FINAL
Working Paper
THE 800-POUND GORILLA IN THE ROOM
US Army Civil-Military Operations: CORDS, CMOCs, and PRTs
Peter W. Connors, PhD
8165906821
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Contents
(To be completed after insertion of maps and photographs)
Forward…………..
Chapter 1. Introduction…………….
Chapter 2. US Civil-Military Operations – An Historical Perspective………
Chapter 3. Counterinsurgency, Couterterrorism, and Pacification in Vietnam……
Chapter 4. Evolution of the Civil Military Operations Center – CMOC……….
Chapter 5. Regain, Rebuild, Reinforce, and Resolve – PRTs in Afghanistan……..
Chapter 6. The PRT Concept Migrates to Iraq……………
Chapter 7. Conclusion…………..
Bibliography………….
List of Suggested Maps and Illustrations…………….
THE 800-POUND GORILLA IN THE ROOM
US Army Civil-Military Operations: CORDS, CMOCs, and PRTs
Chapter 1. Introduction
Immediately after US Special Forces Task Force Viking liberated Kirkuk on 9 April 2003, local Iraqi residents of all ethnic groups looked to the Americans to restore and maintain law and order in the city. Colonel Kenneth Tovo quickly transitioned his 10th SFG Soldiers from combat to stability and support operations, established a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) in the center of the city, and concentrated on preventing Kurd-on-Arab ethnic violence. Kirkuk remained peaceful as Tovo convened a series of public meetings designed to allow the various ethnic groups vying for power in the city to vent their frustrations. For roughly a week in mid-April, Colonel Tovo was the mayor of Kirkuk.[i]
Phase IV of the 1003V CENTCOM plan for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) clearly spelled out the requirement for US Forces to be prepared to conduct stability and support operations as combat operations concluded. Combatant commanders and their staffs, however, focused primarily on the warfighting component of the mission, such that, in preparation for OIF, few tactical units had been adequately trained in civil-military lines of operation, such as governance, essential services, and the rule of law. Many commanders believed that civilian teams from other US Government (USG) agencies would assume oversight responsibility for postwar Iraq after the defeat of Saddam and the Baathist regime. Prior to the invasion, CENTCOM commander, General Tommy Franks, told USG civilian officials in Washington – “You pay attention to the day after and I’ll pay attention to the day of.”[ii] Although 10th SFG Soldiers were forced to improvise, they, nevertheless, developed and successfully implemented ad hoc governance plans for Kirkuk that quelled smoldering ethnic hostilities.
Soldiers from the 173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team continued the civil-military mission – resolving disputes and rebuilding the infrastructure, economy, and political processes – after they relieved the 10th SFG in Kirkuk. Colonel William Mayville, 173d commander, established a small headquarters at the former Baathist compound in downtown Kirkuk, declared the city a weapons-free zone, and established a network of checkpoints manned by Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) traffic police. Colonel Mayville found himself responsible not only for Kirkuk, but also for the dozens of villages, hamlets, and oilfield surrounding the city that comprised his Area of Operations (AO). “Do you know that you are in charge of a million people?” Mayville’s Iraqi interpreter asked him after an evening meet-and-greet with Turkoman community officials.[iii]
Colonel Mayville helped negotiate land resettlement claims and, along with his interpreter, broadcasted a live radio call-in program geared toward airing and quickly resolving Kirkuki citizen complaints. Mayville empowered junior officers to resolve local Kirkuk governance issues at the platoon level and established a jobs program to help the unemployed. 173d ABN Soldiers soon realized, however, that each ethnic group was more intent on furthering its own political and economic interests than adopting the tenets of western-style democracy. Kurds and Turkoman petitioned the Americans to reverse Saddam’s Arabization policies and remove all Baathists from positions of power in Kirkuk. Kurds were especially determined to regain their confiscated homes, land, and other property rights. Mayville, however, refused to take sides and enforced the rule of law equally among all Kirkuki communities and ethnicities.[iv]
Attached Soldiers from the 96th and 404th Civil Affairs Battalions (CAB) proved invaluable to the 173d ABN’s stability and support mission. CAB personnel managed the Kirkuk CMOC, which quickly became the primary location for citizens to interact with US military representatives in soliciting assistance or lodging complaints. Meanwhile, other CAB Soldiers helped Iraqis restore water and electricity and supervised the distribution of fresh food in Kirkuk. Prior to deployment, these Soldiers had been well trained in providing appropriate support to indigenous governments. What they encountered in Kirkuk, however, was that the city had no government whatsoever, since the Baathist city officials had fled following the liberation. The CAB Soldiers, therefore, helped Kirkukis establish an emergency council, consisting of Kurds, Turkoman, Arabs, and Assyrians, to manage city functions until official interim city council elections – also organized by CAB teams – could be held. Subsequently, six members from each principal ethnic group, plus six independents, were elected by 300 delegates to serve on the 30-member council.[v] “This is not full democracy…but it’s a first step,” Major General Raymond Odierno, commander, US 4th Infantry Division, told assembled Kirkuki delegates prior to the historic election.[vi]
For the remainder of 2003, 173d ABN Soldiers continued to shoulder the responsibility for assisting Iraqis with governance, reconstruction, and reconciliation operations in Kirkuk. Civil-Military related initiatives begun in 2003 were continued and improved upon by the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and the 116th Brigade Combat Team during their subsequent troop rotations in Kirkuk, as governance and rule of law issues increased in importance. When asked if the US Military had been given too much responsibility, Colonel Mayville answered “today you cannot simply focus on traditional military operations to the exclusion of civil affairs, of social and political issues, of the mandate for economic development, or whatever the city needs…the challenge is to find the right balance and to make sure we get it right.”[vii] Mayville rightfully took pride in the adaptive nature of his Soldiers and highlighted the way in which the Brigade had transformed as an organization initially in combat to meet the challenges of what was also a core US military mission – that of establishing stability and security in Kirkuk.
Stability Operations a Core US Military Mission
In 2005, the Department of Defense issued Directive 3000.05 that defined stability operations as “military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in states or regions.” The Directive further acknowledged and re-affirmed that stability operations were indeed a “core US military mission” on a par with and “comparable to combat operations,” that should be “integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.”[viii] Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, released in 2006, further described stability operations – along with offensive and defensive operations – as a critical component counterinsurgency campaign planning. “The exact mix varies depending on the mission” and the situation in the respective commander’s Area of Operations. Commanders will often “act as diplomats as well as warriors” and interact with a “wide variety of nonmilitary agencies,” FM 3-24 explains.[ix]
In a 2007 Landon Lecture speech at Kansas State University, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates praised the stability operations efforts of US combat forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, noting the “decisive role reconstruction, development, and governance plays in any meaningful, long-term, success.” “The Department of Defense has taken on many of these burdens that might have been assumed by civilian agencies in the past,” Gates told the Landon audience, adding “our brave men and women in uniform have stepped up to the task, with field artillerymen and tankers building schools and mentoring city councils… they’ve done an admirable job…and the Armed Forces will need to institutionalize and retain these non-traditional capabilities.”[x] Secretary Gates went on, however, to lament the disproportional participation of civilian representatives in on-going OIF and OEF stability operations. “There is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian instruments of national security – non-military foreign affairs programs in diplomacy, strategic communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic reconstruction and development,” he explained.[xi]
Civil Affairs Branch Expansion
In the meantime, the US Army was expanding the size and proficiency of its Civil Affairs Branch, which is equally capable of performing many of the civilian-oriented roles and missions encountered in stability operations environments.[xii] In the April 2009 Report to Congress on Civil Affairs, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, Low Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities (ASD/SOLIC&IC), led by Michael Vickers, described Civil Affairs forces as being trained to “provide expertise to military commanders in their interaction with civil societies,” adding “all US military commanders are charged with overseeing civil-military operations within their areas of responsibility.”[xiii] The ASD Report also cited the revised definition of civil-military operations from Joint Publication (JP) 3-57 released the previous summer:
The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, government and nongovernment civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational; area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government.[xiv]
JP 3-57 further noted the following characteristics of Civil Affairs activities and operations:
(1) They are designed to enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in localities where military forces are present;
(2) They require coordination with other US government organizations, intergovernmental organizations, and the private sector; and
(3) They involve the application of functional specialty skills that normally are the responsibility of civil government to enhance the conduct of civil-military operations.[xv]
Irregular warfare (IW) – the violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations – was identified in the ASD Report as the type of warfare most likely to be encountered by US forces in the foreseeable future. As such, DoD Civil Affairs force development initiatives began focusing on potential global, long-term, irregular warfare campaigns, such as counter-terrorism, counterinsurgency, foreign internal defense, and stability operations in support of friendly countries deemed critical to vital US national security interests and countries in which the population becomes the center of gravity. Therefore, addressing the Civil Affairs “capability and capacity gaps related to IW and the whole-of-government approaches to stability and reconstruction operations” became an official DoD transformation priority as described in the February 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report.[xvi]
Currently, there are approximately 8,000 US Army Soldiers, 90% of whom are Army Reservists, designated civil affairs qualified. Over the next several years, the Army intends to adjust the civil affairs personnel mix to roughly 25% active and 75% reserve. Each Army Division is allocated one civil affairs battalion, while each Brigade Combat Team is provided with a civil affairs company in direct supporting roles. Both generalists and functional specialists staff civil affairs battalions and companies. Generalists mobilize civilian resources and help prevent civilians from interfering with military operations. Functional specialists work with foreign nation officials to provide essential services, restore infrastructure, and develop reconstruction plans.[xvii]
With respect to the notion of a whole-of-government approach to stability operations, Colonel Norman Cotton, Assistant for Civil Affairs Policy, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations Capabilities, reaffirms that the Secretary of Defense’s Guidance for the Development of the Force, FY2010-2015 calls for the development of “interdependent joint force/interagency packages proficient in performing large-scale, civil-military operations needed to defeat irregular threats including capabilities needed for stability operations and enabling/transitioning to civil authorities.”[xviii] In order to attain these required capabilities, DoD is increasing the size of both the active duty and reserve civil affairs forces and continuing to refine/transform the comprehensive military civil affairs program as it relates to irregular warfare and whole-of-government approaches to stability operations. Finally, since the military’s role is only one component of the whole-of-government approach to stability operations, DoD has stipulated that civil affairs capabilities in support of stability missions be “compatible and the complementary to those of other government agencies.”[xix]
This Long War Occasional Paper traces the history of US civil-military operations (CMO) beginning with the French and Indian War. Next, the Paper describes in detail the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Support (CORDS) project that turned around a “disjointed and ineffective civilian pacification program” by placing it under military control during the Vietnam War.[xx] Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOC), Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan, and the accomplishments of PRTs and embedded PRTs during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM will subsequently be explored in depth.
The Paper concludes by building a case for drastically reducing, and possibly eliminating altogether, the whole-of-government approach to stability operations. The entire civilian component of the currently-stated stability operations mission could be easily undertaken and accomplished by highly-trained US Army Civil Affairs Soldiers embedded with Brigade Combat Teams. Stovepiping, confusing reporting channels, and unity of effort would thereby be eliminated and replaced by a clear, concise, unity of command. In 2004, Combined Forces Command Afghanistan (CFC-A) commander, Lieutenant General David Barno gave his regional brigade commanders full authority and responsibility for everything that occurred in their respective AOs. Only the US military had sufficient manpower and materiel to get things done and to make thing happen Afghanistan. “We own it all,” Barno frequently told his staff – the US Army is the 800-pound gorilla in the room.”[xxi]
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[i] Charles Briscoe, et al., All Roads Lead to Baghdad (Fort Bragg, NC: USASOC History Office, 2006), 364-370.
[ii] General Tommy Franks, American Soldier (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 2004), 441.
[iii] Unidentified Iraqi interpreter quoted in Kevin Dougherty, “Army ‘Mayor’ Plans for Diversity in Kirkuk’s Future,” Stars and Stripes, 4 May 2003, 1, (accessed 8 March 2010).
[iv] Colonel William Mayville, interview by FRONTLINE, 1 December 2003, 5, 16, (accessed 7 March 2010).
[v] Charles Briscoe, et al., 381-383.
[vi] Major General Raymond Odierno quoted in United Nations Foundation, “Kirkuk Elects City Council: Ba’athists Loose Jobs,” U.N. Wire, 27 May 2003, 1, (accessed 6 March 2010).
[vii] Colonel William Mayville, interview by FRONTLINE, 1 December 2003, 20.
[viii] Gordon England, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” Department of Defense Directive Number 3000.05, 28 November 2005, 2, (accessed 22 July 2010).
[ix] Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC, December 2006), 1-19, 1-22, 2-8.
[x] Robert Gates, “Landon Lecture, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, 26 November 2007, 3, (accessed 28 October 2010).
[xi] Robert Gates, “Landon Lecture, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, 26 November 2007, 4. October 2010).
[xii] Civil Affairs became a separate branch of the US Army in 2006. Although the US Navy and US Marine Corps each have Civil Affairs capabilities, this Long War Occasional Paper focuses primarily on US Army Civil Affairs operations.
[xiii] Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on Civil Affairs,” Washington, DC, 29 April 2009, 3, (accessed 22 July 2010).
[xiv] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, Civil-Military Operations (Washington, DC, 8 July 2008), GL-6.
[xv] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, GL-6.
[xvi] Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on Civil Affairs,” Washington, DC, 29 April 2009, 5; DoD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, 24-25.
[xvii] Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on Civil Affairs,” Washington, DC, 29 April 2009, 7-8, 12.
[xviii] Colonel Norman Cotton, “Civil Affairs Study,” Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations Capabilities, Briefing, 4 March 2009, Slide 6, Operations – Policy (accessed 29 October 2010).
[xix] Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on Civil Affairs,” Washington, DC, 29 April 2009, 13.
[xx] Dale Andrade, “Three Lessons from Vietnam,” Washington Post, 29 December 2005, 1.
[xxi] Lieutenant General David Barno, interview by the US Army Center of Military History, 21 November 2006, 34.
Chapter 2: US Civil-Military Operations - An Historical Perspective
Civil-Military operations have been a critical component of warfare for millennia. After overthrowing the Persian Empire and defeating the last Persian king, Alexander the Great gave the order to rebuild Babylon and the Alexandrian soldiers soon became schoolmasters.1 Americans have been conducting civil-military operations since the colonial era. This chapter presents a brief overview of those historic instances in which the US military undertook missions that required the resources and manpower necessary to successfully perform civil-military functions involving host nation governance, physical reconstruction, institution building, re-establishing rule of law, humanitarian assistance, caring for refugees and displaced persons, and curtailing civilian interference with combat operations. The importance of civil-military operations has grown steadily over the past several decades to the point where CMO now constitutes a significant component of both the OEF and OIF counterinsurgency campaign plans, addressing critical issues such as interagency coordination, host nation collaboration, management of civilian contractors, and relations with allied nation officials and nongovernmental organizations.
Early American examples of CMO
As an early example of civil-military operations, colonial militias assisted British regular forces with quartering soldiers, negotiating with Native American Indians, detaining prisoners, and impressing private property for military use throughout the course of the French and Indian War (1754-1763) between Great Britain and France in North America.2 During the American Revolution, the Continental Army assumed temporary control of Philadelphia, as General George Washington instructed his Soldiers to “preserve tranquility and order in the city and give security to individuals of every class until the restoration of civil government.”3 British soldiers, likewise, occupied and established martial law in several American cities during the Revolution. The first occupation of foreign territory by US forces occurred during the War of 1812 when the American Army briefly invaded Canada. Also, early in the 19th century, Captain Meriwether Lewis and Lieutenant William Clark led the heralded expedition to explore the Louisiana Territory and Lieutenant Zebulon Pike mapped the upper reaches of the Mississippi River. In the 1840’s, Lieutenant John Fremont charted the Oregon Trail, opening the way for pioneers and the great westward migration. Additionally, Captain Howard Stanbury and Lieutenant John Gunnison, both US Army topographical engineers, discovered passages through the Rocky Mountains that eventually became primary routes for overland stage coaches, the pony express, and the transcontinental railroad.4 The US Army often served temporarily as an occupying and governing force in the new western territories until official civilian authority could be established. Forts Smith, Dodge, Laramie, along with many others, provided much needed protection for the citizens of newly formed western settlements.5
President James Polk order US Army forces commanded by General Winfield Scott to conduct an amphibious assault on the port of Vera Cruz during the Mexican War (1846-1848). After securing Vera Cruz, Scott was to proceed overland to capture Mexico City, thereby forcing Mexican government officials to accept US terms for peace. General Scott was a graduate of West Point and student of military history. He believed that war crimes committed against Spanish citizens by French occupation forces during the Peninsular War (1807-1814) had led to the rise of local insurrections and guerilla warfare that contributed significantly to Napoleon’s downfall and ultimate abdication. Thus, faced with the requirement of dealing with thousands of Mexican citizens on his march to Mexico City, Scott issued General Order No. 20 on 19 February 1847, stipulating a code of conduct that stressed maintaining stability, gaining the support of the Mexican people, respecting the rights and property of innocent civilians, and governing through local officials. “Rape, murder, assault, robbery, desecration of churches, and destruction of private property,” became court-martial offenses for both regular and volunteer American Forces fighting in Mexico.6 Scott went on to reopen local markets, hire Mexican citizens to rebuild Vera Cruz, and distribute food to needy civilians. Because of his actions in the Mexican War, General Scott is considered the “Father of Civil Affairs,” despite having no training in the field and despite having no official civil affairs organization in the US Army at the time.7 After the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was signed in 1848, a delegation of prominent Mexican civic, business, and religious leaders offered Scott the dictatorship of the Federal Mexican Republic. General Scott graciously declined. Commenting on Scott’s noteworthy success in Mexico, General Ulysses S. Grant later remarked, “The Mexicans regretted his departure almost as much as they hated to see his arrival.”8
US Civil War and Beyond
Little more than a decade later, Union generals faced a unique set of problematic civil-military issues during the US Civil War. As Union forces pushed further south into the Confederacy, they were forced out of necessity to control hostile civilians, provide essential services, restore the rule of law, and protect freed slaves, Union sympathizers, and private property. Concerned with the ethics, standards of civilized behavior, and the inhumanity of a war that pitted one group of Americans against another, President Abraham Lincoln appointed Professor Francis Lieber of Columbia University to draft a code of wartime conduct for union forces on the battlefield. General Orders No. 100, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, was subsequently promulgated in April 1963 and quickly achieved worldwide acclaim as the first comprehensive codification of the laws of land warfare. Whereas the 1806 United States Articles of War, forerunner of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, were limited to punitive measures and the internal discipline of US forces, the “Lieber Code,” as General Orders 100 was known, rigorously addressed the treatment of enemy conventional forces, guerrillas, partisans, terrorists, traitors, spies, prisoners of war, civilians, and other non-combatants.9 Both the Geneva Conventions of 1864/1868 and the Hague Convention of 1909 modeled their respective principles on the civil-military guidelines spelled out in US General Orders 100.
During the era of Southern Reconstruction after the Civil War ended, the Union Army continued civil affairs/military government operations to ensure stability, improve economic conditions, and enforce the rule of law throughout the former Confederacy, which was divided into five districts. The Army also assumed responsibility for administering the Freedmen’s Bureau civil rights program that provided aid and comfort to recently freed slaves and encouraged them to participate in the political process. Established by Congress in March 1865, the Bureau became part of the US Department of War, was led by Union Army General Oliver O. Howard, and eventually disbanded in 1872.10 US military rule ended in the South in 1870, however the last troops were not withdrawn until 1877.
After the Spanish-American War ended in 1898, the Treaty of Paris gave the United States temporary control over Cuba and permanent colonial authority over Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines.11 President William McKinley appointed US Army Colonel Leonard Wood as Military Governor of Cuba in 1899. As a Harvard educated physician, Wood initiated a series of medical and sanitation enhancement programs aimed at improving the health and welfare of Cuban citizens. Colonel Wood also assisted Cubans in drafting a new constitution, electing new government leaders, and ultimately gaining formal independence as the Republic of Cuba in 1902. The US Military was called upon to re-occupy Cuba in 1905, 1912, and 1917 to help the Cuban government preserve independence and restore order and stability.
Wood was promoted the Brigadier General and assumed command of the Philippines Division in 1902. Under Wood, US Soldiers in the Philippines conducted a classic civil-military operation – fighting a counterterrorism campaign against Muslim Moro rebels on the one hand, while promoting Philippine self-government, establishing the rule of law, building local defense forces, and improving schools, public health, and essential services on the other.12 Over the next several decades, US Forces (Army, Navy, or Marines) intervened for civil-military purposes in Guam, American Samoa, Puerto Rico, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Nicaragua, Haiti, and El Salvador.13 Finally, the 1903 Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty granted the United States rights to the Panama Canal Zone. The US Army assumed governorship of the Zone and Army Engineers built the 48-mile long canal, which opened in 1914.
World Wars I and II
After the World War I armistice in 1918, US Army troops occupied a de-militarized Allied sector in the German Rhineland. Soldiers assigned the occupation mission were neither adequately trained nor properly organized to establish a military government capable of meeting the needs of several hundred thousand civilians in the region. Recognizing these shortcomings, Colonel Irwin L. Hunt, Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs for the Third Army, reported to his superiors that, “the American army of occupation lacked both the training and organization to guide the destinies of nearly one million civilians whom the fortunes of war had placed under its temporary sovereignty.”14 The Hunt Report languished until 1939 when, once again, war broke out in Europe, thereby underscoring the potential for another US mission involving occupation, civil affairs, and military governance. Subsequently, the Judge Advocate General of the Army published two pertinent US Army Field Manuals in 1940 – FM 27-10, The Rules of Land Warfare and FM 27-5, Military Government. FM 27-10 described the international rules of warfare to which the United States had previously agreed by treaty and included instructions regarding military occupations and governance of enemy territories. FM 27-5 dealt primarily with planning, administration, and legal aspects; and defined military government as being “established and maintained by force of arms over occupied territory of the enemy and over the inhabitants thereof.”15 The military civil affairs community continued to grow in stature during the early 1940s as the Army Staff added a Military Government Division, the University of Virginia School of Military Government opened in Charlottesville, and President Franklin Roosevelt transferred responsibility for future foreign occupations from the US Department of State to the Department of War.16
By 1942, Nazi Germany dominated Europe and was moving aggressively in Russia and North Africa. As the Allied forces retaliated, first invading Italy and then advancing across France, Luxemburg, Belgium, and Holland, US Army Civil Affairs Soldiers prepared movement control plans, prevented civilians from interfering with combat operations, reestablished local governments, and cared for hundreds of thousands of displaced persons. After Allied forces crossed into Germany, Civil Affairs units took full control of the governments of captured cities and towns, removing Nazis from power and beginning reconstruction efforts. Ultimately, nation-building and governance operations during World War II involved 25,000 Civil Affairs Soldiers assisting 80 million civilians from both friendly and enemy nations.17
After the German surrender in 1945, Germany was divided into four military occupation zones. Deputy Military Governor of the US Zone, Army General Lucius D. Clay, organized local elections and assisted the newly elected German officials draft a constitution. When the Soviets blockaded Berlin in 1948, Americans organized the Berlin Airlift in which more than 2 million tons of food, fuel, and other supplies were flown into West Berlin until the blockade was lifted in the spring of 1949.18 Never before had US nation-building efforts been so extensive. And, as noted by former Command Historian Stanley Sandler of the US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, “Enlightened American policy, established by the national command authority and senior military commanders and implemented by Civil Affairs officers, made allies out of enemies and possibly saved thousands of American lives.”19
Meanwhile, after the Japanese unconditionally surrendered in the WW II Pacific Theater, General Douglas MacArthur’s occupation forces undertook military government operations not only in Japan, but in the Carolines, Marianas, Marshals, Okinawa, Iwo Jima, and South Korea as well. More than 6,000 US officers and enlisted men secured Japan’s four main islands, disarmed Japanese forces, and began providing essential services for over 6.5 million displaced persons. MacArthur wisely allowed Emperor Hirohito to remain as head of state and permitted the existing Japanese government, once vetted, to continue normal operations under the direction of US occupying forces. These actions engendered the support of Japanese citizens for the goals and objectives of the occupation, which included establishing democracy, holding elections, and upgrading the education system.20
Korea and Vietnam
US occupation forces withdrew from the democratic Republic of Korea in 1948, however many soon returned as part of the United Nations Civil Assistance Command after North Korea attacked in June 1950. The Eighth Army’s 95th Military Government Group deployed to Pusan and immediately began providing food and shelter for thousands of fleeing refugees. Eventually, Civil Affairs Provincial Teams helped Koreans throughout the country rebuild critical infrastructure and restore essential services.21 In 1955, the US Army established a separate reserve component Civil Affairs and Military Government Branch. The Branch was subsequently redesignated simply “Civil Affairs” in 1959.22
US Marines from the Atlantic Fleet Ready Force and Soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division deployed to the Dominican Republic in April 1965 to prevent the takeover of the country by Marxist rebels. Eventually, 23,000 US troops participated in Operation POWERPACK, in which reservist civil affairs Soldiers, harassed constantly by sniper fire, played a crucial role in evacuating American civilians, and providing food, water, and medical service for the Dominican populace.23 An Inter-American Peace Force comprised of military units from the countries of the Organization of American States replaced the majority of US forces prior to a truce agreement reached in August 1965. The Dominican Republic deployment established a unique civil-military precedent as the senior US military commander, Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, worked closely with US Ambassador William Bennett from the beginning to effectively coordinate all political-military tactics at the local level.24
Meanwhile in Southeast Asia, a new catch phrase emerged to describe civil-military operations during the Vietnam War – “winning the hearts and minds of the people.”25 Typically, US forces conducted conventional military operations in the northern provinces of South Vietnam, while counterinsurgency and pacification efforts were more common in the southern regions of the country. In the central highlands, Civil Affairs Psychological Warfare Officers (CAPOs) assisted US Special Forces Operational Detachment Alphas (ODAs) secure key terrain and gain the confidence of local tribes.26 By 1967, all US civilian pacification activities were consolidated under the Military Assistance Command Vietnam. The resulting integrated, unified, civil-military advisory and support organization, known as Civil Operations Revolutionary Support (CORDS), helped provide local security, good governance, economic development, and essential services for the people in all 44 South Vietnamese provinces.27 Three regular Army Civil Affairs companies – the 2d at Long Binh, the 29th in Da Nang, and the 41st at Nha Trang – each with approximately 60 officers and 100 enlisted Soldiers, played vital roles in the success of the CORDS mission, which involved more than 7,500 military and civilian advisors.28
Under the Nixon Doctrine and a concept entitled “Vietnamization,” the US began withdrawing combat forces in 1969, thereby gradually turning combat operations over to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. Eventually, a cease-fire agreement was reached between the United States, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam during the Paris Peace Accords in early 1973. The North, however, rebuilt its army and attacked South Vietnam in late 1974. The war ended officially on 30 April 1975 after the last remaining Americans were evacuated from the US embassy and the North Vietnamese Army took control of Saigon.
The outcome of the Vietnam War left many in the US military uncertain of their future role. The United States refrained from using extensive military force in support of its foreign policy objectives for the remainder of the 1970s. In his memoir, My American Journey, General Colin Powell expressed this concern, noting “many of my generation, the career captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels seasoned in that war, vowed that when our turn came to call the shots, we would not quietly acquiesce in halfhearted warfare for half-baked reasons that the American people could not understand or support.”29 Similarly, Colonel Harry Summers, in On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context, decried the misuse of the US military, claiming that the “Americanization of the war had led to the US armed forces undertaking political, economic, and social tasks beyond their capabilities while limiting their authority to accomplish the military tasks of which they were capable.”30
CMO Post-Vietnam
Despite these concerns, however, Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) from the 3d Civil Affairs Detachment, US Army Forces Southern Command, based at Fort Clayton in the Canal Zone, conducted several small-scale civic action operations aimed at neutralizing Marxist guerrilla activities and improving the living conditions for rural citizens of the State of Bolivia and the Republics of Colombia and Nicaragua.31 Civil Affairs Soldiers also continued to perform a variety of humanitarian assistance missions in Indonesia and Thailand.32 Beginning in the late 1970s, Civil Affairs personnel helped confront an emerging insurgency in El Salvador by training soldiers, providing equipment, and advising Salvadoran civic action and civil defense teams. During Operation URGENT FURY in 1983, Soldiers from the 96th CA Battalion joined Army Rangers, US Marines, and the 82d Airborne Division in rescuing American citizens, restoring a popular government, and eliminating a militant anti-US Marxist threat on the Caribbean island of Grenada. Civil Affairs teams provided food, water, and shelter for displaced citizens and assisted the interim Grenadian government rebuild the island’s infrastructure.33
Also in 1983, suicide truck bombers killed 241 American Soldiers, Sailors, and Marines who had deployed to Beirut on an ill-defined peacekeeping mission during the Lebanese Civil War. Concerned with avoiding future quagmires similar to Grenada and Lebanon, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger outlined a series of six tests governing the employment of US military power. The resulting Weinberger Doctrine restrained the US Government’s use of military force as follows:
1. The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.
2. If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all.
3. If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces will accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And we should have and send the forces needed.
4. The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed -- their size, composition and disposition -- must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.
5. Before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress.
6. The commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort.34
In concluding his remarks to the National Press Club, Secretary Weinberger emphasized “the President will not allow our military forces to creep – or be drawn gradually – into a combat role in Central America or any other place in the world…and indeed our policy is designed to prevent the need for direct American involvement.”35 Thus, the Weinberger Doctrine effectively curtailed US foreign politico-military operations for the remainder of the decade.
Recognition within the Department of Defense of the need for specially trained Civil Affairs personnel did not wane, however. In 1985, The Army established the 1st Special Operations Command Augmentation Detachment, which, by 1989, had grown into the United States Army Reserve Special Operations Command (USARSOC) with operational control over Army Reserve Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations units. At yearend 1989, the US invaded Panama in order to enforce the terms and conditions of the Torrijos-Carter Treaty (Panama Canal Treaty) and to safeguard American and Panamanian citizens. Soldiers from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, the 4th Psychological Operations Group, and numerous mobilized individual volunteer Reserve Civil Affairs Soldiers participated in Operation JUST CAUSE and the follow-up Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, performing such duties as caring for refugees, providing essential services, training local police, and assisting Panamanian government officials.36
Gulf War I and Beyond
The Army re-designated USARSOC as the US Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) –USACAPOC (A) – in 1990, giving the new command full responsibility for both active and reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units. Also in 1990, Iraqi soldiers invaded Kuwait, drawing immediate international condemnation. Gulf War I ensued, fought by a coalition force of 34 nations led by the United States and the United Kingdom, against Iraq. More than 2,500 Reserve Civil Affairs and PSYOPS Soldiers were activated for Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Many were assigned to the Kuwaiti Task Force that included US State Department officials and in-exile Kuwaiti leaders all of whom began planning the reconstruction of Kuwait before the war actually started. Others were among the first deployed and successfully coordinated much-needed host nation support from Saudi Arabia. Once combat operations began, Army Civil Affairs Soldiers were attached to every ground maneuver unit, including Marines, to help prevent civilian interference, care for refugees, provide humanitarian aid, and restore essential services.37
In the aftermath of Gulf War I, Kurds in northern Iraq revolted against the Baathist regime. They were brutally suppressed Saddam Hussein’s army and forced to flee into the mountains bordering Turkey. In response, the United States initiated Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, a joint, multinational, effort that involved US Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps personnel, along with military forces from the recently disbanded Gulf War allied coalition. The objectives of this operation, which ultimately became the largest humanitarian assistance intervention since the Berlin Airlift, were to curtail suffering and dying among the 500,000 Kurdish refugees and to return them safely to their homes in northern Iraq. Refugee relief and resettlement, dealing with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), coordinating with other government/non-government relief organizations became the primary responsibilities of several Army Civil Affairs units that deployed to the region. The 353d Civil Affairs Command (CAC) and 354th Civil Affairs Brigade established their respective headquarters, along with a joint Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC), in Incirlik, Turkey. Additional Civil affairs units participating in the operation included the 418th, 431st, and 432d Civil Affairs Companies, a detachment from the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, Company A, 6th Psychological Operations Battalion, and several US Marines from the 4th Civil Affairs Group. CAC commander Brigadier General Donald Campbell reorganized the Civil Affairs Companies into smaller teams and sent them forward to assist Special Forces Soldiers operating the remote mountain refugee camps. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT ended successfully in July 1991 and, thereafter, served as a model for future US-led humanitarian interventions in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans.38
Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE were joint, combined, interagency missions in which United States Forces deployed to civil war-torn Somalia, beginning in December 1992, in support of a United Nations humanitarian relief effort. The operations succeeded initially as thousands of Somali citizens were saved from starvation. A Civil Affairs tactical support team and six CA direct support teams from the 96th CA Battalion provided critical assistance in coordinating the efforts of multiple NGOs, staffing humanitarian operations centers, facilitating medical and essential services projects. Soldiers from the 4th Psychological Operations Group helped establish a Joint PSYOPS Task Force that integrated information operations into the overall theater strategic plan. PSYOPS Soldiers established a local newspaper and radio station, and distributed millions of leaflets, posters, and handbills. Fighting among rival factions and clans grew worse in Somalia during 1993, prompting the United Nations Security Council to adopt a more aggressive military stance against Somalia National Alliance forces. The escalation in combat operations ultimately led to the familiar “Blackhawk Down” incident in October 1993. By March 1994, nearly all US military personnel had been withdrawn from Somalia.39
Democratically elected Haitian president, Jean Bertrand Aristide, was ousted during military coup in 1991. Economic chaos ensued in Haiti, as the new military government brutally repressed dissenters, many of whom fled to the United States. After more than two years of unsuccessful diplomatic negotiations, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 940 in July 1994, authorizing the formation of a “multinational force under unified command and control…to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership…the prompt return of the legitimately elected President, and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the government of Haiti.”40 By mid-September 1994, as a result of last minute US diplomatic efforts, Junta leader General Raoul Cedras stepped aside and fled Haiti. Despite this diplomatic success, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY commenced on 19 September, as nearly 20,000 US military personnel from Joint Task Force 180 – XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters, a 10th Mountain Division brigade, a Marine Corps air-ground task force, and the Joint Special Operations Task Force – landed unopposed in and around Port-au-Prince. President Aristide returned to power on 15 October, the majority of US Forces had redeployed by December, and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY ended 31 March 1995 with the transfer of authority to the United Nations Mission in Haiti.41
More than 100 reserve and active duty Civil Affairs Soldiers, from the 407th and 448th CA Companies, the 358th CA Brigade, and the 96th CA Battalion, participated in the Haitian campaign. CA teams hired local contractors to clear and repair Haiti’s main roadways, to restore infrastructure and essential services, and to build a new landfill north of Port-au-Prince. Electrical engineers led “prime power teams” in restoring the country’s electrical grid, and 34 CA officers served as advisors to Haiti’s 12 government ministries. Civil Affairs personnel also manned two CMOCs to deal with refugees and displaced citizens and staffed a Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) that managed relations with the hundreds of NGOs operating in Haiti. Finally, 21 two-man CA direct support teams deployed with US Special Forces detachments on a variety of rural area missions.42
Meanwhile in Europe, civil war raged in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. From 1992 to 1995, a series of United Nations and European Union effort to end hostilities failed. Ethnic cleansing was rampant as civilians were massacred and hundreds of villages destroyed. A cease-fire agreement was eventually reached in December 1995 with the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords. The General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) within the Accords called for (a) the durable cessation of hostilities, (b) the establishment of a NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) to ensure compliance with the Accords, and (c) the permanent reconciliation between all parties.43 As a result, the international, combined, joint IFOR, with more than 50,000 NATO troops, deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina in late 1995 under the codename Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. As Allied Command Europe’s Rapid Reaction Corps, the US Army 1st Armored Division (Task Force Eagle) was designated Multinational Division North (MND)(N) and took control of its area of responsibility – the American Sector in the northeast region of Bosnia-Herzegovina – by the end of December. Task Force Eagle, one of the strongest military formations ever assembled, enforced the cease-fire, kept the warring factions separated, disarmed combatants, and assisted with reconstruction efforts and the country’s first democratic national elections. By the end of 1996, the 1st Infantry Division replaced 1st AD, IFOR was re-designated a Stabilization Force (SFOR), and Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR became Operation JOINT GUARD, which was re-named Operation JOINT FORGE in 1998. A succession of US military units assumed responsibility for the SFOR mission between 1996 and 2004, when Task Force Eagle disbanded and European Union forces took charge.44
During the first year of JOINT ENDEAVOR, Task Force Eagle Soldiers, working with US Agency for International Development (USAID) representatives, initiated more than 125 reconstruction and essential services improvement projects. Over the course of the entire campaign, at least 500 similar projects were either organized or coordinated by US Army Civil Affairs units in northeastern Bosnia.45 Early in the operation, US Admiral Leighton Smith, Commander IFOR (COMIFOR), established a high level combined joint civil military cooperation (CIMIC) directorate that quickly became a dynamic link between civilian and military activities in the region. According to Lieutenant Colonel Pamela Brady, former CIMIC information officer, “JOINT ENDEAVOR marked the unprecedented involvement of civil affairs in a NATO-led mission that included 36 countries.”46 Initially, Soldiers from the 353d Civil Affairs Command and the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion helped minimize civilian interference with combat operations. Then, as the mission transitioned to peacekeeping, CA Soldiers coordinated the activities of NGOs, private voluntary organizations (PVOs), international organizations (IOs), and host nation officials. In Sarajevo, CIMIC opened a walk-in center that served as the principal contact point for military-NGO coordination. CA units in Bosnia also promoted human rights, oversaw displaced persons and refugee initiatives, distributed humanitarian aid, coordinated rehabilitation and reconstruction, found employment for demobilized soldiers, and help organize the 1996 democratic general elections.47
International attention turned to Kosovo in 1998, as Serbian military and police forces clashed with Kosovar Albanians. Thousands of ethnic Albanians were killed and hundreds of thousand more forced to flee. A massive humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operation was organized under the stipulations of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, in which the G-8 Foreign Ministers agreed to take action to end violence in Kosovo, force the withdrawal of Serbian military and police forces, and deploy an international security force to guarantee compliance.48 The NATO-led ground force – Kosovo Task Force (KFOR) – was subsequently established to implement the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to “ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants.”49
Task Force Falcon, the US contingent for Operation JOINT GUARDIAN’s Initial Entry Force (IEF), deployed to Kosovo on 12 June 1999 and consisted of elements from V Corps Headquarters; 1st Armored, 1st Infantry, and 82d Airborne Divisions; 4th Cavalry and 11th Attack Helicopter Regiments; 12th Combat Aviation Brigade, 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit; and various Special Operations Forces. Task Force Falcon entered Kosovo unopposed and quickly established Multinational Brigade East (MNB)(E) headquarters at what would become Camp Bondsteel in the southeast sector of the country. Although no official civil-military campaign plan had been prepared for JOINT GUARDIAN, Civil Affairs Soldiers established CMO Task Force Yankee, initiated CIMIC/CMOC operations, and began performing tasks in accordance with four general UNMIK lines of operation – humanitarian assistance, civil administration, institution building, and economic reconstruction.50 CA personnel also staffed information centers to facilitate improved information sharing between military and civil organizations. Civil Affairs Tactical support Teams deployed daily into assigned sub-sectors to interact with host-nation officials, local civilians, and UNMIK, NGO, and IO representatives. During the first year of MNB(E) operations, Soldiers from the 353d Civil Affairs Command and the 96th CA Battalion helped fund more than 250 humanitarian assistance projects, conducted over 500 village assessments, distributed fertilizer and seed to local farmers, managed refugee camps, found employment for repatriated citizens, and conducted criminal hearings in postwar Kosovo.51
CMO Organization
Over the past 25 years, the US Army Civil Affairs community has grown and reorganized. In 1993, eight years after it’s founding, the United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne) – USACAPOC (A) – became a sub-component of the US Army Special Operations Command. Since USACAPOC (A) is staffed almost entirely by nearly 10,000 US Army Reserve Soldiers, the organization realigned, for administrative control only, under the US Army Reserve Command in 2006. In 2007, the Civil Affairs Branch of the Army was established. Four principal reserve Civil Affairs Commands, with a combined total of seven reserve CA brigades and 28 reserve CA battalions, along with two Psychological Operations Groups and a Training Brigade comprise USACAPOC (A) whose missions is to “organize, train, equip, and resource Army Reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations forces for worldwide support to regional combatant commanders and other agencies as directed.”52 Each CA Command is geographically oriented in order to better support specific warfighting commanders or Theater Army commanders.
As the sole active-duty Army Civil Affairs organization, the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade is a subordinate unit of the US Army Special Operations Command. Activated in March 2007, the 95th CAB has 1100 CA Soldiers and 4 CA Battalions, with plans to add a fifth battalion in the fall of 2010.53 The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report call for an expansion of Civil Affairs capabilities, correctly noting that Civil Affairs forces “serve as the vanguard of DoD’s support to US government efforts to assist partner governments in the fields of rule of law, governance, infrastructure and public health and education.”54 Army Civil Affairs support of Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM will be described in subsequent chapters.
1 Hendrik Van Loon, The Story of Mankind (New York: Boni & Liveright, 1921), 84.
2 Kevin Stanley, “Soldiers of the Colonial Militia,” Early America Review, Winter/Spring 2001, 4-5.
3 The Civil Affairs Association, A Bicentennial of Civil-Military Operations (Silver Springs, MD: Civil Affairs Association, 1976), 5.
4 See Carolyn Gilman, Lewis and Clark, Across the Divide (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Books, 2003); Robert Utley, The Story of the West (New York, NY: DK Publishing, 2003), 153, 171-175, 183-188, 202-205.
5 The Civil Affairs Association, A Bicentennial of Civil-Military Operations, 10.
6 Ron Briley, “Occupation Blues: Let’s Not Forget the Mexican War,” History News Network, 12 November 2006, 1-3, (accessed 12 July 2010).
7 Stanley Sandler, “Seal the Victory: A History of US Army Civil Affairs,” Special Warfare, Winter 1991, 38, (accessed 12 July 2010).
8 The Civil Affairs Association, A Bicentennial of Civil-Military Operations, 10.
9 US War Department, The 1863 Laws of War (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2005), 33-64.
10 US Congress, An Act to Establish a Bureau for the Relief of Freedmen and Refugees, 3 March 1865, 1, (accessed 13 July 2010).
11 Library of Congress, Treaty of Paris 1898, 14 August 1998, 1, (accessed 14 July 2010).
12 Kathleen Hicks and Christine Wormuth, The Future of US Civil Affairs Forces (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2009), 2.
13 Mark Rosenfelder, “US Interventions in Latin America,” 1996, 1-2, (accessed 14 July 2010).
14 Earl F. Ziemke, The US Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946 (Washington, DC: US Army Center for Military History, 1990), 3.
15 BACM Research, “Military Field Manuals 1920-1940,” Paperless Archives, 1999-2005, 2, (accessed 15 July 2010).
16 Troy Thomas, “Governance Operations in Future Conflicts,” Military Review, January-February 2006, 78-79.
17 Kathleen Hicks and Christine Wormuth, The Future of US Civil Affairs Forces, 4.
18 The Civil Affairs Association, A Bicentennial of Civil-Military Operations (Silver Springs, MD: Civil Affairs Association, 1976), 13.
19Stanley Sandler, “Seal the Victory: A History of US Army Civil Affairs,” Special Warfare, Winter 1991, 40.
20 The Civil Affairs Association, A Bicentennial of Civil-Military Operations, 16.
21 The Civil Affairs Association, A Bicentennial of Civil-Military Operations, 23.
22 US Army Information Site, “Civil Affairs,” 2010, 1, (accessed 18 July 2010).
23 William Klein, “Stability Operations in Santo Domingo,” INFANTRY, July-August 2004, 21-23.
25 “Operation Power Pack: A Road Test for the 82d Airborne Division,” 1998 Army Historians Conference, 5, (accessed 20 July 2010).
25 Stanley Sandler, “Seal the Victory: A History of US Army Civil Affairs,” Special Warfare, Winter 1991, 40.
26 Stanley Sandler, “Seal the Victory: A History of US Army Civil Affairs,” Special Warfare, Winter 1991, 40.
27 Frank Jones, “Rolling the Dice of War,” International Journal, Autumn 2006, 951-954.
28 The Civil Affairs Association, A Bicentennial of Civil-Military Operations, 23; Dale Andrade, “Three Lessons from Vietnam,” Washington Post, 29 December 2005, 1-2, (accessed 21 July 2010).
29 General Colin Powell quoted in Frank Jones, “Rolling the Dice of War,” International Journal, Autumn 2006, 954.
30 Colonel Harry Summers quoted in Frank Jones, “Rolling the Dice of War,” International Journal, Autumn 2006, 954.
31 The Civil Affairs Association, A Bicentennial of Civil-Military Operations, 24.
32 Stanley Sandler, “Seal the Victory: A History of US Army Civil Affairs,” Special Warfare, Winter 1991, 41.
33 Ronald Cole, Operation Urgent Fury (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997), 1-7; Stanley Sandler, “Seal the Victory: A History of US Army Civil Affairs,” Special Warfare, Winter 1991, 41.
34 Caspar Weinberger, “The Uses of Military Power,” Remarks to the National Press Club, Washington, DC, 28 November 1983, 7-8, (accessed 25 July 2010).
35 Caspar Weinberger, “The Uses of Military Power,” Remarks to the National Press Club, Washington, DC, 28 November 1983, 10.
36 US Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command (Airborne), “USACAPOC (A) History,” 31 August 2009, 1, (accessed 21 June 2010); Kathleen Hicks and Christine Wormuth, The Future of US Civil Affairs Forces, 7.
37 Public Affairs Office, US Army Special Operations Command, “Special Operations in Desert Storm: Separating Fact from Fiction,” Special Warfare, March 1992, 4-5.
38 “Heritage of the 353d Civil Affairs Command,” 2007, 2, (accessed 27 July 2010); Gordon Rudd, Humanitarian Intervention: Assisting the Iraqi Kurds in Operation Provide Comfort, 1991 (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2004), 138-143.
39 Richard Stewart, The United States Army in Somalia, 1992-1994 (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2003), 1-27.
40 United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 940,” 31 July 1994, 2, (accessed 30 July 2010).
41 Ronald Cole, “Grenada, Panama, and Haiti: Joint Operational Reform,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 1998-99, 61-64; Aaron Wilkins, “The Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti),” US Air Force Air Command and Staff College, March 1997, 1-7, (accessed 21 July 2010).
42 Jeremy White, Civil Affairs in Haiti (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2009), 1-10.
43 US Department of State, “Annex 1A: Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement,” Dayton Peace Accords, 21 November 1995, 1, (accessed 31 July 2010).
44 R. Cody Phillips, Bosnia-Herzegovina: The US Army’s Role in Peace Enforcement Operations 1995-2004 (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2006), 4, 14, 19, 33, 37-8; Task Force Eagle Public Affairs, “History of SFOR,” 2005, 1-4, (accessed 30 July 2010).
45 R. Cody Phillips, Bosnia-Herzegovina: The US Army’s Role in Peace Enforcement Operations 1995-2004, 31.
46 Pamela Brady, “Joint Endeavor – The Role of Civil Affairs,” Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1997, 45.
47 Pamela Brady, “Joint Endeavor – The Role of Civil Affairs,” 45-47.
48 United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 1244: Annex 1,” 10 June 1999, 5, (accessed 31 July 2010).
49 United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo, “UNMIK Fact Sheet,” June 2008, 1, (accessed 1 August 2010).
50 Larry Wentz, Lessons from Kosovo: The KFOR Experience (Washington, DC: DoD Command and Control Research Program, 2002, 483.
51 Eric Ridge, Civil Affairs in Kosovo (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2009), 7; Larry Wentz, Lessons from Kosovo: The KFOR Experience, 485, 490, 505; Patrick Hollen, et. al., “Pre-Planning and Post-Conflict CMOC/CIMIC Challenges,” Joint Forces Staff College, 2003, 9-12, (accessed 2 August 2010).
52 US Army Reserve Command, “US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command,” 2010, 1, (accessed 29 July 2010).
53 Leslie Ozawa, “95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne) Fairwells Colonel Warmack, Welcomes Colonel
Wolff,” USASOC News Service, 12 July 2010, 1, (accessed 3 August 2010).
54 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs, 2010), 24.
Chapter 3: Counterinsurgency, Counterterrorism, and Pacification in Vietnam
The CORDS and Phoenix Programs
Perhaps the most successful counterinsurgency/pacification campaigns in the history of US civil-military undertakings was the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Support (CORDS) project initiated in 1967 during the Vietnam War. According to Richard Stewart of the US Army Center of Military History, “CORDS institutionalized joint, combined, and interagency planning with milestones, measurements, and resources linked to goals – ends, ways, means across the entire civil-military spectrum.”1 US military forces fought two separate and distinct conflicts in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) – a more conventional fight in northern South Vietnam against the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and a counterinsurgency against Viet Cong (VC) guerrillas in the south. As US ground forces began deploying to Vietnam in 1965, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) commanding general, William Westmoreland, realized that he lacked sufficient troops to effectively fight both wars. Westmoreland, therefore, relied on a variety of civilian agencies to address the VC threat, while he concentrated the majority of his military power on stopping the NVA from gaining more ground in South Vietnam. A successful series of search and destroy missions seized the initiative, forced the enemy away from population centers, and provided the South Vietnamese government temporary breathing room in which to regroup and reorganize.2
1950s and Early 1960s
Since the 1950s, US Army Advisors with MACV’s predecessor organization, the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam (MAAGV) had been preparing South Vietnamese forces for a much-anticipated communist invasion from the north. The role of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN) was to hold off attacking NVA forces long enough for US reinforcement to arrive and assist in the fight. North Vietnamese leaders were generally aware if this plan, however, and as a countermeasure, they initiated insurgency operations in the South involving terrorism, political agitation, and small-scale military attacks – all designed to appear as an uprising of the people against the national government. By 1960, approximately 15,000 VC insurgent forces controlled significant regions of rural South Vietnam. The US expanded its military aid program and sent US Army Special Operations teams to train South Vietnamese soldiers in counter-guerilla warfare tactics and to assist them in denying sanctuary to VC insurgents.3
During the early 1960s, US civilian aid agencies expanded their efforts in South Vietnam as well. With the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Congress reorganized US foreign assistance programs, thereby leading President Kennedy to establish the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which was intended to unify existing aid efforts.4 Nevertheless, overlapping governmental and non-governmental programs and agencies continued to create confusion in South Vietnam, as effective interagency coordination was often lacking. As the size and scope of the mission in Vietnam continued to grow, the US established MACV in 1962 as a unified operational command, subordinate to the Commander in Chief, Pacific, and whose commander would be coequal to the American Ambassador. MACV’s initial commanding general, US Army General Paul Harkins, controlled all US forces in Vietnam, served as the principal US Military advisor to the Vietnamese, and oversaw counterinsurgency intelligence operations and MAAGV operations, which primarily involved training Vietnamese armed forces.5
Despite the newly established ambassador-field commander coalition in Vietnam, American unity of effort was still lacking. Although MACV predominated in the relationship due to its comparatively overwhelming resources, General Harkins still did not have complete control over US counterinsurgency efforts, as civilian elements of the embassy-based country team continued to run their own counterinsurgency programs.6 To address the unity of effort schism, newly appointed US Ambassador, General (Ret) Maxwell Taylor, established a mission council to coordinated civil-military operations in 1964. Inter-agency cooperation failed to materialize, however, as “each agency had its own budget and chain of command that stretched back to Washington rather than to a single entity in Saigon.”7
CORDS and the “Other War”
By 1965, President Lyndon Johnson became increasingly concerned with what he described as the “other war” -- US counterinsurgency/pacification efforts in South Vietnam.8 Johnson subsequently signed National Security Action Memorandum No. 343 designating Interim National Security Advisor, Robert Komer, as Special Assistant [to the President] for Peaceful Construction in Vietnam. As the Vietnam czar, Komer oversaw seven civilian agencies and became “the specific focal point for the direction, coordination, and supervision in Washington of US non-military programs [and the mobilization of military resources in support of such programs] for peaceful construction relating to Vietnam.”9 Komer soon recommended that the US military assume total responsibility for Vietnam pacification efforts, since only the military could provide the requisite security and resources. The Department of State countered Komer’s proposal with a recommendation of their own to establish the Office of Civil Operations (OCO) that would consolidate the efforts of all civilian organizations under the US Embassy in Saigon. OCO began operating in November 1966, but closed within six months, since military counterinsurgency/pacification activities were not included within the scope of OCO responsibilities, civilian and military chains of command remained separated, and there was no single-point leader to control the entire US pacification program.10
In May 1967, President Johnson issued National Security Action Memorandum No. 362, “Responsibility for US Role in Pacification (Revolutionary Development),” that integrated all US military/civilian pacification activities in Vietnam under a single manager. Memorandum No. 362 also charged MACV with full responsibility for carrying out the pacification mission in Vietnam and designated Robert Komer as MACV Deputy for Pacification and appointed him to the rank of Ambassador.11 Led by Komer, a new counterinsurgency/pacification organization entitled Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) – renamed Civil Operations and Rural Development Support in 1970 – established its headquarters in Saigon in late May 1967, reporting directly to MACV Commanding General William Westmoreland.
Soon, nearly every pacification program in Vietnam fell under the CORDS’ umbrella, including the USAID New Life Development Initiative; the refugee, National Police, and Chieu Hoi programs; the CIA Rural Development Cadre; MACV civil affairs and civil action components; and, the Joint US Public Affairs Office. Only CIA clandestine operations and the Marine Corps Civil Action Program in the I Corps tactical zone continued to function independent of CORDS control.12 Komer organized CORDS headquarters around four principal staff divisions. The Research and Analysis Division evaluated the effectiveness of pacification programs using quantitative/qualitative methods. The Hamlet Evaluation System (HES), for example, was used to assess the relative security in each South Vietnamese hamlet. CORDS’ Research and Evaluation Division conducted independent studies to determine successes and failures among the various pacification programs. Soldiers and civilians in the Plans and Programs Division coordinated CORDS counterinsurgency/pacification efforts with the South Vietnamese government officials. And, the Management Support Division oversaw general administration, contracting, communications, and training for the civilian agencies under CORDS.13
Komer replicated the CORDS headquarters management structure in all 44 Vietnamese provinces. Each US military corps commander had a deputy for CORDS (DepCORDS) who was responsible for managing corps area pacification programs. Provincial advisory teams, led by province senior advisors, were assigned to each province within the corps area. Provincial advisory teams reported to the corps DepCORDS and assisted the local Vietnamese province chief in administering various province-level counterinsurgency/pacification initiatives. Pacification efforts at the district level were organized similarly, with district senior advisors assisting Vietnamese district chiefs. By 1970, the complete CORDS program was staffed by 6,361 US military personnel, 948 US civilians, 188 foreign nationals, and 7,600 Vietnamese citizens. An additional 2,331 US military advisors were attached to South Vietnamese Regional Forces/Popular Forces militia.14
CORDS officials concentrated on three principal pacification concerns – improving territorial security, centralizing US/Vietnamese planning, and countering VC infrastructure operations.15 To more effectively address these issues, Komer reorganized all of the existing military and civilian pacification projects into six unique CORDS programs:
1. New Life Development – Provided economic aid to villages
2. Chieu Hoi – Encouraged VC to defect
3. Revolutionary Development Cadre – Facilitated local level good governance
4. Refugee Support – Helped refugees relocate
5. PSYOPS – Supported Chieu Hoi and other anti-VC campaigns
6. Public Safety – Increased the size and capacity of the National Police Force.16
Under the Public Safety initiative, for example, CORDS established “Project Takeoff” to expand, train, and re-equip South Vietnam’s National Police Forces. Between 1967 and 1969 security and stability steadily improved in the provinces as nearly 14,000 new police officers were added to the ranks. Police intelligence capabilities also improved with Provincial Intelligence Coordinating Committees (PICC) and District Operations and Intelligence Coordinating Centers (DIOCC) focused on countering VC “shadow government” encroachments in rural provinces and districts.17
In addition to expanding the Vietnamese Police Forces, CORDS also strengthened and enhanced Vietnam’s regular and militia forces (RVNAF) and assisted the RVN in establishing a new military organization – the People’s Self-Defense Force (PSDF), an unpaid militia to defend local hamlets. These military expansion efforts marked a renewed emphasis on CORDS’ territorial security mission, and they were also timely, as the slow withdrawal of US combat forces had begun in 1968. Relatedly, in 1968, Vietnam’s National Assembly passed a General Mobilization Law, requiring that all men between the ages of 16 and 50 be members of either the RVNAF or PSDF. By 1970, RVNAF strength had grown to 475,000 soldiers and the PSDF numbered between three and four million men.18 These enhanced security measures prevented the VC from fully recovering from their Tet offensive loses. According to Vietnam War scholar, Dale Andrade, the VC insurgency was “on the ropes” and the combined actions of the US and South Vietnamese were “steadily dismantling Viet Cong control in the countryside.”19
In another similarly successful program, CORDS members helped RVN enhance the capabilities of the Revolutionary Development (RD) cadre. Under RD, government officials lived and worked in the provinces, helping local leaders establish security and good governance, thereby demonstrating the national government’s sincere concern for the welfare of the people and countering VC shadow government efforts. Hundreds of RD teams, nearly 50,000 men and women, deployed to the hamlets and villages of all 44 provinces.20 Equally productive as RD was the Chieu Hoi – “Open Arms” – program that granted amnesty to defecting Viet Cong insurgents. As many VC were not truly committed to the communist cause, the offer of $150 for deserting was tempting and effective. Between 1968 and 1972, more than 200,000 VC defected, many of whom were retrained, resettled, given land, or served as propagandists for the RVN.[xxii]
Phoenix and Counterterrorism
Another more secretive program, begun in December 1967 to counter the growing VC infrastructure (VCI) influence, was designated Phoenix, or Phung Hoang in Vietnamese. VCI was a communist terrorist organization, with an estimated 75,000 members, that attempted to impose its authority on the Vietnamese people through a series of orchestrated attacks, assassinations, and kidnappings of village chiefs and political officials. Prior to 1967, the CIA and MACV had conducted various counterterrorism and intelligence gathering operations, such as Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation (ICEX), against the VCI. These efforts were subsequently formalized by decree of Vietnam’s Prime Minister and consolidated under the Phoenix Program, which continued to be overseen by the CIA until being transferred to RVN control in July 1969.22
According to a Department of the Army Phung Hoang/Phoenix Program in Vietnam Fact Sheet, the objective of the program was to “centralize and coordinate the efforts of all military and civilian agencies engaged in the neutralization of the Viet Cong Infrastructure…and its control over the people”23 Under staff supervision of the MACV Deputy for CORDS, 450 US military advisory personnel were assigned to the Phoenix Program. More than 250 of these advisors served at the district or city level, with US Army Majors typically dual-hatted as both District Senior Advisors and District Phoenix Coordinators and Intelligence Officers assigned as Phoenix Advisors for local DIOCCs to provide first-level intelligence analysis and dissemination. Still other US military personnel advised RVN Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU), 18 member teams whose primary mission was neutralization of VCI operatives.24 The number of US Phoenix Advisors increased to over 700 by 1970. “Neutralization” under the Phoenix concept was described as defection, capture, exploitation, discreditation, or compromise. Of the 15,000 VCI neutralized during 1968, 10,800 were captured, 2,250 were killed, and 1,950 defected.25 Nearly 82,000 VC were neutralized over the span of the Phoenix Program from 1968-1972.26
To capitalize on VCI weaknesses following the communist Tet offensive, the RVN initiated an Accelerated Pacification Campaign (APC), which expanded funding and resources to village pacification efforts. As a result, the Phoenix Program refocused to concentrated on countering VCI activities along four specific fronts. Initially, Phoenix decentralized ICEX, shifting more responsibility to the provinces and districts. Additional DIOCCs were constructed closer to VCI strongholds. Phoenix placed renewed emphasis on neutralizing VCI operatives and on creating files and dossiers – “black lists – of potential and suspects. The rules of law regarding trial and imprisonment of captured VCI cadre were upgraded and strengthened. And lastly, local militia and police assumed more responsibility for carrying out the Phoenix mission, thereby allowing ARVN forces to concentrate more fully on combat operations.27
Allegations describing the Phoenix Program as a “hit squad” and accusing Phoenix team members of assassinating civilian leaders and using harsh interrogation methods on captured VCI cadre, led MACV Deputy for CORDS to publish a series of “Instructions for Phoenix Advisors,” many of whom received special training at the US Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird, MD prior to joining the program.28 The instructions emphasized that Phoenix was an advice, support, and assistance program to the RVN, intended to reduce Viet Cong influence and effectiveness in South Vietnam. The inherent ties between the VCI, Viet Cong fighting forces, and their North Vietnamese allies were stressed, as was the rule of law. Advisors were instructed to focus on collecting intelligence, identifying VCI members, capturing them alive, interrogating them lawfully, and bringing them before the Provincial Security Committee for lawful sentencing. Only as a last resort or in cases of self-defense would killing VCI cadre be permitted. Phoenix advisors were specifically not authorized to engage in assassinations or other violations of the rules of land warfare, as they were subject to the same legal and moral constraints as regular US military forces. Additionally, advisors were not to participate in illegal activities conducted by their South Vietnamese counterparts and were encouraged to report any such activity to higher authorities. Finally, Phoenix Advisors who found the Phoenix mission not to their liking, could request reassignment without prejudice.29
Concerned with the possibility of US personnel inadvertently violating the Uniformed Code of Military Justice, MACV commander General Creighton Abrams issued orders in November 1969 that forbade Americans from accompanying PRU teams on field operations. The effect of Abrams’ order on PRU team morale was devastating, as the teams relied heavily on US leadership and the accompanying communications, medical evacuation, and fire support. The effectiveness of PRU operations waned as team members grew reluctant to pursue VCI in contested regions without American support. Withdrawal of US support ultimately led to the demise of the Phoenix Program by December 1972.30 Assessing overall success of Phoenix is difficult at best, as the program’s effectiveness differed from province to province. Derrill Ballenger, who served two tours in Vietnam – the latter with the 525th Military Intelligence Group, – considered Phoenix a success since it “created fear and apprehension within the VCI and removed important leaders and terrorists.”31 North Vietnamese General Tran Do described Phoenix as “extremely destructive,” and North Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach noted that Phoenix “wiped out many of our bases.”32 Similarly, Warren Milberg, who was involved with the Phoenix Program, judged it successful in neutralizing the VCI and forcing “the North Vietnamese to abandon their basic attempt at insurgency in South Vietnam and to adopt a more traditional limited war strategy.”33 Finally, although he did not consider Phoenix a total success, William Colby, who became MACV Deputy for CORDS in 1968, testified that VCI cadre have been forced out of their villages, they travel with bodyguards, and pressure was being put on their infrastructure, because Phoenix “is beginning to bite.”34
CORDS Accomplishments
Since tenant farmers in South Vietnam were not permitted to own land, many were attracted to the communist concept of mutual ownership, and therefore supported the Viet Cong insurgency. As a result, land reform became a critical issue for CORDS officials, who convinced the RVN to enact legislation preventing farm owners from having title to more than 37 acres of land. This left thousands of acres of unclaimed land that the Vietnamese government then allotted to tenant farmers in three-acre parcels. Thus, as tenant farmers became landowners themselves, they also became more supportive of their national government. By 1970, RVN farmers were producing the country’s own self-sufficient, national food supply.35
The number of Vietnamese refugees grew significantly after the 1968 Tet Offensive. Humanitarian relief efforts managed by CORDS Refugee Division provided 33,000 tons of food and 66,000 tons of building materials to more than 750,000 displaced persons in the months following Tet. Substandard healthcare was also problematic in South Vietnam. Malnutrition, insufficient potable water, an abnormally high infant mortality rate, and the prevalence of deadly diseases were critical issues facing CORDS Public Health officials. From 1967 onward, CORDS helped Vietnamese universities train hundreds of new doctors, dentists, and pharmacists, such that, by 1975, 650 full time physicians were on staff at the South Vietnamese Ministry of Health. Finally, as the VC insurgency continued to wane, South Vietnam held National Assembly elections in August 1971. In a genuine show of democracy, over 7 million Vietnamese citizens from 12,000 villages and hamlets registered to cast their votes for an extensive slate of 1,295 candidates.36
By 1970, the US political and military leadership of the Vietnam War had changed. President Nixon had replaced President Johnson, General Creighton Abrams replaced General Westmoreland as MACV commander, William Colby replaced Robert Komer as MACV Deputy for CORDS, and Elsworth Bunker had replaced Henry Cabot Lodge as US Ambassador to Vietnam. President Nixon refined US policy for bringing the war in Vietnam to an end, emphasizing negotiated settlement, a reduction of violence by North Vietnam, and further strengthening of the RVN. “Vietnamization” was the term coined to describe US initiatives to fund, train, and equip ARVN forces, thereby enhancing South Vietnam’s capacity for self defense and permitting the gradual withdrawal of American military forces.37
US pacification efforts and the CORDS Program remained critical components of Vietnamization. According to Hamlet Evaluation Surveys, by 1970, 93 percent of South Vietnamese citizens lived in relatively secure villages.38 Positive changes in the coutryside are “there to be seen,” Colby told the Senate Committee of Foreign Relations, describing the open roads, open markets, children returning to school, and “tin roofs sparkling in the sunlight throughout the countryside where families were once again tilling their long-abandoned farms.”39 Andrade, Willbanks, and Jones point out, however, that noted military historian, Richard Hunt, considered the “achievements of CORDS and the pacification program in Vietnam as ambiguous,” and unable to “cause a fundamental transformation of South Vietnam ”40 Those Americans who were actually involved, on the ground, with CORDS, such as Komer, Colby, and Westmoreland, disagreed with Hunt’s assessment, claiming that the pacification program in RVN “made great gains between 1969 and 1972.”41 Although generally successful, pacification alone was not enough to win the war, as South Vietnam was left to defend itself after US Forces withdrew in accordance with the Paris Peace Accords. North Vietnam soon systematically violated the terms and conditions of the Accords and ARVN forces collapsed under the onslaught of some 20 conventional NVA and Viet Cong divisions. On 23 April 1975, President Gerald Ford, who had replaced President Nixon the previous August, declared the Vietnam War “finished as far as America is concerned.”42 A week later Communist troops captured Saigon – soon to be Ho Chi Minh City – and raised the National Liberation Front flag over the presidential palace. General Westmoreland later claimed that the “US lost its nerve and let the Vietnamese down,” and notoriously contended that the US had “won every battle until it lost the war.”43
The CORDS Program effectively and efficiently combined military and civilian assistance initiatives in support of the South Vietnamese government. The RVN, however, was neither sufficiently prepared to make full use of US assistance, nor strong enough to stand on its own. CORDS nevertheless reduced interagency tensions, established a unified counterinsurgency/pacification operation, clearly demonstrated the wisdom of the “one chain of command” and the “single manager” concepts, and confirmed the soundness of having that manager report directly to the most senior military commander in theater. Finally, CORDS also validated the notions that security is essential, that improving the quality of life for civilians and garnering their loyalty is critical, that only the military has sufficient resource to properly conduct counterinsurgency operations, and that those counterinsurgency operations are all about the host country, not the United States.44
1 Richard Stewart, “CORDS and the Vietnam Experience: An interagency Organization for Counterinsurgency and Pacification,” in Security Assistance: US and International Historical Perspectives, ed. Kendall Gott (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), 258.
2 Dale Andrade and James Wilbanks, “CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future,” Military Review, March-April 2006, 9-10; Jeremy White, Civil Affairs in Vietnam (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2009), 1.
3 Donald Brown, “Vietnam and CORDS: Interagency Lessons for Iraq,” 2008, 15-17, (accessed 22 June 2010).
4 USAID, “USAID History,” 3 April 2009, 1, (accessed 7 August 2010).
5 General George Eckhardt, Vietnam Studies: Command and Control 1950-1969 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1991), 25-28.
6 Graham Cosmas, MACV the Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 1962-67 (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2006), 28-29.
7 Gordon Wells quoted in Donald Brown, “Vietnam and CORDS: Interagency Lessons for Iraq,” 2008, 25.
8 Frank Jones, “Blowtorch: Robert Komer and the Making of Vietnam Pacification Policy,” Parameters, Autumn 2005, 103.
9 President Lyndon Johnson, “National Security Action Memorandum No. 343,” The White House, Washington, DC, 28 March 1966, 1, (accessed 8 August 2010).
10 Dale Andrade and James Wilbanks, “CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future,” 13-14.
11 President Lyndon Johnson, “National Security Action Memorandum No. 362,” The White House, Washington, DC, 9 May 1967, 1, (accessed 8 August 2010).
12 Dale Andrade and James Wilbanks, “CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future,”, 15; Brigadier General Philip Bolte, interview by Al Hemingway, Weider History Group, Leesburg, VA, 1994, 2, (accessed 1 June 2010); Richard Stewart, “CORDS and the Vietnam Experience: An interagency Organization for Counterinsurgency and Pacification,” 266.
13 Jeremy White, Civil Affairs in Vietnam (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2009), 4.
14 William Colby, Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Program, Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 17 February 1970, 10, (accessed 9 August 2010); Dale Andrade and James Wilbanks, “CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future,” 15-17; Richard Stewart, “CORDS and the Vietnam Experience: An interagency Organization for Counterinsurgency and Pacification,” 257.
15 Richard Stewart, “CORDS and the Vietnam Experience: An interagency Organization for Counterinsurgency and Pacification,” 257.
16 Jeremy White, Civil Affairs in Vietnam, 5.
17 Richard Stewart, “CORDS and the Vietnam Experience: An interagency Organization for Counterinsurgency and Pacification,”, 258.
18 William Colby, Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Program, Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 17 February 1970, 5.
19 Dale Andrade quoted in Richard Stewart, “CORDS and the Vietnam Experience: An interagency Organization for Counterinsurgency and Pacification,” 259.
20 Richard Stewart, “CORDS and the Vietnam Experience: An interagency Organization for Counterinsurgency and Pacification,” 259.
[xxiii] Jeremy White, Civil Affairs in Vietnam, 7.
22 William Colby, Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Program, Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 17 February 1970, 5, 58, 65.
23 Major General William Becker, “Fact Sheet: Phung Hoang/Phoenix Program in Vietnam,” inserted in Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 17 February 1970, 56-57, (accessed 9 August 2010).
24 According to Wall Street Journal reporter Peter Kann, PRU teams were counter VCI experts, included Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Chinese Nung mercenaries trained by the CIA, and were often led by US Navy Seals or US Army Special Operations Forces – see Peter Kann, “The Invisible Foe: New Intelligence Push Attempts to Wipeout Viet Cong Underground,” Wall Street Journal, 5 September 1968 and “The Hidden War: Elite Phoenix Forces Hunt Viet Cong Chiefs in an Isolated Village,” Wall Street Journal, 25 March 1969, both articles inserted in Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 17 February 1970, 67-75, (accessed 9 August 2010).
25 Major General William Becker, “Fact Sheet: Phung Hoang/Phoenix Program in Vietnam,” inserted in Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 17 February 1970, 56-57.
26 Dale Andrade and James Wilbanks, “CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future,” 20.
27 Dale Andrade and James Wilbanks, “CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future,” 18-19.
28 William Colby, Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Program, Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 17 February 1970, 60-63.
29 “Instructions to Phoenix Advisors,” inserted in Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 17 February 1970, 61-62, (accessed 9 August 2010).
30 Colonel Andrew Finlayson, “A Retrospective on Counterinsurgency Operations,” Center for the Study of Intelligence, 12 June 2007, 9-10, (accessed 11 August 2010).
31 Derrill Ballenger quoted in Davey Kraken, “The Phoenix Program: A Covert CIA Operation of the Vietnam War,” , 5, (accessed 11 August 2010).
32 General Tran Do quoted in Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Viking, 1983), 602; Nguyen Co Thach quoted in Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, 602.
33 Warren Milberg quoted in Davey Kraken, “The Phoenix Program: A Covert CIA Operation of the Vietnam War,” , 5, (accessed 11 August 2010).
34 William Colby, Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Program, Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 19 February 1970, 207.
35 Jeremy White, Civil Affairs in Vietnam, 8-9.
36 Jeremy White, Civil Affairs in Vietnam, 9.
37 President Richard Nixon, “Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam,” The White House, Washington, DC, 3 November 1969, 1-8, (accessed 11 August 2010).
38 Dale Andrade and James Wilbanks, “CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future,” 17.
39 William Colby, Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Program, Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 17 February 1970, 13.
40 Richard Hunt quoted in Dale Andrade and James Wilbanks, “CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future,” 21-22; Richard Hunt quoted in Frank Jones, “Blowtorch: Robert Komer and the Making of Vietnam Pacification Policy,” Parameters, Autumn 2005, 103.
41 Dale Andrade and James Wilbanks, “CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future,” 22.
42 President Gerald Ford, “An Address at a Tulane University Convocation,” New Orleans, LA, 23 April 1975, 2, (accessed 12 August 2010).
43Pointon Dugdale, “General William Westmoreland, 1914-2005,” 6 March 2008, 1, (accessed 12 August 2010).
44 Richard Stewart, “CORDS and the Vietnam Experience: An interagency Organization for Counterinsurgency and Pacification,” 262; Dale Andrade and James Wilbanks, “CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future,” 22.
Chapter 4: Evolution of the Civil Military Operations Center – CMOC
What is a CMOC?
Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOC) are essentially coordination centers that combatant commanders can establish at any level and tailor to facilitate Civil-Military Operations (CMO) involving interactions of civilians, government officials, non-government organizations (NGO), and military forces within a given Area of Responsibility (AOR). Soldiers from Civil Affairs Command (CACOM) brigades or battalions typically provide staff support for CMOCs. CMOCs are not permanent units or organizations, but instead are ad hoc groups assembled to manage CMO on behalf of the supported commander. Depending on the specific mission, operational security, and the availability of trained personnel, civilian representatives often serve as CMOC team members.1
Mission requirements and METT-TC considerations may also dictate that more than one CMOC be located in a single AOR, as was the case with Operation SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda. Normally, CMOC functions involve providing a single point of contact for government officials and NGOs regarding civilian-related matters. According to Ambassador Robert Oakley, for example, “the center (CMOC in Somalia) was an effective, innovative, mechanism not only for operational coordination but to bridge the inevitable gaps between military and civilian perceptions…the staffs were able to alleviate the concerns and anxieties of the relief communities.”2 Requests for military assistance are processed and coordinated by CMOCs, as are US, United Nations, host nation, and allied command relief efforts. CMOC personnel also oversee relations with the US Department of State and assist in the transfer of operational authority to non-military agencies after the cessation hostilities.3
Fully staffed CMOCs consist of communications, sustainment, and operations/intelligence components, Civil Information Management (CIM) and Functional Specialty Cells, and Civil Liaison Teams (CLT). CLTs provide the CMOC with extended outreach capabilities designed to identify and, if possible, meet the needs of civilians, NGOs, and government agencies at grass-root levels. CIM Cells develop and operate extensive civil information central databases and disseminate the collected/consolidated findings throughout the chain of command as appropriate. Civil Affairs Functional Specialty Cells provide CMOCs with civilian sector technical expertise and can be tailored to meet specific CMO mission requirements. At a minimum, however, Specialty Cells are standardized around the following core capabilities: public health and welfare, rule of law, infrastructure, governance, economic stability, and public education/information.4
Specialty Cell Rule of Law Sections, for example, assists host nations establish or re-establish an impartial justice system, thereby enhancing stability and security for the civilian population. Rule of law operations effect the courts, civil rights, and corrections judicial subsystems and are conducted by US Army Judge Advocate personnel and Civil Affairs Soldiers with law enforcement or public safety backgrounds. CMOC Soldiers and civilians in Economic Stability Sections provide goods and services designed to improve host nation economic systems. Bankers, businessmen, and entrepreneurs assist with budgeting, financing, and creating monetary and fiscal policies. Similarly, personnel in the Infrastructure Section help local authorities enhance a nation’s public works, transportation, utilities, communications, and postal systems, while the Governance Section team assists host nation government officials develop policies and procedures for providing the population with an acceptable level of government services. Physicians, dentists, nurses, and healthcare administrators from the Public Health and Welfare Section provide advice and services intended to improve the physical, mental, and social well-being of local citizens. Particular emphasis is placed on preventing, controlling, and treating diseases. Finally, Public Education and Information Section educators and media experts help indigenous officials with improving public school systems and curricula and with creating a single voice message for communicating with the populace.5
Although CMOC staffing varies based on command discretion and the situational environmental, the military component usually includes standard staff sections and support units, such as S2 or G2, S3 or G3, engineers, logistics, legal, transportations, civil affairs, administration, and multinational force representatives. The Operations Section functions as the CMOC nerve center and is divided into three cells – current operations, future plans, and NGO assistance. Representatives from the US Government, host nation government, NGOs, and other international organizations (IO) comprise the CMOC civilian component. CMOC members also conduct area assessments, prepare CMO estimates, escort convoys, and manage refugee camps.6
CMOCs further serve as clearinghouses for US Military assistance requests from civilian agencies. Processing Requests for Assistance (RFA) is a critical CMOC function, as the normal flow of host nation, NGO, and IO goods and services are often significantly disrupted during combat operations or following natural disasters. Additionally, since US military resources and capabilities in a given combat zone or disaster area often surpass those of the various relief agencies, the military becomes the logical choice by default for participating in humanitarian assistance efforts. Finally, force protection requirements dictate whether CMOCs are located inside or outside the wire. The CMOCs were inside the wire, for example, during Operations UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti) and RESTORE HOPE (Somalia), but outside the wire in Operations JOINT ENDEAVOR (Bosnia) and DESERT SHIELD (Saudi Arabia).7
Although the majority of CMOC functions described above were performed by US CA or Military Governance Soldiers during WW II, the Korean conflict, and the Vietnam War, the actual term – Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) – was not used until Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in 1991 and did not appear doctrinally until the 1993 version of FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations.8
Operation PROVIDE COMFORT
Following Gulf War I, Kurds in northern Iraq, rebelled against the Baathist government of Saddam Hussein. Iraqi army forces attacked the Kurds, who fled to the Zagros Mountains along the border with Turkey. Soldiers from the US Army 10th Special Forces Group deployed to assist with humanitarian relief efforts for the Kurds, but soon concluded that the magnitude of the problem was beyond their capacity. As a result, US-led Coalition Combined Task Force (CCTF) Provide Comfort, commanded by Lieutenant General John Shalikashvili, formed in April 1991 to assist and protect the Kurds as they returned to their northern Iraqi homeland. The CCTF mission called for securing the safety and well-being of the Kurdish refugees, establishing temporary refugee camps, and eventually returning Kurds to their homes. CCTF Provide Comfort consisted of five subordinate elements – Joint Task Force (JTF) Alpha continued providing humanitarian relief services for the Kurds, JTF Bravo resettled Kurdish refugees in transit camps in Iraq, a Combined Support Command for logistics, a US Air Force contingent, and the 353d Civil Affairs Command (CAC).9
Four hundred fifty-seven CA Soldiers and Marines from the 353d CAC, the 354th CAB, the 418th, 431st, and 432d Civil Affairs Companies, and the Marine Corps 4th Civil Affairs Group, supported Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. CA personnel performed a variety of humanitarian relief and intervention tasks, including refugee processing, distributing food and water, and improving camp conditions. CAC and CAB Soldiers established CMOCs with each TF and at CCTF Headquarters in Incirlik, Turkey, while the numerous humanitarian relief organizations that had flocked to the region formed their own coordination center, the NGO Coordination Committee for Northern Iraq (NCCNI).
US Army field historian for Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, Gordon Rudd, observed that the “CMOCs took a significant load off the operational commanders and their staffs by providing a single coalition element to coordinate with civilian relief agencies.”10 In a 1992 assessment of the CMOC concept during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, the Center for Army Lessons Learned agreed with Rudd, concluding “the CMOC in Turkey demonstrated the efficiency and effectiveness of the concept. It provided a focal point for coordination of common civil-military needs and competing demands for services and infrastructure, rather than relying on random encounters between relief workers and staff officers.”11 Former Commander in Chief of US Central Command, General Anthony Zinni, similarly concurred, noting that in humanitarian intervention missions the “CMOC …becomes the heart of your operations, as opposed to a combat of fire support operations center.”12 As the security situation improved, US Forces shifted their efforts to delivering humanitarian assistance, particularly to refugees in remote locations. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT ended on 24 July 1991 giving way the Operation PROVIDE COMFORT II with a renewed military mission of preventing Iraqi aggression aimed at the Kurds. By October, Iraqi forces had withdrawn from what would soon become the peaceful autonomous Kurdistan region of Iraq.
Somalia
A year later, UN forces were called upon to intercede in the Somali civil war. Severe drought also afflicted the entire Horn of Africa during the summer of 1992. The resulting combination of civil war and drought created a famine that endangered millions of Somali people. US Forces supported the UN Somalia mission in two separate operations, the first of which, Operation PROVIDE RELIEF, airlifted food, water, and medicine to Somalia and provided security for the distribution of these supplies throughout the country. The second operation, RESTORE HOPE, reinforced UN military efforts to create a protected environment for conducting humanitarian relief in Somalia.13
Prior to the arrival of the US-led United Task Force (UNITAF) in December 1992, the UN had established Humanitarian Operations Centers (HOC) in eight regional Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRS) with a headquarters located in the Mogadishu UN building. US Forces subsequently moved to the HRSs and established CMOCs to interact with the regional HOCs and to serve as focal points where NGOs could obtain information and submit requests for support. UNITAF’s lead CMOC was co-located with the HOC headquarters in the UN building and served as a liaison and coordination center, processed requests for military assistance, established a UNITAF Civil Affairs Office, and monitored regional HOC activities.14 Although US Civil-Military Operations were generally successful in Somalia, fighting among rival factions and clans continued to escalate. After the unfortunate “Blackhawk Down” incident in October 1993, the US withdrew nearly all of its military personnel from Somalia.
Rwanda
In July 1994, President Clinton dispatched a US Joint Task Force (JTF) to assist the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with the Rwandan refugee crisis, which the President described as the “worst humanitarian crisis in a generation.”15 Troops and supplies were immediately airlifted to Rwanda under the designation Operation SUPPORT HOPE. The JTF mission specifically involved operating water distribution and purification systems, establishing airhead and cargo distribution facilities, providing airfield services, providing logistics support to the UN, and protecting the force.16 The JTF also opened a CMOC at its headquarters location in Entebbe, along with an additional CMOC in Kigali and another at Goma. All three CMOCs supported UNHCR humanitarian relief efforts by managing airlift operations, coordinating the numerous NGO initiatives, assisting with refugee camp management, and processing requests for military support. A joint CMOC/UNHCR logistics cell in Entebbe screened and processed intra-theater military airlift requests.17 CMOC operations in Rwanda were effective, and operating from three separate locations demonstrated CMOC flexibility. By the end of September 1994, responsibility for humanitarian relief efforts shifted to NGOs and the US Forces began to withdraw.18
Haiti
In September 1994, a US-led multinational Joint Task Force (JTF) deployed to Haiti to establish a secure and stable environment for the Haitian people and to assist with the restoration to power of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and his democratically elected government. Under the code name Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY and in accordance with a permissive environment intervention plan – OPLAN 2380 – the JTF established its headquarters, a Joint Operations Center, and a CMOC in Port-au-Prince.19 A Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC), under control of the CMOC, was also opened, but at a separate location, to service the nearly 400 NGOs that were operating in Haiti. The CMOC and HACC performed the typical functions of processing NGO requests for military support, facilitating humanitarian assistance, garnering the trust of the Haitian people, and updating NGOs regarding JTF plans and the tactical situation. The JTF set up a second CMOC/HACC in Cap-Haitian along Haiti’s northern coast, which, in addition to the normal functions described above, arranged for military transportation and security for NGOs traveling to and from supply storage sites. A solid working relationship between the CMOC/HACC and the numerous NGOs was critical to the success of the mission in Haiti, as note by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili – “what we have is a partnership…if you are successful, they are successful, and if they are successful, you are successful…we need each other.”20 The two CMOC performed well in Haiti and the overall military mission -- returning Aristide to the presidency, disarming the Junta militia, and reconstituting the Haitian police – was successful as well. Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY ended and the JTF turned over the mission to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) in March 1995.[xxiv]
Afghanistan
Following the rout of the Taliban in the opening weeks of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), the US Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) established a Combined Joint Civil Military Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) in Kabul to provide humanitarian relief assistance for the people of Afghanistan. Soldiers from the 96th CA Battalion opened a CMOC in Islamabad, Pakistan and organized Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLC) to deconflict humanitarian and combat operations, conduct assessments, and identify potential relief projects. Within a year CHLCs were operating in nearly all of Afghanistan’s provincial capitals. Success of the CHLC concept led to the creation of Joint Reconstruction Teams, which by the summer of 2002 were renamed Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). Humanitarian Assistance Survey Teams (HAST), also from the 96th CA Battalion, joined 5th Special Forces Group Soldiers to assist Afghan Northern Alliance forces and to initiate collaborative efforts with local Afghan leaders.22
In many instances, CMOCs were up and running in major Afghan cities prior to the PRT’s arrival. Six person CMOC teams interacted with provincial and regional government officials, United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA) representatives, and NGOs to coordinate requests for assistance. CMOCs eventually reported to the local PRTs, but often operated out of separate “store front” locations away from the PRT compound.23 In Jalalabad, for example, in the eastern Afghan province of Nangarhar, thirteen Soldiers from the 360th Civil Affairs Brigade and the 414th Civil Affairs Battalion operated a CMOC and met regularly with UN representatives, NGOs, local citizens to determine their respective needs. Sergeant First Class Frank Mathias, non commissioned officer in charge, described the six primary activities of the Jalalabad CMOC – foreign national support, population and resource control, humanitarian assistance, military civic action, emergency services, and support for civil administration” – all of which contributed daily to the well-being of Nangarhar Province citizens.24
US Marines and British Soldiers from Task Force Helmand established a joint CMOC next to the British Forward Operating Base Delhi in the Garmsir district. The principal focus of the Garmsir CMOC was support for stabilization, reconstruction, and development, battle damage reparations, and coordinating with NGOs. Local Afghans were hired to work at the CMOC and the Afghan government assigned a representative from the Ministry of Reconstruction and Rural Development. On opening day, the CMOC had 31 visitors and paid 15 reparation claims. Concerned with the growing presence of NGOs, Colonel Peter Petronzio, commanding officer, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), NATO ISAF, explained that “if we aren’t careful, we will do more than can be sustained upon our departure…our guiding principal [is to] meet the needs and desires of the people of Garmsir.”25 MEU Civil Affairs Officer, Chief Warrant Officer 2 Rene Cote concurred, adding “our approach is to work with alliance partners and the government of Afghanistan to build capacity in a manner that is sustainable after the eventual departure of Marine Forces.”26
During the 2010 NATO campaign to retake the Marjah district in Helmand Province, Marines from 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment opened a CMOC, which hired local contractors to work on community projects, paid compensation for battle damages, provided medical care, and enrolled Afghan farmers in the poppy-alternative training program. The Marjah CMOC also refurbished a mosque, made improvements to the local bazaar, registered citizens in a national database, and issued identification cards. “People started off scared when we first began making IDs,” CMOC leader, Gunnery Sergeant Brandon Dickinson, told Stars and Stripes. “They were afraid the Taliban would kill them…then it was five, then 10, now it’s 4,500 [Marjahans with IDs],” Dickinson explained.27 CMOC, CHLC, and PRT relationships in Afghanistan are discussed further in Chapter 5.
Iraq
Successful CMOC operations during OEF led Coalition Forces to quickly adopt the CMOC concept in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Within six months of the fall of Baghdad, 21 CMOC were functioning in Iraq – approximately 10 in and around the capital, the others in major cities, such as Basra, Mosul, Samarra, Arbil, Baqubah, and Kirkuk.28 During the second week of April 2003, for example, Special Forces Soldiers from the 96th and 404th Civil Affairs Battalions (CAB) opened a CMOC in downtown Kirkuk that gave the various ethnic groups vying for power in Kirkuk a common place to meet and discuss issues with US military representatives. CAB Soldiers also helped restore water and electricity to Kirkuk and a public health team supervised the distribution of fresh food. Since Kirkuk had no functioning city government, Soldiers from the CMOC assisted Kirkukis with installing an emergency council comprised of Kurds, Arabs, Turkomans, and Asstrians to oversee operations until official city council elections could be held. According to a US Army Special Operations Command Historian, Charles Briscoe, by mid-April 2003, Kirkuk was the “most stable city in all of Iraq.”29
CMOCs were also instrumental in gathering intelligence during OIF. In July 2003, an Iraqi Sheik provided a Tactical HUMINT Team working out of the 101st ABN Division’s CMOC at the Mosul airport with critical information regarding the location of Saddam Hussein’s sons Uday and Qusay, who were found and subsequently killed resisting capture.30 Following the decisive battle for Fallujah in November 2004, a US Marine Corps Civil Affairs Group team and US Navy Construction Battalion (Seabee) Sailors opened a CMOC to address local citizen concerns, interact with NGOs, and to begin the arduous process of rebuilding the city and reestablishing governance. “I was excited when I heard I was coming to the CMOC,” explained Lieutenant Colonel Beverly Baker, Operations Officer, Fallujah CMOC. “The best part of it is the daily interactions with the locals…you see your work every day…you can physically see that you’re making a difference.”31 CMOC Economic Development Officer, Captain Rodolpho Quiles, agreed with Baker, adding “we believe in the mission tremendously…it’s definitely one of those things that you can feel proud of doing – helping the Iraqis help themselves.”32
When 2d Battalion, 130th Infantry from the Illinois Army National Guard deployed to Iraq in 2005, the battalion fire support element was assigned responsibility for CMO activities. 2-130 IN set up its first CMOC in Abu Ghraib East, on an Iraqi FOB adjacent to Baghdad International Airport. Although the fire supporters had no formal CMO training, they learned quickly and were soon meeting with Iraqis, conducting assessments, and processing requests for assistance. Easy access for Iraqis was critical to 2-130 IN CMOC operations. Our “open door policy [and air conditioned offices] were quite productive. Once the people in the community learned about it, they flocked to see us, and we reaped the benefits of those engagements,” Captain Robert Davis, CMOC OIC, and Sergeant First Class John Kullman, Senior CMOC NCO, reported in FA Journal.33 Also, local Iraqis were less fearful of meeting with CMOC Soldiers, since the CMOC building was located on an Iraqi FOB rather than inside the US compound. “We made every effort to build on their willingness to come to the Iraqi FOB by manning the facility 24/7…Iraqis could (and did) come and go undercover of darkness or during inconspicuous times,” Davis and Kullman explained.34
At the Camp Victory CMOC in Baghdad, Soldiers worked closely with Iraqi government officials from the various ministries in an effort to help as many citizens as possible. The Camp Victory CMOC was open daily and offered an expanded array of service including medical and dental care, and legal assistance for all Iraqis. Every visitor received a small humanitarian assistance package containing food, clothing, hygiene products, and school supplies. CMOC NCIOC, Sergeant First Class Juan Perez estimated that at least 1,000 Iraqis visit the CMOC every month. “I like to be able to give to the children who will be shaping Iraq’s future and let know we’re not here to do bad things…it’s important for us to help them and leave with a positive impact,” Air Force First Lieutenant Christine Anouchian, who volunteered at the CMOC, told Laura Bigenho of the 28th Public Affairs Detachment.35
The 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division’s CMOC was established outside the Q-West Base Complex (QBC) at Quyyarah West Airfield in northern Iraq to make it more accessible to locals. The QBC CMOC team of four Soldiers and two Iraqi interpreters devoted most its time to projects intended to improve the local economy. Iraqis submit project requests, enter bids on approved projects, hire contractors, and receive payments for completed projects – all through the CMOC, which controls millions of dollars for project funding. Improvements to roadways, electrical grids, and water supplies, plus renovations to schools, clinics, and police stations are typical of the projects funded by the CMOC. Iraqis in Ninewah Province became increasingly self-reliant and more interested in making Iraq a better place during 1/25 SBCT’s deployment to Quyyarah. “I like seeing people leave the CMOC happy,” said Sergeant Daniel Otero, Paymaster for the QBC CMOC.36 For more OIF CMO information see Chapter 6.
1 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations (Washington, DC, 14 February 2000), Sections 5-40 to 5-46, Appendix H.
2 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, Interagency Cooperation During Joint Operations Volume I (Washington, DC, 9 October 1996), III-16.
3 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, Sections 5-40 to 5-46, Appendix H.
4 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations (Washington, DC, 29 September 2006), 2-5 to 2-7.
5 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations, 2-7 to 2-14.
6 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, Appendix H.
7 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, Appendix H.
8 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, 5-8.
9 Gordon Rudd, Humanitarian Intervention: Assisting the Iraqi Kurds in operation PROVIDE COMFORT, 1991 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2004), 107-129.
10 Gordon Rudd, Humanitarian Intervention: Assisting the Iraqi Kurds in operation PROVIDE COMFORT, 1991, 237.
11 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency Cooperation During Joint Operations Volume I (Washington, DC, 9 October 1996), III-19.
12 General Anthony Zinni quoted in Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency Cooperation During Joint Operations Volume I (Washington, DC, 9 October 1996), III-19.
13 President George H. W. Bush, “Address on Somalia,” Washington, DC, The White House, 4 December 1992, (accessed 12 August 2010); United Nations Security Council, “Resolution 794,” 3 December 1992, 1-3, (accessed 12 August 2010).
14 Chris Seiple, The US Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 1996), 114.
15 President Bill Clinton quoted in Liz Hunt, “Rwanda: Relief in Sight for Goma Chaos as Airlift Takes Off,” Independent, 24 July 1994, 1, (accessed 13 August 2010).
16 Mark Davis, Tracing the Evolution of the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) in the 1990s: What is the Best Model? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1996), 41.
17 Mark Davis, Tracing the Evolution of the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) in the 1990s: What is the Best Model?, 41-42.
18 Department of Defense, US Military Activities in Rwanda 1994-August 1997, Report to Congress, 16 June 1998, 1.
19 Walter Kretchik, Robert Baumann, and John Fishel, Invasion, Intervention, Intervasion: A Concise History of the US Army in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998), 183-197.
20 General John Shalikashvili quoted in Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Operations, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During joint Operations Vol I (Washington, DC, 17 March 2006), II-1; Aaron Wilkins, The Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti), Air Command and Staff College, March 1997, 21, (accessed 21 July 2010).
[xxv] Walter Kretchik, Robert Baumann, and John Fishel, Invasion, Intervention, Intervasion: A Concise History of the US Army in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998), 196-197.
22 Donald Wright et al, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM October 2001-September 2005 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 82, 194, 197, 226, 255.
23 “The PRTs Structure, Strategies, and their Relationship with NGOs,” JCA-NET, 12 May 2003, 1, 5, (accessed 1 August 2010).
24 Sergeant First Class Frank Mathias quoted in David Mann, “Civil Affairs Team Helps to Rebuild Afghanistan,” USASOC News Service, 20 March 2003, 1.
25 Colonel Peter Petronzio quoted in “Civil-Military Operations Center opens in Afghanistan,” Armed Forces Press Service, 24 June 2008, 1.
26 Rene Cote quoted in “Civil-Military Operations Center opens in Afghanistan,” Armed Forces Press Service, 24 June 2008, 1.
27 Brandon Dickinson quoted in Dianna Cahn, “Months After Marjah Offensive, Success Still Elusive,” Stars and Stripes, 10 July 2010, 3.
28 Eric James, “Two Steps Back: Relearning the Humanitarian-Military Lessons Learned in Afghanistan and Iraq,” The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 1 November 2003, 4-5, (accessed 16 August 2010).
29 Charles Briscoe et al, All Roads Lead to Baghdad, (Fort Bragg, NC: USASOC History Office, 2006), 371.
30 Donald Wright and Timothy Resse, On Point II: Transition to a New Campaign (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 226.
31 Lieutenant Colonel Beverly Baker quoted in Lieutenant Colonel David Benhoff, Among the People: US Marines in Iraq (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2008), 9.
32 Captain Rodolfo Quiles quoted in Lieutenant Colonel David Benhoff, Among the People: US Marines in Iraq, 5.
33 Captain Robert Davis and Sergeant First Class John Kullman, “ILARNG’s 2-130 in FSE as a Battalion-Level CMOC in Iraq,” FA Journal, September/October 2006, 28-29.
34 Captain Robert Davis and Sergeant First Class John Kullman, “ILARNG’s 2-130 in FSE as a Battalion-Level CMOC in Iraq,” 29.
35 First Lieutenant Christine Anouchian quoted in Laura Bigenho, “Volunteers Show Softer Side of War,” United States Forces-Iraq Press Release, 7 February 2007, 2, (accessed 21 July 2010).
36 Sergeant Daniel Otero quoted in First Lieutenant Dana Scott, “Civil Affairs Team Continues CMOC Opportunities for Iraqis,” Stryker Brigade News, 10 September 2005, 3, (accessed 19 August 2010).
Chapter 5: Regain, Rebuild, Reinforce, and Resolve
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan
From CHLCs to PRTs
Following the 11 September 2001 al-Qaeda attacks on New York City and the Pentagon, the United States initiated Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) to oust the Taliban government and destroy al-Qaeda sanctuaries in Afghanistan. Anti-Taliban Northern Alliance forces, heavily supported by US Special Operations Teams and American airpower, resoundingly defeated the Taliban and seized control of Afghanistan’s major cities within a few weeks. The US Combined Forces Land component Command (CFLCC) subsequently established a Combined Joint Civil Operations Task Force (CJCMOTF) in Kabul to provide humanitarian assistance for the Afghan people. In 2002, Civil Affairs Soldiers from the 96th and 489th CA BNs then opened and manned a series of Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLC) and Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOC) in Herat, Kandahar, Bamian, Mazar-e Sharif, Konduz, Khost, Gardez, and Jalalabad.1
Concerns regarding insufficient representation by the Department of State and USAID in the CHLC/CMOC process led CJTF-180 and CJCMOTF leadership to recommend beefed up organizations, initially called “Joint Regional Teams,” then renamed “Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT).” The PRT concept had been roughly outlined in a Political-Military (POL-MIL) Plan prepared by Dennis Skocz, Director of the Office of Contingency Planning and Peacekeeping at the State Department, at the behest of US Special Envoy to Afghanistan, Ambassador James Dobbins. “To get State Department and USAID officers out of Kabul, I proposed that DOD allow American Civilian officials to live and work within military compounds in the areas where US Troops were active,” Dobbins wrote. “Eventually, the first Provincial Reconstruction Team was fielded on the model I had suggested…USAID and State Department personnel were co-located with a military Civil Affairs team and housed within an American military base camp,” he further explained.2 According to Lieutenant Colonel Michael Stout, CJCMOTF deputy commander 2002-2003, the POL-MIL Plan served as a roadmap for achieving political and social stability in Afghanistan.3 Subsequently, the first US-led PRT was established in late 2002 at Gardez, followed in 2003 by PRTs Bamian, Bagram, Herat, Jalalabad, Kandahar, plus German PRT Konduz and UK-led PRT Mazar-e Sharif.4
First PRTs
Initial Afghan PRT staffing varied location to location. PRT Gardez, for example, had representatives from USAID, US State Department, US Department of Agriculture, the Afghan government, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and several additional international organizations. Due to the adverse security environment in and around Gardez, the military presence at the PRT was substantial – 12 Soldiers from the 450th CA BN (Airborne), a US Army Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha (ODA), and an infantry platoon from Combined Task Force 82 (CTF 82).5 In addition to the security forces, CTF 82 provided aviation, communications and overall logistics support to PRT Gardez. Although Major General John Vines, CTF 82 commander, endorsed the PRT concept, diverting troops to Gardez while still conducting Phase III operations, weakened his combat strength. “It certainly was painful to support,” Vines recalled in a 2007 interview.6
Only rudimentary guidance and direction was provided to the pioneering Afghan PRTs in 2003. Each quickly developed plans, programs, and procedures based upon the local situational environment. Germans, for example, at PRT Konduz began publishing a Dari, Pashtun, and English language newspaper and helped launch a Dari radio station. Americans at Herat helped restore peaceful conditions as Mohammad Ismael Khan relinquished his provincial governorship and moved to Kabul to become Afghanistan’s Minister of Energy. And British forces in Mazar-e Sharif assisted in negotiating a settlement between Northern Alliance fighters loyal to Abdul Rashid Dostum and those allied with Tajik General Ustad Atta. Each of the early PRTs developed distinct configurations. US PRTs used QIP funding for local projects, emphasized force protection, and were staffed by roughly 100 military and civilian personnel. The larger British PRT at Mazar-e concentrated on Afghan security sector reforms, while the German PRT, with a staff of 300, stressed civilian humanitarian assistance and governance improvement operations. Eventually, NATO/ISAF officials began referring to these three PRT configurations as the American, British, and German models.7
PRTs under CFC-A
To more effectively address POL-MIL issues at the strategic/theater level, Coalition leaders established the Combined Forces Command (CFC-A) in November 2003. Led by US Army Lieutenant General David Barno, CFC-A reported directly to the United States Central Command. CJTF-180 became a CFC-A subordinate command and continued to concentrate on fighting al-Qaeda/Taliban and on creating security and stability in Afghanistan. Barno redirected Coalition efforts in Afghanistan to a new counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign and focused on strengthening relationships with GIRoA, the US Embassy in Kabul, and the International Security Force Afghanistan (ISAF). CFC-A subsequently set up headquarters in Kabul to facilitate close coordination with US Ambassador Zalmay Khalizad.8 In accordance with COIN doctrine, Lieutenant General Barno shifted the CFC-A mission focus from the enemy to people of Afghanistan and developed five strategic lines of operation – described as pillars – to insure that the goals and objectives of the CFC-A COIN campaign plan would be met.9
Since CFC-A had only 14,000 troops at its disposal in early 2004, Barno viewed the mission as an economy of force effort.10 He directed CJTF-180 to establish two regional commands – RC-East and RC-South – and gave brigade commanders full control over their respective AOs. The area ownership concept stemmed from Lieutenant General Barno’s contention that, since the vast majority of manpower and materiel in Afghanistan belonged to CFC-A, the US Army was the 800-lbs gorilla in the room and therefore responsible for making things happen in the provinces. “We own it all,” Barno frequently told his staff in explaining that only the US military had the resources necessary to get things done and to make progress in Afghanistan.11
The CFC-A COIN campaign plan’s focus on the Afghan people, along with Lieutenant General Barno’s fourth pillar – Enable Reconstruction and Good Governance – placed increased emphasis on the Afghanistan PRT program and its general mission to establish security, facilitate reconstruction, and promote the GIRoA. As a result, eleven additional PRTs opened in 2004 at Asadabad (US), Khost (US), Ghanzi (US), Qalat (US), Lashkar Gah (US), Farah (US), Sharan (US), and Tarin Kowt (US), plus Feyzabad (Germany), Meymaneh (UK), and Pol-e Khormi (Netherlands).12 Barno re-assigned CA personnel from CJCMOTF headquarters and cannibalized CJTF-180 for additional Soldiers to staff these new PRTs. Typically, a Civil Affairs Branch Lieutenant Colonel, who reported to CJCMOTF, commanded the US-led PRTs which included a CA team, a PSYOPS group, a Special Forces ODA, US Army Corps of Engineers personnel, representatives from the DOS, USDA, USAID and GIRoA, plus 60-80 US Soldiers to provide security and perform other related tasks. CA Soldiers oversaw local reconstruction projects, coordinated funding, conducted formal assessments, and opened Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOC) to facilitate relations with IOs and NGOs. Afghan officials, operating from PRTs, often established regional coordination centers to support provincial and district officials and to extend GIRoA influence to rural areas.13
NATO/ISAF Assumes Command
By 2005, there were 22 PRTs in Afghanistan, 10 NATO/ISAF and 12 US-led; and PRT commanders began reporting directly to the military commanders of their respective RCs.14 Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry replaced Barno as CFC-A commander and Ambassador Ronald Neuman was appointed US Ambassador to Afghanistan. CFC-A was disbanded in late 2006, relinquishing responsibility for military operations in Afghanistan to NATO/ISAF. At that point, there were 23,000 US military personnel plus service members from 26 NATO countries and 11 other nations throughout Afghanistan serving in the following commands: RCs East, South, North, West, and the capital area; the Security Training Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A); the Joint Special Operations Task Force, and the National Support Element.15
In November 2006, PRT Vardak, led by Turkey, opened as the first true civilian PRT. A senior Turkish diplomat commanded Vardak, which had only a few military personnel for compound security duty. The US also opened a new PRT at Kala Gush in Nuristan province. This was the first PRT to be established outside of a provincial capital. In 2008, the last PRT was established in Lowgar province by the Czech Republic, thus bringing the total number of PRTs in Afghanistan to 26. As of this writing, the ISAF total force numbers approximately 120,000 – 80,000 US and 40,000 non-US. Between 1,000 and 1,500 US service members were assigned to the 12 US-led Afghanistan PRTs in midyear 201016
Regional Command North – RC(N)
• Konduz (Germany), Konduz province;
• Mazar-e-Sharif (Sweden), Balkh province;
• Feyzabad (Germany), Badakhshan province;
• Pol-e-Khomri (Hungary), Baghlan province;
• Meymaneh (Norway), Faryab province.
Regional Command West – RC(W)
• Herat (Italy), Herat province;
• Farah (US), Farah province;
• Qala-e-Naw (Spain), Badghis province;
• Chaghcharan (Lithuania), Ghowr province.
Regional Command South – RC(S)
• Kandahar (Canada), Kandahar province;
• Lashkar-Gah (United Kingdom), Helmand province;
• Tarin Kowt (US), Uruzgan province;
• Qalat (US), Zabul province.
Regional Command East - RC(E)
• Bamyan (New Zealand), Bamyan province
• Bagram (Republic of Korea), Parwan province
• Nurestan (US), Nurestan province
• Panjshir (US), Panjshir province
• Gardez (US), Paktika province
• Ghazni (US), Ghazni province
• Khowst (US), Khowst province
• Sharan (US), Paktika province
• Jalalabad (US), Nangarhar province
• Asadabad (US), Kunar province
• Mihtarlam (US), Laghman province
• Wardak (TU), Wardak province
• Logar (Czech Republic), Logar province
PRT Funding
Initially, DOD Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funded Afghan PRT operations.17 2003, however, the use of DOD Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds and DOS/USAID Economic Support Funds (ESF) became more prevalent. For the period beginning with FY 2004 up to and including FY 2010, roughly $2.2 billion in CERP funds, $1.1 billion in USAID funds, and $900 million in PRT support funds were spent for US assistance to the Afghan people through a variety of relief projects such as the Quick-Impact Program (QIP).18 According to the ISAF Afghanistan Report 2009, “PRT activities have contributed more than $545 million in projects throughout [Afghanistan].”19
Although PRT operating costs – food, housing, security, health care, etc. – are paid for by DOD, these costs are combined with gross Afghanistan operational expenditures and are not tracked separately. Also, the costs of supporting PRT civilians in Afghanistan were borne by DOD and are not reimbursed by DOS, USAID, or USDA. As of 2008, however, USAID paid a substantial portion of PRT air fleet expenses. According the US Government Accountability Office, DOD estimates the cost of establishing a new PRT in Afghanistan at roughly $20 million. Both RC combatant commanders and PRT commanders were authorized to expend up to $25,000 in CERP funding for local humanitarian and reconstruction projects, such as those involving clean water, sanitation, education, transportation, health care, rule of law, and property damage settlements.20
USAID personnel at Afghan PRTs were also authorized to issue grants of up to $10,000 for similar projects. Additionally, PRT/USAID field program officers recommended and oversaw governance-oriented projects funded through USAID’s Local Governance and Community Development Program (LGCDP). In fiscal years 2007 and 2008, $173 million in LGCDP funding supported a variety of projects intended to improve Afghan provincial and district governance and to provide essential services for local citizens. USAID, in cooperation with local PRTs, also allocated $525 million (FY 2006-FY 2008) for the Alternative Development Program, designed to convert Afghan farmers from poppy cultivation to raising other sustainable crops. Finally, PRTs advised USAID officials concerning large-scale Afghan national development programs involving road construction, building democracy, and improving medical care. USAID obligated nearly $2.5 billion, FY 2006-FY 2008, for these national programs.[xxvi]
PRT Executive Steering Committee
Following NATO’s assumption of authority for ISAF in August 2003, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1510 authorizing ISAF to begin operating outside the confines of Kabul. In its first significant move, ISAF assumed responsibility for PRT Konduz in December 2003 and subsequently took command of several additional PRTs during 2004 and 2005. The ISAF Operations Plan included the following PRT mission statement which was created in January 2005 by the Kabul-based PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC): “Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) will assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified area of operations, and enable security sector reform and reconstruction efforts.”22
The ESC was led by the GIRoA Minister of Interior and was responsible for establishing strategic policy for Afghan PRT operations. ESC members envisioned PRTs as joint, civil-military, teams, manned by personnel from ISAF countries, and typically responsible for a single province in Afghanistan. PRTs extended GIRoA outreach to the country’s provinces and districts, where contact with the national government was limited. They also helped insure that programs to improve security, governance, and development were implemented uniformly and that local environments were sufficiently stable for GIRoA officials, NGOs and IOs to initiate such programs. To reinforce uniformity in PRT operations, the ESC prepared an extensive series of guidelines and principles:
1. Focus on improving stability by reducing the causes of instability;
2. Increase local institutional capacity;
3. Operate as a fully integrated civil-military organization;
4. Work to a common purpose or end-state with unity of effort;
5. Link the people and the GIRoA and separate the insurgents from the people;
6. Facilitate GIRoA visibility in the provinces;
7. Limit the Physical presence of ISAF;
8. Conduct joint patrols with Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF);
9. Promote ANSF as the primary security interface with local residents;
10. Guide and mentor from behind;
11. Promote Afghan leadership, ownership, and legitimacy;
12. Ensure that operations at the provincial level support GIRoA national objectives;
13. Help develop the capacity of all national, provincial, and district Afghan officials;
14. Promise only what you can deliver;
15. Focus on achieving effects not outcomes;
16. Ensure political buy-in between GIRoA officials and PRT leaders;
17. Implement projects through local Afghan development committees;
18. Work harmoniously with all international partners;
19. Avoid project duplication;
20. Ensure that projects are sustainable long-term;
21. Respect and be aware of civil-military sensitivities;
22. Work toward a finite lifespan for the PRT, i.e. draw down, closure, Afghan takeover;
23. Work toward providing balanced development in all areas of the country.23
ISAF PRT Guidance
The ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team Handbook, Edition 4, describes a spectrum of intervention that graphically depicts the linear progress of civil-military operations, beginning with kinetics, then non-kinetics, stabilization, and finally transformational development. Initially, progress in Afghanistan, the Handbook points out, did not develop uniformly throughout the country, as different regions progressed at their own pace along the continuum. As a result, the transition from primarily military operations to more diplomatic efforts was inconsistent region by region. In many instances, military units alone did not have sufficient expertise to effectively stabilize or transform a region. While, on the other hand, DoS, USAID, NGO, and IO representatives were reluctant to establish operations in regions that were unsafe. The combined military/civilian PRTs addressed both of these concerns.24
As envisioned, PRTs were critical components of the OEF counterinsurgency campaign plan, but they were neither military nor civilian organizations. Once stability in a particular province was successfully achieved, the military element of the PRT was expected to draw down, thereby placing increased emphasis on civilian/diplomatic efforts. A PRT’s long-term criteria for success involved engaging Afghans at all levels of government and helping them to improve stability, create good governance, extend their reach, and provide essential services for the people. Consequently, a principal PRT objective was to transform the conflict by simultaneously reducing/eliminating the causes of conflict, while strengthening the government’s ability to manage/overcome these same causes of conflict and instability. ISAF created a stability matrix to reinforce the conflict transformation process that included four Lines of Operation: (1) increase the effectiveness of legitimate authorities, (2) decrease the effectiveness of illegitimate entities, (3) increase the legitimacy of legitimate authorities, and (4) decrease the legitimacy of illegitimate entities. Lines (1) and (3) involved positive activities such as facilitating governance, economic development, reconstruction and securing the population, while Lines (2) and (4) emphasized methods for countering and disrupting the enemy’s (al-Qaeda, Taliban, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, drug trafficers, etc.) lines of operation. All of the ISAF guidelines and directives were intended to add clarity to the PRT mission of extending the authority, legitimacy, and effectiveness of the GIRoA and meeting the needs of the Afghan people.25
PRTs and the Chain of Command
The highest level of authority within NATO is the North Atlantic Council (NAC), comprised of senior representatives from the 26 member nations. Military issues facing the NAC are referred to the NATO Military Committee, which is made up of admirals and generals from each country. The NATO military command structure consists of the Allied Command Transformation and the Allied Command Operations (ACO), located at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Belgium. All NATO military operations are controlled by ACO, which consists of two Joint Forces Commands (JCF) – land-based and sea-based – and is commanded by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). JCF Brunssum in the Netherlands is the command headquarters for ISAF Afghanistan.26
ISAF is the multinational headquarters of the NATO in-theater operational command in Afghanistan. US Forces assigned to ISAF are referred to as United States of America (USA) Forces, while United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) are not assigned to ISAF and are under the operational control of US Central Command.27 In instances where the commander ISAF (COMISAF) is a US General, he may also serve as USFOR-A commander. Finally, the five Regional Commanders in Afghanistan report to COMISAF and PRT leaders report to the commanders of their respective RCs.
The Provincial Reconstruction Team Executive Steering Committee (ESC) in Afghanistan is a multinational, interagency, advisory body that provides policy guidance, direction, and oversight to all Afghan PRTs. Such guidance is based upon the terms and conditions of the official Afghan National Development Strategy Five-Year Plan and stresses overarching issues such as improving security, stability, and governance; facilitating sustainable reconstruction and development; enhancing unity of effort; increasing PRT civilian participation; and aligning PRT goals and objectives with those of the GIRoA. Initially, the ESC was co-chaired by COMISAF and the GIRoA Minister of Interior. As of 2008, however, the General Director of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) has led the ESC on behalf of Afghan President Hamid Karzai. COMISAF, the NATO senior civilian representative, and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General have all served as ESC co-chairpersons. Additional ESC members include the Afghan Deputy Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Public Works, and Rural Rehabilitation and Development; Commander USFOR-A as appropriate; Ambassadors of PRT contributing countries; the European Union Special Representative; the leaders of the European Union Police Mission and the Delegation of the European Commission; and a World Bank representative. Finally, a secondary committee – the PRT Working Group – is subordinate to the PRT Executive Steering Committee and works in support of the ESC mission.28
PRT Support and Training
To answer questions and address PRT-related problems, the Civil-Military Cooperation Office at ISAF headquarters operates a PRT Helpdesk staffed by subject matter experts who respond to email or telephone inquiries from the field. ISAF also conducts PRT Orientation Courses for newly assigned PRT members. The Orientation Course syllabus covers general PRT topics, such as the ISAF OPLAN, the PRT mission, situational awareness, and use of the PRT Handbook.29 In 2006, the NATO School in Oberammergua, Germany began teaching a five-day ISAF PRT pre-deployment course for both military and civilian personnel slated for key PRT positions in Afghanistan. Students from all of the ISAF contributing nations attended the pre-deployment courses, which provided a broad-based common understanding of the ISAF and PRT missions.30 The US First Army and the 189th Infantry Brigade subsequently developed and taught a six-week long DoD PRT Course at Fort Bragg beginning in March 2007. The DoD PRT Course similarly trained US service members and civilians for PRT duty in Afghanistan.31
PRTs across Afghanistan both contribute to and extract information from the ISAF Afghanistan Country Stability Picture (ACSP) – a geographic database describing roughly 50,000 construction, reconstruction, and development projects throughout the country. GIRoA ministries, IOs, and NGOs also provide data for ACSP, which tracks overall progress toward meeting the goals and objectives of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy.32 Additionally, ISAF initiated the Civil-Military Fusion Center/Civil-Military Overview (CFC/CMO) project in Afghanistan in 2008 to facilitate timely and comprehensive information sharing and to enhance situational awareness. Sector-focused Knowledge Managers (KM) at CFC expertly assemble, fuse, and disseminate time-sensitive information involving, security, governance, humanitarian assistance, etc., to Afghan PRTs, IOs, and NGOs.33
PRT Internal Operations
The effective integration of the command group’s senior military and civilian leaders was a critical aspect of the PRT program in Afghanistan. Regularly scheduled meetings, joint planning, and consensual decision-making between the military commander and the DOS, USAID, and USDA representatives were key to the collaborative unity of effort required to successfully execute PRT strategy. “Plan together, train together, work together” was a motto used in PRT training to emphasize the importance of “togetherness” in meeting the goals and objectives of PRT diplomatic, economic, and military lines of operation.34 The PRT integrated command group subsequently oversees the work of subgroups, such as the core planning group, the effects/impact assessment group, and issue oriented working groups – governance, security, economic development, etc.35As the number of ISAF combat troops increased in southern Afghanistan during the 2009-2010 surge, several PRTs began working more closely with local maneuver units to ensure that all elements in a particular province were functioning in harmony. ISAF envisioned a broader view of provincial-level operations – the ISAF Provincial Team – that included PRT members; the maneuver unit; Civil Affairs Teams; Special Operations Forces; and, GIRoA, UNAMA, NGO, and IO representatives.36
The composition of PRTs in Afghanistan was dependent upon the situational environment and the preferences of the particular PRT lead-nation. Unity of effort and clear lines of communication were two guiding organizational principles for ISAF PRT core leaderships groups. PRT Commanders were typically Lieutenant Colonels or Colonels and in some instances Naval Officers, Lieutenant Commanders or Commanders, or high-ranking civilians. The commander’s principal duties included general management of the PRT, overseeing security and force protection operations; ensuring political, military, and development activities conform to the PRT mission, strategy, and lines of operation; and engaging with key GIRoA officials.37 A Deputy PRT Commander assisted the Commander with the aforementioned responsibilities and the Chief of Staff integrated/de-conflicted PRT activities and managed the PRT daily routine. The PRT Diplomatic Officers dealt with local provincial, district, and tribal leaders and served as the PRT expert on policy, governance, and political issues. Development Officers were responsible for PRT strategies, policies, and funding relating to provincial development projects and for coordinating project activities with key constituencies inside and outside the PRT. Additional civilian experts (from DOS, USAID, USDA, for example) served in similar capacities, providing advice and initiating projects in their respective areas of expertise.38
The local situational environment dictated each PRT’s security requirements. Most PRTs used both ISAF troops and local contracted Afghan forces for compound security, convoy escort, and emergency quick reaction force duty. Hiring local Afghans served to improve relationships with the community and contributed to provincial economic development. PRT Military Liaison and Observation Teams (MLOTs) patrolled throughout the province, gathering intelligence, interacting with the populace, promoting the GIRoA agenda, and helping to extend national government influence. The J1-J4 sections of PRTs provided standard personnel, intelligence, operations, and logistics capabilities; while PRT planning, communications, financing, and Civil Affairs functions were performed respectively by the J5, J6, J8, and J9 elements. Most Afghanistan PRTs also incorporated a Role 1 Medical Treatment Facility capable of providing first aid, sick call, casualty collection, triage, resuscitation, and stabilization.39
In addition to the ISAF PRT Handbook and the NATO PRT Pre-deployment course, ISAF employed several additional measures to facilitate cohesiveness among Afghanistan PRTs and the numerous nations that staffed them. Upon their arrival in Afghanistan, first-time PRT leaders and senior staff members attended the ISAF PRT Key Leader Theater Orientation Course (KLTOC) in Kabul. KLTOC emphasized unity of effort and the need for full integration among new military and civilian PRT core leadership elements and updated all attendees regarding current operations and pertinent intelligence. Key leaders from all Afghanistan PRTs also attended Quarterly ISAF PRT Conferences designed as forums for reviewing lessons learned and other relevant data. ISAF Civil-Military PRT Engagement Teams (PETs) visited PRT field locations biannually to address/resolve headquarters-related issues and to share current information.40 Additionally, the ISAF HQ PRT Office and Political Advisory Office jointly published the NATO/ISAF PRT Weekly Report, which was a collection of analysis and assessment documents from Political Advisors and Officers serving with ISAF PRTs in Afghanistan.41 All official reports from PRTs to ISAF HQ were expected to be joint, i.e., Civil-Military, political/diplomatic, and development sections included. Such reports were then used by the ISAF Civil-Military Fusion Center to brief COMISAF, NATO HQ, UNAMA, and other interested parties.
Unity of Effort
Joint Publication 1 (JP 1), Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, notes that “command is central to all military action, and unity of command is central to unity of effort.” JP 1 further defines unity of command as meaning “all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose,” and describes unity of effort as an “essential complement to unity of command, requiring coordination through cooperation and common interests.”42 During multinational/interagency operations such as OEF, involving forces from multiple contributing countries and thousands of government officials and NGO/IO representatives, unity of command is difficult at best.
Responsibility and authority for PRT civilians regarding finances, assessments, and assignments remained with their respective agency’s national headquarters in Kabul. And although PRT military commanders reported to their Regional Commanders, who, in turn, reported to HQ ISAF, DoS PRT Field Service Officers reported directly to the Department of State PRT Office in Kabul. USAID PRT representatives, on the other hand, reported to RC-level Development Advisors, who then reported to the USAID Civil-Military Affairs headquarters also in Kabul. This stovepipe style PRT management structure demanded strong commitments to a unity of effort philosophy, since unity of command was essentially impossible.
Some historians have suggested that the PRT initiative in Afghanistan be organized in a manner similar to the US Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) counterinsurgency/pacification program established during the Vietnam War and described above in Chapter 3. With CORDS, the civilian Deputy for Pacification served with the rank of Ambassador and reported directly, similar to a component commander, to the Commanding General Military Assistance Command Vietnam (COMACV). Nearly all pacification programs in Vietnam – essentially identical to those programs carried out by PRTs during OEF – fell under the CORDS’ umbrella. Each US Military Corps Commander – similar to RC Commanders in Afghanistan – had a deputy for CORDS who managed corps-level pacification programs that spread throughout all 44 Vietnamese provinces. COMACV was therefore responsible for the entire US pacification effort in Vietnam; however, his Deputy for Pacification managed all of the CORDS programs, thereby establishing sound “civil-military integration” and genuine unity of command.43
A similar structural arrangement for pacification may be feasible for implementation by ISAF in Afghanistan. For example, a NATO or United Nations Ambassador for Provincial Stability and Reconstruction could be assigned to report directly to COMISAF. Each of the five RC commanders might then have a civilian deputy for provincial stability and reconstruction, who would oversee all of the PRTs in a particular RC AO. PRT leaders could be civilian or military depending upon the area security situation and report to the deputy for provincial stability and reconstruction at the RC headquarters. Under this scenario, COMISAF would become responsible for the comprehensive PRT effort in Afghanistan, while the ISAF Ambassador for Provincial Stability and Reconstruction would manage all of the PRT programs and projects.
As of mid-2010, however, unity of effort not unity of command, are the watchwords for PRT operations in Afghanistan. The Center for Army Lessons Learned notes that unity of effort should be pervasive, flowing up, down, and sideways through differing chains of command, and thereby improving the odds of success for PRT plans and programs. Divergent priorities among the numerous military organizations, civilian agencies, and contributing nations may undermine PRT goals and objectives and contribute ultimately to mission incompletion or outright failure. Thus, the often fragile, yet symbiotic, relationship between the military and civilian PRT components must be skillfully and continuously nurtured by experienced PRT leaders. Understanding each other’s roles, planning together, and working together interdependently, are critical factors for PRT personnel in both forging unity of effort and accomplishing the PRT mission.44
ISAF cites two case studies, one describing unity of effort, the other disunity. A PRT in northern Afghanistan had sufficient funding, but not the necessary expertise to implement a certain project. An NGO operating in the region agreed to initiate the project if the PRT paid for it and if PRT personnel agreed not to visit the project while NGO representatives were present at the site. With 24-hour notice PRT members could inspect the project, but only after NGO staff had withdrawn from the area. The PRT also agreed not to publicize or otherwise advertise its involvement in the project. The PRT leadership kept its word, military and civilian separation was maintained, and the project was successfully completed to the ultimate benefit of local Afghan citizens.
The second example involves the Ministry of Agriculture’s national livestock vaccination strategy for Afghanistan. Supported with international funding, an NGO in southern Afghanistan established a series of veterinary field offices staffed by paravets – the equivalent of community health workers, but for animals – to implement the MoA vaccination program. The NGO set paravets up in business, provided them with all the necessary equipment, and paid them a stipend to get started. Local farmers then paid the paravets a small fee for vaccinating their animals. The intent was to grow the vaccination business throughout the province, for paravets to become self-sufficient, and for the NGO to drawdown its support. Unfortunately, local military forces operating in the area began offering free animal vaccinations to the farmers. Providing free vaccinations violated the terms and condition of the MoA national livestock strategy and also undermined sustainable livelihood opportunities for paravets. Furthermore, importing drugs by entities other than the MoA and one designated NGO was illegal in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the military moved forward with its own vaccination project, despite official NGO protests. Two years of NGO efforts – building the paravet network and opening veterinary field offices – were lost.45
Inside PRT Jalalabad
Testimony of Michelle Parker, former USAID Field Program Officer at PRT Jalalabad, provides a more in-depth analysis of successful unity of effort operations. As the capital of Nangarhar Province and situated in fertile farmland along the main supply route between Kabul and the Khyber Pass, Jalalabad is the economic center of eastern Afghanistan. Prior to 9/11, Nangarhar, home to the large Pashtun and Pashai tribes, hosted an al-Qaeda training camp, then was the site of the battle of Tora Bora in December 2001, and subsequently became a prime region of Taliban resurgence. “As a PRT, we had to learn about our new home, its power brokers, its history, and its goals,” Parker told members of the House Armed Services Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee.46
The PRT at Jalalabad was organized in typical fashion with a core Command Group (CG) and various supporting elements. The CG was comprised of senior interagency representatives from DoD, DoS, USAID, and USDA, each of whom wore two hats involving allegiance to his or her parent agency, plus commitment to the specific goals/objectives of the Jalalabad PRT mission. A representative of the Ministry of Interior served as an advisor to the CG and as the liaison officer to the GIRoA. The PRT military commander met regularly with RC maneuver unit leaders to review impending plans and to ensure that respective operations did not conflict. Likewise, PRT civilian representatives coordinated with their higher headquarters to verify that local plans were consistent with agency/department strategic policy. Roughly 90 members served at PRT Jalalabad, which also hired more than 100 local Afghans as interpreters and for maintenance and support services. The overall PRT mission at Jalalabad included three components intended to bring stability and security to Nangarhar province: (1) assist the GIRoA extend it authority, (2) enable security sector reform efforts, and (3) enable reconstruction and development efforts.47 In her testimony, Parker cited the ISAF description of stability, i.e. establishing government and governance in a conflict or post-conflict environment; gaining control over the legitimate use of force; increasing the de facto legitimacy and effectiveness of government; providing essential services; and building a connection to the population.48
The PRT at Jalalabad was “not a physical structure,” Parker told Congress, “it was a platform for components of National Security to coordinate larger political missions, while jointly developing and implementing a targeted stability operation.”49 The military concentrated on security, USAID developed government and private sector institutions, and DoS addressed the intricate Afghan political situation. Each component needed the other two in order to successfully accomplish the US mission in Afghanistan. “The PRT’s unique value lay in how it integrated the mission of each National Security component,” Parker continued, and “by creating a unity of effort that maximizes each component’s core competency the United States stands a greater chance of success.”50
The ISAF military presence at PRT Jalalabad consisted of a Lieutenant Colonel who served as the Military Commander, Majors or Captains as leaders of the Civil Affairs “A” and “B” Teams, and a Captain as Force Protection Commander. In addition to security and force protection, the military component was responsible for providing food, shelter, transportation, communications, logistics, and medical care for all PRT members. During her tour as USAID Field Program Officer for Jalalabad, Parker traveled outside the wire on more than 500 PRT missions, for which the security, transportation, and logistics support were planned and carried out by PRT Force Protection Soldiers from the US Army National Guard. These same Soldiers also trained local Afghan security forces and conducted joint patrols with them.51
US Army Reserve Soldiers were responsible for implementing the Jalalabad PRT Civil Affairs (CA) mission. “A” Team members traveled regularly throughout Nangarhar Province, documenting citizen needs and gathering information from Afghan community leaders and government officials. The CA “B” Team worked closer to Jalalabad, meeting and collaborating with Afghan officials, NGOs, and IOs to address and resolve provincial problems. “B” Team’s leader also analyzed and assessed the provincial data retrieved from the field by “A” Team. Both CA Teams coordinated their activities with GIRoA officials, funded and managed local projects, and hired local Afghans to perform the work.52
Parker also provided the following detailed description of the duties and responsibilities of the Jalalabad PRT Military Commander: to manage what was essentially a small combined joint task force; to plan and execute tactical missions; to oversee information operations, Civil Affairs activities, public affairs, and the Police Training Advisory Team; to engage, mentor, and advise the Nangarhar provincial leadership on security issues; to help unify Afghan security elements and clarify their roles and responsibilities; to act as the primary liaison between the US Military and the Afghan government; to approve all military-funded projects; and to assume ultimate responsibility for all PRT operations (security, life support, and logistics) in support of the PRT mission. Lieutenant Colonel James Ruf, Jalalabad PRT Commander during Parker’s tenure, also met regularly with tribal elders, university students, and provincial religious leaders. These relationships proved beneficial in quelling violence during the May 2005 Jalalabad riots over the alleged desecration of a Quran at the Guantanamo Bay military prison. Ruf and the PRT staff subsequently helped rebuild Jalalabad’s largest mosque as a token of US respect for Islam.53 Finally, Parker noted a subtle distinction in the definitions of “PRT Commander” and “Military Commander.” In US PRTs, the Military Commander was the PRT Commander. However, in NATO/ISAF PRTs, the Military Commander was simply the Military Commander, since he had authority over PRT civilians in security matters only, but not in matters involving agency/department plans, programs, or activities.54
Lieutenant Colonel Ruf lamented the fact that he had not been trained for his job as Jalalabad PRT Commander and had only a two-day right-seat/left-seat overlap with his predecessor. There was no pre-command type PRT course and no in-country orientation. “Basically zero training as a PRT Commander…it was just go down there [Jalalabad] and try to do some good things,” Ruf explained.55 After arriving in Jalalabad, Ruf established a security commission and brought liaison officers from all the security elements in the province to the PRT for weekly working group meetings. The security situation in Nangarhar improved dramatically from just four up to 16 permissive districts by the time Ruf re-deployed. Between 20-30 NGOs and IOs were operating in Nangarhar Province during Ruf’s tour. PRT Jalalabad enjoyed a strong working relationship with and occasionally provided funding for several medical organizations, such as the International Foundation of Hope and the private humanitarian assistance corporation, DAI. Ruf re-emphasized that no two PRTs were alike and the “one size fits all” concept was not appropriate for Afghan PRTs. “We need to match the manning with the requirements,” he said.56 Finally, Lieutenant Colonel Ruf recommended that PRT Command Groups form stateside, then train together, and deploy together thereby creating a more cohesive team effort. The PRT management team should “come over as one group, i.e. they’re identified, they’re assembled, they’re trained, and then they’re deployed…and the next group comes over the same way,” Ruf further explained.57
With regard to Parker’s specific duties, she advised the CG on Nangarhar Province development issues, managed USAID PRT funding, and when necessary sought support from USAID headquarters in Kabul. For example, she helped the Civil Affairs team obtain the approved design criteria from the Afghan Ministry of Education (MoE) for a new school in Nangarhar, coordinated the project with the Afghan Director of Education in Jalalabad, and made certain that the school was officially added to the MoE construction schedule. Parker and a staff of four also managed the Jalalabad USAID Field Office that was responsible for nearly $100 million in projects and programs for Nangarhar during her tenure. Significant projects included the Afghanistan Immediate Needs and the comprehensive Alternative Livelihood Programs, both of which helped reduce poppy production in the province. She also advised USAID Kabul concerning national programs that impacted Nangarhar, such as the Jalalabad branch of the Champion Technical Training Center that improved the “livelihood prospects for residents of Afghanistan through training programs and capacity building of the Afghan construction industry.”58 Finally, PRT Jalalabad assisted the GIRoA with Presidential and Parliamentary elections, hired thousands of Afghans for counter-narcotics projects, helped the Afghan government fund programs to prevent Taliban infiltration and smuggling activities, and supported a diverse group of local US military organizations, including Explosive Ordinance Disposal Teams, Police Training and Advisory Teams, Embedded Training Teams, Psychological Operations Teams, Fuel Re-supply Teams, a Helicopter Medical Evacuation Team (Task Force Saber), and US Marines from the 3d Marine Regiment .59
Each senior agency/department representative at the Jalalabad Command Group functioned as a co-equal PRT partner. This arrangement permitted the respective representatives to both work on agency issues in Nangarhar Province as well as participate as a team member on specific projects and programs that supported the Jalalabad PRT mission. Flexible funding procedures allowed PRT members to quickly resolve minor issues before they developed into larger, potentially unmanageable, problems. Dedicated force protection facilitated freedom of movement that was a critical factor in PRT Jalalabad’s success. And, whereas the PRT planned, developed, and funded stability and reconstruction projects in Nangarhar, this role should be slowly assumed by the GIRoA. Citizens of the province should begin turning to their own government, not the PRT, for security, governance, and essential services.60
Parker suggested strengthening civil-military integration within the chains of command of each agency by assigning military advisors to USAID and DoS headquarters facilities and, conversely, by placing USAID and DoS liaison personnel at brigade, division, and corps levels. Also, although the PRT military component was responsible for security operations, CERP funding could not be used for security-related projects. This forced the military to concentrate on funding reconstruction/development initiatives that were the forte of the PRT USAID team. And since USAID funding procedures were long, drawn-out, and cumbersome, the USAID Field Program Officer at the PRT did not have access to immediately available, CERP-like, flexible funding for short-term, tactical level, assistance projects. Similarly, DoS contractors who were training Afghan National Police and Afghan Border Police in Nangarhar Province failed to coordinate their activities with the PRT Jalalabad Military contingent that also had local responsibility for security sector reform. In some instances, both the PRT and the DoS contractor were providing advisors to the same Afghan Police units. Finally, to better understand the issues affecting local Afghans, Parker recommended increasing the numbers of PRT Civil Affairs Teams and embedding USAID representatives with them.61
In 2008, the 935th Agribusiness Development Team (ADT) from the Missouri Army National Guard joined PRT Jalalabad to help expand and improve agriculture and supplant poppy production in Nangarhar Province. “The agriculture piece is a viable alternative to poppy growing,” 935th commander Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Allison told the American Forces Press Service, Afghan farmers were growing wheat, onions, and other viable crops, “but it’s not a quick fix…it takes time for crops to grow, and in some rural areas, irrigation is a problem,” he added.62 In a video teleconference, Lieutenant Colonel Allison and PRT commander at the time, Major Cliffton Cornell, briefed US President George W. Bush and Afghan President Hamid Karzai on PRT Jalalabad accomplishments:
- Approximately 100,000 Afghans have returned to the province in 2008;
- This year, Nangarhar was declared poppy-free by the United Nations office of Drugs and Crime – dropping from almost 20,000 hectares in 2007;
- All 22 districts in Nangarhar have all-weather paved roads connecting to the main highway;
- Nangarhar is now one of the most productive agricultural regions in Afghanistan, and the PRT is working to expand and improve irrigation networks;
- The PRT supports work on roads and bridge construction, schools, government buildings, watershed management, and market infrastructure, and;
- The Nangarhar PRT is providing micro-grants to small businesses and enabling them to re-open and expand, restocking inventory, restoring business equipment, and hiring employees.63
Following the teleconference, President Bush acknowledged the work of all Provincial Reconstruction Team members, past and present, in Afghanistan, noting that PRTs comprise “a central part of the counterinsurgency strategy which combines economic development, education, and infrastructure with security, all aimed to help this young democracy not only survive, but to thrive, so that it never becomes a safe haven for those who would do us harm.”64 US Senator Christopher Bond visited the 935th ADT in Jalalabad to observe their accomplishments first-hand. He later praised his fellow Missourians, remarking that “one of the best remedies to terrorism is a paycheck and by helping Afghan farmers develop skills to support their families, Missourians are contributing to not only rural development, but to a stable Afghanistan.”65
Similarly successful results were reported from PRT Asadabad in Kunar Province. PRT members increased economic development, rebuilt infrastructure, and hired Afghan expatriates to help strengthen community outreach and improve provincial government capacity. Major John Barfels, Asadabad PRT Commander, and Bruce Dubee, PRT Agricultural Advisor briefed the following achievements:
- Small businesses have flourished – Kunar Province’s main marketplace now has more than 600 stores, up from 100 just three years ago;
- The PRT has constructed 16 schools, 20 medical clinics, and 8 district centers;
- The PRT completed 13 roads and 11 bridges;
- The Jalalabad-Asmar and Pech River roads have dramatically cut travel times and connected two provincial centers of commerce with Jalalabad;
- Kunar Province now has cell phone service, and;
- Kunar was declared poppy-free in the United Nations Office of Drug and Crime 2007 report.66
In acknowledging the accomplishments of PRTs Jalalabad and Asadabad, and in praising the success of the entire PRT program in general, President Bush expressed the following:
We’re using Provincial Reconstruction Teams of military and civilian experts to help local communities fight corruption, improve governance, and jumpstart their economies. We’re using Agricultural Development Teams to help afghan farmers feed their people and become more self-sufficient…in all these ways, we’re working to ensure that our military progress is accompanied by the political and economic gains that are critical to the success of a free Afghanistan.67
PRT Bagram - Afghans Doing More
PRT Bagram (also known as PRT Parwan) initially covered two Afghan provinces, Parwan and Kapisa. PRT Commander Major Charles Westover, 364th Civil Affairs Brigade, US Army Reserve, described his mandate as extending the authority of the GIRoA. “We looked to Kabul for their national and regional programs, Westover said, “then we tried to reinforce that by having face to face encounters with the local government…so I dealt with two governors, two police chiefs, and various other local authorities.”68 One of Westover’s first successful projects, therefore, was the expansion and refurbishment of governmental administrative offices in the Dandar District, using Afghan labor. Getting the “different ministries and departments working together helps solidify the government in the eyes of the people,” he explained. “And because we use local contractors, they hire locals to do the work…creating jobs for Afghans in the community.”69
Early on, PRT Bagram was involved in more than 150 local projects – building schools, providing ambulances for clinics, assisting with a women’s cultural center, and opening parks for children. “We had a very synergistic happenstance,” Major Westover said in describing the excellent working relationship he enjoyed with the DoS and USAID representatives, and an Afghan police colonel assigned to the PRT. “We didn’t have cross purposes…and we worked well [together] dealing with the Afghan people,” he added.70 Westover was particularly pleased when Afghans began doing projects on their own, as was the case in Parwan Province where the Governor refurbished a fire station using his own funding and Afghan labor, all without US assistance. In other instances, Westover used CERP funding for projects that were recommended by locals, vetted and approved by the GIRoA in Kabul, and then sanctioned by the provincial governor before work could begin. These projects, therefore, were compatible with the Afghan national building and reconstruction strategy. “What we didn’t want to do was build projects in a vacuum,” he said.71 He lamented the fact that CERP funding was for non-recurring expenses only.72 The PRT could build a clinic, but not purchase the medical supplies needed to run it. Westover could buy a generator to power the clinic, however local Afghans or the clinic management would be responsible for maintaining and providing fuel for the generator. Overall the concept was laudable – “we would get a project going, then Afghans would take over and operate it themselves…we wanted [Afghans to take ownership], Westover explained.”73
Major Westover enjoyed a cooperative, if generally neutral, relationship with the dozens of NGOs working in Parwan and Kapisa Provinces. “Some European Union NGOs would never accept the activities of a military PRT. They had the opinion that we were causing more problems than we were fixing,” he said.74 A Scandinavian NGO, for example, abandoned a school project in the region due to the presence of PRT Soldiers. Westover tried to ensure all NGOs that they were welcome in the PRT area and that he was not competing with them for projects. The PRT’s storefront Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) dealt with day-to-day NGO requests and inquiries, and on occasion, UNAMA representatives would help mediate minor PRT/NGO disputes.
PRT Bagram was not deeply involved in provincial rule-of-law issues, i.e., Afghan police, courts, or prisons. Local Afghan leaders relied on village elder-type court systems involving Jirgas and Shura Councils to mete out justice. “The PRT…wasn’t involved in any judicial activities whatsoever. The idea [was] supporting whatever system would work as long as it didn’t become violent or unfair,” Major Westover pointed out.75 Finally, Westover suggested that PRTs be co-commanded by an Afghan leader and a US military commander, with shared responsibilities. Such an arrangement would accelerate the ultimate turnover of authority and responsibility – Afghans, not Americans, addressing and solving Afghanistan’s problems. This particular recommendation, however, fell on deaf ears. Westover nevertheless believed that “putting an Afghan solution on a problem was the way to make things work long-term.”76
PRT Ghazni - Improving Conditions in rural Areas
Colonel Gerald Timoney, PRT Ghazni commander, initiated a series of quick impact projects in an effort to counter a local Taliban resurgence and to gain the allegiance of Afghan citizens. The principal role of the PRT, Timoney explained, “was to win over the people of Ghazni Province, to support the GIRoA, to improve relations with Coalition Forces, to isolate the Taliban and al-Qaeda from the populace, and to beat [the Taliban] by winning the hearts and minds of the people.”77 Timoney concentrated on improving conditions in the rural areas, whereas his predecessor, Colonel Steven Ford had successfully transformed government and business operations at the Ghazni provincial center. PRT personnel met with village elders, held sick-call, and provided school supplies in remote districts. Colonel Timoney felt that in some cases he was “probably dealing with the Taliban, but they would say ‘yes, yes, come in here and treat our people’”78
PRT Ghazni skillfully employed information operations – radio and television – to publicize the Afghan presidential elections and promote the merits of the democratic process. Timoney also traded food for illegal weapons. A former Hazara mujahedin chief brought in a truckload of heavy weapons that he exchanged for American rations, fuel, rice, sugar, and salt for his village. US Military Police attached to PRT Ghazni, attempted to train rural Afghan police, however rampant corruption prevented the program from gaining traction. Afghan political leaders up and down the chain of command were skimming police funds, village policemen shook-down merchants, and the highway patrol set up illegal checkpoints and exacted exorbitant tolls. We’re “trying to build a nation which hasn’t existed,” Colonel Timoney lamented, “it works on tribal law…it’s the most backward country on the planet…and here we are expecting too much too quickly.”79
During Timoney’s tour as Commander PRT Ghazni, USAID and USDA funding was limited, having been diverted to poppy eradication and alternative livelihood program in other provinces. After the Southern European Task Force (SETAF) replaced the 25th Infantry Division as the lead headquarters for CJTF-76 in 2005, SETAF began micromanaging PRT programs to Colonel Timoney’s consternation. “We had to justify everything…all projects had to be approved…SETAF controlled all the money and [said] we know what’s best…it was rough,” Timoney bemoaned.80 Also, MSF (Doctors without Borders) withdrew from Ghazni Province because of the presence of PRT Soldiers. According to Colonel Timoney, “they refused to work with [us]…they didn’t give us a chance to work with them…they just left in protest because the military was there.”81
Timoney was personally responsible, however, for the much-publicized story of Khan Mohammad, the three-year old Afghan boy who was born with a severe cleft palate. At Colonel Timoney’s behest, Doctors Dallas Homas and John Caulfield, both US Army Colonels with the 325th Combat Support Hospital at Bagram, successfully reconstructed Khan’s palate and lip. Cheering Afghans lined the streets when Khan returned to his Pashtun village. “To perform this surgery was very gratifying”, Colonel Caulfield said reflecting his favorite part of Operation Enduring Freedom – helping others.82 Of everything I did as Ghazni PRT Commander, “that was my personal favorite,” Timoney acknowledged. “I’m not saying everybody loved us, especially in some of the real fundamentalist Pashtun areas. But as they got to know us, they knew when we came through that we were looking to make their lives better…we were the good guys,” he added.83
Ineffective governance and corruption persisted in Ghazni Province. Four successive governors held the office between 2006 and 2008. Nearly half of Ghazni Province’s 19 district governors also left office. In an effort to improve provincial governance, PRT Ghazni assigned several US Military Officers as mentors to government leaders and to the Provincial Council. US Navy Commander Scott Cooledge, Ghazni PRT commander in 2007-2008, extended the mentorship program to the districts and stiffened PRT administrative procedures – more competitive bidding and enhance quality control – designed to curb corruption. In 2007, reconstruction and development funding increased significantly for both large and small-scale projects in Ghazni. More than 50% of project spending supported roadway improvement work.84
PRT personnel, along with the Ghazni Province health minister and a local NGO, placed renewed emphasis on provincial public health by funding an emergency room for the Ghazni hospital, refurbishing district clinics, and providing health care training for interested/qualified Afghans. According to Navy Lieutenant Keith Hoekman, Ghazni PRT Medical Officer, “the project not only expanded emergency care, it increased the capacity of the hospital to provide full-spectrum health care to its patients, especially care associated with pregnancy and birth.”85 Also, during bimonthly medical outreach visits to remote districts, PRT members established short-term treatment facilities and trained village health care workers.86
PRTs Herat and Farah in RC West
Before assuming command of Combined Task Force Longhorn and Regional Command West in Herat, US Army Reserve Colonel Phillip Bookert served as director of the Civil-Military Affairs section (CJ9) of CJTF-76. Bookert was responsible for the four western provinces of Afghanistan – Herat, Farah, Badghis, and Ghowr – and for PRTs Herat and Farah. CTF Longhorn was comprised of one US combat battalion and three Afghan battalions. "My team has laid the foundation for sustained growth and stability in western Afghanistan,” Bookert told the American Forces Press Service. "With our support, the provincial governors from all four western provinces came together for the first time to discuss issues facing their communities, thus strengthening the region and indicating their priorities for reconstruction and economic development."87 The PRTs were responsible for reconstruction, economic development, and coordinating various activities with provincial and district governors, Afghan police, religious leaders, and tribal elders in their respective provinces.
Because of severe drought in western Afghanistan, water resource management was a high priority for the PRTs Herat and Farah, followed closely by electricity, transportation, road construction, health, education, and women’s rights issues. Staff at PRT Herat fluctuated between 82 and 92, and included a four to six squad security element, two Civil-Military Operations Teams, representatives from DoS, USAID, USDA, and the GIRoA MOI, 12 interpreters, plus a variety of support personnel. Both PRTs worked with approximately 40 NGOs operating in the two provinces. PRT staffs made determined efforts to visit every district in order to establish a US presence, extend the reach of the GIRoA, and to demonstrate to the citizens that they were there to assist them. “Most places had never seen anyone from Kabul and when the Ministry of Interior representative would go out on these missions, that to the locals was a big deal…that someone from the central government took the time to come out to their district in an area as remote as RC West,” Colonel Bookert explained.88
Construction engineers attached to the PRTs monitored the work of Afghan construction companies to ensure adherence to PRT quality control standards. US Military Police Technical Assistance Teams, also attached to the PRTs, assessed and trained district level Afghan police forces. Also, the assistance of PRT USDA representatives was invaluable in helping the nomadic population in rural, drought-stricken, western Afghanistan care for their animals and irrigated their farms.89
Colonel Hookert particularly appreciated the assistance received from the DoS Officers at PRTs Heart and Farah. “They were far more experienced in dealing with government officials that I was,” he said, adding “there were times when the Department of State representative would have meetings with provincial governors or mayors and were able to get information from them that I never would have gotten; plus they had a direct link to Ambassador [Khalizad’s] office which had a direct link back to Washington,”90 DoS political savvy was also beneficial when CTF Longhorn transitioned authority for PRT Herat to Italian military officials in March 2005. Since the Italian PRT was to be staffed entirely by active duty military personnel, with no civilian or diplomatic expertise, Colonel Hookert’s team developed a detailed transition plan to train the Italians how to run a PRT. Subsequently, the Herat PRT under Italian control became larger – a staff of 124 including a Special Forces element. Due to the relatively permissive security environment in Herat and Farah Provinces, local investment and private economic development began to thrive during Colonel Bookert’s tenure in RC West. “As provincial governors and their staffs become more adept at providing government services and reconstruction and development increases, then [we] can start removing the PRTs…a sign of success is a PRT working itself out of a job and the GIRoA taking over that mission,” Colonel Bookert said, concluding his United States Institute of Peace interview.91
USIP and USAID Assessments
During testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, US expert on PRT operations, Dr. Robert Perito, restated the PRT mission in Afghanistan: “to help extend the authority of the Afghan government into the provinces in order to develop a stable and secure environment, enable security sector reform and economic and social development…all PRTs concentrate on three essential functions – governance, reconstruction, and security.”92 Perito noted however that the various PRT organizations differed widely, particularly since NATO and coalition partners began assuming PRT responsibility for previously US-led sites. Above and beyond the general mission statement, there was little agreement “within the US government and between the US and its allies on how PRTs should be organized, conduct operations, or what they should accomplish…actual decisions on priorities and programs reflected local conditions along with national priorities of participating governments,” Perito testified.93 Additional problematic PRT issues were addressed by Perito, such as the fact that PRT member personalities often influenced operations, priorities changed with successive staff rotations, US civilian agencies were unable to furnish sufficient personnel, and the dual chain of command, with DoD handling security and DoS responsible for politics, governance, and economics, often proved inefficient.94
In further testimony, Dr. Perito offered four conclusions/recommendations regarding PRT operations in Afghanistan. Pointing out that improvisation is not a concept of operations, Perito first recommended that PRTs have an agreed upon concept, a standardized organizational structure, and a single chain of command. Next, he noted that stability operations is not a game for pick up teams and admonished US civilian agencies to staff PRTs with trained and qualified teams of experts rather than relying on contractors and US Military Reservists to fill the void. Thirdly, Perito voiced his concern that silence is not an effective information operations strategy. The quantity, features, benefits, and results of PRT programs are not adequately publicized, particularly among the Afghan population. Finally, he called for uniform PRT objectives and for appropriate metrics for measuring PRT performance and effectiveness.95
In an interagency assessment of the Afghanistan PRT program, USAID reached many of the same conclusions as did Dr. Perito. A lack of explicit guidance and a common political vision, military commanders excluding non-DoD team members from decision-making processes, staffing shortages, limited combined team training, and an insufficient alignment of PRT programs with the national Afghan stabilization and reconstruction strategy, were some of the discrepancies addressed in the USAID report. The assessment clearly stated, however, that PRTs served the vital role of providing humanitarian assistance in rural, Taliban-infested, areas where NGOs were unable or unwilling to operate. To expedite PRT projects, USAID recommended that civilian representative have access to dedicated funding provided by his or her parent agency, in order to avoid interagency borrowing. “The PRT concept was at a transition point,” USAID concluded, noting that refinements were necessary for PRTs to truly “offer an effective tool for stabilization and regional reconstruction tied to USG national programs and efforts.”96
PRTS and the US Afghanistan Strategic Review
Violence in Afghanistan increased dramatically in 2006, despite the presence of approximately 30,000 US Troops and a comparable number of NATO/ISAF forces. Resilient Taliban insurgents had staged a successful resurgence. Setbacks throughout 2008, such as the attack on the Serena Hotel in Kabul, the bombing at the Indian Embassy, another assassination attempt on President Karzai, and the Sariposa prison break in Kandahar, prompted Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Admiral Mike Mullen to speculate “I’m not sure we’re winning” in Afghanistan.97 Chairman Mullen’s concerns were echoed by research professor Thomas Johnson of the Naval Postgraduate School and Senior Fellow M. Chris Mason at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies, who suggested that the Coalition was fighting the war “according to the Taliban game plan,” and thereby “losing the war in Afghanistan one Pashtun village at a time.”98 Eventually, CENTCOM commander, General David Petraeus, described Afghanistan as the “graveyard of empires,” noted a marked deterioration in the war, and cautioned NATO allies of a “downward spiral of security” in the country.99 Finally, statistical measures of the enemy resurgence grew substantially in 2008. Overall Taliban-initiated attacks were up by fifty-five percent over 2007, small arms attacks increased by thirty-three percent, surface-to-air fire increased sixty-seven percent, and IED incidents and suicide bombings rose 106 percent and twenty-one percent, respectively, in 2008.100
Both DoD and NATO conducted comprehensive Afghanistan strategy reviews during 2008, which President Obama subsequently incorporated into his first review of the war in March 2009. In announcing his comprehensive new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, President Obama noted the following:
Our troops have fought bravely against a ruthless enemy. Our civilians have made great sacrifices. Our allies have borne a heavy burden. Afghans have suffered and sacrificed for their future. But for six years, Afghanistan has been denied the resources that it demands because of the war in Iraq. Now, we must make a commitment that can accomplish our goals.101
The President’s strategy called for six new policy elements, including developing an obtainable objective, taking a regional approach, building Afghan capacity, increasing ANSF training, using all aspects of national power, and increasing international support.102
After Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal replaced General David McKiernan as ISAF Commander in June 2009, he conducted his own assessment, which called for a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy, protection of the Afghan people, and 44,000 US combat forces in addition to the 21,000 that President Obama approved in March. McChrystal’s report prompted the Obama Administration to undertake a second top-level review of US involvement in Afghanistan. In a speech to the United States Corps of Cadets at the US Military Academy on 1 December 2009, the President presented his “New Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” The principal goals of the revised strategy included:
- Reversing Taliban momentum through sustained military action,
- Denying the Taliban access to and control of key population and production centers and lines of communications,
- Disrupting the Taliban outside secure areas and preventing al-Qaeda from regaining sanctuary in Afghanistan,
- Degrading the Taliban to levels manageable by the Afghanistan National Security Forces,
- Increasing the size and capability of the Afghanistan National Security Force and employing other local forces selectively to begin a conditions-based transition of security responsibility to the Afghan government by July 2011, and
- Supporting US government efforts to build the capacity of the Afghan government, particularly in key ministries.103
Several subcontexts of President Obama’s strategy impacted Civil-military Operations and the PRT program in Afghanistan. For example, the new plan ensured that the ISAF commander was both the NATO commander and commander of all US Forces. ISAF also established an Intermediate Joint Command to concentrate exclusively on counterinsurgency campaign, created another Joint Task Force for detainee operations, opened a Force Reintegration Cell to facilitate the Afghan national reconciliation process, and developed a Joint Information Operations Task Force for strategic communications. In August 2009, the US Chief of Mission and the Commander US Forces-Afghanistan published a revised Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan that focused renewed emphasis on the Afghan People. The plan was a collaborative effort of all the departments, agencies, and entities operating in Afghanistan and stressed the following core principals: (1) Afghan leadership, Afghan capacity, Afghan sustainability; (2) Increased action at all levels; (3) Unity of effort; (4) Close collaboration with the international community; (5) Visible and measurable progress, and; (6) accountability and transparency.104 President Obama committed an additional 30,000 US troops for Afghanistan – NATO and coalition partners added 9,000 more – with the intention of stopping the Taliban, securing the Afghan people, and building the legitimacy of the GIRoA.105
In January 2010, the US Department of State issued its own plan – Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy – reaffirming that the United States would “remain politically, diplomatically, and economically engaged in Afghanistan and Pakistan for the long-term to protect our enduring interests in the region.”106 Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and lead author of the DoS plan, described a “civilian surge/civilian uplift,” noting that the number of civilian advisors in Afghanistan would rise to more than 1,000 in 2010.107 District Support Teams (DST) and District Working Groups would serve outside Kabul, working at local levels to stabilize the area and help build the capacity of Afghan institutions. As of 20 March 2010, 32 DSTs, comprised of 3-5 civilian representatives, were embedded with forward-deployed combat units in Afghanistan.108 Finally, under a new joint DoS-DoD Interagency Provincial Affairs initiative, which focuses primarily on civilian issues, DoS and USAID posted senior-level officials to oversee governance and development in RC South and RC East, respectively.109
Kenneth Katzman, PRT expert and Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, reported in March 2010 that as increased numbers of senior level DoS officers join PRTs in Afghanistan, the name may be changed to “Interagency Provincial Affairs” offices, thereby reflecting the “civilianization” of the previously military-oriented PRT concept. DoD, DoS, and USAID were also studying the possibility of converting the lead in US PRTs from a military officer to a civilian representative. As of 2010, ISAF controlled all PRTs in Afghanistan, including those led by the United States. PRTs in Helmand, Kandahar, Paktika, and Zabul Provinces were co-located with US military bases and outposts, reflecting the emphasis on security operations in southern Afghanistan. Although some NGOs continued to argue that PRTs compromised their perceived neutrality or delayed Afghans’ assuming responsibility for themselves, US and partner-nation officials “generally praised the effectiveness of PRTs” and considered them “key to implementing US and international policy to build governance in Afghanistan,” Katzman reported.110
The 2010 PRT Conference in Kabul
At the 2010 Provincial Reconstruction Team Conference held in Kabul on 16 and 17 March, Mark Ward, Special Advisor to the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan, outlined his vision for the future of PRTs. Ward believed that Afghans should be in-the-lead on more important initiatives, and he reiterated the point that “PRTs are interim structures to be dismantled when they have fulfilled their mission…our main goal is to leave…that is the future we see for PRTs.”111 This notion is consistent with the following conclusion regarding PRTs drawn by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) in 2007:
PRTs exist to help the host nation’s government gain a monopoly over the use of force through an increase of legitimacy and effectiveness. The PRT must utilize each component of national power – diplomatic, economic, and military – to achieve this goal with an understanding that the human terrain dictates which element has the lead in any given intervention. Every activity the PRT undertakes must be in support of stability. The PRT mission is complete when sustainable stability is achieved. At that time, the PRT can then be dismantled.112
Originally, “PRTs were the only game in town,” Ward continued.113 As of 2010, however, the Afghan government should be managing more PRT-type projects on their own, particularly in relatively secure provinces where the GIRoA has established a reasonable presence. Ward also advised PRT members to begin developing transition plans for turning PRTs over entirely to the Afghans.
To date, 22,000 PRT-financed projects have been undertaken in Afghanistan and $1.2 billion was allocated for US PRT governance and development projects in FY 2010. The vast majority of PRT projects, however, involve short-term local work that Afghans could now be performing themselves. Ward suggested that a portion of PRT funding be turned over to the GIRoA to help finance its National Solidarity Program, which was created in 2003 by the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development to empower rural Afghan communities to identify, plan, manage, and monitor their own development projects.114 PRTs could then play a supporting role, but “Afghans would have the lead…the people would see their government getting things done,” Ward explained to the PRT Conference audience.115 The remainder of PRT funding could then be devoted to larger-scale, multi-year, projects that Afghans are incapable of performing.
In also addressing the 2010 PRT Conference, NATO Senior Civilian Representative, Ambassador Mark Sedwill from United Kingdom, distilled the often-cumbersome PRT mission statements to four words – regain, rebuild, reinforce, and resolve. Sedwill explained, “regain the initiative against the insurgents, rebuild and reinforce the Afghan government and military, and resolve political grievances that fuel the insurgency…those are the [four] ‘Rs’ that are key to the strategy over the next 18 months.”116 Lieutenant General David Rodriguez, host of the PRT conference, added his encouragement to the attendees noting “the challenges are many, but you can and will make a difference in the lives of the people by your diligent efforts…I wish you success in returning this country to the courageous and industrious people of Afghanistan.”117 Finally, Special Advisor Ward acknowledged the changing role of PRTs and the renewed partnership between ISAF, UNAMA, and the GIRoA. Resources must be used “more effectively to train and educate [Afghans] and to create an environment in which to build a sustainable Afghan-led future. If we do this right, all of you can go home sooner without worrying that you will have to come back someday,” Ward said in concluding his Conference remarks.118
1 Donald Wright et al, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM October 2001-September 2005 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), 223.
2 Ambassador James Dobbins, After the Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghanistan (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, Inc., 2008), 132-133.
3 Lieutenant Colonel Michael Stout, US Army War College Briefing cited in Donald Wright et al, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM October 2001-September 2005, 227.
4 United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-09-86R Report to Congress, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq, 1 October 2008, 3; ISAF, ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook (Kabul, Afghanistan: ISAF, 2009), 105-106.
5 Donald Wright et al, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM October 2001-September 2005, 227-228.
6 Major General John Vines, interview by Contemporary Operations Study Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 27 June 2007, 6.
7 ISAF, ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook (Kabul, Afghanistan: ISAF, 2009), 93.
8 Colonel Tucker Mansager, “Interagency Lessons Learned in Afghanistan,” Joint Force Quarterly, First Quarter 2006, 82.
9 The five pillars of the CFC-A Campaign Plan: 1. Defeat Terrorism and Deny Sanctuary, 2. Enable Afghan Security Structure, 3. Sustain Area Ownership, 4. Enable Reconstruction and Good Governance, 5. Engage Regional States; see Lieutenant General David Barno, “Fighting ‘the Other War’: Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan, 2003-2005,” Military Review (September-October 2007), 32-45.
10 Donald Wright et al, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM October 2001-September 2005, 247; Troop strength increased to 22,000 during 2004, see Briefing by Lieutenant General David Barno, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan,” USAID Speeches, Washington, DC, 15 December 2005, (accessed 22 July 2010).
11 Lieutenant General David Barno, interview by the US Army Center of Military History, 21 November 2006, 34.
12 ISAF, ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook (Kabul, Afghanistan: ISAF, 2009), 105-109.
13 Donald Wright et al, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM October 2001-September 2005, 255-256.
14 CFC-A also began assigning US Air Force and US Navy officers as commanders of US-led PRTs.
15 Stars and Stripes, “Eikenberry Ends Tenure as Head of CFC-Afghanistan,” Stars and Stripes, 23 January 2007, 1, (accessed 26 August 2010); LeeAnn Lloyd, “LTF-82 Bridges the Gap, Replaces 297th BSB as KAF Logistics Support,” 22d Mobile Public Affairs Detachment, 28 May 2007, 1, (accessed 26 August 2010).
16 NATO/OTAN, “ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Teams,” 29 April 2009, 1, (accessed 30 May 2010); Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress (Washington, DC: SIGAR, 30 July 2010), 76; ISAF, ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook (Kabul, Afghanistan: ISAF, 2009), 92-97.
17 Donald Wright et al, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM October 2001-September 2005, 259.
18 Kenneth Katzman, RL30588 CRS Report for Congress, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and US Policy, 7 June 2010, 75-81; US Government Accountability Office, GAO-07-801SP Report to Congress, Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, May 2007, 21.
19 NATO/OTAN, Afghanistan Report 2009 (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2009), 34.
20 United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-09-86R Report to Congress, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq, 1 October 2008, 10-11.
[xxvii] United States Government Accountability Office, GAO-09-86R Report to Congress, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq, 11-12.
22 ISAF, ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook (Kabul, Afghanistan: ISAF, 2009), 2-3.
23 ISAF, ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook, 4-6.
24 ISAF, ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook, 6-8.
25 ISAF, ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook, 8-14.
26 NATO/OTAN, “NATO Military Command Structure,” Chief Public Affairs Officer, 2010, 1, (accessed 16 June 2010); NATO/OTAN, “Military Organization and Structures,” NATO Press Office, 10 August 2010, 1, (accessed 31 August 2010).
27 Ambassador Karl Eikenberry and General Stanley McChrystal, “Memorandum of Agreement,” 1, (accessed 25 July 2010).
28 Provincial Reconstruction Team Executive Steering Committee, “The Charter of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Executive Steering Committee,” December 2008, 1-5, (accessed 31 August 2010).
29 Matthew Swannell and Arnfinn Ruset, “ISAF PRT Orientation Course,” ISAF Mirror, 30 July 2006, 22, (accessed 28 July 2010).
30 Sjon Selles, “First ISAF PRT Course Held at the NATO School,” NATO School Public Information Office, 25 September 2006, 1, (accessed 1 September 2010).
31 James Derdall, “USJFCOM Support to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Training,” United States Joint Forces Command, 18 July 2007, 1, (accessed 1 September 2010).
32 Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, “Afghanistan Country Stability Picture (ACSP),” Afghanistan Research Newsletter, April 2007, 5, (accessed 1 September 2010).
33 NATO/OTAN, “The Civil-Military Fusion Center and Civil Military Overview-Ready When Disaster Strikes,” Allied Command Operations Public Affairs Office, 22 January 2010, 1, (accessed 1 September 2010).
34 US Department of State, 82d Airborne Division, US Agency for International Development, “Other USG Actors,” Briefing, 31 January 2008, Slides 1-5, (accessed 2 September 2010).
35 ISAF, ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook, 23.
36 ISAF, ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook, 24.
37 Security and force protection became the responsibility of the senior military PRT member if a civilian commanded the PRT.
38 ISAF, ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook, 24-25.
39 NATO, Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 4.10, Allied Joint Medical Support Doctrine (Brussels, Belgium: Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers Europe, 2002), 24; ISAF, ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook, 26-29.
40 ISAF, ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook, 30-31.
41 Laurent Zazzera and Daniel Dail, “CFC Weekly Newsletter-Afghanistan,” ISAF Civil-Military Fusion Center, 8 August 2008, 1, (08-AUG-08).pdf (accessed 4 September 2010).
42 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States Incorporating Change 1 (Washington, DC, 20 March 2009), IV-1.
43 Henry Nuzum, Shades of CORDS in the Kush: The False Hope of Unity of Effort in American Counterinsurgency (Carlisle, PA: United States Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 49-50.
44 Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Provincial Reconstruction Teams Playbook: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, September 2007), 10.
45 Both case studies provided by ISAF, ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook, 244-246.
46 Michelle Parker, The Role of the Department of Defense in Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 5 September 2007, 2, (accessed 22 June 2010).
47 Michelle Parker, The Role of the Department of Defense in Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 5 September 2007, 2-3.
48 This is an updated ISAF description of stability from ISAF, ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook, 10-11.
49 Michelle Parker, The Role of the Department of Defense in Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 5 September 2007, 8.
50 Michelle Parker, The Role of the Department of Defense in Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 5 September 2007, 8.
511 Michelle Parker, The Role of the Department of Defense in Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 5 September 2007, 5-6.
52 Michelle Parker, The Role of the Department of Defense in Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 5 September 2007, 6.
53 “Newsweek Retracts Quran Story,” CNN World, 16 May 2005, 1, (accessed 10 September 2010); Sharon Morris et al., “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment,” USAID Report PN-ADG-252, June 2006, 8, (accessed 10 September 2010).
54 Michelle Parker, The Role of the Department of Defense in Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 5 September 2007, 6.
55 Lieutenant Colonel James Ruf, interview by United States Institute of Peace, Afghanistan Experience Project, Washington, DC, Interview # 40, 18 August 2005, 2.
56 Lieutenant Colonel James Ruf, interview by United States Institute of Peace, 10.
57 Lieutenant Colonel James Ruf, interview by United States Institute of Peace, 10.
58 Mohammad Zaman Rezai, “Champion Technical Training Center: Organization Prospectus,” 23 March 2010, 1, (accessed 7 September 2010); Michelle Parker, The Role of the Department of Defense in Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 5 September 2007, 7.
59 Lieutenant Colonel James Ruf, interview by United States Institute of Peace, 5; Michelle Parker, The Role of the Department of Defense in Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 5 September 2007, 4, 8.
60 Michelle Parker, The Role of the Department of Defense in Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 5 September 2007, 9.
61 Michelle Parker, The Role of the Department of Defense in Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 5 September 2007, 9-12.
62 Gerry Gilmore, “Poppy-Free Nangarhar Province Shows Afghanistan Improvements,” American Forces Press Services, 26 September 2008, 1, (accessed 11 September 2010).
63 Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Allison and Major Cliffton Cornell, “Rebuilding Afghanistan,” Video Teleconference Briefing, 26 September 2008, 2-3, (accessed 10 September 2010).
64 President George Bush, quoted in Gerry Gilmore, “Poppy-Free Nangarhar Province Shows Afghanistan Improvements,” American Forces Press Services, 26 September 2008, 1, (accessed 11 September 2010).
65 US Senator Christopher Bond, quoted in “Bond Meets with MO Guard in Afghanistan, Touts Success of Agribusiness Development Team, US Senate News Releases Newsroom, 22 December 2008, 1, (accessed 11 September 2010).
66 Major John Barfels and Bruce Dubee, “Rebuilding Afghanistan,” Video Teleconference Briefing, 26 September 2008, 3, (accessed 10 September 2010).
67 President George Bush quoted in “Rebuilding Afghanistan,” White House Press Release, 9 September 2008, 1, (accessed 10 September 2010).
68 Major Charles Westover, interview by United States Institute of Peace, Afghanistan Experience Project, Washington, DC, Interview # 21, 27 April 2005, 5.
69 Major Charles Westover quoted in Lance Corporal John Lawson, “Parwan PRT Begins New Projects,” Global , 7 June 2004, 1, (accessed 12 September 2010).
70 Major Charles Westover, interview by United States Institute of Peace, 7.
71 Major Charles Westover, interview by United States Institute of Peace, 15.
72 Major Westover spent nearly $5 million in CERP funds during his tour.
73 Major Charles Westover, interview by United States Institute of Peace, 16.
74 Major Charles Westover, interview by United States Institute of Peace, 17.
75 Major Charles Westover, interview by United States Institute of Peace, 20.
76 Major Charles Westover, interview by United States Institute of Peace, 24.
77 Colonel Gerald Timoney, interview by United States Institute of Peace, Afghanistan Experience Project, Washington, DC, Interview # 45, 20 September 2005, 2.
78 Colonel Gerald Timoney, interview by United States Institute of Peace, 2.
79 Colonel Gerald Timoney, interview by United States Institute of Peace, 6.
80 Colonel Gerald Timoney, interview by United States Institute of Peace, 10.
81 Colonel Gerald Timoney, interview by United States Institute of Peace, 12.
82 Colonel John Caulfield quoted in “Caolition Docs Mend Boy’s Cleft Palate: Hall of Unsung Heroes,” Guns Magazine, 1 November 2005, 6.
83 Colonel Gerald Timoney, interview by United States Institute of Peace, 14-15.
84 Carter Malkasian and Gerald Meyerle, Provincial Reconstruction Teams: How Do We Know they Work? (Carlisle PA: United States Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2009), 22-23.
85 US Navy Lieutenant Keith Hoekman quoted in NATO/OTAN, “New Medical Facility Opens in Ghazni Province,” ISAF Public Affairs Office, 13 November 2007, 1, (accessed 14 September 2010).
86 Carter Malkasian and Gerald Meyerle, Provincial Reconstruction Teams: How Do We Know they Work? (Carlisle PA: United States Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2009), 22-23.
87 Colonel Phillip Bookert quoted in Samantha Quigley, “Task Force Lays Foundation for Stability in Afghan West,” Armed Forces Press Service, 14 March 2005, 1, (accessed 15 September 2010).
88 Colonel Phillip Bookert, interview by United States Institute of Peace, Afghanistan Experience Project, Washington, DC, Interview # 43, 11 August 2005, 17.
89 Colonel Phillip Bookert, interview by United States Institute of Peace, 4-12.
90 Colonel Phillip Bookert, interview by United States Institute of Peace, 12.
91 Colonel Phillip Bookert, interview by United States Institute of Peace, 18.
92 Robert Perito, The US Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, Testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, October 2007, 1-2, 4.
93 Robert Perito, The US Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, Testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 3.
94 Robert Perito, The US Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, Testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 3.
95 Robert Perito, The US Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, Testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 5-6.
96 Sharon Morris et al., USAID Report PN-ADG-252, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment, June 2006, 10-17, 22,
97 Admiral Mike Mullen quoted in Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,” CRS Report for Congress RL 30588, 29 September 2008, 22, (accessed 10 November 2008).
98 Thomas Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan,” Orbis, Winter 2007, 71, (accessed 6 December 2008); Note: According to Johnson and Mason the “Taliban game plan” entices U.S. and NATO forces to emphasize the kill/capture mission and to concentrate on battalion-sized sweep operations that often fail and create collateral damage, see page 72.
99General David Petraeus quoted in Craig Whitlock, “Dire Assessment on Afghanistan,” Kansas City Star, 9 February 2009, A7.
100 Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, Annual Threat Assessment, Statement before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, 10 March 2009, 9, (accessed 11 March 2009); Department of Defense, Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, January 2009, 31, (accessed 12 March 2009).
101 President Barack Obama, “A New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,” , 27 March 2009, 2, (accessed 16 September 2010).
102 “What’s New in the Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,” , 27 March 2009, 1, (accessed 16 September 2010).
103 President Barack Obama, “New Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Televised Speech, 1 December 2009, (accessed 15 December 2009); General David Petraeus, Statement of the Commander US Central Command on the Posture of US Central Command, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 16 March 2010, 23.
104 Ambassador Karl Eikenberry and General Stanley McChrystal, United States Government Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan, 10 august 2009, 5-6, (accessed 12 September 2009).
105 General David Petraeus, Statement of the Commander US Central Command on the Posture of US Central Command, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 16 March 2010, 24-26.
106 Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, US State Department, 24 February 2010, i, (accessed 16 September 2010).
107 Kenneth Katzman, CRS Report for Congress No. RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and US Policy, 25 March 2010, 31, (accessed 16 July 2010).
108 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress (Arlington, VA: SIGAR, 30 April 2010) 75-76.
109 Kenneth Katzman, CRS Report for Congress No. RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and US Policy, 31.
110 Kenneth Katzman, CRS Report for Congress No. RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and US Policy, 45-46.
111 Mark Ward, “The Future of PRTs,” Transcript of speech delivered to the 2010 Provisional Reconstruction Team Conference, Kabul, Afghanistan, 17 March 2010, (accessed 31 August 2010).
112 Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Report No. 07-34, Playbook: Provincial Reconstruction Teams-Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, September 2007, 36.
113 Mark Ward, “The Future of PRTs,” Transcript of speech delivered to the 2010 Provisional Reconstruction Team Conference, Kabul, Afghanistan, 17 March 2010.
114 “National Solidarity Program,” GIRoA Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, 5 April 2010 1, (accessed 17 September 2010).
115 Mark Ward, “The Future of PRTs,” Transcript of speech delivered to the 2010 Provisional Reconstruction Team Conference, Kabul, Afghanistan, 17 March 2010.
116 Ambassador Mark Sedwill, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams Look at Way Forward in Afghanistan,” address to the 2010 PRT Conference Kabul, 16 March 2010, (accessed 2 June 2010).
117 Lieutenant General David Rodriguez, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams Look at Way Forward in Afghanistan,” address to the 2010 PRT Conference Kabul, 16 March 2010, (accessed 2 June 2010).
118 Mark Ward, “The Future of PRTs,” Transcript of speech delivered to the 2010 Provisional Reconstruction Team Conference, Kabul, Afghanistan, 17 March 2010; Mark Ward, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams Look at Way Forward in Afghanistan,” address to the 2010 PRT Conference Kabul, 17 March 2010, (accessed 2 June 2010).
Chapter 6: The PRT Concept Migrates to Iraq
Whereas military officers typically commanded Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, US Department of State officials led PRTs in Iraq. Civilians from various US agencies, along with private contractors, a military force protection element, and Civil Affairs teams, staffed the Iraqi PRTs. Initially, ten PRTs opened in Iraq during late 2005, with ten more ePRTs – embedded with US Military Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) -- added in 2007 as a component of President George Bush’s New Way Forward initiative. By yearend 2007, there were 25 PRTs in Iraq, three of which were led by the United Kingdom, Italy, and South Korea. This total was reduced to 22 PRTs in 2009, and as of June 2010, there were 15 classic PRTs, one Regional Reconstruction Team, and two ePRTs operating in Iraq.1
The mission of PRTs in Iraq was similar to that of PRTs in Afghanistan – to assist with provincial reconstruction, governance, and security. PRTs also assisted regional combatant commanders with political issues in accordance with the overall US counterinsurgency strategy for Iraq. As of 2007, the complete mission statement for PRTs in Iraq was as follows:
The PRT program is a priority joint Department of State (DoS)/Department of Defense (DoD) initiative to bolster moderates, support US counterinsurgency strategy, promote reconciliation, shape the political environment, support economic development, and build the capacity of Iraqi provincial governments to hasten the transition to Iraqi self-sufficiency.2
A US military officer served as deputy leader of the original Iraqi PRTs, which ranged in size from 80-100 members and included representatives from DoS, USAID, USDA, DoJ, Army Corps of Engineers, military liaison officers, Civil Affairs Soldiers, and Iraqi interpreters. State Department officials also led e-PRTs in Iraq, which likewise included USAID representatives and Civil Affairs Teams, plus cultural advisors, subject matter experts, and translators. Initially, US Army National Guard and US Army Reserve Soldiers filled the majority of e-PRT on a temporary basis, while DoS recruited permanent replacements.3
The Multi-National Force Iraq provide military and logistics support for Iraqi PRTs and the US Embassy Office of Provincial Affairs in Baghdad was responsible for guidance and direction regarding policy/procedural issues. As was the case with Afghan PRTs, however, specifics relating to organization, operations, and expected accomplishments varied among PRTs in Iraq. Priorities were often based on the whims of the PRT commanders and in many instances changed from one rotation to the next. Dangerous security conditions and disagreement between DoS and DoD concerning support and protection also restricted early PRT operations in several Iraqi provinces. Separate chains of command and dual lines of authority – DoS responsible for governance and economic issues, DoS in charge of security and movement, but no one at the individual PRT level with total authority – often led to disputes that percolated up to senior officials for resolution. Additionally, e-PRTs in Baghdad and Anbar Province reported directly to the US Embassy, thereby circumventing the chains of command of the larger provincial PRTs.4
Regional Embassy Office and Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kirkuk
In May 2003, The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) had established a Regional Headquarters in Kirkuk, which converted to a Regional Embassy Office (REO) in June 2004. At the same time, the CPA relinquished sovereignty to the interim Iraqi government and the United States opened its Baghdad Embassy in the Green Zone. REO Kirkuk, along with three others in Mosul, Hillah, and Basrah, was managed by State Department staff and included representatives from the United State Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Justice, and the Project and Contracting Office (PCO). USAID was an independent federal government agency that promoted US foreign policy objectives by providing host nations with a variety of useful services addressing economic growth, agriculture, democracy and governance, healthcare, the environment, and humanitarian assistance.5 The Kirkuk PCO provided program and financial management assistance to Iraqis concerning electricity and water issues, communications and transportation, security and justice, education, and oil.6
With REO Kirkuk, the US Department of State had a diplomatic presence in the city that facilitated coordination with local Iraqi officials and was conducive to obtaining firsthand information regarding the local economic and political situation. REO staff worked closely with US and Coalition Forces in the area, initially the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, and after the winter of 2005, the 116th BCT, to further US strategic objectives – stability, territorial integrity, broad-based governance – in the region and to convey the message that America was there to help improve the quality of life for all Iraqis.7
One problematic issue uncovered by REO personnel was the inadequate experience levels of local Iraqi officials who had replaced Baathist appointees after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The decentralization of authority introduced by the CPA left many local governments in the hands of untrained administrators who struggled with delivering essential services to the people. The need to substantially improve skill levels of local and regional Iraqi officials had also been identified in National Security Presidential Directive 36, which outlined the policy and framework for a new, combined, civilian-military organization to implement nation-building programs in Iraq.8
On 17 February 2005, 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry division transferred authority for the Kirkuk AO to the 116th Brigade Combat Team (116th BCT) from the Idaho Army National Guard (ARNG), which had deployed to FOB Warrior in December 2004.9 Commanded by Brigadier General Alan Gayhart, 116th BCT (Task Force Liberty) was comprised of additional ARNG units from Oregon, Montana, Utah, North Dakota, New Jersey, and Maryland. 2d Battalion, 116th Cavalry relieved 1-21 in Kirkuk city, while 1st Battalion, 163d Infantry replaced 1-27 at Hawija and 3d Battalion, 116th Cavalry assumed responsibility from 1-14 for the southern sector of 116th BCT’s AO.10
During the winter 2005, the Embassy in Baghdad began assembling Provincial Reconstruction Development Councils to oversee Iraqi and US reconstruction projects. This effort was short-lived however, as newly arrived US Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad argued for a more formidable provincial presence – one similar to that of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams already operational in Afghanistan.11 When Khalilzad visited Kirkuk, he found that the 116th BCT had already set-up a successful PRT-like organization that would serve as a model for future governance and reconstruction teams in Iraq. Brigadier General Alan Gayhart’s Soldiers had worked hand-in-hand with REO Kirkuk staff members to train provincial Iraqi officials in the basics of good governance, such as conducting meetings, forming consensus, and following parliamentary procedures. Their civilian skill sets helped the Idaho Army National Guard men and women work cooperatively with State Department officials and the ethnically diverse provincial council to significantly improve governance – lawyers mentored Iraqi judges, engineers worked at water treatment plants and sewage disposal facilities, and police officers assisted Iraqis in setting up Joint Coordination Centers.12
The PRT initiative in Iraq was officially established by Joint (US Embassy Iraq and Multi-National Force-Iraq) Baghdad Cable 4045 in October 2005. The mission called for PRTs to “assist Iraq’s provincial governments in developing a transparent and sustained capability to govern; to promote reconciliation, increased security, the rule of law, and political and economic development; to support the Coalition counterinsurgency strategy; to encourage political moderates, and; to provide the provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the population.”13 Shortly thereafter, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice inaugurated PRT Ninawa, the first in Iraq, at FOB Courage outside the city of Mosul, during a surprise visit to that city on 11 November 2005.14
Ambassador Khalilzad then dedicated PRT Kirkuk, third to open behind Ninawa and Babil, on 27 November 2005. “I urge Iraqis to take advantage of this opportunity to be a part of rebuilding Iraq. The PRT can help build capacity and systems based on the rule of law and building effective security systems to deal with the problems of Iraq,” Khalilzad told those in attendance at the official ceremony. “The PRT can assist these programs and can help, but the ultimate success will come from the decisions Iraqis make for themselves,” the Ambassador added.15 Just the week before in Al-Hillah, Khalilzad had expressed a slightly different point of view concerning the PRT initiative, “We regard Iraq’s success as our own. We are partners in building this new Iraq. The PRTs use all of the tools, military and civilian, to get behind the ideas the Iraqis feel are most important to build their national institutions to offer a better hope for the Iraqi people’s economic future,” he explained.16 The notion that governance in Iraq would ultimately be an Iraqi, not a US, responsibility would become a recurring OIF theme throughout the country, including Kirkuk.
Whereas Coalition military officers led PRTs in Afghanistan, State Department officials assumed the leadership roles for Iraqi PRTs. Although Baghdad Cable 4045 stipulated that the US Embassy would support PRTs at State Department sites and that MNF-I support those at military locations, there was no detailed doctrine describing how the Iraqi PRTs would function. As pointed out by United States Institute of Peace in an assessment of the Iraqi PRT effort, there were no “agreed upon objectives, delineation of authority and responsibility between civilian and military personnel plans, or job descriptions.”17 In April 2006, Multi-National Corps-Iraq determined that, since the PRT mission was a State Department responsibility, Defense Department funding could no longer be used to support the PRT program.
The resulting interagency dispute was not resolved until the departments of State and Defense signed a memorandum of understanding in November 2006 clarifying security and infrastructure funding and operating cost issues.18 Secretary Rice reemphasized the State Department commitment to the PRT initiative by declaring, “We’re very focused on the need to build capacity in the local and provincial governments and to be able to deliver economic and reconstruction assistance.”19 Rice would add later, “We are long term partners in these efforts [to improve the quality of life for Iraqis] and the PRTs, Embassy, and US Government are all committed to helping Iraqis achieve these goals.”20 The Embassy staff in Baghdad also stressed that the PRT program was in direct support of the political track described in President Bush’s National Strategy for Victory in Iraq – “to build stable, pluralistic, and effective national institutions that can protect the interests of all Iraqis, and facilitate integration into the international community.”[xxviii] Despite this strong commitment to the PRT program in Iraq, challenges persisted related to the lack of skilled personnel, the integration of civilian and military resources, the sometimes-unclear chain of command, physical security and mobility, and the coordination of reconstruction and counterinsurgency efforts both within the Coalition and between the Coalition and the Iraqi government. 22
With respect to the PRT in Kirkuk, the staff was divided, with some members working from the Regional Embassy Office in the Kirkuk Government Building (KGB) downtown and others from FOB Warrior at the airbase. As of September 2006, the combined Kirkuk contingent numbered 25, nine civilians and 16 military, about 70 percent of the 36 total personnel authorized.23 The Kirkuk PRT mission statement called for “improving the livelihoods of Iraqi citizens in Kirkuk by promoting reconciliation, shaping the political environment, supporting economic development and building the capacity of provincial government to hasten self-sufficiency.”24 Despite being shorthanded, PRT Kirkuk initiated and sustained a significant number of governance, economic, and reconstruction activities. For example, PRT members met several times weekly with representatives of the Provincial Council and the governor’s office and established strong, one-on-one, working relationships with key Iraqi officials. Since there was no classic banking system in Kirkuk – no normal loans, a cash-only economy ( the Iraq Al-Aman Micro Credit Center and the Kirkuk Business Center were both set up in the KGB with assistance from PRT personnel. In addition, the Kirkuk PRT oversaw the Project Contracting Coordination Office (PCC), which tracked and coordinated all ongoing projects in the province including those financed with Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding.25
Advancing the rule of law in Kirkuk was a strategic objective for the PRT. To that end, the staff helped Iraqis open new courthouses, including a major crimes unit, trained prison guards, and strengthened the emphasis on protecting human rights in the corrections system. PRT members also continued efforts to repair or replace the water system, sewage disposal system, and the electrical grid damaged by neglect during the Saddam regime. Kirkukis and the PRT staff developed plans for a new tire production facility, a sunflower seed processing plant, a vocational technical school, the Kirkuk Center for Business and Professional Women, and for the rehabilitation of a cotton gin and a sewing factory. The provincial Director General of Agriculture, Kirkuk University, and the PRT agricultural team conducted dozens of training workshops for local farmers. Among the workshops, classes included modern farming techniques, animal husbandry, disease prevention, irrigation, and fruit and olive grove management.26 The entire PRT staff consolidated operations at FOB Warrior in early 2007, and the Regional Embassy Office Kirkuk closed shortly thereafter.27
Iraq’s First and Second PRTs – Ninewa and Babil
With its headquarters in the provincial capital of Mosul and a branch office in Tal Afar, PRT Ninewa was Iraq’s first to open in November 2005. As the second largest province in Iraq, Ninewa has an ethnically diverse population of roughly 2.8 million people, the majority of whom are dependent upon agriculture for their livelihoods. Representatives form the Departments of Defense, State, Justice, Agriculture, and USAID comprise the staff of over 60 members at PRT Ninewa, which is led by a senior State Department Foreign Service Officer. The PRT interacts continuously with the military, provincial Iraqi officials, private sector organizations, and other agencies to facilitate security and stability, good governance, and economic development in Ninewa Province.28
In 2009, PRT Ninewa provided comprehensive advanced training for dozens of Iraqi primary school teachers prior to initiating the “My Arabic Library” program in Mosul. Developed by Scholastic, Inc., a global children’s publishing, education, and media company, “My Arabic Library” is a unique series of high-interest, Arabic-language, fiction and nonfiction books designed to inspire Arabic-speaking school children to read, learn, and improve critical thinking proficiency. The integrated teacher training program was organized around examples, strategies, and exercises taken directly from the Arabic language books the children would be reading.29
More than 250 Iraqi residents of Ayn Sifini attended a reconciliation concert organized by PRT Ninewa in March 2009. A brass quintet from the 25th Infantry Division Band participated in the concert, which also included Christian and Arab musicians from the Mosul Institute for Fine Arts and members of a local Kurdish Yazidi band.30 Also, the Women’s Empowerment Organization (WEO) conducted a three-day business skills – planning, start-up, loan application – workshop for farmers in Tal Afar. PRT Ninewa provided coordination for the WEO workshop that was funded by USAID.31
In October 2009, W. Patrick Murphy, Ninewa PRT team leader, sponsored an event entitled Sustainable Pertnerships – Building toward the Future, which both inaugurated the Ninewa Zero Tillage Agricultural Conservation Program and celebrated the reopening of the Al Baraka Market in east Mosul. The US donated 30 tractors and grain drills to seven Ninewa Province farmers’ cooperatives, which in turn rented the equipment to local farmers and then used the proceeds to purchase additional machinery and materials as the program spread across the province. The Iraqi Directorate of Agriculture concurrently trained farmers in zero tillage farming techniques, intended to enhance efficiency, profitability, and sustainability.32
With micro-loan assistance from the PRT, dozens of Iraqi vendors, many of whom contributed their own funding, reopened the Al Baraka Market for the first time since it was partially destroyed by a terrorist car bomb attack in 2007. “The Iraqi Army, the 3d Brigade Combat Team, the 2d Battalion, 82d Field Artillery Regiment were responsible for engaging the vendors, assisting them in economic revitalization of the neighborhood, and taking on the role of being responsible community leaders,” Murphy explained, giving credit to all concerned. “The 130th Engineer Brigade, and its’ Mosul Reconstruction Cell also provided materials and technical expertise to help in the rebuilding of the market area,” Murphy said.33 “Now it’s time to take it to the next level and look for opportunities to stimulate the economy and focus on job creation,” added Captain Joseph Himpelmann, commander B Battery, 2-82 FA.34
In another agriculturally related program, PRT Ninewa built 36 greenhouses – hoop houses – throughout the arid province. The greenhouses were awarded to local Iraqi farmers by lottery and appropriate training in greenhouse farming techniques was provided by Iraq’s Ministry of Agriculture. Each greenhouse was expected to yield approximately $6,000 worth of crops per year. A small portion of the proceeds generated from the sale of greenhouse crops went toward the purchase of additional greenhouses for other Ninewa farmers. “We have built hoop houses in villages, towns, and even in people’s yards…this is the best solution for the current environmental state of drought-stricken Ninewa…we are really proud of where we and Ninewa’s farmers are going,” PRT Agricultural Specialist, Faris Al Assadi, told visiting US Embassy Baghdad representatives in December 2009.35
PRT Ninewa’s Rule of Law section and the Provincial Police Training Team from the 3d BCT conducted a Personal Security Detail (PSD) training program at the Blickenstaff judicial compound in Mosul for 60 Iraqi civilians in November 2009. The intent of the PSD program was to train participants to be effective judicial bodyguards, thereby strengthening protection and security for provincial jurists against terrorists, insurgents, and criminals. Abe Martinez, Chief of the PRT Rule of Law section, explained that “since Ninewa judges assumed control of their own courts in the past year, they have come under assault by terrorists and others dissatisfied with their rulings…the training is meant to counter that threat and enable judges to work free from fear of reprisal.” “A strong judiciary will advance rule of law in Ninewa Province…this training is intended to support Ninewa’s brave judges,” Martinez further noted.36
With $148,000 in Quick Response funding provided by PRT Ninewa, the Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Center for Ninewa Province created a new computerized base map for the city of Mosul. The project included the purchase of sophisticated computer equipment, mapping software, and specialized training for the GIS Center’s engineering and technical staff. The new base map included several data overlays that were beneficial to the Ninewa Directorates of Water, Sewer, and Municipalities in improving and expanding central services networks in Mosul. Emphasizing the importance of the GIS base map system, Renas Shwany, Reconstruction Architect for PRT Ninewa, explained the “project is an essential part of Mosul’s strategic urban development plan…and brings the province’s planners and engineers into the twenty-first century…the future of Mosul and Ninewa will be well-served.”37
Soldiers from the 364th Medical Civil Affairs Team, along with members of PRT Ninewa helped train 55 Iraqi health care professionals from the Tal Afar district in techniques designed to reduce mother/infant mortality rates. The public health training session focused on reducing risks associated with birth, proper delivery methods, and identifying and treating childhood diseases. Mother/infant mortality rates in Iraq are nearly ten-times those experienced in the United States. “We want to teach necessary skill sets to reduce that [rate] in a sustainable manner,” explained Dr. Christopher Kenyhercz, Senior Health Advisor at the Tal Afar PRT branch office.38
Known as the cradle of civilization, Babil Province, situated south of Baghdad between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, has an estimated population of 1.4 million people. PRT Babil, which also began operations in November 2005, is staffed similarly to PRT Ninewa, but with additional assets including officers from the US Army Corps of Engineers, Civil Affairs Teams, and civilian technical experts versed in governance, rule of law, economic development, and public diplomacy. PRT Babil personnel formally train local Iraqis in capacity-building and sustainability skills such as modern agricultural methods, police investigation techniques, forensic evidence collection and analysis, and water/sewer system master planning. PRT members are also helping Iraqis preserve the province’s cultural heritage.39
In March 2009, Dr. Mary Sue Sroda, a member of the English faculty at Murray State University and an instructor in the Teach English to speakers of Other Languages at the university, traveled to Babil to teach a week-long English Teaching Methodology Workshop for Iraqi high school teachers who specialized in teaching English as a foreign language. The US State Department awarded Sroda a grant to conduct the program, which was sponsored jointly by PRT Babil, the Director General of Education in Babil Province, the Babil Teacher Training Center (TTC), and the Office of Cultural Affairs at the US Embassy in Baghdad. On the last day of the workshop, the Iraqi teachers practiced their new skills during an English-only camp for 50 local high school students. The TTC then added the workshop techniques to its comprehensive English-teacher continuing education program that eventually impacted 1,100 teachers and 300,000 students in Babil Province. PRT Babil leaders considered the workshop and teaching/learning English critical components of their provincial economic development strategy.40 The team subsequently instituted the Department of State’s ACCESS English program that was spearheaded in Babil by the US Embassy English Language Officer, Beverly Hall, a former member of the Defense Language Institute and first-ever recipient of the Secretary of Defense Medal for the Global War on Terrorism.41
PRT Babil, along with Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Jerry Kammer, sponsored an investigative journalism workshop for Iraqi print and broadcast reporters in April 2009. Krammer led discussions on critical topics, such as proper interviewing techniques, cultivating sources, and identifying abuses of power, and emphasized the importance of investigative journalism in a fledging democracy.42 Later, reporters toured the crime laboratory at Forward Operating Base Kalsu, and PRT members briefed them on forensic evidence and its use in criminal prosecutions and in maintaining government transparency.43 Also in April, the Iraqi comedy group Mud House performed the play “Sense of Democracy” in Babil. Staged in an amphitheater at the Babylonian ruins and backed by PRT Babil, the play, which was attended by large crowds of Iraqis and numerous provincial dignitaries, stressed themes of civil liberty, constitutional rights, and anti-corruption.44 Later during spring 2009, PRT Babil purchased and helped install four solar-powered water purification units in the villages of Shamoli and Mahaweel. Contaminated drinking water had put the villages at high risk of developing an outbreak of cholera – 230 confirmed cases of which were confirmed elsewhere in Babil Province in 2008. PRT representatives and Babil Province health authorities trained key village residents on the operation and maintenance of the purification units.45
In a further effort to provide clean drinking water and combat cholera in the province, PRT Babil donated seven 10,000-liter water tanker trucks to provincial authorities in September 2009. In accepting the gift from PRT leader Dr. Rick Roberts, Babil Governor Salman Al-Zargany expressed his gratitude, remarking, “The trucks should be call liquid friendship as they are a tangible example of how the PRT and the Babil government are working together to ensure that the people of the province have clean and safe drinking water.”46 PRT Babil subsequently funded the Center for Information and Training, a state-of-the-art communications facility in Babil Province. The Center provides computer training for provincial residents, up-to-date information regarding local construction projects, and modern equipment for processing and transmitting data.47 In late 2009, the US Department of State and PRT Babil awarded a grant to the Babylon Beekeepers Association for the construction of a Queen Bee Breeding Center and honey processing facility in Jebala. Honey is a substantial and sustainable cash commodity in Iraq, and Babil Province Agriculture Director General, Hussan Hasony Ahmed expected honey production to triple in the province as a result of the new facilities.48 Finally, in response to requests from provincial medical students, the US Department of Agriculture and PRT Babil donated several hundred biological sciences textbooks to the Central Library in Hillah.49
Working at PRT Baghdad
Situated in the Green Zone, PRT Baghdad shared a building with the World Bank, Iraqi government agencies, and several US Military units. Of the ninety team members in 2007, roughly a third were US Military personnel – mostly US Army with a few US Navy Sailors and US Air Force Airmen. The remainder of the PRT staff consisted of US government civilians, USAID contractors, bilingual/bicultural advisors (BBAs), and local Iraqi nationals. PRT Baghdad’s mission was to assist the provincial government build capacity through good governance, economic development, reconstruction, improving the rule of law, and providing the population with essential services. A small team of governance subject matter experts met regularly with Baghdad provincial officials, district leaders, and city politicians to assist them in refining democratic practices and parliamentary procedures. USAID and its contractor, RTI international, helped Baghdad city leaders establish a Geographical Information System and taught Iraqi government officials a variety of public administration courses covering general management, strategic planning, and finance. Despite limited resources, the PRT Rule of Law section, which included several attorneys, helped Iraqis initiate reforms within the provincial judicial system, with particular emphasis on detention center operations.50
PRT Baghdad interacted daily with various international agencies, coalition partners (particularly the British), and the US Military commands in Baghdad. Relations with Multinational Division Baghdad were especially strong since PRT Baghdad deputy team leader, US Army Lieutenant Colonel Robert Ruch, also served as MND-B Division Engineer. Security support from the MND-B Special Troops Battalion was always readily available. Unity of effort was the overarching theme at PRT Baghdad, since team leader Joseph Gregoire, who reported to the US Embassy National Coordination Team (NCT) for operational guidance and direction, had no command authority over the PRT military elements. In 2007, NCT became the Office of Provincial Affairs, which reported to the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office at the US Embassy. The inevitable agency stove piping was not a particular problem for PRT Baghdad, however the lack of pre-deployment team training – civilian and military together – may have been detrimental to PRT operations.51
The Public Diplomacy Cell at PRT Baghdad was the only one in Iraq. The four-member cell was led by a State Department Foreign Service Officer and was responsible for publishing a weekly provincial newspaper, operating a local radio station, training Iraqi government public spokespersons, and managing the PRT’s International Visitors program. The agriculture cell at PRT Baghdad helped USAID and the Iraqi Inma – meaning “growth” in Arabic – Agribusiness Program establish a comprehensive field-to-market logistics system to increase the flow of fresh produce from local farms to Baghdad’s central markets. Funding for economic development and reconstruction was provided by USAID and by the US Army Corps of Engineers for larger projects. The Army Civil Affairs section attached to PRT Baghdad also had access to Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding for expenditures less than $200,000. A limited amount of reconstruction funding was turned over to the Iraqis to manage themselves. During the first year of operation, PRT Baghdad established six micro-credit banking branches in the province. Team leader Gregoire’s primary focus was convincing provincial officials to concentrate on addressing common activities and providing essential services for the people. He advised future PRT members to “stay the course…focus on the mission at hand,” and that “collegiality was key to it all.”52 Lieutenant Colonel Ruch argued for even greater State Department involvement in grass root PRT operations. “I think it is very important for us to get a civilian face on this,” Ruch said, adding that we need “a trained corps of folks ready to do this again if we have to in the future…so it is not always a pick-up game.”53
The New Way Forward in Iraq – the Surge and Embedded PRTs
In January 2007, President Bush announced the surge of additional US troops to Iraq to counter the vicious cycle of sectarian violence that had erupted after the Golden Mosque bombing in Samarra a year earlier. The escalating violence seriously threatened to derail recent Iraqi political achievements. Providing a secure environment for Iraqis – particularly those living in Baghdad – was the principal priority of both the President’s New Way Forward strategy and the third iteration of the Baghdad Security Plan. Clear, Hold, and Build had been essentially unsuccessful in Baghdad since there were insufficient Iraqi and American troops to effectively and permanently secure neighborhoods that had been cleared of terrorists and insurgents. The strategic goal in Iraq remained the same: A unified democratic federal Iraq that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself, and is an ally in the War on Terror. However, 20,000 additional US Forces – five brigades – along with three more Iraqi Army brigades would be deployed to Baghdad to undertake the following revised mission: “to help Iraqis clear and hold neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad needs.”54 The specific objectives of the New Way Forward initiative were:
- Defeat al-Qaeda and its supporters and ensure that no terrorist safe haven exists in Iraq.
- Support Iraqi efforts to quell sectarian violence in Baghdad and regain control over the capital.
- Ensure the territorial integrity of Iraq and counter/limit destructive Iranian and Syrian activity in Iraq.
- Help safeguard democracy in Iraq by encouraging strong democratic institutions impartially serving all Iraqis and preventing the return of the forces of tyranny.
- Foster the conditions for Iraqi national reconciliation but with the Iraqi government clearly in the lead.
- Continue to strengthen Iraqi Security Forces and accelerate the transition of security responsibility to the Iraqi government.
- Encourage an expanding Iraqi economy including by helping Iraq maintain and expand its export of oil to support Iraqi development.
- Promote support for Iraq from its neighbors, the region, and the international community.55
The President also announced the accelerated training of Iraqi forces, an increase of imbedded American advisors in Iraqi Army units, and a doubling of the number of PRTs in Iraq, referred to a civilian surge. “We will double the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams…these teams bring together military and civilian experts to help Iraqi communities pursue reconciliation, strengthen the moderates, and speed the transition to Iraqi self-reliance,” President Bush explained in his address.56 At the time there were ten functioning PRTs in Iraq – US-led teams in Baghdad, Anbar, Ninewa, Kirkuk, Salah Ad Din, Diyala, and Babil; and, Coalition-led teams in Basrah (UK), Dhi Qar (Italy), and Arbil (Korea). The ten new PRTs increased the number of PRT-specific personnel in Iraq from 290 to more than 600 and each team was embedded (ePRTs) with a US Army Brigade or Marine Corps Regimental Combat Team – six in Baghdad, three in Anbar (Fallujah, Ramadi, and Qaim), and one in North Babil.57 The next day, 11 January 2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice described the objectives of the expanded PRT mission to members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: “Build Iraqi capacity; help the Iraqi government expand its reach, relevance, and resources beyond Baghdad; and decentralize US government efforts to expand our reach in support of strategic priorities to promote reconciliation, bolster moderates through political engagement and targeted assistance, and support counterinsurgency efforts.”58 Secretary Rice further explained that “our decentralization effort in Iraq will require a more decentralized presence…we must continue to get civilians and diplomats out of the embassy, out of the capital and into the field all across the country.”59
Civilians assigned to the new ePRTs lived and worked side-by-side with Soldiers and Marines and became integral components of the Brigade and Regimental Combat Teams (B/RCTs) that provided them with food, shelter, communications, transportation, and security. Civil-military cooperation would increase dramatically, since “using brigades as landlords for the ePRTs was intended to yield a multiplier effect on capacity building and reconstruction.”60 Initially, ePRTs were four person teams comprised of a senior State Department foreign service officer as leader, a USAID representative, a US Army Civil Affairs officer, and a bilingual cultural advisor. After completing an assessment of the AO situational environment, the B/RCT commander and ePRT leader prepared a Joint Common Operational Plan that identified needs for additional personnel, i.e., specialists with particular skill sets appropriate to the situation. US Army National Guard and Reserve Soldiers and DoD civilians filled ePRT specialist positions initially, until civilian contractors recruited by DoS and temporarily appointed under 5 USC 3161 began deploying to Iraq in November 2007.61
Embedded PRTs reported organizationally to the Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) at the US Embassy in Baghdad. Since there was no overarching strategic guidance from OPA, each ePRT operated relatively independently, performing tasks deemed necessary in its own unique area. Team members formed professional relationships local Iraqi officials, addressed issues involving district and sub-district governance, employment, and essential services, promoted reconciliation among tribal groups, engaging Sons of Iraq leaders, and helped improve the image of the Iraqi government. Embedded teams also used CERP and DoS Quick Response Funds (QRF) to stimulate local economic development, establish business centers, and disperse small business micro-loans.62 Hundreds of unskilled Iraqi workers were hired for small, neighborhood-level, infrastructure construction projects.
In many instances, ePRTs were “full participants in the B/RCT’s battle rhythm with team leaders functioning as political advisors to the military commanders,” according to Dr. Robert Perito, PRT expert at the United States Institute of Peace.63 Kiki Munshi, former PRT Diyala leader, generally agreed, pointing out that “theoretically the military pursues the kinetic mission and the PRT addresses the non-kinetic, [but] in fact it is not possible to separate kinetic from non-kinetic because winning this war is as much political as military…our missions overlap.”64 In other cases, however, as explained by Blake Stone, US Army Judge Advocate General’s Corp officer and Adjunct Professor at the US Naval War College, B/RCTs with ePRTs often “had their own separate agendas… viewed the ePRT simply as a brigade enabler… and expected the civilian efforts to be subordinate to the brigade concept of operation – the net effect was an almost complete lack of unity of effort with the Army and State Department working from two different playbooks.”65
In April 2007, a Joint Strategic Assessment Team (JSAT) established by newly assigned MNF-I Commanding General David Petraeus and recently appointed US Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker, recommended that political accommodation become the goal of all lines of operation. “Every tool in the Coalition arsenal, including the use of force, political negotiation, and economic aid, would be used to foster accommodation between warring groups…although falling well short of true reconciliation, this would at least bring about local ceasefires that could subsequently be expanded across Iraq,” the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) Reported.66 The JSAT report formed the basis for a revised Joint Campaign Plan for Iraq, which emphasized three operational pillars that were implemented simultaneously: (1) protect Iraq’s population in troubled areas, (2) build the Iraqi government’s capacity to function, and (3) purge Iraq’s leadership of officials whose sectarian and criminal agendas are thwarting US efforts67 new plan shifted the emphasis of military operations away from rapidly transitioning responsibilities to Iraqi security forces and Iraqi government officials, and instead created an 18-21 month bridging strategy intended to set the proper conditions for a more viable handover. The expanded Iraq PRT program would be more decentralized and serve as a “powerful tool in the new counterinsurgency strategy by: bolstering political moderates; promoting reconciliation; fostering economic development, and; building provincial capacity.”68 Miles of twelve-foot high concrete barriers were erected throughout Baghdad to separate Shia and Sunni enclaves. And in Anbar Province, negotiations with reconcilable Sunni tribes led to the formation of US-funded security forces described alternatively as Awakening Councils, Concerned Local Citizens, and Sons of Iraq.69
Embedded PRTs genuinely reinforced a B/RCT’s ability to interact with local Iraqi government officials. Typical brigade staff’s do not have “people that are organized and trained to go help with municipal governance and reconstruction issues,” said Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Winton, Executive Officer of the 1st BCT, 3d Infantry Division, whose AO during 2007 and 2008 included Ramadi, capital of Anbar Province. First BCT’s ePRT effectively assisted Winton and Brigade Commander, Colonel Robert Cloutier, with implementing reconstruction plans, dispersing CERP funds, and coordinating civil affairs operations designed to improve local and provincial governance. Progress in security, reconstruction, and governance were mutually reinforcing. “Gains in governance and gains in reconstruction are linked…and ePRTs were helping BCTs take essential services to the next level,” Winton explained.70 And, while ePRT daily interactions with municipal and provincial officials provided team members with unique insights into local Iraqi affairs, the BCT’s larger footprint and wider reach created more contacts and produced greater amounts of useful data. “We can flood the zone and bring back the information, Lieutenant Colonel Winton added.71 “This was exactly the dynamic envisioned by earlier assessments that suggested the key to success in Iraq would be marrying civilian development expertise to the military’s circulation within local communities,” SIGIR noted.72
Determining whom to trust in local Iraqi communities loomed as a significant problem for ePRT members. The Iraqi government offices where reconstruction deals were negotiated often resembled classic smoke filled back rooms. “My favorite description is the bar scene from Star Wars…when you go to a [council] meeting, it’s just a parade of characters,” said Michael Antoine, former ePRT member in Baghdad’s dangerous Rasheed District73 Many Iraqi officials were keenly interested in the allocation of American reconstruction funding. “Our district council chairman has become the Tony Soprano of Resheed, in terms of controlling resources,” David Atteberry, former USAID Officer at ePRT Rasheed, added.74 “You will use my contractor, or the work will not get done,” Yaqoub al-Bakhaty, Rasheed District Council Chairman, once said, chiding Antoine and other ePRT members.75
Additionally, in the opinion of many ePRT civilian representatives, the military was being judged on the amount of CERP money spent rather than on achieving demonstrable results. “They are being graded on how many projects are being carried out, how much money is flowing to the districts…[but] they should be graded on how many projects are being turned over to the Iraqis and how much less money they are spending…that would be a better indicator of success [which ultimately] is getting Iraqis to deliver their own services, using their own funds and their own people,” said Timothy Zuniga-Brown, ePRT Rasheed team leader in 2007.76 Atteberry believed that excessive US funding actually undermined efforts to increase self-reliance among Iraqis. He noted that “Iraqis are less likely to spend their money when we’re just pumping in ours,” then added, “the best thing we could do is cut off CERP money.”77
Although most ePRTs had BBAs, there was still a marked shortage of cultural and linguistic experts system-wide. Only 29 Arabic-speaking cultural advisors, out of a total compliment of 610 PRT assigned personnel, were actively functional in Iraq as of mid-2007. Overall ePRT staffing was also inadequate for the prodigious scale of the mission. East Rasheed, for example, with a population of 800,000, had roughly the same number of residents as San Francisco. Determining the needs of this many people and subsequently attempting to provide them with essential services was an enormous challenge for the six-member ePRT. Embedded PRT Rasheed team leader Zuniga-Brown even questioned the value of attempting to deliver essential services in the midst of civil conflict. “We might extend legitimacy to the local government, but I don’t know if that’s necessarily true…I know the Iraqis appreciate that we are doing this,” he said, “but it might not translate into strategic success for us.”78
Ambassador Crocker reorganized the US Embassy in Baghdad during 2007 in an effort to gain greater control over reconstruction programs in Iraq. On 9 May, the Iraq Transition Assistance Office (ITAO) was created by presidential order as the successor organization to the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO).79 By yearend 2007, all 28 PRTs in Iraq – 18 full-sized “mothership teams” and 10 ePRTs – reported directly to the Embassy-based Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA), which replaced the National Coordination Team earlier in the year. British, Italians, and Koreans continued to lead the PRTs in Basrah, Dhi Qar, and Erbil, respectively. This reporting relationship was modified in 2008 such that ePRTs began reporting to the mothership PRTs in their particular provinces.80
US reporting chains in Iraq remained complex and convoluted, however. “We have an underdeveloped Iraqi bureaucracy and an overdeveloped US bureaucracy,” observed Colonel Michael Meese, economic and reconstruction advisor to General Patraeus.81 Concerned with the increasing size of the Green Zone staff, USAID’s acting-Deputy Administrator James Kunder told Ambassador Crocker, “if I were you, I’d reduce the embassy presence to a hundred people and give everybody else two choices: they can either go to a PRT, or they can go home.”82 According to SIGIR, however, “a truly joint command structure never evolved.” “To Ambassador Crocker and General Patraeus, achieving unity of effort, in which everyone worked toward common goals, was more important than unity of command, where action was not always predicated upon achieving consensus.”83 Occasionally, the unity of effort structural approach led to misunderstandings and disagreements between US military and civilian personnel serving in Iraq. SIGIR, however, concluded, “that despite the litany of challenges, the civil-military relationship between the embassy and MNF-I improved steadily during 2007.”84
USAID programs, such as the Community Stabilization, Community Action, and Local Governance programs, flourished during the surge. More than 300,000 Iraqis were employed for short-term labor projects in areas recently cleared during military operations. Despite being nearly impossible to accurately measure, economic stimulus programs, according to Vijay Samaraweera, Senior Policy Advisor for RTI International, were seen as a critical component of the surge and its ultimate success.85 By 2008, Iraqis were beginning to assume increasing responsibility for reconstruction and security, as ethno-sectarian violence ebbed through the country. The goal of creating a self-sufficient Iraqi government, a peaceful population, and increased trust between Iraqis and Americans and among Iraqi ethnic and sectarian factions was closer at hand. Nevertheless, DoD force levels in Iraq remained high during 2008, with approximately 160,000 military personnel and 165,000 DoD civilian contractors operating in country.86 These figures do not include the roughly 3,000 DoS, USAID, and other US agency employees/contractors deployed to Iraq in 2008, when the total number of PRTs reached 31 of which 13 were embedded.87
Embedded PRT Baghdad #4 in the Triangle of Death
In September 2007, Colonel Dominic Caraccilo and the 3d BCT, 101st Airborne Division replaced the 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, led by Colonel Michael Kershaw, in a region 20 miles south of Baghdad city that included the infamous triangle of death. The area, referred to as the southern belt of Baghdad, covers 1,000 square kilometers, includes the cities of Mahmudiyah, Yusufiya, and parts of Abu Ghraib, and is inhabited by both Sunnis (75%) and Shias (25%). During the previous 15 months, 2d Brigade sustained 60 KIAs and 300 wounded in this AO, renamed Rakkasan with the arrival of the 3d BCT. Caraccilo reported to Major General Rick Lynch, 3d Infantry Division, Task Force Marne, and commander of Multinational Division-Center. 3d BCT was partnered with the 4th Brigade of the 6th Iraqi Army Division, commanded by Iraqi Brigadier General Ali Jassim Mohammed Hassen Al-Frejee, and with ePRT Baghdad #4, led by US State Department official, Louis Lantner and a full complement of subject matter experts versed in governance, economics, and essential services.
Colonel Caraccilo’s mission was typical of brigades involved in the surge and counterinsurgency in Iraq: to conduct full-spectrum operations; to assist the government of Iraq and Iraqi security forces by interdicting insurgents headed for Baghdad; to defeat sectarian violence and secure the population; to continue to increase the capacity of the Iraqi security forces; to foster local government and economic system development, and; to set the conditions for long-term self-reliance by the Iraqis.88 3d BCT manned 12 patrol bases and seven combined battle positions placed strategically throughout the AO. Iraqi forces occupied 84 battle positions, roughly 2,000 Iraqi police patrolled the main and alternate supply routes, and the newly reintegrated Sons of Iraq established 780 additional checkpoints in the zone. Although insurgents still operated in the area, they were “fragmented and disorganized…and the insurgency was indeed dying on the vine,” Colonel Caraccilo explained, adding that “stability in our region is on a positive upward trend,” because the Iraqi people have chosen “peace and freedom over violence.”89
Embedded PRT Baghdad #4 was task organized with three team members based at FOB St. Michael in Mahmudiyah, the regional government center, and three others in Yusufiyah, an agricultural hub known for raising crops, poultry, and livestock. The ePRT staff assisted the mayor and city council in Mahmudiyah with training, budgeting, project management, and strengthening the city’s relationships with Iraqi federal ministries, such as the Ministry of Education for school and teacher issues and the Ministry of Health for clinics, hospitals, and medical staffing. “It’s a cooperative relationship…some of our ideas they like, some of our ideas they don’t…it’s up to them to decide what’s right for them, what’s right for their culture,” team leader Lantner told the audience at a Department of State Special Briefing in January 2008.90
As for economic development in AO Rakkasan, ePRT Baghdad #4 helped Iraqis re-open a ready-made clothing factory and a metal fabrication/bicycle manufacturing plant, each of which were capable of employing several hundred local residents. The ePRT placed orders with the metal works for giant stop signs, printed in both Arabic and English, for use at the numerous, newly established, government checkpoints in the area. And although the ready-made clothing factory only made uniforms for the Iraqi Army initially, the ePRT helped the workers diversify by ordering the design and production of thousand of soccer uniforms for local Iraqi schools. Subsequently, ePRT Baghdad #4 ordered hundreds of distinctive dayglow orange colored vests for the Sons of Iraq on checkpoint duty. “We are concerned about sustainability, [but] we think we’re making some real inroads here,” Lantner explained.91
Lantner also described the Chicken Run Project, an ePRT effort to re-establish the once thriving poultry industry in the AO. With the veterinarian from his own staff and agricultural specialists on loan from the Baghdad mothership PRT, Lantner began to revive poultry production by developing feed mills, increasing the number of chicken farms, building a slaughterhouse, and bolstering local trucking capabilities in order to move the finished product to market. Also under Lantner’s watch, and with assistance from 3d BCT Soldiers, ePRT Baghdad #4 renovated 10 schools, 11 health clinics, four government buildings, and eight water treatment plants, and paved the road to the central market in Yusufiyah.92
Although incidents of violence were down dramatically by 2008, ePRT members still traveled by full armored convoy, particularly when meeting with the leaders of the 50 tribes in the area. A typical convoy consisted of four Humvees, each with a crew of four or more. Once at a particular destination, the crew then served as a security detail, patrolling the area or surrounding the meeting site building. When Lantner first arrived in Iraq, he was required to wear his vest and helmet at all times, while in convoy and during meetings with government officials and tribal sheikhs. Toward the end of his tenure, he was allowed to remove his equipment during meetings. Lantner was deeply appreciative of the US Military’s role in providing security. “They’re doing a great job of that,” he said, adding, “maintaining security enables my team and me to get out and do our jobs.”93 Lantner envisioned security as the base of a triangle, which had to be relatively stable before activities along the two sides of the triangle – seen as economic development and governance – could begin to flourish and reap rewards. In explaining the synergy among the three sides of the triangle, Lantner emphasized, “there is no doubt that as security becomes better, the economic development and governance sides get better as well.”94
Lantner was concerned about the increasing number of Iraqi refugees returning to the region and with the slowness of the Iraqi ministries in Baghdad to allocate project funding. He also acknowledged the challenge involved in recruiting volunteers to staff ePRTs. “There’s no doubt in my mind that what we’re doing in Iraq on these ePRTs is a worthwhile operation…I’d like to see the number [of ePRTs] increased, because I believe we are contributing.” Lantner exclaimed. “It’s exciting to be here…it really is,” he said concluding his briefing.95
More than Pins on a Map – PRT Accomplishments Across Iraq
In 2007, Shawn Dorman, a former Foreign Service Officer and, at the time, associate editor of the Foreign Service Journal, suggested that PRTs may be only “pins on a map…so officials could say they were out there [when giving] PowerPoint presentations in Washington.”96 Although some State Department representatives serving with PRTs in Iraq may have felt cut off, or lamented the lack of clear operating instructions, the confusing chain of command, and insufficient support from the Embassy in Baghdad, PRT accomplishments were, nevertheless, numerous and noteworthy. “Much of the progress we are seeing is the result of the work of our Provincial Reconstruction Teams. These teams bring together military and civilian experts to help local Iraqi communities pursue reconciliation, strengthen moderates, and speed the transition to Iraqi self-reliance…we’re taking the fight to the enemy,” President Bush said in remarks at the Naval War College on 28 June 2007, as the last of the surge reinforcements were arriving in Iraq.97
In Kirkuk, for example, the PRT assisted provincial officials with financing and managing 575 projects using their own Iraqi Rapid Reconstruction and Economic Development Funds. Along with the 1st BCT, 10th Mountain Division, PRT Kirkuk established the Provincial Reconstruction Development Committee and helped local officials prepare and execute the provincial budget. Additional PRT Kirkuk initiatives begun under the leadership of Howard Keegan included establishing a Major Crimes Court, providing small business loans to local enterprises, developing a solid waste management program, and creating green spaces in previously blighted sections of Kirkuk City.98
PRT Anbar helped the provincial council initiated contact with anti-insurgent tribal leaders that ultimately resulted in power sharing and reconciliation. The PRT also worked with Iraqi judges to restore the rule of law and played a significant role in re-establishing productive communications between the Anbar provincial council and the central Iraqi government officials and ministries in Baghdad. USAID and Community Stabilization Program funding assisted PRT Anbar in opening a chamber of commerce and the Fallujah Business Development Center, both of which were intended to support small businesses in the province. The Ramadi ePRT, led by Kristin Hagerstom, assisted Iraqis in reopening the Agricultural Bank of Ramadi, which had closed in 2004 due to terrorist activity and ePRT Fallijah provided much needed assistance to internally displaced Sunni refugees.99
The PRT in Diyala improved soil fertility and nutrition throughout the province by partnering with Iraqis in the construction of a state-of-the art soil-testing laboratory. PRT Diyala also assisted with renovating Baqubah General Hospital, which improved infant and child-care and the treatment of infectious diseases in the province. The US Army Corps of Engineers also built a new primary health clinic in Khalis, and the first Iraqi woman graduated from the Regional Police Academy at Ashraf.100
With PRT Baghdad assistance, the provincial council opened a newspaper, the Baghdaduna, to report local news and to promote government transparency and accountability by promptly publishing council decisions. The PRT also worked with the Provincial Reconstruction Development Committee (PRDC) to strengthen relations between the provincial council and Baghdad’s nine district and six qada councils. As of mid-2007, PRDC had approved 68 projects and awarded 42 project contracts. An ePRT helped renovate and reopen the Doura Market Complex in Baghdad, increasing the number of shops to 235. One hundred sheikhs from the Taji area attended a regional security summit sponsored by the 1st Cavalry Division and its embedded PRT in Baghdad. The summit, which was also attended by Iraqi military and police leaders, was instrumental in reducing sectarian violence in northern Baghdad province. Additionally, ePRT Baghdad #6, which was led by Ambassador John Bennett and covered the Mansour, Kadhimiya, and Karkh districts, issued micro loans to small businesses, purchased generators to power district markets, developed public works and joint security substations, and mentored district councils and Iraqi public works department staff. Also in Baghdad, the Sadr City PRT provided 265,000 local students with uniforms and backpacks, rehabilitated four health clinics, helped establish a separate women’s clinic, and sponsored several youth soccer leagues.101
The Najaf, Karbala, and Diwaniyah PRTs were all based out of the Regional Embassy Office in Al-Hillih and led by a single team leader, Angus Simmons. With USAID assistance, the team renovated the provincial council offices in all three provinces. The Najaf arm of the PRT helped upgrade Kufa University, began working with Iraqis to build a modern airport intended to boost regional tourism, provided assistance to Iraqi widows with a grant to the Al Hurria Women’s Center, and launched the Al Nur Internet Center for Women.102 In 2008, the Maysan PRT under Daniel Foote and the 4th BCT, 1st Cavalry Division, commanded by Colonel Phillip Battaglia, distributed food and clothing to needy provincial residents during Ramadan, furnished and equipped secondary schools, installed the internet and a computer laboratory at Maysan University, and successfully fostered reconciliation between tribal leaders and provincial officials.103
In Muthanna province, the PRT initiated a wide variety of projects involving agriculture, government, and public diplomacy, and helped provide many citizens with access to clean water, electricity, and health care for the first time. Dr. Indu Chandra Ram, PRT Muthanna’s senior agricultural advisor, led a delegation of provincial officials on a research trip to India to study new methods of agricultural development. Muthanna team leader, Bradley Lynch and senior business advisor Richard Torborg were personally involved in handing-out new computers to students at the Namuthaij girls elementary school as part of the PRT-sponsored One Laptop per Child distribution program. Muthunna Provincial Council Chairman, Abdul Hussein Dhalamy, praised the PRT’s effort to improve technology in the province’s education sector.104
The Iraq Director Generals of Libraries and Education, along with PRT Salah ad Din, sponsored a school visitation program and expanded the collection of history and science books at the Tikrit Central Library, and the US Army 345th Combat Support Hospital conducted a basic life support training program for 24 Iraqi physicians in Tikrit. In August 2008, the Tikrit TIPS Academy graduated 18 Iraqi investigators from its Basic Criminal Investigation Course, and on 21 September, Salah ad Din Governor, Hamad Hamood Shekti, presented team leader Richard Bell and the entire PRT staff including Soldiers from the 407th Civil Affairs Battalion, with certificates of appreciation for their outstanding work on provincial governance issues. Finally, Vanessa Beary, public diplomacy officer at PRT Wasit, sponsored an E-Learning conference at Wasit University College of Education in Al Kut that brought together educators from several provinces to discuss the role of distance learning in the Iraqi college system.105
By the beginning of 2009, the US surge in Iraq was clearly working. US, Coalition, and Iraqi security efforts had significantly reduced ethno-sectarian violence – down 96% from the previous year – in most regions of the country. High profile attacks and civilian casualties likewise decreased by 70% and 75%, respectively. Iraqi security forces had successfully taken-on al-Qaeda insurgents in Basra, Mosul, and Sadr City and all five US surge BCTs, two Marine Corps battalions, and a Marine Expeditionary Unit had redeployed home. The Iraqi Council of Representatives had passed new legislation, such as De-Bathification reform, and amnesty, pension, provincial powers, and provincial election laws; and although revised hydrocarbon and revenue-sharing laws failed to pass, the GoI, nonetheless, began sharing oil revenue with the provinces. The United Arab Emirates posted an ambassador to Baghdad and Kuwait, Bahrain, Syria, Jordan, and the League of Arab States reestablished diplomatic relations with Iraq.106
Throughout Iraq, US ePRTs and US/Coalition mothership PRTs continued to provide federal, provincial, and district government officials, as well as everyday citizens, with reconstruction, essential services, and governance support. In Anbar Province, US Army Major Meredith Brown, ePRT Fallujah civil society organization advisor, and ePRT deputy team leader, Dr. Kevin Rushing, partnered with a local NGO to establish the “50 cows for 50 widows” program. The intent of the sustainable initiative was to help Anbari women become self-supporting and more capable of taking care of each other and their children. The mothership PRT in Anbar helped Ramadi’s Fuel Distribution Center add new stations to its pumping platform, create a rail fuel point at the West Ramadi train station, and rebuild the Hiditha oil refinery. PRT Anbar team leader James Soriano, Multi-National Forces-West Commander, Brigadier General John Wissler (USMC), US Army Corps of Engineers Director of Programs, Richard Hancock, and Colonel Brett Barkey (USMC), PRT rule of law section leader, participated with provincial officials in reopening the Anbar Palace of Justice in Ramadi. Also, Anbar PRT public diplomacy officer, Kelli Cook, provided the English Language Department at Anbar University with several hundred TOEFL (Test of English as a Foreign Language) study guides and CDs purchased with US Embassy micro grant funding. In 2010, ePRT Al-Asad and Soldiers from the 82d Airborne Division donated $9 million in medical supplies to Anbar Province health care professionals. Finally, US Ambassador Christopher Hill met in February with provincial officials, tribal sheikhs, and religious leaders in Ramadi, where he praised the significant capacity-building accomplishments of both current and past Anbar PRT/ePRT team members.107
As security improved in and around Tikrit, PRT Salah ad Din trained emergency medical technicians and helped restore provincial emergency services. Team leader, David Stewart, began teaching classes at the University of Tikrit, which later established a formal internet, video conferencing, and instant messaging connection with Boise State University in Idaho. PRT Salah ad Din also helped construct a new road connecting the village of Tulul El Baq with the larger city of Sharqat. In Dhi Qar Province, the PRT, led by Dr. Anna Prouse, helped revitalize the milk producing industry, donated My Arabic Library books to dozens of schools, and assisted with the restoration of the Nasiriyah Museum and with the preservation of the Great Ziggurat of Ur. The Dhi Qar PRT cultural affairs advisor, along with the Women’s Press Association, organized an International Women’s Day Conference at the Nasiriyah Cultural Center. PRT staff members also hosted a women-only health day at the Mittica Training Center, sponsored a computer skills training program for attorneys, and conducted professional development training for local Iraqi English teachers.108
In Maysan Province, the PRT helped organize the Maysan Agricultural Advisory Committee, and, in cooperation with the Iraqi Director General of Veterinary Medicine, oversaw the vaccination of sheep and cattle against common livestock diseases. The USAID and PRT Maysan, led at the time by Gary Mignano, trained Iraqi engineers in the use of computer aided design (AutoCAD) software. The PRT also taught Iraqi English teachers, instructed Iraqi agricultural officials in proper water/soil management techniques, purchased generators for the courthouses in six Maysani districts, and refurbished water filtration equipment in Qalat Salah. Colonel Walter Franz, MD, Commander of the 945th Forward Surgical Team, US Army medical personnel from the 121st Brigade Support Battalion form Camp Gary Owen, and the Maysan PRT medical staff began conducting specialized “train-the-trainer” workshops, focused on trauma and critical care management procedures, for Maysani physicians, nurses, and health care administrators.109
Diyala PRT sponsored a conference entitled Women of Diyala: Speak. The attendees included Iraqi women from a wide variety of backgrounds – young, old, urban, rural, professional, farmers, homemakers, Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish. PRT members also trained local residents in the operation and maintenance of Vactor sewage pumping vehicles and distributed “My Arabic Library” books to 80 provincial schools. The PRT at Diwaniyah, led by Michael Klechesky, opened new primary health care clinics built by the Army Corps of Engineers in the al-Jumoury neighborhood of Diwaniyah City and in al Noor village, Qadisiyah Province. In 2009-2010, six additional clinics were opened by the PRT, as well as a new public health training center. The PRT established a local fish hatchery in collaboration with Diwaniyah Agricultural High School, refurbished the Khadeeja School for Girls and the Dijla Boys School, provided provincial officials with a Geographic Information System in order to better manage scarce water resources, and trained local women in entrepreneurship. And with PRT assistance, Qadisiyah University became a “sister university” of the University of Bridgeport.110
The Erbil Regional Reconstruction Team (RRT) provided a micro-grant to provincial officials for the development of an English language curriculum and the purchase of textbooks. RRT Erbil also established an “American Corner” at the Zaytun Public Library, funded programs at the Unity Youth Performing Arts Academy, sponsored a cultural festival in Sulimaniyah, provided mobility equipment for handicapped war survivors, and offered emergency and humanitarian assistance to northern Erbil Governorate flood victims. Under the leadership of Andrew Snow, the RRT also sponsored environmental stewardship and women’s economic integration programs, opened a TOEFL training and testing center at Dohuk University, and built a new emergency hospital and trauma center in Zakho.111
In Muthanna Province, the PRT and a local NGO, the Public Awareness Organization, exhibited the works of 40 Iraqi female artists. The exhibit, entitled the “Colors of Warka,” traveled between the cities of Samawa, Rumaytha, and Khider, and was eventually displayed in Washington, DC. Bradley Lynch, PRT Muthunna leader, issued micro-grants to provincial residents for training at the Nasiriyah Small Business Development Center and at Camp Mittica, the Iraqi security forces facility near Tallil Air Base, and also sponsored a basic medical skills refresher program for local physicians, continuing education for journalist, and sewing classes for women. Lynch and the Community Action Group funded a Festival of Peace and Tolerance for children and opened the Al Jarbo’eya Family Park in the town of Samawa. In addition, the PRT opened the Muthanna Chamber of Commerce Business Development Center, taught literacy, and installed water purification equipment in the city of Al Khidr on the Euphrates River.112
Similarly, in Najaf, the PRT funded sustainable livelihood programs for women, such as the greenhouse management project at the Al Hurria Women’s Center. The Iraqi Journalists Syndicate, also financed by PRT Najaf, conducted a four-day workshop for provincial journalist that culminated with the celebration of Iraqi Press Freedom Day. In March 2010, team leader Angus Simmons marked the opening of the Al Mahajeer Al Gharbiah Public Health Center and a new vehicle bridge built to reach the center. PRT Karbala sponsored a new provincial business development center and gave the Husayniyah Youth Center enough sports and recreation equipment to support programs for 500 children.113
In Wasit Province, the US Army Corps of Engineers and PRT leader Kevin Blackstone reopened the newly renovated Zurbatiyah Port of Entry, east of Baghdad and the busiest border crossing point between Iraq and Iran. PRT Wasit opened the Danoobi Electrical Substation, renovated the Jassan-Danoobi irrigation pump stations, and rebuilt three Shuhada micro power generation sites serving the impoverished Damook neighborhood of Al Kut. The PRT also held a Cultural Arts Festival at the Wasit Provincial Council auditorium and conducted midwifery training for health care providers throughout the province. Meanwhile in Baghdad, agricultural advisors with the mothership PRT helped the Green Mada’in Association for Agricultural Development open a new office and warehouse facilities. PRT funding assisted local farmers install 600 drip irrigation systems and build 400 greenhouses in Mada’in Qada. The Baghdad PRT, in conjunction with the Iraqi Society for Defending Press Freedom, conducted workshops for journalists and also sponsored a Boy Scout Jamboree at the Qadisiyyah Scout Camp, which once served as Saddam Hussein’s private hunting grounds. Embedded PRT North hosted youth activities – the Arab-Kurdish Youth Exchange and the Summer Youth Programs for elementary, middle, and high school students – in the rural areas of Taji and Tarmiyah, sponsored women’s health education programs for nurses and midwives, and conducted adult literacy and life skills training programs. And in Mahmudiya, ePRT Baghdad South continued to help local farmers revive poultry production in the region.114
Finally, in Basra, the PRT, British Consulate General, and the provincial investment commission hosted United Kingdom Business Secretary, Lord Peter Mandelson and a UK trade delegation in an effort to expand economic development in southern Iraq. Basra PRT also furnished training manuals and equipment to the Al Amah Deaf and Mute Society, initiated the US-funded “goats for widows” program intended to give rural single female heads of household a sustainable means of self-support, began delivering daily supplies of fresh water to the drought-stricken city of Al Khaseeb, and refurbished water treatment plants in Ribbat, Jubalia, Bradia, and Al Maqil. The PRT in Basra, led in 2010 by John Naland, former President of the American Foreign Service Association, also supported the formation of the Basra Transparency Board, made up of public and private Iraqi officials intent on creating greater openness in government. Numerous micro grants funded by the PRT and the USAID Tijara Program helped provincial residents develop a wide variety of small businesses. Improvements to Basra’s sewer system, trash removal program, and electrical grid were likewise facilitated by the PRT, as was the rehabilitation of dozens of schools, the Basra Children’s Hospital, Basra International Airport, and the Port of Umm Qasr. Basra PRT also helped Iraqis initiate several rule of law projects, including construction of the Basra Central Prison and the Al Medina and Shatt Al Arab courthouses, renovation of the Basra Police Forensic Laboratory, and establishment of the Access to Justice program designed to provide Iraqi criminal defendants with appropriate legal representation.115
Operation NEW DAWN
The redeployment of US surge forces from Iraq began in January 2009, and, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the US-Iraq Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA), all American combat troops were withdrawn from Iraqi cities by 30 June 2009. “The level of violence remained at record lows following the withdrawal of US Forces from Iraqi cities…demonstrating the Iraqi security forces’ growing capability to handle security responsibilities independently,” General David Petraeus, Commander US Central Command, told the Senate Armed Services Committee.116 Iraqis held nationwide parliamentary elections in March 2010, and, although the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court certified the election results in June, a new government had yet to be formed and a new Council of representatives had not been seated as of October 2010, since no political bloc had won a dominant proportion of votes.117
Although many contentious political issues remained unresolved in Iraq, such as Sons of Iraq integration, de-Baathification, perceived Sunni marginalization, revenue distribution, and disputed internal boundaries between Arabs and Kurds, neither political, ethnic, nor sectarian tensions escalated into retributive violence. As of 2010, Iraqis continued to show slow, but steady, progress across the board with improved diplomatic relations, rule of law expansion, reduction of government corruption, oil infrastructure investments, creation of new jobs, and the successful functioning of Iraqi security forces in the counterinsurgency role. “We will continue to work with the new Iraqi government to implement the SFA and strengthen our bilateral relationship,” General Petraeus told Congress.118 Petraeus’ statement echoed the official DoD position on Iraq as of June 2010: “The ongoing implementation of the SFA…sets the stage for long-term cooperative efforts as Iraq develops into a sovereign, stable, self-reliant partner in the region and the United States transitions roles and responsibilities from US Forces to the GoI, the US Embassy in Baghdad, and other non-USF-I entities.”119
“Let me say this as plainly as I can: by August 31, 2010, our combat mission in Iraq will end,” President Obama told Marines at Camp Lejeune on 27 February 2009.120 At the time there were 144,000 US troops in Iraq, however the number steadily declined to roughly 100,000 a year later and 88,000 by May 2010. In early August, the President reminded the nation of his promise, telling attendees at the national Disabled Veterans of American Convention in Atlanta that “I pledged to bring the war in Iraq to a responsible end…I made it clear that by August 31, 2010, American combat missions in Iraq would end…and that’s exactly what were doing – as promised and on schedule.”121 At 1:30 a.m., 19 August, the last convoy of the Army’s 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2d Infantry Division, the final combat unit to leave Iraq, passed through the Khabari border crossing and into Kuwait, thus marking the conclusion of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and the beginning of another – Operation NEW DAWN.122
Left behind in Iraq was a transitional force of 50,000 US troops, re-designated United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I). Led initially by US Army General Raymond Odierno, and as of 1 September 2010, by General Lloyd Austin, USF-I was a sub-unified command of US Central Command and had three principal subordinate units: United States Division-North (USD-N), 1st Cavalry Division; United State Division-Center (USD-C), 1st Armored Division; and United States Division-South (USD-S), 1st Infantry Division.123 US military equipment in Iraq was reduced by roughly 75% and the number US bases cut back from 357 to 92.124 By 1 September 2010, USF-I was fully transitioned to stability operations with the mission of “advising, training, assisting, and equipping the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF); conducting partnered counterterrorism operations by, with, and through ISF; logistically supporting M-1 tanks, artillery, and F-16 aircraft; protecting Iraqi airspace; and providing support to the US Embassy Baghdad, the GoI, the UN in improving Iraqi civil capacity including ministerial and institutional development.”125
“Our combat mission is ending, but our commitment to Iraq’s future is not…the Iraqi people will have a strong partner in the United States,” President Obama said, 31 August 2010, in an address to the nation on the end of American combat operations in Iraq.126 The US troop reduction did not foreshadow a reduced US commitment to Iraq. The strength of the American commitment remained the same, however the nature of the commitment shifted dramatically from one dominated by the military to one led by civilians. Newly arrived US Ambassador to Iraq, James Jeffrey, was expected to increase his staff to 2,400 members at the embassy in Baghdad and other diplomatic sites and to expand to 7,000 the DoS private security detail required to protect the civilian personnel and guard the embassy and four additional fortified US compounds in Iraq. In addition to typical security operations, such as convoy escort, the security contractors’ mission was expanded to include the use of counter-rocket/counter-artillery radar, searching for IEDs and EFPs, flying reconnaissance drones, and standing-up quick reaction forces. To help accomplish this mission, the State Department intended to acquire 60 mine-resistant, ambush-protected vehicles (MRAPs) and more than 1,300 armored cars, and to increase the size of its Iraq-based helicopter fleet from 17 to 29. Approximately 1,200 specific tasks, formerly undertaken by the US military, were scheduled for phase out or transfer to either American civilians or to Iraqis. By October 2011, the Department of State was to assume the additional responsibility of training the Iraqi police127 “I don’t think State has ever operated on its own, independent of the US military, in an environment that is quite as threatening on such a large scale…it is unprecedented,” former ambassador James Dobbins said, commenting on the scope of the new DoS Iraq operation.128 Dr. Kenneth Pollack, Director of Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution agreed, noting, “What the State Department is being asked to do isn’t in their DNA.”129
As for PRTs and ePRTs in Iraq, SIGIR reported a total of 18 as of midyear 2010: 15 PRTs, one RRT, and two ePRTs. There were also 15 PRT satellite offices – re-designated Forward Presence offices – scattered throughout the country. The mothership PRTs in Basrah, Ninewa, Kirkuk, and Diyala, along with the RRT in Erbil, were scheduled to transition to more permanent Enduring Presence Posts.130 DoD reported slightly different figures for the same time frame: 15 US-led PRTs, one Italian-led PRT at Dhi Qar, one RRT in Erbil, and four ePRTs in Baghdad.131 As of October 2010, however, the Office of Provincial Affairs at the US Embassy Baghdad confirmed the existence of 16 mothership PRTs still operating in Iraq, twelve of which are scheduled for closure in 2011. RRT Erbil and PRT Basrah will transition to Consulate Generals and PRTs Mosul and Kirkuk will become Embassy Branch Offices. All remaining embedded PRTs were closed by the end of August 2010.132
1 Robert Perito, The US Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, Testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on oversight and Investigations, October 2007, 1, (accessed 31 August 2010); Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress, 30 July 2010, 42-43, (accessed 31 August 2010).
2 Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Report No. 07-34, Playbook: Provincial Reconstruction Teams-Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, September 2007, 61.
3 Robert Perito, The US Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, Testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on oversight and Investigations, October 2007, 2-3.
4 Robert Perito, The US Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, Testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on oversight and Investigations, October 2007, 3-4.
5 “This is USAID,” 29 April 2009, 1, (accessed 17 March 2010).
6 Embassy of the United States, “Iraq Project and Contracting Office,” 1-2, (accessed 17 March 2010).
7 United States Department of State, Office of Inspector General, “Review of the Roles, Staffing, and Effectiveness of Regional Embassy Offices in Iraq,” Report Number MERO-IQO-09-09, August 2009, 16, (accessed 15 March 2010).
8 President George W. Bush, “National Security Presidential Directive 36,” 11 May 2004, 1-3, (accessed 17 March 2010).
9 Portions of the following section draw upon the author’s previous, but as yet unpublished, works. See Donald Wright et al., On Point III, Chapter 9 and Peter Connors, Three Dimensional Chess in the Jerusalem of Kurdistan, Chapter 3, drafts of both documents on file at the US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
10 Several 116th BCT subunits relieved their respective 2d BCT counterparts before the official TOA ceremony on 17 February 2005. TF 3-116 under Lieutenant Colonel Daniel McCabe, for example, replaced TF1-14 south of Kirkuk on 27 December 2004.
11 Ginger Cruz, The Role of the Department of Defense in Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 5 September 2007, 2, (accessed 17 March 2010).
12 Brigadier General Alan Gayhart, interview by Contemporary Operations Studies Team, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 3 January 2008, 9-10, 15.
13 Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, “Action Plan to Build Capacity and Sustainability within Iraq’s Provincial Governments,” Baghdad Cable 004045, 1 October 2005, 1-11.
14 Secretary Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks at the Inauguration of the Provincial Reconstruction Team,” 11 November 2005, 1-2. (accessed 24 July 2008).
15 Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, “US Ambassador in Kirkuk Inaugurates New Tamim Provincial Reconstruction Team,” Embassy of the United States Press Release, 27 November 2005,1, (accessed 16 March 2010).
16 Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad quoted in “Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) Fact Sheet,” Embassy of the United States Press Release, 16 June 2006, 1, (accessed 12 March 2010).
17 Robert Perito, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq, Special Report 185, United States Institute of Peace, March 2007, 3, (accessed 18 March 2010).
18 Robert Perito, 3.
19 Condoleezza Rice quoted in Andrew Lubin, “Economic Reconstruction in Iraq,” US Cavalry ON Point, 6 September 2007, 1, (accessed 16 March 2010).
20 Condoleezza Rice quoted in Jim Fisher-Thompson, “Rice Pays Surprise Visit to Iraq, Highlights Rebuilding Partnerships,” Embassy of the United States Press Release, 18 December 2007, 2, (accessed 16 March 2010).
[xxix] President George W. Bush, “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq,” National Security Council, November 2005, 8, (accessed 18 March 2010).
22 Ginger Cruz, The Role of the Department of Defense in Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 5 September 2007, 4.
23 Office of the Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq, SIGIR-06-034, 29 October 2006, 16, (accessed 22 February 2010).
24 United States Department of State, Kirkuk PRT Overview, 10 May 2008, Slide No. 5, (10_May_2008).ppt (accessed 27 February 2010).
25 Center for Army Lessons Learned, Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, Handbook No. 07-11, January 2007, 30-31, 35, 41.
26 Andrew Lubin, “Economic Reconstruction in Iraq,” US Cavalry ON Point, 6 September 2007, 3-5, (accessed 16 March 2010); Jim Fisher-Thompson, “Rice Pays Surprise Visit to Iraq, Highlights Rebuilding Partnerships,” Embassy of the United States Press Release, 18 December 2007, 1-2, (accessed 16 March 2010).
27 United States Department of State, Office of Inspector General, “Review of the Roles, Staffing, and Effectiveness of Regional Embassy Offices in Iraq,” Report Number MERO-IQO-09-09, August 2009, 16, (accessed 15 March 2010).
28 US Embassy Baghdad, Iraq, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Ninewa,” 2010, 1, (accessed 21 September 2010).
29 US Embassy Baghdad, Iraq, “PRT Ninewa Prepares Teachers for My Arabic Library,” 9 March 2009, 1, (accessed 21 September 2010).
30 US Embassy Baghdad, Iraq, “PRT Ninewa Plays Music for Peace,” 7 March 2009, 1, (accessed 21 September 2010).
31 US Embassy Baghdad, Iraq, “US Helps Prepare Farmers in Ninewa Province in Better Business,” 6 April 2009, 1, (accessed 21 September 2010).
32 US Embassy Baghdad, Iraq, “Ninewa PRT Celebrates Sustainable Partnerships,” 3 October 2009, 1, (accessed 21 September 2010).
33 W. Patrick Murphy quoted in Multi-National Division – North PAO, “Stable Security Allows Market to Re-open in Mosul,” 11 October 2009, 1, (accessed 30 September 2010).
34 Captain Joseph Himpelmann quoted in Multi-National Division – North PAO, “Stable Security Allows Market to Re-open in Mosul,” 11 October 2009, 1.
35 Faris Al Assadi quoted in US Embassy Baghdad, Iraq, “Thirty-six Strong, Ninewa PRT Presses on with Greenhouse Program,” 16 December 2009, 1, (accessed 21 September 2010).
36 Abe Martinez quoted in US Embassy Baghdad, Iraq, “Ninewa PRT Security Training Helps Rule of Law Take Hold in Ninewa,” 30 November 2009, 1, (accessed 21 September 2010).
37 Renas Shwany quoted in US Embassy Baghdad, Iraq, “Ninewa PRT Funds Mosul GIS Base Map Project,” 22 December 2009, 1, (accessed 21 September 2010).
38 Dr. Christopher Kenyhercz quoted in US Embassy Baghdad, Iraq, “PRT Ninewa Mother/Infant Health Training Already Showing Signs of Success,” 27 December 2009, 1, (accessed 21 September 2010).
39 US Embassy Baghdad, Iraq, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Babil,” 2010, 1, (accessed 21 September 2010).
40 Sherry McClain, “Dr. Sue Sroda Returns from Iraq and Plans to Share Her Experiences,” Murray State University Press Release, 31 March 2009, 1, (accessed 3 October 2010); US Embassy Baghdad, Iraq, “PRT Babil Sponsors English Teaching Workshop,” 6 March 2009, 1, (accessed 21 September 2010).
41 US Embassy Baghdad, Iraq, “PRT Babil Supports Training by Embassy English Language Specialist,” 13 April 2010, 1, (accessed 21 September 2010).
42 US Embassy Baghdad, Iraq, “PRT Babil Hosts Workshop on Investigative Reporting,” 6 April 2009, 1, (accessed 21 September 2010).
43 US Embassy Baghdad, Iraq, “Babil PRT Expands Successful Criminal Forensic Training to Include Reporters,” 28 March 2010, 1, (accessed 21 September 2010).
44 US Embassy Baghdad, Iraq, “PRT Babil Sponsors Performances of Sense of Democracy,” 25 April 2009, 1, (accessed 21 September 2010).
45 US Embassy Baghdad, Iraq, “Babil PRT Joins Provincial Health Authorities in Fight Against Cholera,” 16 June 2009, 1, (accessed 21 September 2010).
46 Salman Al-Zargany quoted in US Embassy Baghdad, Iraq, “Babil PRT Delivers Water Tankers to Combat Cholera,” 12 September 2009, 1, (accessed 21 September 2010).
47 US Embassy Baghdad, Iraq, “Babil PRT Funds New Center for Information and Training,” 10 November 2009, 1, (accessed 21 September 2010).
48 US Embassy Baghdad, Iraq, “Babil PRT Supports Babylon Beekeepers Association,” 24 November 2009, 1, (accessed 21 September 2010).
49 US Embassy Baghdad, Iraq, “PRT Babil Donates Books to Hillah Central Library,” 28 February 2010, 1, (accessed 21 September 2010).
50 Joseph Gregoire, interview by United States Institute of Peace, Oral Histories: Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Washington, DC, Interview # 6, 13 March 2008, 1-3; Lieutenant Colonel Robert Ruch, interview by United States Institute of Peace, Oral Histories: Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Washington, DC, Interview # 1, 8 February 2008, 10, 15.
51 Joseph Gregoire, interview by United States Institute of Peace, 4-5, 9; Lieutenant Colonel Robert Ruch, interview by United States Institute of Peace, 3.
52 Joseph Gregoire, interview by United States Institute of Peace, 4, 8, 10, 13-15; Lieutenant Colonel Robert Ruch, interview by United States Institute of Peace, 9, 16.
53 Lieutenant Colonel Robert Ruch, interview by United States Institute of Peace, 18, 21.
54 President George W. Bush, “President’s Address to the Nation,” Office of the White House Press Secretary, 10 January 2007, 2.
55 National Security Council, “Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review,” Briefing, January 2007, Slide 8, (accessed 18 July 2010).
56 President George W. Bush, “President’s Address to the Nation,” Office of the White House Press Secretary, 10 January 2007, 2.
57 “Fact Sheet: Expanding Provincial Reconstruction Teams to Achieve Iraqi Self Reliance,” Office of the White House Press Secretary, 22 March 2007, 1-2, (accessed 10 October 2010).
58 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice quoted in Shawn Dorman, “Iraq PRTs: Pins on a Map,” Foreign Service Journal, March 2007, 34.
59 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, The New Way Forward in Iraq, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 11 January 2007, 3, (accessed 20 July 2010).
60 Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2009), 314.
61 Robert Perito, “Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams,” United States Institute of Peace, Briefing, February 2008, 1-2, (accessed 6 October 2010).
62 Some ePRT members considered CERP funded projects as “feel good” projects, touted as tangible examples of American good works focused on quick wins with visible indices of progress, see Blake Stone, “Blind Ambition: Lessons Learned and Not Learned in an Embedded PRT,” PRISM Volume 1, Issue 4, September 2010, 147-158.
63 Robert Perito, “Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams,” 2-3.
64 Kiki Munshi quoted in Shawn Dorman, “Iraq PRTs: Pins on a Map,” 29.
65 Blake Stone, “Blind Ambition: Lessons Learned and Not Learned in an Embedded PRT,” 154.
66 Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2009), 298.
67 Ann Scott Tyson, “New Strategy for War Stresses Iraqi Politics,” Washington Post, 23 May 2007, 1-2.
68 “Fact Sheet: Expanding Provincial Reconstruction Teams to Achieve Iraqi Self Reliance,” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 22 March 2007, 1-3, (accessed 10 October 2010).
69 Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, 297.
70Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Winton quoted in Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, 300.
71 Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Winton quoted in Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, 301.
72 Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, 302.
73 Michael Antoine quoted in Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, 302.
74 David Atteberry quoted in Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, 302.
75 Yaqoub al-Bakhaty, quote repeated by Michael Antoine in Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, 302.
76 Timothy Zuniga-Brown quoted in Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, 303.
77 David Atteberry quoted in Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, 303.
78 Timothy Zuniga-Brown quoted in Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, 303-304.
79 President George W. Bush, “Executive Order: Establishment of Temporary Organization to Facilitate United States Government Assistance for Transition in Iraq,” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 9 May 2007, 1, (accessed 10 October 2010).
80 0 US Department of State, “Fact Sheet on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs),” Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, 17 December 2007, 1, (accessed 21 September 2010).
81 Colonel Michael Meese quoted in Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, 307.
82 James Kunder quoted in Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, 308.
83 Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, 308.
84 Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, 308.
85 Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, 309.
86 Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, April 2008), 32.
87 US Embassy Baghdad, “PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Teams) Fact Sheet,” Public Affairs Section, 20 March 2008, 1, (accessed 14 October 2010).
88 Colonel Dominic Caraccilo, “DoD News Briefing with Colonel Caraccilo,” Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, 24 March 2008, 1-2, (accessed 15 October 2010).
89 Colonel Dominic Caraccilo, “DoD News Briefing with Colonel Caraccilo,” Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, 24 March 2008, 2, (accessed 15 October 2010).
90 Louis Lantner, “Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Leader Louis Lantner on Progress in Iraq,” US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, 16 January 2008, 1, (accessed 13 September 2010).
91 Louis Lantner, “Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Leader Louis Lantner on Progress in Iraq,” 2.
92 Louis Lantner, “Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Leader Louis Lantner on Progress in Iraq,” 2-3; Colonel Dominic Caraccilo, “DoD News Briefing with Colonel Caraccilo,” 2.
93 Louis Lantner, “Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Leader Louis Lantner on Progress in Iraq,” 2.
94 Louis Lantner, “Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Leader Louis Lantner on Progress in Iraq,” 2-3.
95 Louis Lantner, “Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Leader Louis Lantner on Progress in Iraq,” 3-4.
96 Shawn Dorman, “Iraq PRTs: Pins on a Map,” Foreign Service Journal, March 2007, 23, 39.
97 President George Bush quoted in “The Way Forward in Iraq: An Update,” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 28 June 2007, 1-3, (accessed 17 October 2010).
98 “Fact Sheet: Expanding Provincial Reconstruction Teams to Achieve Iraqi Self Reliance,” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 22 March 2007, 1-3, (accessed 10 October 2010); “Provincial Reconstruction Teams Helping Iraq to Stabilize,” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 8 January 2008, 1-4, (accessed 5 October 2010).
99 “Fact Sheet: Expanding Provincial Reconstruction Teams to Achieve Iraqi Self Reliance,” 1-3; “Overview of Provincial Reconstruction Teams’ Mission in Iraq,” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 13 July 2007, 1-3, (accessed 12 June 2010); “Provincial Reconstruction Teams Helping Iraq to Stabilize,” 1-4; Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, “Embassy News: 2008 PRT News,” September-December 2008, 1-3, (accessed 12 June 2010).
100 “Fact Sheet: Expanding Provincial Reconstruction Teams to Achieve Iraqi Self Reliance,” 1-3; “Overview of Provincial Reconstruction Teams’ Mission in Iraq,” 1-3; Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, “Embassy News: 2008 PRT News,” September-December 2008, 1-3, (accessed 12 June 2010).
101 “Fact Sheet: Expanding Provincial Reconstruction Teams to Achieve Iraqi Self Reliance,” 1-3; “Overview of Provincial Reconstruction Teams’ Mission in Iraq,” 1-3; “Provincial Reconstruction Teams Helping Iraq to Stabilize,” 1-4; “Success of the Surge and Political Improvements in Iraq,” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 15 October 2008, 1-3, (accessed 5 October 2010).
102 “Provincial Reconstruction Teams Helping Iraq to Stabilize,” 1-4;
Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams: PRT Najaf,” 28 and 30 March 2009, 1, (accessed 16 October 2010).
103 “Provincial Reconstruction Teams Helping Iraq to Stabilize,” 1-4; “Success of the Surge and Political Improvements in Iraq,” 1-3.
104 Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, “Embassy News: 2008 PRT News,” September-December 2008, 1-3.
105 “Success of the Surge and Political Improvements in Iraq,” 1-3; Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, “Embassy News: 2008 PRT News,” September-December 2008, 1-3.
106 “Success of the Surge and Political Improvements in Iraq,” 2.
107 Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, “2009 Provincial Reconstruction Team News,” January-June 2009, 1-3, (accessed 6 October 2010); Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, “2010 Provincial Reconstruction Team News,” January-March 2010, 1-5, (accessed 6 October 2010).
108 Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, “2009 Provincial Reconstruction Team News,” January-June 2009, 1-3; Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, “2009 Provincial Reconstruction Team News,” March-December 2009, 1-8, (accessed 6 October 2010); Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, “2010 Provincial Reconstruction Team News,” January-March 2010, 1-5.
109 Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, “2009 Provincial Reconstruction Team News,” January-June 2009, 1-3; Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, “2009 Provincial Reconstruction Team News,” March-December 2009, 1-8.
110 Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, “2009 Provincial Reconstruction Team News,” January-June 2009, 1-3; Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, “2009 Provincial Reconstruction Team News,” March-December 2009, 1-8; Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, “2010 Provincial Reconstruction Team News,” January-March 2010, 1-5.
111 Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, “2009 Provincial Reconstruction Team News,” January-June 2009, 1-3; Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, “2009 Provincial Reconstruction Team News,” March-December 2009, 1-8; Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, “2010 Provincial Reconstruction Team News,” January-March 2010, 1-5.
112 Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, “2009 Provincial Reconstruction Team News,” March-December 2009, 1-8; Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, “2010 Provincial Reconstruction Team News,” January-March 2010, 1-5.
113 Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, “2009 Provincial Reconstruction Team News,” March-December 2009, 1-8; Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, “2010 Provincial Reconstruction Team News,” January-March 2010, 1-5.
114 Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, “2009 Provincial Reconstruction Team News,” March-December 2009, 1-8; Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, “2010 Provincial Reconstruction Team News,” January-March 2010, 1-5.
115 Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, “2009 Provincial Reconstruction Team News,” March-December 2009, 1-8; Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, “2010 Provincial Reconstruction Team News,” January-March 2010, 1-5.
116General David Petraeus, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 16 March 2010, 34, (accessed 21 August 2010).
117 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, Report to Congress, June 2010, iii-iv.
118 General David Petraeus, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 16 March 2010, 35.
119 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, Report to Congress, June 2010, x.
120 President Barack Obama, “Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq,” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 27 February 2009, 2, (accessed 13 October 2010).
121 President Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at Disabled Veterans of America Conference in Atlanta, GA,” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2 August 2010, 2, (accessed 22 October 2010).
122 “Last Full US Combat Brigade Leaves Iraq,” , 19 August 2010, 1-2, (accessed 13 October 2010).
123 “United States Forces-Iraq Major Units,” USF-I PAO, 3 March 2010, 1, (accessed 21 October 2010).
124 Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, “Facts and Figures on Drawdown in Iraq,” 31 August 2010, 1-2, (accessed 13 October 2010).
125 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, Report to Congress, June 2010, iii; Michael Gordon, “Civilians to Take Lead as Military Leaves Iraq,” New York Times, 18 August 2010, 2, (accessed 13 October 2010).
126 President Barack Obama, “President Obama on End of US Combat Mission in Iraq,” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 31 August 2010, 2, (accessed 21 October 2010).
127 Michael Gordon, “Civilians to Take Lead as Military Leaves Iraq,” 1-6.
128 Ambassador James Dobbins quoted in Michael Gordon, “Civilians to Take Lead as Military Leaves Iraq,” 2.
129 Kenneth Pollack quoted in Robert Burns, “Army of Diplomats Takes the Lead in Fractious Iraq,” ABC News, 21 August 2010, 2, (accessed 21 October 2010).
130 Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, July 2010), 42.
131 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, Report to Congress, June 2010, 6.
132 Michael Morrow, Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, Office of Provincial Affairs, email correspondence, 23 October 2010, on file at the US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
Chapter 7. Conclusion
Since before the United States became an independent nation, American Armed Forces have been conducting successful civil-military operations. After World War II, the Marshall Plan transformed Europe and the United States helped rebuild Japan. The CORDS/Phoenix programs effectively pacified much of South Vietnam during the war there. More recently, humanitarian relief contingency missions, such as those in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, have all included significant civil-military components. Currently, US counterinsurgency and SASO missions have required the deployment of hundreds of thousands of military and civilian personnel in support of civil-military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq where the innovative Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) concept came of age.
PRTs are the most effective civil-military organizations in US military history. Conceptualized in 2002 by US Special Envoy to Afghanistan, James Dobbins, the PRT experiment expanded in Afghanistan under Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad. Khalilzad subsequently initiated an OIF PRT program after he was appointed US Ambassador to Iraq in 2005. Iraq PRTs were staffed primarily by civilians, whereas those in Afghanistan had a greater military presence. The PRT missions in both countries were generally similar. In Afghanistan, PRTs were “located in provincial capitals where they interacted with the governor, representatives of the central government, and elected provincial councils. Afghan PRTs endeavored to extend the authority of the central government into the provinces in order to develop a stable and secure environment, enable security sector reform and economic and social development, and to help insure that traditionally strong local authorities promoted the aims of the central government and not pursue independent agendas.”1 While in Iraq, PRTs were “expected to assist Iraqi provincial and municipal officials undertake local initiatives in an historically centralized state and to help them improve governance, reconstruction, and security through capacity building and by creating political space for moderates to operate. Iraq PRTs were also expected to assist the US military by providing the political component of the US counterinsurgency strategy.”2
Civilian Surge in Iraq
In his 2007 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush asked Congress to authorize an increase in the size of the US Army and Marine Corps by an additional 92,000 Soldiers and Marines. In an effort to further the cause of a whole-of-government approach to contingency operations involving both military and diplomatic action, the President also called upon Congress to assist with the design and establishment of a “volunteer civilian reserve corps that would function much like our military reserve and ease the burden on our Armed Forces by allowing us to hire civilians with critical skills to serve on missions abroad when America needs them.”3
The intent of the President’s request was to add strength to his December 2005 National Security Presidential Directive-44 that directed the Secretary of State to “coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all US Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities.”4 In hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice endorsed civilian expansion, testifying “in Iraq we tried to do reconstruction by putting it under a single department, the Defense Department…we were not fully able to mobilize the civilian capabilities needed for reconstruction…we did not have in the US Government an institution that could really deal with post-conflict stabilization.”5 Eventually, the US House of Representatives passed the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act (RSCMA) of 2008 – H.R. 1084 – which authorized the Secretary of State to “establish and maintain a response readiness corps and a civilian reserve corps” to provide civilian management of stabilization and reconstruction efforts in post-conflict environments.6 President Bush signed RSCMA into law on 14 October 2008.
According to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), RSCMA was “the most significant congressional legislation ever passed regarding the structure of and planning for contingency relief and reconstruction operations.”7 The Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Ambassador John Herbst, was appointed by the President, confirmed by the Senate, and reported directly to the Secretary of State. Under RSCMA, Ambassador Herbst’s duties and responsibilities were numerous:
- Monitoring political and economic instability worldwide;
- Anticipating the need for mobilizing United States assistance;
- Assessing the types of reconstruction and stabilization crises that could occur;
- Monitoring the non-military resources available to address such crises;
- Planning to address requirements that arise in such crises;
- Developing interagency contingency plans to mobilize and deploy civilian personnel;
- Developing interagency contingency plans for reconstruction and stabilization;
- Identifying appropriate civilian personnel to participate in the Civilian Reserve Corps;
- Training and educating Civilian Reserve Corps volunteers;
- Coordinating US reconstruction and stabilization actions with other governments; and,
- Fielding on-site needs assessment teams.8
SIGIR also reported, however, three significant impediments to RSCMA’s fulfilling its much-anticipated promise. First, without a substantial staff and sufficient funding, the State Department office for Reconstruction and Stabilization would be hard pressed to meet its ambitious goals and objectives. Thus far, Congress has been unable to appropriate sufficient funding to adequately address the RSCMA mandate. The Senate Appropriations Committee provided $120M in fiscal year 2010 funding for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, but has recommended only $50M for FY 2011which is $134M less than the State Department budget request and $70M below the FY2010 level9
Secondly, the interagency coordination and integration envisioned with RSCMA has not materialized due primarily to insufficient budgets and lack of appropriate authority to cross supporting-agencies’ boundaries. “Contingency relief and reconstruction operations are not inherently the function of any single department,” SIGIR emphasizes, “and the concept has no single constituency in Congress, whose oversight committees are organized along departmental lines.”10 Moreover, DoD Directive 3000.05 stipulates “stability operations are a core US military mission [with] priority comparable to combat operations.”11 The Directive instructs the military to undertake contingency relief and reconstruction efforts in situations where civilian agencies are unable to perform the mission. Accordingly, the US Army has strengthened its Civil Affairs and Corps of Engineers support to combatant commands.
Third, the military and civilian components for contingency relief and reconstruction operations have not been sufficiently integrated. A lack of coordination among government agencies, NGOs, and contractors continues in Afghanistan and Iraq as of Fall 2010. The notions of “jointness” and “cross-jurisdictional responsibility” have not fully taken shape and efforts to achieve unity of command in a multi-agency environment have been, thus far, unsuccessful. Duplication of effort is nearly unavoidable as each supporting agency has its own specific mission and reports back to Washington through its own dedicated, stovepipe, chain of command. “State is never going to put an ambassador under a general, and DoD is never going to put a general under an ambassador, so you have to work together…you have to have unity of purpose,” Multi-National Force-Iraq commander, General David Petraeus, explained during the surge in 2008.12 However, as SIGIR notes, “when unity of command is missing and unity of purpose does not foster unity of effort, a solution can only be implemented at the top.”13 Unfortunately, even the National Security Council has been unable to fully and effectively integrate interagency contingency relief and reconstruction operations efforts.
Whole-of-Government Approach
Despite the US Government’s inability to affect unity of command in Afghanistan and Iraq, many current and former officials believe that the whole-of-government concept is still the most effective approach to conducting civil-military operations. For example, W. Patrick Murphy, a State Department Foreign Service officer and former leader of PRT Ninewa and Brigadier General Thomas Vandal, deputy commanding general of the Army’s 3d Infantry Division, formerly deployed in northern Iraq believe that they worked well together in pursuing and achieving common goals in Ninewa province. The civil-military relationship in Ninewa matured during OIF, and unity of effort was achieved through transparency and solidarity, Murphy and Vandal wrote in July 2010. At Team Ninewa, “we represented separate bureaucratic cultures and traditions, but neither of us was subordinate to the other…we directed our subordinates to collaborate daily [in order to build] a sense of common purpose…our civilian diplomats adjusted to the disproportionate balance of resources that favored our armed forces…and our uniformed personnel learned to respect ‘the suits,’” they explained.14 Murphy and Vandal credit joint US civil-military cooperation, in partnership with Iraqi provincial officials, for Team Ninewa’s numerous accomplishments. “There is no question that unity of effort among our civilian agencies and US armed forces can create a tangible multiplier effect, giving new meaning to the motto on our nation’s great seal: E pluribus unum – out of many, one,” they said in conclusion.15
Similar sentiments were expressed by former 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armor Division commander, Colonel Sean MacFarland, who was a major architect of the Anbar Awakening and the pacification of Ar Ramadi. The situational environment improved in Al Anbar province with the establishment of a US PRT in Ramadi, the provincial capital, according to MacFarland. Even at full staff, however, PRT Anbar was incapable of effectively covering the 53,000 square mile province with seven districts and a population of 1.2M. The State Department “needs to work with the military at every level down to brigade. State should help form a clear strategy for the war, which POTUS approves and then resources with congressional approval…then we execute,” Colonel MacFarland explained in a 2007 interview.16
At the May 2010 Summit on Entrepreneurial and Expeditionary Economics, Ambassador Ronald Neumann weighed-in in favor of an expanded role for the Department of State in post-conflict stabilization operations. Neumann, a 40-year career Foreign Service diplomat and former ambassador to Afghanistan (2005-2007), explained that no single US Government agency had sufficient resources to undertake the complex and difficult task of re-building a war-torn country. As for broadening the US Military’s mission to include more traditional civilian roles, Ambassador Neumann countered the notion, arguing “the idea that you ought to throw another nonmilitary operation into the military I believe to be fundamentally flawed… it has already led to an excessive militarization in our foreign policy and to conflicting policies for training and equipping armies.”17
Neumann subsequently explained that, as a phase of warfare, post-combat stabilization might be difficult to simply hand off to civilians, thereby extending the military mission, i.e. in charge of the whole host-nation country, for years. The military has only limited experience in connecting local stability operations to national level development strategies. “I think there were as many bad decisions taken by commanders during the ’04 period in Iraq as there were by CPA…commanders [did not] always listen to their own civil affairs people…and there was huge variation in the policies pursued by the different divisions,” Ambassador Neumann pointed out. However, “if you don’t find a way to build in the whole-of-government early then you will have to create larger and larger capacities within the military to duplicate the whole-of-government [approach] to stabilization…the military would be in charge of the whole show,” he continued.18 Ambassador Neumann conceded that a case could be made for establishing a unified command under the military until such time as the lead could be safely passed to State Department officials, as was the situation with Germany and Japan following World War II.
Case for Greater Civil Affairs Involvement in PRTs
Former US ambassador to Iraq (2007-2009) Ryan Crocker, however, questioned whether the US military’s departure from Iraq would create a security vacuum and whether the Department of State had sufficient resources to maintain stability. “I worry that what we’re seeing is a transition from a military lead to no lead,” Crocker said in late October 2010, adding “simply put, the capacity does not exist on the civilian side to take on the vast array of roles and missions that the military has so ably performed in Iraq.”19 Also in October 2010, the State Department Office of Inspector General (OIG) essentially agreed, reporting that DoS officials may be overestimating what US diplomats can actually do to restrain ethnic and sectarian tensions – exacerbated by failure of political leaders to form a unity government – in Iraq without US military support.20
Since security risks are expected to rise, the OIG Report also questioned the adequacy of protection for US civilian personnel against potential insurgent violence. “Normally, stabilizing a situation [like Iraq] requires peacekeepers…peacekeepers are soldiers…that’s not something State Department civilians do,” explained Dr. Stephen Biddle, senior fellow for defense policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and former Elihu Root chair of military studies at the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute.[xxx] The OIG insinuates that the US may be biting off more than it can chew and admonishes State to “stringently evaluate whether it has the capabilities and resources to ensure the safety of its personnel, and whether those personnel will be able to effectively pursue and accomplish US policy goals in a non-permissive security environment.”22
Ideally, civilian organizations and agencies, such as DoS and USAID, would be responsible for post-conflict stability operations. National Security Presidential Directive-44, in fact, assigns responsibility to the Secretary of State to lead the civilian response necessary to meet the needs of US stabilization and reconstruction operations. During OEF and OIF, however, civilian institutions often lacked the resources – manpower, equipment, and funding – to appropriately address post-conflict stability requirements. Consequently, at least partial responsibility for conducting extended stability operations have fallen to the US military. The on-the-ground realities of counterinsurgency and irregular warfare often cast the military into unfamiliar roles. Former commander of the 25th Infantry Division in Iraq, Lieutenant General Robert Caslen, Jr., for example, described how “it became his job to figure out how to build an Iraqi economy…because that was one of our missions.”23 Similarly, Colonel Jeffrey Peterson, instructor of economics at West Point and OIF veteran said “his troops often succeeded because they had experience as Americans and were encouraged to adapt on the fly.” “Don’t underestimate the ability of the US Army to be entrepreneurial,” Peterson cautioned fellow panelists at the Summit on Entrepreneurial and Expeditionary Economics.24 Just as Colonels Tovo and Mayville re-established governance in Kirkuk within days of liberating the city, Lieutenant General Caslen and Colonel Peterson successfully undertook missions in Iraq that had been traditionally carried out by civilians.
As the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq progressed, Provincial Reconstruction Teams emerged as essential components of successful US stability, reconstruction, and counterinsurgency operations. MNF-I commander, General David Petraeus, specifically addressed the importance of PRTs in his Counterinsurgency Guidance issued shortly after the surge began in Iraq:
Integrate civilian/military efforts – this is an interagency combined arms fight. Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams now operate directly alongside military units, adding new capabilities, skills, and funds to our counterinsurgency effort. PRTs bring political and economic expertise to the brigade and regimental combat teams with whom they serve, operate under force protection rules that allow them to accompany our military forces on operations, and conduct extended engagement with local communities. In order to exploit military and civilian capabilities to their fullest potential, we must fully integrate our civilian partners into all aspects of our operations – from inception through execution. Close working relationships, mutual respect, and personal interaction between BCT/RCT commanders and PRT Team Leaders are critical to achieving interagency combined arms.25
Neither PRTs nor ePRTs, however, fell under the umbrella of a unified, comprehensive, campaign plan for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, since civilian team leaders continued to report to the Office of Provincial Affairs at the US Embassy, Baghdad. In his updated MNF-I Commander’s Counterinsurgency Guidance issued 16 September 2008, newly appointed MNF-I commander, General Raymond Odierno, called for continued integration of civilian and military efforts and for working together to achieve a common purpose, but failed to mention the role of Provincial Reconstruction Teams26
The unity of command – or lack thereof – issue continues to plague US civil-military operations. Personnel in the field, engaged in combat, stability, or counterinsurgency operations, need clear-cut guidance, direction, and leadership. Generals Barno and Eikenberry worked well together with Ambassadors Khalilzad and Neumann, respectively in Afghanistan. Likewise for Generals Patraeus and Odierno and Ambassadors Crocker and Hill in Iraq. US success in counterinsurgency or stability operations, however, should not be dependent upon compatible personalities in order to carry out the mission. While unity of effort and unity of purpose are well-intentioned concepts, senior leaders may not always get along or see eye-to-eye with respect to mission execution. Unity of command, therefore, is the optimum organizational structure for accomplishing complex, civil-military, operations. In the final analysis, someone has to be in charge, someone with across-the-board responsibility and authority. “PRTs in both Iraq and Afghanistan operated under complicated, disjointed, and, at times, unclear chains of command and often received direction from multiple sources,” the House Armed Services’ Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations reported in 2008.27 The Subcommittee also noted a lack of unity of command within the PRT community at the tactical, unified combatant command, and national levels. “Personalities do matter and good people can overcome bad structures, but they should not have to do so.”28
US Army Civil Affairs Soldiers are general-purpose forces that are already trained and equipped to perform many of the tasks required in stability and reconstruction operations. In 2005, DoD Directive 3000.05 declared stability operations a core military mission to be conducted with proficiency equivalent to that of combat operations. Although highly skilled civilian experts would be preferable, fully trained CA personnel could readily and effectively staff PRT and ePRT organizations in future US counterinsurgency and stability campaigns. This would be particularly appropriate for post-conflict situations in which adequate numbers of civilian officials were unable or unwilling to deploy.
Consider, for example, the most recent mission statement for PRTs in Iraq and the five PRT Lines of Activity (LOA) described in the Operation NEW DAWN Joint Campaign Plan. This information is contained in the revised version of the Handbook: Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Team, scheduled for publication by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Fort Leavenworth, KS in 2011:
Mission Statement for PRTs in Iraq
The PRT program is a priority joint Department of State (DoS/Department of Defense (DoD) initiative to bolster moderates, support US counterinsurgency strategy, promote reconciliation, shape the political environment, support economic development, and build the capacity of Iraqi provincial governments to hasten the transition to Iraqi self-sufficiency.
Lines of Activity (LOA) for PRTs in Iraq
Governance. Assist in the development of sub-national governments that are self-sufficient, transparent, accountable, and capable of identifying, prioritizing, and servicing the needs of their citizens.
Political Development. Promote the development of an engaged local population and effective political parties, institutions, representatives, and officials that respect rights of individuals and groups; promote pluralism; and peacefully transfer power.
Political Reconciliation. Assist conflicting parties to resolve their differences by engaging in direct and peaceful dialogue to identify and pursue shared aims and interests.
Economic. Help sub-national governments and the private sector to establish and implement broad-based and comprehensive economic development strategies that promote equitable and sustained growth.
Rule of Law. Enhance the quality of justice enjoyed by the populace by improving the accountability, effectiveness, and consistency of services administered by policing, corrections, judicial, and other legal institutions.29
In theory, highly skilled civilian government officials would perform the PRT mission and carry out the Lines of Activity listed above in future conflicts. The PRT mission and LOAs, however, are also well within the capabilities of properly trained US Army Civil Affairs Soldiers. It is the recommendation of this Long War Occasional Paper, therefore, that the entire PRT mission be transferred exclusively to the Army Civil Affairs Branch as follows:
1. Expand the numbers and capabilities of generalist and specialist CA Soldiers.
2. Attach an embedded PRT (ePRT) staffed by CA Soldiers to each deployed BCT.
3. All ePRTs would be the size (100+) of mothership PRTs in Iraq.
4. All ePRTs would commence LOAs immediately upon arrival in host nation.
5. Establish CA CMOCs to coordinate NGO activities and humanitarian assistance.
6. Utilize increased CERP funding (unity of funding) for reconstruction projects.
7. Coordinate with US Army Corps of Engineers for larger projects.
8. Transition to whole-of-government approach once secure environment established.
9. DoS open Consulate Generals and Embassy Branch Offices as appropriate.
Only the US military has the necessary personnel, equipment, and funding to get stability operations up and running in a hostile environment. Large, embedded, CA-led PRTs offer an effective, unity of command-based, approach to future US stability operations. As General Barno told his Regional Commanders in Afghanistan, “only the US military has the resources to get things done…we own it all…we’re the 800-pound gorilla in the room.”
1 Robert Perito, The US Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, Testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on oversight and Investigations, October 2007, 1-2, (accessed 31 August 2010).
2 Robert Perito, The US Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, Testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on oversight and Investigations, October 2007, 2.
3 President George W. Bush, “Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,” 23 January 2007, 3, (accessed 6 November 2010).
4 President George W. Bush, “National Security Presidential Directive-44,” 7 December 2005, 1, (accessed 17 September 2010).
5 Condoleezza Rice, International Relations Budget for Fiscal Year 2009, Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 13 February 2008, 10, (accessed 29 September 2010).
6 Congressional Budget Office, “H.R. 1084 – Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act of 2008,” 4 March 2008, 2, (accessed 17 September 2010).
7 Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, October 2008), 9.
8 Congress of the United States of America, “Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (S.3001),” 3 January 2008, 300, (accessed 27 August 2010).
9 US Senate Appropriations Committee, “Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2011,” Senate Report 111-237 (S.3676), 29 July 2010, 16, (accessed 7 November 2010).
10 Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2009), 340.
11 Department of Defense, “DoD Directive 3000.05: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” 28 November 2005, 2, (accessed 22 July 2010).
12 General David Petaeus quoted in Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2009), 341.
13 Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, 341.
14 W. Patrick Murphy and Thomas Vandal, “Winning in Iraq by Working Together,” Washington Times, 15 July 2010, 1.
15 W. Patrick Murphy and Thomas Vandal, “Winning in Iraq by Working Together,” 2.
16 Colonel Sean MacFarland quoted in Shawn Dorman, “Iraq PRTs: Pins on a Map,” Foreign Service Journal, March 2007, 30.
17 Ambassador Ronald Neumann quoted in Greg Hack, “Promoting the Market Amid Strife,” Kansas City Star, 2 November 2010, C8.
18 Ambassador Ronald Neumann, email correspondence with the author, 2 November 2010, on file at the US Army Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
19 Ambassador Ryan Crocker quoted in Robert Burns and Mathew Lee, “Report: US Diplomats in Iraq Face Challenges,” Army Times, 1-2, (accessed 3 November 2010).
20 US Department of State, Office of Inspector General, “Report of Inspection: Compliance Follow-up Review of Embassy Baghdad, Iraq,” Report number ISP-C-11-08A, October 2010, 1, (accessed 2 November 2010).
21 Stephen Biddle quoted in Robert Burns and Mathew Lee, “Report: US Diplomats in Iraq Face Challenges,” Army Times, 1-2, (accessed 3 November 2010).
22 US Department of State, Office of Inspector General, “Report of Inspection: Compliance Follow-up Review of Embassy Baghdad, Iraq,”1.
23 Lieutenant General Robert Caslen, Jr. quoted in Greg Hack, “Promoting the Market Amid Strife,” Kansas City Star, 2 November 2010, C8.
24 Colonel Jeffrey Peterson quoted in Greg Hack, “Promoting the Market Amid Strife,” Kansas City Star, 2 November 2010, C8.
25 Multi-National Force – Iraq, “Multi-National Force – Iraq Counterinsurgency Guidance,” 6 June 2007, 1-2, (accessed 10 November 2010).
26 Multi-National Force – Iraq, “Multi-National Force – Iraq Counterinsurgency Guidance,” 16 September 2008, 2, (accessed 10 November 2010).
27 House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, “Agency Stovepipes vs Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan,” April 2008, 35, 42, (accessed 22 July 2010).
28 House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, “Agency Stovepipes vs Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan,” April 2008, 32, (accessed 22 July 2010); The 9/11Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Washington, DC, 2004), 399.
29 Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Handbook: Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Teams-Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, draft report received 1 October 2010, 15, 76.
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Perito, Robert. Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq. Special Report 185, United States Institute of Peace, March 2007, (accessed 18 March 2010).
Provincial Reconstruction Team Executive Steering Committee. “The Charter of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Executive Steering Committee,” December 2008, (accessed 31 August 2010).
“Provincial Reconstruction Teams Helping Iraq to Stabilize.” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 8 January 2008, (accessed 5 October 2010).
Public Affairs Office, US Army Special Operations Command. “Special Operations in Desert Storm: Separating Fact from Fiction.” Special Warfare, March 1992.
Quigley, Samantha. “Task Force Lays Foundation for Stability in Afghan West.” Armed Forces Press Service, 14 March 2005, (accessed 15 September 2010).
Rezai, Mohammad Zaman. “Champion Technical Training Center: Organization Prospectus,” 23 March 2010, (accessed 7 September 2010).
Sandler, Stanley. “Seal the Victory: A History of US Army Civil Affairs.” Special Warfare, Winter 1991, (accessed 12 July 2010).
Scott, First Lieutenant Dana. “Civil Affairs Team Continues CMOC Opportunities for Iraqis.” Stryker Brigade News, 10 September 2005. (accessed 19 August 2010).
Selles, Sjon. “First ISAF PRT Course Held at the NATO School.” NATO School Public Information Office, 25 September 2006, (accessed 1 September 2010).
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. Quarterly Report to the United States Congress. Washington, DC: SIGAR, 30 July 2010, (accessed 31 August 2010).
Stanley, Kevin. “Soldiers of the Colonial Militia.” Early America Review, Winter/Spring 2001.
Stars and Stripes. “Eikenberry Ends Tenure as Head of CFC-Afghanistan.” Stars and Stripes, 23 January 2007, (accessed 26 August 2010).
Stone, Blake. “Blind Ambition: Lessons Learned and Not Learned in an Embedded PRT.” PRISM Volume 1, Issue 4, September 2010.
“Success of the Surge and Political Improvements in Iraq.” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 15 October 2008, (accessed 5 October 2010).
Swannell, Matthew and Arnfinn Ruset. “ISAF PRT Orientation Course.” ISAF Mirror, 30 July 2006, (accessed 28 July 2010).
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Thomas, Troy. “Governance Operations in Future Conflicts.” Military Review, January-February 2006.
Tyson, Ann Scott. “New Strategy for War Stresses Iraqi Politics.” Washington Post, 23 May 2007.
United States Department of State. Kirkuk PRT Overview, 10 May 2008, (10_May_2008).ppt (accessed 27 February 2010).
United Nations Foundation. “Kirkuk Elects City Council: Baathists Loose Jobs.” U.N. Wire, 27 May 2003.
US Senate Appropriations Committee. “Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2011.” Senate Report 111-237 (S.3676), 29 July 2010, 16, (accessed 7 November 2010).
US Department of State. “Fact Sheet on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).” Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, 17 December 2007. (accessed 21 September 2010).
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US Embassy Baghdad, Iraq. “Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Ninewa,” 2010, (accessed 21 September 2010).
----------. “PRT Ninewa Prepares Teachers for My Arabic Library,” 9 March 2009, (accessed 21 September 2010).
----------. “PRT Ninewa Plays Music for Peace,” 7 March 2009, (accessed 21 September 2010).
----------. “US Helps Prepare Farmers in Ninewa Province in Better Business,” 6 April 2009, 1,
---------- “Ninewa PRT Security Training Helps Rule of Law Take Hold in Ninewa,” 30 November 2009, (accessed 21 September 2010).
----------. “Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Babil,” 2010, (accessed 21 September 2010).
----------. “PRT Babil Sponsors English Teaching Workshop,” 6 March 2009, (accessed 21 September 2010).
----------. “PRT Babil Supports Training by Embassy English Language Specialist,” 13 April 2010, (accessed 21 September 2010).
----------. “PRT Babil Hosts Workshop on Investigative Reporting,” 6 April 2009, (accessed 21 September 2010).
----------. “Babil PRT Expands Successful Criminal Forensic Training to Include Reporters,” 28 March 2010, (accessed 21 September 2010).
----------. “PRT Babil Sponsors Performances of Sense of Democracy,” 25 April 2009, (accessed 21 September 2010).
----------. “Babil PRT Joins Provincial Health Authorities in Fight Against Cholera,” 16 June 2009, (accessed 21 September 2010).
----------. “Babil PRT Funds New Center for Information and Training,” 10 November 2009, (accessed 21 September 2010).
----------. “Babil PRT Supports Babylon Beekeepers Association,” 24 November 2009, (accessed 21 September 2010).
----------. “PRT Babil Donates Books to Hillah Central Library,” 28 February 2010, (accessed 21 September 2010).
----------. “PRT Fact Sheet.” Public Affairs Section, 20 March 2008. (accessed 14 October 2010).
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----------.“2009 Provincial Reconstruction Team News,” January-June 2009, (accessed 6 October 2010).
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----------. “Provincial Reconstruction Teams: PRT Najaf,” 28 and 30 March 2009, (accessed 16 October 2010).
----------. “Facts and Figures on Drawdown in Iraq,” 31 August 2010, (accessed 13 October 2010).
……….. “Babil PRT Delivers Water Tankers to Combat Cholera,” 12 September 2009, (accessed 21 September 2010).
----------. “Thirty-six Strong, Ninewa PRT Presses on with Greenhouse Program,” 16 December 2009, (accessed 21 September 2010).
----------. “PRT Ninewa Mother/Infant Health Training Already Showing Signs of Success,” 27 December 2009, (accessed 21 September 2010).
----------. “Ninewa PRT Funds Mosul GIS Base Map Project,” 22 December 2009, (accessed 21 September 2010).
US Government Accountability Office, GAO-07-801SP Report to Congress. Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight, May 2007.
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Lawson, Lance Corporal John. “Parwan PRT Begins New Projects.” Global , 7 June 2004, (accessed 12 September 2010).
Whitlock, Craig. “Dire Assessment on Afghanistan,” Kansas City Star, 9 February 2009.
Lectures, Speeches, and Presentations
Obama, President Barack. “New Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan.” Televised Speech, 1 December 2009, (accessed 15 December 2009).
----------. “Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq.” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 27 February 2009, (accessed 13 October 2010).
Barno, Lieutenant General David. “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan.” USAID Speeches, Washington, DC, 15 December 2005, (accessed 22 July 2010).
Bush, President George H. W. “Address on Somalia.” Washington, DC, The White House, 4 December 1992, (accessed 12 August 2010).
Bush, President George W. “President’s Address to the Nation.” Office of the White House Press Secretary, 10 January 2007.
----------. “Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union.” 23 January 2007, (accessed 6 November 2010).
Ford, President Gerald. “An Address at a Tulane University Convocation.” New Orleans, LA, 23 April 1975, (accessed 12 August 2010).
Gates, Robert. “Landon Lecture.” Kansas State University. Manhattan, KS, 26 November 2007, (accessed 28 October 2010).
Khalilzad, Ambassador Zalmay. “Action Plan to Build Capacity and Sustainability within Iraq’s Provincial Governments,” Baghdad Cable, 1 October 2005.
Maples, Lieutenant General Michael D. Annual Threat Assessment. Statement before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, 10 March 2009, (accessed 11 March 2009).
Nixon, President Richard. “Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam.” The White House, Washington, DC, 3 November 1969, (accessed 11 August 2010).
“Operation Power Pack: A Road Test for the 82d Airborne Division.” 1998 Army Historians Conference, (accessed 20 July 2010).
Rice, Secretary Condoleezza. “Remarks at the Inauguration of the Provincial Reconstruction Team,” 11 November 2005, (accessed 24 July 2008).
Rodriguez, Lieutenant General David. “Provincial Reconstruction Teams Look at Way Forward in Afghanistan.” address to the 2010 PRT Conference Kabul, 16 March 2010, (accessed 2 June 2010).
Sedwill, Ambassador Mark. “Provincial Reconstruction Teams Look at Way Forward in Afghanistan.” address to the 2010 PRT Conference Kabul, 16 March 2010, (accessed 2 June 2010).
Ward, Mark. “The Future of PRTs.” Transcript of speech delivered to the 2010 Provisional Reconstruction Team Conference, Kabul, Afghanistan, 17 March 2010, (accessed 31 August 2010).
Weinberger, Caspar. “The Uses of Military Power.” Remarks to the National Press Club, Washington, DC, 28 November 1983, (accessed 25 July 2010).
Press Releases
Bigenho, Laura. “Volunteers Show Softer Side of War.” United States Forces-Iraq Press Release, 7 February 2007, (accessed 21 July 2010).
“Bond Meets with MO Guard in Afghanistan, Touts Success of Agribusiness Development Team.” US Senate News Releases Newsroom, 22 December 2008, (accessed 11 September 2010).
Bush, President George W. “Executive Order: Establishment of Temporary Organization to Facilitate United States Government Assistance for Transition in Iraq.” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 9 May 2007, (accessed 10 October 2010).
“Civil-Military Operations Center opens in Afghanistan.” Armed Forces Press Service, 24 June 2008. (accessed 13 August 2010).
Embassy of the United States Press Release, 16 June 2006, (accessed 12 March 2010).
“Fact Sheet: Expanding Provincial Reconstruction Teams to Achieve Iraqi Self Reliance.” Office of the White House Press Secretary, 22 March 2007, (accessed 10 October 2010).
Fisher-Thompson, Jim. “Rice Pays Surprise Visit to Iraq, Highlights Rebuilding Partnerships.” Embassy of the United States Press Release, 18 December 2007, (accessed 16 March 2010).
Khalilzad, Ambassador Zalmay. “US Ambassador in Kirkuk Inaugurates New Tamim Provincial Reconstruction Team.” Embassy of the United States Press Release, 27 November 2005, (accessed 16 March 2010).
McClain, Sherry. “Dr. Sue Sroda Returns from Iraq and Plans to Share Her Experiences.” Murray State University Press Release, 31 March 2009, (accessed 3 October 2010);
Multi-National Division – North PAO. “Stable Security Allows Market to Re-open in Mosul,” 11 October 2009, (accessed 30 September 2010).
NATO/OTAN. “Military Organization and Structures.” NATO Press Office, 10 August 2010, (accessed 31 August 2010).
----------. “New Medical Facility Opens in Ghazni Province.” ISAF Public Affairs Office, 13 November 2007, (accessed 14 September 2010).
“Overview of Provincial Reconstruction Teams’ Mission in Iraq.” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 13 July 2007, (accessed 12 June 2010).
Ozawa, Leslie. “95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Airborne) Fairwells Colonel Warmack, Welcomes Colonel Wolff.” USASOC News Service, 12 July 2010, (accessed 3 August 2010).
“Provincial Reconstruction Teams Helping Iraq to Stabilize.” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 8 January 2008, (accessed 5 October 2010).
“Rebuilding Afghanistan.” White House Press Release, 9 September 2008, (accessed 10 September 2010).
“Success of the Surge and Political Improvements in Iraq” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 15 October 2008, (accessed 5 October 2010).
“The Way Forward in Iraq: An Update.” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 28 June 2007, 1-3, (accessed 17 October 2010).
Websites
BACM Research. “Military Field Manuals 1920-1940.” Paperless Archives, 1999-2005, (accessed 15 July 2010).
Briley, Ron. “Occupation Blues: Let’s Not Forget the Mexican War.” History News Network, 12 November 2006, (accessed 12 July 2010).
Dugdale, Pointon. “General William Westmoreland, 1914-2005,” 6 March 2008, (accessed 12 August 2010).
Finlayson, Colonel Andrew. “A Retrospective on Counterinsurgency Operations.” Center for the Study of Intelligence, 12 June 2007, (accessed 11 August 2010).
“Heritage of the 353d Civil Affairs Command.” 2007, (accessed 27 July 2010).
Kraken, Davey. “The Phoenix Program: A Covert CIA Operation of the Vietnam War.” , (accessed 11 August 2010).
“Last Full US Combat Brigade Leaves Iraq.” , 19 August 2010. (accessed 13 October 2010).
Lloyd, LeeAnn. “LTF-82 Bridges the Gap, Replaces 297th BSB as KAF Logistics Support.” 22d Mobile Public Affairs Detachment, 28 May 2007, (accessed 26 August 2010).
“National Solidarity Program.” GIRoA Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development. 5 April 2010, (accessed 17 September 2010).
Obama, President Barack. “A New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.” 27 March 2009, (accessed 16 September 2010).
Rosenfelder, Mark. “US Interventions in Latin America.” 1996. (accessed 14 July 2010).
Task Force Eagle Public Affairs. “History of SFOR.” 2005, (accessed 30 July 2010).
“The PRTs Structure, Strategies, and their Relationship with NGOs.” JCA-NET, 12 May 2003, (accessed 1 August 2010).
USAID. “USAID History.” 3 April 2009, (accessed 7 August 2010).
----------. “This is USAID,” 29 April 2009, (accessed 17 March 2010).
US Army Information Site. “Civil Affairs.” 2010, (accessed 18 July 2010).
US Congress. An Act to Establish a Bureau for the Relief of Freedmen and Refugee. 3 March 1865, (accessed 13 July 2010).
“United States Forces-Iraq Major Units.” USF-I PAO, 3 March 2010, (accessed 21 October 2010).
“What’s New in the Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.” 27 March 2009, (accessed 16 September 2010).
US Military
Briefings
Allison, Lieutenant Colonel Gregory and Major Cliffton Cornell. “Rebuilding Afghanistan.” Video Teleconference Briefing, 26 September 2008, (accessed 10 September 2010).
Barfels, Major John and Bruce Dubee. “Rebuilding Afghanistan.” Video Teleconference Briefing, 26 September 2008, (accessed 10 September 2010).
Cotton, Colonel Norman. “Civil Affairs Study.” Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations Capabilities. Briefing, 4 March 2009. Operations – Policy (accessed 29 October 2010).
Perito, Robert. “Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams.” United States Institute of Peace. Briefing, February 2008, (accessed 6 October 2010).
National Security Council. “Highlights of the Iraq Strategy Review.” Briefing, January 2007, (accessed 18 July 2010).
US Department of State. 82d Airborne Division US Agency for International Development. “Other USG Actors.” Briefing, 31 January 2008, (accessed 2 September 2010).
Documents
Becker, Major General William. “Fact Sheet: Phung Hoang/Phoenix Program in Vietnam.” inserted in Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 17 February 1970, (accessed 9 August 2010).
Bush, President George W. “National Security Presidential Directive 36.” 11 May 2004, (accessed 17 March 2010).
Department of Defense. “Report to Congress on Civil Affairs.” Washington, DC. 29 April 2009, to_Congress_29Apr09_FINAL.pdf?docID=18261 (accessed 22 July 2010).
----------. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. February 2010 (accessed 3 August 2010.)
----------. “DoD Directive 3000.05: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations.” 28 November 2005, (accessed 22 July 2010).
Eikenberry, Ambassador Karl and General Stanley McChrystal. “Memorandum of Agreement.” (accessed 25 July 2010).
----------. United States Government Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan. 10 august 2009, (accessed 12 September 2009).
England, Gordon. “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations.” Department of Defense Directive Number 3000.05. 28 November 2005, (accessed 22 July 2010).
“Instructions to Phoenix Advisors.” inserted in Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate. 17 February 1970, (accessed 9 August 2010).
Johnson, President Lyndon. “National Security Action Memorandum No. 343.” The White House, Washington, DC, 28 March 1966, (accessed 8 August 2010).
----------. “National Security Action Memorandum No. 362.” The White House, Washington, DC, 9 May 1967, (accessed 8 August 2010).
United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo. “UNMIK Fact Sheet.” June 2008, (accessed 1 August 2010).
United Nations Security Council. “Resolution 940.” 31 July 1994, (accessed 30 July 2010).
----------. “Resolution 1244: Annex 1.” 10 June 1999, (accessed 31 July 2010).
----------. “Resolution 794.” 3 December 1992.
US Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command (Airborne). “USACAPOC (A) History.” August 2009, (accessed 21 June 2010).
US Department of State. “Annex 1A: Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement.” Dayton Peace Accords, 21 November 1995, (accessed 31 July 2010).
Wentz, Larry. Lessons from Kosovo: The KFOR Experience. Washington, DC: DoD Command and Control Research Program, 2002.
Zazzera, Laurent and Daniel Dail. “CFC Weekly Newsletter-Afghanistan.” ISAF Civil-Military Fusion Center, 8 August 2008, (08-AUG-08).pdf (accessed 4 September 2010).
Joint Publications, Field Manuals, and Army Regulations
Brady, Pamela. “Joint Endeavor – The Role of Civil Affairs.” Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1997.
Brown, Donald. “Vietnam and CORDS: Interagency Lessons for Iraq.” 2008, (accessed 22 June 2010).
Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). Report No. 07-34, Playbook: Provincial Reconstruction Teams-Tactics, Techniques, and Procedure. September 2007.
----------. Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, Handbook No. 07-11, January 2007.
----------. Handbook: Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Teams-Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. draft report received 1 October 2010.
Cole, Ronald. Operation Urgent Fury. Washington, DC: Joint History Office. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997.
----------. “Grenada, Panama, and Haiti: Joint Operational Reform.” Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 1998-99.
Department of Defense. Joint Publication 3-08. Interagency Cooperation During Joint Operations Volume I. Washington, DC, 9 October.
----------. “DoD Directive 3000.05: Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations.” 28 November 2005, (accessed 22 July 2010).
Derdall, James. “USJFCOM Support to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Training.” United States Joint Forces Command, 18 July 2007, (accessed 1 September 2010).
Headquarters, Department of the Army. Field Manual (FM) 3-24. Counterinsurgency. Washington, DC, December 2006.
----------. FM 41-10. Civil Affairs Operations. Washington, DC, 14 February 2000.
----------. FM 3-05.40. Civil Affairs Operations. Washington, DC, 29 September 2006.
Hollen, Patrick et. al., “Pre-Planning and Post-Conflict CMOC/CIMIC Challenges,” Joint Forces Staff College, 2003, (accessed 2 August 2010).
International Security Assistance Force. ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Handbook. Kabul, Afghanistan: ISAF, 2009.
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication (JP) 3-57. Civil-Military Operations. Washington, DC, 8 July 2008.
----------. JP 3-08. Interagency Cooperation During Joint Operations Volume I. Washington, DC, 9 October 1996.
----------. JP 1. Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States Incorporating Change 1. Washington, DC, 20 March 2009.
----------. JP 3-08. Interagency, Intergovernmental Operations, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During joint Operations Vol I. Washington, DC, 17 March 2006.
Multi-National Force – Iraq. “Multi-National Force – Iraq Counterinsurgency Guidance.” 6 June 2007, (accessed 10 November 2010).
NATO. Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 4.10. Allied Joint Medical Support Doctrine. Brussels, Belgium: Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers Europe, 2002.
NATO/OTAN. “ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Teams.” 29 April 2009. (accessed 30 May 2010).
Donald Brown, “Vietnam and CORDS: Interagency Lessons for Iraq,” 2008, (accessed 22 June 2010).
Wilkins, Aaron. “The Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti).” US Air Force Air Command and Staff College, March 1997, (accessed 21 July 2010).
US Army Reserve Command. “US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command.” 2010.
List of Suggested Maps and Illustrations
Montcalm Trying to Stop Native Americans from Attacking Civilians
Trails Blazed by Army Explorers, from A Bicentennial of Civil-Military Operations, 6
General Winfield Scott,
IFOR Areas of Responsibility Bosnia-Herzegovina, from JFQ summer 1997, 46
1st AD assumes command of MND(N) Bosnia-Herzegovina
, 2
UNITAF Areas of Operation Somalia
, 12
418th CA help repatriated Kurds Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, from Humanitarian Intervention, , 142
Civil Affairs Mobile Training Team Vietnam, from Special Warfare, winter 1991, 40
Army Civil Affairs Helps Kurdish Children, from Special Warfare, March 1992, 6
Sniper Fire in Downtown Santo Domingo, from Infantry July-August 2004, 22
US Army Advisor and Child, from Military Review Mar-Apr 2006, 9
CORDS Advisors with Hamlet Chief from Military Review Mar-Apr 2006, 10
CORDS Advisor from Military Review Mar-Apr 2006, 12
Structure of US Mission RVN from Military Review Mar-Apr 2006, 14
Organization of CORDS Team from Military Review Mar-Apr 2006, 15
Operations under the Phoenix Program from Military Review Mar-Apr 2006, 18
Coordination between Military and Non-Military from Tracing the Evolution of the CMOC, 16,
Role of the CMOC from JP 3-08, 9 October 1996, lll-17
Sample Composition of a CMOC from Tracing the Evolution of the CMOC, 25,
CMOC Organization from Tracing the Evolution of the CMOC, 30,
Personnel for Model CMOC from Tracing the Evolution of the CMOC, 57,
Major Dave Bernacki Commander of CMOC from Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, 1, freedom/images40.html
Standing Capability of the New CMOC from Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Improving Effectiveness, September 2007, 51,
Notional Composition of a CMOC from Operational Art and Campaigning Primer AY 09-10, 96,
Key Term-CMOC from Operational Art and Campaigning Primer AY 09-10, 95,
CMOC Functions from Operational Art and Campaigning Primer AY 09-10, 98,
Stability Matrix from ISAF PRT Handbook Ed. #4, 13,
Senator Bond Meets with MO Guard in Afghanistan, photo pg 2, news release, 22 Dec 2008,
PRT Jalalabad Task Organization from Michelle Parker Testimony 5 September 2007, 5,
PRT Afghanistan Map from USAID PRTs in Afghanistan, June 2006, 9,
PRT Key Leaders and Responsibilities from ISAF PRT Handbook Ed. #4, 24,
PRT Afghanistan List from CRS RL30588, 1 March 2010, 81,
Konduz PRT Structure from PRTs: Lessons and Recommendations, Jan 2008, 28,
Mazar-e Sharif PRT Structure from PRTs: Lessons and Recommendations, Jan 2008, 44,
Map-Location of PRTs in Afghanistan from GAO-09-86R PRTs, 1 October 2008, 4,
Chain of command for PRTs in Afghanistan from GAO-09-86R PRTs, 1 October 2008, 6,
Structure US-Led PRTs Afghanistan from GAO-09-86R PRTs, 1 October 2008, 7,
Number of US Military and Civilians in Afghan PRTs from GAO-09-86R PRTs, 1 October 2008, 9,
US-Led Afghan PRT Locations, Funding, and Staffing from Report of Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, October 2009, 36,
Members of Supreme Court Jalalabad from SIGAR, 30 July 2010, 80,
Technical Advisor Ministry of Agriculture Farah from SIGAR, 30 July 2010, 100,
A Helping Hand Gardez from Afghanistan: Coalition Forces Launch…4 February 2003,
Photos Front Cover from Agency Stovepipes, April 2008,
Photo Micro Hydro Electric from Agency Stovepipes, April 2008, 14,
Photo Spc. Ashley Stermole from Agency Stovepipes, April 2008, 16,
Photo DoS Representative from Agency Stovepipes, April 2008, 39,
Photo Capt. Brian Rick from Agency Stovepipes, April 2008, 42,
Map Iraq PRTs and Number Personnel from SIGIR, 30 July 2010, 43,
PRT Focus from CALL Handbook Iraq PRTs, 2011 version, 7
Civilians to Take US Lead-Mil Leave Iraq from NYT 18 August 2010, 1,
President Obama Announces End of Combat Mission in Iz, 31 August 2010, 1,
Map-PRT Program in Iraq from SIGIR, 25 July 2007, 2,
Location of PRTs/Partner Mil Units Iz from SIGIR, 25 July 2007, 5,
PRTs/Partner Military Units Iz from SIGIR, 18 October 2007, 38,
Funding for Iz PRTs from SIGIR, 25 July 2007, 8,
Typical Iz PRT Organization from SIGIR, 30 October 2006, 22,
Detailed Iz PRT Staffing from SIGIR, 30 October 2006, 23,
Embedded PRT Organization Chart from CALL Playbook, September 2007, 70
Interagency Coordination Mechanism from CALL Playbook, September 2007, 23
Baghdad Embassy Org Chart from SIGIR Hard Lessons, 2 February 2009, 307,
Photo Soldier Maintaining Security from Blind Ambition in Prism, September 2010, 147,
Photo Goat Vaccinated from Blind Ambition in Prism, September 2010, 149,
Photo Conoleezza Rice with PRT from In Response, Foreign Service Journal, May 2007, 16,
Photo Babil PRT from Embassy Baghdad
Photo Babil PRT from Embassy Baghdad
Photo Solar Powered Water from Embassy Baghdad
Photo Babil PRT Leader from Embassy Baghdad
Photo Ninewa Greenhouse from Embassy Baghdad
Photo Farmers in Tal Afar from Embassy Baghdad
Photo Sustainable Partnerships from Embassy Baghdad
Photo Mother/Infant Health from Embassy Baghdad
Photo Colonel Robert Brown Marketplace Mosul from KC Star, 2 November 2010, C1,
Photo PRT Anbar Members from Foreign Service Journal, March 2007, 23,
Photo Jennifer Mergy in Kurdistan from Foreign Service Journal, March 2007, 28,
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