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CASE LAW SUMMARIESFEBRUARY 2017Drafted and Summarized by:Randall SharpAssistant Public DefenderCapital Defender’s OfficeRandall.sharp.esq@AGGRAVATED STALKINGOrdelt v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A2084 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 16, 2017) TA \l "Ordelt v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A2084 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 16, 2017)" \s "Ordelt v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A2084 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 16, 2017)" \c 1 Judgment: (Affirmed)Defendant and the complaining witness were in an abusive relationship. On numerous times defendant got intoxicated and became abusive with the complaining witness. Eventually, the complaining witness was able to get a temporary restraining order and required Defendant to have no contact with the complaining witness and not to return to the house. When Defendant was served with the TRO, he inquired about his belongings. Defendant was notified to set up an appointment with the Sheriff’s department. Defendant called the local police and made an appointment. When they arrived, they informed Defendant needed to call the Sheriff’s department and the local police. Defendant left only to call the local police a week later for another appointment. When the local police arrived, Defendant walked up to the house and was arrested for aggravated stalking. Holding: “We find the evidence sufficient to establish that [Defendant] contracted the victim in person when he arrived unannounced at her apartment without coordinating the Sheriff’s Department after he was explicitly informed by the Marietta Police Department that they would not assist him in retrieving his property.” Further the jury was able to find that Defendant contacted the complaining witness was for harassing and intimidating. A single violation of a protective order may be determined a pattern of harassing and intimidating, when taken together with prior incidents. ARMED ROBBERYTAKING OCCURRED PRIOR TO BRANDASHING A FIREARMHarrington v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1545 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 27, 2017) TA \l "Harrington v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1545 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 27, 2017)" \s "Harrington v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1545 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 27, 2017)" \c 1 Judgment: (Reversed)The indictment charging Defendant with armed robbery stated, “unlawfully taking a…cell phone…from the immediate presence of Mamie Evelyn Wright, by the use of a handgun.” At trial, evidence was presented that the complaining witness came home from the grocery store and found Defendant in her home. There was no evidence presented concerning the timing of when the Defendant obtained the cell phone. There was evidence that the complaining witness had previously deactivated her cell phone prior to the incident, so it was unlikely she would have had the phone on her person. Defendant appealed his conviction, claiming the evidence was insufficient.Holding: “The State…was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Defendant’s] use of the handgun occurred ‘prior to or contemporaneously with the taking’ of the cell phone…Moreover, ‘the taking of property is not a continuing transaction which ends only when the defendant leaves the presence of the victim. Instead, the taking is complete once control of the property is transferred involuntarily from the victim to the defendant, even if only briefly.’” Citing Fox v. State, 289 Ga. 34 (2011). Here there was no evidence when the Defendant obtained control of the cell phone. It is equally plausible that he obtained control of the cell phone prior to the complaining witness coming home. Thus the conviction for armed robbery must be reversed. AUTHENTICITYJAIL PHONECALLSSmith v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1781 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017) TA \l "Smith v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1781 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017)" \s "Smith v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1781 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017)" \c 1 Judgment: (Affirmed)Case was decided after the new rules of evidence went into effect. At trial, the State introduced several recorded jail phone calls of Defendant and his brother and wife. Defendant claims the State did not lay the proper foundation as required by Davis v. State, 279 Ga. 786 (2005). Holding: Since this case was after the new rules of evidence, Davis is not controlling. OCGA 24-9-923(c) controls and “allows the admission of computer controlled audio recordings, such as jail phone calls, when the court determines, based on competent evidence presented to the court, that such items tend to show reliably the fact or facts for which the items are offered…” In this case, the investigator testified that the parties identified themselves several times and discussed parts of the case that only the Defendant would have knowledge.BURGLARYENTRY INTO YOUR OWN HOUSEPolanco v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1622 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 21, 2017) TA \l "Polanco v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1622 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 21, 2017)" \s "Polanco v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1622 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 21, 2017)" \c 1 Judgment: (Affirmed)Defendant was married to the complaining witness and they had both resided in the same apartment. Due to physical abuse, Defendant was previously arrested. While defendant was in jail, complaining witness moved all Defendant’s items out of the apartment and changed the locks. Based upon Defendant’s continued harassment, the complaining witness obtained a temporary restraining order. On a later night, Defendant gained entry into the house by way of an open window and brought his wife flowers and wedding ring back. Complaining witness called the police. Defendant claims because they are still married, he cannot be found guilty of the burglary.Holding: “In State v. Kennedy, 266 Ga. 195 (1996), the Georgia Supreme Court recognized that while ‘marriage is a significant factor in the determination of whether one spouse is authorized…to enter the separate residence of his or her estranged spouse…marriage alone is not an absolute defense to burglary.” The fact that Defendant used to live at that residence, does not itself give the defendant subsequent authority to enter the residence, once his wife has made it clear that he no longer has the right to enter by changing the locks and taking out a TRO. Because Defendant entered the house to commit aggravated stalking, the jury was capable of finding Defendant guilty of Burglary as well.CROSS EXAMINATION OF CO-DEFENDANTPOTENTIAL SENTENCES CO-DEFENDANT FACEDSmith v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1781 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017) TA \s "Smith v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1781 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017)" Judgment: (Affirmed)Co-defendant testified against the Defendant in the State’s case in chief. During cross-examination, Defendant’s counsel was able to get co-defendant that he had not been sentenced on any counts and that he was still facing some of the same potential sentences including life in prison without the possibility of parole. At this point, the State objected, claiming Defendant could not go into the potential sentences co-defendant was facing, because no agreement had been reached.Holding: “We have previously held that, where a witness has not obtained a concrete plea deal from the State in exchange for his testimony, the accused ‘may not bring out the potential penalties faced by the witness.’” Citing Cheley v. State, 299 Ga. 88, 94 (2016). Here Defendant was able to cross-examine the co-defendant concerning his potential motive and bias, including the charges he was facing and any potential plea deal. The mere fact he could not cross-examine about potential sentences did not amount to an abuse of discretion. DEMURRERGENERAL AND SPECIALAllen v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1528 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017) TA \l "Allen v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1528 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017)" \s "Allen v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1528 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017)" \c 1 Judgment: (Affirmed)Defendant was charged with two separate identical counts for possession of firearm in commission of crime. Defendant did not demurrer prior to trial and after the jury was selected, Defendant moved to dismiss the counts, because he could not determine who was the alleged victim in the counts. Court refused to dismiss.Holding: The Court determined the motion to dismiss the counts were in fact being raised as a general demurrer, which can be raised at any time. However, because the counts allege a crime, regardless of the identical counts, Defendant could not admit the facts and be found guilty. Thus the motion to dismiss was properly denied. The proper remedy was to file a special demurrer, but Defendant did not file the demurrer within 10 days of arraignment. OCGA 17-7-110 “All pretrial motions, including demurrers and special pleas, shall be filed within ten days after the date of arraignment, unless the time for filing is extended by the court.” Due to the identical counts, Defendant was properly only sentenced to one count of the possession of a firearm during a felony.FALSE IMPRISONMENTKNOWLEDGE OF VICTIM IS NOT REQUIREDMoore v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A2088 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 01, 2017) TA \l "Moore v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A2088 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 01, 2017)" \s "Moore v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A2088 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 01, 2017)" \c 1 Judgment: (Affirmed)Defendant was found guilty of false imprisonment. Defendant claimed the evidence was insufficient, because there was no evidence presented at trial that he was aware of the victim was in the restaurant. The evidence included that he gathered all the people in the restaurant together and prevented them all from leaving the restaurant. The victim at issue hid, but witnessed the Defendant prevent anyone from leaving the restaurant. No evidence was presented that Defendant was aware of the victim and the Defendant claims, had he known, he would have gathered her the rest of the people.Holding: “To sustain a conviction for false imprisonment, the State must show evidence of an arrest, confinement, or detention for a brief amount of time is sufficient.” In this case, the fact that Defendant had no knowledge of the victim, “does not negate the evidence of false imprisonment as [Defendant’s] actions upon accosting [another employee] as she attempted to leave the restaurant and his actions towards the other employees located inside clearly demonstrated an intent to confine them.”GUILTY PLEA – WITHDRAWALINNEFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSELGomez v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1529 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 27, 2017) TA \l "Gomez v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1529 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 27, 2017)" \s "Gomez v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1529 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 27, 2017)" \c 1 Judgment: (Affirmed)Defendant pled guilty to malice murder and armed robbery and was sentenced to life plus 15 years. The counts were run consecutively. Thus, Defendant would not be eligible for parole until the passage of 42-45 years in prison. Defendant filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea and claimed he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel informed him he would be eligible for parole around 20-25 years. Supreme Court reviewed the motion based upon effective assistance of counsel standard.Holding: Court determined Defendant could not prove the prejudice arm of the effective assistance of counsel test. The Court explained that the evidence was over-whelming including an eye witness, a confession, and a cohort testifying against him should he have went to trial. Thus, had Defendant went to trial he was facing life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Court did not decide the issue on whether the defense attorney was deficient in advising a client to accept a plea deal by erroneously explaining the parole guidelines. HEARSAYCO-CONSPIRATOR EXCEPTIONAllen v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1528 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017) TA \s "Allen v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1528 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017)" Judgment: (Affirmed)Defendant was tried jointly with co-defendant. At trial, the co-defendant’s uncle testified and his written statement was introduced. The statement asserted that the co-defendant told him they would not be in trouble if the Defendant had kept his mouth shut. Defendant objected at trial, claiming Bruton and hearsay precluded the introduction of the statement.Holding: The Uncle’s statement concerning the Defendant was subject to a confrontation clause challenge under Bruton only if the statement was testimonial. “[the] Statement – which was made shortly after the crimes and before any arrests to a friend’s uncle rather than to police officers investigating a crime – clearly was not intended for use in a future prosecution and cannot be considered testimonial.”INDEPENDENT CRIMES AND ACTSINTENT AND MOTIVEOlds v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A15A0136 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 28, 2017) TA \l "Olds v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A15A0136 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 28, 2017)" \s "Olds v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A15A0136 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 28, 2017)" \c 1 Judgment: (Affirmed)This is the third decision concerning this same issue by appellate courts. In Olds I, Court of Appeals found the trial court did not commit error by admitting prior independent crimes under 404(b) and affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court of Georgia granted cert and explained in Olds II that by pleading not guilty, intent becomes an issue in every crime. However the Supreme Court held the Court of Appeals did not properly weigh the second factor outlined in Bradshaw – probative value versus prejudicial effect, and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals. Now the Court of Appeals has given this decision and affirmed the trial courts decision to admit the prior extrinsic acts.Holding: The court weighed the three factors outlined in Bradshaw and Parks v. State, --- Ga. --- (Case No. S16A1001)(Decided November 30, 2016). These factors are: “(1) the evidence is relevant to an issue in the case other than the defendant’s character, (2) the probative value is not substantially outweighed by undue prejudice, and (3) there is sufficient proof for a jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the prior act. When weighing the probative value of other acts evidence against its prejudicial effect, we apply the balancing test set forth in OCGA 24-4-403.” As it relates to the second and third prong, the COA determined the probative value was not outweighed by the prejudicial effect and the Defendant committed the prior crimes by preponderance of the evidence. The first factor is outlined below. INTENT: [Defendant] put his intent at issue in this case when he pled not guilty and argued at trial that the victim lied about the crimes.” The court further explained, “evidence that an accused committed an intentional act generally is relevant to show…that the same defendant committed a similar act with the same sort of intent, especially when the acts were committed…in similar circumstances.” MOTIVE: “Extrinsic acts are admissible to show motive under Rule 404(b) if they are logically relevant and necessary to prove something other than the accused’s propensity to commit the crime charged.” The court cited Smart v. State, 299 Ga. 414, 418 (2016), “extrinsic acts victim’s testimony regarding specific acts of violence was relevant to show defendant’s motive in using violence to control murder victim.”INDIGENT CLIENTFINDING OF INDIGENCY Roberson v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16G0931 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 27, 2017) TA \l "Roberson v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16G0931 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 27, 2017)" \s "Roberson v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16G0931 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 27, 2017)" \c 1 Judgment: (Affirmed)This case was originally heard by the Court of Appeals in Roberson v. State, 335 Ga. App. 606 (2016). Defendant was represented by the public defender’s office and was eventually found guilty of misdemeanor battery (family violence). At the conclusion of trial, she requested a transcript of the trial to be provided at the public’s expense. Court held a hearing and determined she was not indigent. Court of Appeals held the determination of indigence for the purpose of requiring the county to pay for a transcript lies exclusively with the trial court and cannot be appealed. The Supreme Court granted cert and now affirms.Holding: OCGA 9-15-2(a)(2) addresses reviewability: “The judgment of the court on all issues of fact concerning the ability of a party to pay costs or give bond shall be final.” Thus this “cost statute” rests the decision of a parties ability to pay for transcripts exclusively with the trial court and the Indigent Defense Act of 2003, OCGA 17-12-1 et seq does nothing to change this conclusion. IMPORTANT NOTE: Even though the factual determination rests with the trial court and cannot be appealed, procedural review may be appealed. The Court explained, “such review could perhaps be had where the trial court either failed to hold a hearing to consider the evidence tendered or demonstrated a failure to consider the evidence.” However in the case at bar, the trial court held a hearing, weighed the evidence and ruled the Defendant was no longer indigent. INEFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSELHEARSAY – COURSE OF CONDUCTEntwisle v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1782 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 01, 2017) TA \l "Entwisle v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1782 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 01, 2017)" \s "Entwisle v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1782 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 01, 2017)" \c 1 Judgment: (Reversed)Defendant was found guilty of computer invasion of property. At trial the complaining witness’s house was burglarized. After the burglary, the complaining witness was contacted by Carbonite (an online back-up system), who stated her financial documents were accessed from her home computer. Based upon this information given by Carbonite, the complaining witness testified that she contacted all her financial companies and canceled her credit cards. Defendant’s attorney never objected at trial to the testimony concerning the Carbonite information. State argued that under former OCGA 24-3-2 that the hearsay is available to show the actor’s course of conduct of why she contacted her banking institutionsHolding: Former OCGA 24-3-2 for course of conduct was not carried over to the new evidence code. Since this case occurred after the new evidence code went into effect, this code section did not apply to the case at bar. The COA then looked at whether the attorney was ineffective or potential trial strategy. The COA stated, “we cannot identify any reason why a reasonable attorney would have decided not to object to the hearsay testimony that provided the only evidentiary basis for a conviction of computer invasion of privacy. As a result, trial counsel was deficient for failing to object to [complaining witness’s] hearsay statements.“ MERGERARMED ROBBERY OF ONE PERSONMoore v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A2088 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 01, 2017) TA \s "Moore v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A2088 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 01, 2017)" Judgment: (Reversed)Defendant was found guilty of two counts of armed robbery. The first count charged Defendant from taking money out of the cash register drawer. The second count of armed robbery charged Defendant with taking money from the manager. Defendant was sentenced to both counts and claims this was error.Holding: “Robbery is a crime against possession, and is not affected by concepts of ownership. Similarly, one may only rob a person, and not a corporate entity, or an object such as a cash drawer. It follows that since there was only one victim, the manager, who was by this single transaction despoiled of his possession of both his own money and his employer’s money, there was only one robbery.”ATTEMPTED ARMED ROBBERY – AGGRAVATED ASSAULT – AGGRAVATED BATTERYMorris v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1960 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 21, 2017) TA \l "Morris v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1960 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 21, 2017)" \s "Morris v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1960 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 21, 2017)" \c 1 Judgment: (Reversed and Remanded)Defendant was charged and convicted for various offenses including Attempted Armed Robbery, Aggravated Assault, and Aggravated Battery; all of which occurred during the same incident. Defendant was eventually sentenced to each count and appeals claiming they should have merged into the attempted armed robbery. COA agrees as to the aggravated assault but not to the aggravated battery.Holding: “When determining whether convictions for multiple crimes merge for purposes of sentencing, the applicable rule is that when the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not. “ As it pertains to the aggravated assault, the Georgia Supreme Court has already determined in Long v. State, 287 Ga. 886 (2010); and Lucky v. State, 286 Ga. 478 (2010) that the assault requirement in aggravated assault is the same requirement that is contained in armed robbery, by “use of an offensive weapon”. Thus, both offenses contain the same requirements and they should merge. However, as it pertains to the aggravated battery, it should not merge. Aggravated Battery requires “deprived of a member of his body or that member was rendered useless” and armed robbery requires “an intent to rob”. The two offenses contain different requirements and thus do not merge.MURDER AND POSSESSION OF A FIREARM BY CONVICTED FELONSmith v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1766 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017) TA \l "Smith v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1766 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017)" \s "Smith v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1766 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017)" \c 1 Judgment: (Affirmed)Defendant was found guilty of malice murder and possession of a firearm by a felon. At sentencing, the trial court merged the possession of a firearm count into the malice murder count. Supreme Court took up the issue sua sponte and found that it was error.Holding: As possession of a firearm is a crime that requires prof of elements not included in malice murder, this conviction did not merge as a matter of act with Defendant’s murder conviction. The case was remanded back to the trial court to enter a proper sentence on the possession of firearm count.MISSING TRANSCRIPTSUPPLEMENT THE RECORDMosley v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1657 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017) TA \l "Mosley v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1657 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017)" \s "Mosley v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1657 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017)" \c 1 Judgment: (Affirmed)Defendant was found guilty of murder. During the appeal process, it became known that the court reporter’s recoding equipment was defected for the first day of trial. About 3 years later, the trial court held a hearing at the State’s requests to supplement the record. The same trial judge, prosecutor, defense attorney, and witnesses attended. The witnesses testified and the trial court agreed that substantively the same testimony was given as that of the original trial. Defendant appeals claiming due process violation, by supplementing the record rather than having the original transcript. Supreme Court disagrees.Holding: “OCGA § 5-6-41(f) establishes a procedure whereby a party who contends that the transcript or record does not truly or fully disclose what transpired at trial may have the record completed either by stipulation of the parties as to what occurred or the independent recollection of the trial judge. If anything material to either party is omitted from the record, the omission may be corrected and, if necessary, a supplemental record filed.” The Court went further and explained: “In the specific situation in which a portion of a transcript is lost or destroyed, subsections (f) and (g) of OCGA 5-6-41 permit the parties to recreate the transcript from memory and also allow the trial court to do so when the parties cannot agree as to what transpired.”MURDERUSE OF THE WORD MURDERStanley v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1636 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 27, 2017) TA \l "Stanley v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1636 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 27, 2017)" \s "Stanley v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1636 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 27, 2017)" \c 1 Judgment: (Affirmed)Defendant was charged with murder. Defendant motioned in limine prior to trial to prevent the State from using the term “murder”. The trial court denied the motion, but instructed the State to not elicit testimony from the witnesses concerning the ultimate issue. During trial, the State used the word “murder” 12 times and Defendant objected three times. After the third objection, the Court instructed the jury that the statements made by the attorneys are not evidence and they should not consider the prosecution’s word choice of “murder” as evidence. Defendant moved for mistrial and was denied.Holding: “The trial court was not obligated to bar the prosecution from using the word ‘murder’ as [Defendant] requested…the prosecutor’s use of the ‘murder’ in his 12 queries to witnesses did not require those witnesses to opine on the ultimate issue in the case.”PHOTOGRAPHSAUTOPSYPlez v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1537 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017) TA \l "Plez v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1537 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017)" \s "Plez v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1537 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017)" \c 1 Judgment: (Affirmed)State introduced photographs of the decedent. Defendant objected, complaining that these photographs showed the decedent’s genitals and were cumulative, inflammatory, and prejudicial based upon OCGA 24-4-403. Case was decided under the new evidence code.Holding: “The application of Rule 403 is a matter committed principally to the discretion of the trial courts, and as we have explained before, the exclusion of relevant evidence under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy that should be used only sparingly.” Because the photographs showed different angles of the scene and helped the expert during his testimony, there was no abuse of discretion.RECANTATION OF TRIAL TESTIMONYHuff v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1619 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017) TA \l "Huff v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1619 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017)" \s "Huff v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1619 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017)" \c 1 Judgment: (Affirmed)Defendant was found guilty of murder. At trial, the main State’s witness was an accomplice. After Defendant was found guilty, State’s witness recanted his trial testimony. Defendant now appealsHolding: “That a material witness for the State, who at the trial gave direct evidence tending strongly to show the defendant’s guilt, has since the trial made statements even under oath that his former testimony was false, is not cause for a new trial. Declarations made after the trial are entitled to much less regard than sworn testimony delivered at the trial. The only exception to the rule against setting aside a verdict without proof of a material witness’ conviction for perjury, is where there can be no doubt of any kind that the State’s witness’ previous testimony was the purest fabrication.” Trial court found no credibility in the recantation.RECUSALJUDGEBarnett v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1892 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017) TA \l "Barnett v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1892 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017)" \s "Barnett v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1892 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017)" \c 1 Judgment: (Affirmed)Defendant was ultimately found guilty of murder. Prior to trial, the trial judge explained to all the parties that she had represented the decedent years ago before taking the bench in a civil matter. Defense counsel had a brief discussion with Defendant explaining, he did not see it to be a conflict. Defense counsel ultimately waived on the record any potential conflicts and never asked to recuse the trial judge. Defendant now claims this was error.Holding: “Generally speaking, when a party learns of grounds for the potential disqualification of the judge, he must promptly move for the recusal of the judge, and if he does not, the question of disqualification is not preserved for appellate review….When considering the issue of recusal, both OCGA 15-1-8 and Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct should be applied.” As for the Defendant’s assertion that the judge should have automatically recused himself based upon prior representation, there are no Georgia cases on point, but the Court cited several federal cases all stating, “a judge’s prior representation of a witness or a party in an unrelated matter does not automatically require disqualification.”REFRESHING RECOLLECTIONDOCUMENT PREPARED BY THIRD PERSONJones et al v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A2058, A16A2066, and A17A0110 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 01, 2017) TA \l "Jones et al v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A2058, A16A2066, and A17A0110 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 01, 2017)" \s "Jones et al v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A2058, A16A2066, and A17A0110 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 01, 2017)" \c 1 Judgment: (Affirmed)The three defendants were charged and convicted of burglary for entering a home, while on prison work detail. At trial the prison guard testified and at several points looked at notes in his possession to refresh his recollection. Defendants eventually inquired to what notes he was using and it was discovered that the DA had inadvertently left her notes with the officer and it was these notes the officer looked at. Defendants moved more a mistrial for improper refreshing witnesses recollection and prosecutorial misconduct. Holding: This case was tried after the new rules of evidence. The COA eventually determined the witness did not actually use the documents to refresh his recollection and there was no prosecutorial misconduct. However, the COA determined under the old evidence code, it would be improper for a witness to refresh his or her recollection with a document that was prepared by a third person and not in the presence of the witness. IMPORTANT NOTE: The COA did not explain how the new rules of evidence should be applied, because they determined the witness did not use the documents to refresh his recollection. However, I believe it could be argued both ways. The prior statute, OCGA 24-9-69 states, “a witness may refresh and assist his memory by the use of any written instrument or memorandum, provided he shall finally speak from his recollection thus refreshed or shall be willing to swear positively from the paper.” (emphasis added) This underlined portion was not carried over to the new evidence code in OCGA 24-6-612. The new rules merely explain that if a document is used to refresh a recollection, what procedures are afforded to the adverse party and provides nothing in regards to the witness swearing to the accuracy of the document. So you can argue this both ways: 1) the COA referred to the old rules in this opinion or 2) nothing in the new statute requires a witness to swear to the accuracy of the document relied upon. Keep in mind that under the new rules OCGA 24-6-612(b) if a witness refreshed his or her recollection prior to testifying with a document, the adverse party is still able to inquire to the contents of that document and have it potentially introduced into evidence. So if an officer testifies he read his notes prior to testimony, you have the opportunity to review those notes and determine if you want to admit them into evidence or cross-examine the officer to the contents. SEARCH AND SEIZUREDUI BLOOD DRAW – IMPLIED CONSENTState v. Brogan, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A2152 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 15, 2017) TA \l "State v. Brogan, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A2152 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 15, 2017)" \s "State v. Brogan, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A2152 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 15, 2017)" \c 1 Judgment: (Affirmed)Police responded to a stopped car at an intersection with the Defendant asleep behind the wheel. Defendant repeatedly was unable to follow the officer’s instructions. Officer never told Defendant she was under arrest, but placed her in the back of the police car. The officer then read Georgia’s implied consent. Officer could not recall how Defendant consented, but believed she gave an affirmative answer after he read the implied consent. Defendant prevailed in the Motion to Suppress and the State appealed. Holding: “It is not clear from the evidence that [Defendant} gave any affirmative response to the implied consent notice, but even if she did respond affirmatively to it, our Supreme Court in Williams v. State, 296 Ga. 817 (2015), ‘rejected a per se rule automatically equating an affirmative response to the implied consent notice with actual consent to a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Instead, courts must now conduct a case-by-case analysis, considering the totality of the circumstances.” In this case, the evidence shows Defendant was extremely intoxicated and consistently confused during the police encounter. The evidence presented supports the trial court’s finding that the Defendant did not voluntarily consent to the blood draw.DUI BLOOD DRAW – SEARCH FOR DRUGSJackson v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1807 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 15, 2017) TA \l "Jackson v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1807 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 15, 2017)" \s "Jackson v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1807 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 15, 2017)" \c 1 Judgment: (Affirmed)Defendant was stopped for speeding and the officer believed Defendant was under the influence of some intoxicant. The officer read Defendant Georgia’s Implied Consent and Defendant agreed. The results of the blood draw, showed the presence of narcotics. Defendant claims OCGA 40-6-392(a)(2) does not allow the individual testing the blood to search for any presence of intoxicants other than alcohol. COA disagrees.Holding: OCGA 40-6-392(a)(2) does state, “may withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content therein.” However the analysis does not end there. Under OCGA 50-5-55(a) and OCGA 40-6-392(a) make reference to chemical testing for alcohol or any other drugs in a person’s blood. “The statutory scheme expressly authorizes law enforcement officers to request a chemical analysis of a person’s blood for the purpose of determining the presence of drugs, provided the chemical analysis complies with the requirements of OCGA 49-6-392(a)(1)(A).” The fact that OCGA 49-6-392(a)(2) does not specifically enumerate drugs, does not leave the other statutes inapplicable. MIRANDA WARNINGSState v. Troutman, --- Ga. --- - S16A1858 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 27, 2017) TA \l "State v. Troutman, --- Ga. --- - S16A1858 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 27, 2017)" \s "State v. Troutman, --- Ga. --- - S16A1858 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 27, 2017)" \c 1 Judgment: (Affirmed in part – in custody - reversed in part -voluntariness)Defendant was at the sheriff’s department for 9 plus hours and interrogated on three separate times. The interrogations took place over a 2 plus hour span. At no point during the interrogations did the officers advise the Defendant of his Miranda Warnings. Defendant was searched and told he could not leave during this 9 hour span. Defendant made certain admissions in the third interview and moved to suppress. The trial court found he was in custody in terms of Miranda and that the statements were involuntarily obtained. The trial court thus suppressed the statements. Supreme Court agreed as it pertains to the custody issue, but disagrees as it pertains to the voluntariness of the statements.Holding: Defendant was specifically told he could not leave the police station and should be considered “in custody” for Miranda purposes. To determine whether a confession is voluntary or not within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, there needs to be a showing of “coercive police activity”. “Investigators’ mere failure to administer Miranda warnings does not mean that the statement s received have actually been coerced, but only that courts will presume the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination has not been intelligently exercised.” The Court went on to explain, “the circumstances of the investigation and arrest in the case reveal none of the extreme tactics identified as the hallmarks of coercive police activity offensive to fundamental notions of due process, such as lengthy interrogation, physical deprivation, brutality, or deception.”REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICIONState v. Martinez-Arvealo, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1813 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 17, 2017) TA \l "State v. Martinez-Arvealo, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1813 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 17, 2017)" \s "State v. Martinez-Arvealo, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1813 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 17, 2017)" \c 1 Judgment: (Affirmed)Police Officer was near an intersection running license plates. When the male Defendant drove through the intersection, the license reader hit that “Laura Martinez” the owner of the vehicle had a suspended license. Officer stops the vehicle and cited the Defendant for driving without a license. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, claiming the officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion because the reader came back to a female owner and he was obvious a male. Trial Court agreed and suppressed the stop.Holding: “viewing the totality of circumstances, the officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, provide a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Here the trial court found and the COA agreed the officer lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion for making the stop because the officer failed to note the unlicensed owner’s name and gender on the report and made no attempt to observe the driver’s gender prior to the stop. The COA did state, had the trial court believed the officer’s testimony concerning not focusing on the gender of the owner, the trial court could have properly denied the motion to suppress, but because they found otherwise, the COA is not in a position to overturn the trial court’s decision.SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST – DISORDERLY CONDUCT – FIGHTING WORDSKnowles v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1607 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 21, 2017) TA \l "Knowles v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1607 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 21, 2017)" \s "Knowles v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1607 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 21, 2017)" \c 1 Judgment: (Reversed)Defendant was a passenger in a vehicle. Officer ran Defendant’s identification and it came back he had no outstanding warrants. When the officer gave Defendant back his ID, Defendant told the officer, “Fuck You”. Officer then arrested Defendant for disorderly conduct and searched Defendant. The search revealed a crack pipe with residue. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence based upon the officer had no reasonable suspicion to arrest Defendant as Defendant had not committed a crime of disorderly conduct. Trial Court denied the motion and Defendant appealed.Holding: This case hinges on whether cursing toward a police officer is First Amendment free speech or considered “fighting words” not protected by the First Amendment. “Fighting words are defined as those words by which their very utterance tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. Indeed, as the Supreme Court of Georgia has explained, ‘profane, libelous, lewd, obscene, and fighting words…have in common the characteristics of injuring or offending a particular audience and tending to provoke a retaliatory response.” The COA further explained, “the Supreme Court of the United States and other federal courts have indicated that the fighting words exception to constitutionally protected speech requires a narrower application in cases involving words addressed to a police officer. This is because a properly trained officer may reasonably be expected to exercise a higher degree of restraint than the average citizen, and thus be less likely to respond belligerently to ‘fighting words’”. Based upon there was no evidence other than Defendant cursed toward a properly trained police officer, that alone is not enough to raise to the level of fighting words.IMPORTANT NOTE: The COA distinguished the cases cited by the State: Bolden v. State, 148 Ga. App. 315 (1978) and Brooks v. State, 166 Ga. App. 704 (1983). In both of those cases, the circumstances surrounding the vulgar language were used to incite a riot directed at the officers. I do not read anything in this opinion to overturn these decisions. The case at bar, there was no evidence that any aggressive actions were directed toward the officer other than saying “fuck you”. Court found that is not enough to be considered fighting words.STANDING Courtney v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1668 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 17, 2017) TA \l "Courtney v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1668 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 17, 2017)" \s "Courtney v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1668 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 17, 2017)" \c 1 Judgment: (Affirmed)Investigator monitoring child pornography websites discovered an IP address who was frequenting the website. Based upon this, they subpoenaed the name and address of the IP owner from the internet provider. Defendant moved to suppress this information, claiming that the investigator should have obtained a search warrant and not merely used a subpoena. Holding: “This Court previously has held that an internet service customer has no reasonable expectation of privacy in subscriber information that he voluntarily conveys to an IP, noting that the United States Supreme Court and Georgia appellate courts have held that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily conveyed to another. Accordingly, [Defendant] lacked standing to bring a Fourth Amendment challenge to the search of the internet provider for his subscriber information.” SEX OFFENDER REGISTRYRENEW ADDRESS IN THE COUNTY OF RESIDENCE WITH THE SHERIFFJones v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A2001 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 27, 2017) TA \l "Jones v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A2001 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 27, 2017)" \s "Jones v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A2001 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 27, 2017)" \c 1 Judgment: (Reversed)Defendant was convicted of statutory rape and upon release registered in Gwinnett County. A couple weeks prior to his birthday, he signed a lease on a house in Walton County and began moving his items to that residence. Defendant went to the Walton County sheriff’s office and attempted to register as required. He had to come back the next week, because the normal officer was not on duty that week. He went back and continued the registration process. In the midst of this, when Defendant’s birthday passed, Gwinnett County noticed he did not re-register within 72 hours of his birthday in Gwinnett and took out an arrest warrant. Gwinnett prosecutors provided no evidence at trial that Gwinnett police checked to determine if the Defendant was still a resident of Gwinnett. Jury still found him guilty and Defendant appealed. Holding: “Pretermitting whether the evidence demonstrated a violation of some other portion of OCGA 42-1-12, [Defendant] was indicted under subsection (f)(4) of that statute, which requires that he renew his registration information ‘with the sheriff of the county in which the sexual offender resides or sleeps’ within 72 hours prior to his birthday. The State presented no evidence that [Defendant] was residing or sleeping in Gwinnett County at that time; in fact, the only evidence is to the contrary.”STREET GANG TERRORISM ACTMorris v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1960 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 21, 2017) TA \s "Morris v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1960 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 21, 2017)" Judgment: (Affirmed)Defendant was charged with several offenses, including attempted armed robbery, aggravated battery, and several counts of street gang terrorism. Defendant and co-defendant were accused of going to a house where they have purchased marijuana on prior occasions. Eventually they shot the occupant of the house, before running from the premises. The State produced an expert witness who had reviewed Facebook photographs from before the incident that showed the defendants displaying various street gang symbols and references to the “Sex Money Murder” street gang. The expert also testified to a Facebook post from the defendant after the incident in which he stated, “Yall been waiting on a reply…keep waiting yall will 3 me when yall 3 me…say no more…#BLATT #SMM #GunsUP”. Trial Court found sufficient evidence to present to the jury to determine if furtherance of a street gang.Holding: When determining if a crime was in furtherance of a street gang activities, the courts weigh the following four factors: “(1) [Defendant] was in fact associated with Sex Money Murder; (2) Sex Money Murder was a criminal street gang as defined by law; (3) [Defendant] committed the predicate acts of criminal street gang activity…; and (4) the commission of the predicate acts was intended to further the interests of Sex Money Murder.” A State’s expert testified to the existence of the gang and the fact that the Defendant was associated with it, by way of prior Facebook post and the officer’s expertise and training. As to the fourth factor, the COA differentiated this from Randolph v. State, 334 Ga. App. 475 (2015). Here the Defendant’s Facebook post after the commission of the crime was adequate to show the Defendant was referring to the shooting incident and was in fact in furtherance of Sex Money Murder gang by way of the hashtags. VENUEHoward v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1817 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 01, 2017) TA \l "Howard v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1817 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 01, 2017)" \s "Howard v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1817 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 01, 2017)" \c 1 Judgment: (Affirmed)Defendant was found guilty of various charges including rape and kidnapping with bodily injuries. The facts alleged Defendant took two females to a secluded near Lake Tobesofkee in Bibb County. Neither victim knew the area, but circumstantial evidence was provided that allowed the question of venue to presented to the jury. Defendant now appeals claiming evidence was insufficient for the State to prove venue. COA disagrees.Holding: “As with every other material allegation contained in an indictment, the State must prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt. But the State may do so by circumstantial evidence.” There was evidence presented where the complaining witnesses were eventually located in and around Lake Tobesofkee, which is in Bibb County. There was no testimony that the offenses took place in any other county. Accordingly, the evidence here was sufficient for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that venue for the crimes was in Bibb County.VOIRE DIRESTRIKE FOR CAUSESmith v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1766 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017) TA \s "Smith v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1766 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017)" Judgment: (Affirmed)During voire dire, one juror stated she had a problem with men hitting women as she herself was a victim of domestic violence. When initially asked if her personal experiences would make it difficult for her to be fair and impartial, she stated she did not know how to answer that question. When asked by the trial court if she could make her decision based upon the evidence at trial, she stated she could. She further reiterated she would not hold any biases against the defendant.Holding: “Where, as here, a prospective juror indicates her opinion is not so fixed that she could not set aside an inclination of bias from past personal experience, no abuse of discretion is shown.” Douglas v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1488 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 08, 2017) TA \l "Douglas v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1488 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 08, 2017)" \s "Douglas v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1488 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 08, 2017)" \c 1 Judgment: (Affirmed)Defendant was charged with child molestation. A potential juror stated that he would have problem deciding this case, if the juvenile was forced to testify in the case. The juror further stated, he has two daughters and a granddaughter and it would be difficult to decide this case because his granddaughter is the same age. When pressed, the juror stated if the proof was different, he would have to go with that, but it would be hard.Holding: “a juror who expresses a willingness to try to be objective and whose bias arises from feelings about the particular crime as opposed to feelings about the accused may be eligible for service.” Thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion.IMPORTANT NOTE: It is important to show when questioning the juror to direct their attention away from the type of crime, and more toward the bias directed at the defendant. The questions asked of the juror should have been that he had preconceived opinion about the defendant for making this girl testify. Instead the defense focused on the crime itself.BATSON CHALLENGEClayton et al v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A2147 and A16A2148 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 17, 2017) TA \l "Clayton et al v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A2147 and A16A2148 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 17, 2017)" \s "Clayton et al v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A2147 and A16A2148 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 17, 2017)" \c 1 Judgment: (Reversed)Co-defendants were tried together and their case was combined for appeal. During jury selection, State struck a black juror, who had gold teeth and a prior misdemeanor conviction for theft. Defendants raised a Batson Challenge. The State gave as an explanation for striking the juror: “The juror has a conviction for theft by receiving. This is a theft-related case. The juror also has gold teeth. Now, that’s not a definitive factor, but the fact of the matter is, in general, when I see jurors who have gold teeth that’s – I just don’t like that so I don’t thing that’s race. If they were white and had gold teeth I would have the same reason.”Holding: “The analysis of a Batson challenge involves a three-step process: (1) the opponent of a peremptory challenge must make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination; (2) the proponent of the strike must then provide a race-neutral explanation for the strike; and (3) the court must decide whether the opponent of the strike has proven the proponent’s discriminatory intent.” The trial court properly held that because the juror had a prior conviction, that is a race neutral reason and not subject to Batson. However, as the court has previously stated, “even though the State’s attorney may have given other racially neutral explanations, the trial court’s finding of one racially motivated explanation vitiates the legitimacy of the entire jury selection procedure…if racially neutral and neutrally applied reasons are given for a strike, the simultaneous existence of any facially racially motivated explanation results in a Batson Challenge.” The COA further explained, “Although the State argued otherwise, we cannot ignore the fact that having a full mouth of gold teeth is a racial stereotype associated with African Americans.” Thus even though the juror had a race neutral reason (prior conviction), they also argued a race motivated reason (gold teeth) and thus the trial court erred in allowing the State to strike the juror.CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONSTruong v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1560 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 08, 2017) TA \l "Truong v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1560 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 08, 2017)" \s "Truong v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1560 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 08, 2017)" \c 1 Judgment: (Affirmed)Potential juror admitted to making campaign contributions to the sheriff. Defendant moved to strike for cause. Potential juror explained he could set aside his friendships and base his decision on the facts.Holding: “For a juror to be excused for cause, it must be shown that he or she holds an opinion of the guilt or innocence of the defendant that is so fixed and definite that the juror will be unable to set the opinion aside and decide the case based upon the evidence or the court’s charge upon the evidence.” TOA \h \c "1" \p INDEX OF CASES SUMMARIZEDAllen v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1528 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017)7, 8Barnett v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1892 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017)15Clayton et al v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A2147 and A16A2148 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 17, 2017)23Courtney v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1668 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 17, 2017)20Douglas v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1488 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 08, 2017)22Entwisle v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1782 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 01, 2017)10Gomez v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1529 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 27, 2017)8Harrington v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1545 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 27, 2017)4Howard v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1817 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 01, 2017)22Huff v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1619 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017)14Jackson v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1807 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 15, 2017)17Jones et al v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A2058, A16A2066, and A17A0110 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 01, 2017)15Jones v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A2001 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 27, 2017)20Knowles v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1607 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 21, 2017)19Moore v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A2088 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 01, 2017)7, 11Morris v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1960 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 21, 2017)12, 21Mosley v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1657 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017)13Olds v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A15A0136 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 28, 2017)9Ordelt v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A2084 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 16, 2017)4Plez v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1537 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017)14Polanco v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1622 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 21, 2017)5Roberson v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16G0931 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 27, 2017)10Smith v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1766 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017)12, 22Smith v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1781 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 06, 2017)5, 6Stanley v. State, --- Ga. --- - S16A1636 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 27, 2017)13State v. Brogan, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A2152 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 15, 2017)16State v. Martinez-Arvealo, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1813 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 17, 2017)18State v. Troutman, --- Ga. --- - S16A1858 – GA Supreme Court – (Decided February 27, 2017)17Truong v. State, --- Ga. App. --- - A16A1560 – GA Court of Appeals – (Decided February 08, 2017)24 ................
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