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A Deficit of Information: An Analysis of Contemporary Studies Regarding China’s Military Capabilities & Security Environment

By

Patrick N. Garrett

Associate



May 6, 2003

Throughout the Cold War a considerable debate raged among and between scholars, experts and policymakers within military and strategic circles concerning the capabilities and intentions of the rival superpowers. Measuring the relative strengths and weaknesses of the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as their respective alliance partners, involved the monumental and decades long effort to collect basic equipment data, information on doctrinal developments, force structure and makeup, and political intentions. Countless studies were undertaken, books written, conferences held, and predictions made concerning the implications of either one state being ahead or behind the other, and the impact that might have had on the likelihood and result of a direct military confrontation between the two states.

Beginning in the mid-1990s a very similar debate began to take shape that focused instead on the military and strategic potential of the People’s Republic of China and on the possibility that it might become a dominant power in the Asia-Pacific region and a global competitor with the United States. China scholars and military experts directed their attention towards China’s military modernization and actions regarding Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the region as a whole to determine if the PRC could or would engage in territorial expansion or the willingness to settle diplomatic disputes with military action.

Generally, two schools of thought regarding China’s future have emerged; the first argues that China’s military modernization is destabilizing and intended to help China reunite the mainland and Taiwan through force as well as to intimidate and dominate other nations in the region.[1] This view of China as a naturally aggressive state bent on regional and possibly global dominance is opposed by a more benign view that contends that China’s military capabilities are rather modest and certainly incapable of waging wars of conquest throughout the region, thus China would have very little incentive to engage in the type of behavior that might make it a threat to the United States, and Asian or Pacific states.[2] Assessments of China’s relative military strengths or weaknesses are used to justify the views of both sides, which normally results in an inability to accurately discern China’s military effectiveness.

Analysis regarding China’s military capabilities and strategy, generally tend to be based on studies on the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) doctrine and organization as well as on bean-counting that is used to determine the general strength and size of China’s military, such as how many and what type of tanks and aircraft China might have in its inventory. The result of such efforts are studies that tend to focus either on China’s perceived strengths versus the weaknesses of a specific opponent, or China’s perceived weaknesses versus the strengths of other states.

While these efforts have generally been useful in structuring the debate over the last decade, the overall value and accuracy of efforts to calculate relative military capabilities, with significant exceptions, remain relatively limited as studies tend to be tailored to fit the views or notions of the analyst or scholar in question.[3] For example, the importance of China’s recent aircraft and submarine acquisitions are mentioned by some to illustrate China’s ability to threaten Taiwan while others may totally ignore these developments and instead focus on the relative lack of training of Chinese pilots, and the various shortcomings of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) amphibious fleet to describe China’s inability to mount a successful invasion of the island.[4] While these arguments may be useful in facilitating debate amongst the various camps and helping them to develop coherent arguments and positions, they lack precision and balance that tends to result in conceptual and factual mistakes that can often taint conclusions.

Furthermore, the bulk of the literature to date, seems to be based on four types of sources: foreign language publications (either in their original form or translated into English), conversations and interviews with Chinese or Taiwanese experts within their respective countries, reference materials such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Military Balance or the various Jane’s Information Group publications, and finally, the official publications or reports of governmental agencies and organizations.

While each of these sources of information are invaluable to researching the issue, there has been a tendency to focus almost exclusively on these sources while ignoring or being unaware of new sources of data that have emerged or become available in the last decade. The end of the Cold War has resulted in a massive declassification effort on the part of the United States and Russia, allowing vast quantities of raw intelligence data to become available to the public including satellite imagery, aerial photography, and various intelligence estimates and reports allowing scholars and experts to gain new insights into China’s military.

Finally, the availability of commercial high resolution satellite imagery is an important development as it replaces dots on the map with color images that leaves little to the imagination and allows analysts to have a greater understanding of individual facilities and there general placement within the overall force structure of a military.

But the inability or unwillingness to exploit additional sources of information is only one element of the problem as the inclusion of these materials would continue to result in partisan discussions not necessarily designed for truth seeking or objective analysis but rather to advocate an individuals specific preferences or beliefs for the purpose of advocacy. Additionally, the use of snapshot analysis rather than developing a comprehensive baseline of information that integrates order of battle, equipment numbers, doctrinal information, organizational history, and facility and infrastructure profiles, is a serious drawback of contemporary studies.

By understanding the flaws of contemporary studies, recognizing the utility of additional sources of information and methods to gain that information, and by readjusting the analytical framework to emphasize objective analysis rather than advocacy can scholars and experts attempt to credibly understand the dynamics and capabilities of the Chinese military.

What’s wrong with the Status Quo?

There are a number of problems or flaws associated with contemporary studies that prevent an accurate assessment of China’s military capabilities and how the Chinese military might conduct an invasion of Taiwan. First, such studies tend to take a snapshot of the military situation focusing on subsets of the issue, namely the ones that support their thesis. Secondly, many of the writings tend to portray potential scenarios in very superficial terms, analyzing the type of operation that may be conducted but not going into any deeper discussion. Finally, though this is certainly not universal, there tends to be an over reliance on sources that may draw questionable conclusions or whose data deserves closer scrutiny than it currently receives. Each of these issues, if handled poorly, can result in seriously skewed analysis.

“Snapshots” are a useful tool for scholars, experts, and policymakers to illustrate complex issues in a manner that is not overbearing for the reader and still conveys the authors point. A snapshot is the presentation of certain pieces of information that best illustrate ones idea or concept. This information is usually factual in nature, but when applied does not take into consideration other specific issues that might impact on their argument. Furthermore, each school of thought, “…held captive by its inclinations, tends unintentionally towards advocacy analyses that are tailored to support positions … [and] may even slant assumptions on purpose or exclude selected data that do not dovetail with desired plans.”[5]

For instance, Shambaugh, when discussing the difficulties that China might face in an amphibious landing of Taiwan, argues that China’s military only has the ability to “transport one or two divisions and about 300 tanks at a time, far short of the numbers necessary [1.25 million] to establish a beachhead on the heavily fortified western approaches of the island.”[6]

Unfortunately, Shambaugh fails to account for China being, one of the largest shipbuilders, could also use civilian vessels to transport nearly 2 million troops to Taiwan and be used in an invasion of the island.[7] In O’Hanlon’s much longer analysis of the subject he sets the bar at no more than 10,000 or 15,000 transported via sealift and does not even mention the possibility of civilian vessels being used.[8]

While Gill and O’Hanlon argue that civilian vessels might be used, they argue that both civilian and military vessels would be subject to “fierce attacks” before they even reach the island.[9] While it is correct and valid to point out that these ships would be harassed and possibly sunk by Taiwanese anti-ship missiles en route to the island, the authors ignore that such a threat was not enough to deter other countries, most notably the United Kingdom during the Falklands War, and that while there will undoubtedly be Taiwanese successes in attacking surface vessels, the Chinese also get a vote and could prove to be unwilling to allow their invasion force to be harassed freely and without consequence. [10]

Another example of this practice can be found in Bernstein and Munro’s citing the PLA’s rapid reaction forces “which numbered 15,000 in 1988, [but] had expanded to more than 200,000 by the mid-1990s” as an example of China’s interests in territorial expansion by having forces that could be airdropped into disputed islands throughout the South China Sea and in East Asia.[11] While it is certainly possible that the increase in rapid reaction forces are related to an active effort to take control of additional territory, less nefarious motives may also be at work. For instance, the concept of rapid reaction forces was not established until the early to mid-1980s and was part of a larger effort to modernize the force structure and doctrine of the PLA.[12] Bernstein and Munro also neglected to mention that even if China wanted to vertically insert 200,000 ground troops into these areas it might prove difficult to do so without the necessary aircraft that would be needed to deliver these soldiers.

Focus on the military balance also tends to result in miscounts or the exclusion of other weapon systems that may be important to the discussion at hand. One scholar, when discussing the military situation in the Taiwan Strait, argues that while China is “quietly and methodically” making preparations to seize Taiwan by force, the Taiwanese are suffering from a shortage of qualitative and quantitative shortage of aircraft as the “backbone” of its air force is the Indigenous Defense Fighter, which Taipei has 130.[13] But the author ends her discussion there without also identifying the 126 F-16A/Bs, 200 F-5s, or 58 Mirage 2000-5s that Taiwan also had in its inventory at the time the article was written.[14] By excluding the existence of these other aircraft the author may have inadvertently created the false impression that Taiwan’s air force was much weaker than it really was.

When arguing amongst themselves, as illustrated in the series of articles in the National Interest in 1999 on China’s military capabilities, advocates tend to have arguments that either resemble two ships passing in the night that completely ignore the core issues of the other side, or they tend to degenerate into a “Yes / No” debate where each side is unable to weigh the implications of their respective arguments and come to a resolution that would allow debate to progress.[15]

This is not to say that all of the coverage of China’s military reflects these tendencies. As has been mentioned elsewhere, the efforts of some analysts, to explore the organizational structure or doctrine of the PLA and the Taiwanese military are among some of the very best resources currently available as they serve not to advocate positions but instead focus on describing what is known about these particular subjects. These studies and undertakings tend to explore their issues from an intelligence perspective that is interested more in what the answer to their various questions may be rather than how those answers may impact other debates or arguments.[16]

On-balance, however, the bulk of the literature discussing military capabilities or the military balance tend to be focused less on determining actual capabilities then on proving that China can or cannot invade Taiwan or that China does or does not pose a threat to regional security. The answers to such questions tend to be not as black or white as some may contend, as most arguments designed to prove a point usually exclude pertinent pieces of information which might mitigate the strength of the argument but shed light on the dynamics involved. In determining military realities a high degree of precision is necessary to insure effective analysis.

A second shortcoming of many published studies involves the general lack of specific scenarios that would describe how one thinks a conflict might be waged.[17] The bulk of the studies discussing an invasion of Taiwan, both the ones that believe China could or would initiate such an invasion and the ones that argue that an invasion would fail, do not go into any great detail as to how the operation would play out other than to describe how China’s amphibious ships would be sunk or Taiwan’s airbases destroyed or made unusable.[18]

The utility of specific scenarios that describe how the analyst sees a military conflict playing out is crucial to understanding his or her thought processes and in determining if the situation that he or she envisions is realistic. Furthermore, attempting to place oneself into the shoes of the senior military leaders of China or Taiwan may allow the analyst to understand the military and political pressures and restraints that are involved in pursuing or defending against an invasion.

Much of the analysis regarding the Taiwan issue generally covers some of the basic military intricacies involved with the subject and ultimately declares that an invasion would be unfeasible or even impossible and leaves it at that. One scholar has speculated that an amphibious operation against Taiwan would be nearly impossible because of geographical issues such as “…the western coastline consists of mud flats extending two to five miles out to sea.”[19]

However, PLA or Taiwanese generals, when faced with orders from superiors to prepare for an invasion or a defense cannot simply point out some of the advantages or disadvantages of their respective positions and agree or decline to begin preparations. In reality, if a PLA general is ordered by the Chinese Military Commission to plan for an invasion of Taiwan and he declines to comply there is a better then even chance that general will soon be out of a job.

The PLA must have a plan to invade Taiwan, for it not to would defy common sense and be one of the greatest acts of shortsightedness that a military could engage in. The responsibility of analysts and scholars is to determine what that plan might be, the assumptions involved, and determine the likelihood of success; to do this requires that scenarios be developed and simulated. For instance, to use the example of geography cited above, a closer examination of the issue reveals that while invading Taiwan might not be as preferable as other locations, and that there are periods of the year in which mounting an invasion would not be strategically wise due to typhoons and other weather issues, there are options available to planners that would put Chinese soldiers on solid ground (provided they got there).[20] Troubleshooting the issue, to determine possible operation plans, would cause one to quickly realize this feature of Taiwan’s geography.

The lack of credible scenario development may be due to a variety of factors including the daunting task of compiling a comprehensive dataset that would cover not only organizational issues, but also unit strengths, composition, location, mission and empirical analysis of the units effectiveness. Furthermore, scenario generation may require analysts to develop a better understanding of military operations including tactics, logistics, and doctrine, which are intrinsically complicated issues requiring a considerable investment of time and effort to master or become proficient in.[21]

Regardless of the reasons why such analysis is not generally included in scholarly works, their inclusion may dramatically and positively enhance the current discourse. As Shlapak et al. discovered only after initiating their simulation, the importance of some factors (including landing operations) in an invasion become less important relative to others such as the battle for air superiority. Only through working through potential scenarios can one discover critically important facets of a complicated issue.

Finally, one must address the possibility that the data being used to ascertain military capabilities or developments may be flawed, incorrect, or completely untrue. As David Shambaugh wrote in 2000:

“Data is the lifeblood of all research. Without an adequate empirical data base, analysts – be they scholars, journalists, or intelligence analysts – have no alternative but to fall back on inference, subjectivity, hunches, and even ideologically-driven and politically-motivated approaches. Without hard data, the field of China military studies would quickly be prone to these less-than-empirical methods.”[22]

Unfortunately there tends to be an insistence by many scholars to use some sources of information without scrutinizing the data or by treating the information provided as being factual or a given.

An excellent example of a source that may require a greater degree of scrutiny would be IISS’s The Military Balance series that provides the quantitative strengths of the world’s military powers, and is used in nearly every study of the military strengths of China (and Taiwan).[23] Throughout much of the 1980s and 1990s The Military Balance carried a disclaimer or warning that stated, among other things, that

“Inevitably, over the course of time it has become apparent that some information presented in earlier versions was erroneous, or insufficiently supported by reliable evidence. Hence, it is not always possible to construct valid time-series comparisons from information given in successive editions…”[24]

As this document goes into very little detail concerning its sources and methods, or quite frankly, who is responsible for the individual sections of the book from year to year, it is difficult to assess the validity and accuracy of the publication. While tracking military procurement in many Western countries is straightforward and transparent, one wonders how data on closed societies can be gathered with the degree of precision that The Military Balance attempts to present.

However IISS gathers and determines the figures presented in its annual publication, the Military Balance has presented a number of, well, numbers, that have proven to be inaccurate. For instance, Military Balance listed “the North Korean Army with twenty divisions in its 1978 edition, but thirty-five the next year.”[25] More recently, Military Balance has consistently given ““high-side” counts for the PRC and tends to be very credulous about rumors and muddled news reports. Moreover, it frequently reports systems still under development as already being operational.”[26]

The other authoritative source, publications from Jane’s Information Group suffer from the same problems though to a lesser extent. Jencks argues that Jane’s has a tendency “to accept rumors and muddled news reports, and to repeat last year’s listings in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary.”[27] Much of this could be due to the fact that Jane’s is now publishing hundreds of titles every year, not including individual magazines, and the burden of data management may becoming more difficult than its relatively small staff and loose conglomeration of free-lance writers and consultants can handle.

This does not mean that these sources should be ignored or not consulted, but that rather, one should be aware of the potential problems that these resources have and reflect that in one’s writing. The collected work of Anthony Cordesman and his staff at the Center for Strategic and International Studies attempts to take data from the Military Balance and “correct it” so that it might more accurately reflect the information available in open-sources as well as information that might be gathered from sources within the government.

Additionally, information gathered from human sources should be treated with care, as the information imparted could be quite accurate, not completely accurate, inaccurate or outright fantasy. One is not questioning the importance of human sources, but rather, one wishes to emphasize that information gathered may not be as firm as a source alleges.

Furthermore, greater efforts should be made by scholars and analysts to highlight the probability of the information or estimates that are provided. Equipment numbers should not be treated as absolute, especially since there is no clear way to verify the claims or statistics provided by some resources. Additionally, speculation and rumor abound in the realm of military studies and it is important to treat bits of intelligence with the degree of probabability that they deserve.

For instance, news reports and “strategic forecasts” that make predictions or claims regarding Chinese military activities and intentions but are not supported by or confirmed in other information sources or are subsequently disproven, should be a signal to analysts and scholars that some information sources should be treated carefully and individual pieces of information should be evaluated according to their probability.[28]

By using “words of probability” and labeling certain numbers, analysis, or estimates on a scale of probability the degree of precision involved may improve markedly.[29] Contradicting data can be more easily weighed against each other as can the likelihood of the success of potential military operations.

Information should be evaluated, based on the likelihood of accuracy, and steps should be taken to verify pieces of information, especially those that are leaked by intelligence organizations, as this information may not be as credible as advertised. Analysts and scholars should scrutinize data sources, especially, those considered reliable, such as government documents, publications and intelligence estimates, as the potential for institutional bias is significant. One is reminded that a reason why so much effort was expended on determining the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War was because some analysts and scholars took issue with the estimates that were released or advocated by political officials and governmental agencies. The yearly Department of Defense publication, Soviet Military Power, that were released during the 1980s were considered to be highly suspect as information was often contradictory or subject to miscounts.

What is required to resolve these issues is greater attention to details previously ignored or not researched. One of the biggest question marks within military studies, not just regarding China and Taiwan, but in general, concerns military facilities. While most scholars are able to name some of the important airfields on either side of the Taiwan Strait as well as major ports, naval bases, and missile garrisons, few can actually describe what these facilities or locations look like.[30]

This might seem to be a generally minor issue that may not warrant the consideration of some scholars or analysts. After all, why would one care what a facility looks like so long as the facility exists and some basic facts are known, as in for an airfield how long is its runway, and for a port what kind of ships or vessels are at that location. Such views may be understandable but they unfortunately tend to be misguided.

Facilities are important not only for their location but for their lay-out, the order-of-battle present, and the type of structures or accommodations that the facility may offer. For instance, aircraft at an airfield would be particularly vulnerable to an attack from enemy cruise missiles or submunitions if the airfield had an inadequate number of revetments[31] or hardened structures that would help protect aircraft. All of these details play an integral role in the military assessments of militaries and intelligence organizations because they are critical to determining the strengths and weaknesses of a country’s military.

Another example can be found in the various references to Taiwan’s efforts to harden its own airbases. There seems to be a considerable degree of confusion regarding how extensive Taiwan’s efforts have been to protect its aircraft by hardening shelters and creating additional revetments. O’Hanlon argues in 1999 that “…Taiwan already has hardened shelters for many of its fighters and should be able to provide 60 percent of them with protection against anything but laser-guided bombs…”[32] But, another analyst stated in 2001 that most of Taiwan’s airbases are unhardened and vulnerable to air strikes with the exception of Chia-shan and Taitung airbases which have some portion of their operations staged from within a mountain.[33] Relatedly, scholars have yet to ask, let alone answer, if the aircraft at these airfields must taxi to and from the mountain hangars to their runways or whether aircraft can take off directly from inside the runway, thus minimizing their exposure to air strikes. The inability to determine with any degree of certainty the vulnerability of Taiwanese air bases prevents analysts and scholars from stating with any degree of confidence how Taiwan’s air force might fare during the first hours of the war.

Additionally, while there has been a concerted effort to understand the organization, force structure and order-of-battle of the People’s Liberation Army, there has been little effort to compile the information into a format that is easily accessible and updatable. This results in a significant lag from the time that changes in the PLA are identified till the time that they are written about or discussed in journal and academic forums. Only by creating a “living, breathing” resource, such as a comprehensive website, can information be analyzed and diffused in a timely manner.

While many scholars and analysts scoff at bean-counting exercises one must conclude that the current state-of-affairs in which analysis on China’s military situation is taking place is inadequate to the task at hand and will significantly increase the chances that assessments will lack realism and accuracy. By endeavoring to create a baseline of information, similar to the files and estimates available to the various intelligence agencies and militaries can scholars and analysts begin to fully understand the dynamics of China’s military environment.

Taking Advantage of Additional Resources

A greater granularity of detail requires new data resources. The end of the Cold War, the dramatic improvements in the dispersion of information, and the ability of commercial entities to take advantage of recently available technologies presents a number of opportunities for scholars and analysts.

It has been only within the last decade, or in some cases the last few years, that the United States government has decided to declassify sensitive intelligence reports, satellite imagery, and aerial photography that had been used to develop estimates and reports upon which the basis of American foreign policy and defense strategy had been based. The quantity and quality of the information released has been quite significant and instrumental to the study of the Chinese military.

Photographic interpretation reports describe the physical characteristics of naval bases and airfields, providing geographic coordinates, place names, and maps that leave little to imagination and may allow analysts to better understand the importance of a facility within the overall structure of China’s military. Strengths and weaknesses of the locations may be identified, including the presence of a dry dock at a naval base or the lack of sufficient hardening at an airfield.

Geographic Intelligence Memorandums allow scholars and analysts to catch a glimpse of the operational difficulties that the US intelligence community believes might play a role in an invasion of Taiwan or the other offshore islands. These documents, though at times heavily sanitized, go into significant detail concerning weather and climate trends, terrain considerations, road and airfield characteristics, and possible landing areas that might be used by an invading force.[34]

While many of these reports tend to be rather old, sometimes as much as forty years, the information that is contained within them are still important in identifying the locations of still possibly active facilities and in understanding some of the dynamics involved in China’s security environment. For analysts intent on developing “advanced bean-counts” that describe not only the organizational and doctrinal issues within the PLA but also create a baseline of information on all aspects of China’s military, the use of declassified material is critical as it minimizes the amount of leg work necessary to pursue such studies.

Unfortunately, with few exceptions, scholars and analysts have for the most part left this source of primary documentation and raw intelligence alone.[35] It is possible that some might perceive this information to be of little relevance to current affairs and be of more use in historical surveys which is understandable. However, it makes little sense to forego valuable sources of information that add rather than subtract to the understanding of China’s capabilities.

What is equally puzzling is the apparent failure by the community to take advantage of new technical means that allow Chinese facilities to be identified, analyzed and interpreted. Satellite imagery has been used by the United States since the 1950s to detect and monitor Soviet nuclear weapons developments and military deployments from space without having to risk additional confrontations with the Soviet Union by using U-2 overflights.[36]

Satellite imagery would be useful for analysts and scholars for the same reason that imagery was useful for the government. Satellite imagery allows scholars and analysts to have access to “denied areas to obtain invaluable information where authoritarian regimes, or internal conflicts substantially limit the amount of information available to the outside world.”[37] Furthermore, imagery analysis of “ground force installations provides a productive and reliable means of assessing the order-of-battle factors and military capabilities of a specific installation.”[38]

Commercial satellite imagery has been available for some time, though at resolutions that made interpretation difficult.[39] With the launch of the IKONOS high-resolution satellite by Space Imaging, Inc in 1999 and the availability of roughly 1-meter imagery, analysts and academics were for the first time given access, for a price, to materials that previously had only been available to governments and intelligence organizations.

In May 2000 the Federation of American Scientists in conjunction with the Center for Defense Information released a study that evaluated a portion of the Chinese airfields within range of Taiwan.[40] The study concluded that while China had sufficient ramp space and bed-down for additional aircraft and their crews, there were no indications that China had initiated a major modernization effort to improve the airfields by increasing runway lengths or constructing hardened hangars. Though this study took place nearly three years ago, recent footnotes discussing the People’s Liberation Army Air Force modernization efforts or the threat that it may pose to Taiwan have not referenced these studies.

On a related matter, satellite imagery has been used to monitor Chinese actions in the Spratly Island area.[41] While Gupta and Bernstein did not use imagery with the resolution of IKONOS, they were able to conclude that “a combination of aerial and satellite imaging can provide timely, substantive information on ships, structures, and activities in the South China Sea.”[42] By using open and commercial sources to monitor construction and operational activities Gupta and Bernstein demonstrated that academics and experts could track issues with a degree of specificity that had previously only been available to governments. Furthermore, Gupta and Bernstein concluded that “declassified and commercial satellite imagery have not been used on a sustained, systematic basis to monitor the principal conflict areas in the South China Sea…” and one would add that there has been a similar drought of monitoring efforts in other parts of East Asia.[43]

It is important to note, however, that the availability of satellite imagery of a specific facility may raise as many questions as it answers. For instance, multiple images of facilities over regular time intervals would be necessary to monitor developments and to determine operational tempo. Additionally, two different imagery analysts may interpret the same image in different ways, depending on their relative experience. The process of analyzing imagery is a technically difficult one that requires proficiency with certain software applications and training in photo interpretation, all of these barriers may make it difficult for scholars to begin exploiting satellite imagery on their own. Yet these difficulties would not prevent scholars or analysts from referring to the imagery or consulting with other experts on the implications of certain images.

Furthermore, access to high-resolution imagery is not free, and can tend to be rather expensive, selling for as little as $500 or as much as $6,500 depending on the vendor and whether the image is brand new or available in the archive.[44]

At the very least, the availability of commercial satellite imagery and their searchable archives allows one to identify what areas of China or Taiwan are of interest to intelligence agencies and foreign governments. Very few people are interested in imagery of locations such as Jiuquan, also known as Base 20 where China launches satellites, rockets for its space program, and other missile systems. But governments (who are the major customers for these companies), specifically their intelligence agencies and militaries are interested in those locations. By monitoring the number of “collects” or new images that are purchased of a particular area, analysts might be able to determine how much coverage intelligence organizations are interested in acquiring of a certain location. Furthermore, a tight coupling of collects out in the middle of nowhere (but in the general area one believes a certain facility is located) might be a strong indication of where that facility is located as other customers with greater technical means (a government) might have a better idea as to the facilities actual location and decided to purchase an image.

Conclusion

Contemporary PLA studies, while generally strong with regards to doctrine, force organization, and to general equipment numbers, face serious information deficits that prevent accurate or comprehensive analysis. The over reliance on traditional sources of information at the expense of exploring new realms of primary documentation and methods of acquiring data prevent the community from realizing its true potential.

Though some studies are particularly important, such as The People’s Liberation Army as Organization: Reference Volume v1.0, the inability to integrate this information into a broader, more comprehensive presentation, while continuing to use potentially flawed datasets and ignoring new and empirical sources of information will create barriers to accurate analysis.

One potential method of addressing this issue would for some analysts to pursue a net assessment approach similar to the studies that are undertaken by the Department of Defense that would be based on all available sources and methods. These assessments would consist of detailed information on order-of-battle, force location, missions, and capabilities. While a bean-counting approach is often derided as a poor method of assessing the military situation, these criticisms often ignore the fact that these studies are still vital to understanding the military problems involved. Excluding areas of study prevent analysts from identifying crucial factors that may not have been thought to play an important role in broader affairs.

This is not to say that the undertaking would be easy or always accurate. The accumulation of data is often fraught with uncertainties as information can be ambiguous or false, but this is a risk that one takes in any forum including the government. Adopting a research as intelligence gathering approach, and clearly specifying probabilities, may minimize the impact of uncertainties and allow analysts and scholars to quantify capabilities and risks.

Often experts and pundits are more interested in acquiring data to prove their point. This is an unfortunate practice that does not generally increase the overall understanding of the issues involved. By refocusing efforts so that the answer is more important than the answers implication, better, more accurate and comprehensive assessments can be made.

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[1] The best examples of such a school of thought can be found in Richard Bernstein & Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred A. Knopf; 1997) and Steven W. Mosher, Hegemon: China’s Plan to Dominate Asia and the World (San Francisco: Encounter; 2000).

[2] See Andrew J. Nathan and Robert S. Ross, The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security (New York: W.W. Norton; 1997)

[3] There are some notable exceptions to this argument such as The People’s Liberation Army as Organization: Reference Volume v1.0 edited by James C. Mulvenon & Andrew N.D. Young, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), You Ji’s The Armed Forces of China, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1999), Bernard D. Cole’s The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001) and the collected works of Kenneth W. Allen who generally focuses on the People’s Liberation Army Air Force.

The balance of these studies do, however, tend to focus on the organizational structure and doctrine of the PLA with some attention paid to equipment and force deployment. This is not to say that there are not other equally important sources available but, rather, that these are illustrative of the breath and depth that should be sought for.

[4] Examples of this tendency can be found in a number of articles on the subject of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan but of particular note are Bates Gill and Michael O’Hanlon. “China’s Hollow Military” The National Interest (Summer 1999): pp. 55-62, James Lilley and Carl Ford, “China’s Military: A Second Opinion,” The National Interest, (Fall 1999): pp. 71-77, and Michael O’Hanlon, “Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan,” International Security (Fall 2000): pp. 51-86.

[5] John M. Collins, U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities 1960-1980, (No City Listed: McGraw-Hill, 1980): p. 9.

[6] David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002): p. 325. [Total number inserted] Shambaugh arrives at the 1.25 million number by calculating that a force making an amphibious landing would need a 5:1 numerical advantage over the defender to be successful.

[7] U.S. Transportation Department. Bureau of Transportation Statistics. Maritime Trade & Transportation 99. (Washington D.C.: 1999): p. 33: China is listed as a distant third in the total number of shipbuilding contracts with roughly 5 percent of the total share in 1997. The idea that China could successfully stage an amphibious assault using civilian cargo and passenger ships is argued rather persuasively in Piers M. Wood and Charles D. Ferguson, “How China Might Invade Taiwan,” Naval War College Review, (Autumn 2001): p. 61. Wood and Ferguson argue that the naval amphibious ships and landing craft would be used to transport the purely military equipment such as tanks and artillery pieces while the merchant fleet, which consists of some 1,764 ships (according to the Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 2002, available on the World Wide Web: [accessed on April 1, 2003)]) which could be used to transport roughly 2 million troops (if one assumes that 82 percent of the shipping were used and one were to conservatively calculate that 100 troops could be carried per thousand deadweight tons, of which there is a total of 20.3 million tons available).

Bernard Cole, however, points out that merchant vessels, historically, have had a very poor record when used by a nation’s military to support military priorities. While this argument is generally true, it assumes the organization of a merchant marine and using those forces for logistical aims rather than in direct support of an invasion, which took place during the Falklands. See Cole, p. 235.

[8] O’Hanlon, p. 62.

[9] Gill and O’Hanlon, p. 58.

[10] It is important to note that China’s experience in waging amphibious assaults has not been successful. While China has not attempted to undertake such a complicated operation in recent years, in 1949 the People’s Liberation Army tried to capture Dengbu and Quemoy Islands but was forced to withdraw its forces after having suffering 1,490 and 9,000 casualties, respectively, and being unable to prevent the Taiwanese from reinforcing the garrison on the island. While the PLA has had over 50 years to rethink such campaigns and to build their forces so too have the Taiwanese, see Felix K. Chang, “Conventional War Across the Taiwan Strait,” Orbis, (Fall 1996): ONLINE: EBSCOHOST [Accessed on April 1, 2003].

[11] Bernstein and Munro, p. 74.

[12] Andrew N.D Yang and Col. Milton Wen-Chung Liao (Ret.), “PLA Rapid Reaction Forces: Concept, Training, and Preliminary Assessment” The People’s Liberation Army in the Information Age James Mulvenon and Richard Yang eds, (Santa Monica: RAND; 1999): pp. 48-51.

[13] June Teufel Dreyer. “Flashpoint in the Taiwan Strait,” Orbis, (Fall 2000): ONLINE: EBSCOHOST [Accessed on April 1, 2003].

[14] Dreyer did not specify exactly where she may have gotten her 130 plane figure, though she does site an Associated Press story in the Strait Times, repeated attempts to locate this article came up empty. One might assume that the IISS Military Balance 2000/2001 was used which identifies 128 IDFs (which meant someone may have rounded up). As it is certainly possible that this was the case, the numbers for the F-5s, F-16s, and Mirage-2000s were also taken from The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2000/2001 (London: Oxford University Press, 2000): p. 215.

[15] This series consists of the Gill and O’Hanlon and the Lilley and Ford pieces.

[16] This does not mean that all intelligence analysis is unbiased or objective, but that rather, that is the intent or standard by which intelligence agencies aim for.

[17] By published studies one is referring to articles and scholarly pieces that appear in print or electronic publications. This does not include the war games and simulations that are run by the various military organizations, such as those run at the Naval War College, governmental agencies, or non-governmental groups such as RAND, as those activities are generally closed to the public and are confidential or classified.

[18] There is one notable exception, see David A. Shlapak, David T. Orletsky, and Barry A. Wilson, Dire Strait? Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Confrontation and Options for U.S. Policy, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000). Shlapak et al use sophisticated models and tools, including a computer simulation, to war game an invasion scenario. Their scenario, though set in 2005, is based on best-available information concerning order-of-battle and force locations to increase the accuracy of the scenario.

[19] Shambaugh, p. 325.

[20] Contrary to Shambaugh’s contention, there are some areas along the western coastline that are free of mudflats and other obstacles “…that offers open terrain suitable for the build-up of a beach-head and subsequent operations to the north and south.” See Federation of American Scientists, “Taiwan Geography”: [Created prior to November 2000, last accessed on May 1, 2003]

[21] This is of course assuming that these concepts can even be identified as the People’s Liberation Army is not known for its openness and does not in any way approach the transparency that the United States military has achieved, regardless if such transparency was intentional or not.

[22] David Shambaugh, “PLA Strategy & Doctrine: Recommendations for a Future Research Agenda” conference paper for “Chinese Military Studies: A conference on the State of the Field,” US National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies’ Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, Fort McNair, October 26-27, 2000: [last accessed on April 2, 2003]

[23] The author is fully aware that he has used this source to describe the strength of Taiwan’s air force, but this was done to try to explain where another author may have found her numbers and to demonstrate what information was lacking from her analysis.

[24] IISS, The Military Balance 1995/1996 (London: Oxford University Press. 1995): p. 11. The 1990/1991 edition holds the same disclaimer or warning on page 10. It is not clear when IISS discontinued this practice but the three most recent editions do not contain any sort of disclaimer.

[25] Eliot A. Cohen, “Toward Better Net Assessment,” International Security, (Summer 1988): p. 58-59. Cohen goes on to describe various other examples of how some information within The Military Balance has turned out to be questionable including the assigning of two different numbers for the total amount of T-80s within the Soviet military. See Cohen, p. 58, 59 notes 24 and 26.

[26] Harlan W. Jencks, “Wild Speculations on the Military Balance in the Taiwan Strait,” in Crisis in the Taiwan Strait, James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs, eds., (Washington D.C.” National Defense University Press; 1997): p. 139. Jencks also describes how the Military Balance listed China has having three Xia class SSBNs throughout much of the 1980s and claiming that significant numbers of conventional submarines and missile boats were operational when in fact they were not. See Jencks, p. 139-140.

[27] Ibid, p. 140.

[28] One specifically is referring to the collected works of Bill Gertz at The Washington Times and the occasional forecasts or predictions made by organizations such as Strategic Forecasts, Inc. (). Much of this information is said to be based on leaks from intelligence organizations or are derived by some unknown method of analysis or information. Unfortunately, there is a disturbing inability to verify some of the information provided, and while it is true that some of the reports provided by these entities may be true, there is also a tendency for some of this information to be fallacious as well. For instance, Bill Gertz is famous for his reporting of leaked information from unnamed intelligence officials, but there is often no way to verify the information that is published, and as there has yet to be a retraction issued by the Washington Times for stories that have been incorrect, it is difficult to ascertain the credibility of the news source.

[29] Sherman Kent, “Words of Estimative Probability,” Studies in Intelligence, (Fall 1964): pp. 49-65. Mr. Kent argues that estimates and information should set forth the community’s, or the scholar’s, findings “…in such a way as to make clear to the reader what is certain knowledge and what is reasoned judgment, and within this large realm of judgment what varying degrees of certitude lie behind each key statement.” Kent, p. 50. For example, Kent argues that certain words should be associated with certain odds; 100% is a certainty, 93% +/- 6% is almost certain, 75% +/- 12% is probable, 50% +/- 10% is chances are about even, 30% +/- 10% is probably not, 7% +/- 5% is almost certainly not, and 0% is and impossibility.

[30] One possible exception to this rule would be those scholars or analysts that are former defense attaches that were stationed in China or who were intelligence analysts with access to sensitive information. As a rule however, none of these scholars spend much time writing about the layout or capabilities of individual facilities.

[31] Revetments are identified as a type of defensive structure that protects parked aircraft from lateral blast damage. A revetment is generally an earthen wall placed around the parking pad.

[32] O’Hanlon, p. 60. This analysis was apparently based on personnel communications with Shuhfan Ding, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei in 2000, though O’Hanlon concedes that he was unable to determine the schedule of additional upgrades to facilities.

[33] James H. Hughes, “The People’s Republic of China Confronts Taiwan,” The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies, (Summer 2001): p. 407. For descriptions of these facilities see “Taitung Air Base / Chihhang Air Base” [last updated on August 08, 2002; last accessed on April 15, 2003] and “Cha Shan Air Base” [last updated on August 08, 2002; last accessed on April 15, 2003], David Shambaugh also appears to confirm the existence of these facilities (as do many other sources) though he lists the two airfields as being located in Hualian and Jiayi, and while Hualian has been identified as the Cha Shan facility, the air base of Jiayi has not been previously identified as having a mountain facility; see David Shambaugh, “A Matter of Time: Taiwan’s Eroding Military Advantage,” The Washington Quarterly, (Spring 2000): p. 121.

[34] Central Intelligence Agency. Office of Current Intelligence. The Chinese Offshore Islands, CIA No. 50318 (September 8, 2003) approved for release on September 8, 1999: CIA-RDP80R01443R000300040003-3, and Central Intelligence Agency. Office of Research and Reports. The Offshore Islands, CIA/RR-GM-10 (October 8, 1958) approved for release on May 31, 2000: CIA-RDP83-00825R000100420001-9.

[35] The body of work presented by the National Security Archive, has however sought to acquire and exploit declassified materials, generally documentation whereas the Public Eye project, formerly at the Federation of American Scientists and currently at has focused primarily on declassified satellite and aerial imagery.

[36] For an excellent analysis of the use of satellite imagery see David T. Lindgren, Trust But Verify: Imagery Analysis in the Cold War, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000), Jeffrey T. Richelson, America’s Secret Eyes in Space: The U.S. Keyhole Spy Satellite Program, (New York: Harper & Row, 1990), and Dwayne A. Day, John M. Logsdon, and Brian Latell eds, Eye in the Sky: The Story of the Corona Spy Satellites, (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998).

[37] John C. Baker, Ray A Williamson, and Kevin M. O’Connell, “Introduction,” ,” in Commercial Observation Satellites: A the Leading Edge of Global Transparency, John C. Baker, Kevin M. O’Connell, Ray A. Williamson, eds., (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001): p. 7.

[38] Donald Vance and William Bumbera, “Imagery Analysis and Installations of Ground Forces” in Commercial Observation Satellites and International Security, Michael Krepon, Peter D. Zimmerman, Leonard S. Spector and Mary Umberger eds., (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990): p. 210.

[39] Resolution is defined by the Department of Defense as being “A measurement of the smallest detail which can by a sensor system under specific conditions.” United States Defense Department. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms: Joint Publication 1-02, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 23 March 1994): p. 325. The greater the resolution the more that can be identified. A 1-meter image from the IKONOS satellite, while better than previous products, is of lesser quality than the new .6 meter Quickbird satellite owned by DigitalGlobe. The National Imagery Interpretability Rating Scale, or NIIRS, is used by image analysts to rate the quality and interpretability of the imagery in question. For instance, NIIRS 1, 9 meters, allows analysts to detect the presence, but is unable to identify the type, or larger aircraft at an airfield, while NIIRS 5, between .75 and 1.2 meters allows analysts to identify command and control headquarters, perform technical analysis of airfield facilities. United States Department of the Army, Imagery Intelligence TC 34-55, (Washington D.C., 1988): pp. I-1-4

[40] This study had until late 2002 been available on the Federation of American Scientists website but is currently offline. Its address was located at FAS’ China Special Weapons Guide on their facility listings . Archived editions of the study can be attained through .

[41] See Vipin Gupta and Adam Bernstein, “Keeping an Eye on the Islands: Cooperative Remote Monitoring in the South China Sea,” in Commercial Observation Satellites: A the Leading Edge of Global Transparency, John C. Baker, Kevin M. O’Connell, Ray A. Williamson, eds., (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001): pp. 327-360.

[42] Ibid, p. 357.

[43] There has been some attention paid to China’s fissile material production capability through the use of satellite imagery. See Hui Zhang and Frank von Hippel, “Building Confidence in a Fissile Material Production Moratorium Using Commercial Satellite Imagery,” Disarmament Forum (No. 3, 2000): pp. 71-77, and Hui Zhang, “Uses of Commercial Satellite Imagery in FMCT Verification,” The Nonproliferation Review (Summer 2000): pp. 120-135.

[44] Space Imaging and DigitalGlobe do provide free access to their archives where users can view browse images of significantly poorer resolution then if one were to make a purchase. And while the browse imagery available from DigitalGlobe is practically useless (because it has a 30-meter resolution), the Space Imaging browse is of significantly greater quality (10-meter resolution) allowing some analysis of the location to take place.

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