Reading the Nichomachean Ethics Book I

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Reading the Nichomachean Ethics

Book I: Chapter 1: Good as the aim of action

Every art, applied science, systematic investigation, action and choice aims at some good: either an activity, or a product of an activity. Is there some end at which all actions aim? (Yes--it is happiness [eudaimonia].)

Chapter 2: Politics as master science of the good That end which is most sought for its own sake is the good for man , which is subject of the science of politics. It includes the individual's good, but also the good for the state, which is a collective of individuals.

Chapter 3: Limitations of ethics and politics We should seek for no more precision that the nature of the subject allows. Politics is not a study for young men, but it does profit the rationally inclined.

Chapter 4: The many characterizations of happiness Everyone agrees that `happiness' is the name we agree to give to the good for man; but people disagree on what kind of life it is that deserves that name. The definition of that life is that it amounts to `living well and doing well' (1095a19). But what life in particular meets that specification, constitutes such a life? Some of the candidates: life of pleasure; life of wealth; life of honor.

The method by which we should resolve this question is by induction: bottom- up, rather than trying to deduce the answer from some theory. Consult the opinions of our fellow men, preferably the wiser among them or those who have been well raised.

Chapter 5: Various views of the highest good Although the average man considers the life of pleasure the one most likely to lead to the goal we desire, but the notable suggest the political life, or the contemplative life. (see p. 432, 1178a5-15 for a discussion of the political life.)

--pleasure is something we share with the animals; not very classy. --honor depends more on those who confer it, than those who receive it; and we

want something that is actually in the power of the agent. --money is only advantageous as a means to that which it can buy. About the contemplative life we will hear more later. Chapter 6: Plato's view Some things are good in themselves; some things are good as a means to things good in themselves. Chapter 7: The good is final and self-sufficient That which is always chosen for itself and not as a means to anything else is called final in an unqualified sense; and that description applies to happiness more than to anything else. (If we do choose honor and pleasure, it is in hopes that they will contribute to a happy life.) One approach to characterizing happiness is to ascertain the proper function of the human. Being alive, nutrition and growth, and perception are common to other living things; but the active life of the rational element is unique to the human. Just being born with the capacity to be rational does not suffice; it is the exercise of that capacity, its full attainment, that characterizes the fully human.

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Conclusion: the good of man is an activity of the soul in conformity with excellence / virtue--and if there are several such activities, in conformity with the best and most complete. (1098a15-17)

--But in a complete life. For one swallow does not make a spring, nor does one summer day.

Chapter 8: Popular views confirm our position Goods of the soul are prior to goods of the body and external goods; our specification of the good life includes references to virtues--as actualized, not as potential alone, as a practice or activity, not just a latent characteristic.

A life of this sort is pleasurable of itself; for activities in conformity with virtue (=excellent performance of a faculty or capacity) include pleasure as a consequence, are in themselves pleasant.

External goods: of course perfect happiness requires external goods as well--or at least will be better for them: wealth, friends, political power, good birth, beauty and good children...

Chapter 9: How happiness is acquired Is it a gift of the gods? Well, there is certainly something divine about it, but it is in fact accessible to everyone whose capacity for excellence is unimpaired. It is acquired through learning and training, through study and effort.

Chapter 10: Can a man be judged happy before he is dead? Chapter 11: Do the fortunes of the living affect the happiness of the dead? Chapter 12: The praise accorded to happiness Chapter 13: The psychological foundation of virtue The soul consists of two elements, the rational and the irrational. Of the irrational part, one (the nutritive) seems to have no share in human excellence; the other, the seat of appetite and desire in general, seems to be able to listen to reason and accept its leadership. This suggests that the rational part is itself dual; one element is reason in the strictest sense, contained within itself; and the other relates to the appetitive and directs action. Virtues are differentiated to in accordance with this division of the soul: Intellectual virtues: theoretical wisdom, understanding, and practical wisdom Moral virtues: generosity, self-control

Book II: Chapter 1: Moral virtue is the result of habit

Intellectual virtues come by teaching (=require experience and time); Moral virtues come by HABIT. We have the capacity (=potentiality) to acquire them; and this capacity can be actualized in us--by first having them put into action.

(=analogous to skills; different from perception) "We become courageous by performing acts of courage." Hence it is no small matter whether one habit or another is inculcated in us from early childhood; on the contrary, it makes a considerable difference, or rather, all the difference. Chapter 2: Method in the practical sciences Not a theoretical study: the object is to become good. The correct judgment of how to behave must be determined "on each different occasion [by considering] what the situation demands."

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We do have a thumb-rule on which to rely: moral qualities (=habits of correct action) are destroyed by defect and by excess, and are preserved by the mean.

Chapter 3: Pleasure and pain are the test of virtue Virtues have to do with actions and emotions. Pleasure and pain are consequences of every emotion and every action. So virtue has to do with pleasure and pain. (1104b1416) Virtue makes us act in the best way in matters involving pleasure and pain.

Pleasure (or pain) accompanies all objects of choice. We use pleasure as our criterion of choice.

So: virtue/excellence is concerned with p/p; the actions which produce it also develop it (and can destroy it); it actualizes itself fully in those activities to which it owes its origin.

Chapter 4: Virtuous action and virtue The excellence of an action--its virtue (or absence of that) lies not alone in the kind of act it is--but in certain characteristics of the agent as he performs it: he must know what he is doing; he must choose to act the way he does( and choose it for its own sake); and the act must spring "from a firm and unchangeable character."

Chapter 5: Virtue defined: the genus Virtue relates to the soul of man (=he is alive; he feels and thinks and chooses and acts; he is an agent in the world). Aristotle here distinguishes emotions; capacities (=my faculties, my potential for doing those things of which human beings are capable); and a third thing, which he calls here "the condition, either good or bad, in which we are in relation to the emotions." [ Ostwald (=our text) uses the word "characteristic." Ross uses the word "state." Urmson uses the word "disposition." ]

Emotions: he gives a list of emotions: appetite; anger; fear; confidence; envy; joy; affection; hatred; longing, emulation, pity--"anything, in short, followed by pleasure or pain" (=things that I like, enjoy, want, avoid; positive or negative.)

He says the virtues are not emotions (although emotions are the subject-matter of virtue; virtue [or vice] is a specific way of reacting to our emotions, how we express or act on them). We are not praised or blamed for our emotions (although we may be for how we express our emotions).

Nor is there a specific moral faculty, so that we can say that we can `see' the right way to behave, and are thus free from judgment about how we then choose to act...)

Instead, he locates `virtue' in "the condition we are in with respect to the emotions." He says it is how we are `disposed' toward our emotions: it is a settled state or disposition toward how we express our emotions.

Chapter 6: The differentia There are many `dispositions' or settled states toward emotions, of which virtue is only one. It is distinguished from the others by aiming at the median (mean). (1106b15) Now this is not as easy to determine with respect to human action as it is with respect to, for instance, the middle point of a line, or mean household income (a statistically determinable point, given enough information): with human action, things are not so easy. So: virtue/excellence is a characteristic involving choice; It consists in observing the mean relative to us, defined by a rational principle, --and his standard is "such as a man of practical wisdom" might determine.

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Virtue is the mean between two vices: an excess and a deficiency, in respect of experiencing (and acting on the basis of) emotions: "at the right time, toward the right object, toward the right people, for the right reason and in the right manner" ?that is the median, and the best course, and the mark of virtue. (1106b20) Chapter 7: Examples of the mean in various virtues He realizes that this is all too theoretical, in this section, to be very clear. So he gives us examples, with respect to the passion/emotion OF which they are the mean: Courage is the mean between recklessness and cowardice. Self-control is the mean between self-indulgence and [asceticism?] Generosity is the mean between stinginess and extravagance. Truthfulness is the virtue between self-depreciation and exaggeration. Wit is the mean between buffoonery and boorishness. Righteous indignation is the virtue of which envy and spite are the vices. Chapter 8: The relation between the mean and its extremes This is not a mechanical determination; some of the extremes are more socially undesirable than others; and the [character? Disposition] of some individuals tends more to one of the extremes (=vices) than the other, so to seek individual excellence may require individuals to compensate for their own unfortunate proclivities. Chapter 9: How to attain the mean So: we all know now that moral virtue is a mean (and in what sense it is a mean): that it is a mean, an appropriate balance, between two extremes (both of which count as vices) marked by excess and deficiency; and that it aims at the median in emotions and in actions. It is not easy to be virtuous; it is a difficult rational task. It is clear that the median characteristic in all fields is the one that deserves praise (and its extremes deserve blame).

Book III: Chapter 1: Actions voluntary and involuntary

(He reminds us here that when he talks about human beings he is talking about agents-- and agents with rational capacities who are purposive, who in their actions set themselves goals and act toward them.)

We need to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary actions; for we are praised or blamed for the one, and pardoned or pitied for the other.

Two kinds of involuntary actions: those done from compulsion, or from ignorance.

(a) Compelled actions: the source of the action is external to the agent, who contributes nothing. (=swept away by a storm, or taken captive by pirates)

What about cases where the choice is between a base action and a greater evil, or men endure ignoble things for the sake of a noble end? We consider them mixed, but mainly voluntary--but we tend not to blame people for them, or to praise them if the end result is noble.

(b) actions done out of ignorance: these too are of two kinds. An action done out of ignorance that is regretted is considered involuntary: he would not have done it if he had known the relevant circumstances, but he didn't. [The

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category of non-voluntary actions is a bit more puzzling: it seems to be demarcated by the absence of regret. The person in this position seems to be non-voluntary, and hence free of praise or blame, because he did not in any relevant sense choose the action or situation that had the result. Example: I was in the way of someone who was trying to go somewhere, so he didn't get there, so there was a bad result? But I didn't choose to do anything in particular, so there was no `action' in the relevant sense on my part?] (c) A list of things of which I can be ignorant: who the agent is, what he is doing, what thing or person is affected, the means he is using, the result intended, and the manner in which he is acting. (d) So: a voluntary act is one in which the initiative lies with an agent who knows the particular circumstances in which the action is performed. (e) Acts due to passion and appetite are voluntary. Chapter 2: Choice Not all voluntary acts are chosen. We choose what we believe might be attained through our own agency; and we choose the means to the ends we wish for. Choice is concerned with things that lie within our power. It involves reason and thought, and is the result of preceding deliberation. Chapter 3: Deliberation We deliberate about things that are within our power and can be realized in action. That excludes outcomes that are certain, for about them no deliberation is necessary. Deliberation comes into play for things with unpredictable outcome or in cases where an indeterminate element is involved. (1112b8) We deliberate about means, not about ends; sometimes about how to find the relevant instruments, and sometimes about how to use them. Conclusions: man is the source of his actions; deliberation is about the things obtainable by human action; and actions aim at something other than themselves. Chapter 4: Wish Wish is concerned with the ends at which actions aim, which is the good. But: people can wish for things that are not in fact good, though they appear so to the individual at the time and under the circumstances. But: in such cases they are mistaken. "what seems good to a man of high moral standard is truly the object of a wish, whereas a worthless man wishes anything that strikes his fancy." The chief distinction of a man of high moral standards is his ability to see the truth in each particular moral question. Chapter 5: Man as responsible agent Actions concerned with means are based on choice, and voluntary actions. The activities in which the virtues find their expression deal with means. So our virtue or excellence depends upon ourselves. If we have the power to act nobly or basely, and likewise the power not to act--and if such action or inaction constitutes our being good or evil, we must conclude that it depends upon us whether we are decent or worthless individuals. We are in some cases responsible for our ignorance as well; in which case it is no excuse, but blameworthy. To sum up: 1114b25 ff

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