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Michael FunkeDepartment of Economic HistoryUppsala Universitymichael.funke@ekhist.uu.seDear fellow participants of the sessionThis paper is mainly based on findings in my forthcoming doctoral thesis in Economic History, which focuses on the policy process of advertising self-regulation in Sweden during 1950-1971. At the moment I am finishing up a first final draft to be presented this fall. The thesis departs from a theoretical combination of the strategic interests of business interest associations (leaning on the logic of membership vs. logic of influence model) and a stages heuristic theory modified to suit the self-regulatory policy process of self-regulation. The main actors in the thesis are business associations. This paper tries to take things bit further by looking at the actions of all actors relevant for the policy process of advertising self-regulation. To do so it introduces a theoretical model that combines Advocacy coalition framework theory with the two other approaches. Empirically the paper leans on mainly four chapters of the thesis; the introductory chapter, first empirical chapter covering the general positions on advertising among key actors in the Swedish political economy at the time, the second empirical analyzing the strategies of the business associations in the policy process of self-regulation and the third empirical analyzing the organized business involvement in the policy process of the statutory regulations of advertising. All these chapters have been presented at several conferences and seminars. The general idea in this paper is to explore new possibilities of research, either in the thesis or in further research.Advocacy coalitions, strategic interests and the policy process of Swedish advertising self-regulation 1950–1971Policy change and policy processes have received increased interest in recent decades. This is evident not only in the number of empirical studies, but also in a dynamic development of theory and method, with ensuing debates and discussions on the merits and shortcomings of different approaches (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999; Sabatier 2007). One theory that has received significant attention is the advocacy coalition framework (ACF). The ACF has been developed since the late 1980s in a number of theoretical contributions, with Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith being particularly salient. The framework affords special focus on the importance of actor coalitions in explaining policy change. These are said to exist over prolonged periods of time and either struggle over or negotiate over policy outcomes. Coalitions often incorporate broad groups of actors, such as interest groups, government officials, experts, policy entrepreneurs and even journalists. The ACF regards policy subsystems as the best level of analysis, and proposes that these include actors from many levels of government. (Sabatier 1987; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier 1998; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1999; Sabatier 2007; Weible & Sabatier & McQueen 2009)The ACF assumes that a coalition is bounds together by a shared hierarchical belief system of its members, where deep core beliefs (ideology) and policy core (general policy principles of the subsystem) are more immune to change than secondary beliefs (instrumental and administrative issues). These beliefs are also seen as the main causal mechanism driving the actions of the coalitions and leading to subsequent policy change. This change can be minor, shifting secondary beliefs, or major, changing policy core beliefs. Initially the ACF described two paths to major policy change: learning and external subsystem events. In the first case the framework sees policy change as being contingent on the internal learning of coalitions, a process where expertise and new knowledge play crucial roles and the policy process take place in a setting with stable external structures. In the second case major policy changes in a subsystem are associated with external chocks, leading to a significant redistribution of political resources and a modification of the core of a policy beliefs. The external systems function as both constraint and resource for the coalitions. Recently two more paths have been added to the framework. The third path is internal subsystem events, usually based on realization of failed current policies, and the fourth revolves around the possibility of a negotiated settlement between two or more coalitions (Sabatier 1998; Weible & Sabatier & McQueen 2009).Advocacy Coalitions aim to transform their beliefs into policy by utilizing a number of different strategies. Among these we find lobbying, research, mobilizing public opinion, initiating research, taking part in state commissions, legal means, etc. The theory has empirically been associated with policy subsystems dependent on the expertise of natural science (energy, environment, forestry), but according to Sabatier et al, an overview of over 80 case studies using the framework proves its usefulness in other policy fields. The framework has also been used in conjunction with the stages heuristic, which Sabatier et al think is feasible, given four conditions. Firstly, the stages heuristic should be viewed as an organizing tool lacking inherent explanatory value. The stages are therefore to be regarded as either linked to strategies or arenas. Second, it must be understood that coalitions often have a multi-policy perspective. Third, the same can be said of stages, where coalitions will be simultaneously active within many policy stages at once. Fourth, the stages model lacks explanatory power regarding group formation or group strategy, and here the ACF should instead be used (Sabatier 1998; Weible & Sabatier & McQueen 2009).The ACF has made key contributions to the discussion on the importance of actor beliefs and actor agency within policy subsystems (Sabatier 1987; Sabatier 1998; Zafonte & Sabatier 1998; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993; Sabatier 1999; Sabatier 2007; Weible & Sabatier & McQueen 2009). Still, other aspects of the theory have been criticized as having weak or insufficient explanatory power. The emphasis on beliefs as the causal drive of policy change has been described as one-sided and ignoring the importance of strategic interests in the political power play that policy processes often are part of (Schlager 1995; Schlager & Blomquist 1996; Hoberg 1996; Nohrstedt 2005). In a series of papers exploring the change in Swedish nuclear policy after the Three Mile Island crisis in 1979, Daniel Nohrstedt suggests that core policy beliefs do not always come into play when actors react upon what can be termed a crisis event, whether it is internal or external to the subsystem in question. While the ACF posits that core policy beliefs seldom change, but can do so when a subsystem is subject to crisis, Nohrstedts conclusion from studying the actions and beliefs of the ruling Social democrats party at the time of the Three Mile Island crisis is that the party retained its positive core policy beliefs in nuclear power, but due to a sudden surge in negative public opinion on nuclear power after the disaster decided to opt for a referendum and a more ambivalent public stance on nuclear power. This decision, then, went against the core policy beliefs, but was implemented to secure political power and avoid party infighting and loss at coming elections, i.e. strategic interests were given primacy over policy beliefs when guiding policy action. Accordingly neither minority coalition mobilization nor majority coalition learning was a deciding factor in events. Instead strategic action of select leadership of the incumbent elite shaped policy outcomes (Nohrstedt 2005; Nohrsted 2007; Nohrsted 2008). Concluding, Nohrstedt does not refute the applicability of the ACF in analysis of policy change, but urges careful research design and process tracing to differentiate between for example policy change due to learning and subsequent shifts in policy values and policy change due to mainly strategic interest considerations. In his analysis, Nohrsted combines the analytical model of the ACF with a rational choice inspired model of political parties’ strategic interests that allows for analysis to differentiate between these two causal explanations of actor agency and subsequent policy change. This paper will depart from this suggestion of combining an ACF with an interest oriented approach to better understand policy change. The subject of study is the policy process of Swedish self-regulation of advertising during the time period 1950–1971. The beginning of the period is chosen for two reasons. Firstly, the state initiated a number of competitive and consumer oriented policies during this time, which directly or indirectly affected advertising. Secondly, the sustained economic growth during this time completely transformed lifestyles and consumption of Swedish society, giving an unprecedented possibility of hedonistic consumption, hence also propelling advertising to the fore of social, political and economic life. During this time, it was also a hotly debated social issue, often within the context of consumer issues. Advertising was criticized for manipulating consumers, creating higher prices, wasting resources and creating informational overload and ecological strains. Among critics counted both influential interest groups such as trade unions, the cooperative movement and women’s associations that had official state sanction as consumer representatives in corporatist power structures, and influential individual critics from academia and intellectual circles. (Funke 2011; Funke 2012) At the same time, the business community considered advertising an integral part of the free market, and vigorously defended it, usually through its business associations or by business supported research. Reflecting these major events, advertising regulations went through several changes at this time period. Particularly self-regulation was reformed and transformed.Given the historical context, the policy process of Swedish advertising self-regulation exhibits many promising qualities for a policy process analysis in the context of an ACF/interest group framework. Still, some revisions in theoretical make up are necessary. Nohrstedt’s strategic interests are modeled on the behavior of political parties. These are vote maximization (winning elections), office seeking (private gains from office), policy seeking (maximizing effects of policy), representation (mediating public sentiments) and party cohesion (party unity). They fit quite well with political actors. But as self-regulation usually is created, maintained and developed by market actors or their associations, an interest model more attuned to this type of actor is needed. Theoretical and empirical research on business associations has suggested that these are run by two competing logics, the logic of membership and the logic of influence. The logic of membership focuses on market internal factors, and represents the interaction between the interests of members and the interests of the associational leadership. Here members offer market compliance to the leadership who in turn supplies direct market control in the form of competitive rules as cartels or self-regulation. The logic of influence focuses on the exchange between associational leadership and external envirnoment that the association has an interest in influencing, i.e. the state and other interest groups (trade unions, consumer movements). Here the goal is to influence regulations and actors that have a potential indirect control of the market, such as state regulations. The associations main task has historically therefore been to handle and reduce risks, both on the market and due to market external factors (Lundqvist 1995; van Waarden 1992; Schmitter & Streeck 1999). The literature on self-regulation also emphasizes that business support for self-regulation can be deduced to the following interests: 1) profitability 2) consumer sovereignty (fair competition and consumer rights) 2) influencing state policies 3) creating public good will. The first two interests correspond to the direct market interests of members, while the other two correspond to interests in market external factors. (Funke 2012).Also, the study will utilize the stages heuristic (agenda setting, problem definition, decision making, implementation, evaluation) as an ordering mechanism in analyzing the policy process. This warrants a further modification, as the policy process of self-regulation displays some structural differences from state policy processes. Most self-regulatory systems co-exist, or even co-regulate, with state, supranational or international regulations. This has led to the development of a modified stages heuristic approach in studying the policy process (Gunningham 1995; Wotruba 1997; Jenkins 2001; Haufler 2001; Scott 2002; Porter & Ronit, 2006).Porter & Ronit note that the structures and rules of the state enabling and constraining policy formation is either lacking or not well known when it comes to internal rules being set up by market actors. The development of self-regulatory policies is hidden from public view, either intentionally or due to the indifference of the public. Instead this process takes place in clandestine, with business associations and regulatory experts as main actors. (Porter & Ronit, 2006)Nevertheless, the authors assert that the basic model of the stages heuristic, is valid for self-regulations too. What must be kept in mind, Porter & Ronit state, is that most self-regulatory practices evolve in interaction with state laws, and that the particular co-regulation the two systems create in a given setting varies over time and in place, affecting the policy process of self-regulation in unexpected ways. Here actors from the business world interact with market outsiders as representatives of consumers and the state. This can lead to the process “criss-crossing” or being terminated or interrupted in unexpected manners, but still essentially be explainable within the framework of analysis. Also to be considered is the power of public opinion and policy strategies aimed at influencing it. Putting a self-regulatory issue on the agenda that attracts public attention can pressure the self-regulatory process into opening up. This in, in turn, is close to the reasoning of both the ACF and the interest approach, where external or internal subsystem crisis can affect policy beliefs and force actors to resort to strategic action. (Porter & Ronit, 2006)Advertising regulations in Sweden during 1950 –1971Advertising in Sweden had few statutory regulations at the start of the period. The law of 1931 on disloyal competition forbade explicit lies in advertising, but awarded damages only to producers, being primarily a law to regulate fair competition. Thus a number of self-regulatory bodies started to appear in the 1930s, with two regimes functioning side by side until a merger in 1957, creating one regime. As its precursors, the regime was based on the international code of advertising practice, and transgressions, or accusations thereof, were handled by a self-regulatory agency, of which a number of business associations were both principals and stakeholders. The agency functioned in a judicial-like manner, although it lacked coercive powers. Self-regulation had initially been created to look after producer interests, but relatively quickly representation of consumer interests was officially made part of the operations of the regime. Still, very few consumers made use of the institution (SOU 1972:7; Boddewyn 1985).In 1963, consumer representatives were made part of the main self-regulatory body, N?ringslivets opinionsn?mnd (NOp). The 1963 State Commission on disloyal advertising suggested in its 1966 report introducing a general clause to strengthen marketing law, but at the same time keeping a primary role for self-regulation. However, the Social Democratic government decided to discard the report and instead proposed extensive statutory consumer regulations, which were approved by parliament 1970. In 1971 the new regime basically replaced the old self-regulatory system with a Consumer Ombudsman acting as a consumer attorney in front of a special Market Court with coercive statutory powers. Later a National Consumer Board was added in 1973, and in 1976 the Consumer ombudsman became its head (Funke 2011; Funke 2012). According to (Boddewyn 1985), the replaced regime of self-regulation suffered from four major drawbacks: the inability to highlight rising consumer concerns, not being well known among consumers, a limited capacity to handle large number of complaints and difficulties in getting non-compliers to adhere to self-regulation. Self-regulation, in turn, thus went through major reforms in 1968 to adapt to the new regulatory landscape. The new self-regulatory regime was based on internal producer censorship to avoid production of advertisements that would be in breach of the coming laws, and survives more or less intact until this day (SOU 1972:7; Funke 2004).The coalitions of the policy subsystem of advertisingDuring the chosen period of study, the policy subsystem of advertising consisted of two competing advocacy coalitions. The first coalition, termed the producer oriented coalition, was mainly comprised of business associations with interests in advertising and advertising regulations, business oriented academics, politicians, journalists and public intellectuals. The second coalition, named the consumer oriented coalition, was made up of interest groups and individuals that claimed to represent the consumers. Among these we find trade unions, the cooperative movement, state officials, academics, consumer activists, journalists, artists and public intellectuals. Of these, the interest groups received official legitimacy by being selected as consumer representatives in the new state agencies created in the postwar era. Likewise, several of the business associations were given similar positions on these agencies in the capacity of producer representatives (Funke 2004; Funke 2011; Funke 2012; J?fvert 1969; Pestoff 1984; Rothstein 1992; Lundqvist 2003; Lundqvist 2007). This was in line with the corporatist policies of the social democratic state, whereby interest groups were co-opted into subordinating or at least adjusting their interests to that of the state. In consequence the coalitions each had a central core supported by the corporatist structures, which incidentally also placed them in the same policy structures, covering most of the stages heuristic model.The core policy beliefsLooking at the core policy beliefs of the coalitions during the start of the period, the producer oriented coalition viewed advertising’s function as market information, giving consumer the information they needed to make an informed buy according to their preferences. This view was supported by economic theory that stated that this created lower search costs, lower prices, better competition, enabled new market entries and product innovation. The persuasive function was downplayed and seen as an exception or a complement to the informative function. The consumer was regarded as capable and having heterogeneous needs, creating a demand driven consumer choice market. Advertising was therefore a beneficial good for both producers and consumers, and the coalition was united in faith in the market’s ability as a producer of societal goods, given that market freedom, i.e. significant producer control of the market, was part of the equation. Regarding problem definition, the main goal of policy was to safeguard advertising maneuverability on the market to guarantee market freedom and competitiveness. The social group whose welfare was crucial was that of the producers while basic choice of policy instruments was self-regulation and communicating good will. Desirability of participation of various segments of society was based on the belief that producer controlled self-regulation represented both the interests of producers and consumers. The ability of society to solve problems in this policy area was seen as best served by self-regulation in combination with restricted and market accommodated state policies.The core policy beliefs of the consumer oriented coalition were based on advertising’s main function as persuasion, trying to bend the consumer’s preferences into buying a specific product. This was backed up by economic theories such as the market power school that stated that advertising was used by large companies to build brand loyalty, thereby creating barriers of entry, monopolistic competition, higher prices, higher search costs and less innovation. The consumer was seen as capable but in need of consumer information and product testing to balance the persuasive characteristics of advertising. Also needs were regarded as normative, creating a discourse of rational consumption, whereby thriftiness and the bare essentials of the household was to be prioritized, while luxury goods and entertainment was seen as a threat to limited household budgets of ordinary citizens. Persuasive advertising was consequently by default a risky and potentially hazardous part of the market. Still, the coalition had faith in the market as provider of societal goods, given that the market was subjugated to state control and overall political goals. (Aléx 1994; Aléx 2003; Husz 2009) Regarding problem definition, the main goal of policy was to guarantee consumer rights by limiting, countering and improving advertising. The social group whose welfare was crucial was that of the consumers while basic choice of policy instruments was statutory regulations. Desirability of participation of various segments of society was based on the belief that strong consumer and state participation was necessary to safeguard that consumer interests were met. The ability of society to solve problems in this policy area was seen as best served by statutory regulations, as producers by default made self-regulation biased.The progress of the policy beliefs of the two coalitions are described in more analytical detail in the three tables accompanying this paper ( appendix 1–3)The policy process – changing coalition policy beliefs and strategic action by key elite majority actorsLooking at the development of self-regulation of advertising during this time period, three extended policy phases are discernable. These occur between 1950-1963, 1963-1968 and 1968-1971. Each phase will first be shortly described, then analyzed using the theoretical constructs presented. 1950-1963 – the first serious challenges to self-regulationDuring the period 1950-1963, self-regulation is essentially still a producer oriented regime, although going through a major reform in 1957, and beginning to discuss increased consumer representation in the NOp at roughly the same time. The reforms of 1957, which merged the two regimes that had emerged in the 1930s into one, can be explained by both advocacy coalitions learning and a strategic interest framework. Business association representatives from both regimes entered talks of a merger in 1955. Talks were held between the two camps, and the matter was also discussed on the board of the Marketing association, at that time the principal of one of the regimes. An internal report was produced by the commission handling negations on the merger, which gave a number of reasons why a merger should be done. The conclusion was that slightly different rules in the two regimes created a loophole for producers, as these could “chose” which regime they wanted to handle a case, while consumers’ complaints were only admitted in one of the regimes. This made for ineffective regulation and double standards. A single regime would remedy this. Also, the possibility of the state stepping in and taking over regulation increased if the current state of things were left intact. This risk was further aggravated by the fact that only about ten percent of the complaints originated from consumers (in the regime that admitted them). This could also attract the attention of the state and give it arguments to replace self-regulation with a statutory regime. The decision was taken to merge the two regimes, which would include the previous principals and also a number of new ones, all established business associations. In the same year as the new regime was launched, a book critical of advertising as a societal phenomena, Reklamen ?r livsfarlig (Advertising is lethal) by author Sven Lindqvist, garnered a lot of public attention and sparked a critical debate on advertising whose intensity that chocked the business community. The author claimed advertising poisoned the minds of people, making them abandon civic values for false materialism. He also blasted self-regulation as being ineffective and equivalent to “letting the thieves being the judges of their own crimes” ( Lindqvist 1957, 2001; quote p. 67,69). Lindqvist’s book was read by the author as a serial on public radio, and was also published in Cooperative movement’s membership journal. Here, the response from the producer oriented coalition varied. The Marketing Association organized a public debate on advertising in Stockholm, but refrained to invite Lindqvist, whose views were considered too extreme (Bj?rklund 1967). However, the Association of Advertisers decided to approach the peak trade union LO and newly formed state consumer agency Statens Konsumentr?d to hold tripartite talks on what could be done to better the public standing on advertising. Possible revisions of self-regulatory rules, particularly aimed at the ad agencies, and inclusion of consumer representatives were the topic of discussion. Talks were held during 1957 and 1958, and resulted in a memo that stated that the current rules of self-regulation were sufficient, but that the LO and Statens konsumentr?d ought to be invited to join the NOp as consumer representatives. However, nothing came of this suggestion. Still, board meetings among the principals of the NOp show that the issue of additional principals was brought up in the year reports of 1961 and 1962, with the need for consume representatives explicitly being mentioned in 1962. In 1962, a second major public debate on advertising was initiated, first in major Daily Dagens nyheter, then by producer oriented coalition member ?ke Ortmark, a journalist with a background in producer oriented think tank SNS. Ortmark vehemently attacked gasoline advertising in the press in 1962 and the released a book in 1963, Sveket mot konsumenterna (Betrayal of the consumers). Unlike Lindqvist, who attacked the foundation of the newly created Affluent society as devoid of meaning, Ortmark had a more classic consumerist approach, calling for the young and more socially oriented business leadership to take the lead in reforming business practices and making sure advertising became more informative and responsible. The new CEO of the Marketing Association wrote an appreciating article on Ortmark’s book in major Stockholm daily, and also took on a series of debates with Ortmark at various local Marketing societes all over the country. The same year, LO and Statens konsumentr?d, together with two other peak trade union (SACO and TCO) and a national women’s’ association (Sveriges Husmodersf?reningars Riksf?rbund), were admitted as consumer representatives into the NOp. A few years later the trade union representing employees in hotel and restaurants (Sveriges hotel och restaurangf?rbund) was added as a consumer representative.During this time period the consumer oriented coalition produced a number of books, pamphlets and government commissions that clearly stated that advertising was a problem for consumers. Self-regulation was also called into question. Powerful trade union LO in 1955 stated in Konsumeten och reklamen (The consumer and advertising), a pamphlet joint-released with the Cooperative Movement, that self-regulation needed improvement or would otherwise have to be complemented with stringer statutory rules. The Social Democratic state had by this time launched a series of ambitions economic policies whose interaction was crucial to the wider visions of the labor movement. The Rhen-Meidner model, whose economic policies would keep inflation and wages in check, was at the center but would interact with competitive and consumer policies to create an ideal outcome for large groups of consumers. The goal was to create modest but real wage increases that in turn would guarantee increased purchasing power among blue collar workers as competitive polices lowered prices and consumer polices helped them make the best buy possible. In this equation, advertising was perceived by the consumer oriented coalition as a possible risk. Main labor movement economist Rudolf Meidner lambasted it in Konsumeten och reklamen as a potential hazard, as the economic policies of the state made full use of all resources, and did not need extra stimulation or mechanisms that threatened diverting consumption into wrong directions.AnalysisThe reforms of self-regulation in 1957 were the outcome of a clandestine policy process, pricy only to the participating business associations. In this case agenda setting, problem formulation, decision making and implementation took place inside the business associations. However, the evaluation process was partly opened up to outsiders, as the Association of Advertisers invited the LO and state consumer agency Statens konsumentr?d to evaluate the new regime. The Marketing association had similar evaluation done, but kept these away from outside participation. The actions of the associations are clearly tied to the Lindqvist debate, as internal documents explicitly reveal that these actions were taken due to it. Still, this is a good example of how the policy process of self-regulation due to sudden outside pressure started to exhibit a “criss-crossing” behavior.Applying the ACF/strategies interest framework, it is apparent that the first reforms were due to a combination of internal coalition learning and strategic interests. The realization that two regimes worked worse than one was based on almost 20 years of experience of having two regimes. The internal report done on the subject, together with board discussions reveal that representatives of both camps wanted a better and more stringent regulatory regime. So this would constitute a learning process based on a cumulative experience, guided by the experts responsible for the report and also heading the merger talks. Still, a number of arguments given for the merger were based on the fear of market external factors thought to impact negatively on market relations. The market internal control of self-regulation was threatened by the market external state unless weaknesses, or what could be seen as such by the state, were addressed. As a main interest of the actors in self-regulation was to uphold consumer sovereignty, it did not bode well that the regime in practice only regulated fair competition while ignoring consumer rights. Here strategic reasons are clear. Still, the experts behind the report stress that the rights of the consumers have recently been implemented into the International code of advertising practice which Swedish self-regulation adhered to, and done so on the initiative of these Swedish experts. This would indicate that the consumer issue for the experts was a matter of core policy beliefs, but that strategic arguments were used to convince the more market active board members. Accordingly it is possible that tensions existed between these groups on core policy beliefs existed, as the market active members more or less equated producers with the main group whose welfare was at stake, while among experts active in self-regulation a view started to emerge that it was just as important that the regime stood up for consumer welfare. (Funke 2012)The sudden evaluation of the new regime in the wake of the Lindqvist debate, as well as the invitation of the Advertisers to include the LO and Statens konsumentr?d in the self-regulatory regime appears to be more a case of strategy than learning or shift of core policy values. The clue to this interpretation is the timing of events. The board of the advertisers had in 1956 remarked that advertising had a low public standing, and asked the CEO to contact the LO to discuss the situation. It must be understood that the LO at this time was one of the most powerful interest groups in Sweden. As one of two organizations making up the ruling labor movement (the Social Democratic Party, at this time in power since 1932, being the other one), and also having recently acquired official status as consumer representative on a number of new state agencies regulating both consumer and competitive issues, the LO held considerable weight. Also, the pamphlet Konsumenten och reklamen had demonstrated that the LO was critical of advertising and wanted stronger state regulations. However, it took over a year until the CEO did initiate those contacts, and when they were initiated it was shortly after the Lindqvist debate had taken place. These contacts were also labeled by the board of the Marketing Association as “informational gathering from the main enemies of advertising”. (Funke 2011; Funke 2012). It seems that the Lindqvist debate acted as “the final straw”, turning public opinion towards the views of the LO, making it imperative to actually go ahead with contacting the trade union.When discussing the upcoming talks, the board of the Association of Advertisers also stressed the importance of not allowing possible consumer representatives having a say in fair competition matters, and that it was imperative that a politically neutral organization, as the national housewives association, should be invited to break what the board considered LO’s hold on the public discourse on the consumer issue. It was also suggested that a CEO from a Cooperative company should be present at the talks. The Cooperative KF had close and usually good relations with the labor movement, and several of its key figures were also party members in the SAP. But as producers, they were also members of several business associations, such as the Advertiser Association. This makes them potentially hard to place coalition-wise, but their ideological stance on putting member welfare before profits at least disassociates them from one of the key interests of market producers. (Funke 2012)The time lag between the tripartite report in 1958 recommending the LO and Statens konsumentr?d and the actual induction in 1963 also point in the direction of strategy. Although lack of sources makes it hard to definitely settle what happened, the inductive evidence points to the Marketing association blocking this initiative of the Association of Advertisers. The Marketing association, acting as a peak organization on marketing matters for all other business associations, had a pivotal influence over self-regulations at this time, holding four seats on the board of the NOp, instead of one or two, like the remaining organizations. Also, the Marketing Association had on its own appointed two consumer representatives, a consumer researcher and an mp from the liberal party on the board of the NOp. The suggestion of the tripartite commission thus directly challenged the legitimacy of these representatives, and indirectly the authority of the board of the marketing association.This interpretation is further strengthened by the fact that the board of the Marketing Association blocked calls for reforms that appeared in internal reports in 1958 and in 1963. The first report was commissioned by the board after the Lindqvist debate took off, and was written by the leadership of the NOp, while the second was drafted by the CEO and the Chairman of the board of the Marketing Association. The first report recommended more stringent monitoring of the market and maybe the introduction of a pro-active attorney-like function inside the NOp. The second report put forward that members inside the Marketing societies, the local chapters of the Marketing association, could be activated to better monitor and report dubious advertising to the NOp. Increased member action in monitoring would also active more consumers, as these would have more venues to turn to with their complaints. These suggestions were refuted by the board as being against the spirit of self-regulation, which according to them emphasized a discrete and flexible process of handling complaints. Here it must be stressed that suggested in the internal commissions did not suggest inclusion of corporatist interest groups in self-regulation. But none of these suggestions or the suggestion by the tripartite group resulted in any policy change. It is therefore likely that the board of the Marketing Association not only blocked internal calls for reform, but for some time also thwarted the ambitions of the Association of Advertisers. The conclusion that the reasoning of the Association of Advertisers’ reveals strategic interests as the main drive behind the tripartite initiative is also strengthened by looking at the development of the wider regulatory context and the policy ideas behind it. The initiative of the Association of Advertisers was made in a political setting where consumer issues were increasingly targeted by state policies, and where advertising was criticized as a potential hindrance to these policies. The initiative of the Advertisers was thus more along the lines of damage control than a change of core policy beliefs. The inclusion of corporatist consumer representatives in the NOp risked producer control of the regime, as it was hard to know what agenda these actors would pursue once inside, but the producer principals must have decided that potential gains outweighed the risks. The strategy would hopefully would dampen public criticism of advertising and subsequently remove some external pressure by moving the issue away from the unpredictability of the public arena into the closed off policy arena of corporatist intermediation. Also, the fact that new consumer representatives were clearly outnumbered by those of the producers, as the former consisted of five associations while producer representatives numbered 20 associations, and that the regulatory regime had been shaped by business interests meant that the producer oriented coalition could hope for corporatism on business terms. (Funke 2012)This interpretation of advocating corporatist inclusion as a interest strategic to move away the issue of advertising from a confrontational setting in the public arena to a corporatist policy arena of intermediation is strengthen by internal sources of the business associations. At a board meeting of the Marketing Association, The CEO of the Association of Advertisers reacted with anger to the decision of the new reform friendly CEO of the Marketing Association to take part in and encourage public debate on advertising. This strategy would only result in giving critics of advertising more attention and influence, he claimed, as producers according to him stood no chance when advertising was debated in public. The second public debate on advertising in 1962-1963 probably tilted in favor of the Advertisers strategy, and thus contributed to a corporatization of self-regulation of advertising. So while the core policy values on regulation remained that producer controlled self-regulation was sufficient for the needs of both producers and consumers, the outside pressure of the consumer oriented coalition had forced the producer oriented coalition to relinquish complete control of self-regulation. The scheme of the Marketing Association to appoint consumer representatives that lacked affiliation with particularly the LO had not been sufficient or effective in the eyes of the Advertisers, given the heightened state of debate due to Lindqvist and later Ortmark. That Ortmark in his book commended the business community for its recent inclusion of corporatist consumer representatives in the NOp indicates that the some of the sought effect was reached. (Funke 2012)1963 -1968 corporatist self-regulation – a brief interludeAs the 1960s progressed, it appears that consumer issues were incorporated into the producer view of an efficient market. As the consumer issue continued to grow in both public debate and state policies, expert members and leadership figures in associations of the producer oriented coalition started to exhibit views whereby the welfare of the consumer was central to a healthy market. In a number of debate books, articles and reform proposals, it was stressed that the market was essentially demand driven, and that consumer information was an essential part of market information. However, this view of the consumer differed from that of the consumer oriented coalition. While the latter view emphasized advertising as a problematic market function and consumer information as the solution, the former saw advertising as functional and consumer information as a necessary complement to the information already given in advertising. According to these segments of the producer oriented coalition, the concern was to educate and inform consumers on how to best utilize both advertising and consumer information to maximize their market exchange. (Funke 2011; Funke 2012)Looking at policy processes on regulation, the second phase is characterized by the problematic existence of the corporatist self-regulatory regime. While the inclusion of the new consumer representatives had formalized the criss-crossing of the policy process of self-regulation, it was seen as an improvement rather than a makeover by the producer principals. The regime would also be both unstable and relatively short-lived, being side stepped by the government bill of 1970 recommending the formation of a statutory consumer regime, and ending with the termination of the NOp in 1971 in conjunction with the launch of the new state consumer policies. (Funke 2012)A study of the two coalitions also reveals that both sides were quite active in the numerous state commissions that at this time investigated consumer and competitive policies. In these commissions telltale signs are apparent that the corporatist solution did not have the full support of the consumer oriented coalition. Particularly the LO kept advancing ideas of larger role for the state in consumer policies. While the organization had supported the state policies instituted in the 1950s that aimed at increasing competition and educating consumers, it voiced its dissatisfaction with the outcome of these policies. In a referral to a report from the state commission on consumer prices in 1965 the LO claimed that cartel-like behavior still existed, price competition was insufficient and consumers did not appear to act more informed than before. Particularly marketing was singled out as standing in the way of a more efficient consumer market, and increased state efforts in consumer polices was recommended. (Lundqvist 2003; Lundqvist 2007)At the same time members of the producer oriented coalition that took part in state commissions that actively sought to influence statutory policy as to give self-regulation continued regulatory primacy members of the producer oriented coalition. In the 1966 report of the producer dominated Commission on disloyal competition, some additional statutory rules were recommended. But at the same time the report stressed a continued central role for self-regulation, as this mode of regulation best suited the dynamic and ever changing demands of the market. In the 1968 the report of the Commission on consumer information, also having a strong producer oriented presence, further reforms inside self-regulation was suggested as to improve consumer information and regulation of advertising. On the other hand, rival proposals were given by reports of commissions where the consumer oriented coalition was dominant. These instead recommended increased statutory involvement, and the creation of state agencies to handle both information and regulation of consumer issues, including advertising. (Funke 2012)The actual activities of the NOp also tell of a half-hearted involvement of the new consumer representatives. The Archives of the LO that contain yearly reports of all the corporatist boards the organization was a member of does not contain any mention of the NOp. Documents from the mid 1960s also strengthens the interpretation that the LO were unhappy with the NOp, and pursued other strategies closer to their core policy beliefs. In an informal hearing held by the Marketing Associations PR-Commission at the end of 1964, a number of key players in consumer politics and self-regulation were interviewed on their personal thoughts on the subject of advertising and advertising ethics. Present at the hearing were Rudolf Meidner, perhaps the most influential economist inside Swedish Social Democracy during the post-war years and at the time member of Statens Konsumentr?d and Eric Petterson, representative of LO in the NOp. At the hearing Meidner revealed a very negative and distrustful opinion of advertising, stating that unacceptable violations and transgressions of the consumer’s rights were common occurrences in the world of advertising. (Funke 2012)Meidner also had little faith in advertising being considered ethically sound just because it was not convicted of a crime in a court. The best aid of the consumer in confronting advertising, according to Meidner, was the insight that advertising was always biased, always acting on the behalf of the producer, and never on that of the consumer. Regarding self-regulation of advertising, Meidner gave ambiguous answers, stating that he thought it was a good regime, especially since the consumers had become represented, but that he didn’t think the trade unions would be interested in funding the regime. He also said that it was a pity so few consumers reported cases to the NOp, and that that he found other consumer based initiatives possible. He suggested a pro-active consumer commission policing and reporting bad advertising, although it would refrain from passing judgement, leaving this to the NOp. It is worthwhile to note that the so–called Skoglund group, a commission on consumer issues formed by the SAP and the LO, in 1966 suggested that the formation of local consumer commissions made up of trade union representatives were necessary to make consumer information more efficient. This proposal was also included in a government bill in 1967, where these commissions were to be formed on a trial basis, funded by the state. The suggestion of Meidner bears a potential affinity with the proposal made by the Skoglund group. Petterson also came out as critical of the NOp, stating that it needed to be faster in processing complaints, and that an animated body of consumers would demand an ever increasing capacity of the NOp. He also implied that increased funding by the government, something that to him would be needed to make possible the responsibilities of the body, might discredit it in the eyes of the business community, leading to a lessening will of the business community to abide by its verdicts. (Funke 2012)The question of financing was at this point becoming critical at the NOp. This was due both to the burden of an increased workload and the cost of extra staff needed to cope with it and several attempts at increasing the scope and activities of the NOp. For example, a pro-active attorney like function, Anm?lningsbyr?n, was launched in 1968, but was depended on state funding and would thus only run for an initial trial year. The organisation had grown substantially since its inception. Only two years after its foundation, in 1959, it had to hire an extra law expert to be able to keep up with the amount of complaints it received. By the year of 1971, it housed a head, two vice-heads and 39 regular members in three sections. Certain reforms were made in the organisation to increase efficiency, and in 1966, acting CEO of the NOp Tengelin reported to the board of the Marketing Association that these had been successful, as the pile of complaints had been reduced. Still, in the following year the NOp wished to hire an information secretary, but that lack of funds made it impossible. That LO at this point did not show any interest in participating in funding was not positive, and the statements by Meidner and Ericsson is supported by internal documents from the NOp, where LO and the other trade unions are missing when individual contributions from principals are listed. It is also evident that LO did not attend or participate in several internal reports discussing reforms that were made at the NOp during this time, and at times even avoided the yearly meeting of the principals. (Funke 2012)Here it is also worth to note that Lillemor Erlander, LO spokesperson on consumer matters and very critical of advertising, was also a LO representative of the NOp. Erlander was a member of both the Consumer Commission launched in 1967 and the Skoglund group (Skoglundgruppen), which both influenced the formulation of state consumer policies in the early 1970:s. In the Consumer Commission, Erlander was an outspoken supporter for minimizing business influence in the proposed Swedish Consumer Agency, wanting fewer business representatives on the board than the proposal suggested. The actions and statements of the LO vis-à-vis the NOp were, in conjunction with the initiatives and the proposals given by some state commissions, an indication that Social Democracy during the second half of the 1960s had developed other ideas about regulations of marketing than just letting itself be a part of the corporatist arrangement of self-regulation (Funke 2012).AnalysisDuring this phase, the criss-crossing of the policy process had partly been formalized with the inclusion of the corporatist consumer representatives. However, the policy process of self-regulation appears to have been divided into two separate processes: one taking part inside the NOp, with internal reports and reforms, one placed inside the state policy process, whereby the two coalitions in a number of state commissions tried to either defend self-regulation or push for more state relations. The developments during the second phase of policy development shows that despite the formalization of the criss-crossing policy process of self-regulation through a corporatization, this did not lead to the creation of a new coalition with shared core policy beliefs, nor a negotiated settlement between two coalitions. The producer oriented coalition appears to partially have adopted new policy beliefs by including consumer welfare and consumer information as part of their core beliefs. However, this did not mean that they accepted the consumer oriented coalitions’ view on consumer information, or their negative assessment of advertising. Likewise, the consumer oriented coalition did not abandon their core view that consumer and advertising regulations were to be handled by the state or directly by consumers. Their participation in the NOp appears to have been purely strategic, gaining increasing influence on regulation of advertising while at the same time pursuing the core policy goal through referrals and participation in state commissions. This interpretation is supported by the fact that producer oriented coalition members also actively in state commissions in referrals tried to influence statutory development as to give continued primacy to market accommodated self-regulation. This was an admission that the struggle between the coalitions over policy influence definitely had moved into the sphere of state policies. At the same time, tensions existed inside the coalitions. In the producer oriented coalition, experts and association leadership appears to have favored stricter reforms and a more consumer inclusive policy, while producers active in the market were more hesitant and blocked some of these reform initiatives. In the consumer oriented coalition, the stronger pro-state beliefs developed inside the labor movement created friction with the cooperative, whose double nature as both representing both consumers and producers caused them to be excluded from the internal policy work of the trade unions in the influential Skoglund group.Third phase 1968 – 1971 external pressure and radical reformsBy the end of the 1960s, it was apparent that major policy changes were about in the area of consumer and competitive policies. Public opinion had increasingly turned against advertising, and the political radicalism of the late 1960s made advertising a key issue in protests. Polls showed growing dissatisfaction or suspicion with advertising, particularly among young people. The labor movement had mirrored these changes by adopting an increasingly negative stance on advertising, and similar views were apparent in the Cooperative movement and among consumer activists as well. Criticism of advertising was now part of a context where the capacity of a market economy to deliver societal goods was seriously questioned or even refuted. The leftist radical discourse on advertising also received support from the media, as a number of journalists and public intellectuals criticized advertising and the foundations of the affluent society itself. The producer oriented coalition made a few attempt to launch a media counter-offensive, but it was largely unsuccessful. Members of the producer oriented coalition complained about what they perceived as a biased media, favoring the consumer oriented coalition, and a concerted effort by the business associations never materialized as a number of associations thought taking a public stand that risked severe the political repercussions. Also, an overall radicalization of the labor movement by the end of the 1960s and early 1970s resulted in its partial abandonment of corporatist consensus policies. Adopting slogans as “democratic socialism”, Social Democracy pushed for increased union influence in the labor market and a larger public sector. These policies were also largely turned into policy, although the most controversial, the creation of wage earner funds that in effect would make trade unions major owners of private business, did not come into effect until much later, and then in a watered down version. (Funke 2011; Funke 2012)By this time, numerous commissions had also filed reports recommending various reforms and policy changes. Now it was up to the Social Democratic government to formulate a bill based on these various suggestions and probes. The report that explicitly covered the issue of advertising was the 1966 report of the commission on disloyal competition. As stated earlier, it had recommended some revisions in statutory regulations, but stressed that self-regulation needed a central role, as it was the best way of developing regulations in tandem with market demands.However, the proposal of that commission did not turn into a bill. Instead, the Ministries of Trade and Justice produced a memorandum in 1969 where the proposal of the commission was criticized for not being in line with the governments view on the protection of the consumer’s rights. In the memorandum, the head of the justice department stated that the suggestions of the commission only went half- way in realizing a proper consumer protection. The commission still wanted self-regulation to have a wider function than the new law, letting self-regulation be one step ahead of the law, and letting legislation remain as a second rate regime. This was not good enough, the ministry stated. Consumer politics was not only based on sound competition, but also on the deliberate policies of pressuring the producers into making the goods that the consumers needed, with regard to type, quality, and prices. Consumer politics also had a duty to make the consumer more aware of the rational aspects of a buy, and make sure that irrational distractions did not cloud their judgments. The state was irreplaceable when it came to fulfilling the needs of the consumer. “It is my principal standpoint that society (meaning the state) should be responsible for the upholding of good ethic standards of advertising and marketing. The legislation should be as advanced as needed to make sure it is the basis for the creation of good ethical norms, and the creation of norms should be a task assigned to public agencies. Sufficient coercive means and sanctions should be put to their disposal.”, the head of the ministry of justice wrote. (Funke 2012; quote: Prop. 57: 1970 p.59, author’s translation)The memorandum was sent off for referrals, and tellingly it was labeled as a “memorandum concerning certain questions of organization in relation to a new law on improper marketing”. This title bore a real significance, as those who were expected to write the referral, were not allowed to comment on the revised suggestions of the new law, but only on the suggestions of how its institutions and agencies should be constructed. In the proposed law were explicit prohibition of combined offers and a certain types of coupons. The Marketing Association commented on these restraints, and gravely wrote that the inability to refer on the letters of the law went against the principles of the whole system of referrals. Many of the associations also stressed that they thought it was irresponsible of the memorandum to disregard the importance of market efficiency and market competition in formulating the new legislation. (Funke 2012)Other referrals were more pleased with the content of the memorandum. The central trade union LO expressed satisfaction that its demand for prohibiting combined offers and coupons had been provided for. The Consumer Commission also concluded that the memorandum was very much in line with the reasoning of the commission. This was perhaps no surprise, as the consumer commission in its referral stated that it had taken part in writing a first draft of the PM, said that it was pleased that most of the original content had remained in the finished version. Here it is worth noting that one of the two who had signed the referral of the LO was Lillemor Erlander, also member of the Consumer Commission. The Consumer Commission, launched in 1967, had in its in 1969 report and the final report in 1971 in various forms expounded the view that the consumer was weak, and the producer strong. The solution lay in the state assuming stewardship of consumer politics, guiding consumers into making rational purchases and using legislation to pressuring the producer to satisfy the normative needs of the consumer. (Funke 2012)The final bill of the government contained most of the revised suggestions of the memorandum, and in 1970, it was passed by the Swedish parliament, and took effect in 1971 as the Market Practices Act, introducing new laws and two new state agencies, the Consumer ombudsman and the Market Court. The new statutory regime was corporatist in structure, with business associations being producer representatives on the boards of the new consumer bodies, together with consumer representatives and representatives of political parties. The change of setting gave business a much smaller percentage of board seats, being around a third of the seats in the Market Court and the Consumer ombudsman. An additional third of the seats were taken by trade unions and the cooperative movements in the capacity of consumer representatives, and the final third reserved for state officials and MPs from parliament. (Pestoff 1984; Rothstein 1992; Funke 2012)These development were not entirely unanticipated by the producer oriented coalition. At the end of 1968 a major reform of the whole self-regulatory took place that completely changed the regime. The old regime had been based on the policy beliefs that self-regulation was best handled by post-production control of existing market advertising, and judge according to a common set of formalized ethical rules. Transgression would be reported and handled by a court-like agency lacking coercive powers, relying solely on the moral standing of market actors. The new regime instead abandoned this mode of operation, instead favoring setting up a wholly new regime based on pre-production censorship, whereby every company and ad agency would have someone formally responsible and acting as gate keeper stopping questionable advertising from ever reaching the market. To aid in this endeavor, producer funded agencies staffed with legal personnel would for a fee assist in cases that were too difficult to settle at company or ad agency level. Initially a series of experimental and proactive market monitoring commissions were also formed, probably to quickly jump start and complement the new regime. These were however short-lived, and all discontinued by the time the statutory regime was in place in 1971. (Funke 2012)The regime change had been the initiative of the Advertising Association (representing the ad agencies) and quickly also won the approval of the Association of Advertisers. These associations would fund and organize the new regime, particularly setting up certified training for members that would act as gate keepers on ad agencies and in company marketing departments. The origins of the new regime can be traced to recurring complaints from the Association of Advertisers that ad agencies produced too much advertising that was below standard and caused good will issues for the whole business community. These arguments had been voiced in connection with the tripartite initiative in the late 1950s, and resurfaced when the architects of the 1968 reforms in 1965 inside the Advertising Association (representing the ad agencies) started to discuss what to do about self-regulation. Those behind were the same as in previous suggestions of reform inside the producer oriented coalition; legal experts, marketing academics and producers active inside NOp. A report was produced in 1965 that argued that a larger part of the ethical responsibility of advertising ought to be placed upon the ad agencies, and more pro-active self-regulatory agencies were needed to monitor the market and receive complaints. However, nothing came of the suggested reforms until the end of 1968. (Funke 2012)The idea behind the new regime of 1968 was reform self-regulation as to fit in with the expected statutory regime, where transgressions risked leading to judicial processes risking both bad will and hefty fines. To avoid such outcomes was imperative for the producer oriented coalition. Thus the corporatist post-production monitoring was replaced by a producer-only pre-production internal censorship regime. This accomplished three things. First, it made sure that self-regulation accommodated itself to the new regulatory conditions. Second, it made the regime again a pure business operation, devoid of the political entanglements and conflicting beliefs and strategies that had plagued the NOp in its corporatist phase. It would thus be easier to get support for reforms and actual participation on company level. Third it shifted the ultimate responsibility on the ad agencies, which now had to manage a system of pre-production censorship. (Funke 2012)AnalysisThe third phase of policy development is characterized by extreme external pressure on the producer oriented coalition. The subsystem of advertising was subjected pressure from public opinion increasingly negative towards advertising. Inside the subsystem, the consumer oriented coalition dominated a number of government reports that took opposition to the support for self-regulation from producer dominated commissions. When it came time for the government to formulate a bill for a new consumer policy, the suggestions of the producer coalition dominated reports were discarded in favor of those of the consumer coalition. The close contacts between the trade union LO and the Social Democratic government appear to have been instrumental in this turn of events, as the LO were consulted in formulation of a ministry PM that in 1969 initially formulated what was to become the bill of 1970, subsequently being enacted by the parliament creating a new regulatory regime in 1971.By launching a new state regime to monitor transgressions and use state coercive powers if necessary, the self-regulatory regime based on the corporatist NOp was made redundant. Still, the transfer of regimes kept the corporatist principles, but in a state context. In this setting business influence was made much smaller while that of the consumer representatives and the state increased, giving the consumer oriented coalition the upper hand. This transition of regimes confirms the evidence presented in the section covering the previous phase of policy development, in that the consumer oriented coalition was unconvinced of the merits of corporatist self-regulation as long as it remained a business dominated regime. It also confirms that the business oriented coalition’s strategy to devote resources to state policy processes in order to protect the independence of self-regulation was a necessary but in the end insufficient approach, due to the increasing influence of the consumer oriented coalition in this policy arena.The regulatory switch from self-regulatory corporatism to state corporatism seems to have been the outcome of a long-term strategy of the consumer oriented coalition, and based on their core policy beliefs. Still, the often harsh anti-market rhetoric that was voiced by the labor movement and the launch of polices under the aegis of “democratic socialism” during this period indicates a shift in core beliefs of the consumer oriented coalition. Gone was faith in the market as a provider of societal goods. Instead, the market was viewed as flawed, and the cause of resources being diverted away from the production of public goods to a waste in private consumption. The ideas of “democratic socialism” are apparent in SAP:s consumer policy programme of 1972 and the consumer policy document of trade unions LO and TCO from the same year. In the documents, the market’s ability to satisfy consumer needs is described as a failure. A high private consumption rate is described as standing in the way of public consumption, the only way to realizing social, educational and economic equality. Advertising is described as something that is used by the producers to divert the consumer’s attention away from the essential factors that should decide a buy. The producers are portrayed as actors consciously working against the satisfaction of the consumer’s need. Therefore, active state consumer politics is necessary to achieve the goals of social democracy – spiritual growth and active citizenship. The creation of a Swedish Consumer Agency (Konsumentverket) is described as a tool to reach this goal. Thus core policy beliefs of the consumer oriented coalition now saw larger potential in the state as producer of societal goods than the market driven private sector (Funke 2012).The radical reforms of self-regulation in 1968 appear to have been the result of a combination of external and internal pressure on the producer oriented coalition and internal learning. The internal learning was connected to the realization that the current system of self-regulation was insufficient given the growth of market in recent years. Also, a new type of system was needed if the regime was to become more effective, and the key position of the ad agencies in keeping up standards had been discussed at least among advertisers for over a decade. A small shift in core policy beliefs is also evident, as the persuasive component of advertising had changed from being an exception during the other phase, but now more or less was termed as problem that needed addressing by proper reforms. It is also noteworthy that the actual reforms of 1968 were much more pervasive and elaborate than those suggested in the 1965 report, indicating that the want for reforms was not just symbolic politics, but actual need of instrumental changes that would in effect make self-regulation more effective and complement the new state regulations.But it seems that external pressure in the shape of increasing bad will in public, the general radicalization of the incumbent labor movement and the imminent threat of new statutory regulations were needed to convince the boards of the Advertising Association and the Association of advertisers to actually go through with reforms.Conclusion – Two or three coalitions?The policy process of advertising self-regulation in Sweden during the time period 1950-1971 can be deduced to the actions of two main coalitions active in the subsystem regulating advertising. On the one hand a producer oriented coalition, that had created and maintained a self-regulatory regime since the mid 1930s, and on the other, a consumer oriented coalition that very much mirrored the increased interest in consumer issues present in the public, the state and in key interest groups that successfully had gained legitimacy as consumer representatives.With the state taking an increased interest in consumer policies in the 1950s, the policy process of self-regulation became increasingly complex. While the different stages previously had taken place inside the business associations acting as regime principals, the pressure from both the consumer oriented coalition and the state initiated a ”crisscrossing” policy process. In effect, business and non-business actors interacted directly inside the NOp after the reforms of 1963. But at the same time both coalitions were also active inside the state policy process as members of various state commissions, directly trying to influence agenda setting and problem definition. Reforms inside the NOp in the 1960s together with activity in state commission reports can be seen as a two-pronged attempt by the producer oriented coalition to preserve and strengthen the independence of self-regulation. The consumer oriented coalition’s lack of interest in taking part of the policy process inside the NOp and its strong activity in agenda setting and problem inside the state policy process indicate the opposite goal – to weaken business dominated self-regulation and create a stronger position for state regulations. The logic behind these parallel policy processes is to be found in the fact that the producer oriented coalition even after the reforms of 1963 without doubt was the majority coalition inside the policy arena of self-regulation, while the newcomers representing the consumer oriented coalition were the minority. However, on the public arena and in the state policy arena power was not distributed in the same manner. The consumer coalition appears to have dominated the public discourse in advertising, which was one reason for the producer coalition to try to kill off the agenda setting taking place there and move the issue in the NOp. Inside the state policy arena the close allegiance between the Social Democratic state and the trade unions and the propensity of the Cooperative movement to support them also finally tipped the balance of power in favor of the consumer oriented coalition. That the labor movement had a stable majority in parliament also made it likely that the problem definition favored by the consumer oriented coalition would survive decision making. The producer coalition was thus faced with the difficult position of being a majority coalition in one arena (self-regulation), but a minority one in arenas that held both potential (public arena) and formal power (state policy arena) over self-regulation.The core policy beliefs of the coalitions remained largely unaffected during the studied period, but key changes among them were important in how the coalitions over time pushed for policy reforms. A gradual learning inside the producer oriented coalition created a bigger awareness that self-regulation also had to cater to consumer needs and incorporate consumer information, and that the persuasive aspects of advertising could constitute a real problem. Still, it seems that this learning was somewhat isolated to segments inside the coalition that was actively involved in self-regulation. Board members of the business associations that dominated as principals of the main self-regulatory agency NOp appear to have been less keen on this, blocking policy reforms that had this aim at the decision making stage until external pressure forced them to let them pass. The admittance of consumer representatives inside the NOp appears to have been largely a strategic move in a situation of external pressure.It is possible that the producer oriented coalition in reality consisted of two factions fighting for control of the policy arena of self-regulation, which in reality equated the boards of the NOp and the boards of the stakeholder associations that were principals of the NOp. According Schmitter & Streeck (Schmitter & Streeck 1985), associations inside corporatist systems often exhibit internal tension between leadership keen on running self-regulation with the approval of the state, and members who often have market based interests that can be contrary to or challenge regulatory design. Depending on the regulatory outcome of these internal tensions, this in can lead to tension between state and association and association and other associations not covered by the agreement between the association and the state. Another possible interpretation would be to analytically split the coalition into two: a pro-active reform-friendly producer coalition and a re-active reform-skeptic producer coalition. Still, active reformers did not question or abandon the associations they were member of, and ultimately supported self-regulation over state regulations. This conflict might therefore also be explicable as an internal fight in a single coalition over which secondary strategy to use to best safeguard the continued existence of a core policy producer dominated self-regulatory regime.The policy actions of the producer oriented coalition can consequently be seen as a combination of learning in certain quarters and the increasing internal as well as external subsystem pressure leading to actions based on protecting strategic interests, such as power over market regulations.The consumer coalition seems more cohesive, although tension between for example the trade union LO and the Cooperative movement in the end of the 1960s indicate that this coalition wasn’t so stable either. Still, the radicalism of the labor movement wasn’t challenged by the Cooperative. It even had staunch supporters inside its own ranks. Here the core policy beliefs appear to be pretty solid over time (see tables in appendix), with the important exception of the faith in the market’s ability to deliver societal goods. The faith in this function, given state control over market regulations, was diminished by the end of the period and replaced with a larger faith in the state as provider of societal goods. Barring the membership in the NOp, the actions of the consumer oriented coalition seems more based on beliefs than on strategic action. One reason for this is of course the long term incumbency of the SAP. Having been in power since 1932, and with corporatism co-opting key collective actors in supporting Social democratic policies, many of the strategic interests were manageable enough to allow for more long term ideological goals, such as state dominated market. 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Boulder,Colorado: Westview Press.Schlager, Edella and William Blomquist. 1996. “A comparison of three emergingtheories of the policy process.“ Political Research Quarterly 49 (3): 651-672.Schmitter, Phillipe C. & Wolfgang Streeck 1999. “The Organization of Business Interests. Studying the Associative Action of Business in Advanced industrial Societes.” MPIfG Discussion Paper 1/99. Scott, Colin. 2002. "Regulation of the Public Sector. A Neglected Facet of Contemporary Governance.” Journal of Law and Society 29 (1) 56-76SOU 1972:7Streeck, Wolfgang & Phillip C. Schmitter. 1985. “Community, market, state – and associations? The Prospective Contribution of Interest Governance to Social Order”. European Sociological Review 1(2) 119-138van Waarden, Frans. 1992. Emergence and development of Business Interest Associations. An example from the Netherlands. “Organization Studies 13 (4) 521-561Weible, Christopher M. & Paul A. Sabatier and Kelly McQueen. 2009. “Themes and Variations. Taking stock on the Advocay Coalition Framework”. Policy Studies Journal. 37 (1) 121-140 Wotruba, Thomas R. 1997. Industry Self-Regulation: a review and extension to a Global Setting.” Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 16 (1) 38-54Zafonte, Matthew & Paul A. Sabatier 1998. ”Shared Beliefs and Imposed Interdependencies as Determinants of Ally Networks in Overlapping Subsystems”. Journal of Theoretical Politics 10 (4) 473-505.?mark, Klas. 1994. Vem styr marknaden? Facket, makten och marknaden 1850 – 1990. Stockholm: TidenAppendix 1.Appendix 2.Appendix 3. ................
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