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PTAB JudgesJuly 2020R o s s G u b e r m a n______________________________________________President, Legal Writing ProROSS GUBERMAN is the president of Legal Writing Pro LLC and the founder of BriefCatch LLC. From Alaska and Hawaii to Paris and Hong Kong, Ross has conducted thousands of workshops on three continents for prominent law firms, judges, agencies, corporations, and associations. His workshops are among the highest rated in the world of legal education.Ross holds degrees from Yale, the Sorbonne, and the University of Chicago Law School.Ross’s Point Made: How to Write Like the Nation’s Top Advocates is an Amazon bestseller that reviewers have praised as a “tour de force” and “a must for the library of veteran litigators.” Ross also wrote Point Taken: How to Write Like the World’s Best Judges, which Court Review called “the best book . . . by far . . . about judicial writing.” He coauthored Deal Struck: The World’s Best Drafting Tips with Gary Karl and created the online contract editor ContractCatch.Ross’s newest product, BriefCatch, is a first-of-its-kind editing add-in. Its devoted users include lawyers, law firms, judges, courts, agencies, and corporations around the world. BriefCatch was named one of TechnoLawyer’s Top 10 Products of 2019.An active member of the bar and a former attorney at a top law firm, Ross has also worked as a translator, professional musician, and award-winning journalist. Slate called his investigative reporting about Fannie Mae “totally brilliant and prescient,” and Pulitzer Prize–winner Gretchen Morgenson wrote that his article “made even the most jaded Washingtonian take note.”For nearly a decade, Ross has been invited to train all new federal judges on opinion writing. He has presented at many other judicial conferences and for the Association for Training and Development, the Professional Development Consortium, the Appellate Judges Education Institute, and the Corporate Counsel Summit, among others. Ross is a founding “Trusted Adviser” for the Professional Development Consortium and consults for Caren Stacy’s OnRamp Fellowship. He is often quoted in such publications as the New York Times and American Lawyer.Ross won the Legal Writing Institute’s 2016 Golden Pen award for making “an extraordinary contribution to the cause of good legal writing.” He was also honored as one of the 2016 Fastcase 50 for legal innovators, and his feed is on the ABA’s Best Law Twitter list. A Minnesota native, Ross lives with his wife and two children outside Washington, DC. Family travel has taken them everywhere from Argentina and Bhutan to Greenland and Zambia.Feel-Good Warm-UpsPlaintiff ROBERT S. TRUMP seeks a preliminary injunction against defendants MARY L. TRUMP and SIMON & SCHUSTER, INC. (S&S) premised upon the terms set forth in the aforesaid Agreement.Simultaneously, ROBERT S. TRUMP filed an Order to Show Cause (OSC) seeking a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction (PI) wherein the Court set forth a return date of July 10, 2020.In addition, plaintiff alleges that the relationship between S&S and MARY L. TRUMP is distinguishable from a journalist and its source, as they have more than an arm’s length relationship, and both fare to gain a lucrative benefit from this publication, therefore it is a collaborative effort to evade the terms of the Agreement. From Raw to Refined: Structure, Speed, and StyleFive StepsBased on a Paul Clement memo for Clearview.Step One: Raw MaterialStep Two: Logical MovesWhich four points should start the paragraphs and in what order?___Fourth Amendment inquiry starts with whether an individual has an “expectation of privacy” that “society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”___Problem: Carpenter does limit these uses when subject’s physical location is implicated.___When a user uploads an image for matching, Clearview compares that image against images from publicly available sources (social media, news media, employment networking sites).___The specific concerns in Carpenter and related cases do not apply to Clearview.___Law enforcement agencies’ use of Clearview as intended does not trigger Fourth Amendment protections.Step Three: Authorities in ServiceWhat to quote from Smith?(1)The starting point for any Fourth Amendment inquiry is whether an individual has an “expectation of privacy” that “society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.”CarpenterSmithMiller(2)Law enforcement agencies’ use of Clearview as intended does not trigger Fourth Amendment protections.Clearview factsSmithIndividuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in images or other information that they (or others) have voluntarily turn[ed] over to third parties like social media sites or directly transmitted into the public sphere. Smith, 442 U.S. at 734-44.BurkeMeregildoBowery(3)Carpenter did limit these uses when a subject’s physical location is implicated.CarpenterCell-phone info tracker(4)The specific concerns in Carpenter and related cases do not apply to Clearview.Tech differences cell phone location vs. ClearviewStep Four: ConcisenessEdit the boldface language for conciseness, readability, and punch.Pursuant to these principles, law enforcement agencies’ use of Clearview as intended does not, in our view, “trigger Fourth Amendment protections.” In instances in which a user uploads an image for matching, Clearview compares such image against publicly available images from publicly available internet sources—namely, social media, news media, employment networking sites, etc. Individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to images or additional information that they (or others) have . . . .The Fourth Amendment would not be implicated by using a Google search in order to obtain information made available on the internet.. . .when the government obtains cell phone records demonstrating an individual’s physical location, notwithstanding the fact that the location information was . . . . That the technology (and records capturing that technology) formed the basis of an “exhaustive chronicle” of a person’s “physical movements” was particularly troubling to the Court. The Court made much of the fact that the cell phone location information both was incidentally generated. . . . the images against which it compares a user-generated image are made publicly available to a range of third parties by voluntary acts as opposed to the incidental operation of a device utilized for other purposes . . . .Step Five: Transitions___But___Indeed___Just as___so too___That remains true ___To be sure___To the contraryA person “has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979). ___________ “even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose.”Individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in images or other information that they (or others) have ”voluntarily turn[ed] over to third parties” like social media sites or directly transmitted into the public sphere. Smith, 442 U.S. at 734-44; see also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (no Fourth Amendment interest in trash placed at a curb for pickup; individuals had put out garbage “for the express purpose of conveying it to a third party” and for, “in a manner of speaking ... public consumption”). That remains true even if an individual uploaded an image for a “limited purpose” (for example, a job networking site). Miller, 425 U.S. at 443. _________ the Fourth Amendment would not be implicated by using a Google search to obtain information made available on the internet, _________ is the Fourth Amendment not implicated by using Clearview to do the same. ________, the Supreme Court observed in Carpenter that “[a] person does not surrender all Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere.” 138 S. Ct. at 2217. The Court held in that case that . . . . _______ Carpenter was a “narrow” decision that focused on one particular set of circumstances—obtaining cell phone records that provide a “ comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past movements.” None of these concerns is implicated in the case of Clearview: it does not track a person’s “ physical movements”; the images against which it compares a user-generated image are made publicly available to a range of third parties by voluntary acts rather than the incidental operation of a device used for other purposes. _______, the Court expressly stated in Carpenter that it was not “call[ing] into question conventional surveillance techniques and tools . . . . _________, the fact that four Justices did not think there was a Fourth Amendment problem in Carpenter goes a long way to underscoring the absence of . . . .Structure ModelThe PTO Has Not Adopted a Rule or Regulation Governing the Burden of Persuasion on the Patentability of Proposed Amended ClaimsWe use the same interpretive rules to construe regu- lations as we do statutes; we consider the plain language of the regulation, the common meaning of the terms, and the text of the regulation both as a whole and in the context of its surrounding sections. Tesoro Haw. Corp. v. United States, 405 F.3d 1339, 1346–47 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Lockheed Corp. v. Widnall, 113 F.3d 1225, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Lengerich v. Dep’t of the Interior, 454 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006). If the regulatory language is clear and unambiguous, no further inquiry is usually required. Roberto v. Dep’t of the Navy, 440 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2006). But “[d]eference is undoubtedly inappropriate, for example, when the agency’s interpretation is ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’” Christo- pher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155(2012) (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 461).Neither Rule 42.20 nor Rule 42.121 addresses the burdens of proof or persuasion with respect to propositions of unpatentability once an amended claim has been entered into the IPR. Rule 42.20 is a general provision establishing procedures for motion practice in IPRs. As noted previously, when the patent owner files a motion to amend claims during an IPR, the patent owner’s “re- quested relief” under Rule 42.20 is the Board’s permission to enter a reasonable number of substitute claims into the IPR. That is the “motion” practice contemplated and, indeed, spelled out in § 316(d). To the extent Rule 42.20(c) imposes a burden on the patent owner as the “movant,” it is a burden to show that the amendments do “not enlarge the scope of the claims of the patent or introduce new matter” as required by 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(3), not a burden to prove the overall patentability of the amended claim. Likewise, Rule 42.121(a)(2)(i) merely requires the pa- tent owner to show that its proposed amendment is responsive to at least one ground of unpatentability at issue in the IPR.9 In connection with its promulgation, the PTO explained to the public that this requirement was merely to ensure that the proposed amendment had a minimal level of relevancy to the IPR. Changes to Imple- ment IPRs, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,705. The PTO said that this procedural rule was intended to streamline IPRs, not to create a substantive requirement that the patent owner bear the burden of persuasion on the patentability of an amended claim:As the PTO explained, [Rule 42.121(a)(2)(i)] is meant to “enhance efficiency of review proceed- ings [A]ny amendment that does not respondto a ground of unpatentability most likely would cause delay, increase the complexity of the review, and place additional burdens on the petitioner and the Board.”Proxyconn, 789 F.3d at 1308 (second alteration in original) (quoting Changes to Implement IPRs, 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,705). Like Rule 42.20, Rule 42.121 does not address the underlying issue of where the burden of persuasionWe do not read these regulations, separately or together, to say that the patent owner must bear the burden of proving the patentability of amended claims or to require satisfaction of that burden on the face of the motion to amend. These regulatory requirements simply do not address the ultimate relief sought by the petitioner in the IPR: a determination of unpatentability, leading to the cancellation of challenged patent claims—as originally issued or amended—after a final written decision. They address preconditions to entry of the amended claims into the IPR. Auer deference does not permit the PTO to write words into a regulation, or to interpret a regulation in ways that are not supported by the very language employed in the regulations. See, e.g., Christopher, 567 U.S. at 155 (Auer “[d]eference is undoubtedly inappropriate, for example, when the agency’s interpretation is ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’” (quoting Auer, 519 U.S. at 461)).More fundamentally, the PTO’s contention that its regulations actually address and interpret the scope of§ 316(d) and § 316(e) finds no support in the language of, or commentary relating to the adoption of, those regulations. Other than language parroting the basic requirements of § 316(d)(3), there is no other reference to either statutory section, no reference to proving propositions of patentability or unpatentability, and no mention of the words “burden of persuasion.” And, there is no place in the regulations or relevant commentary where reference to an ambiguity or statutory silence in either § 316(d) or § 316(e) is claimed, explored, or mentioned. Chevron does not apply where an agency has not actually addressed the issue it purports to be within its discretion to address. See, e.g., Encino, 136 S. Ct. at 2127 (holding Chevron deference is not warranted where the agency “did not analyze or explain why the statute should be interpreted” in a particular manner).Auer cannot be invoked to substitute for an agency’s failure to analyze the relevant statutory provisions in the first instance. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (“Simply put, the existence of a parroting regulation does not change the fact that the question here is not the meaning of the regulation but the meaning of the statute. An agency does not acquire special authority to interpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise and experience to formulate a regulation, it has elected merely to paraphrase the statutory language.”). Of course, “if Congress has directly spoken to an issue then any agency interpretation contradicting what Congress has said would be unreasonable.” Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218 n.4 (2009).The PTO’s decisions in Idle Free and MasterImage do not alter our conclusion that the PTO’s regulations do not speak to either § 316(e) or the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding patentability.First, the Idle Free decision is not entitled to deference. It has been designated as an “interpretive” nonbinding discussion not approved by the Director, and later redesignated as a “representative” non-binding discussion. Such musings are not sufficient to command Chevron or Auer deference of any sort. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (collecting casesTrial ExampleIn its Motion, Patent Owner proposes to replace cancelled claim 12 with substitute dependent claim 27. Proposed, substitute claim 27 is reproduced below with annotations:27. The method of [[claim 11]] claim 26 wherein the user commands includes lift command data and controlling the RC aircraft includes controlling the RC to a hovering state in response to the lift command data, and wherein the remote control device includes a plurality of spring-loaded interface devices, at least one spring-loaded interface device of the plurality of spring-loaded interface devices configured to return to a corresponding particular position, the particular position comprising a center position of multiple axes of operation.Ex, 2005, 6.?Based upon the entirety of the record, including but not limited to arguments and evidence that were presented by Patent Owner, we determine that proposed substitute claim 27 does not enlarge the scope of the originally issued claims, is supported by the ’995 Application, and is responsive to the grounds of unpatentability involved in the proceeding.?Petitioner asserts that the limitations of substitute claim 27 are unpatentable over the combination of Thornberg ’983, Karem, and Thornberg-1995. Petitioner asserts that Thornberg-1995 teaches a “conventional hand-held control unit” with a pair of multi-axes “spring-centered” joysticks, the right for pitch/roll control and the left for lateral axis and yaw control. Petitioner asserts it would have been obvious to a POSITA that Thornberg-1995’s multi-axis spring-centered joysticks could be used for the input controls on Thornberg ’983’s control panel 200, as such an arrangement was conventional, obvious to try, and known to provide advantages. Petitioner further notes that the proposed modifications would have been well within the ability of a POSITA.?Patent Owner responds that Thornberg-1995 discloses a left joystick that returns to center in the lateral axis, but stays in the longitudinal direction due to friction. Patent Owner argues that the left joystick controls the collective of the blade helicopter, for which constant adjustment is not needed. Id. Patent Owner argues “it would not have been ‘obvious to try’ such an arrangement, as Thornberg-[19]95 explicitly states a contrary reasoning for making the second (i.e., left) joystick stay in one position rather than be ‘spring-loaded.’”?Based on the entirety of the record, we determine that Petitioner has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that substitute claim 27 is unpatentable over Thornberg ’983, Karem, and Thornberg-1995. Thornberg-1995 teaches thatthe operator always has positive control of the aircraft through a conventional hand-held control unit. The control unit has two joysticks. The right one is spring-centered in both axes and controls pitch and roll, which the left is spring-centered in the lateral axis and controls yaw. The left joystick is held by friction in the longitudinal axis and controls collective.Ex. 3002, 9. Substitute claim 27 requires “at least one spring-loaded interface device of the plurality of spring-loaded interface devices configured to return to a corresponding particular position, the particular position comprising a center position of multiple axes of operation.” Ex. 2005, 6 (emphasis added). Thornberg-1995 teaches at least one of the two joysticks is spring-centered in both axes (i.e., right joystick).?We further credit Dr. Hansman’s testimony that a POSITA would have understood Thornberg-1995’s spring-loaded joysticks could be used for the input controls of Thornberg ’983, and would have been motivated to use spring-loaded joysticks for Thornberg 983’s controls “based on Thornberg 983’s teaching that such an arrangement is conventional and provides advantageous modes of control for use on a control unit.” Dr. Hansman’s testimony is supported by the disclosure of Thornberg-1995, which teaches the spring-centered joystick as part of a conventional hand-held control unit, and that releasing the right joystick to a spring-centered position “has proven very forgiving and safe, as well as easy to fly.”?Accordingly, we deny Patent Owner’s Motion to Amend as to substitute claim 25.AppealAppellant argues the pending claims as a group (Br. 4-5). We select independent claim 1 as representative. The remaining claims stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. §41.37(c)(1)(iv).?Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101 to include an implicit exception: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).?The Supreme Court, in Alice, reiterated the two-step framework previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66 (2012), “for distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217. The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. If the claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract idea, the inquiry ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step where the elements of the claims are considered “individually and ‘as an ordered combination”’ to determine whether there are additional elements that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 78). This is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’ -- i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.”’ Id. at 217-18 (alteration in original).?In rejecting the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101, the Examiner determined that independent claim 1 is directed to “creating bill of work for maintenance, assigning the aircraft to a maintenance location based on criteria, validating performance, and creating maintenance release,” which the Examiner concluded is simply a “method of organizing human activities for generating rule based tasks for aircraft maintenance process” (Final Act. 3-4). The Examiner further determined that the claims do not include “meaningful limitation(s)” that “amounts to significantly more than the abstract idea itself.”?After Appellant’s briefs were filed, and the Examiner’s Answer mailed, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (the “USPTO”) published revised guidance on January 7, 2019 for use by USPTO personnel in evaluating subject matter eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101. 2019 REVISED PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 57 (Jan. 7, 2019) (the “2019 Revised Guidance”). That guidance revised the USPTO’s examination procedure with respect to the first step of the Mayo/Alice framework by (1) “[p]roviding groupings of subject matter that [are] considered an abstract idea”; and (2) clarifying that a claim is not “directed to” a judicial exception if the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception. Id. at 50. The 2019 Revised Guidance, by its terms, applies to all applications, and to all patents resulting from applications, filed before, on, or after January 7, 2019. Id. HYPERLINK ":\\Users\\Ross\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\Temp3_archive%20(3).zip\\EX%20PARTE%20DINAKARA%20NAGALLA%20AND%20KEVIN%20STOLTZFUS.doc" \l "co_footnote_FN_F2_1" 2 Step One of the Mayo/Alice Framework (2019 Revised Guidance, Step 2A)?The first step in the Mayo/Alice framework, as mentioned above, is to determine whether the claims at issue are “directed to” a patent-ineligible concept, e.g., an abstract idea. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 217. This first step, as set forth in the 2019 Revised Guidance (i.e., Step 2A), is a two-prong test; in Step 2A, Prong One, we look to whether the claim recites a judicial exception, e.g., one of the following three groupings of abstract ideas: (1) mathematical concepts; (2) certain methods of organizing human activity, e.g., fundamental economic principles or practices, commercial or legal interactions; and (3) mental processes. 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. If so, we next consider whether the claim includes additional elements, beyond the judicial exception, that “integrate the [judicial] exception into a practical application,” i.e., that apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception (“Step 2A, Prong Two”). Id. at 54-55. Only if the claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application do we conclude that the claim is “directed to” the judicial exception, e.g., an abstract idea.?Appellant argues that the Examiner failed to provide a reasoned explanation for why the claims correspond to a concept that the court have identified as an abstract idea, and, to the extent that there is explanation, it is based on the “mistaken assertion that these limitations are directed towards ‘a method of organizing human activity for generating rule based tasks.”?We do not find these arguments persuasive. In particular, the Examiner identified the claim limitations that made up the judicial exception, including the relevant portions of steps (a)-(e) in claim 1, and analogized those limitations to claims at issue in previous cases. See Final Act. 3-5; Ans. 7-8. The Examiner also explained why the claim did not include additional elements that integrated the judicial exception into a practical application. See Final Act. 4; Ans. 7-8. Therefore, we find that the Examiner made out a prima facie case of unpatentability under § 101.?We also do not agree with Appellant that the Examiner erred in determining that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea (Br. 4). The Federal Circuit has explained that “the ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the specification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject matter.”’ Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). It asks whether the focus of the claims is on a specific improvement in relevant technology or on a process that itself qualifies as an “abstract idea” for which computers are invoked merely as a tool. See id. at 1335-36. Here, the Specification (including the claim language) makes clear that the claims focus on an abstract idea, and not on any improvement to technology and/or a technical field.?The Specification is entitled “LINE MAINTENANCE MANAGER,” and describes, in the Background section, that aircraft require maintenance in order to remain airworthy, and that, to that end, aircraft manufacturers, the Federal Aviation Administration, and Maintenance Review Board (“MRB”) provide, and can continuously revise and update, aircraft maintenance requirements for various aircraft (Spec. ? 2). These aircraft maintenance requirements are documented in aircraft-specific MRB documents (id. ? 3). An MRB document details each task that must be accomplished on a particular aircraft, the requirements of that task, and the frequency with which the task must be performed (id.). An MRB document can include 800 to 2,000 tasks that need to be accomplished anywhere from once a day to once every 20 years, and also tasks that need to be accomplished after the aircraft has achieved a specific number of flight hours, flight cycles, or other triggering aircraft use metrics (id.). The Specification explains that the MRB document for each aircraft details a “very complicated maintenance schedule,” and to ensure compliance with the MRB document, airlines must implement various tracking programs to monitor for the dates when tasks come due, as well as to log the completion of those tasks and any corrective actions taken (id. ? 4).?The Specification also explains that airlines seek to keep maintenance time at a minimum, and, as part of that effort, group task together into “letter checks” rather than perform the tasks one at a time as they come due (id. ? 5). Some letter checks can be performed overnight in a “line maintenance” environment where the aircraft remains airworthy because it can be reassembled quickly (id.). Other letter checks comprise largely numbers of tasks that require a substantial amount of time to complete (id.). Those more complicated checks are typically performed in a heavy maintenance environment in which the aircraft is taken out of service, and taken to a hanger, where it is taken apart, inspected, fixed, and reassembled over the course of one week to over a month (id.).?The Specification states that line maintenance presents unique challenges to ensure the aircraft remains in service or is delayed from service as little as possible because line maintenance can consist of a number of planned maintenance tasks and a number of unplanned maintenance tasks, both of which may include routine and non-routine tasks (those not detailed in the MRB document) (id. ? 6). The Specification explains that “[p]lanned maintenance tasks are those tasks that may be scheduled ahead of performing the line maintenance on the aircraft,” and “unplanned maintenance tasks that arise just prior to or during the execution of line maintenance on the aircraft” (id.). On the other hand, unplanned tasks “cannot be scheduled because they arise dynamically in the line maintenance environment” (id.). The Specification states that “[a]lthough line maintenance can plan for a certain number of unplanned events . . . by estimating based on historical data for the aircraft, such unplanned maintenance tasks may nevertheless cause costly delays to the aircraft line maintenance if not handled quickly and efficiently” (id.).?The claimed invention intends to provide a computer-based method and system to manage execution of line maintenance including planned and unplanned maintenance tasks performed on an aircraft without removing the aircraft from service (id.). The Specification, thus, discloses that in one embodiment, creating an electronic scheduled bill of work comprising a plurality of planned tasks, creating an electronic work-in-progress bill of work comprising the scheduled bill of work and a plurality of unplanned tasks, electronically validating performance for each of the tasks in the work-in-progress bill of work, and creating an electronic maintenance release for the aircraft (id. ? 7). The Specification further discloses that the system and method may also assign the aircraft to a maintenance location, including assigning the aircraft to a station, i.e., a specific airport, and a hanger, ramp, or gate at the station (id. ? 16). The system may assign the station by analyzing the aircraft’s flight schedule to determine what stations the aircraft is passing through around the time the line maintenance is due (id.). The system may also analyze each possible station’s facility availability, including how many gates or hangers are open for use, and also the number, availability, and training levels of maintenance personnel at the station in order to minimize out of service time of the aircraft and maximize line maintenance efficiency (id.).?Consistent with this disclosure, claim 1 recites a computer implemented method of managing execution of line maintenance for an aircraft comprising: (1) creating an electronic scheduled bill of work of planned line maintenance tasks, i.e., “creating an electronic scheduled bill of work comprising a plurality of planned line maintenance tasks, including tasks generated based on faults reported by electronic built in test equipment” (step (a)); (2) creating an electronic bill of work in progress including the items from the scheduled electronic bill of work and additional unplanned line maintenance tasks, i.e., “creating an electronic work-in-progress bill of work comprising the scheduled bill of work and a plurality of unplanned line maintenance tasks” (step (b)); (3) assigning the aircraft to maintenance location based its flight schedule, when the maintenance tasks are due, and on the availability of maintenance personnel, i.e., “assigning the aircraft to a maintenance location based on a flight schedule of the aircraft, on times when line maintenance is due, and on availability of maintenance space and personnel” (step (c)); (4) electronically validating the performance of the tasks in the work-in-progress bill of work, i.e., “electronically validating performance for each of the tasks in the work-in-progress bill of work” (step (d)); and (5) creating an electronic maintenance release for the aircraft, i.e., “creating an electronic maintenance release for the aircraft” (step (e)).?These limitations, when given their broadest reasonable interpretation, recite creating an bill of work of scheduled tasks of aircraft line maintenance, creating a second bill of work that includes both the scheduled line maintenance tasks and unplanned line maintenance tasks, assigning the aircraft to a maintenance location based on the aircraft’s schedule and the availability of space personnel, validating the work once its completed, and then creating an electronic release for the aircraft. Simply put, claim 1 recites observations, evaluation, and judgment (creating, assigning, and validating), i.e., mental processes--concepts performed in the human mind. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Claim 1 also recites managing personal behavior or relationships (creating bills of work for maintenance personnel to perform, assigning aircraft to maintenance locations, validating the maintenance personnel have completed the work, and creating releases to allow the aircraft to resume service), which is a certain method of organizing human activity and, therefore, an abstract idea. See 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. ................
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