UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC ...

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION

1200 New Jersey Avenue SE

Washington D.C. 20590

____________________________________

In re:

)

)

Docket No. NHTSA-2015-0055

)

Coordinated Remedy Program Proceeding )

)

___________________________________ )

THIRD AMENDMENT TO THE COORDINATED REMEDY ORDER

This Amendment to the Coordinated Remedy Order (¡°Amendment¡±) is issued by the

Administrator of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (¡°NHTSA¡±), an operating

administration of the U.S. Department of Transportation. Pursuant to NHTSA¡¯s authority under

the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, as amended and recodified (the

¡°Safety Act¡±), 49 U.S.C. ¡ì 30101, et seq., and specifically, 49 U.S.C. ¡ì¡ì 30118-30120,

30120(a)(1), 30120(c)(2)-(3), 30166(b), 30166(c), 30166(e), 30166(g)(1), and 49 CFR ¡ì¡ì 573.6,

573.14, this Amendment modifies the Coordinated Remedy Order issued on November 3, 2015

(¡°CRO¡±) to add newly affected vehicle manufacturers1 (the ¡°Expansion Vehicle Manufacturers¡±)

to the Coordinated Remedy Program and to set forth additional requirements and obligations of

the affected vehicle manufacturers (the ¡°Affected Vehicle Manufacturers¡±)2 and TK Holdings,

1

Including Ferrari North America, Inc. (¡°Ferrari¡±), Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC (¡°Jaguar-Land

Rover¡±), McLaren Automotive, Ltd. (¡°McLaren¡±), Mercedes-Benz US, LCC (¡°Mercedes-Benz¡±), Tesla Motors, Inc.

(¡°Tesla¡±), Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. (¡°Volkswagen¡±), and, per Memorandum of Understanding dated

September 16, 2016, Karma Automotive on behalf of certain Fisker vehicles (¡°Karma¡±).

2

Including, in addition to the Expansion Vehicle Manufacturers, the previously included companies, or

¡°Original Affected Manufacturers¡±: BMW of North America, LLC (¡°BMW¡±), FCA US, LLC (¡°FCA¡±) (formerly

Chrysler), Daimler Trucks North America, LLC (¡°Daimler Trucks¡±), Daimler Vans USA, LLC (¡°Daimler Vans¡±),

Ford Motor Company (¡°Ford¡±), General Motors, LLC (¡°GM¡±), American Honda Motor Company (¡°Honda¡±),

Mazda North American Operations (¡°Mazda¡±), Mitsubishi Motors North America, Inc. (¡°Mitsubishi¡±), Nissan North

Inc., (¡°Takata¡±) in connection with the recall and remedy of certain types of Takata air bag

inflators. The CRO, including all facts, findings, terms, and prior amendments3, is hereby

incorporated by reference as if fully set forth herein.

I.

NATURE OF THE MATTER AND FINDINGS.

1.

On November 3, 2015, upon the conclusion of the Coordinated Remedy Program

Proceeding and closing of public Docket Number NHTSA-2015-0055 (addressing the recalls of

certain Takata air bag inflators), NHTSA issued a Consent Order to Takata on November 3,

2015 (¡°November 2015 Consent Order¡±) and the CRO. See Coordinated Remedy Order with

Annex A, 80 FED. REG. 70866 (Nov. 16, 2015).

2.

Since that time, NHTSA has continued its investigation into the Takata air bag

inflator ruptures (EA15-001) and has been implementing and overseeing the Coordinated

Remedy Program. As part of the ongoing investigation NHTSA has, among other things,

received briefings from three independent research organizations,4 each of which had

undertaken scientific evaluations of Takata¡¯s frontal air bag inflators containing non-desiccated

phase-stabilized ammonium nitrate (¡°PSAN¡±). See Amendment to November 3, 2015 Consent

Order, EA15-001 Air Bag Inflator Rupture (May 4, 2016) (¡°Amended Consent Order¡±).

NHTSA staff evaluated the research and also consulted with the Agency¡¯s independent expert

on the various researchers¡¯ findings. See id. (including Expert Report of Harold R. Blomquist,

Ph.D. as Exhibit A). Based upon the scientific analyses and data obtained from the researchers

America, Inc. (¡°Nissan¡±), Subaru of America, Inc. (¡°Subaru¡±), and Toyota Motor Engineering and Manufacturing

(¡°Toyota¡±).

3

Amendments were issued granting extensions of time to BMW on March 15, 2016, and to GM, Daimler

Vans, and Ford on September 29, 2016. These amendments are publicly available at:

.

4

Exponent, Inc., Fraunhofer ICT, and Orbital ATK.

2

and additional data from Takata, on May 4, 2016, NHTSA issued, with Takata¡¯s agreement, the

Amended Consent Order, which, among other things, established a phased schedule for the

future recall of all Takata frontal inflators containing non-desiccated PSAN by December 31,

2019.

3.

The number of Takata air bag inflators currently recalled, or scheduled for recall,

has increased since November 3, 2015, from approximately 23 million to approximately 61

million5 and the number of affected vehicle manufacturers has grown from 12 to 19. The size of

these recalls, ages of vehicles affected, nature of the defect, and associated communications and

outreach challenges, as well as remedy part and alternative part supply challenges, lends

unprecedented complexity to the recall and remedy process. Given the potential severity of the

harm to vehicle occupants when an inflator rupture occurs and the wide-spread exposure across

a large vehicle population, the ongoing risk of harm presented by the defective Takata air bag

inflators is extraordinary. Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, and upon consideration of

the entire record in this proceeding (including NHTSA¡¯s ongoing investigation in EA15-001,

oversight of the Takata non-desiccated PSAN inflator recalls issued in May and June 2015 by

the Original Affected Manufacturers (the ¡°Inflator Recalls¡±) to date, and the Amended Consent

Order) NHTSA now issues this Third Amendment to the Coordinated Remedy Order.

Additional Factual Background

4.

Following the issuance of the November 2015 Consent Order and the CRO,

NHTSA continued its investigation into the rupturing Takata air bag inflators and began to

implement the Coordinated Remedy Program.

5.

5

In late 2015, Takata shared new inflator ballistic testing data with the Agency.

This number of inflators does not include like-for-like remedies.

3

That data included ruptures during testing of four (4) non-desiccated PSPI inflators and two (2)

non-desiccated PSPI-L inflators (both of which are passenger side air bag inflators). Based on

the new ballistic testing data, in December 2015, Takata amended DIRs 15E-042 (for the PSPIL) and 15E-043 (for the PSPI) to include inflators through model year 2008, and the impacted

vehicle manufacturers6 expanded their existing recalls to all vehicles with those inflator types

through model year 2008.

6.

Meanwhile, in the fall of 2015, Takata began ballistic testing and analysis of

certain non-desiccated PSDI-5 driver air bag inflators returned from the field. In January 2016,

Takata notified the Agency that of 961 returned non-desiccated PSDI-5 inflators subjected to

testing, three (3) had ruptured during testing and an additional five (5) had shown elevated

internal pressure levels during testing deployment, but did not rupture during testing.

7.

In January 2016, the Agency learned that on December 22, 2015, the driver of a

2006 Ford Ranger was killed in a crash in Lancaster County, South Carolina, when the nondesiccated SDI inflator in his air bag ruptured during deployment. While this vehicle was under

recall for the passenger side air bag inflator, the driver side air bag inflator had not been recalled

because no ruptures had occurred during previous ballistic testing. That ballistic testing was

conducted as part of a proactive surveillance testing program that included 1,900 tests conducted

on parts taken out of vehicles located in the high absolute humidity (¡°HAH¡±) region.

8.

In light of the new ballistic test data showing ruptures in non-desiccated PSDI-5

inflators (see Paragraph 6)7, the December 22, 2015, fatality involving a non-desiccated SDI

inflator (see Paragraph 7), and paragraph 29 of the November 2015 Consent Order, on January

6

Honda, Mazda, and Subaru.

7

By the time Takata filed the DIR with the Agency on January 25, 2016, Takata reported four (4) ruptures

and six (6) abnormally high internal pressurizations during ballistic testing on 1995 inflators returned from the field.

4

25, 2016, Takata filed two DIRs, initiating the recall of non-desiccated PSDI-5 inflators (16E005) from start of production through model year 2014, and initiating the recall of nondesiccated SDI inflators (16E-006) from the start of production through model year 2014.

Thereafter, vehicle manufacturers impacted by these expansions subsequently filed

corresponding DIRs, including Volkswagen and Mercedes-Benz, neither of which had

previously been part of the Coordinated Remedy Program.

9.

In February and March 2016, the Agency received briefings from Exponent, Inc.,

Fraunhofer ITC, and Orbital ATK, regarding their research into the root cause(s) of the inflator

ruptures, including the conclusions each had drawn as of that time. The findings of all three

research organizations were consistent with previous theories that most of the inflator ruptures

are associated with a long-term phenomenon of PSAN propellant degradation caused by years of

exposure to temperature fluctuations and intrusion of moisture from the ambient atmosphere

into the inflator. See Amended Consent Order at ? 2. The temperature fluctuations and

moisture intrusions are more severe in warmer climates with high absolute humidity. Id. Based

upon the Agency¡¯s review of the work done by the research organizations, it concluded that the

likely root cause of the rupturing of most8 non-desiccated frontal Takata air bag inflators is a

function of time, temperature cycling, and environmental moisture. Id. at ? 5. Other factors

may influence the relative risk9 of inflator rupture, but the overarching root cause of the ruptures

consists of the three identified factors.

10.

Based on the Agency¡¯s root cause determination regarding the non-desiccated

8

The findings are qualified as applicable to ¡°most¡± non-desiccated PSAN frontal inflators made by Takata

because some of the earliest rupture-related recalls additionally involved certain manufacturing defects that caused

the inflators to rupture before the combined effects of time, temperature cycling, and humidity could have caused the

degradation that leads to rupture.

9

Factors that may affect relative risk of inflator rupture and risk to vehicle occupants include, but are not

limited to, vehicle size, position of the inflator in the vehicle (passenger, driver, or both), and manufacturing

location.

5

 ................
................

In order to avoid copyright disputes, this page is only a partial summary.

Google Online Preview   Download