Aristotle, Virtue and the Mean: Introduction

De Gruyter

Aristotle, Virtue and the Mean: Introduction Author(s): Janet D. Sisson Source: Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science, Vol. 28, No. 4, ARISTOTLE, VIRTUE AND THE MEAN (December 1995), pp. vii-xxi Published by: De Gruyter Stable URL: . Accessed: 29/04/2014 03:37 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@. .

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AristotleV,irtuaen? theMean: Introduction

JanetD. Sisson

In 1994,theeditoriabl oardofAPEIRONissueda callforpapersfora specialissueofthejournalon AristotleV,irtueand theMean.Current interesitnvirtueethicsas an approachtomoralthinkinigs increasing, anditseemedappropriatteoexaminean ancientsourceinwhichvirtue andthedistincvtirtuesforma basisforethicaltheoryT.heideawas to reconsideAr ristotle'tsheoryofexcellencein character(?thika?rete)a,s distinctfromhis doctrineofpracticalwisdom,and in particularthe centradloctrintehatvirtueisa dispositiontochoosethemean.Theboard ofAPEIRONwereverypleasedwiththeresponseandtheinteresotfthe paperssubmitteda,ndthisvolumeis theresultofthatcall.Thepapers werewrittenseparatelya,nd respondto a generalclimateofopinion, rathetrhantooneanotherT.hisintroductioonwesfarmoretothemthan canbe indicatedbymerereferenceasn; ymistakeisntheinterpretations oftheindividualpapersaremyresponsibilitaylone,due I hopetono morethana needtoteaseoutsomeinitiatlhreadfs roma fascinatinwgeb ofdiscourse.

BooksII toV oftheNicomacheEanthicasreconcernedwiththeparticularmoralexcellence(s?thikairetai)A. ristotlfeirsdtiscussesthegeneral definitioonf?thika?retei;nII 6,hearguesthatitis'a stateconcernedwith choice,lyingina meanrelativetous,thisbeingdeterminebdyreason (horismenlo?gi ?ia)ndinthewayinwhichthepersonofpracticawl isdom (phronimows)ould determiniet/1Moralexcellencesare distinguished

1 QuotationasrefromtherevisedOxfordtranslatiown,ithoccasionasllightemendationsofmyown.

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viii JanetD. Sisson fromintellectuvalirtueisnthattheformearretheexcellenceosfthatpart ofthesoulwhichdoesnotpossessreasona,lthoughitmayberesponsive toit.2Intellectuavlirtuesaretheexcellenceosftherationasloul (orthe soul consideredpurelyas rational)w, hilemoralvirtuesarerelatedto passionandactionn, eitheorfwhichbelongtothepurelyrationasloul.3 Aristotlgeoeson tosaythat?thika?reteis also a tendencyto findand choosemeansofrelevankt indsandthatitisthereforaemean'inrespect ofitssubstanceand theaccountwhichstatesitsessence/

Opinionshavediffereodn thephilosophicailnteresatnd usefulness ofthisaccountofmoralvirtueas an excellencethatliesina mean.All thecontributortos thisvolumeconsiderthatcriticismosfAristotle's thesiscanbe answered,and thatethicalthinkinigs thericherforthe incorporatioonfinsightdsrawnfromAristotled'siscussionofthevirtues.

Someofthequestionsthatariseare:Is Aristotlev'siewonethatgives a trivialf, ormadl escriptiont,hatneedsto be supplementedby some fulleraccountoftheactualprincipleson whichsomeonemightact? Whatis thehowsthatis to be determinebdy thephronimoWs?hatis meantbytheexpression'relativetous'?Does Aristotlev'siewofethics dependtooheavilyuponthepreconceptionosfitstimetobe ofinterest today?Is itrelativistiAc?ndisitthereforoebjectionableO?rdo wehave somethingtolearnfromAristotlaeboutethicalresponsesand variant ways ofregardingour livesand our relationswithothers?Can our understandinogfethicsbe illuminatebdydiscussionofAristotlev'sery specificthesisthatvirtueliesina mean?

Two aspectsofChristianconceptionosfethicscontrasstharplywith Aristotle'asccount.In thefirstplace,ethicsis viewedas a matterof principlest;heTen Commandmentasre perhapsthecentralexample here.Theyare specifics,tatable,ruleslaid down forbiddincgertain actionsunderanycircumstanceSsi.rDavidRossviewedtheseprinciples as internalizepdrimafacieduties,andthesehadthesameformasltructureas a setofmoralrulesinthesensethattheyweretobe followedon everyoccasiona,ndjudgemenwt asrequiredonlywhendisobediencteo onedutyoranotherwas unavoidable.I4n Aristoteliaenthicst,hereare

2 EN 113,cf.PlatoRepublicIV. 3 DiMmma III 4,429b22ff9,,432b26ff. 4 W.D. Ross,TheRightandtheGood.(Oxford:ClarendonPress 1930)

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AristotleV, irtueand theMean:Introductionix no codesofrules,and theonlyguidetojudgemenotffereids thelogosof thephronimoSse.condly,t5heChristianvirtuesare each opposedto a singlevice,so theyforma pairofcontrariews,hileon Aristotle'vsiew thespecificallmy oralvirtueasreopposednottoonebuttotwopossible vices,whichformtheextremebsetweenwhichthevirtueinquestionis a mean.

It thereforseeemscogent,froma perspectivleikethatofRoss,to criticizeAristotlfe orignoringtheroleof principlesof moralityT. he lackofsuchprinciplese,xceptperhapsin thecase ofjustice,appears obviouswhenone readsAristotlferomtheperspectivoefa Kantian viewofethicsw, heredutiesaregroundedinCategoricaIlmperatives. Nothingplays theroleof an imperativein Aristotle'ssystemR: oss disguisesthisin thathe frequentluysed 'rule'to renderlogos,in his olderOxfordtranslationso, thatAristotlseoundedmorelikea modern deontologistT.hiscriticismpresupposedthatprinciplehs ave a foundationalrolein moralityI.fwe are to chargeAristotlwe ithignoring principlest,henwe needindependenrteasonsforbelievingthatprinciplesshouldnotbe ignored.

Theassumptionthatrulesofconductarecentratlomoralityisclearly questionableT.o theparticularismmoralityis beststudiedbyattention to whetherparticularkindsofbehaviourare to be recommendedin particularsituationasnd tojustificationgsivenin thoseexactcircumstancesn, otbya searchforgeneralrulesofconductt; herearenoeasily followeda,uthoritativTeen Commandmenttshatapplyin all,or even mostsituationse,xceptwherethesearisefromconsideratioonfa wide arrayofcases.6

J.E.Tilesin'ThePracticaUl tilityofAristotle'DsoctrineoftheMean' arguesthatthedemandforprincipleosfconductrestson a misapprehensioni:tis oftenthoughtthatconformittyomoralstandardsis like conformittyolaw,thattheactionsofa moralpersonshouldbebasedon a universalprincipleo,ne thatcould (in principleat least)be stated withoutreferencteoparticulaprersonsp, laces,timesorcircumstances. In Tiles'sview,thisis nottheway thatAristotleapproachesmoral

5 DennisMcKerlieremindedmeoftheimportancoefthiscontrast. 6 Amongrecentparticularistosn, e maymentionJonathanDancy,whoseMoral

Reason(sBlackwel1l993)giveswide-ranginsgupporttothepositionw, ithdiscussionofRoss'sviews.

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x JanetD. Sisson reasoningH. is approachis to lookat particularcircumstanceIsn. his developmenotfthetheoryofvirtueh, e is nottryingtodiscoverrules, buttogivea wayofdescribinigna simplifiewd aythecomplexprocess ofcomingtoa decisiono,rmakinga judgementa,midthecomplexitoyf actualsituationsP.articulasrituationrsequireparticulaarnswersw, hich involveweighingup allthedifferenastpectsinvolved.

InTiles'sview,Aristotlea'spproachtoethicsis distinctivedlyifferent fromthatofmostmodernwriterst;hedifferencleisebothinmeta-ethics, as we have alreadynoted,and in theoverallunderstandinogfhow philosophyis tobe conductedA. reethicaltheoriestobe regardedas purelyinvestigationosfconceptsand logic?Whatdifferencdeoes it makethatethicabl eliefsarenotmerelytheoreticablu, tarepracticalt,hat theyinfluencdeecisionsandactions?

ForAristotlep,racticatlhinkinigs importantldyifferenftromtheoreticatlhinkingsc: ienceisconcernedwiththeuniversalw, hilepractical reasoningmustbe concernedwiththeparticularI.n termsfamiliarin modernphilosophyo,ne cannotmakethisdistinctionin: science,true generalprincipleasrecorrectonlyifeveryinstantiatioins true,while inpracticatlhinkingif,D iswhatis tobe done,thenitmustbe possible to producea generalruleR oftheformg: ivencircumstanceQs, C2, ... Cn,do D. IftheruleR is tobe a principleofactionthathas moral weighti,twillbe universali,nthesensethatitdemandsthatinevery relevantlysimilarsituationD is also the actionof choice.Universalizabilityis notmeregeneralityb,utplacesa constrain(ta necessary conditionu)pontheacceptabilitoyfprinciplesif,itistobecomea guide toaction.One wayis touse somesuchdeviceas a KingdomofEnds, or some equivalenttheoreticaclonstructionto, distinguishbetween principleson formalgrounds.Alternativelyth, econstrainmt ay be appliedby individualsto themaximsoftheirown conduct,so that eachasks:ifI wereon thereceivingend ofthisconducth, ow would itseemto me?How wouldI judgethesituationW? oulditseemfair to all involved?Such an approachis indeed an effectivwe ay of presentinmg oralmattersy,etitis notthelogicalbutthesocialforce oftheuniversalizatiotnhatmatters.

Criticallyw,e maynotethatinneithercaseis theremorethana test ofproposedmaximsforindividualactionss,o thatitbecomeshardto seehowa principlbeyitselfprovidesa justificatioTnh. isleadsus back to Aristotlef;orhim,as formodernparticularistjsu,dgementasbout casesgroundtheguidingprinciplesn,otthereversea; degreeofmoral imaginationn,otformarligourf,ormtshesecurebasisforactionV. irtuous characterasre thosewho perceiveactualcircumstancews itha

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