable inany case."145CHAPTER VIIIInvestigations It takes a good many shovels full to bury the truth.- Danish Proverb. 1. THE ROBERTS COMMISSION THE ROBERTS COMMISSION was appointed December 16,1941. It was headed by Associate Justice Owen D. Rob-erts of the U.S. Supreme Court. Its members were Ad-miral William H. Standley, a former fleet commander andChief of Naval Operations, Rear Admiral J. M. Reeves, aformer commander of the U.S. fleet. Major General Frank R.McCoy, U.S.A., retired, president of the Foreign Policy Asso-ciation, and Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, U.S.Army, of the Army Air Corps, an officer on duty in the WarDepartment and years junior to General Short and me. Regulations of the Navy governing the conduct of courtsof inquiry and boards of investigation in force at the time ofPearl Harbor provided that when any one might be heldresponsible for any casualty or disaster, he be called before theinvestigating body, informed of the substance of the evidenceimplicating him and made an interested party or a defendant.This gave him the right to have counsel, to be present duringthe testimony of witnesses, and to cross-examine witnesses, alsoto introduce evidence before the investigating body. The very146 INVESTIGATIONSnature of the disaster at Pearl Harbor made me an interestedparty. The Roberts Commission was not conducted in accordancewith the rules governing naval investigations. Indeed it wasconducted with complete disregard of all rules of fair playand justice. I was denied any knowledge of what any witness testified.It was not until 1944, when I was supplied a copy of the pro-ceedings, that I learned what testimony the commission hadrecorded. I will never know what testimony was not recorded. I had no opportunity to confront witnesses or to submitevidence on subjects they discussed. Each witness was enjoinedby the commission that his testimony was secret. When I came before the commission I was informed thatI was not permitted to have counsel, also that I was not ontrial. Rear Admiral Theobald was permitted to assist me inhandling my papers. When Admiral Theobald interposed tocorrect misunderstandings that are bound to arise when fivepersons are questioning one, Mr. Roberts reprimanded Theo-bald, reminding him that he was not my counsel as I was notpermitted to have counsel. When Theobald refused to be sup-pressed, Mr. Roberts insisted that Theobald be sworn as awitness. The copy of the record of proceedings supplied to mecontains no record of these statements of Mr. Roberts. Several days after I had completed my testimony I askedwhen I would be permitted to read and verify the record ofmy testimony. After considerable argument I was permittedto come alone to see the record of my testimony. I found the transcript of my testimony incomplete, inac-curate and misleading. The transcript was so badly garbledand there were such glaring omissions that I requested author-ity to return the next day with a stenographer (yeoman) and 147 ADMIRAL KIMMEL’S STORYTheobald to assist me to reconstruct the testimony as nearlyas possible as it had been presented. An example of what Ifound was the omission from the transcript of a sixteen-pagestatement which I had read to the commission and suppliedthem with a copy. Late that evening I was informed that Mr. Roberts hadruled that I could return with a stenographer but that Iwould not be permitted to have Theobald assist me. Nextmorning I had an interview with Mr. Roberts (AdmiralStandley was present) in which I renewed my request. In thecourse of his reply, Mr. Roberts again assured me that I wasnot on trial, that the President had expressly told him this wasnot a trial. My reply was that his statement was just so manywords and words do not alter facts. In the eyes of the Americanpeople I was on trial and no words of his could alter that fact. Mr. Roberts was not stupid enough to believe what he toldme. At least he used the term "trial" in its strictly legalisticsense. As a result of this interview Theobald, the stenographer,and I revised the transcript to present the substance of whatI actually testified to before the commission. Subsequently Iwas informed that the original transcript would remain un-changed and my revision would be attached as an addendum.When I was supplied with a copy of the proceedings in 1944I found the original transcript considerably revised and thesixteen page statement added. The remainder of my correc-tions were placed in an addendum attached to the so-calledoriginal. In 1944 I found in the Navy Department a copy of a letteraddressed to the Chief of Naval Operations by the Chief ofNaval Intelligence which detailed the testimony he had givento the Roberts Commission. No record of this testimony isincluded in the copy of the proceedings supplied to me.148 INVESTIGATIONS The proceedings, strangely enough, relate that the part ofthe findings which record that General Marshall and AdmiralStark had performed their duties relating to the attack onPearl Harbor in an exemplary manner, had first been sub-mitted to them and revised to their satisfaction before beingadopted by the commission.1 The treatment accorded General Marshall and AdmiralStark is in sharp contrast to that accorded to General Shortand to me. While I was testifying before the commission Mr.Roberts' attitude was that of a prosecutor, not a judge. Inretrospect it is clear that when he had received what he be-lieved to be damaging admissions he carefully refrained fromfurther questions which would have clarified the statementsmade. The conduct of the commission's investigation was withoutprecedent. It was conducted without regard to rules, law orjustice. Scapegoats had to be provided to save the administra-tion. Apparently Short and I were elected before the commis-sion left Washington. How a justice of the U.S. SupremeCourt, two generals and two admirals could lend themselvesto such an undertaking is past understanding. Without affording me the opportunity to defend myself,the Roberts Commission convicted me without trial on secretevidence withheld from me and the public and published thefindings to the world. The conflicting and confusing orders sent to General Shortand to me is best illustrated by the indictment in the findingsof the commission which states that General Short and I didnot consult as to the meaning of the warning messages re-ceived. Aside from the fact that we did confer both beforeand after the receipt of the message, it is a strange doctrinethat would require the admiral commanding the Pacific Fleetto consult with the commanding general at Hawaii to deter- 149 ADMIRAL KIMMEL’S STORYmine the meaning of a message from the Chief of Naval Opera-tions and equally ridiculous to require the commanding gen-eral at Hawaii to consult with the commander of the PacificFleet to determine the meaning of a message sent to him bythe Army Chief of Staff. Yet this was the principal indictmentused by the Roberts Commission in their attempt to fastenthe blame for the Pearl Harbor disaster upon General Shortand me. The mere statement that such consultation was neces-sary to determine the meaning of an order is an indictmentof the agency which originated it. The Roberts Commission may well have been as confusedas their findings indicate they were. I do not know whether the members of the commissionhad access to the "magic" messages. General McNarney's con-cern, when he was deputy chief of staff in 1944, because ofthe inspection by my counsel of the secret translated Japaneseintercepts would indicate that McNarney, who was a memberof the Roberts Commission, knew what they contained. How-ever, Mr. Justice Roberts in his testimony before the congres-sional committee indicated that he would not have read themeven had they been presented to him.2 It is impossible to imagine how a just and honest allocationof responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster can be madewithout a thorough knowledge of the Japanese intercepts andof their distribution prior to the attack. The testimony of Mr. Justice Roberts before the congres-sional investigating committee in regard to the accuracy withwhich my testimony was recorded is directly contradicted byAdmiral Standley in his article.3 I know from my own experi-ence that Admiral Standley's statements (herein quoted) inregard to this matter are correct. The confusion in handling papers and testimony given to150 INVESTIGATIONSthe commission is evidenced by requests for copies of the Se-curity Order, Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41.When I appeared for the last time before the commission,conversation within the commission indicated the five mem-bers could not find a copy. They thereupon requested fiveadditional copies of this order. When I gave this request toLieutenant Commander Paul Crosley, the flag secretary, heinformed me that this would make a total of seventeen copiessupplied to the commission. 2. STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL ROBERT A. THEOBALD, U.S. NAVY, DATED MARCH 20, 1944, CONCERNING THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROBERTS COMMISSION: "When Admiral Kimmel was informed that the RobertsCommission would arrive in Pearl Harbor to investigate theJapanese surprise attack on the United States Fleet, December7, 1941, he asked me to act as his counsel. At the time I in-formed him that I would be very glad to do anything I could,but suggested that, as I had no legal training, it might be atleast desirable to have an assistant counsel with legal knowl-edge. Admiral Kimmel stated that he did not desire this, thatall he wanted was a straightforward presentation of his con-duct of Fleet affairs prior to and during the attack of Decem-ber 7, 1941. I then said that I would be very glad to render anyassistance within my capabilities. "The preparation of Admiral Kimmel's testimony was ren-dered most difficult for both of us by our total inability to findout what procedure the Roberts Commission was following,when Admiral Kimmel would be called, the manner in whichhe would be permitted to present his testimony, etc. We spent l5l ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYtwo or three days attempting to obtain information concern-ing these matters. "The Roberts Commission commenced its sittings in theHawaiian Area by spending several days at Fort Shafter whereGeneral Short and other witnesses from the Army were calledbefore the Commission. Neither Admiral Kimmel nor anyrepresentative of his was present at any of these hearings. Ad-miral Kimmel thus had no knowledge of what testimony hadbeen presented to the Roberts Commission, what documen-tary material, if any, was in evidence before that commission,etc. He had no opportunity whatever to question any otherwitness before the Commission at any time in the proceedings. "As a matter of fact. Admiral Kimmel and I were before theCommission during the presentation of Admiral Kimmel'sown testimony and at no other time. When Admiral Kimmelentered the board room, he requested of the Commission thatI be permitted to attend him due to the fact that I had facilitywith and knowledge of the location of papers which he woulddesire to use in presenting his testimony. My presence in thisstatus was authorized by the Roberts Commission. In themiddle of Admiral Kimmel's testimony, Associate JusticeRoberts turned to me and asked what my status was before theCommission. I stated that I was there to help Admiral Kimmellocate papers which might be pertinent to his testimony.Associate Justice Roberts replied, 'In order that your statusmay be official, Admiral Theobald, I think it would be wellthat you be sworn as a witness.' This was done at that time.Mr. Roberts then smilingly said to me, 'Of course you are nothere in the capacity of a defense counsel because you and Ad-miral Kimmel both understand that as no charges have beenpreferred against him, he is not in the status of a defendant.'I bowed but made no answer to this statement of Associate152 INVESTIGATIONSJustice Roberts. I regarded it at the time and still regard thestatement as incomprehensible and totally at variance withthe facts. Admiral Kimmel was Commander-in-Chief of theUnited States Fleet which had suffered severe losses in the sur-prise attack by the Japanese on December 7,1941. The RobertsCommission, consisting of Associate Justice Roberts, AdmiralStandley, Admiral Reeves, Major General McCoy, and Briga-dier General McNarney, with Mr. Howe as Judge Advocate,had been despatched by Presidential order to the HawaiianArea to investigate the happenings of December 7th. Theconduct of the Fleet prior to and during that event, the train-ing of the Fleet, the Fleet's defensive dispositions, were all un-der scrutiny and inquiry by the Roberts Commission. Howany investigation of these matters could be conducted withoutregarding Admiral Kimmel as a defendant is incomprehensi-ble to me. He was Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet and al-though charges had not been preferred against him, he stoodpartially condemned in the public eye as soon as the events ofDecember 7, 1941, were known. Everything that was said be-fore the Roberts Commission, all testimony verbal and docu-mentary, must be a matter of serious interest and import toAdmiral Kimmel. "In my opinion, equity, fairness, impartiality, and commonjustice demanded that Admiral Kimmel be accorded the fullrights and status of a defendant before the Roberts Commis-sion. Any finding of that body which concerned the reputationand fair name of Admiral Kimmel after he had definitely beendenied the status of a defendant is at variance with basic prin-ciples of justice and fair play. "Associate Justice Roberts attempted to establish the factthat Admiral Kimmel was not a defendant because the RobertsCommission was a fact finding tribunal. How a fact finding 153 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYtribunal which was delving into the behavior and conduct ofAdmiral Kimmel on December 7, 1941, and for a year priorthereto, could proceed without according that officer his dueand proper right to be present to question witnesses and scru-tinize testimony, is a matter that, in my opinion, must alwaysremain incapable of satisfactory explanation. "As already intimated, Admiral Kimmel gave his testimonywithout the slightest knowledge of what prior witnesses hadstated to the Commission. "The actions of the Commission were generally fair andimpartial in their treatment of Admiral Kimmel during thetime he was before the Commission in the capacity of a wit-ness. Late on the afternoon of the first day of Admiral Kim-mel's testimony, however, Associate Justice Roberts for a con-siderable period of time forgot his status as a presiding officerof an impartial commission and questioned Admiral Kimmelin a loud tone of voice; in fact, in a manner more to be ex-pected of a trial lawyer in a lower court. That Associate Jus-tice Roberts was not entirely satisfied with his conduct of thebusiness of the Commission at this particular time was evi-denced by certain remarks which he addressed to AdmiralKimmel at the opening of the next meeting of the Commission.These remarks were semi-apologetic in character. I can notquote Admiral Kimmel's reply exactly, but he stated in effectthat he desired to offer no objection to the treatment that hehad received from the Commission up to that time. "As another evidence of the fatally defective manner inwhich the inquiry was conducted, I will cite a further instance: "The general bearing and manner of Brigadier GeneralMcNarney gave me the definite impression that the officer hadlittle interest in the inquiry unless matters pertaining to Airforces were in question. Admiral Kimmel made some remark154 INVESTIGATIONSconcerning the Hawaiian Air Warning Service which in ac-cordance with the provisions of 'Joint Action, Army and Navy'was an Army responsibility and in wartime was to be operatedby the Army. Brigadier General McNarney at this point inter-rupted Admiral Kimmel with a request to Associate JusticeRoberts that he be permitted to read into the record an extractfrom a yellow-backed publication which was in front of himat the table. Permission for this was granted by Justice Roberts,of course without a reference to Admiral Kimmel. BrigadierGeneral McNarney prefaced his reading with the remark, 'Iintroduce this just to keep the record straight.' A member ofan impartial commission suggests that the testimony of thewitness has to be refuted in order to keep the record straight!He then read certain extracts from this publication which hadto do with the presence of the Naval liaison officer at the AirWarning Service Center. "Due to the manner in which the inquiry was conducted,Admiral Kimmel had no knowledge as to whether or not thepublication from which Brigadier General McNarney hadjust read was in evidence before the Commission or not. Itwas not offered to Admiral Kimmel for examination prior toGeneral McNarney's reading of the extract into the record.During the recess that evening, Admiral Kimmel and I founda copy of the publication. To show the general character ofthe publication from which Brigadier General McNarney hadread, it is only necessary to quote a footnote which appearedat the bottom of page 12 in the publication in question. Ineffect this footnote read about as follows: 'Warning to thereader: It must be recognized that this pamphlet is merely astab in the dark and the reader must treat it accordingly.' Ap-parently the publication was the first effort of the InterceptorCommand to establish some regulations for the conduct of 155 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYthe Air Warning Service. This pamphlet had not been sentto Admiral Kimmel's command officially. It had not been pro-mulgated by an order of any senior officer of the Army, nor byany adjutant or Adjutant General of the Army in the name ofa senior officer of the Army. "Later in Admiral Kimmel's testimony, a question of scout-ing flight about noon of December 7, 1941, came up in theCommission proceedings. I stated before the Commission thata Naval scouting plane had encountered enemy fighters some250 to 300 miles north of Oahu. Both Admiral Standley andBrigadier General McNarney stated that no such flight hadbeen made. Admiral Kimmel had requested that Captain De-laney of his Staff be placed on the witness stand to introducetracing of flights that had been made on December 7th in anattempt to locate the Japanese attacking surface forces. Afterthis happening in the Commission, I went to Captain Delaneyand asked him if he had not placed these tracings in evidencebefore the Commission. He stated that he had appeared as awitness and had tried to offer the tracings of the scouting op-erations in evidence to the Commission, but the Commissionwas uninterested and brushed them aside. I quote this inci-dent to show that except during the time he was a witness,Admiral Kimmel had no control whatever over the testimonythat he desired presented to the Roberts Commission. AdmiralKimmel asked that several officers be called and it is believedthat this was done. However, he had no opportunity to bepresent to hear their testimony, to cross question them and toassure himself that they offered in evidence facts which heconsidered material to his presentation of his case. The De-laney incident is merely an evidence of this condition. In-formally, Admiral Kimmel and I knew that several seniorofficers of the Fleet were called but the character of their testi-mony was totally unknown to us.156 INVESTIGATIONS "When the transcript of Admiral Kimmel's testimony waspresented to him for correction, it was at once seen that a verybad stenographic job had been done. The representatives ofthe stenographic firm hired by the Roberts Commission neverat any time in the court asked Admiral Kimmel to repeat histestimony or intimated in any way that they were not gettingall that was said. However, the record could hardly have beenworse. Admiral Kimmel and I spent about a day and a halfcorrecting his testimony. Admiral Kimmel had read his mainstatement which was the main part of his testimony. This wasnot included in the stenographic report and it was the appar-ent intention to place the report of this section of AdmiralKimmel's testimony in an addendum to the Commission'sreport. "I first saw Mr. Howe, the Judge Advocate of the Commis-sion, and told him how bad was the record of Admiral Kim-mel's testimony. Mr. Howe saw Mr. Roberts and said thatMr. Roberts was opposed to any extensive correction of Ad-miral Kimmel's testimony. I tried to explain to Mr. Howe thatAdmiral Kimmel had no desire to modify his testimony in anyrespect. All that he desired to do in correcting his testimonywas to bring it in accord with what he had originally said be-fore the Commission. Mr. Howe apparently reported this toMr. Roberts but again stated that Mr. Roberts was opposed toany correction of the testimony other than by numbering theerrors and placing the correct statements in an addendum tothe Commission's report, a perfectly hopeless proceeding asnobody reading the Commission's report was going to turn toan addendum every three or four words. "Recognizing that what Admiral Kimmel desired in the cor-rection of his testimony was the customary proceeding beforemilitary courts, I then took the matter up with Admiral Stand- 157ADMIRAL KIMMEL’S STORYley, but had no better success with him than I did with Mr.Howe. Admiral Standley said to me, 'Theobald, Mr. Robertswill not permit the original transcript of Kimmel's testimonyto be altered. The changes which Kimmel desires will have tobe noted and made up in an addendum.' To this I replied thatAdmiral Kimmel merely desired to revise his testimony as anywitness before a General Court Martial or a Court of Inquiryof the Navy would be permitted to do under similar circum-stances. Admiral Standley said again, 'Nothing can be done asMr. Roberts opposes such action.' I then said to AdmiralStandley, 'But Mr. Roberts is only one member of the Com-mission, and there are four military men on that Commissionwho must know how this matter is handled in the case of testi-mony before a military court.' I asked Admiral Standley if Iwas to understand that Mr. Roberts' wishes controlled the ac-tions of the entire commission. Admiral Standley did not replyto this but countered with the remark, 'Theobald, you andKimmel fully understand what Kimmel is up against in thisinquiry, don't you?' To which I replied, 'Of course we do.' " 3. THE HART INVESTIGATION Early in 1944 I was invited by the Navy Department to col-laborate in an investigation of the Pearl Harbor disaster to beundertaken by Admiral T. C. Hart. Admiral Hart intimatedto me that Secretary Knox was favorably disposed toward meand the investigation would benefit me. An exchange of let-ters with Mr. Knox developed certain stipulations I mustagree to before my assistance would be acceptable. Thesestipulations placed my fate completely at the mercy of theSecretary. I therefore declined to take any part in the Hartinvestigation. Admiral Hart took the testimony of numerous158 INVESTIGATIONSnaval personnel and gathered much valuable data, the mostinteresting of which was the testimony of Captain Safford whooutlined the information received in the Navy Departmentthrough the translation of the intercepted Japanese messages. When I came to Washington for the naval court of inquiryin the summer of 1944, a copy of the Hart investigation wassupplied to me. Safford's testimony provided me with my firstauthoritative information on this subject. Admiral Hart sub-mitted no conclusions, findings or recommendations. 4. THE NAVAL COURT OF INQUIRY In June of 1944 the Congress by resolution demanded thatthe executive branch of the government investigate the PearlHarbor disaster. To comply with this resolution the Navyconvened a court of inquiry and the Army a board of in-vestigation. The Naval Court of Inquiry was convened by precept dated13 July 1944. The president of this court was Admiral OrinG. Murfin, U.S. Navy, Retired, formerly commander-in-chief,U.S. Asiatic Fleet. The other members were Admiral E. C.Kalbfus, U.S. Navy, Retired, formerly commander of the bat-tle force, U.S. Fleet, and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews,U.S. Navy, Retired, formerly commander of the scouting force,U.S. Fleet when it was based on Pearl Harbor, with Command-er Harold Biesmaier, an experienced naval lawyer as judgeadvocate. These officers were selected by the Secretary of theNavy to conduct this investigation. They were experiencedofficers of great ability who had a comprehensive grasp of thecapacities and limitations imposed by logistic and operationaldifficulties under which the Pacific Fleet was forced to operate. When I came before the Naval Court of Inquiry in the 159 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYsummer of 1944, I was made a defendant which gave me theright to be present during all proceedings of the court, tocross-examine witnesses, call witnesses, and to present evidenceto the court. In short, it gave me the right to defend myself. After a thorough investigation, the naval court CLEARED MECOMPLETELY AND MADE IN EFFECT A POSITIVE FINDING OF NOBLAME OR MISTAKES IN JUDGMENT ON MY PART AND THAT I DIDEVERYTHING POSSIBLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. Their findings were contrary to those of the Roberts Com-mission. They placed the blame for the Pearl Harbor disasterlargely on the shoulders of the Secretary of the Navy and hisprincipal subordinates. The court assembled the record of proceedings in two sepa-rate parts and the findings also in two parts. One part of eachwas marked secret and the other part was unclassified. Thecourt expected the unclassified part to be published. The partsmarked secret included all reference to the "magic" inter-cepted Japanese messages and some other matter. Shortly after the proceedings and findings were submittedto the Secretary, a letter from the Secretary to Admiral OrinG. Murfin, the president of the Court, was published in thepress. The letter stated that the Court of Inquiry had markedthe proceedings and findings secret so nothing could be pub-lished. At an interview which followed quickly, Admiral Murfintold the Secretary certain parts of the proceedings and find-ings had not been marked secret because the court expectedthose parts to be published. The Secretary replied he hadmeant to tell Murfin to mark these parts secret. Admiral Mur-fin then stated the court would not mark the unclassified partssecret, the Secretary could do so if he wished but the Secretaryhad no right to tell the press or anyone else that the court had160 INVESTIGATIONSmarked all the proceedings and findings secret. During thisinterview the counselor of the department, who was present,remarked to the effect that publication of the record at thattime would be disastrous. The parts of the report marked non-confidential by theCourt of Inquiry were not released to the press until 29August 1945. Admiral King's endorsement reversing the findings of theCourt of Inquiry was dated November 6, 1944. I had an inter-view with King on December 7, 1944, during which he ad-mitted he had never read the proceedings upon which theCourt had based their findings. Yet I found when the recordswere published in September 1945 that, for reasons of his own,on November 6, 1944, King had not hesitated to reverse thefindings which cleared me and to brand me with the lack ofsuperior judgment required of an officer of my rank. At this time Admiral King had many duties and heavy re-sponsibilities; however I believe every dictate of justice de-manded that before he repudiated the findings of the NavalCourt of Inquiry composed of outstanding officers who haddevoted many weeks to collecting, evaluating, and judging theevidence, he should have read the record of proceedings andread it carefully. The American people were entitled to hisbest judgment regardless of the desires of the Secretary of theNavy and the administration. In a letter to the Secretary of the Navy dated July 14, 1948,he reversed the finding he had made in November 1944. The Naval Court of Inquiry found that Admiral Stark failedto transmit to Admiral Kimmel, during the very criticalperiod of 26 November to 7 December important informationwhich he had regarding the Japanese situation and especially,that he did not on the morning of December 7, 1941, transmit 161 ADMIRAL KIMMEL’S STORYimmediately the information that a break in diplomatic rela-tions was imminent and an attack in the Hawiian area mightbe expected soon4 (Italics supplied.) This was in effect adirect criticism of Mr. Roosevelt although direct criticism ofthe President was not authorized by their precept. While the Navy was conducting the Naval Court of Inquirya similar inquiry was being conducted by an Army Board ofInvestigation. Their findings held that the War Departmentin Washington bore much of the responsibility for the disaster.Mr. Stimson elected to by-pass the judge advocate general ofthe Army and to review the findings of the board himself. Heproduced a review which exonerated General Marshall andhimself. The findings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board of Investiga-tion include: The Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall, failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in the following particulars: (a) To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian De- partment fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which indicated an increasing necessity for better preparation for war, of which information he had an abundance and Short had little. (b) To send additional instructions to the Commanding Gen- eral of the Hawaiian Department on November 28, 1941, when evidently he failed to realize the import of General Short's reply of November 27th, which indicated clearly that General Short had misunderstood and miscontrued the message of November 27 (472) and had not adequately alerted his command for war. (c) To get to General Short on the evening of December 6th and the early morning of December 7th, the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan, though there was ample time to have accomplished this. (d) To investigate and determine the state of readiness of the162 INVESTIGATIONS Hawaiian Command between November 27 and December 7, 1941, despite the impending threat of war.5 The findings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board of Investiga-tion also include the following statements: The record shows that from informers and other sources the War Department had complete and detailed information of Japanese intentions. Information of the evident Japanese inten- tion to go to war in the very near future was well known to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Chief of Naval Opera- tions. It was not a question of fact; it was only a question of time. The next few days would see the end of peace and the beginning of war. If it be assumed that for any reason the information could not have been given to the Hawaiian Department, then it was the responsibility of the War Department to give orders to Short what to do, and to tell him to go on an all-out alert instead of a sabotage alert. As elsewhere related in detail, when vital information of De- cember 6th reached G-2 of the War Department, not later than nine o'clock the evening of December 6, it was placed in the locked pouch and delivered to the Secretary of the General Staff, Colonel Bedell Smith, now Lt. General Smith, with a warning from Colonel Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of G-2, that it contained a vitally important message. In fact the mes- sage implied war and soon. Whatever was the reason of Colonel Bedell Smith for not conveying this message to General Marshall on the night of December 6th it was an unfortunate one. And further, with the top War Department officials fully aware of the critical nature of the situation, standing operating procedure should have required the delivery of this vital information to General Marshall at once. He, himself was responsible for the organization and operation of his own immediate office. This information could have been sent to Short on the after- noon (Honolulu Time) of December 6. Additionally this same 163 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY information was given to General Gerow's Executive, Colonel Gailey, of the War Plans Division, and there is no evidence of action taken by that Division. The responsibility of the War Department is clearly defined and plain. Action by it would have been sufficient further to have alerted the Hawaiian Department. It was in possession of the information which was the last clear chance to use the means available to meet an attack. It had the background of the full development of the Japanese preparation for war and its prob- able date. Again, the equally important and vital information of De- cember 7th, the day of the attack, was in the possession of the War Department at 0900 on the morning of December 7.6 Under the circumstances where information has a vital bear- ing upon actions to be taken by field commanders, and this in- formation cannot be disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders it is incumbent upon the War Department then to assume the responsibility for specific directions to the theater commanders. This is an exception to the admirable pol- icy of the War Department of decentralized and complete respon- sibility upon the competent field commanders. Short got neither form of assistance from the War Department. The disaster of Pearl Harbor would have been eliminated to the extent that its defenses were available on December 7 if alerted in time. The difference between alerting these defenses in time by a directive from the War Department based upon this in- formation and the failure to alert them is a difference for which the War Department is responsible.... The War Department had the information. All they had to do was either to give it to Short or give him directions based upon it.7 Like the Navy Court of Inquiry the Army Board of Investi-gation was not authorized to criticize Mr. Roosevelt. Neverthe-less the criticism of General Marshall and the War Department include the President because he was kept fully informed of164 INVESTIGATIONSall phases of the Japanese situation including instructions andinformation sent to the commanders in Hawaii. 5. THE HEWITT INVESTIGATIONS The Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Forrestal, displeased withthe findings of the Naval Court of Inquiry, requested AdmiralJ. 0. Richardson, my predecessor as commander-in-chief ofthe fleet, to conduct a further investigation of the disaster. Ad-miral Richardson declined stating in effect that he was notavailable for that duty because the primary qualification forsuch an investigator was to have no preconceived ideas as towhere the responsibility lay and no fixed ideas upon the sub-ject; that he, Richardson, was disqualified because he wasfirmly convinced that much of the responsibility for the PearlHarbor disaster rested upon the occupant of 1600 Pennsyl-vania Avenue and the members of his cabinet and that notestimony that might be adduced would change that opinion. How many Admirals were approached before Admiral H.Kent Hewitt was designated to conduct the investigation I donot know. Lieutenant Commander John F. Sonnett, a lawyerin civilian life and serving as special assistant to Secretary For-restal, was appointed counsel. Most of the examination ofwitnesses was conducted by Mr. Sonnett. The precept for this investigation specifically provided: Except that the testimony you take should be taken under oath so as to be on equal status in this respect with the testimony previously taken, you will conduct your examination in an in- formal manner and without regard to legal or formal require- ments. [Italics supplied.]8 The proceedings and findings of the Naval Court were sub-mitted to the Secretary in October 1944. In June 1945 the 165 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYpublic press carried the announcement that Admiral H. KentHewitt would make Forrestal's further investigation. I wrote immediately to the Secretary and requested that Ibe permitted to be present with counsel during the investiga-tion and be given the rights of a defendant. The Secretary'sreply denied me this right on the plea that time did not permit,which reason I did not accept. I wrote a second letter protest-ing this decision in strong language. I never received a reply. Thus once more an Admiral was found who was willing toconduct a star chamber investigation from which I was ex-cluded and to arrive at findings on my official conduct with-out permitting me to defend myself or to know what evidencehe had received. Like the Roberts Commission everything wassecret. I gathered that Mr. Sonnett in effect conducted the in-vestigation. Captain Safford testified that Mr. Sonnett had at-tempted to intimidate him and finally to convince Saffordthat he, Safford, suffered hallucinations.9 Some witnesses whotestified before the Hewitt board changed the testimony theyhad previously sworn to. Meanwhile the Secretary of War, displeased by the findingsof the Army board, had Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen,a lawyer in civil life, conduct a similar investigation. In justice to Admiral King I must record that he told mehe had protested the appointment of Hewitt or any otherindividual to conduct such an investigation. In King's opin-ion, such an appointment delegated too much power and re-sponsibility to a single individual. 6. THE CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION I welcomed the congressional investigation. It was largelythrough the efforts of my counsel, Mr. Charles B. Rugg of166 INVESTIGATIONSBoston, that this investigation was held. This was the onlymethod by which correspondence and dispatches marked se-cret could be made public. Until the translations of the Jap-anese intercepts and other material marked secret were re-leased for publication I had no chance to present my case tothe public. If I had done so I would have made myself liableto penalties prescribed for such an offense. Also no one wouldhave believed my unsupported statement of such a fantasticstory. The public would have concluded, as Admiral Pye did,that I had lost my mind. The administration by a series of Presidential orders, themajority vote of the committee, and a committee staff friendlyto the administration, decided what papers and evidence couldbe presented to the committee. In spite of these and otherdifficulties, much pertinent and valuable evidence was re-corded. There is no doubt that vital information has not yetbeen disclosed. The general attitude of the managers of this investigationis illustrated by the action of the committee counsel, Mr. Wil-liam D. Mitchell, who attempted to exclude from the commit-tee all knowledge of the offensive tasks assigned by the warplans to the Pacific Fleet. He attempted to give to the com-mittee the impression that the sole duty of the Pacific Fleetwas to defend Pearl Harbor when exactly the reverse was true.Pearl Harbor existed for the supply of the fleet; defense of thefleet, while in Pearl Harbor, was an Army responsibility. Mycounsel's protest at this distortion of the evidence was ignored.It was only when the investigation was far advanced that theRepublican members succeeded in obtaining the suppresseddocuments. The committee selected the witnesses to be called. In severalinstances the committee did not call the witnesses I requested. 167 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY One of these was Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey. Halsey was the commander of the aircraft of the battle force and the senior naval aviator under my command while I was com- mander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet. He was in command of the carrier group returning from the reenforcement of Wake Island on December 7, 1941, when the attack came. He had first hand knowledge of the attack and the information and orders supplied by the Navy Department. His testimony would have been of the greatest value to the committee. The com- mittee did not call him and did not take his evidence. Perhaps the convictions he expressed to me in a letter of July 20, 1953, may be the reason. I quote Admiral Halsey's letter to me: As you know I have always thought and have not hesitated to say on any and all occasions, that I believe you and Short were the greatest military martyrs this country has ever produced, and that your treatment was outrageous. In the course of time I have not changed my opinion one iota. I have always felt that you were left holding the bag for something you did not know and could not control. I always felt you kept me fully informed and that I knew all the important and pertinent secret informa- tion. Certainly we did not discard the possibility of an attack on Pearl, but with evidence we had the most logical inference was that the attack would be against the Philippines and to the Southard. Knowing what I did, I felt I was just as responsible as you or anyone else in the higher command position. Had we been in possession of the "Magic" messages with clear implication from the Japs, by their anxiety to be constantly in- formed of ships berthing, that an attack on Pearl was intended, and the further pointed fact that the date was Dec. 7th, the Enterprise and Lexington would never have gone on their mis- sions to Wake and Midway. And further the Fleet would not have been in Pearl Harbor on that date. It is probable that we should have been able to locate the Jap fleet by air scouting be-168 INVESTIGATIONS fore they could reach their take off position. Again all good luck and God bless you. My love to you both, As ever- BILL HALSEY The congressional investigation was governed by the ma-jority party, the Democrats. The huge volumes of testimonyin that inquiry served to confuse the public mind as to thesignificance of the facts and to smother testimony damagingto the administration. In the main the views of the administration prevailed. Thepublic was fed up with the inquiry. Millions of words hadconcealed the salient facts about Pearl Harbor. We were un-ready at Pearl Harbor for reasons set forth in this record. Icannot excuse those in authority in Washington for what theydid. And I do not believe that thousands of mothers and fath-ers whose sons perished on that tragic seventh day of DecemberNineteen Hundred and Forty-one will excuse them. They willbe judged at the bar of history. In my book they must answeron the Day of Judgment like any other criminal.169 CHAPTER IXVilification andEncouragement The most disgraceful feature of the whole tragic affair was the evident determination on the part of Washing- ton to fasten the blame on Hawaiian Commanders.- Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, U.S.N., Ret.The flood of abuse and misrepresentation began imme-diately after the attack. My court-martial was demandedon the floor of the House of Representatives on Mon-day, December 8, 1941. After the Secretary of the Navy, Mr.Frank Knox, reported to the President the result of his inspec-tion at Pearl Harbor, additional statements were releasedwhich augmented the campaign of vilification. When theRoberts report was published a veritable hurricane of chargeswere hurled indiscriminately at Short and me. On April 6,1942, at Pikeville, Kentucky, Mr. Andrew J. May, chairmanof the military affairs committee of the House of Representa-tives, suggested in a speech that Admiral Kimmel and GeneralShort should be shot! I received many abusive and threatening letters most ofthem from people quite evidently unbalanced. Some of theseletters were from people, as identified by themselves, whoshould not have been infected with the hysteria which Mr.170 VILIFICATION AND ENCOURAGEMENTMay and some of his colleagues in the Congress did everythingin their power to promote. Three of the less virulent letters are quoted. The lettersfrom the two judges were sent to the Navy Department witha request for action. I was informed that the Navy Departmentwould do nothing.Municipal Court San Francisco, Calif.Twain Michelsen, Judge February 8, 1942Hall of Justice,San FranciscoRear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel,Fairmont Hotel,San Francisco.Dear Sir: If it is possible, under Navy regulations, for you to request ageneral court-martial for the purpose of determining who, orwhat, was responsible for the Pearl Harbor debacle, would itnot be in keeping with the proprieties for you, as well as Lieu-tenant General Walter C. Short, to pursue such a course? I am confident that the people of America will never forgetthe culpability that has been attached to both yourself andShort. Equally sure am I that history will forever point an accu-satory finger at both of you, and to your memory, when each haspassed to the realm where so many of our men were so suddenlyhurled because of your joint neglect and utter stupidity. Surely, there isn't much for you and Short to live for,-unlessa general court-martial would bring forth a page from the shame-ful chapter of Pearl Harbor that might shed a little more lighton the entire picture and thus, however possible, clean from thehands of both of you the blood of your unsuspecting victims.That would, it seems to me, be the honorable thing for you todo, instead of to ask for "retirement." Sincerely, Twain Michelsen 171 ADMIRAL KIMMEL’S STORYCentral 2020 George Edward Mix 2021 (Former Circuit Judge) Law Offices, 601-606 International Office Bidg. 722 Chestnut Street, St. Louis, Mo. February 11, 1942Husband Kimmel,c/o Adjutant General's Office,Washington, D. C.Sir:- As an American citizen, taxpayer, graduate of Yale University,and as one whose ancestors have fought in all the wars in whichthis country has been engaged, I suggest that instead of yourcowardly act in asking to be relieved from duty and placed onthe taxpayers' payroll at f6ooo.oo per year, and in view of themillions of dollars worth of taxpayers' property destroyed inPearl Harbor by reason of your carelessness, negligence andthoughtlessness, that you try to show that you are a real man byusing a pistol and ending your existence, as you are certainly ofno use to yourself nor the American people. An American citizen,GM George E. Mix 315 Johnson Avenue Los Gatos, California January 28, 1942Admiral Husband E. KimmelFairmount HotelSan Francisco, CaliforniaDear Sir: In the interest of plain justice I wish to bring something toyour attention. It is bad enough, I am sure, to be blamed forneglect of duty, but I think you should have the privilege ofrefuting and denying malicious gossip which hurts the Navyand makes you appear as a traitor, which I am sure you are not.I hope you can do something about the following:172 VILIFICATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT On New Year's Eve, in San Francisco, I was told by a Spanish lady that someone connected with the Spanish council, and who had "just returned from Honolulu and so knew all about it", that the reason the Navy leader was off guard at Pearl Harbor on December the seventh was because he was spending the night with a Japanese woman. I passed that by as malicious gossip until the story, somewhat twisted by time and distance was repeated to me here in Los Gatos yesterday by a U.S. citizen of German parentage whose informant quoted "the Portuguese council from Hawaii." This time the story stated that the leaders of army and navy were holding an all-night Japanese party. This looks like deliberate foreign propaganda to discredit members of the Defense to me, doesn't it to you? Many people do not know the difference between Spaniards and Portuguese, a "wop" is a "wop" from either country. Allow- ing for the element of time and distance the two stories seem to have a common origin, apparently the first-"the someone connected with the Spanish council who had just arrived from Honolulu." Such stories are apt to be the expression of that nasty instinct of humans to kick a man when he is down, but if it is part of the foreign propaganda, you should, for the sake of the honor- able history of our Navy track it down and stop it. You see I have a personal interest in the Navy; our family also had a Commander of the U.S. Fleet to write history about. I refer to Commodore Preble of Barbary Coast fame, who was also engaged in chasing pirates off the seas. Sincerely yours, S/ Donna Preble (copy Ss- 5/5/42) In spite of the half truths and outright lies constantly beingpublished about Short and me the sound common sense ofthe American people was evidenced by many letters whichshowed they were not impressed by the Roberts report andother statements. I quote one of them. 173 ADMIRAL KIMMEL’S STORY Admiral Husband Kimmel Feb. 1, 1942 San Francisco, Calif. Dear Admiral Kimmel: I wanted to send you the enclosed clipping from the Los An-geles Examiner of Jan. 27, 1942, but have procrastinated a fewdays. I think it bespeaks the opinions of a great part of therank and file of Americans; in fact, anyone who reads carefullythe Commission's report could hardly come to any other con-clusion. You have a multitude of supporters. Admiral, in thistime of trial. Keep up your spirit. We can believe nothing elsethan that you have now, and always had the safety and welfareof the U.S.A. and its Navy foremost in your heart, mind andenergies. May God see that right prevails and that He may protect youagainst these accusations. Sincerely, Mr. & Mrs. Geo. W. Jones 403 Kenoak Dr. Pomona, California From officers and enlisted men with whom I had served Ireceived a great number of understanding letters. I quote afew of them. ROTARY INTERNATIONAL Service Above Self-He Profits Most Who Serves Best Central Office, 35 East Wacker Drive, Chicago, U.S.A. 18 December, 1941 (non-official, personal communication) Admiral Husband E. Kimmel United States Navy Washington, District of Columbia Dear Sir: No matter what the newspapers say-no matter what the pub-174 VILIFICATION AND ENCOURAGEMENTlie thinks-and no matter what is finally published I will neverbelieve that you were negligent in your duty to the U.S. Navy orto your country. And I consider myself a loyal American citizenin every sense of the word. I feel so sure of my convictions on this point because I servedunder you aboard the U.S.S. ARKANSAS as a member of theHospital Corps. (Dr. Myron C. Baker was our senior medicalofficer). When I was aboard the "Arky" you, "Skipper" de Steigerand Dr. Baker were my ideals. You were real "Navy" to me;"regulation as hell," as some of my shipmates used to say, but fineofficers, gentlemen and sailors. And I can never believe anythingelse. After leaving the Navy I completed my high school educa-tion, then attended the University of Illinois until I received myA.B. degree. For a few years after graduation there were numer-ous ups and downs, but for the past seven or eight years I've hada little success-which my wife sometimes likes to boast about.But good position or not I anticipate the day when I'll be backin the Navy to help win this damnable war. I believe that if itwere possible to obtain the consensus of others who served underyou it would be in agreement with my attitude-that you arenot the type of officer who could ever be labeled as incompetentin your profession. I damned near cried when I read the paperthis morning. With best wishes for a satisfactory outcome in the present in-vestigation so that the new year will bring you added successand happiness, I am, Most sincerely, Russel A. Perry, Ex-Pharmacists Mate, U.S. Navy 210 Lexington Avenue, Providence, R.I. 3-8-43Admiral H. E. Kimmel:Dear Sir: I don't expect you to remember me but I served under yourcommand in 1924 and 1925 aboard the U.S.S. PREBLE. In fact l75 ADMIRAL KIMMEL’S STORYI was the engineer in your gig for one year, and served in yourdivision until January 1927 aboard the U.S.S. PRUITT. As I am back in the service I have refrained from addressingyou until you were retired. But now I feel that even though Imight be breaking regulations you will be generous enough tooverlook it. After three and one half years under your command I believeI can safely say that I am expressing the opinion of your entirecrew when I say that with you in command I would gladlyserve on any vessel, in any waters and on any mission. Respectfully, /s/ Raymond Printy Coronado, California, December 16, 1941Dear Kimmel, I want you to know that Mrs. Senn and I have absolute con-fidence in you, your leadership and the Naval Forces underyour command. I know of no officer who I had rather see lead our Fleet intobattle and I know my son Elliott feels the same way for he hasfrequently said so. You may always know that you are constantlyin my thoughts. /s/ Thos J. Senn, Rear Admiral, Thomas J. Senn, USN, RetiredBureau of Navigation Memorandum December 19,1941Dear Kimmel, Just a line to let you know that my unbounded faith in yourability, energy, judgment, and devotion to duty has been notone whit diminished. Stand firm.176 VILIFICATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT I am still at your service. My best to you all and the Dave Clarks. Sincerely, Hal BowenI concur- C. W. Nimitz[Rear Admiral H. G. Bowen, U.S. Navy, at that time chief ofthe Bureau of Engineering in the Navy Department, now a ViceAdmiral. Rear Admiral C. W. Nimitz, U.S. Navy, at that timechief of the Bureau of Navigation in the Navy Department. Nowa Fleet Admiral.} Norfolk, Virginia, January 26, 1942Dear Kim, While anything I may write you will probably not give youmuch comfort, I just can't help letting you know, that I know,in spite of the findings of the Roberts Board, that you were notguilty of anything either in the way of dereliction of duty or inyour judgment. I, probably as much, if not more, than any high ranking officerhave studied the Hawaiian Defense-and the Pacific situation ingeneral, having spent 8 years at our War College-been Chief ofStaff of the Fleet, and Assistant Chief of Operations. I knowhow the State Department always prevented our Navy from do-ing anything which Japan might in any way consider an offen-sive move, or a slap at their delicate feelings. I know how impos-sible it has been to get our own Navy Department to obtain theessentials for carrying on a great war. And what I think is im-portant, I don't believe there is a single high ranking officer-whether so called air minded or not,-who believed that Japanwould or could make such an attack on Pearl Harbor. And, ofcourse, I also know that it is the Army's business to defend aNaval Base, and that ships at a base are there for rest, recreation,and repairs. 177 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY I have always felt that the entire blame for this whole affairlies right in Washington-but, of course there is no way that Ican see to get at the culprits. So they have to find a goat and themantle falls on you, who through circumstances happens to bethe CinC. If the Department contemplates taking any action against youin this matter, and if I can be of any service to you as an expert,or in any other way, I hope you will call on me. My kindest thoughts and best regards. Sincerely and sympathetically, /s/Joe Taussig [From Vice Admiral Joseph K. Taussig, U.S. Navy, Retired, at that time president of the Hampton Roads Sanitation Com- mission.] Washington- December 17th Dear Kim- I wish to express in writing-what I feel you already know- that you have my sincere regrets over what has occurred-it is something that might well have happened to any of us! The ingratitude-the ruthlessness-of "democracies" may not be the subject of the proverbs but it is none-the-less a reality! Please be sure of my very real regards for you and of my good wishes for you-in every way Most sincerely yours- King [The letters dated December lyth (1941) and February 27 (1942) signed King are from the then Admiral Ernest J. King now Fleet Admiral.] UNITED STATES FLEET Washington- February 27th Dear Kimmel- It is high time that I wrote to you to say that, while I appre-178 VILIFICATION AND ENCOURAGEMENTciate the task set for the Roberts Commission, the reading of thereport leaves me with the definite feeling that much was omittedthat was germane to the inquiry-which the commission wasaware of-which they probably left out for "reasons of state"-the all-powerful public must be presented with a report whichnamed names-not necessarily all of the names-but enough tomake the public feel that the commission had done its duty-that the report could receive approval. It is wholly hindsight to say this or that as to events or as topeople. All of the "breaks" went against us. I am confident that,almost without exception, the same thing would have happenedwhether you and Short were there or any other Navy or Armyofficers-the set-up was "that way," physically and psychological-ly, premised on the attitude here in Washington as to the real-ities of the case-not only as to "ways and means" placed at yourdisposal but as to the several progressive steps which led to thebreak with Japan! No one thought the Japs would strike-or eventhat they were ready to strike! Please be assured of my good will and good wishes. Do not fail to let me know if there is anyway in which I can be of service to you. Sincerely yours- /s/ King U.S.S. Trenton At Sea 8 February 1942 My dear Kimmel, The radio press this morning brought to me the very sad newsthat you and Short had applied for retirement. I have known you intimately for many years; have talked"shop" with you both on board ship and ashore; know as wellas anyone in the service the unselfish devotion you have giventhat service; have knowledge of the high ideals you have cher-ished and the untiring efforts you have made to bring your ships,your division and your fleet up to the standards they should meetwhich were definitely higher than those then obtaining. More- 179 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYover I know the professional ability character that goes with it.I know too that only one side of the Pearl Harbor story has beentold the public and probably ever will be told. So when I read the press this morning I know that the actiontaken had been carefully considered and was based on what youfelt was for the best interest of your country. That is in keepingwith how you have always acted. Your country and your navyalways came first with you. And that is why you have my faith,my confidence and my deep affection. With love to you andDorothy I am, As always /s/Jack [Rear Admiral John F. Shafroth, U.S. Navy.] United States Pacific Fleet, Commander Service Force, March 6, 1943Dear Admiral Kimmel, While you were our Commander-in-Chief, I was loyal. I didwork hard, but only followed my leader. This Fleet and BillCalhoun have much for which to thank Admiral Kimmel. We are working hard. I wish I could talk to you to say all thatis in my heart. It is not necessary for me to reassure you of myfriendship, my respect and my admiration. All my senior Staff (My flag men) send best wishes. Sincerely and gratefully, /s/ Bill Calhoun[Vice Admiral W. L. Calhoun, U.S. Navy.] Department of the Navy General Board Washington February 24, 1942Dear Kimmel, I received a recent letter from Theobald in which he said, "Poor Kimmel. No one ever worked harder than he did.180 VILIFICATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT I was with him when he testified to Mr. Roberts and his friends-!!!! "One had to be proud of Kimmel. He backed away from nothing throughout his ordeal, kept his head up and did his level best during his last days as CinC, with everything tumbling about his head, and will carry to his grave the re- spect and well wishes of every one who served under his command." That is a fine tribute and one that I know is fully deserved. Sincerely, /s/ J. 0. Richardson If I can be of any service to you call on me. [Admiral J. 0. Richardson my predecessor as commander-in- chief.] My feelings at the time and the situation in which I foundmyself can best be shown by quoting my letter on 22 February1942 to Admiral Stark: 22 February 1942 Dear Betty: I started writing this letter a few minutes after Pye gave meyour letter of 21 February. I thank you for the letter and for theinformation contained therein. I also thank you for your otherletters which I have not answered. I understand from your letter that I will not be retired forthe present, that I will be in a leave status until some furtheraction is taken. I submitted my request for retirement because I was notifiedthat Short had done so and took that notification as a suggestionfor me to do likewise. I submitted this request solely to permitthe department to take whatever action they deemed best forthe interests of the country. I did not submit it in order to escapecensure or punishment. When I was notified that the notification in regard to Short 181 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORYwas not meant to put pressure on me, I submitted my secondletter on the subject. When the fact that Short and I had submitted requests forretirement was published to the country, I was astounded thatthe department would put Short and me in such light before thepublic. On February 19, I received notification signed by the Secre-tary that I would be placed on the Retired list on March 1,1942. Paragraph 2 of this letter states, "This approval of yourrequest for retirement is without condonation of any offense orprejudice to future disciplinary action." I do not understand this paragraph unless it is to be publishedto the country as a promise that I will be disciplined at somefuture time. I stand ready at any time to accept the consequences of myacts. I do not wish to embarrass the government in the conductof the war. I do feel, however, that my crucifixion before thepublic has about reached the limit. I am in daily receipt of let-ters from irresponsible people over the country taking me totask and even threatening to kill me. I am not particularly con-cerned except as it shows the effect on the public of articlespublished about me. I feel that the publication of paragraph two of the Secretary'sletter of February 16 will further inflame the public and do mea great injustice. I have kept my mouth shut and propose to continue to do soas long as it is humanly possible. I regret the losses at Pearl Harbor just as keenly, or perhapsmore keenly than any other American citizen. I wish that I hadbeen smarter than I was and able to foresee what happened onDecember 7. I devoted all my energies to the job and made thedispositions which appeared to me to be called for. I cannot nowreproach myself for any lack of effort. I will not comment on the Report of the Commission, but youprobably know what I think of it. I will say in passing that Iwas not made an interested party or a defendant. All this I have been willing to accept for the good of the182 VILIFICATION AND ENCOURAGEMENTcountry out of my loyalty to the Nation, and to await the judg-ment of history when all the factors can be published. But I do think that in all justice the department should donothing further to inflame the public against me. I am entitledto some consideration even though you may consider I erredgievously. You must appreciate that the beating I have taken leavesvery little that can be added to my burden. I appreciate your efforts on my behalf and will always valueyour friendship, which is a precious thing to me. My kindest regards always. /s/ H. E. Kimmel To: Admiral H. R. Stark, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Opera- tions. The campaign against Short and me continued through theyears. On August 20, 1944, I found it necessary to write theletter which I quote: 280 Bronxville Road, Bronxville 8, N. Y. August 20, 1944 Senator Harry S. Truman, Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C. My dear Senator Truman, In an article appearing under your name in Collier's Maga- zine of August 26, 1944, you have made false statements concern- ing my conduct as Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor prior to the Japanese attack. Your innuendo that General Short and I were not on speaking terms is not true. Your statements alleging failure to cooperate and coordinate our efforts are equally false. General Short and I, as well as our subordinates, coordinated the efforts of our com- mands in close, friendly, personal and official relationships. The real story of the Pearl Harbor attack and the events pre- ceding it has never been publicly told. This has not been my 183 ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S STORY decision. For more than two and a half years I have been anxious to have the American people know all the facts. The Roberts Report, upon which you rely, does not contain the basic truths of the Pearl Harbor Catastrophe. This is evident from the fact that no official action has ever been taken upon the basis of that Report. The Congress of the United States, of which you are a Member, has recognized the inadequacy of the Roberts Report by directing that the War and Navy Departments under- take a full investigation of the Pearl Harbor disaster. Until I am afforded a hearing in open court, it is grossly un- just to repeat false charges against me, when, by official action, I have been persistently denied an opportunity to defend myself publicly. I suggest that until such time as complete disclosure is made of the facts about Pearl Harbor, you refrain from repeating charges based on evidence that has never met the test of public scrutiny. I ask for nothing more than an end to untruths, and half truths about this matter, until the entire story is given to our people, who, I am convinced, will be amazed by the truth. I am releasing this letter to the press in the belief that the historic American sense of fair play will approve this action. Very truly yours, /s/ H. E. Kimmel, Rear Admiral, U.S.N.(Ret.)I never received a reply to this letter. My wife also received letters of which the following is asample: 136 East 30 Street, New York City, January 26, 1942 Mrs. Husband Kimmel, Navy Department, Washington, D. C. My dear Mrs. Kimmel: My nephew came back from Hawaii with you on the Clipper184 VILIFICATION AND ENCOURAGEMENT and reported that because you would leave none of your luggage to follow by a slower route two Navy wives, who were pregnant were forced to cancel their passage. This, in addition to the re- port that you required an unusual amount of service en route, would seem to indicate a type of person not the best influence for a husband! Very truly yours, Eleanor Overman This letter finally reached my wife when we were in Prince-ton, New Jersey, and she replied immediately. Princeton, New Jersey, March 23rd, 1942 My dear Mrs. Overman, Your letter of January 26th reached me today. Your nephew is mistaken. I have never been to Hawaii and I have never travelled on a clipper. Sincerely, Dorothy K. Kimmel (Mrs. Husband E. Kimmel)Mrs. Overman replied promptly with a profuse apology butthat did not stop this malicious lie. Again in October of 1945 Bill Cunningham published inhis column in the Boston Herald a statement to the effect thatservice hostesses in Hawaii were careful never to include Mrs.Kimmel and Mrs. Short as guests at the same time becausetheir constant state of belligerency was embarrassing to allbystanders. It was only by chance that we heard of this canardand informed Mr. Cunningham that Mrs. Kimmel had neverbeen to Hawaii and that she and Mrs. Short had never met.Mr. Cunningham promptly apologized publicly in his column. But there were hundreds of similar lies which were propo-gated and never overtaken. 185CHAPTER XThe Story EndsAgain and again in my mind I have reviewed the eventsthat preceded the Japanese attack, seeking to deter-mine if I was unjustified in drawing from the orders,directives and information that were forwarded to me the con-clusions that I did. The fact that I then thought and nowthink my conclusions were sound when based upon the infor-mation I received, has sustained me during the years that havepassed since the first Japanese bomb fell on Pearl Harbor. When the information available in Washington prior tothe attack was disclosed to me I was appalled. Nothing in myexperience of nearly forty-two years service in the Navy hadprepared me for the actions of the highest officials in our gov-ernment which denied this vital information to the Pearl Har-bor commanders. If those in authority wished to engage in power politics,the least that they should have done was to advise their navaland military commanders what they were endeavoring to ac-complish. To utilize the Pacific Fleet and the Army forces atPearl Harbor as a lure for a Japanese attack without advisingthe commander-in-chief of the fleet and the commander ofthe Army base at Hawaii is something I am wholly unable tocomprehend.186 THE STORY ENDS While I am still able to do so, I feel that I must tell the storyso that those who follow may fully realize the imperative neces-sity of furnishing the naval and military commanders at thefront with full and clear information. Only in this way canthe future security of our country be preserved.187188 Blank APPENDIX UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FlagshipCincpac File No.A2-11/FF12/A4-3/QL/(13)Serial 01646 Pearl Harbor, T.H., October 14, 1941.CONFIDENTIAL PACIFIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL LETTER No. 2CL-41 (Revised).From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.To : PACIFIC FLEET.Subject: Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.Reference: (a) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41. (b) Cincpac conf. Itr. file A7-2(13) Serial 01221 of 8 Au- gust 1941. (c) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memo. No. 1CM-41. (d) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memo. No. 2CM-41. (e) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 3L-40 (Revised). (f) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 19L-40. (g) Section 3, Chapter II, U.S.F. 10. (h) Chapter IV, U.S.F. 10.Enclosure: (A) Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan showing Air Defense Sectors. (B) Measures to be effective until further orders. 1. Reference (a) is revised herewith. References (b), (c)and (d), are cancelled and superseded by this letter. 2. The security of the Fleet, operating and based in theHawaiian Area, is predicated, at present, on two assumptions: (a) That no responsible foreign power will provokewar, under present existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet orBase, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such pow-ers may attempt; 189 APPENDIX (1) sabotage, on ships based in Pearl Harbor, from small craft. (2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sink- ing an obstruction in the Channel. (3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the ap- proaches to Pearl Harbor. (b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by; (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in oper- ating area, (3) a combination of these two. 3. The following security measures are prescribed here-with, effective in part in accordance with enclosure (B) or in theirentirety as may later be directed by the Commander-in-Chief,U. S. Pacific Fleet, or the Senior Officer Present Afloat in the Ha-waiian Area: (A) CONTINUOUS PATROLS: (1) Inshore Patrol (administered and furnished by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District). (2) Boom Patrols. (3) Harbor Patrols. (B) INTERMITTENT PATROLS: (1) Destroyer Offshore Patrol. (a) The limits of this patrol shall be the nav- igable portion to seaward of a circle ten miles in radius from Pearl Harbor entrance buoy number one which is not patrolled by the Inshore Patrol. (b) Three destroyers to search twelve hours prior to the sortie or entry of the Fleet or of a Task Force containing heavy ships. The Fleet or Task Force Commander concerned shall furnish this patrol and when a sortie and entry occur in succession the Com- mander entering shall furnish it. (c) One destroyer (READY DUTY) to screen heavy ships departing or entering Pearl Harbor other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry. The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District will admin-190 APPENDIX ister the Ready Duty Destroyer for this purpose and issue necessary orders when requested by forces afloat. Such Ready Duty Destroyer shall be on one hour's notice. (2) Air Patrols: (a) Daily search of operating areas as directed, by Aircraft, Scouting Force. (b) An air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force. It will search that part of a circle of a radius of thirty miles from the entrance chan- nel buoys which is south of latitude 21°- 20' N. The Fleet or Task Force Commander concerned shall fur- nish this patrol, establishing it at least two hours prior to the sortie or entrance, and arranging for its discon- tinuance. When a sortie and entry occur in succession, the Commander entering shall supply this patrol. (c) Air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at times other than described in foregoing subparagraph. The ship concerned shall furnish the patrol mentioned therein. (3) Daily sweep for magnetic and anchored mines by Fourteenth Naval District Forces. The swept chan- nel for Fleet and Task Force sorties or entries is two thousand yards wide between Points "A" and "X" as defined in subparagraph (C) (3), below. (C) SORTIE AND ENTRY: (1) Reference (h) will not be in effect in the Pa-cific Fleet during the present emergency. (2) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval Districtcontrols the movements of ships within Pearl Harbor, theEntrance Channel, and the swept channel. (3) Point "A" is midway between Pearl Harborentrance channel buoys Nos. ONE and TWO; Point "A-1"is midchannel on a line drawn 270° true from Buoy No.EIGHTEEN; Point "X" unless otherwise prescribed is threethousand yards bearing 153° true from Point "A". (4) Zero hour is the time first ship passes Point l9l APPENDIX"A-1" abeam for sortie, or Point "A" for entry, and will beset by despatch. Interval between ships will be as prescribedby Fleet or Task Force Commanders. (5) Fleet and Task Force Commanders shall, fortheir respective forces: (a) Arrange with Commandant Fourteenth Naval District for times of entry and departure, berth- ing and services. (b) Prepare and issue sortie and entrance plans. (c) Clear the Defensive Sea Area promptly after sortie. (d) When a sortie and entry occur in succes- sion, keep entry force well clear of Defensive Sea Area until sortie force is clear. (e) Furnish own patrols except as modified by (B) (1) (b) and (B) (2) (b), above. (6) Units departing or entering Pearl Harbor attimes other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry,request authority and services as required, direct from Com-mandant Fourteenth Naval District. (7) Heavy ships (including 7,500 ton light cruis-ers) maintain a minimum speed of 15 knots when withina radius of 15 miles from the entrance buoys to Pearl Har-bor. During approach and entry, individual units governmovements to provide for minimum time in waters adjacentto the entrance. (D) OPERATING AREAS: (1) The Naval Operating Areas in HawaiianWaters (U.S.C. & G.S. Chart No. 4102) are considered sub-marine waters. Observe requirements of reference (g). (2) Ships, except submarines, shall anchor only inprotected anchorages. Pearl Harbor is a protected anchorage.Hilo and Kahului are considered as such if boat patrols aremaintained at the entrance and if ships are so moored as notto be subject to torpedo fire from outside the harbor. (3) Submarines may anchor in the following192 APPENDIXplaces: in Pearl Harbor, off Lahaina, inside or outside Kahu-lui, off Kauai, and at Hilo. No boat patrols need be main-tained. (4) Submarines shall not operate submerged inthe vicinity of surface ships except in accordance with pre-arranged plans for tactical exercises, for gunnery exercises, orfor services to other types. (5) Submarine operations, except (4) above, shallbe confined ordinarily to Areas C-5, C-7, U-1, M-20, M-21and M-24. Under special circumstances submarine squadronsmay request additional areas from the officer responsible forassigning operating areas, who shall assign areas clear ofthe general area allocated to surface ships and shall notify allFleet units in the Hawaiian area. While submarines are oper-ating submerged in C-5 and C-7 they shall maintain a guardship on the surface to warn approaching surface ships. (6) Except as specifically directed for exercisepurposes, all operations of submarines other than those cov-ered in sub-paragraphs (4) and (5) above, shall be on thesurface. (7) Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, shallensure that commanders of surface and air task forces arefurnished with detailed submarine schedules and all changesthereto. The latter shall ensure that units concerned, includ-ing air patrols, operating under their command are properlynotified thereof. (8) Ships proceeding independently across theoperating areas at night shall follow neutral zones and areaboundaries where practicable. The Task. Force Commanderin the vicinity shall be informed of: (a) the route to be fol-lowed using point numbers on the Operating Chart, (b) timeof starting route, (c) the speed of advance. The Task ForceCommander shall notify vessels of his force that may beconcerned. (E) SHIPS AT SEA: (i) When ships operate at sea from Pearl Harborthey shall be organized as a Task Force to which will be as- 193 APPENDIXsigned destroyers and aircraft as necessary for screening. Eachtask force shall be organized offensively and defensively.These organizations shall be promulgated prior to leavingport and shall provide for the following: (a) A destroyer attack unit to locate and at- tack hostile submarines. (b) Anti-submarine screens for heavy ships in accordance with the number of destroyers available, priority in assignments being governed by the follow- ing: Priority 1-BBs Priority 2-CVs Priority 3-CAs Priority 4-CLs (c) A striking unit of cruisers, carrier (if oper- ating) and destroyers, to co-operate with Patrol Wings and Army Air Units in destroying hostile carrier group. (d) A concentration of own operating sub- marines preparatory to disposition as circumstances require. (e) Inner air patrol for dispositions or forma- tions, when in operating areas. Such screen shall be maintained by Task Groups, if the Task Force Com- mander so directs. (f) Inner anti-submarine screens, insofar as practicable with assigned destroyers. Carriers operating alone utilize plane guards for screening when they are not employed in plane guarding. (g) Maintenance of condition of readiness THREE on torpedo defense batteries and equivalent condition of readiness in destroyers. Supply ready am- munition and keep depth charges ready for use. Air- craft will not be armed unless especially directed. (h) Maintenance of material condition XRAY, or equivalent in all ships. (i) Steaming darkened at night in defensive disposition either as a Task Force or by Task Groups as practicable.194 APPENDIX (j) Restricting use of radio to minimum re- quired for carrying out operations. (k) Maintenance of horizon and surface battle lookouts. (1) Energizing degaussing coils whenever there is any possibility of the presence of magnetic mines. Water of less than sixty fathoms shall be avoided if operations permit. (2) Ships towing targets in operating areas atnight will show appropriate running and towing lights, ex-cept when engaged in exercises the nature of which requiresthem to be darkened. (F) SHIPS IN PORT: (1) Ships in port in the Hawaiian Area shall carryout applicable measures outlined in references (e) and (t). (G) DEFENSE AGAINST AIR ATTACK: (1) The principal Army anti-aircraft gun defenseof Pearl Harbor consists of several three-inch mobile batterieswhich are to be located on the circumference of a circle ofan approximate radius of five thousand yards with center inthe middle of Ford Island. The Army, assisted by such unitsof the Marine Defense Battalions as may be available, willman these stations. Machine guns are located both inside andoutside the circle of three-inch gun positions. (2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part ofthe Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shore-basedon Oahu, will augment the local air defense. (3) Enclosure (A) defines the air defense sectors inPearl Harbor and is the basis for the distribution of shipswithin the harbor for anti-aircraft fire. Hostile planes attack-ing in a sector shall be considered as the primary targets forships in that sector. However, ships in other sectors may aug-ment fire of any other sector at the discretion of the SectorCommander. (4) The Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor,(exclusive of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) shallensure that ships are disposed at berths so that they may de-velop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector com- 195 APPENDIX mensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port. He is authorized to depart from the normal berthing plan for this purpose. Battleships, carriers, and cruisers shall normal- ly be moored singly insofar as available berths permit. (5) The Senior Officer Present in each sector pre- scribed in sub-paragraph (G) (3) above, is the Sector Com- mander, and responsible for the fire in his own sector. (6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer (N.B.D.O.). As such he shall: (a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack. (b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti- aircraft guns emplaced. (c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing TWO for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy. (d) Coordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by: (1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the Commander-in- Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what condition of readi- ness to maintain. (2) Holding necessary drills. (3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal, all clear signal. (4) Informing the Task Force Com- mander at sea of the attack and the type of attack- ing aircraft. (5) Arranging communication plan. (6) Notifying all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed. (7) The following naval base defense conditionsof readiness are prescribed:Condition I - General Quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base De- fense Officer.196 APPENDIXCondition II - One-half of anti-aircraft battery of all ships in each sector manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Na- val Base Defense Officer.Condition III - Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector). Con- dition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer. (8) Searchlights of ships shall not be used in eventof a night attack. (9) In event of an air attack, the following pro-cedure shall be followed by the task forces: (a) Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor. (1) Execute an emergency sortie order which will accomplish (2), (3) and (4) below. (This order must be prepared and issued in advance). (2) Direct destroyers to depart as soon as possible and report to operating task force com- mander. (3) Prepare carrier with one division of plane guards for earliest practicable sortie. (4) Prepare heavy ships and submarines for sortie. (5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Task Force Commander operating at sea, advised. (b) Task Force Commander operating at sea. (1) Despatch striking unit. (See (E) (i) (c), above). (2) Make appropriate defensive disposi- tion of heavy ships and remaining surface forces at sea. (3) Despatch destroyer attack unit if cir- cumstances require. (May utilize unit of (E) (1) (a) for this it not needed for A/S purposes.) (4) Direct commander of operating sub- 197 APPENDIX marines to carry out action desired of him. (5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor informed and advised of any at- tacks or hostile planes sighted in the operating area. (c) Naval Base Defense Officer. (1) Give the alarm indicating attack is in progress or imminent. If not already blacked out, each unit shall execute blackout when the alarm is given. (2) Inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking air- craft. (3) Launch air search for enemy ships. (4) Arm and prepare all bombing units available. (H) ACTION TO BE TAKEN IF SUBMARINE ATTACKS INOPERATING AREA: (1) In the event of a submarine attack in the oper-ating area, the following general procedure will be followed: Ship Attacked. (a) Proceed in accordance with Article 509, F.T.P. 188. Originate a plain language despatch, urgent precedence, containing essential details addressed for action to the Task Force Commander in the operating area and for information to Commander-in-Chief, Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and S.O.P.A., Pearl Harbor. If the ship attacked is damaged, it will clear the immediate submarine danger area, at best re- maining speed, then proceed toward Pearl Harbor using zigzag appropriate for speed in use. Ships other than one attacked. (b) Battleships. Zigzag at maximum speed. Launch aircraft armed for inner air patrol. Do not ap- proach scene of attack closer than 50 miles during re- mainder of daylight period. Give own screening unit information to enable them to join quickly.198 APPENDIX (c) Carriers. Same as for battleships, exceptplace all aircraft in Condition ONE, armed. (At leastone squadron with depth charges when they becomeavailable.) Aircraft for initial inner air patrol may belaunched unarmed. Launch planes other than those forinner air patrol as ordered by Task Force Commanderor as circumstances warrant. (d) Cruisers. Same as for battleships, except,use one-half available aircraft (armed) for own innerair patrol. Send the second half to scene of attack(armed), to attack enemy submarine and to providepatrol for damaged ship if damaged ship has been un-able to provide its own inner air patrol. (e) Destroyers. Attack unit proceed at maxi-mum speed to scene of attack. Take determined offen-sive action. Screening units join heavy ship units towhich assigned. Destroyers in Pearl Harbor make im-mediate preparations for departure. Sortie on order ofSenior Officer Present Afloat. Report to Task ForceCommander when clear of Channel. (f) Submarines. Surface if submerged. Remainin own assigned areas, zigzagging at best speed untildirected otherwise. (g) Minecraft. Augment screening units as di-rected by Task Force Commander. (h) Base Force. If ship attacked is damaged,tugs in operating areas join her at best speed, preparedto tow, slipping targets as necessary. Report in code,positions of rafts abandoned. Tugs in Pearl Harborprepare for departure. Sortie on order of Senior OfficerPresent Afloat. High speed towing vessels proceed atdiscretion, keeping 50 miles from scene of attack. (i) Patrol Wings. Assume readiness for searchand for offensive action. Carry out search as directedby Task Force Commander. Prepare to establish stationpatrol 220 mile radius from scene of attack at one hourbefore daylight of next succeeding daylight period. (j) Shore-based Fleet Aircraft. Prepare to 199 APPENDIX relieve planes in the air over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor is also attacked, in which case the in- structions issued by Naval Base Defense Officer have priority. (k) Naval District. Clear Pearl Harbor Chan- nel at once for either sortie or entry. Prepare to receive damaged ship(s) for repair. (l) S.O.P.A., Pearl Harbor. Prepare destroy- ers in Pearl Harbor for sortie and direct the departure of units as requested by the Task Force Commander of units at sea. Control of departing units will pass to the Task Force Commander at sea as units clear the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys. (m) Task Force Commander at Sea. Coordi- nate offensive and defensive measures. When immedi- ate defensive measures have been accomplished, pre- scribe rendezvous and issue necessary instructions for concentrating and forming the Task Force. (2) It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack. (3) It must be remembered too, that a single sub- marine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must therefore assemble his Task Groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pur- sue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means. 4. Subordinate Commanders shall issue the necessaryorders to make these measures effective. H. E. KIMMEL.DISTRIBUTION: (5CM-4l) List II. Case 1: A, X. ENl, EN3, NA12, ND11AC, ND11-12-13-14, NY8-10, (A1 - Asiatic, A1 - Atlantic). P. C. Crosley, Flag Secretary.USS Penn.-75-10-15-41-1,000.200APPENDIXCONFIDENTIAL MEASURES To BE EFFECTIVE UNDER PARAGRAPH 3 OF BASIC LETTER UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS (A) (1) (A) (2) Boom - administered by Commandant Fourteenth Naval Dis- trict with services furnished by Commander Battle Force from allships present. (A) (3) Harbor - administered by Commander Base Force with serv-ices furnished by Commander Battle Force from all ships present. (B) (1) (a) (b) (c) Furnished by Destroyers, Battle Force; Minecraft, BattleForce; and Minecraft, Base Force, and coordinated by CommanderDestroyers, Battle Force.(B) (2) (a) (b) (c)(B) (3)(C) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (6) (7)(D) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)(E) (1) (a) (b) (c) (d) Assignments only shall be made. The Task Force Commanderwill hold one drill during each operating period, if employmentpermits, in the establishment of units prescribed.(E) (1) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l)(E) (2)(F) The provisions of reference (e).(G) Entire article, except sub-paragraph 6 (b), which will be asarranged by Naval Base Defense Officer with Commanding Gen-eral, Hawaiian Department.ENCLOSURE (B)201 NOTES Unless otherwise stated, references will be found in the Hearings and Findings of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack published in thirty-nine Parts or Volumes and one Volume of Findings. CHAPTER I—pp. 1-10 1. Part 11, pp. 5434-35. 2. Part 11, p. 5433. 3. Exhibit 1. Part 12, pp. 238-45 and 248. 4. Exhibit 32, Part 14, p. 1334 No. 21. 5. Naval Court of Inquiry, Finding IV, Part 39, p. 299. CHAPTER II—pp. 11-31 1. Exhibit 10, Part 14, p. 1000. 2. Exhibit 44, Part 15, p. 1430. 3. Exhibit 44, Part 15, p. 1431. 4. Official letter Com 14 to CNO, October 17, 1941; Exhibit 46 NavalCourt of Inquiry, Part 33, p. 1280. 5. CincPac 1st endorsement to Com 14 letter A16-1/ND 14, Exhibit 46,Naval Court of Inquiry, Part 33, p. 1280. 6. Exhibit 44, Part 15, p. 1466. 7. Exhibit 28, Naval Court of Inquiry, Part 33, p. 1194. 8. Exhibit 41, Naval Court of Inquiry, Part 33, p. 1240. 9. See Chapter II, Note 5, above. 10. CNO to CincPac and Com 14, November 25, 1941, Serial 0135412,Part 17, p.2471. 11. Exhibit 9, Part 14, pp. 985-92. 12. Exhibit 10, Part 14, p. 1000. 13. Exhibit 44, item 12, Part 15, p. 1452. 14. Testimony Part 1, p. 57. 15. Official letter, CNO to CincPac, February 15, 1941, Serial 09330,Exhibit 49, Naval Court of Inquiry, Part 33, p. 1283. 16. CNO to several Commandants, February 17, 1941, Serial 010230,Exhibit 54, Naval Court of Inquiry, Part 33, p. 1316. 17. CNO to several Commandants, June 13, 1941, Serial 055730, Ex-hibit 55, Naval Court of Inquiry, Part 33, p. 1318. 18. Naval Court of Inquiry, Finding XV, Part 39, p. 311. 19. Dispatch, Opnav to CincPac, May 24, 1941, 242130, Part 17,p. 2465. 20. Dispatch, Opnav to CincPac, May 13, 1941, 132019; CincPac toOpnav May 15, 1941, 150625, Part 17, pp. 2465 and 2466. 21. Joint Memorandum, Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations,November 5, 1941, Exhibit 16, Part 14, p. 1061.202 NOTES 23. Exhibit 86, Part 15, p. 1901. Also testimony. Part 4, p. 1827. 33. Admiral Turner, Part 26, p. 265, question 10. 24. Part 18, p. 2910. 85. Dispatch, CincPac to ComTaskFor 3, Corn 14, December 4, 1941, 040237; Part 17, p.2475. 26. Hart investigation, testimony Admiral Newton, Part 26, p. 346, question 45. 27. Naval Court of Inquiry, Finding X, Part 39, p. 304. 28. Hewitt report. Part 39, p. 526, conclusion 25. CHAPTER III—pp. 32-77 1. Dispatch CNO to CinCUS, January 21, 1941, 212155, Part 17, p. 2475. 2. Dispatch Alusna, London to Opnav, February 3, 1941, 031400, passed to CinCUS as Opnav 032300, Part 17, p. 2476. 3. Exhibit 37, Part 14, p. 1396. 4. Exhibit 37, Part 14, p. 1397. 5. Exhibit 37. Part 14, p. 1400. 6. Exhibit 15, Part 14, p. 1044. 7. Exhibit 37. Part 14, p. 1405. 8. Naval Court of Inquiry, Testimony of Admiral Stark, Part 32, pp. 49, 89, questions 142, 404-5. 9. CincPac File No. A4-3/FF12(13), Serial 01254, August 13, 1941, rec'd Opnav September 3, 1941, Part 17, p. 2476. 10. Exhibit 52, Part 15, p. 1594. 11. Navy Basic War Plan-Rainbow 5, Chapter II, Part 18, p. 2882. 12. Dispatch CNO to CinCUS January 21, 1941, 212155, "If this esti- mate proves correct I contemplate ordering mobilization according to Rainbow Three with following modifications . . .", Part 17, p. 2475. 13. Exhibit 37, Part 14, p. 1402. 14. Dispatch, CincPac to ComSubscofor 170354 and 170426, October 17, 1941, Part 17, p. 2478. 15. Dispatch, CincPac to Com 14, 170319, October 17, 1941, and dis-patch Com 14 to CincPac 170356, Part 17, p. 2478. 16. Dispatch, CincPac to Compat wing 2, 170429, October 17, 1041,Part 17, p. 2479. 17. Part 10, pp. 5081-3. 18. Exhibit 37, Part 14, p. 1405. 19. Exhibit 37. Part 14, p. 1406. 20. Dispatch CNO to CincPac, November 26, 1941, 270040, Part 17,p. 2479. 21. Dispatch CNO to CincPac, November 26, 1941, 270038, Part 17,p. 2479. 22. See note 21. 23. See note 20. 24. Message No. 489, November 29, 1941, War Department to Com-manding General Hawaiian Department, Part 17, p. 2479. 25. Dispatch CincPac to Opnav November 28, 1941, 280627; officialletter CincPac to CNO, December 2, 1941, Serial 0114W: personal letter 203 NOTESto Admiral Stark, December 2, 1941, Part 17, pp. 2480-3 and Part 16,p. 2253. 26. See note 25. 27. Exhibit 32, Part 14, p. 1330, No. 13-14. 28. Exhibit 78, Part 15, p. 1768. 29. Dispatch Opnav to CincAF, info CincPac, December 1, 1941,011400, Part 17, p. 2484; also Hewitt Testimony, Captain Layton, Part 36,p.130. 30. Dispatch Opnav to CincAF, Info CincPac November 28, 1941,281633, Part 17, p. 2485; also Hewitt testimony. Captain Layton, Part 36,p. 121. 31. Dispatch CincAF to Opnav, info CincPac, December 6, 1941,061255, Part 17, p. 2485. 32. Exhibit 80, Part 15, p. 1783. 33. Exhibit 37, Part 14, p. 1407. 34. Dispatch Com 16, to Opnav, Info, CincPac, December 8, 1941,080333, Part 17, p.2485. 35. Hewitt testimony, Captain Layton, Part 36, p. 134. 36. Memorandum for the Roberts Commission from Lieutenant Com-mander E. T. Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer Pacific Fleet, dated Jan-uary 5, 1942, Part 17, p.2486. 37. Exhibit 37, Part 14, p. 1407. 38. Finding XVI, Naval Court of Inquiry, Part 39, p. 312. 39. Exhibit 1. Part 12, pp. 191, 195, 199. 40. Exhibit 1. Part 12, pp. 180, 204. 41. W. P. Pac-46, Annex II, Part 17, p. 2595. 42. Hart Testimony, Admiral Halsey, Part 26, p. 323, question 44. 43. Hart Testimony, Admiral Newton, Part 26, p. 343, question 30. 44. Dispatch CincPac to Compatwing 2, November 28, 1941, 280450,Part 17, p. 2487. 45. See note 44. 46. Mailgram Comtaskfor 9 to Compatrons 21 and 22, November 20, 1941, 292103, Part 17, p. 2487. 47. Naval Court of Inquiry Testimony, Admiral Bellinger, Part 32,p. 516, questions 106, 107. 48. Hewitt Testimony, Admiral Bellinger, Part 36, pp. 288-294. NavalCourt of Inquiry Testimony, Captain Ramsey, Part 32, p. 447, question 72. 49. Letter CincPac to CinCUS, January 7, 1942, Serial 059, Part 17,p. 2488. 50. Hewitt Testimony, Admiral Bellinger, Part 36, p. 299. 51. Naval Court of Inquiry, Testimony Captain Ramsey, Part 32, p.442, question 44. 52. Naval Court of Inquiry, Testimony Captain Ramsey, Part 32, p.451, question 101. 53. Dispatch CNO to CincPac, November 28, 1941, 282054, Part 17,p.2496. 54. Roberts Commission Testimony-Admiral Stark, Part 23, p. 1087. 55. Dispatch CincPac to Pacific Fleet, Info Opnav, November 28, 1941, 280355, Part 17, p. 2496. 204 NOTES 56. Official letter CincPac to CNO, February 11, 1941, Serial 0243,Part 17, p. 2496. 57. Hewitt Report, Part 39, p. 502. 58. Dispatch U.S.S. HELENA to GR 1.5-info CincPac, November 28,1941, 280835, Part 17, p. 2501. 59. Hewitt Report, Part 39, p. 502. CHAPTER IV—pp. 78-112 1. Exhibit 37, Part 14, pp. 1397-1399. 2. Dispatch Opnav to CinCAF info CincPac, December 1, 1941, 011400,Part 17, p. 2484. 3. Exhibit 37. Part 14, p. 1408. 4. Exhibit 37. Part 14, p. 1407. 5. Exhibit 2, Part 12, p. 261. 6. Exhibit 2. Part 12, p. 262. 7. Exhibit 2, Part 12, p. 262. 8. Exhibit 2, Part 12, p. 263. 9. Exhibit 2, Part 12, p. 262. 10. Exhibit 2. Part 12, p. 263. 11. Exhibit 2, Part 12, p. 263. 12. Exhibit 1, Part 12, p. 100. 13. Exhibit 1, Part 12, p. 116. 14. Exhibit 1, Part 12, p. 130. 15. Exhibit 1, Part 12, p. 137. 16. Exhibit 1, Part 12, p. 165. 17. Exhibit 1, Part 12, p. 173. 18. Exhibit 1, Part 12, p. 137. 19. Exhibit 1, Part 12, p. 208. 20. Exhibit 1, Part 12, p. 195. 21. Foreign Relations United States and Japan 1931-1941, Volume 2,pp. 768-70. 22. Exhibit 1. Part 12, p. 195. 23. Exhibit 1. Part 12, p. 208. 24- Exhibit 1. Part 12, p. 190. 25. Exhibit 1. Part 12, p. 207. 26. Exhibit 1. Part 12, p. 199. 27. Testimony Admiral Inglis, Part i, p. 185. 28. Foreign Relations United States and Japan 1931-1941, Volume 2,p. 779. 29. Exhibit 1. Part 12, p. 180. 30. Exhibit 1. Part 12, p. 195. 31. Exhibit 1. Part 12, p. 180. 32. Exhibit 1. Part 12, p. 195. 33. Exhibit 1. Part 12, pp. 205-206. 34. Exhibit 1. Part 12, p. 204. 35. Exhibit 1. Part 12, pp. 154-155. 36. Dispatch Alusna Batavia to Opnav December 5, 1941, 031030;Exhibit 142, Part 18, p. 3304. 37. Naval Court of Inquiry, Testimony Comdr. Kramer, Part 33, p.853, question 32. 38. Addendum to Naval Court of Inquiry finding of fact, Part 39,pp. 324-325. 39. Naval Court of Inquiry Finding XVIII, Part 39, p. 316. 40. Exhibit 1. Part 12, p. 238. 41. Exhibit 1. Part 12, pp. 239-244. 42. Foreign Relations United States and Japan 1931-1941, Volume 2,p. 787. 43. Exhibit 1, Part 12, pp. 239-245. 44. Testimony Lieut. Comdr. Schulz, Part 10, p. 4662. 45. Testimony General Marshall, Part 3, p. 1108. 46. Part 36, pp. 25-26. 47. Testimony, Part 36, p. 26. 205 NOTES 48. Part 8, p. 3385. 49. Part 8, pp. 3388, 3390. 50. Part 8, p. 3417. 51. Part 8, p. 3427. 52. Part 8, p. 3437. 53. Part 8, p. 3438. 54. Testimony Admiral Stark and Captain Krick, Part 11, pp. 5543-60. 55. Exhibit 1. Part 12, p. 248. 56. Hewitt Report, Part 39, p. 449. 57. Hewitt Testimony-Captain Kramer, Part 36, p. 340. CHAPTER V—pp. 113-121 1. Exhibit 40, Part 14, p. 1412. 2. Testimony Part 10, p. 4803. 3. Testimony Part 10, pp. 5081-83. 4. Testimony Part 10, p. 5082. 5. Mr. Stimson, Part 11, p. 5419. 6. Mr. Stimson, Part 11, p. 5421. 7. Mr. Stimson, Part 11, p. 5438. CHAPTER VI—pp. 122-134 1. Part 9, pp. 4502, 4567. 2. Part 35, p. 101. 3. Senate Bill 805, 79th Congress, First Session. 4. Admiral Turner testimony, Part 4, p. 1922. 5. Exhibit 1, Part 12, p. 261. 6. Minority findings Congressional Committee, pp. 518-19. 7. Testimony, Part 4, p. 1979. 8. Testimony, Part 4, p. 1592. 9. Opnav Dispatches 272337 of November 27, 1941 and 290110 ofNovember 28, 1941, Part 14, pp. 1406-1407. CHAPTER VII—pp. 135-145 1. How War Came by Davis and Lindley (New York: Simon andSchuster, 1942), p.4. CHAPTER VIII—pp. 146-169 1. Part 23, p.1076. 2. Testimony Mr. Justice Roberts, Part 7, p. 3280. 3. Testimony Mr. Justice Roberts, Part 7, p. 3268. 4. Part 39, p.321. 5. Part 39, pp. 175-76- 6. Part 39, pp. 139-40. 7. Part 39, pp. 221-22. 8. Exhibit lA Hewitt Inquiry, Part 36, p. 361. 9. Testimony Captain Safford, Part 8, pp. 3608-10.206____________________________________________________________________Facts About Pearl HarborBy Husband E. Kimmel???????193 Plant StreetGroton, Connecticut June 3, 1958The Honorable Clarence Cannon Congressman from Missouri House Office Building Washington, D. C.Sir: Your remarks on the floor of the House of Representatives on May 6, 1958 were recently called to my attention. They included the following passages which I quote from the Congressional Record of May 6, 1958:A subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations held hearings in which it was testified that at the time of the attack the Naval Commander, Admiral Kimmel and the Army Commander General Short were not even on speaking terms. And the exhaustive investigations by the commission appointed by the President and by the Joint Committee of the House and Senate showed that although both had been repeatedly alerted “over a period of weeks prior to the attack” they did not confer on the matter at any time.At one of the most critical periods in the defense of the nation, there was not the slightest cooperation between the Army and the Navy.Had they merely checked and compared the official message; received by each, they could not have failed to have taken the precautions which would have rendered the attack futile and in all likelihood have prevented the Second World War and the situation in which we find ourselves today. . . .It was not the Japanese superiority winning the victory. It was our own lack of cooperation between Army and Navy throwing victory away. . . .When the Jap naval code was broken and when for some time we were reading all official messages from Tokyo to the Japanese fleet, much of this information came to Admiral Kimmel at his Hawaiian headquarters. . . .From your remarks I have learned for the first time the origin of the lie that General Short and I were not on speaking terms at the time of the attack. I would like very much to know the identity of the individual who gave this testimony before a subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee.In regard to the alleged lack of cooperation between General Short and me your statement is completely in error. We did consult together frequently. As a man in your position should know before making the charges you have made, the Naval Court of Inquiry which was composed of Admiral Orin G. Murfin, Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, all of whom had held high commands afloat, made an exhaustive investigation and reached the following conclusion:Finding of Fact Number V.Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short were personal friends. They met frequently, both socially and officially. Their relations were cordial and cooperative in every respect and, in general, this is true as regards their subordinates. They frequently conferred with each other on official matters of common interest, but invariably did so when messages were received by either which had any bearing on the development of the United States-Japanese situation or on their general plans in preparing for war. Each was mindful of his own responsibility and the responsibilities vested in the other. Each was informed of measures being undertaken by the other to a degree sufficient for all practical purposes.Your statement that the actions of the 1941 Hawaiian Commanders might have prevented the Second World War and the situation in which we find ourselves today is utterly fantastic. The Hawaiian Commanders had no part in the exchange of notes between the two governments and were never informed of the terms of the so called ultimatum of November 26, 1941 to Japan, nor were they notified that the feeling of informed sources in Washington was that the Japanese reply to this ultimatum would trigger the attack on the United States. To blame the Hawaiian Commanders of 1941 for the situation in which we find ourselves today is something out of Alice in Wonderland.With regard to the Japanese messages intercepted and decoded, exhaustive testimony before the Naval Court of Inquiry and the Joint Congressional Committee of Investigation shows that none of these decoded messages received after July 1941 were supplied to me and none were supplied to General Short.My book, Admiral Kimmel's Story, contains a collection of documented facts which support this statement and give the text of important decoded intercepts which were withheld from me and from General Short. These decoded intercepts were in such detail that they made the Japanese intentions clear. Had they been supplied to the Hawaiian Commanders the result of the attack would have been far different if indeed the attack would ever have been made.I know of no other occasion in our military history where vital information was denied the commanders in the field.To make unfounded charges against me and General Short to support your argument is grossly unfair and a misrepresentation of facts. The success of the attack on Pearl Harbor was not the result of inter-service rivalries at Pearl Harbor. This success was caused by the deliberate failure of Washington to give the Commanders in Hawaii the information available in Washington to which they were entitled. This information which was denied to the Hawaiian Commanders was supplied to the American Commanders in the Philippines and to the British.I request you insert this letter in the Congressional Record.Yours very truly, Husband E. Kimmel____________________________Groton, ConnecticutJuly 7, 1958.Hon. Clarence Cannon House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations Eighty Fifth CongressWashington, DC.Sir: You have failed up to the present time to provide me with the name of the individual whom you quoted in your remarks appearing in the Congressional Record of May 6, 1958 as authority for your statement that General Short and I were not on speaking terms when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. I know that to be wholly false and believe I am entitled to the name of the person so testifying. Whether or not he testified under oath and his qualifications. Moreover I would appreciate a definite reference to the hearing of the Sub-Committee of the appropriations Committee if printed and if not a transcript of that part of the record to which you refer.The receipt of your remarks in the Congressional Record of18 June is acknowledged. It was forwarded without accompanying letter in a franked envelope bearing your name and I presume sent by your direction.Your remarks are a continuation of the frantic efforts of the Roosevelt Administration to divert attention from the failures in Washington and to place the blame for the catastrophe on the Commanders at Pearl Harbor. Your account of the testimony that General Short and I were not on speaking terms given to your committee shortly after Pearl Harbor was effectively publicized though sixteen years later I am still denied the name of the individual who perpetrated this lie.For four years, from 1941 to 1945, the administration supporters and gossip peddlers had a field day making statements which the wall of government war time secrecy prevented me from answering.One of the most persistent and widespread was to the effect that General Short and I were not on speaking terms at the time of the attack. Another was that the uniformed services in Hawaii were all drunk when the attack came. This is the reason the Naval Court of Inquiry investigated these charges thoroughly and set forth their falsity in unmistakable language.You still seek to sustain these charges by the simple expedient of attacking the integrity of the investigators and witnesses who reached conclusions or gave testimony which does not suit you.You have slandered the honorable, capable, and devoted officers who served as members of the Army Board of Investigation and the Navy Court of Inquiry. You have also slandered the personnel of the Army and Navy stationed in Hawaii in 1941, many of whom gave their lives in defense of this country.It is astounding to me that you should charge General Short and me of falsely testifying as to our personal and official cooperation even when as you phrase it “all but life itself depended on their convincing the world that they had been friends when they should have been friends.”The testimony on this matter given before the Naval Court of Inquiry was given under oath and was true to my personal knowledge and is substantiated by much other testimony.You, yourself, refer to the statements in the Roberts Report to the effect that General Short and I conferred on November 27 and December 1, 2 and 3. You further state from the Roberts Report—“They did not then or subsequently hold any conferences specially directed to the meaning and significance of the warning messages received by both.” (General Short--Admiral Kimmel).How ridiculous it is to assume that the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet is unable to understand a message sent by the Navy Department without conferring with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to determine what the Navy Department meant by the messages that were sent to him and conversely that the Commanding General Hawaiian Department had to confer with the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet in order for him to know what the messages sent to him by the War Department meant. If the messages were so worded the fault lay neither with me or General Short.You imply that my request to revise the transcript of my testimony before the Roberts Commission is censurable and completely ignore the published statement of Admiral William H. Standley, USN, retired, a former Chief of Naval Operations and a member of the Roberts Commission. He wrote regarding Admiral Kimmel:He was permitted no counsel and had no right to ask questions or to cross-examine witnesses as he would have had if he had been made a defendant. Thus both Short and Kimmel were denied all of the usual rights accorded to American citizens appearing before judicial proceedings as interested parties. Even communists plotting the overthrow of our country are accorded far more legal safeguards than were granted to me and General Short. Admiral Standley also wrote: In spite of the known inefficiency of the Commission's reporters, when Admiral Kimmel asked permission to correct his testimony in which he had found so many errors that it took him two days to go over it, the Commission voted to keep the record as originally made although the answers recorded to many questions were obviously incorrect and many of them absurd. At my urgent insistences, the Commission did finally authorize Admiral Kimmel's corrected testimony to be attached to the record as an addendum.Your remarks with regard to the conduct of both officers and men on the evening preceding the Pearl Harbor attack is an insult to the gallant men who died in the treacherous Japanese attack and to all the members of both Army and Navy stationed on the Island of Oahu. Infrequently there might be an individual who overindulged in intoxicants but these were promptly apprehended by the shore patrol or military police and returned to their ship or station. The evidence as to the sobriety of officers and men was clear in the documentary evidence available to the investigation boards and yet in spite of their findings you state, “But the very fact that it was considered necessary to emphasize this testimony naturally gives rise to some doubt.” You apparently are quite willing to doubt the testimony given and believe the worst of the fine young men in the armed forces that were stationed in Hawaii.I was not permitted to know what testimony was presented to the Roberts Commission and was never given an opportunity to clarify or refute any statement made before it.I was not made a defendant before the Hawaii one-man investigation, was not called to testify, and was not permitted to have any knowledge of the proceedings. I requested authority to attend this investigation and was advised that time did not permit. When I repeated my request the Secretary of the Navy did not even reply. Perhaps the reason may be found in the testimony of Captain Safford who narrated before the Joint Congressional Committee the pressure to which he was subjected by the Committee Counsel to make him change his testimony. All did not have the strength of character of Captain Safford and some modified their preceding sworn statements.Although I requested the Joint Congressional Committee to call certain witnesses many of them were not called to testify. Among these was Fleet Admiral F. Halsey, my senior Fleet Air Officer at the time of the attack.The Navy court of Inquiry was the only investigation of Peal Harbor before which I was permitted to cross-examine and call witnesses. You are substantially correct in your statement that this inquiry “found Admiral Kimmel as pure as the driven snow.” In more moderate language expressed by Admiral Murfin, the President of the Court, years later, “We found Admiral Kimmel had done everything possible under the circumstances.”On Advice of Counsel I declined to take part in the Hart Investigation because the stipulations demanded of me would have placed my fate completely in the hands of the Secretary of the Navy. This I did regretfully because it was through my efforts that this investigation was initiated. The proceedings of the Hart Investigation were a valuable contribution.Why were the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War so anxious to have the damaging testimony in both the Naval Court of Inquiry and the Army Inquiry changed? The answer is very simple, both inquiries had found that the responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster rested in large part at the Headquarters of our government in Washington. Admiral Standley whom I have referred to above wrote:From the beginning of our investigation I held a firm belief that the real responsibility for the disaster at Pearl Harbor was lodged many thousands of miles from the Territory of Hawaii.Even the Hewitt Investigation found:During his incumbency as Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, Admiral Kimmel was indefatigable, resourceful and energetic in his efforts to prepare the Fleet for war.You refer to the information that had been forwarded to me and to General Short and specifically to a message based upon information from our Ambassador in Tokyo, Mr. Grew, dated 27 January 1941 to the effect that the Peruvian Ambassador in Tokyo had heard rumors that in the event of trouble breaking out between the United States and Japan, the Japanese intended to make a surprise attack against Pearl Harbor but you make no mention of the letter of the Chief of Naval Operations which forwarded this information to me on 1 February 1941 to the effect that: The Division of Naval Intelligence places no credence in these rumors. Furthermore based upon known data regarding the present disposition and employment of Japanese Naval and Army forces no move against Pearl Harbor appears imminent or planned for the foreseeable future.This estimate was never changed.When you refer to—“A position so admirable defended as Pearl Harbor with every facility, submarine nets, radar, sonar, planes and ships of the line” you create a very false impression. Admiral Richardson was relieved because he so strongly held that the Fleet should not be based in the Hawaiian area.The Army anti-aircraft batteries were woefully lacking but the War Department was unable to supply more.Of 180 long-range bombing planes authorized by the War Department early in 1941 only 12 had arrived and of these six were out of commission as they had been stripped of vital parts to enable other planes of similar type to continue their flight to their destination in the Philippines.Of 100 Navy patrol planes authorized for the 14th Naval District at Pearl Harbor not one had arrived prior to December 7, 1941.With regard to the radar installations, these had just been installed and their personnel were under training. The installation of these stations had been delayed due to the inability of the Army and the Interior Department to agree upon the location of these stations.With reference to personnel for the ships there were serious shortages of both officers and enlisted personnel and men were constantly being detached to provide crews for ships being newly commissioned. No one has ever explained why the weaknesses so clearly described in the Secretary of the Navy's letter of 24 January, 1941 were permitted to continue during all the months at this outlying station whose security was vital to the safety of the fleet and of the United States.Facilities to fuel the fleet were inadequate and a severe handicap to all fleet operations.The only planes in Hawaii suitable for long distance scouting were the patrol planes assigned to the fleet and they were totally inadequate to cover the approaches to Hawaii. The only planes suitable for long range bombing were the six B-17 Army planes and those attached to the two carriers.At the time of the attack the two carriers were on missions initiated by the Navy Department.These and other deficiencies had been repeatedly reported by General Short and me as well as by our predecessors.The messages of October 16, November 24 and November 27, 1941 from the Navy Department to the Commander of the Pacific Fleet and the messages of November 27 and November 29, 1941 to General Short from the War Department stressed sabotage and that an attack if made would be directed against ports in South East Asia or the Philippines. With the benefit of the intercepted Japanese messages, how they arrived at this conclusion will always be a mystery to me.To add to our difficulties the messages also directed that, “If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. . . .”The message of November 27, 1941 from the War Department to General Short specifically directed him to, “Report measures taken”. On the same date General Short replied, “Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy.”Recorded testimony shows this report was read by the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of War Plans Army, and the Chief of War Plans Navy. There can be no reasonable doubt that this report was read and understood by these responsible officials in Washington. For nine days and until the Japanese attack the War Department did not express any disapproval of this alert and did not give General Short any information calculated to make him change the alert.What was most needed at Pearl Harbor at this time was the information in Washington from the Japanese intercepts that indicated clearly an attack on Pearl Harbor.The Navy Department sent me various messages quoting from intercepted Japanese dispatches. I believed I was getting all such messages and acted accordingly. After the attack I found that many vitally important messages were withheld from the Hawaiian Commanders.I was never informed that Japanese intercepted messages had divided Pearl Harbor into five areas and sought minute information of the berthing of ships in those areas.A Japanese dispatch decoded and translated on October 9,1941 stated: With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we wouldlike to have you report on those at anchor, (those are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys, and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels alongside the same wharf).On October 10, 1941, another dispatch was decoded and translated in Washington which described an elaborate and detailed system of symbols to be used thereafter in designating the location of vessels in Pearl Harbor.A dispatch of November 15 decoded and translated in Washington on December 3, 1941 stated:As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your “ships in harbor report” irregular but at the rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.A dispatch of November 18 decoded and translated in Washington on December 5, 1941 stated:Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area N. Pearl Harbor, Mamala Bay (Honolulu), and the Areas adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy).A dispatch of November decoded and translated in Washington on December 6, 1941, stated the Japanese Consul General in Honolulu had reported that in area A there was a battleship of the Oklahoma Class; that in Area O there were three heavy cruisers at anchor, as well as carrier “Enterprise” or some other vessel; that two heavy cruisers of the Chicago Class were tied up at docks “KS”. The course taken by destroyers entering the harbor, their speed and distances apart were also described.On December 4 a dispatch was decoded and translated in Washington which gave instructions to the Japanese Consul in Honolulu to investigate bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation.On December 5, 1941 a dispatch was decoded and translated in Washington which stated:We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future you will also report even when there are no movements.In no other area was the Japanese Government seeking the detailed information that they sought about Pearl Harbor.In the period immediately preceding the attack reports were demanded even when there were no ship movements. This detailed information obtained with such pains-taking care had no conceivable usefulness from a military viewpoint except for an attack on Pearl Harbor.No one had a more direct and immediate interest in the security of the fleet in Pearl Harbor than its Commander-in- Chief. No one had a greater right than I to know that Japan had carved up Pearl Harbor into sub areas and was seeking and receiving reports as to the precise berthings in that harbor of the ships of the fleet. I had been sent Mr. Grew's report earlier in the year with positive advice from the Navy Department that no credence was to be placed in the rumored Japanese plans for an attack on Pearl Harbor. I was told then, that no Japanese move against Pearl Harbor appeared, “imminent or planned for the foreseeable future”. Certainly I was entitled to know what information in the Navy Department completely altered the information and advice previously given to me. Surely I was entitled to know of the intercepted dispatches between Tokyo and Honolulu on and after September 24, 1941, which indicated that a Japanese move against Pearl Harbor was planned in Tokyo.Yet not one of these dispatches about the location in Pearl Harbor was supplied to me.Knowledge of these foregoing dispatches would have radically changed the estimate of the situation made and my staff.General Willoughby in his book MacArthur 1941-1945 quotes a staff report from MacArthur's Headquarters:It was known that the Japanese consul in Honolulu cabled Tokyo reports on general ship movements. In October his instructions were “sharpened”. Tokyo called for specific instead of general reports. In November, the daily reports were on a grid-system of the inner harbor with coordinate locations of American men of war: this was no longer a case of diplomatic curiosity; coordinate grid is the classical method for pin-point target designation; our battleships had suddenly become targets.Spencer Akin was uneasy from the start. We drew our own conclusions and the Filipino-American troops took up beach positions long before the Japanese landings.If MacArthur's Headquarters which had no responsibility for Pearl Harbor were impressed by this information it is impossible to understand how its significance escaped all the talent in the War and Navy Department in Washington.The dispatches about the berthing of ships in Pearl Harbor also clarified the significance of other Japanese dispatches decoded and translated in the Navy Department prior to the attack.The deadline date was first established by a dispatch decoded and translated on November 5, 1941 the date of its origin:Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-United States relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.This information is to be kept strictly to yourself alone.The deadline was reiterated in a dispatch decoded and translated in the Navy Department on November 12, 1941:Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. The fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736 is absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite deadline and therefore it is essential that a settlement be reached by about that time. The session of Parliament opens on the 15th (work will start on (the following day?)) according to the schedule. The government must have a clear picture of things to come in presenting its case at the session. You can see, therefore, that the situation is nearing a climax, and that time is indeed becoming short . . .Whatever the case may be, the fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736 is an absolutely immovable one. Please, therefore, make the United States see the light, so as to make possible the signing of the agreement by that date.The deadline was again repeated in a dispatch decoded in Washington on November 17:For your Honor's own information.1. I have read your #1090 and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.2. In you opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736 and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals and do your best to bring about an immediate solution.The deadline was finally extended on November 22 for four days in a dispatch decoded and translated on November 22, 1941:It was awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you-- twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short, if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.Again on November 24, 1941, Tokyo specifically instructed its ambassadors in Washington that the November 29 deadline was set in Tokyo time.In at least six separate dispatches on November 5, 11, 15, 16, 22 and 24 Japan established and extended the deadline finally advanced to November 29. After the deadline date a Japanese plan was automaticallygoing into operation. It was of such importance that the Japanese Government declared: “The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days.”On December 1, 1941 Tokyo advised its ambassadors in Washington:The date set in my message #812 has come and gone and the situation continues to be increasingly critical.A dispatch on November 28 decoded and translated on the same day, stated:Well, you two ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable.Not one of the Japanese messages about the “Deadline” were supplied to me although the American Commanders in the Philippines were supplied with this information as they were also supplied with all the information in the decoded Japanese intercepts that were denied to the Hawaiian Commanders.The Commanders at Pearl Harbor were not kept informed of the progress of negotiations with Japan. I was never supplied with the text of Mr. Hull's message of November 26, 1941 to the Japanese Government which has been referred to frequently as an ultimatum. Mr. Stimson characterized it as Mr. Hull's decision to “kick the whole thing over”.Among other terms this note provided:The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and Indo China.The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support--militarily, politically, economically—any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with Capital temporarily at Chunking.Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific Area.The reply to this note was delivered in Washington within hours of the Japanese attack.My information on this and previous exchanges between the two governments was obtained from newspapers and radio. I believe Washington newspaper correspondents and the editors of our leading newspapers were kept better informed than were the Commanders at Pearl Harbor.After receipt by Tokyo of the American note of November 26, the intercepted Japanese dispatches indicate that Japan attached great importance to the continuance of negotiations in order to conceal the plan that would take effect automatically on November 29, as evidenced by the Japanese dispatch of November 28: . . . I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. . . .I never received this information.Again the dispatches from Tokyo to Washington of December 1, 1941:. . . to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information.)I never received this information.Again in the transpacific telephone conversations and dispatches the same theme is stressed, be careful not to alarm the Government of the United States and do nothing to cause a breaking off of negotiations.This information was decoded and translated in Washington on November 30 and was never sent to me.The intercepted Japanese diplomatic dispatches show that on and after November 29 a Japanese plan of action automatically went into effect: that the plan was of such importance it involved the fate of the Empire: that Japan urgently wanted the United States to believe that negotiations were continuing after the deadline date to prevent suspicion as to the nature of the plan.What was the plan? Why such elaborate instructions to stretch out negotiations as a pretext to hide the unfolding of this plan? Anyone reading the Japanese intercepted messages would face this question.No effort was made to mask the movements or presence of Naval Forces moving southward, because physical and radio observation of that movement were unavoidable. The troop movements to southern Indo China were the subject of formal exchanges between the Governments of Japan and the United States as evidenced by the communication which Mr. Wells handed to Mr. Nomura on December 2, 1941.Other dispatches were received in Washington which gave evidence of the deepening crisis.On the afternoon of December 6, 1941 a Japanese intercept was decoded which warned that a fourteen part message from Japan was on its way to the Ambassadors in Washington. That the time for presenting this message to our State Department would be supplied later.By 3:00 p.m. December 6, 1941 thirteen of the fourteen parts had been received. The decoding and translation was completed by 9:00 p.m. and distributed to the most important officers of the government by midnight. Nine p.m. in Washington was 3:30 in the afternoon in Hawaii. At midnight it was 6:30 p.m. in Hawaii.When the thirteen parts were delivered to Mr. Roosevelt about 9:00 p.m., he remarked, “This means war”.The time of delivery message and the fourteenth part were decoded and translated by 9:00 a.m. December 7, 1941, the time for delivery was set at 1:00 p.m. Washington time which was 7:30 a.m. at Honolulu and 2:00 a.m. at Manila.Yet not one word of the receipt of these messages which again clearly indicated an attack on Hawaii were ever given to General Short and me.The story of the whereabouts of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations and their unaccountable lapse of memory has been publicized so much that it is unnecessary for me to repeat it.I have written a documented account of Pearl Harbor. Other accounts which also tell the true story have been published by Charles A. Beard, Charles Callan Tansill, Frederic R. Sanborn, Harry Elmer Barnes, Admiral Robert A. Theobald, John T. Flynn, George Morgenstern, Walter Trohan, Percy L. Greaves, Jr. and many others.I repeat to you once more Mr. Cannon, the success of the attack on Pearl Harbor was not the result of inter-service rivalries at Pearl Harbor. This success was caused by the deliberate failure of Washington to give the Commanders in Hawaii the information available in Washington to which they were entitled. This information which was denied to the Hawaiian Commanders was supplied to the American Commanders in the Philippines and to the British.Finally, Mr. Congressman, the officers and men stationed in the Hawaiian Islands were fine, upstanding and well disciplined young Americans whom the American People should ever remember with gratitude and honor. In the attack launched by the Japanese they showed themselves fearless, resourceful and self-sacrificing and I shall always be proud of having commanded such men but I cannot forgive those responsible for the death of the more than 3000 soldiers, sailors and marines who died for their country on the 7th of December 1941 nor accept your insinuation that hangovers from intemperance ashore on the night of 6 December may have contributed to the delay in opening fire on the attacking Japanese planes. As a matter of fact many anti-aircraft guns on the ships were manned at the time of the attack and all anti-aircraft guns of the fleet were in action in less than ten minutes.It is requested that you insert this letter in the Congressional Record.Yours very truly, Husband E. Kimmel____________________________________________Groton, ConnecticutJuly 8, 1958.Mr. J. Edgar Hoover Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington 25, DC.My Dear Mr. Hoover:Thank you for your letter of 25 June, 1958, and your references to the Robert's Commission, The Army Pearl Harbor Report, the Naval Court of Inquiry and the Hewitt Inquiry. I am familiar with them, but all except the Roberts Commission Report were long after the hearings of a sub committee of the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives in 1942. Congressman Cannon advised me the information given to the Committee immediately after Pearl harbor was from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.I judge from your letter there was no evidence in the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1942 to the effect that General Short and I were not on speaking terms at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.Is this correct?If this is not correct will you kindly cite the evidence in order that I may learn the name of the individual who instigated this infamous lie.Yours very truly, Husband E. Kimmel_________________________________________________________January 28 1962. Mr. Cannon refused to publish my letters in the Congressional Record, but some Congressmen friends of mine did so.I never received a reply to my letter of 8 July, 1958 to Mr. J. Edgar Hoover and I have never been supplied with the name of the individual who is alleged to have testified that General Short and I were noton speaking terms.Husband E. KimmelFall 2009.Mr. Hoover never confirmed or denied his accusation against Admiral Kimmel. However, truth was finally revealed in June 2002, a remarkable 34 years after Kimmel deceased, when Chairman Cannon’s letter to Mr. Hoover, under date of June 28, 1958, was declassified:You [Mr. Hoover] told us that at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack Admiral Kimmel and General Short were not on speaking terms. . .This information you gave us in person.See “The FBI’s Role in the Pearl Harbor Attack,” by Thomas K. Kimmel, Jr., J.A. Williams, Esq., and Paul Glyn Williams, Esq., National Military Intelligence Association (NMIA), American Intelligence Journal, Fall 2009, pp. 41-48, for details; also available at: Cannon’s letter to Mr. Hoover follows: ................
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