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Conflict in International Politics:A Literature Review Ryan Timothy JacobsUniversity of North Carolina, WilmingtonINTRODUCTIONIn the field of political science, large-scale conflict, and its resolution is analyzed through several different lenses. The theory of war however, tends to be rooted in classical and neorealist theories and focuses on security and power. Both domestic and international conflicts can also be analyzed through the dependency paradigm. At the same time, theories of conflict resolution that exclude force with the exception of deterrence theory, are rooted in institutionalism, and focuses on learned cooperation (game theory), sanctions, international law, and other international mechanisms for resolving stemming conflict. Constructivism, on the other hand, tends to focus on more abstract elements such as ‘collective memories’ and identify politics. By utilizing research, the following will analyze and compare the different theories, and their ability to describe, analyze and predict outcomes and resolution to real or potential conflict. In addition, levels of analysis are broad and deepen the scope of each theory. The current article will describe how each level of analysis changes the way that conflict is viewed through these various theories. The theories will help guide a comprehensive analysis of international conflict, markedly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, conflicts in the Middle East, and rebel organizations. Concluding with conflict management and resolution approaches, it will purport the necessary mechanisms to achieve resolve of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, include negotiation and decision-making strategies apropos to the Middle East, and indicate the necessary actions that must be taken towards rebel organizations. THE DEPENDENCY PARADIGM: Realists & NeorealistsAs a response to human nature, classical realism was first introduced in the work of political thinkers such as Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. Author of The Prince, Machiavelli was accredited as the first important realist, emphasizing the use of force. Classical realism has four main assumptions to system-level international relations theory. First, classical realists argue that the states are the main actors in the system. Secondly, they purpose that all of the states are rational, unitary actors. Thirdly, classical realists contest that all of the rational, unitary main actors or states, pursue their own interests. The interest of the state is power; and this ultimate determining factor of the state is equivalent to security. Furthermore, in classical realism power is fungible; meaning military power and economic power are mutually interchangeable. To classical realists, the state of human nature is anarchic, and there is no international order; therefore, there is no central structure or authority which exists to resolve interstate disputes. Lastly, since all states pursue their own interests (i.e. power) without centralized authority, there will inevitably be conflicts of interests among the states. Realism is best illustrated in the conquests of early civilizations, such as the Ancient Greeks, Romans, and other well-known empires. The fall of the Ottoman Empire brought about the first proliferation of states in the world. After the armistice, on October 31st, 1918 power quickly shifted into the gathering of states to form alliances against one another. Moreover, when it comes to foreign policy, other theorists argue that realism does not provide enough meaning to understand international politics. For realism, theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason. It assumes that the character of a foreign policy can be ascertained only through the examination of the political acts performed and of the foreseeable consequences of these acts. Thus we can find out what statesmen have actually done, and from the foreseeable consequences of their acts we can surmise what their objectives might have been. To better understand international relations, other theories can be beneficial in understanding not only political facts, but nonpolitical facts. It can also provide other reasoning behind statesmen’s actions besides that of power.As neorealism suggests, structural constraints, as opposed to that of motivation, strategy, and egoism are the determining factors in international relations. Although it shares the belief in the anarchic state of nature, neorealism suggests that the number of powers within the international system shapes the behavior of states. In addition, because of states limit of power, the concept of a “balance of power” and the “security dilemma” are central to this theory, as well as time in history. The “security dilemma” which suggests that as states look to protect themselves (internally and externally), it will make other states insecure and increase their desire to defend themselves which will then create a threatening environment as states increase their external power by forming alliance with other states. More so, the “balance of power” exists in a multipolar world between nations which determines whether war will be severe or limited. This is best explained through the building of alliance which led to the two great world wars. For nearly half of a century, it had seemed that the Second World War might possibly be the “war to end wars” between the great powers in the world. Depicting the end of conflict, globalization became the new catch-phrase as it replaced the East-West conflict. It was in the post WWII period (1945-1991) that the Soviet Union and the United States maintained a Cold War stance between the two dominant political models; liberal democracy and socialism. During one of the longest periods of peace, which rested upon bipolarity and nuclear weapons, the Cold War illustrates the theory of deterrence. The underlying assumption was that neither side, being rational and reasonable, would intentionally initiate a war if the end result could be widespread mutual destruction. In the context of mutual vulnerability confidence in deterrence became a tautology: any rational leader would be deterred from severe provocation by the fear of mutual destruction; national leaders are rational (how else could they climb to positions of responsibility?); thus, nuclear weapons would deter. In short, rational leaders would be deterred via mutual nuclear threats because, by definition, they would be irrational if they were not deterred. Deterrence consists of mirror-imaging, and that actors involved are rational and reasonable. Although deterrence did prove successful during the Cold War, if a leader such as Hitler was in power of one of the two main actors, the Cold War might have ended very differently. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the replacement of its system with one of free market capitalism. The focus of conflict was in developing countries experiencing a host of internal political and economic disparities. It was at this time that Russia, as well as the dismantled republics had no other choice but to enter into the international capitalist system. This suggested a more globalized economy trend and interaction and a sense that great power conflicts had come to an end. Comparatively, there were several other aspects of international relations that had changed due to the end of the Cold War. Eight predominant phenomena that reflected the post-Cold War Era including: a reduced threat of a large-scale inter-state conflict; internal ethnic and nationalist conflicts; an emergence of international law as an instrument to resolve international and domestic conflicts and extreme human rights violations; war crimes tribunals and the international court (ICC); UN resolutions and missions in several regions; increasing interdependence economically (and politically); increasing free trade agreements throughout the world (over 400 Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) and Free Trade Agreements (FTAs); and the European Union, which consisted of 27 countries (including several great powers) that had moved towards total integration. At this point in history, scholars began to start to look at international organizations and, without the use of force, theorize how they can resolve or stem conflict. Other scholars also turned towards Constructivism to explain conflict in international politics. LEARNED COOPERATION: Institutionalism & International MechanismsInstitutionalists argue that institutions increase information about state behavior. Institutions collect information about state behavior and make judgments of compliance or non-compliance with particular rules. States thus know they will not be able to ‘get away with it’ if they do not comply with a given rule. Game-theory thinking can bring to the surface the fact that actors usually try to anticipate how others will behave, knowing that the others are doing likewise (although of course they may not do so accurately, as Israel did not in 1973). In November 2012, Israel’s Iron Dome missile-defense system performed admirably in protecting against rockets fired from Gaza, but by doing so may have allowed the Palestinians to attack with relative safety. That is, without these defenses, Israel almost surely would have responded to the attacks with a ground invasion, something Hamas very much wanted to avoid, and so it might not have launched anything like the barrage that it did had Israel remained undefended. The question of whether actors expect indirect effects is important to the debate about institutions between institutionalists and realists in international relations. Institutionalists emphasize that institutions can facilitate cooperation. Realists, at least defensive realists, have no trouble with this emphasis (Jervis 1999). For them, institutions are one of many tools of statecraft, including cooperation, that can be used to further state interests. What gives realists trouble is institutionalists’ central claim: that establishing an institution sets in motion processes that eventually alter actors’ incentives, expectations, and even values in a way they did not seek or foresee, giving the institution much greater autonomy than it had at the start. This is what is meant by the argument that ‘‘institutions have a life of their own,’’ affecting actors in unexpected ways, as was the case with regional integration. CONSTRUCTIVISM: Social Norms, Values & Beliefs and Social-Networking Another theory is that of Constructivism. Constructivism focuses on the more abstract elements, such as ‘collective memories’ and political identity that shape the national identity of people. National identities include norms, beliefs, and the social identities of individuals. Strictly speaking, as a social theory, constructivism challenges materialism by hypothesizing the structures of human association as “primarily cultural rather than material phenomena,” and rationalism by arguing for their function as not only behaviour-regulating but also identity- and interest-constructing, though “material forces,” it admits, “still matter,” and “people,” it acknowledges, “are still intentional actors. Constructivism argues that statesmen and other people are motivated by their sense of identity, and what is considered appropriate by their particular culture; not only material interests. As opposed to that of other theories, constructivism points to how the ultimate subjectivity of interests and their links to changing identities. The social dimensions create a system which is constantly changing based on a process of construction and interaction. Constructivism lacks generalizations to explain political phenomena. As Alexander Wendt wrote: “Anarchy is what states make of it”; unlike the rationalists, who emphasize that structures constrain, norms and identity have constitutive roles in relation to the relationship between agency and structure (Wendt, 1992). Therefore, constructivists see knowledge as constructed as opposed to created. Epistemologically, social constructivism is in-between positivist and post-positivist perspectives, making it adaptive, organized and constrained at the same time. Constraints happen because, as John Gerard Ruggie wrote: “… epistemology contradicts ontology. In many (…) puzzling instances, actor behavior has failed adequately to convey intersubjective meaning. (…) In the simulated world, actors cannot communicate and engage in behavior; they are condemned to communicate through behavior. In the real world, the situation of course differs fundamentally.” (Ruggie, 1998:95-96). Largely due to technology, the media and social network interactions led the youth of the Middle East to become the main agent of force, during the Arab Spring. Social interaction, both on the domestic and international level, constituted conflict which may have been arguably avoided the Arab Spring. Ideas of human rights, freedom, social equity and dignity flooded the Middle East and weakened the structure that had been established in the area for centuries. Even though structure clearly sets parameters in a political system, these parameters are not bound to be irreversible. Indeed, it might be because many leaders in the Middle East assumed that their set parameters were irreversible, that they believed in the durability of their political authoritarianism (El-Mahdi, 2012:13). Because they felt reassured in their supposedly safe identity and structure, the increased influx of ideas and Western norms through a process of globalization was not deemed as a threat. But the agents of political socialization were adept at influencing the people’s consciousness, especially through media (El-Mahdi, 2012:63). The more frequent the social interactions became, through the help of social platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and BlackBerry Messenger, the more the people were ready to reconstruct their social identities. The increased levels of attention and desire to share the story worldwide caused an influx of knowledge and Western ideas that spread throughout the Middle East. Furthermore, it can be argued that the level of attention was brought from the recognition of the Western World’s norms and structures affecting the Middle East. This human consciousness was one of the most powerful tools for the structural change, where the relationship between material forces and ideas consequently led to the people questioning the origins of what they had accepted as a fact of their lives, resulting in the idea to establish an alternative pathway, an alternative world in the Middle East (Barnett in Baylis, 2011:159). Globalization, through the usage of social networking spread from Western states, and the ability to mobilize through informal pathways with the masses and civil society organizations connected various agents throughout the Middle East; most notably, the youth who came from different backgrounds and educational systems, but were inspired by similar political ideas and economic opportunities. These people responded to what had happened in Tunisia. According to the Critical Theorist Jürgen Habermas, individuals who want either to retain or to recreate their lifestyles in the public sphere, which the state has structured and occupied, “turn to grassroots mobilization through new social movements” (Habermas 1989; El-Mahdi, 2012:64). This can also been illustrated in recent conflicts in regards to ISIS, and other terrorist organizations. If it were not for their knowledge and ability to utilize new technologies and the media, there reach could not extend as far as it has today. A new generation, well educated, connected and inspired by new norms and values, has created a new reality. Structures are not fixed, but are flexible constructions that interact with the norms and identities of agents and agencies. Social constructivism is therefore an important theory that can explain some events in the current international system. Unlike realism, which tends to make generalizations in regards to the actions of states based on true and faithful interpretation of a knowable and independent reality, constructivism makes no ontological claims, which would thus confine it to making epistemological claims only. Constructivism suggests that continued empirical investigation, leading to an increase in knowledge will change the attitudes of people; and in turn, the way in which things are constructed.The above mentioned theories cover various levels of analyzing conflict in international politics. Utilizing the most dominant wars up until the post-Cold War era explains how these theories are significant in understanding conflict, as well as resolution. The determinants behind why large-scale conflicts occur depend on a multitude of actions and reactions by powerful states, institutions, and cultures that differ among people around the world. The post-Cold War era consisted of several phenomena, as suggested in the first section of this article, but an increase in internal conflict, territorial and nationalist conflicts (some of which remain intractable) became more glaring. The following section will discuss theories in ethnicity and nationalism; focusing on the case of Israel and Palestine. It will also be the purpose of the following to analyze the social and political dynamics of these types of conflicts.THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: Ethnicity & NationalismIt is far less likely for a major war to occur in the post-Cold War era. Yet, regional and domestic conflicts persist. Because of this, pressure will always be placed upon powerful states and international organizations to intervene. Destructive international conflicts that have endured for more than 20 years, which includes the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, have been referred to as intractable conflicts (Coleman & Vallacher, 2011), deep-rooted conflict (Burton, 1987), protracted social conflict (Azar, 1986), moral conflict (Pearce & Littlejohn, 1997), and enduring rivalries (Diehl & Goertz, 2000). These conflicts are characterized by factors such as legacies of dominance and injustice, instability, human and social polarities, symbolism and ideology, oppositional group identities and intense intergroup dynamics, strong emotionally, protracted trauma, and normalization of hostility (Coleman, Deutsch, & Marcus, 2014; Goddard, 2010). Before these issues can be analyzed, the tactics of asymmetric warfare must be discussed. In doing such, a generalization of the Israeli-Palestinian case will be provided, and this research will close with methods for management and resolution to the Middle East conflict.ASYMMETRIC WARFARE: Seven Deadly TacticsThe term “asymmetric conflict” covers a wide range of unconventional tactics used against conventional forces, civilians, and governments. In one sense, it is a form of competitive strategy (Chapter 9). Although often viewed as the strategy of the weak against the strong, in some forms it is just the opposite. Moreover, there are seven primary tactics of asymmetric conflict: economic, “humanitarian” warfare, guerilla warfare, terrorism, piracy, cyber warfare, and “lawfare”. Blockades, commerce raiding, boycotts, embargoes, and sanctions are asymmetric methods for attacking an opponent through its economy. Furthermore, sanctions are commonly regarded as an alternative to war, which Carl von Clausewitz defined as “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” By substituting economic pressure for military force, those who advocate the use of sanctions hope to change an adversary’s policies without the cost associated with war. This also illustrates how military power and economic power are fungible in politics. “Humanitarian” warfare concerns the actions of international actors intervening in a conflict in order to resolve an issue relating to violating the rights of the people that reside with the sovereign state. The biggest issues with international intervention is ensuring that the intervention does not go against the national sovereignty of the state, finding a basis for violating Just War traditions of only fighting defensive wars, and ensuring that the former victims do not turn into aggressors after the intervention occurs. Most importantly, as illustrated in the vast majority of international interventions in Africa, if international actors do not have a national interest in intervening in the conflict, they tend to not act until it is far too late. Guerilla warfare is the most typical tactic utilized by the weak over the strong. It involves smaller units of fighters against much larger groups of opponents; usually by the element of surprise. Still, the success guerilla warfare depends largely upon the terrain, a large location with plenty of places to ambush an opponent, a charismatic leader to strengthen morale, and intelligence gathering from the people that live within the region that a war is fought. If combatants that are using this method to fight against an adversary lose any one of the above mentioned dependents for success, they will most likely lose the entire fight itself. Terrorism, as Title 22 of the US Code defines, is “premeditated political violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational or clandestine agents.” This seems largely satisfactory. Under the Geneva Conventions, legal combatants must be in uniforms or wear distinctive insignia, carry arms openly, be under responsible command, and operate under the laws of war. Clearly, terrorists do not follow these guidelines, which take away the rights that they would otherwise have if they were legal combatants. Moreover, the current wave of Arab terrorism has its origin in the 1948, 1956, and especially the 1967 defeats by Israel of the Arabs, who began to ask why and answered, as Jewish prophets and Christian preachers also have done in times of disaster, “because we have been faithless.” Unable to defeat Israel and its American sponsor by conventional means, they turned to terror, beginning with the August 1969 hijacking of TWA 840 from Rome led not by Muslim but by Christian Arabs. More so, a vast majority of people associate terrorism with Muslims. This is not necessarily the case. Although current terrorist organizations including ISIS, Al Qaeda, and Hezbollah originated in the Arab world, other organizations such as the IRA, FARC, PETA, Black Panthers, Aum Shrinri Kyo, Earth Liberation Front, Baader Meinhoff Gang, ETA, Shining Path, Green Peace, Symbionese Liberation Army, and Tamil Tigers are responsible for many of the terrorist attacks that occurred in 2002 alone; according to RAND. Still, Muslims may not be responsible for all terror incidents, but they are responsible for the ones that kill the most people and do the most damage to the world economy. Undoubtedly, terrorism is a tactic that can profoundly disrupt a state’s sense of security and stability, as its consequences reach far beyond the extent of a battlefield. Piracy, Cyber Warfare, and Lawfare are three other forms of asymmetric warfare. Piracy has been considered illegitimate warfare because of the methods that are undertaken, lack of usual formalities, and its typically sole purpose to plunder. Cyber Warfare is considered utilizing technology for political aims to access information, sabotage systems, and subvert systems of a state; by state or non-state actors. Cyber Warfare is one of the tactics that is used on a daily basis that the majority of the population is completely unaware of its current warfare status. Norse Financial Systems has an up-to-date analysis on their website which can be monitored simply by connecting to the internet. Lawfare, the final of the seven deadly tactics of asymmetric warfare, concerns the use of law in order to force military actions to cease based on its application. Lawfare consists mainly of international organizations, and institutions that enforce policies. This tactic is essentially new to asymmetric warfare, but it can help settle disputes between states, or assist in the management of a conflict that occurs. ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT: Social and Political Dynamics Near the end of the 17th Century, European colonists known as Zionists began to immigrate to Palestine. Their desire was to create a Jewish homeland, but the indigenous people of the region slowly began to feel threatened, as more and more Zionists began to inhibit the land. During World War II, Hitler’s aggressions toward the Jewish population intensified the conflict. In 1947, the UN divided the land among the people. Although the majority of the population in Israel/Palestine were not Jewish, the UN recommended that a larger portion of the land to given to the Zionists. Shortly thereafter, war broke out and by the end of the war, Israel had conquered 78 percent of Palestine; three-quarters of a million Palestinians had been made refugees; over 500 towns and villages had been obliterated; and a new map was drawn up, in which every city, river and hillock received a new, Hebrew name, as all vestiges of the Palestinian culture were to be erased. For decades Israel denied the existence of this population, former Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir once saying: “There were no such thing as Palestinians.” In response to the war, the UN Security Council passes Resolution 242, which calls for the “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict [in official UN languages other than English the article “the” precedes “territories,” thus implying that Israel has to return all the conquered territory]; termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.” This resolution, with its formula of “land for peace,” is the basis of for all subsequent peace negotiations between Israel, Palestinians, and the surrounding Arab states. Yet still, war continued to erupt throughout this region of the world until present day. Through decades of highly intensified conflict, the military power of Israel, backed by the US and other powerful international actors, claimed more and more territory. As Chaim Kaufmann explains:It is useful to compare characteristics of ethnic conflicts with those of ideological conflicts. The latter are competitions between the government and the rebels for the loyalties of the people. The critical features of these conflicts are that ideological loyalties are changeable and difficult to assess, and the same population serves as the shared mobilization base for both sides. As a result, winning the “hearts and minds” of the population is both possible and necessary for victory. The most important instruments are political, economic, and social reforms that redress popular grievances such as poverty, inequality, corruption, and physical insecurity. Control of access to population is also important, both to allow recruitment and implementation of reform promises, and to block the enemy from these tasks. Population control, however, cannot be guaranteed solely by physical control over territory, but depends on careful intelligence, persuasion, and coercion. Purely military successes are often indecisive as long as the enemy’s base of political support is undamaged. Dominated by Muslims and Christians, modern-day Israel’s military occupies the West Bank, and has control over Gaza. The remaining Jewish refugees within this region are discriminated against, as the social and political differences have caused various problems. From the Bilu to the British Mandate’s end, Israel’s initial independence through the 1973 war’s aftermath, Camp David up until the Madrid Conference, and the wide-range of dialogue among political leaders in the 1990s and 2000s, the case of Israel and Palestine (and the overall conflict occurring in the Middle East) is one of the most complicated, chaotic, and catatonic conflicts in the history of humankind; and addressing these issues is no easy task. To the argument made by realists, that the pursuit of such altruistic aims contradicts the very logic of international relations-a logic of selfishness-and that the promotion of such values is not in the nature of “the game,” which aims at promoting state interests, the advocates of a new international law reply that these are false distinctions, because the toleration of shocking or egregious atrocities is likely to lead either to chaos spreading through imitation or to regional destabilization through arms smuggling, massive flows of refugees, and self-interested interventions in support of feuding parties. As illustrated by the UN’s initial decision to give such a large portion of land to the Zionists, it can be argued that this served the interests of powerful states in providing a place to push refugees aside during WWII, but resulted in yet even more problems down the road. Robert D. Kaplan expressed that, “America’s fascination with the Israeli-Palestinian issue, coupled with the lack of interest in the Turkish-Kurdish one, is a function of its own domestic and ethnic obsessions, not of the cartographic reality that is about to transform the Middle East. The diplomatic process involving Israelis and Palestinians will, I believe, have little effect on the early- and mid-twenty-first-century map of the region. Israel with a 6.6 percent economic growth rate based increasingly on high-tech exports, is about to enter Homer-Dixon’s stretch limo, fortified by a well-defined political community that is an organic outgrowth of history and ethnicity.” Coupled with U.S. support, Israel has benefited extensively throughout the course of the on-going conflict. In the following section of the current article, further research will cover conflict management and resolution strategies for the Middle East; particularly, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION RECOMMENDATIONS: Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Middle East & Rebel OrganizationsFormer U.S. President George W. Bush’s speech at the Annapolis Conference on November 27th, 2007 was central to establishing an agreed upon democratic Palestinian state that will live side by side with Israel in peace and security.” At the Annapolis Conference, he read a statement that expressed: “our determination to bring an end to the bloodshed, suffering and decades of conflict between our peoples; usher in a new era of peace, based on freedom, security, justice, dignity, respect and mutual recognition … We agree to engage in vigorous, ongoing negotiations and shall make every effort to conclude an agreement before the end of 2008. For this purpose, a steering committee, led jointly by the head of the delegation of each party, will meet continuously, as agreed.” The statement continued to specify a process towards establishing negotiations that were to address all issues. It further stated that they had agreed to form an American, Palestinian and Israeli mechanism, which would be led by the United States of America. Most notably, the “roadmap” towards two peaceful states living side by side would be monitored, and judged by that of the U.S. This statement is an example of poor U.S. foreign policy. It is neither the U.S. responsibility nor the right of the U.S. government to determine a feasible outcome for Israel and Palestine. In addition, as demonstrated in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, conflict management negotiations were too often combined with conflict resolution negotiations and failed as stepping-stones to a resolution. Whether considering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or other conflicts, we suggest that achieving conflict management may hinder the possibility of attaining conflict resolution because it shifts the interests of the parties and changes their mutual interests to resolve the conflict. This has been done time and time again in international intervention decisions concerning conflicts in the Middle East. With a variety of players involved, the goals that they each seek contrast that of one another, and continue to hinder the possibility of concrete conflict resolution for the people that populate the region. As it is precisely the need for consent from each state concerned that creates the problem-solving difficulties of international law, it is unlikely that consensual steps will provide solutions in many instances. At times, then, it is through nonconsensual processes that nonconsensualism will come about: through potentially bold moves by some states or institutions to change the rules of the game and reinterpret old rules or posit new decision-making rules and an expansion of institutional powers. It becomes merely a question of “if” and “when”.Withal, there is urgency for beneficial negotiations between the cultures within the region. As Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall explain:But a number of preconditions are required before such a settlement is feasible. First, evidently, the Israeli government would have to agree it. External and internal changes are necessary for that to happen. A weakness of the conflict resolution attempts, arguably, has been their narrow basis. Only politicians from the Israeli Labour Party and the PLO have been able to come somewhere close to – but still some way from – a framework for an agreement. It will require changes in perspective and discourse for the Sephardic Jews and others who have supported Likud and the religious parties to accept a two-state solution, and also for Islamists on the Palestinian side to come to terms with a Jewish state. Indeed, the exclusively Jewish basis that Israelis claim for their state appears difficult to reconcile with the rights of Palestinian refugees and Arabs within Israel. Resolving the issues that have arisen due to the social and political dynamics expressed in the previous section is imperative; and by emphasizing the power and status imbalances that exist between groups, it is prescriptive of how such asymmetries can and should be reduced. The brunt of attention is not about a particular culture, yours or mine, but focus is placed on each culture’s relationship to the other and their standing within a larger power and privilege context of intergroup relations. For two culturally different groups in conflict, the question then becomes, “Given our culture’s standing and sociopolitical history as it relates to your culture’s standing and sociopolitical history, how we can negotiate across these differences to problem-solve fairly and effectively?” Another interesting aspect of resolving the Israeli-Palestine conflict is mentioned by Galtung (2004: 103-9) [who] suggests that the conflict must be balanced, by placing Israel and Palestine within a Middle Eastern community. Another way of balancing is to modify the US economic, military and political support for Israel, which remains a lynchpin of the conflict. It would be in the best interests of Israel and Palestine if U.S. support was more even-handed in its implementation of policies in order to reach a peaceful settlement.Furthermore, the Middle East has increasingly become weary of the foreign policies of the U.S., and often believes that they serve the purpose of Israel and western powers; and not that of the Arab World. The deep distrust of America, which has hardened and deepened in the last few years, means that any American initiative will be greeted with suspicion, and will not likely quickly win goodwill. Nor would an American withdrawal from the region. Perhaps any U.S. involvement should be focused on balancing support of Israel and Palestine, leaving the conflict management process to the Israeli and Palestine politicians, and with the assistance of international organizations. In this particular conflict, the task of resolving the conflict goes much further beyond what mediators can achieve. It also raises issues of how the world society is to implement cosmopolitan standards of justice and human rights, in an even-handed way. Additionally, if international institutions seek to resolve conflicts stemming from the social and political dynamics of these conflicts, there is a desperate need to establish new programs that benefit the Middle East, as a whole. Transitional Justice Programs could assist Israel and Palestine. Truth and reconciliation processes aim to identify people or groups that attacked civilians, and to give victims a process to identify their needs and to receive symbolic and financial reparations. The sheer number of offenses and delay in investigations into war crimes make identifying offenders difficult, time-consuming, and expensive. Often offenders do not perceive their actions in the same light as that of the victims, and Transnational Justice Programs, such as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) offers incentives towards offenders that admit guilt, which makes the transition process more palatable. Seeking a compromise between amnesty programs and punishment can help avoid constraints based upon time and money. As states make a transition, it is important that the victims of such an atrocity feel that their issues have been acknowledged, addressed, and ensured that similar occurrences will not transpire in the future.Furthermore, concerning rebel organizations that cause conflict in the Middle East, killing or arresting the leader of a rebel organization increases the chances that a conflict will end. It appears that chopping the head off of these organizations may be a fruitful strategy for states seeking to end conflict. Also, if the leader of a rebel organization is one of its founding members, conflicts are significantly less likely to end. Taken together, these two findings suggest that leadership decapitation in rebel groups is effective because it removes charismatic leaders. At times, this is a pragmatic solution, and if actions are not taken, hesitation to act may lead to the escalation of intra-state and inter-state conflicts. Yet, it is possible for counterterrorism actions to create a backlash. Benmelech et al. and Byman’s article introduce an interesting and potentially very important caveat. While we can assume that both kinds of attacks are likely to hurt the brigade, indiscriminate attacks compensate for this pain by making the group more popular and creating more support. As research demonstrates, it is difficult to come to an overall consensus on exactly how to deal with terrorism. It often depends on each individual circumstance, and determining the best solution to resolve the conflict often relies upon many different aspects including the objectives of the organization. It is also common for terrorist organizations to make strategic attacks for the purpose of creating popularity through the use of the media; as they rely heavily on it for international support. ................
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