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Beyond Lethal: Firearms and Sub-National State Building in Mindanao
Eddie L. Quitoriano
(Draft, for 20-21 March 2012,V2)
Introduction and Argument
In the United Nations General Assembly First Committee, diplomats are accustomed to negotiating large weapons – armaments whose stockpiles are limited to a few countries and are known to governments. The largely unknown – small arms trade- was not a topic until 2005 when the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 60/68 (“Addressing the Negative Humanitarian and Development Impact of the Illicit Manufacture, Transfer and Circulation of Small Arms and Light Weapons and their excessive accumulation”) addressing the humanitarian and development impacts of small arms.[1] This resolution calls on governments to integrate small arms control into poverty reduction strategies and regulation of small arms in post-conflict peace building.
Globally, hundreds of millions of civilians possess guns more than the two hundred or so defense forces that possess large weapons. It is estimated that since 2001, 200,000 people die of gun-related homicides annually (Peters 2006). The flood of guns raises the firearms discourse from a purely national and military security issue towards general issues of poverty, human rights, public health and social development. In Mindanao, it distinctly raises the issue towards sub-national state building.
Firearms have mutated in consonance with improvements in the tools of the trade. World War I realities changed the configuration of firearms, with emphasis on small size and volume (Stohl, Schroeder and Smith 2007) and through World War II. Around 347 million small arms were produced from 1945 until 2000 and the number of worldwide small arms producing companies has grown from 200 in 1980 to 600 by 2001 (Small Arms Survey 2001). Production takes place in 95 countries of which illicit production takes place in 25 countries in regions such as South Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia, including the Philippines (Small Arms Survey 2001).
Official reports suggest the existence of 910,615 million law enforcement firearms globally but extrapolation techniques show there are approximately 200 million official military firearms of which only 16.3 million have been publicly declared by governments (Karp 2006).
At the first instance, firearms proliferation is best viewed from the point of supply. The world’s five largest producers and exporters – the United States, Russia, Germany, France and Britain – sold US $ 20 billion worth of weapons in 2007 (Gilby 2009). Using Small Arms Survey 2009 data on authorized small arms transfer in 2006 (estimated at US $ 1.58 billion), small arms constitute almost 10 percent of value in global weapons transfers. But financial value itself could be misleading. It is easier to count fighter planes and tanks and what they are capable of doing in big wars but less easy to track the distribution of small arms and how they are used. Between 2006 and 2009, there was an estimated US$ 4.3 billion annual value of authorized ammunitions transfer for small arms and light weapons, excluding man-portable missiles or disposable rockets (Small Arms Survey 2010).
Where the guns go is another critical criterion in examining proliferation. The volume of global arms trading is a monitoring function of the UN Register of Conventional Arms and the UN Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade). The latter relies on reported customs data. As of 2006, statistics at the Comtrade show that 80 percent of global exports comes from no more than 20 countries with the United States at the top of the list (Small Arms Survey 2009). Ironically, the United States also tops the list of importers accounting for 59% of export sales in handguns and 42% of hunting shotguns and rifles (Small Arms Survey 2009). This irony is further emphasized by United States attitude during the occupation of Iraq when, in 2003, it allowed Iraqi citizens to keep only one gun of up to 7.62 mm and offered amnesty and buy back (@ US $ 125 for an AK 47) to siphon off and destroy an estimated 600,000 to 700,000 tons of weapons in circulation (Stohl, Schroeder & Smith 2007). While firearms studies tend to look at the connection of firearms to civil conflict and crime in developing countries, one also needs to look at the appetite for guns in developed countries and how this fuels proliferation.
In the United States, federal regulations on firearms are weaker than the power of states and municipalities to regulate using their own gun laws. The country is ranked number one among 178 countries in terms of civilian possession where there is an estimated 270 million guns in private hands and which means that there are 88.8 guns per 100 people (Karp 2007). In comparison, US defense forces have an estimated 3.05 million firearms while the police forces have an estimate 0.89 million firearms (Karp 2006). From here it is not difficult to understand why almost 60% of homicides in the United States is with the use of firearms. In 2006, 10,225 out of 17,030 homicides were firearms homicides (OAS Observatory on Citizen Security 2011). So too are the number of gun-related suicides that reached 17,002 in 2005 or an annual rate of 5.75 firearms suicides per 100 people ( 2011).
The Middle East has an estimated 13-17 million firearms in the hands of militaries and police forces and 45-90 million in the hands of civilians while Northeast Asian militaries and police forces hold an estimated 22-42 million firearms (Karp 2005). The small arms trade has not only become larger, it has gone global (Cairns 2006). Stockpiles have correspondingly grown in consonance with state formation. Scholars also examined small arms trade and proliferation in Southeast Asia and had to rely on newspaper and magazine articles as well as press releases of foiled small arms movement due to lack of available documentation. More significantly, they found difficulty in obtaining data on legal trade in weapons from East Asian governments due to the treatment of weapons as sensitive information.[2]
States and societies tend to behave differently in regard to function of firearms in state formation and social development. What is seen globally is that firearms that used to be in the hands of colonial, World War I, World War II and Cold War armies, have found their way into the hands of non-state actors and civilians. Some states, like Germany, would abhor the notion of allowing civilians to possess firearms while others, like the United States and the Philippines, would have a tolerant attitude towards firearms possession even as they mark the boundary between legal and illegal possession.
In the Philippines, colonialist expansions of Spain and the United States introduced the muskets, pistols and modern rifles that formed part of the coercive power of the post-colonial Philippine state and, conversely, the weaponry that formed part of the Muslim rebellion and communist insurgency. United States support to the Philippine war against Japan in World War II and post World War II military aid led to American firearms becoming the standard feature of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP). This could be seen from the post-War II adoption of the Cal. 30 Carbine and Garand rifles and Cal. 38 and Cal. 45 pistols as standard weapons of the AFP and the PNP.
In the late 1990s, after the dismantling of U.S. military bases and reduction of US military aid, the Philippine government sought new and cheaper sources of firearms and ammunition. In parallel, private traders (licit and illicit) brought in new models while licensed domestic producers sought licenses to make copies of foreign counterparts. Presently, the licit and illicit markets offer a large variety of small arms that cater to the needs of both state actors and non-state actors and the civilian population. In sum, the firearms market does not seem to discriminate between the state security sector and the civilian population.
Official data on licensed and loose firearms suggest minute differences in pistols and rifles is in the hands of security forces and what is in the hands of the civilian population, except for state monopoly in big war machines such as tanks, fighter planes, combat helicopters and warships. Even the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) derived from 60mm or 80 mm mortar shells and used in indiscriminate bombings of government facilities, public transportation and malls are traceable to their official counterparts in military arsenals.
This study examines the trade in small arms, specifically, the illicit trade in firearms in the Philippines. It seeks to understand the system and structure that allow for the accumulation and proliferation of small arms. This question is relevant to the context of state formation where one of the fundamental interests of the state is to retain monopoly of coercion through control of firearms. Yet, in the Philippines we have a puzzle that confronts us: Why does the state tolerate the proliferation and accumulation of firearms in the hands of citizens and, in turn, why do many of its citizens participate in this shadow economy despite threats of penalties and inducement of violence? I also intend to probe the connection between firearms and state formation and socio-economic development in Mindanao, particularly the role of firearms in horizontal violence, on the one hand, and functioning of local governments, on the other. I argue that Mindanao is at center of national and international public discourse on conflict and peace building, and within the island the association between shadow economies and the illicit trading in firearms to violence is a major factor in dealing with the question of human security. Furthermore, I argue that firearms accumulation and proliferation in the Philippines fulfills a schizophrenic function of supporting sub-national state building, on the one hand, and at the same time, undermining central state authority and functions. This hypothesis is constructed on the assumption that the Philippine state tolerates firearms proliferation and accumulation – both legal and illegal. This assumption can be supported by evidence from primary and secondary data.
I have not encountered a singular paradigm that theorizes the link between firearms and sub-national state formation. Existing theories, in fact, are silent on firearms or that firearms are assumed to be such – a tool in the hands of the state or anti-state actors engage in contests on how the state should be organized. The examination, therefore, should begin with a clearer understanding of the trade in firearms (legal and illegal) and the role of state bureaucracies when the twains meet and then tracing how the firearms are used by different sets of users. Here I limit myself to firearms in the hands of civilians and how they relate to the functioning of the state.
However, this study is far from being a definitive one. As expected, when one deals with the shadow economy of firearms faces, one faces a lot of unknowns and incompletes. There is a dearth of literature that focuses on illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons and its link to conflict and sub-national state building in Mindanao. Among the few related studies are a quantitative and qualitative study on small arms and light weapons possession, demand, supply and regulation (Quilop 2010), the link of guns to private armies and warlord politics in Northern Philippines (Paredes 2010), the link of guns to humanitarian crisis in Central Mindanao (Quitoriano & Libre 2001) and the general problem of small arms proliferation in Southeast Asia (Rizal 2004).
Methodology
I have tried to deal with these limitations by drawing upon the works of the following scholars to explain the phenomenon and find answers to the central research question:
• Statis Kalyvas (2006) posits a theory of violence, a theory of selective violence within the main cleavages of civil war. Within the frame of civil war theory of collaboration and defection to offers of denunciation and exercise of control by political actors, Kalyvas argues that selective violence is a joint product of political actors, on the one hand, and civilians seeking to avoid the worst but also seeking opportunities provided by the situation. The theory takes from the argument that civilians are rational and are sensitive to rewards or punishment; political actors, on the other hand, choose where, when and what type of violence to employ.
• James Scott (1972) look at corruption and violence as alternative expressions of political influence – the former being peaceful than the latter and Paul Hutchcroft (2000) reinforces this argument by saying that, in practice, the two reinforce each other in effective ways. Hutchcroft further argues that the formal authority in the Philippines is much more weakly defined (compared to other Southeast Asian countries) thus explaining the existence of ‘extra-bureaucracies’ and the lack of coherence between and among the various parts and within each part of the bureaucracy. This thesis aids in understanding how, when the firearm is treated as a commodity and its administration as subject of rent seeking, undermines the strengthening of bureaucracies and militaries.
I took three steps in undertaking the study: first, generating primary data from key actors in the illicit trade in firearms using the life history method and multi-sited ethnography approach; second, generating secondary data from official sources to establish longitudinal on firearms and selected data on state functions in public administration, social services and economic support; third, comparative study of two extremes between the conflict prone municipality of Talayan (Maguindanao) and less-conflict prone municipality of Naawan (Misamis Oriental). The two municipalities respectively form part of the ARMM and Northern Mindanao (Region 10) and regional data are also available for comparison.
Examining the illicit trade in firearms is easier visualized in cinema or viewed from the global arena than properly understood in urban streets and rural villages. “We use a chainsaw to break the legs of those who break the code of silence and harm us,” says one facilitator and study storyteller who works for a high-ranking officer in the Philippine National Police (PNP).
I begin the study with an examination of the illicit economy – the nature of the “goods”, the structure and system of the trade and the incentives and ties that bind the actors whose legal identifies are either unknown to or protected by each other. I adopted and adapted the multi-sited ethnography and life history method or what Janet MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga (2000) describes as “conversations.” The use of “conversations” has precedence in anthropological studies (Gudeman and Rivera xxxx). Other scholars (e.g. Sandra Kouritzin, writing for the TESL Cana Journaurevue TESL Du Canada) would focus on life history as the focus itself of the study rather than means to another end as used by MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga. Kouritzin would use the life history as a method to examine the individual’s understanding of a phenomenon rather than an examination of the phenomenon itself (but strongly differentiates research from journalism).
I also draw from Massey (2005) who argues that space is a product of interrelationships constituted through interactions and the sphere for the co-existence of distinct trajectories. In this case study, I look that the illicit trade as a space that connects various actors under a co-existent relationship with but each with independent trajectories. As argued by Falzon (2005), it is not about the perspectives of the actors but about the space itself being the center of the actors, the connections and the associations.
From John Law’s (1991) network analysis, I focused on firearms and not any other illicit good. Law argues that the social is not only made up of humans but also of the material – that objects mediate social relations or that social structure also reside in material arrangements. The network analysis puts emphasis on particular goods, firearms in this case, and not just any good. It also highlights the non-hierarchical character of network transactions, as against hierarchical market transactions. But given the limitations of measurability from life history accounts, I triangulated the information with official data, both current and historical.
Dealing with actors operating outside the law and with lethal goods such as firearms is a risky undertaking and such risk is an un-declared mutual sentiment of the researcher and illicit actor. McGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga gained the trust of informants on topics that varied from passports to music CDs and food. Firearms are an entirely different game because of their extrapolative value and lethal impact. I chose to adapt and use the “mediated conversations” approach - a “trialogue” where I exist as the unknown listener to a face-to-face dialogue between my intermediary and the resource person. The subjects – illegal firearms traders – speak for themselves and the biographies would be used as reference for documenting social context, social processes and inter-dependent lives.
I proceed with the intuition that the trade would be less understood without examining the ethnography of the actors and that the people best suited to describe the less-known phenomenon are the actors who are themselves involved in the trade. From the “mediated conversations” I draw an understanding of the phenomenon rather than the life of the illicit traders. Open-ended questions were used to allow space for the resource person to come in and out of the conversation over bottles of beer, a billiard game or mundane anecdotes about mistresses and SUVs. I monitored the conversations from a safe distance with the use of SMS or quick mobile phone calls. The subjects set the rules for agreeing to converse: anonymity, non-disclosure of traceable events and extreme measures in case of non-fulfillment of the conditions. I have not seen any of my subjects face to face.
Firearms Proliferation in the Philippines and the Place of Mindanao
There is no definite figure that represents the total volume of small arms and light weapons in the Philippines. What is directly observable is the number of registered firearms in the records of the Firearms and Explosives Division (FED) of the Philippine National Police. As of 2006, the estimated number is around 1 million. This is distributed as follows: 45% in the hands of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), 15% in the hands of private security agencies and 40% in the hands of private citizens (Quilop 2010). There are varying estimates in the number of loose (or unregistered) firearms. The Philippine Center for Transnational Crimes (PCTC) puts the number at 320,000 as of 2006. Other organizations would argue on higher figures: 1.2 million loose firearms as of 2006 according to PhilANSA and 4.2 million loose firearms as of 2002 according to the Geneva-based Small Arms Survey. , an international advocacy group estimates 3.9 million firearms (with only 775,000 registered) in the hands of civilians making the Philippines 20th among 178 countries with the most number of firearms in civilian hands.[3]
The Philippine Firearms Law recognizes the legal right of citizens to bear arms and merely distinguishes legally registered firearms and loose firearms (if they are not registered). Penalties are imposed against persons possessing unregistered firearms or carrying registered firearms without a permit. In short, the regulatory environment tends to focus on legal and illegal possession and legal and illegal carrying. Illicit trading, per se, is not covered by existing legislation.
In 2001, Eddie Quitoriano and Eric Libre (“Reaching for the Gun: The Human Cost of Small Arms in Central Mindanao, Philippines,” Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies. Vol. 16, No. 2, pp. 13-40) examined the human life-security consequences of small arms by looking at the connection between reported deaths in hospitals and type of guns or bullets causing the wounds or deaths. The study further examined the connection between guns, wounds and deaths with the ethnic origins of the victims over a specific period of time (e.g. January-November in North Cotabato – 86% of reported deaths and 53 % of injuries were due to small arms; in Cotabato City (hospital records) during the April 29-September 17, 2000 period, injuries from small arms directly affected men more than women (76% among Muslims and 93% among Christians) and between groups, more Muslims (58%) than Christians. Small arms trade was examined at the macro level based on published sources. Local trade (of locally manufactured arms) was examined based on key informant interviews.
In 2010, Aritha Kira Paredes (“Where Guns Rule: Private Armies in Abra,” in Santos, Soliman and Santos, Paz-Verdades. 2010. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies) examined the link between guns and private armies to political structures and processes in the province of Abra (Northern Luzon). Although the methodological approach is not explicitly defined in the study, the literature suggests use of key informant interviews where the anecdotal evidence was matched with statistics generated from news clippings.
Media statistics on crime, drugs, violence and armed conflict usually reveal the connections to small arms and the corresponding consequences to human life. But beyond the lethal, there is as yet no examination of the connection of illicit trade in small arms and light weapons to sub-national state building in Mindanao.
Where is Mindanao in all of this? Studies undertaken by scholars of conflict and sub-national state building in Mindanao reveal the complex economic and political processes that frame the problem of persistent violence in the region. These include analysis of the links between economics and conflict in Mindanao (Concepcion, Sylvia et al. 2003), clan feuds and conflict management in Mindanao (Torres III, W.M. 2007), raiding, trading, foraging and feasting in Southeast Asia (Junker, L. 1968), analysis of the links between Mindanao’s informal, illegal, parallel and/or shadow economy to conflict persistence (Lara, F. and Champain, P. 2010), analysis of colonial and postcolonial construction of the state and how they shape the political landscape of Mindanao (Abinales 2000) . This meant, among other things, that we explore how violence that appears endemic in a shadow economy shape the way small firearms proliferate.
Violence and the Shadow Economy
In Illicit markets, weak states and violence: Iraq and Mexico, Phil Williams (2009) argues that illicit markets and criminal organizations should not be isolated from the broader political context in which they are embedded. He further argues that violence in illicit markets may not be only related to the particular illicit commodities being trafficked but also from the political, social and cultural context in which criminal organizations are operating.
In Illicit markets and violence: what is the relationship? Peter Andreas and Joel Wallman (2009) stresses the selective nature of violence and argues that violence is instrumental rather than random and gratuitous where the targets are market participants rather than state actors or the general public.
In Contraband and violence: lessons from the Southeast Asian case, Eric Tagliacozzo (2009) stresses the function of history and context in understanding violence in smuggling of contraband. He argues that violence is linked with major lines of commerce and where the space for violence is created when state or proto-state authority is not present. He further argues that context – such as standard of living and value systems – influence the proneness of violence over certain types of contraband.
Lara and Champain (Inclusive Peace in Muslim Mindanao: Revising the Dynamics of Conflict and Exclusion. International Alert, 2009) underscore the function of legal and illegal firearms as a traditional and non-traditional source of revenue in the shadow economy of Mindanao and how they form part of the interplay of vertical and horizontal violence. In the same study, the authors highlight illegal firearms as a resource in elite bargains – between national and clan-based local elites in Muslim Mindanao – and the persistence of horizontal violence within the main cleavages of the vertical conflict. A classic example would be the during the rule of the Ampatuan clan over the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and Maguindanao Province and warlord power and proliferation of firearms was tolerated by national elites in exchange for delivery of votes.
Citing Lara and Champain, Gabi Hesselbein (“Development as State-Making -Patterns of Resource Mobilization and the Underlying Elite Bargain: Drivers of State Stability or State Fragility,” Crisis States Centre at the London School of Economics, 2011) further describes elite bargains in the Philippines within the frame of what North et al (2008) and North (2009) describe basic “low access order” (LAO) where the state exists as the most durable organization that maintains stability but agrees to a division of labor and sharing of power with specialists of violence.
Guns in the Philippines
The Philippine legal framework on firearms could be argued as “made in the USA.” The first law regulating firearms possession, importation, acquisition and transfer was enacted for the Philippines by the American legislature in 1907.[4] In 1983, during Martial Law, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued the first Filipino legislation – by Presidential Decree (No. 1866) – to codify all laws pertaining to firearms, explosives and ammunition. In 1986, after the overthrow of the Marcos regime, the new President, Corazon Aquino, issued Executive Order No. 107 calling for the surrender of loose firearms, ammunitions and explosives with offer of benefits. In 1990, she followed through with National Emergency Memorandum Order No. 6-1990, which provided a period for General Registration of Firearms. Correspondingly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) issued Circular No. 9 calling for the annual verification of firearms and to combat proliferation of loose firearms. In 1993, Executive Order No. 122 provided for the surrender and licensing of loose firearms and establishing of a central records unit.
The first formal act of Congress on firearms was in 1997, the enactment of RA 8294 commonly known as the Firearms Law of the Philippines and is an amendment to Presidential Decree No. 1866. Under the Firearms Law, a person gets a prision correctional (maximum period) and a fine of PHP 15,000 for illegal manufacture, dealing, acquisition, disposition or possession of a low power firearm (up to Cal. 32 and Cal. 38); a prision mayor (maximum period) and a fine of PHP 30,000 for high powered firearms up to Cal. 45; and an arresto mayor for any person carrying a licensed firearm outside residence without legal authority.
The Firearms Law is in fact liberal on gun ownership and on penalties for violations of the law. Any private individual who could show a certificate of employment or Income Tax Return, a professional who can show a professional license, a businessman who can show a business name, balance sheet and profit and loss statement or even a senior citizen who can show a Senior Citizen’s ID Card and provide proof or document that he or she is under threat, can own a gun. Civilian can own one low powered rifle and low powered pistol. Officers of the PNP or AFP can privately own one low powered rifle and one pistol or revolver of any type or caliber. The PNP Firearms and Explosives Division (FED) provides the guidelines, procedures and documentary requirements. For those who have no time to go through the procedures, there are gun shops and private individuals who offer facilitation services for a fee. And for those who are not familiar with guns but wish to own one, they could just ask their neighbors, scan the pages of “Buy and Sell” ad magazine or browse online in sites such as .ph.
In short, the law is lenient on gun ownership but seems to be ineffective in controlling the proliferation of loose firearms. The volume of firearms has been accumulating since the anti-colonial wars, through World War II and the post-World War II insurgencies and rebellions. The Aquino and Ramos administrations issued orders for surrender and registration of loose firearms but these were apparently less-than-successful. Up until 2003 and 2004, then President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued a succession of executive orders calling for the surrender of loose firearms.
Gun holding is a legal right and citizens avail of this right, apparently, by any means if only to reduce the cost of transactions; which is why, executive orders also tend to be repetitive in calling for the surrender of loose firearms. But it is one thing – and the subject of this study – to understand how and why firearms proliferate in the shadow economy.
In 1990, there were 458,264 registered firearms before the Presidential National Emergency Memorandum (PNEMO) No. 6 cancelled all licenses. When the government issued an amnesty program in 1993, only 328,322 firearms were registered while another 130,042 went underground. Twenty years later, in 2010, official data from the FED shows an estimated 1.9 million loose firearms of which 73% are in Luzon, 19% in Mindanao and 8% in the Visayas. In Luzon, the bulk of loose firearms (1.1 million) are in Metro Manila. It is not known how the estimates are measured. By FED classification, any firearm that is not registered or licensed is considered loose.
Fig. 1. Registered Firearms, 1990-2008
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Licensed firearms are traceable. They are bought from licensed gun dealers, as prescribed by law. From 1990 until 2008, 757,752 firearms were bought from gun dealers and duly licensed by the FED. This represents an annual acquisition and accumulation of 57,904 units.
If we add up the number of registered firearms and estimated number of loose firearms we get a staggering figure of 2.8 million firearms in the hands of private individuals. This is equivalent to providing sidearm to soldiers of 283 army divisions. Converting the same number to financial value we get a staggering low of PHP 141 billion (@ PHP 50,000 per unit) or a high of PHP 283 billion (@ PHP 100,000 per unit). Later we examine why citizens spend so much for a non-basic commodity especially under conditions of protracted public grievance against high prices of basic commodities, tuition fees or public transportation. It is also worth noting that the largest concentration of firearms (licensed and loose) is in Luzon Island with 70% in Metro Manila.
Regional Distribution and Density of Firearms in Mindanao
Official data show that there are 492,268 firearms in the hands of private individuals in Mindanao (134, 018 licensed or 14.4% of national total and 358,250 loose or 19% of the national total). Within Mindanao, the largest concentrations would be in the ARMM (32%) and Central Mindanao (17%). The two regions alone hold almost 50 percent of total firearms in the island. Relatively lower concentrations are in Region 10 (12%) and Caraga Region (12%) of the total.
As of 2010, around 2% of the national population would have a loose firearm and another 1.7% would have a licensed firearm. The highest density would be in Metro Manila with 9.03% of the population having both a licensed and loose firearm. In Mindanao, the highest density would be found in the ARMM and Central Mindanao with 2.3% and 1.5% of the regional populations owning a licensed and loose firearm, respectively.
Fig. 2. Population to Firearm Ratio
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In fact, based on data of registered firearms from 1990 to 2008, the licensed firearms-to-population ratio alone has grown from 129:1 in 1990 to 56:1 by 2008.
Findings: The Ethnography of the Storytellers
The strongest persuasion on the subject was that he or she would not be telling about herself but about the phenomenon of illicit trade. The topic of the conversation is not about the person but about the person’s perception of the phenomenon of illicit trading.
Indirectly, I “conversed” with four actors in the illicit trade in multiple sites – Davao City, Cagayan de Oro City, Cotabato City and Quezon City and xxx actors in the licit trade.
1. Storyteller # 1 is a “broker” based in Quezon City who is in the active service with the PNP as a non-commissioned officer. He is 36 years old, College Graduate and a pastor of a religious group. He has a wife and several mistresses to support financially. He brokers for a big player – a high-ranking officer in the state security sector – who does business with a big player from Malaysia. The business brings in three shipments annually via the southern ports. The conversations were held on July 3 and 10, 2011.
2. Storyteller # 2 is gun collector - a 50-year old businessman and real estate broker who has a dual residence in Davao City and Cebu City. He belongs to an informal group of gun-collectors and lovers of big cars whose members range from 35 to 65 years of age. These are well-off professionals and businessmen who socialize via encounters in gun clubs and shooting ranges. The average inventory of a collector is 20-30 units that are both for personal use and high-end trade. All guns are licensed. He differentiates collectors from gun enthusiasts who have less in their inventory. Gun collectors represent 10% of private gun holders in the city. The conversation was held at his residence on July 19, 2011.
3. Storyteller # 3 is a media observer, a freelance Journalist from Cagayan de Oro City. He tells the story about the Paruhinog private armed group and Kuratong Baleleng, the Danao firearms supply and the connection between the two using Ports 3& 4 of Cebu and Ozamis City port. The conversation was held at Bo’s Café in Cagayan de Oro City on July 14,2011.
4. Storyteller # 4 is a facilitator and transporter. He calls himself Akmad (not his real name), 28 years old, former CAFGU and facilitator and transporter illegal firearms since 2005. His CAFGU handler initiated him into the trade, beginning with minor roles at first then proceeding to more regular transactions. As facilitator, he bridges buyers to his suppliers. At the time of the conversation, he just consummated five transactions with a price margin of PHP 5,000 per transaction. As transporter, he moves firearms in the Municipalities of Mamasapano, Datu Saudi Ampatuan, Datu Unsay Ampatuan and Shariif Aguak. He emphasizes that he operates only within the areas protected by the Ampatuan clan. He moves the goods between 7-8 AM when the police are not yet in their posts. For small-scale transactions (pistols up to 5 units), he would deliver the goods to public places like waiting sheds, restaurants, coffee shops and public markets. For large-scale transactions (e.g. high powered rifles), he would be given specific instruction on where to deliver the goods. In his experience, the favored drop-off points are near or along highway structures constructed by the government or humanitarian agencies. The first conversation was held at the house of a common acquaintance on July 16, 2011 and the second at a restaurant in a public market on July 20, 2011, all in Cotabato City.
The conversations are usually repeated twice or thrice in varying lengths. The longer ones are often interrupted by bottles of beer, a game of billiard, dinner or urgent calls from wives and mistresses. So too are the topics of the conversation. They are usually interrupted with mundane stories about women, cars, sex, and ‘knocking’ power of guns or lifestyles of gun buyers.
I also had mediated “conversations” with four gun dealers operating in Metro Manila. One thing they have in common is kinship with people who are members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) or the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), except one who learned the trade from a gun supplier.
1. Informant # 1 is a former member of the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) group of the PNP and an operative of the Firearms and Explosive Division (FED). He began his gun business as early as when he was still with the FED. The conversation was held on August 1, 2011.
2. Informant # 2 is a 39-year old businessman, married with two children and a college undergraduate. His father, who was in the Philippine Navy, taught him how to use a gun since he was in grade school. It was his cousin, a former member of the Philippine Army and a gun dealer who brought him into the business. He uses his earnings from the gun business to set up a grocery store.
3. Informant # 3 is a 46-year old businessman, married with 3 children and a college undergraduate. He and his brother are practical shooting enthusiasts. His main business is in furniture and interior design but his brother brought him into the gun business.
4. Informant # 4 is a 44-year old businesswoman, married with 5 children and a college undergraduate. She has been in the gun business for 11 years now. She started as a facilitator (processing of documents) for a gun supplier until she carved her own network of clients. She sells guns to complement the income of her husband. She also sells ammunition, accessories and color alterations for handguns.
The conversations with legal gun dealers had been designed to get a view of the illicit trade from the perspective of licit traders. The data also yielded information on trends in legal firearms proliferation in the hands of civilians.
The scope of secondary data gathered includes official statistics on legal and illegal firearms, crime index and state of state services in education, health and economic support services using proxy indicators of outcomes such as level of competency in the elementary education (based on mean percentage scores or MPS in the National Achievement Tests for Grade VI), business registration and capitalization, local investments and revenue generation. The scope of secondary data aims to provide evidence on the topics of state functions in security and protection and delivery of basic services and economic support.
The third set of data consists of comparative analysis of qualitative and quantitative data pertaining to extreme cases – the conflict prone and high gun holding municipality of Talayan (Maguindanao) and the relatively peaceful and low gun holding municipality of Naawan (Misamis Oriental). The extremes criteria is based on official and unofficial data on firearms volume and density and historical proneness to conflict but with the safeguard of, first, identifying what is common between the two: both are rural, both are of similar LGU income class (4th class municipality) and annual IRA receipts.
The firearms trade is a largely assumed phenomenon and little is actually known of the illicit dimension – the actors, the structures governing their relationships and the incentives that bind them into the very specific commodity: firearms. Here I aim to demonstrate the porosity of the two economies, including the existence of hidden structures within the state and their complicity in the proliferation of loose firearms not only in rents from legal authority but also in augmenting the supply side of the market.
Official and unofficial data on firearms proliferation and accumulation, both legal and illegal. This presentation aims to support the argument that a greater volume of firearms is in the hands of civilians and this possession is suggestive of the functions of security and protection that either is derived from the absence of the state or the self-governance functions of proto-states. The statistics are corroborated by qualitative data from life history accounts and purposive interviews.
Comparative data from the extreme case comparison. Here I aim to describe the parallel phenomena of firearms proliferation and state functions in fundamentals of governance and other variables such as administrative, social, economic and environmental governance.
Licit Arms Trade
Upon examination, the legal arms trade (see Table 1) tells us the following:
• The volume of legally traded firearms indicates a growing demand for higher-end types and models (with prices in the range of PHP 100,000 to PHP 400,000) and an aggregate number that could be extrapolated from the number of gun dealers and the average number of units traded annually;
• The demand for higher-end units come from politicians, businessmen, professionals (from lawyers, doctors to accountants), police recruits and gun enthusiasts;
• The ethnography of legal traders suggest close connection to the security sector and have access to supplies from the FED;
• The prices of licit firearms are prohibitive to low-income groups.
Official statistics suggest a much larger volume of firearms in the shadow economy. Data from Mindanao suggests two things: one, the market is segmented where low income groups go for low-priced types and models and gain access to higher-end models from dole outs or temporary provision from politicians; two, that the licit and illicit markets in firearms intersect at the higher-end types and models where ‘old boys’ clubs of businessmen, politicians and professionals trade types and models for projection of status and power.
Table 1. Licit Firearms Trade: the Legal Traders’ Perspectives
|Key Questions |Informant 1 |Informant 2 |Informant 3 |Informant 4 |
|Volume traded | 5 digits a year |15-20 units per year |20 units per month |50-70 units per year |
| |from government | | |(high end units) |
| |contracts; | | | |
| |at the FED, 300 units | | | |
| |daily | | | |
|Brands sold |Norinco |Colt |Norinco |Armscorp |
| |Taurus |Taurus |Colt |Danao |
| |Para Ordnance |Glock |Taurus |Para Ordnance |
| | |Sig |Sti |STI |
| | |Para Ordnance |Sig |FN |
| | |Benelli |Smith and Wesson |MP5 Finger Cutter |
| | |Remington |Kimber |Karatay |
| | |Akkar |Akkar |Shezei |
| | | |Remington |Bushmaster M16 |
| | | |Benelli |Tavor TR 21 |
| | | |Browning |AK 47 |
|Type of firearms |Pistols, |handguns |handguns |handguns |
| |semi-automatic rifles, |shotguns |shotguns |rifles |
| |shotguns, | |rifles |submachine guns |
| |automatic rifles | | | |
| |submachine guns | | | |
|Type of clients |Government |Businessmen |Businessmen |Politicians |
| |Government officials |Friends |Professionals |Businessment |
| |Businessmen |Gun enthusiasts |Gun enthusiasts |New police recruits |
| |Gun enthusiasts |Professionals | |Doctors |
| | | | |Lawyers |
| | | | |Accountants |
| | | | |Gun enthusiasts |
| | | | |celebrities |
|Prices |PHP 100,000 + for |PHP 30-40,000 for Glock and |PHP 14-25,000 for a |Armscorp – PHP |
| |automatic rifles and |Taurus |Norinco handgun |16,500-PHP 72,000 |
| |submachine guns |PHP 100,000 for Colt and Para|PHP 30-40,000 for a Taurus|Danao Uzi – PHP 16,000 |
| |PHP 7,000 to PHP 10,000 |Ordnance |handgun |Para Ordnance – PHP |
| |for facilitation of |PHP 100,000 for Benelli and |PHP 80-130,000 for a Para |88-126,000 |
| |licensing |Remington |Ordnance |STI – PHP 135-235,000 |
| | |PHP 20,000 for Akkar |PHP 80-100,000 for a Colt |FN Cal. 57 handgun – PHP|
| | |PHP 18,000 for those made in |PHP 40-200,000 for an STI |430,000 |
| | |China |PHP 100-120,000 for a Sig |MP5 Finger Cutter – PHP |
| | | |PHP 90-170,000 for a |240,000 |
| | | |Kimber |Karatay – PHP 16,900- |
| | | |PHP 20-30,000 for an Akkar|25,000 |
| | | |PHP 100,000+ for Remington|Shezei MP – PHP 105,000 |
| | | |and Benelli |Shezei Checkmate – PHP |
| | | |PHP 60-80,000 for a |235,000 |
| | | |Browning |Bushmaster M16 – PHP |
| | | | |235,000 |
| | | | |Tavor TR 21 - PHP |
| | | | |500,000+ |
| | | | |AK 47 – PHP 65,000 |
| | | | |Norinco HP 5.56 rifle – |
| | | | |PHP 85,000 |
|Source of supplies |International suppliers |Foreign supplier |Foreign suppliers |FED storage |
| |ARMSCORP for local | |FED storage | |
| |stocks | | | |
Fig. 3 illustrates the trend in legal gun purchases during the last two decades. It is worth examining why legal acquisition went up in 1996 during the signing of the MNLF-GRP Peace Agreement and dived low in 2000 when the government declared an all out war against the MILF. I would venture to argue that, given the high concentration of firearms in Luzon, public confidence was low on the peace agreement and conversely, public confidence went up when it saw government at work on security in 2000.
Fig. 3. Guns Purchased from Gun Leaders, 1990-2008
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Illicit Trade in Firearms
The illicit trade in firearms is anchored on the supply-demand equation of the market with at least three layers on the supply side and three layers on the demand side (see Fig. 4). The actors in each layer carry the risks and costs tied to a specific commodity that bind their relationships. The space between supply and demand is a non-hierarchical bargaining field where the final price of the commodity is determined by several factors: transaction costs, negotiating ability of the intermediaries and seasonal highs and lows of demand. The supply side is characterized by complicity of firearms regulators and law enforcement officers whose actions are determined by the amount of authority and persuasion of the key actors – in the form of official authority where the power to enforce rules and regulations is convertible to cash. Within the frame of what North et al (2008) and North (2009) describe as “low access order” this rent is exclusive to certain elites within the police and military establishment. However, in the Lara and Champain’s (2010) description of elite bargains and interplay of vertical and horizontal conflict in Mindanao, national political elites can choose to step back and, instead, tolerate the illicit trade flows to local warlords in exchange for votes.
Anecdotal accounts from illicit actors and legal traders suggest that, outside of those smuggled from abroad, the supply of firearms could emanate from surplus inventories of the security forces (such as unreported captures) or field-level supplies actually or fictitiously lost in battle.
Fig. 4. Structure of the Illicit Trade in Firearms, Philippines
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The illicit trade system is porous. Licit firearms become illicit when the license is not renewed. Illicit firearms could also surface as licit supply depending on access to firearms information and providers of alteration services who own and operate marking machines and supply of spare parts. In fact, with the widespread availability of spare parts, one could assembly a weapon and variably chooses to dispose of the same in the licit or illicit market depending on opportunity and price gain. The firearms information system (FIMS) at the FED is not like poverty statistics or data of births and marriages that could be publicly accessed. In 1993, when the government proclaimed an amnesty program for unlicensed firearms, only 328,322 firearms were registered out of the 458,264 firearms previously registered and illegalized in 1990. The serial numbers of 130,042 firearms that were not registered could be transferred to other firearms.
The supply side of the system is woven by rents from legal protection or non-exercise of authority and the dialogue between persons of authority and illegal intermediaries. Brokers connect the supply side to the demand side, also for a fee. The demand side, on the other hand, is characterized by a multi-functional but not necessarily interconnected set of actors. They could range from security agencies that have legal licenses to accumulate personnel but aim to save on cost of weapons, politicians who aim to expand spheres of influence during election campaigns, ideological groups that seek to challenge the state or plain civilians who aim to fill gaps in state protection against crime. In short, the supply side of the equation does not care who is on the demand side. What matters is the price and gain from the transaction.
Fig. 5. System of the Illicit Trade in Firearms, Philippines
[pic]
Fig. 6. Function-Based Incentive Structure of the Illicit Trade in Firearms
[pic]
Legal traders are aware of the system and structure of the illegal trade. In fact it is a cause of concern as it directly competes with the legal trade notwithstanding the fact that some legal traders also benefit from the porosity of the market. The common view is that the illicit market is fueled by citizens’ perception of gaps and weaknesses in state protection (see Table 2). The same is reinforced by hidden structures within the state – a blurred collection of entrepreneurs operating within mandated offices and ranked authority. On field, government soldiers or police become enterprising enforcers by declaring loss of weapons and ammunition or converting confiscated weapons into commodities. This is often done with the awareness that the commodity crosses over to individuals or groups that expand the domain for which gun laws and security laws are formulated. Although some actions may be deemed as individual enterprise unknown to higher ranking officers, the proliferation of such actions could not have occurred without the tolerance, if not, complicity of higher officers.
Table 2. Illicit Trade in Firearms: Legal Traders’ Perspectives
|Key Questions |Informant 1 |Informant 2 |Informant 3 |Informant 4 |
|What fuels the black market |Inability of the police |Inability of the police to |Convenience in |Daily accumulation of |
|in firearms? |to enforce laws; low |protect citizens; civilians |transactions and price; |loose firearms; home |
| |salaries and training |protect themselves |self protection |made guns and technology|
| | | | |and services for |
| | | | |alteration of serial |
| | | | |numbers |
|Why is gun smuggling |Weak border controls; |Government cannot even |Weak border and customs |Weak border controls |
|unabated? |graft and corruption |control pirated DVDs how much|control | |
| | |more for guns? | | |
|What is the estimated volume |Hard to estimate but the|Various sources: foreign |There are sources: |40% of loose firearms go|
|of loose firearms flowing to |sources are military |supporters and vested |military surplus, weapons|to Mindanao; some FED |
|Mindanao? |surplus and weapons |interests, military surplus, |lost during military |officials are complicit |
| |“lost” during military |weapons during military |operations, support from |to issuance of transport|
| |operations |operations |foreign organizations; and|permits (e.g. for the |
| | | |there are media reports |Ampatuans) |
| | | |that the government is | |
| | | |supplying weapons to | |
| | | |rebels | |
|What accounts for firearms |There are rumours that |Desire for self-protection |Intentional declaration of|50% of loose firearms |
|flows from legal to illegal? |the government is supply|because of inability of the |loss; availability of |are due to non-renewal |
| |weapons to insurgents |police to protect citizens |technology and services |of licenses; alteration|
| | | |for alteration of serial |of FIMS data from legal |
| | | |numbers, barrels, etc. |to loose |
Comparison of Extreme Cases
First let us take a look at the regional picture, between ARMM and Region 10 (Northern Mindanao) where Talayan (Maguindanao Province) and Naawan (Misamis Oriental Province) belong:
• Region 10 has less (68,745 licensed and loose firearms) and ARMM has more firearms (134,392 licensed and loose), in terms of volume.
• Individual access to loose firearms is higher in the ARMM (31:1) than Region 10 (102:1) although the density of licensed firearms to population is relatively equal with little disparity in volume (20,203 in the ARMM and 26,514 in the ARMM).
• As of 2010, life expectancy is shorter in the ARMM 57.9 years for males and 61.8 years for females, the lowest in the country although this is an improvement from 10 years ago when, on average, males died at 55.5 years old and females at 59.3 years old; also then, the lowest life expectancy in the country. Comparably, Region 10 males die at the age of 65.3 and females at the age of 70.6. In both regions, male die earlier than females.
• Curiously, comparing child (5 years and below) and infant (below 1 year old) mortality paints a different picture when we look at the rates. For infants, ARMM has progressed from 55 in 1998 (per 1000 live births) to 4 in the 2000-2006 period. Region 10 has also progressed from 41 in 1998 to 10.5 by 2006 but not as radically as the ARMM. For children, ARMM has progressed radically from 98 in 1998 to 6.5 between 2001 and 2006. Region 10 has a slower progress from 65 to 15 during the 2000-2006 period.
• We look at gun-related crimes. The NSCB Statistical Yearbook data for 2010, gives us a picture of declining volume of gun-related crimes in the ARMM (from 144, 134 and down to 82 from 2008 to 2010) and the inversely proportional increase in gun related crime volume in Region 10 from 113, 265 and 418 during the same period.
Nationwide, there were 3,303 gun-related crimes with 3,489 firearms used in 2008, 4,711 crimes with 4,894 firearms used in 2009 and 5,779 crimes with 6,075 firearms used in 2010. Consistently, 99.5%, 99.4% and 99.3% of firearms used in the respective years were illegal firearms. Understandably, more than 50% of the crimes would be committed in Luzon corresponding the volume of firearms in the island. Mindanao contributes a fourth to the national crime volume.
Fig. 7. Gun related crimes, ARMM and Region 10
[pic][pic]
Northern Mindanao contributed 0.03%, 5.56% and 7.2% to the national crime statistics during the same period while ARMM contributed 4.3%, 2.8% and 7.2% of crimes, respectively, during the same period. Despite variances in crime volume, the two regions exhibit the same consistency: more than 99 percent of crimes were with the use of illegal firearms.
• The decline in crime volume, improvement in life expectancy and radical reduction of infant and child mortality would either reflect (or contribute to) favorable household conditions for child education ( state education services being the necessarily complement). However, 2006-2011 data from the National Education Testing and Research Center (NETRC) of the Department Education show that the ARMM and Maguindanao lag behind the national mean and Region 10 performance in National Achievement Tests (NATs) for Grade VI pupils.
Fig. 8. Comparative NAT Data based on Mean Percentage Scores (MPS), 2006-2011
[pic][pic]
Source: NETRC, Department of Education
Regional data is difficult to compare due to the variability of influences of provinces, cities and municipalities and between urban and rural areas. Hence, I took two sample municipalities – Naawan (Misamis Oriental) and Talayan (Maguindanao) - where I first established a common denominator: rural, LGU income class (4th class) and roughly similar IRA. Then I look at the extremes: conflict prone-relatively peaceful; larger territory-smaller territory; inland-coastal; larger population-smaller population; and, more firearms-less firearms.
Table 3. Basic Profiles, Talayan and Naawan, as of 2010
| |Naawan |Talayan |
|Year Established |1957 (55 years old) |1976 (36 years old) |
|Income Class |4th |4th |
|Population |19,955 |25,753 |
|Land Area |954.88 (hectares) |14,384 (hectares) |
|No. of Barangays |10 |15 |
|No. of Households |4,089 |4,758 |
|IRA Share |PHP 34.6 M |PHP 38.7 M |
|Local Revenues |PHP 6.3 M |PHP 0.84 M |
|Other Revenues |PHP 156,516 |PHP 15.8 M |
|Total LGU Income |PHP 41.07 M |PHP 55.3 M |
Source: DILG-LGMPS 2010
For comparison, I used variables related to state building and functioning. I used the latest (2010) Local Governance Performance Management System (LGPMS) data from the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). The LGPMS looks at local governance performance using key variables such as: Fundamentals of Governance, Administrative Governance, Social Governance, Economic Governance and Environmental Governance. The level of performance is measured according to a gradated scale of 1 to 5, 1 being the lowest and 5 being the highest (or excellent). The performance rating is self-administered but based on key reference data. Although there is wide room for error in self-administered surveys, I used this data because of its comparability and standardized methodology.
Talayan. As is common in Philippine sub-national state formation, Talayan, a former barangay of Datu Piang (Maguindanao Province), is a product of gerrymandering to accommodate political clans that need their own local government territories. The municipality was created in 1976 and since 1977, one clan – the Midtimbang clan – wielded local power.
Table 4. Succession of Local Executives, Talayan, 1976-2010
|1976 Sept – 1977 Feb |Tong Utina Datu Piang (caretaker) |
|1977 Feb – 1986 August |Datu Udzaq Midtimbang |
|1986-August – 1995 June |Datu Udzag Midtimbang |
|1995 July – 2004 June |Datu Udzag Midtimbang |
|2004 July – 2010 June |Hadji Datu Ali Midtimbang |
|2010 July – till present |Tongkang Midtimbang (son of Datu Ali) |
There are five big clans in the municipality: Midtimbang, Umal, Baganian, Pangalao and Kasim. The Umal and Midtimbang clans are perennial enemies. In 2012, feuds emerged between the Kasim and Midtimbang clans. However, the Midtimbang clan remain at the upperhand. Of the three adjacent municipalities of Datu Odin Sinsuat, Datu Anggal Midtimbang and Guindulungan, two are dominated by the Midtimbang clan and one is dominated by the Sinsuat clan.
The town hosts three camps of three armed groups, two affiliated with the MILF and one private group which functions like a mini-government that regulates access to land and behavior of citizens. The commander of one of the MILF camps, Kumander Wahid, comes from the Midtimbang clan.
Each camp has weapons caches on top of firearms in each of close to 5,000 households. Firearms prices are prohibitive and are apparently beyond the income capacity of families but people always find means of acquiring one or two for each family. Ammunition is readily available at a price of PHP 30 for a Cal. 38 and PHP 45 for a Cal. 45 pistol. One bullet alone represents half the daily wage from informal farm labor and a high powered rifle could cost the equivalent of one carabao a crucial asset of rural farming households.
Firearms and ammunition traders find it easy to transact business because law enforcement is hardly present; and, in some cases, the same weapons and ammunition could be purchased from moonlighting law enforcers. It is estimated that nine percent of weapons in the town are un-registered. Based on anecdotal evidence, people save surpluses from harvest income in order to purchase firearms.
There is no record of crime in significant proportions relative to national or regional crime indices. There was a rido-associated massacre of one family in 2007 and an ambush against local government officials in 2008, all affecting members of Midtimbang clan and all allegedly perpetrated by an opposing political clan. The other recorded violent conflicts were associated with the AFP-MILF armed confrontations in 2000, 2003 and 2008.
Although there is an uneasy co-existence between the Maguindanao (70% of the population) and the Teduray (30% of the population) families, the weapons in their hands are not proactively used to radically change the imbalance. The Teduray’s recognize their minoritization and have decided to adopt Islam as their religion. Likewise, they either provide support to the MILF by becoming combatants of the nearest base command or force multiplier during heights of conflict with the government. In the upland village of Fukol, the Tedurays comprise the majority of the population and have been seeking support from a local NGO for their ancestral domain claim or CBFM application but have encountered administrative bottlenecks beginning with the refusal of the local government to endorse their application. The grievance is there, they are armed, but they don’t shoot their way to seek redress. The rational approach is to avoid direct armed confrontation and threat of annihilation while reserving the armed capacity to resist.
The economic and psychological premium given to firearms tend to be much higher than the premium given to expectations from the local government in regard to essential services such as health, education and economic development. The Mayor’s clan control agricultural credit and trade. It also controls the local business sector, almost absolutely running un-registered enterprises, including a gas station. In fact, only one trading enterprise is listed in the business registry of the town – an enterprise owned by the cousin of the Mayor who lives in the adjacent municipality.
Naawan. The municipality is a former barangay of Initao (Misamis Oriental) and was created in 1957. The first inhabitants were indigenous peoples who were later displaced during Spanish Christianization and waves of resettlements during the American colonial period. In fact, the name is derived from “Nahawaan” (lit. “abandoned”) referring to the displacement.
Its natural endowment is being in the coastal zone and access to two cities (Iligan City and Cagayan de Oro City) where industries and businesses offer opportunities for employment and trade. Unlike Talayan, there are no anti-state armed groups or proto-state organizations. The CPP-NPA tried to penetrate the municipality in the early 1980s but this initiative was short-lived due to military debacles and the internal purges in 1985. Most people would remember CPP-NPA presence as a big-bang promise immediately turned to a nightmare. CPP-NPA attempts in the 1990s to restore relations by offering compensation to victims of the purges did not prosper.
Also, unlike Talayan, since its creation, Naawan local power has liberally transferred from one family to another without physical coercion or threat of force and neither with the power of the clan. This is evidenced by the following succession of local chief executives since 1957:
• Paulino Ong (1957; appointed by President Carlos Garcia)
• Galicano Cosing
• Domingo Gaid
• Salvador Legaspi
• Alfredo Ratunil
• Sulpicio Laranjo
• Clemente Lim
• Erlinda Niere
• Dennis Roa
• Jaime Roa (uncle of Dennis Roa; since 2010)
This is not to argue that patronage politics is absent in Naawan. There is but this patronage is forms part of post-election incentives (such as opportunity for contractual jobs, disposition of the IRA and other political favors). Patronage is preceded by vote capture either in money or persuasion (derived from charisma, social standing or religious affiliation) but not by the use of armed coercion.
Comparative Analysis: Volume and Function of Firearms
The Naawan and Talayan cases demonstrate extremes in contexts and functions of firearms. In Naawan, only a few people own firearms. There were 16 registered guns prior to the PNEMO in 1990 and only four (4) were registered back when the amnesty was proclaimed in 1993. The gun owners are mainly those who hold public duties or those who are in business. In contrast, in Talayan, there is a proliferation of firearms across all sections of the population. Inferring from anecdotal accounts, the Talayan firearms could range from 5,000 to 15,000 in the hands of civilians, 300 to 1,500 in the three military camps of non-state armed groups, including the MILF and 50-100 in the municipal LGU (police and bodyguards of elected officials) and 150 in the barangay LGUs (based on a minimum of 10 CVOs per barangay).
Anecdotal accounts of gun holders (see Table 5) suggest that what is significantly common among the two cases are the function of firearm as a tool for protection against threats. Thereafter lies the difference. Gun ownership in Talayan is widespread. The function of protection is more specific against cattle-rustling, government military and rido opponents with indications of proto-state back up from organized groups. There are at least three armed groups with separate military camps in Talayan, two associated with the MILF and one independent. The commander of the independent group performs proto-state functions such as allocation of land and delivery of agriculture services.
The number of owned guns also vary with Naawan gun owners limited to one firearm while Talayan gun owners having an average of three with the common ambition of owning a high powered rifle or the opportunity of acquiring one from politicians. This occurs during elections when clans vie for what Lara and Champain (2010) describe as “winner take all” contests for political power and when competing clans offer high powered firearms (in addition to money) as incentives to followers (and threat to opponents).
The basis of ownership also varies. In Naawan, ownership is based on income and ascription of the gun to social status. In Talayan, gun owners use hard-earned savings and looking at the level of production and income, the tendency to sacrifice basic needs for food, health and education for children in order to acquire firearms. On the other hand, firearms function as an asset that could be converted to cash during family emergencies.
While the two cases indicate protection as a common element in gun ownership, Talayan strongly suggests variability in functions such as: passive protection where state protection is absent, active protection, self-enforcement in defiance of state authority, auxiliary support to proto-states and reserved asset in case of emergencies. Active protection and self-enforcement are also evidenced by the preference to high- powered rifles. In contrast, Naawan gun holders tend to use firearms as reserved protection in case the state fails to function against crime and social status but they generally owe allegiance to the state to the extent of providing auxiliary support to mandated authority. This allegiance and support is evidenced by lack of interest in high-powered rifles that is normally perceived as defiance of state authority.
Table 5. Firearms owners in Naawan and Talayan: Comparative Criteria of Preferences
|Questions |Talayan (Maguindanao) |Naawan (Misamis Oriental)[5] |
|Why do you buy firearms? |Protection against rido |Necessary as a bodyguard; I envy another who |
| |Protection against cattle rustling |has one |
| |Protection against thieves (cattle rustlers) |Protection and social status as a public |
| |Protection against military intervention (by the |official; you get a sense of power |
| |AFP) |Accessory as a member of the barangay |
| |Defense against bad elements and against |intelligence network (BIN); protection against |
| |oppression by our Moro brothers |robbers |
| |Protection against cattle rustlers, rido and AFP|Status symbol; protection against bad elements |
| | |To gain respect and prevent crime |
|What type of firearms do you buy? |M16, Carbine and Cal. 45 |Cal. 45 and Cal. 38; registered with permit to |
| |M16, Carbine and Cal. 45 |carry (PTC) |
| |M16, Carbine, Cal. 45 and Minimi |Cal. 45 with PTC |
| |M16 and Cal. 45 |Cal. 45 with PTC |
| |M16, Carbine, Cal. 45 and Minimi |Cal. 45 with licence |
| | |Cal. 38 with PTC |
|When do you buy? What conditions make you |I save for it from income during harvest time |Buy and sell for profit |
|decide to buy a firearm? |I save income from coconut and corn harvest | |
| |As soon as I have enough savings from coconut and| |
| |corn income; no matter what the price is | |
| |It is a need so we really save for it | |
| |We collect from members (of the group); we save | |
| |from income from harvest | |
|When do you sell? What conditions make you|I don’t, not even for dowry. The gun is important|When the price is high |
|decide to sell? |to me. | |
| |I use it as collateral for a loan during | |
| |emergency (hospitalization) | |
| |I use it as collateral for a loan (from traders | |
| |or politicians) during emergency | |
| |I sell during emergency (hospitalization) | |
| |I sell during emergency (hospitalization) | |
|How often do you change the type or model |When I have money I go for a high powered rifle | |
|of firearm? |If there is information about the new model and | |
| |when I have the money | |
| |We get information from the military on new | |
| |models and then we buy to prepare for war | |
| |The Mayor lends us the firearm when he needs | |
| |protection | |
| |I get a new model when I am on duty at the | |
| |municipal hall; before it took three years | |
| |before you can hold a new model but now, after | |
| |the arrest of the Ampatuans, there’s plenty of | |
| |new models | |
Comparative Performance in Governance
Here I examine five variables, namely: (a) Fundamentals of Governance; (b) Administrative Governance; (c) Economic Governance; (d) Social Governance; and, (e) Environmental Governance.
In LGPMS language, fundamentals of governance pertain to financial accountability, transparency and citizen participation. Fig. 9 shows the wide disparity between Naawan and Talayan where the latter shows relatively poor performance in financial accountability and transparency and fair performance in citizen participation. In contrast, Naawan shows high performance in all attributes.
Fig. 9. Comparative Performance in Fundamentals of Governance
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Administrative Governance is measured using indicators such as revenue generation, local legislation, customer service, development planning, resource allocation and utilization and human resource management and development. Fig. 10 shows that Naawan has excellent performance in all indicators except a lower score for local legislation. Local revenue generation in Naawan is about 14% of total income compared to Talayan’s 2.2 percent. In terms of volume, Naawan local revenues is six times higher than that of Talayan.
| |Naawan |Talayan |
|Year Established |1957 (55 years old) |1976 (36 years old) |
|Income Class |4th |4th |
|Population |19,955 |25,753 |
|Land Area |954.88 (hectares) |14,384 (hectares) |
|No. of Barangays |10 |15 |
|No. of Households |4,089 |4,758 |
|IRA Share |PHP 34.6 M |PHP 38.7 M |
|Local Revenues |PHP 6.3 M |PHP 0.84 M |
|Other Revenues |PHP 156,516 |PHP 15.8 M |
|Total LGU Income |PHP 41.07 M |PHP 55.3 M |
Fig. 10. Comparative Performance in Administrative Governance
[pic]
Talayan shows poor performance in revenue generation, local legislation and customer service. Business processing procedures are either not clear to entrepreneurs or that the latter are afraid of competing with clan monopoly of businesses. Key informants say that only one business enterprise is registered in the municipality – a trading firm owned by the cousin of the Mayor; and yet, it is publicly known that the Mayor’s clan owns the gasoline station, lending and trading enterprises and other businesses. In contrast, Naawan receives an average of 50 business applications per year in addition to an average of 150 renewals. Anecdotal accounts also suggest that the income from the cedula (residence tax) is used by the Mayor as patronage to barangay officials. The Municipal Treasurer issues the cedula booklets to barangay officials and no longer expects the income generated from the issuances.
In 2010, Talayan’s total income was PHP 55 million or PHP 14 million higher than that of Naawan. This was driven by PHP 15.8 million described as “other revenues”, which pertain to non-IRA receipts that include Government Funded Program/Project (GFPP), Congressional Allocation (CA), Loans and Grants Funds (LGF) and Off-Budget Funding (OBF) spent for devolved functions. In 2003, a total of PHP 25 billion in non-IRA budgets were spent for devolved functions of which PHP 17 billion was spent for or transferred to municipalities (Soriano, Steffensen, Makayan and Nisperos 2005). Talayan could have benefited from the transfers from CAs and GFPPs that could be easily generated through political patronage or lobby. In 2003, legislators had access to PHP 15.6 billion for CA of which 70.5% was channeled to municipalities. Also in the same year, 70.6% in ODA funding was channeled to municipalities.
Economic governance performance is about the government’s ability to provide support services to economic sectors. For rural municipalities, it is about support to local businesses and industries and agriculture, fishery and forestry. Fig. 11 shows the very poor performance of Talayan – a manifestation of neglect, compared to the almost excellent performance of Naawan (as evidenced by growth of local enterprises and generation of local revenues).
Fig. 11. Comparative Performance in Economic Governance
[pic]
Social governance performance pertains to government support for housing and basic utilities, education, health, peace and security and disaster risk management (DRM). Fig. 12 shows the relatively poor performance of Talayan in housing and basic utilities and education but relatively high performance in health and peace and security and DRM. The excellent performance of Naawan is verifiable from recorded data at the municipal and provincial health offices and in the data reference of the municipal Comprehensive Development Plan. None of this could be accessed at the Talayan Municipal offices. The Mayor has instructed offices not to give data to NGOs. I was able to access data from the Maguindanao Provincial Health Office where the recording of morbidity for Talayan starts in 2000 and available information is up to 2004. The recorded data does not match anecdotal accounts and other data sources. For example, there were 5 recorded cases of child malnutrition in 2003 and 2 in 2004. Malnutrition is generated from measurements of body mass index (BMI) using heights and weights. This is done by Barangay Health Workers (BHWs) where weigh-ins are scheduled at the barangay centers. Key informants suggest that BHWs do not even have weighing equipment. They do not even have the incentive to work because the Municipal Midwife gets 50 percent of their PHP 300 monthly allowance. Also in 2003, there were 15 recorded cases of malaria among children that was reduced to 1 by 2004. Again, this data does not match anecdotal accounts suggesting that the municipal health office does not take blood smears for sampling. An NGO operating in the highland barangay of Fukol distributed 200 mosquito nets to one barangay alone due to high incidence of Malaria.
Fig. 12. Comparative Performance in Social Governance
[pic]
Environmental governance performance is measured using two indicators: urban ecosystems management and freshwater ecosystems management. Fig. 13 shows the relatively poor performance of Talayan, even very poor in regard to urban ecosystems, where ‘urban’ refers to the town center.
Fig. 13. Comparative Performance in Environmental Governance
[pic]
Conclusions
The shadow economy of firearms in the Philippines is not, in the intuitive sense, completely outside the law. In fact, the supply side is abated by, if not, sustained by the complicity of hidden structures of the state or what Scott (1972) Hutchcroft (2000) describe as informal or ‘extra bureaucracies’. I argue that this is more structural than individual in nature. The legal framework and regulatory structure is not impervious to inner-state complicity given the secluded, low profile but high monopoly of the FED in firearms regulation. The existing legal framework also tolerates firearms accumulation that has is off the mark of existing modernist policies such as land reform, fisheries reform, ancestral domains or public private partnerships. The legal framework tends to treat firearms as tradeable commodity rather than its affiliation to state building.
Although it is difficult to make a statistical correlation between firearms proliferation and functioning of the state in regard to fundamentals of governance, administration, social services, environmental management and economic support services, quantitative and qualitative data from the extreme-case comparison suggests the following:
• Proliferation of firearms in the hands civilians is a manifestation of what Kalyvas (2006) describes as a bounded rationality of civilians; civilians, like the Tedurays of Talayan choosing to owe allegiance to local warlords and other political actors to avoid retaliation and, conversely, civilians in Naawan choosing to owe allegiance to the state, even supporting its security functions simply for the absence of organized threats from non-state actors. In both cases, the other measures the benefit from absence of punishment, in the other, the multiplicity of benefits from good social, economic, administrative and environmental governance.
• The statistics on gun-related crimes and the general preference to use illegal weapons in the commission of crime also support the rational behavior of civilians, the avoidance of risk of penalty for homicidal violence.
• The proliferation of illicit trading in firearms is abated by rent-seeking behavior of mandated authority and corruption in the administration of the firearms law and the treatment of firearms as a mere commodity.
In summary, the accumulation and proliferation of firearms in the Philippines symbolizes a political schizophrenia with the central state tending to lose grip of the function of firearms state building and social development. At the sub-national level, it encourages non-democratic growth and clan-based monopoly of political power that cursorily neglects other state functions related to social and economic development and environmental governance. The duality reinforces warlord politics and local cleavages that are debilitating to social and economic development and human security in general.
Possible Recommendations
• GPH accession to the UN Program of Action on tracing, marking and reporting.
• Public decommissioning of confiscated weapons to reduce leakage back to the black and grey markets.
• Legislative oversight of the FED and promotion of transparency in firearms trading and registration.
• Explicit inclusion of firearms trading in the campaign against corruption.
• Strengthening law enforcement and deterrence against criminality.
------------------------
Initial List of References
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Annex 1. Definition of Terms
To ensure comparability with similar and future studies, this study adopts the international definition of small arms and light weapons, marking and what constitutes illicit in this category of goods. On December 8, 2005, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the “ International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace,
in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons.” This instrument puts forward the following definitions:
• Small Arms and Light Weapons - any manportable lethal weapon that expels or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, excluding antique small arms and light weapons or their replicas. Antique small arms and light weapons and their replicas will be defined in accordance with domestic law. In no case will antique small arms and light weapons include those manufactured after 1899.
• Small Arms - broadly speaking, weapons designed for individual use. They include, inter alia, revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns.
• Light Weapons - broadly speaking, weapons designed for use by two or three persons serving as a crew, although some may be carried and used by a single person. They include, inter alia, heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of a calibre of less than 100 millimeters.
• Tracing - the systematic tracking of illicit small arms and light weapons found or seized on the territory of a State from the point of manufacture or the point of importation through the lines of supply to the point at which they became illicit.
• Small arms and light weapons are considered illicit if:
a) They are considered illicit under the law of the State within whose territorial jurisdiction the small arm or light weapon is found:
b) They are transferred in violation of arms embargoes decided by the Security Council in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
c) They are not marked in accordance with the provisions of this instrument;
d) They are manufactured or assembled without a license or authorization from the competent authority of the State where the manufacture or assembly takes place; or,
e) They are transferred without a license or authorization by a competent national authority.
• Marking. The UN instrument provides that the choice of methods for marking small arms and light weapons is a national prerogative. However, States must ensure that whatever method is used, all marks required under the instrument are on exposed surface, conspicuous without technical aids or tools, easily recognizable, readable, durable and, as far as technically possible, recoverable.
• Tracing – the systematic tracking of illicit small arms and light weapons found or seized on the territory of a State from the point of manufacture or point of importation through the lines of supply to the point at which they became illicit.
• Trafficking. Illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons is covered by the “Protocol Against Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition,” adopted by the UN General Assembly on May 31, 2001. If runs third of two other protocols in line with the November 2000 UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime; the others are aimed at stopping the smuggling of migrants and the trafficking in persons, particularly women and children. Illicit trafficking means circumvention of the agreement that States mark each legally produced, exported and imported weapon with identifying information and to set up proper licensing and authorization procedures for the commercial export of firearms. The protocol distinguishes law enforcement related to illicit trade in firearms and arms control related to government sale of firearms and weapons. The protocol entered into force on June 3, 2005 and is the only global legally-binding instrument that addresses the issue of small arms.
• Broker
• Transporter
• Facilitator
*****
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[1] The Netherlands led the ranks of sponsoring states. With 177 votes in favor, only one country – the United States- voted against it.
[2] Bedeski, R., Andersen, A. & Darmosumarto, S. (1998). Small Arms Trade and Proliferation in East Asia: Southeast Asia and the Russian Far East. Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, Working Paper No. 24, September 1998.)
[3] Httph://firearms/region/Philippines: accessed 05 March 2012.
[4] Act No. 1780 or “An Act to Regulate the Importation, Acquisition, Possession and Transfer of Firearms and to Prohibit the Possession of Same Except in Compliance with the Provisions of this Act” enacted in 1907.
[5] Naawan informants: retired policeman, public official, municipal councilor, credit investigator and a CAFGU member.
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