MEMORANDUM



[pic] RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH [pic]

No.6, January 8, 2000

Graham T. Allison, Director Writer, Editor: Henry E. Hale

Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project Production Director: Melissa C. Carr

John F. Kennedy School of Government Assistants: Emily Van Buskirk, Ben Dunlap

Harvard University Production Assistant: Emily Goodhue

DECEMBER’S TOP NEWS

• Yeltsin resigns on New Year’s Eve

• Putin becomes acting President, overwhelming favorite in presidential race

• Russian stock market booms at prospect of stability

• Presidential election moved up to March 26, 2000

• Pro-Putin parties (Unity and the Union of Right-Wing Forces) score big successes in December 19 Duma vote

• Communist Party wins the most seats in Duma, but many of its allies lose

• Yabloko barely clears 5% hurdle in Duma race

• Fatherland-All Russia splits after poor finish, ‘All Russia’ governors endorse Putin

• Putin previews economic ideas, stressing foreign investment, state-managed transition to market

THE PRESIDENTIAL POLLS

Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.

Putin 4 21 45 51

Zyuganov 27 20 17 19

Primakov 19 16 9 9

Yavlinsky 9 7 5 5

Zhirinovsky 3 3 3 4

Shoigu n.a. 3 4 2

Luzhkov 10 8 2 2

Lebed 6 3 7 2

Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (VTsIOM) polls: December 17-20, November 26-29, October 15-19, 1999, September 17-21. Percentages are from the total of those who said they intended to vote. December data from .

SEE INSIDE

• PERSPECTIVES ON PUTIN: Who he is (p.2), what he stands for (p.3), what key figures say about him (p.4), how he plans to become president (p.4), and how he might still lose (p.5).

• Duma Election Results: Who won and why, reactions from winners and losers, what kind of Duma Russia is likely to get, and an assessment of election fairness (p.5).

• Insider Information: Some of Russia’s most respected political analysts explain the Duma vote and its implications, starting on p.9.

• Primer on Presidential Election Law (p.8).

• PLUS: latest polls; key dates; Yeltsin’s farewell.

BACK ISSUES AVAILABLE ON THE WEB AT:



KEY DATES

January 18 New Duma convenes

February 13 Deadline for presidential candidates to submit signatures for registration

February 21 Deadline for Central Election Commission to register candidates

March 26 Presidential Election

(For key points in Russian election law, see p.8)

Will this man be Russia’s next president? See p.2

YELTSIN’S MILLENNIAL SURPRISE

The predictably unpredictable Boris Yeltsin surprised fellow Russians and the world once again with his New Year’s eve resignation. In accordance with the Russian Constitution, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin immediately assumed office as acting President and elections were scheduled to take place early, on March 26, 2000. Coming at the beginning of Russia’s most important extended holiday season, Yeltsin’s move gave Putin two weeks to define his image as chief executive before Russians return to work.

The considerations that motivated Yeltsin’s decision were primarily political. First, Yeltsin concluded that his handpicked “heir,” Prime Minister

Vladimir Putin, can in fact win election as his successor. The success of pro-Putin parties (Unity and the Union of Right-Wing Forces) in the December 19 Duma race provided sufficient evidence of Putin’s electoral potential. Second, by resigning, allowing Putin to run as acting President with all the resources of the state at his command, and moving the election up by over two months, Yeltsin gave Putin an important advantage over all potential rivals. Third, recognizing the danger that the Chechen war could turn into a disaster for federal forces as happened in 1994–95, Yeltsin minimized the risk that such a disaster would undermine Putin’s popularity before the election. Finally, Yeltsin not only received immunity from prosecution and cloture of his papers as part of the package, but also got the best guarantee available that such a grant of immunity will be honored in the years ahead. As Yeltsin concluded in his farewell address, “Russia must enter the new millenium with new politicians, new faces, new intelligent, strong, energetic people.”

PERSPECTIVES ON PUTIN

Putin remains an unknown quantity in Russia as well as the West, having risen from political nowhere to Russia’s top post in a matter of months. Here is what is known.

VLADIMIR VLADIMIROVICH PUTIN (POO-teen): A CONCISE BIOGRAPHY

KGB agent, 1975-90. His main stint as a foreign agent was in the 1980s in Dresden, East Germany, where one of his tasks was to monitor Western technology and citizen contacts with the West. German intelligence sources report he was once expelled from West Germany for espionage after arriving in 1975 as a correspondent for TASS, a Soviet news agency (AFP 1/8/00). Achieved the rank of lieutenant colonel.

Deputy to St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak, 1990-96. Sobchak invited his former student in law school, Putin, to join him when he (an early leader of Russia’s democratic movement) became Mayor. Putin rose rapidly, eventually becoming First Deputy Mayor, reportedly playing a key role in attracting Western firms like Dresdener Bank and Wrigley to St. Petersburg. His low-profile style led some to consider him the “gray cardinal” of Sobchak’s administration. After Sobchak lost his reelection bid in 1996, Putin left for Moscow and remained untarnished by allegations of corruption in Sobchak’s administration.

Yeltsin Administration Official, 1996-98. In August 1996, he was named deputy to Pavel Borodin (now officially charged with corruption) in the Department for Managing Presidential Business, which admin-isters state property. In March 1997, he became deputy head of the presidential administration in charge of the Kremlin’s Main Control Administration. From May 1998 to July 1998, he served as the first deputy head of the presidential administration in charge of relations with Russia’s regional governments.

Director, FSB (formerly the internal KGB), 1998-99. Under his leadership, the FSB conducted investigations into Moscow Mayor Luzhkov’s wife’s business activities.

Security Council Secretary, March-August 1999. Putin expanded his influence to include all spheres of security, combining this post with the FSB chairmanship.

Prime Minister, August 1999 – present. Launched popular and successful (so far) military “anti-terrorist operation” in Chechnya, surged to top of presidential polls.

Acting President, December 31, 1999 – present.

PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES

Degrees: Law, Economics.

Hobby: Judo black belt.

Foreign Language: German.

Family Status: Married with two children.

Personal Characteristics: a private man who plays his cards close to his chest, competent, an effective manager, not charismatic, laconic, frank, sometimes severe in relations with subordinates.

PUTIN’S POLICY POSITIONS

Putin has focused on defining his image for Russian voters, not on producing a comprehensive political platform. The best statement of his policy views can be found in his 5500-word essay “Russia at the Turn of the Millennium,” in English at .ru. These positions include:

Chechnya: Putin defines Chechnya not only as an “anti-terrorist operation,” but more importantly as “the place where Russia’s fate is being decided” (emphasis added). Speaking at a New Year’s reception about Russia’s war against Chechen fighters, Putin said: “Unfortunately, not everyone in Western nations understands this. But we will not tolerate any humiliation to the national pride of Russian or any threat to the territorial integrity of the country.” Operationally, this will require not only victory over terrorist fighters in Chechnya, but the restoration of full federal control over Chechnya. This in effect marks the coup de gras against the 1996 agreement that gave Chechnya de facto independence.

The State: He is for creating a “strong state” in Russia. “Russia will not soon become, if it ever becomes, a second copy of, say, the U.S. or England, where liberal values have deep historic roots,” he said. “A strong state for Russians is not an anomaly, not something that must be fought against, but on the contrary is the source and guarantor of order, the initiator and main driving force of all change” (WSJ 1/3/00). A strong state does not mean totalitarianism, he emphasizes, but “a streamlined structure of the bodies of state authority and management, higher professionalism, more discipline and responsibility of civil servants, keener struggle against corruption; a restructuring of state personnel policy on the basis of a selection of the best

staffs; creating conditions beneficial for the rise in the country of a full-blooded civil society to balance out and monitor the authorities; a larger role and higher authority for the judiciary; improved federative relations, including in the sphere of budgets and finances; and an active offensive on crime.”

The Economic Transition: He calls for a leading role for the state as an “effective coordinator” in a measured transition to a free market. This, he said, “naturally exceeds the commonplace formula which limits the state's role in the economy to devising rules of the game and controlling their observance. With time, we are likely to evolve to this formula. But today's situation necessitates deeper state involvement in the social and economic processes.” In particular, he stresses the need for an “energetic industrial policy,” which he says means the strategic use of indirect state levers like taxation and state loans to stimulate technology-intensive industry in Russia, especially export-oriented industry.

Foreign Investment: He is for foreign investment as the key to Russian economic recovery. Without it, the recovery would be “long and painful.”

Foreign Trade: He is for joining the WTO, combating foreign countries’ discrimination against Russian exports, and introducing anti-dumping legislation in Russia.

Corruption and the Shadow Economy: For strengthening criminal, licensing, taxation, hard-currency and export regulation to combat the shadow economy and corruption.

The Constitution: Against amending the Constitution to restrain executive power.

Russia and the West: “It will take us approximately fifteen years and an annual growth of our Gross Domestic Product by 8 percent a year to reach the per capita GDP level of present-day Portugal or Spain, which are not among the world's industrialized leaders,” he writes.

Russia and the World: “For the first time in the past 200-300 years, Russia is facing a real threat of sliding to the second, and possibly even the third, echelon of world states,” he declared in late December. “We must strain all intellectual physical and moral forces of the nation. Nobody will do it for us. Everything depends on us, and us alone.” Two months earlier, he said similarly: “We must stop the process of our being left behind by the economically developed nations of the world, and find the path which will allow us to take up a suitable place in the ranks of leading nations in the 21st century” (Reuters 11/6/99).

RUSSIAN POLITICIANS ON PUTIN

Anatoly Sobchak (Putin’s former professor and boss): “He is a convinced supporter of the market economy. But in contrast to the majority of Russian politicians, he knows the Western model of economic and political life not as an outsider but from the inside….He will not blindly transfer some of the recommendations of the West onto Russia….I think Putin has a wonderful opportunity to become for Russia what the Roosevelts were for America.” (NYT, January 2, 1999)

Mikhail Gorbachev: "Putin's positions are not strong as they seem, because his opinions are unknown. Putin is holding on thanks to his mystery. Mysterious appearance, mysterious glance, mysterious phrases. But it so happens that a man opens his mouth and has nothing to say." (Interfax, December 31, 1999)

Anatoly Chubais (Campaign manager, Union of Right-Wing Forces, before Putin’s promotion): “Destroying terrorism is, of course, the basis of continued support for Putin. Any failure by Putin in Chechnya would be a very grave factor.” (Financial Times, December 21, 1999)

THE PUTIN CAMPAIGN

Putin’s election strategy is already evident. First, it is to do everything possible to avoid a major public defeat in the Chechen war (Chechen fighters pictured here); second, to focus on a presidential image more than issues. He presents himself as an energetic, decisive young defender of the Russian state. His first moves as acting president were carefully calculated to buttress this image. One day after Yeltsin’ resignation, on New Year’s Day, he made a highly publicized trip to Chechnya with his wife to meet with the troops. Two days later, he fired Yeltsin’s daughter, Tatyana Dyachenko, and reassigned some other top Yeltsin officials, although he has avoided a break with Yeltsin, appearing with him and even his family on television. Meanwhile, he has not yet created a formal campaign team, although the head of his governmental staff, Dmitry Kozak, is considered likely to serve as campaign manager.

PUTIN’S BANDWAGON

Bandwagoning is familiar in all political systems: politicians like to join a winner. In Russia, ties among political leaders are even looser and realignments there powerfully evoke the universal observation that “politics makes strange bedfellows.” Even as late as the Duma campaign, many governors sought to straddle between the team that seemed most likely to come to power over the summer (former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov and Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov) and the newly ascendant Putin. Since Yeltsin’s resignation, the rush to Putin’s side has begun, including leading governors in the All Russia movement that had joined in a coalition with Luzhkov and Primakov (Tatarstan’s Mintimer Shaymiev (pictured), St. Petersburg’s Vladimir Yakovlev, Bashkortostan’s Murtaza Rakhimov and Ingushetia’s Ruslan Aushev) and former Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin, who ran as the number two man on Yabloko’s Duma list.

RESULTS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE PREDETERMINED?

In the wake of Putin’s stunning rise in the polls, his victory in the Duma elections (see below), and his appointment as acting President, many observers now regard his victory in the presidential race as predetermined. But before declaring him the victor, one should recall how many times Russia has surprised us before. What could weaken Putin’s candidacy?

• Chechnya. If the Russian population gets information that federal troops have suffered disastrous defeats there, voters could hold Putin responsible. But given the current depth of public support for his war effort, rooted in the shock from September’s apartment-building bombings, Putin could likely pull off a victory even with opposition media coverage of setbacks, at least until late March.

A Communist-Primakov alliance. If other things go badly wrong for Putin, former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov would stand a chance if the Communists back him instead of their own leader. No one else has broad enough appeal to reach more than 30-40% of the vote.

New apartment bombings in Russia. A new round of such tragedies could undermine Putin’s “law-and-order” image, but it could also give him cause to show his mettle with a tough crackdown.

Deadly “kompromat.” If opposition politicians can find some powerful kompromat (Russian slang for “compromising material”) on Putin, he could begin to drop in the ratings much like Luzhkov before him. The most explosive possibility being investigated by Putin opponents is the rumor that the Kremlin “Family,” with assistance from the FSB, actually orchestrated the September apartment bombings (ruins pictured) as a pretext for the Chechen invasion. Their goal, according to the rumor: either to make Putin a winner or give him a pretext to suspend elections.

An economic catastrophe. It is hard to imagine how things could get dramatically worse in just 2-3 months, but a major collapse, especially if mishandled, could mean electoral trouble.

THE DUMA RACE

Who were the winners and losers in the December 19 Duma race? On paper, the Communist Party won, garnering half again as many seats as its nearest rival. But this is not a gain for the Communists; they merely held their core electorate. The biggest winner was instead someone who did not even appear on the ballot, Prime Minister Putin. The two parties that backed Putin most openly, Unity and the Union of Right-Wing Forces, far exceeded the expectations of a month ago. Yabloko suffered the heaviest blow, barely clearing 5% when its leaders had hoped for closer to 10%. Fatherland-All Russia succeeded where virtually all “centrists” had previously failed, far exceeding the 5% barrier with 13% of the vote. But against the backdrop of their high expectations (Primakov suggested 25% as late as December), this showing was considered a significant defeat. Zhirinovsky’s self-named bloc once again defied the polls and cleared the 5% hurdle, demonstrating its hold on a loyal clutch of voters. (For more, see elections/russia99results).

RESULTS OF DUMA ELECTIONS Total Shares of Seats in New Duma

|PARTIES/BLOCS |Number of Deputies From |Number of Deputies |

| |Party Lists |Elected in Districts |

|Communist Party |67 |46 |

|Unity |64 |8 |

|Fatherland-All Russia |36 |30 |

|Union of Right-Wing Forces|24 |5 |

|Yabloko |17 |4 |

|Zhirinovsky Bloc |16 |0 |

|Other |0 |16 |

|Independents |not applicable |106 |

KEY FACTORS DRIVING DUMA ELECTION RESULTS

Putin’s coattails. The Union of Right-Wing Forces’ last-minute declaration that it was a Putinite party, and a tacit Putin endorsement, helped it surge from a precarious 5% in the polls to 9% in the balloting, and Putin’s late November endorsement sent Unity’s poll numbers from 9% to 18% in one week.

Media. All major parties except the Communists had some friendly media, making clear that it is not just media bias that matters but how you use it. The Kremlin used its media (ORT and RTR) to boost Unity and the Zhirinovsky Bloc (a reliable pro-Kremlin vote on many key issues) and to launch a very effective no-holds-barred attack on its main rival, Fatherland-All Russia. The latter did not use its media (NTV and TV Center) effectively in response (although it tried). In fact, it was largely the negative campaign against Luzhkov (pictured right) that built ORT’s Sergei Dorenko Show (Dorenko pictured left) into Russia’s most popular program in the Sunday evening time slot previously dominated by the pro-Luzhkov NTV. The military’s careful media management of the Chechen war also produced the positive coverage that helped drive Putin’s rise in popularity. The Union of Right-Wing Forces managed to get favorable coverage in both media camps, contributing to its surprising success. The Communists were largely left alone to mobilize their legions at a more grass roots level.

WERE THE ELECTIONS FREE AND FAIR?

Foreign and domestic observers issued widely varying assessments of how free and fair the Duma elections were. The OSCE and the Council of Europe gave a generally positive assessment of the Duma vote, calling most polling place violations insignificant. While its observers criticized the biased media behavior, they noted that many countries face this kind of problem. The European Institute on the Media (EMI), on the other hand, lambasted the elections, particularly the role of the media. "Voters were not given the information necessary to make proper decisions," said Sarah Oates, an EMI elections observer and professor of politics and media at Glasgow University (Moscow Times, 12/21/99). Russia’s Central Election Commission Chairman, Aleksandr Veshnyakov, acknowledged deficiencies in the process: “I cannot claim that the electioneering, including media campaigning, was fair.” He said that the CEC had received “an abundance of complaints” about a variety of electoral violations (RFE/RL Newsline, 12/20/99).

“Administrative resources.” All sides with powerful governors in their camp appeared to have used them to apply pressure to voters by squeezing powerful intermediaries like factory managers, collective farm chairmen and local election commissions. With Putin clearly ascendant, most governors had strong incentive to prove their worthiness for future material support by helping deliver a favorable vote. The power of administrative resources was most prominent, however, in the voting patterns for Fatherland-All Russia. In those regions with loyal local leaders, such as the huge voter pools of Moscow and Bashkortostan, this bloc received far more than its federal average.

WHAT WILL THE NEW DUMA LOOK LIKE?

Members of parliament, once elected, can switch parliamentary factions at will. The biggest unknown is now where the new Duma’s 124 independents and small-party members will go. Given Putin's ascendancy, many independents can be expected to ally with his “party of power” (the Unity faction), as can some Duma members who ran on other tickets. For example, the seven members of Our Home is Russia who won district races, including former Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin (pictured), have indicated they will join the Unity faction. The Communists will also attract some independents and small-party members, such as noted antisemite Viktor Ilyukhin and Gorbachev’s former nemesis, Yegor Ligachev. The Union of Right-Wing Forces and the Zhirinovsky Bloc are likely to keep most of their members but are unlikely to attract large numbers of independents. The factional breakdown of the new Duma will become clearer after the body convenes on January 18.

Fatherland-All Russia and Yabloko, on the other hand, risk losing some key allies or even splitting up due to their poorer-than-anticipated performance. The governors’ bloc All Russia, for example, has already announced that it will form its own faction separate from Fatherland (over Luzhkov’s and Primakov’s objections) and its leadership has even endorsed Putin for president. Former Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin (pictured), elected on Yabloko’s ticket, is now a leading candidate to become Duma speaker, in which case he may formally abandon Yabloko along with his supporters in the fraction.

FAMILIAR FACES ENTERING THE DUMA

What happened to some of the personalities with whom the international community is familiar but who were not in the top three on winning parties’ lists? Here is a short list of who among them is in the new Duma and who is out:

|WHO’S IN |WHO’S OUT |

|Abramovich (Oligarch, Sibneft) |Baburin (radical leftist) |

|Berezovsky (Oligarch, media/oil baron) |Baturina (Luzhkov’s wife) |

|Chernomyrdin (former Prime Minister) |Chubais (did not run) |

|Gaidar (former Prime Minister) |Karaganov (foreign policy specialist) |

|Kokoshin (former deputy defense minister) |Makashov (anti-Semitic General) |

|Korzhakov (former Yeltsin bodyguard) |Narusova (Sobchak’s wife) |

|Kovalev (Human Rights activist) |Rybkin (speaker of first Duma) |

|Ligachev (former Gorbachev nemesis) |Sobchak (former St. Petersburg governor) |

NOTABLE QUOTABLES ON THE DUMA RESULTS

• Igor Shabdurasulov, first deputy head of Yeltsin’s administration, on the Duma election results: “In Russia a revolution has taken place, a peaceful one but a revolution all the same.” (Moscow Times, December 21, 1999)

• Grigory Yavlinsky, Yabloko Party leader, on the media’s role in the Duma election: “How can one compete if on the football field the length of one goal is one meter and the other 10 kilometers?” (Polit.Ru, December 20, 1999)

• Vladimir Ryzhkov, former leader of the Our Home is Russia faction in the Duma, on Unity’s success: “This is not politics – it is theater. On the whole this biomass will support the government of Putin in the Duma, and silently by the way, since there is no one there to talk to.” (Polit.Ru, December 20, 1999)

• Anatoly Chubais, campaign manager for Union of Right-Wing Forces: “The most important problem is solved – the restoration of the powerful position of rightists in the State Duma. This is only the first stage on the path to the goal that is the second coming of the rightists to power.” (Polit.Ru, December 20, 1999)

• Sergei Shoigu, Unity leader: “Thank goodness we have come through that wonderful period when people's ideological and political convictions meant everything. Today we believe the main accent should be on professionalism, morals and, above all, patriotism.” (Moscow Times, December 22, 1999)

• Gennady Zyuganov, Communist Party leader: “Unity is a bloc that was hastily cobbled together, which has used all the modern [electoral] techniques, which has been fed by unprecedented administrative and financial resources, and which has not offered the society even an elementary program.” (St. Petersburg Times, December 21, 1999)

YELTSIN ON HIS RETIREMENT

When Yeltsin stepped down on December 31, he reached out to Russian citizens with uncharacteristic introspection:

• “Why hold on to power for another six months when the country has a strong person, fit to be president, with whom practically all Russians link their hopes for the future today? Why should I stand in his way?”

• “I want to ask your forgiveness, because many of our hopes have not come true, because what we thought would be easy turned out to be painfully difficult…In some respects, I was too naïve.”

BASIC PROVISIONS OF THE NEW PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION LAW

Matt Curtis, International Foundation for Election Systems

With its official publication on 4 January, Russia’s new Presidential Election Law is now in effect. The basic provisions of the law include:

• In the case of presidential resignation, the Federation Council (upper house of parliament) must within 14 days set a new election date that is no more than three months from the resignation. On 5 January the Federation Council set the election date for 26 March.

• The law raises two other important issues when early elections are called. The calendar of activity for the various election commissions, candidates, media, and public associates is shortened by one-quarter. Candidates are required to collect only 500,000 signatures in support of registration instead of the usual 1 million.

• Campaign financing rules require candidates to open an electoral account with the Savings Bank of the Russian Federation, through which all campaign funds must flow. Campaign expenditures by presidential candidates may not exceed 300,000 minimum monthly wages (set on the day the decision to call the election was officially published; for the upcoming election this limit is about $10 million), or 400,000 minimum monthly wages (about $13.5 million) in the case of a second round of voting (see below). Candidates must file three financial reports: at the time of registration; between 10-20 days before the election; and no later than 30 days after publication of the official election results.

• Russian citizens at least 18 years of age may vote. Absentee balloting is allowed under certain circumstances, and the law provides for mobile ballot boxes and voting at official polling sites outside Russia.

• The Central Election Commission aggregates results of voting from sub-level commissions, and must release the results within one day of determining the election’s outcome. The winning candidate must receive an absolute majority of votes to avoid a run-off election, and the first round of voting is only valid if at least 50% of registered voters participate.

Any individual, political association, candidate, or election commission may contest the results of an election in court or through the appropriate election commission, and may appeal court or commission decisions to higher level bodies.

YABLOKO’S EXPLANATION FOR ITS SHOWING IN THE DECEMBER 19 ELECTIONS:

The election campaign began with the explosions in apartment buildings which killed hundreds of people and continued in the context of war hysteria. In such situations citizens’ parties face many difficulties. Yabloko conducted its campaign standing in opposition to two blocs of the criminal nomenklatura. One of these blocs, Unity, represented the Kremlin and the government while the other, Fatherland-All Russia, represented the governors. Vladimir Lukin was completely accurate when he said that all the power of state institutions was focused on providing the best results for the state apparatus which participated in the elections “under the “masks” of Unity and the Union of Right Wing Forces, disregarding all rules, principles and laws. Based on the level of greed and manipulation of public opinion, this has been an unprecedented campaign.” Three days before the elections, the governors reported by phone to the Prime Minister what percentage of their regions would be with Unity. The Perm governor, apparently unaware that at that moment their conference was being shown on TV, told Putin: Unity has gained the requisite amount – 18%. Yabloko practically did not have access to the most powerful propaganda resources. The amount of airtime that different parties received on different TV stations was completely incomparable. It was not hard to notice that the resources spent by today’s leading parties are inconsistent with the amount of funds officially allowed by law. We observed multiple violations of the election law, which created conditions for falsification. The most scandalous occurred in three places: (1) in Bashkortostan, where the president of the republic, Murtaza Rakhimov, right there at the voting station called for people to vote for his bloc – this was all shown on television; (2) in Moscow, where at voting station number 391 it was announced at 3:00 p.m. that there were no more ballots and that since 25% had already voted, that was enough; and (3) in Kalmykia, where on the day of the elections, when all kinds of campaigning are forbidden, leaflets, in which Kolesnikov was called a “member of the national-social group called “Yids” and Yabloko was called a raging Semitic faction, were distributed. Yabloko did not use “dirty PR,” did not use means and methods which discredited our opponents. But to struggle using democratic methods in the conditions in which we found ourselves is almost impossible. Such methods do not exist. Therefore, 6 percent is a good result. Yabloko would not want to have received 5 or 10 percent more votes but remember for our whole lives that when the war began in Chechnya, we said that it was necessary to fight down to the last Chechen and the last Russian soldier, as our opponents did. – Grigory Yavlinsky

INSIDER INFORMATION

Analysis of the Russian election campaign by leading Russian specialists

Section Editor: Emily Van Buskirk

PUTIN IS RIDING ON MORE THAN WAR

HOW THE MEDIAN VOTERS WERE DRAWN TOWARDS UNITY

Vladimir Boxer, Fellow

SDI Project, Harvard University

KEY POINTS:

* FAR performed badly in all of Russia’s regions except 8.

* NTV’s structure in the regions made it ill-suited to influence national elections.

* Even according to pro-Yabloko sources, Yavlinsky lost all three debates he was in: with Chubais, Kirienko, and Boos (FAR)

There is a tendency to explain the outcome of recent elections to the Russian Duma by one single factor: the war in Chechnya. In my opinion, this tendency may be explained by the sudden turn in the results of opinion polls during October.

However, one who attempted to follow carefully the underlying currents within Russian society might have predicted that this outcome wasn’t baseless. It reflected generational, cultural, and structural changes within the Russian elite, and to a lesser extent, changes within the population as a whole.

From this perspective, I have tried to distinguish between the major factors that in my opinion particularly contributed to the election results. They are outlined below.

A) The adaptive orientation of the relative (and less politicized) majority of Russian voters-- the so-called Russian median voters. (Also called the “swamp” voters, they are not firm adherents of the right or the left.) Even if they are not satisfied with economic and political situation, these voters above all wish to preserve political stability and prevent large-scale social confrontation at any price.

The outcome reflected generational, cultural, and structural changes within the elite.

Fatherland-All Russia did not recognize this tendency and, relying on the so-called protest electorate (whose base currently does not exceed 10 %), gambled on a political confrontation with the regime.

The adaptive electorate rejected this bloc instinctively and was snatched up by a new guarantor of the political stability -- Putin, who subsequently lent this electorate to Unity.

B) A generation shift. Not only the Communists, but also Fatherland-All Russia looked like a party of the older generation -- different forms of the former nomenclature.

This impression is related to the age of the leaders and congress delegates, as well as their language, style of communicating with voters and with the press, fear of debates, ideological phraseology, and use of slogans from the past.

Here, in contrast, the Union of Right-Wing Forces was at an advantage. It could avoid the image of a party of old-style (and rather middle-aged) liberals in order to appear as a party of the new generation.

This is the secret of how the right-wingers stole the voters from Yabloko, which once again (just as in 95 and 96) relied exclusively on the middle-aged and the older generation of the pessimistic and offended intelligentsia.

C) New powerful industrial and financial groups, more oriented to the regions than to Moscow. This process was mostly ignored by Western analysts, who have traditionally focused their interest on the “old” oligarchies and federal leaders.

However, after the latest financial crisis of 1998 and the following shift in orientation from western imports to domestic products, there was a weakening of Moscow’s import-dependent economic position and a strengthening of regional industrial empires.

These groups do not want to depend on the will of either the capital’s mayor (Luzhkov) or the “Primakov-surrounded” group, which lacks all regional connections.

It is important that in a significant number of cases the leaders of these empires (for example Deripasko) belong to the new generation.

The increase in oil prices gave resources to the anti-Luzhkov oil magnates.

The increase in oil prices was also very important. It gave additional resources to the “anti-Luzhkov” oil magnates, especially the powerful ones in the oil-producing and refining regions of Siberia.

It is also difficult to overestimate the influence of Chubais’ Russian Joint-Stock Company “United Energy Systems” (UES), which has branches in all Russian regions.

Because of the lack of real money and the resultant system of mutual payments and companies’ universal debts for electricity, the leaders of regional UES structures have become the most powerful local magnates.

D) Media influence. From the point of view of the duel between the Kremlin and Moscow parties (Putin vs. Luzhkov/Primakov or Unity vs. Fatherland-All Russia), the balance of these parties’ media influence on voters was of crucial importance for the election results.

It was not their first “media war”, and in earlier such battles, the Moscow party always triumphed over that of the Kremlin.

We can recall four incidents as evidence of this: that between the leader of Yeltsin’s personal security, Korzhakov, and the Chairman of the Most Group Gusinsky, the battle to turn public opinion against the military campaign on media coverage of the first Chechen war, the campaign against Yeltsin’s favorite Defense Minister Grachev, and the discrediting of Yeltsin’s “Family.”

However, none of these media wars took place during election campaigns. The ’99 election was the first time.

And it turned out that although the Moscow and Kremlin groups have equally strong media empires, the Kremlin media’s strategy of development and way of dealing with the audience turned out to be better adapted for the national elections.

In previous media wars, the Moscow party always triumphed over the Kremlin’s.

The core of the Moscow media empire (NTV) counted on the well-educated (which means more ideologized and less “swamp-like”) electorate of big cities, while the federal forces’ core (ORT) tried to cover smaller towns with their malleable (easy to manipulate) electorate.

It is also important that NTV, unlike ORT, did not pay enough attention to Siberia and the Far East regions.

The style of the media influence from each of the main TV channels corresponded to their audiences. As a result, the “swamp” voters (most of them dwellers of small and medium-size cities, especially in northern and eastern regions) in most regions found themselves under the Kremlin’s influence.

It is necessary, however, to take into consideration that the Kremlin’s message corresponded ideally to the adaptive electorate’s aims.

This fact, combined with Fatherland-All Russia’s regional weaknesses, resulted in the bloc’s particularly bad performance in all of Russia’s regions except 8.

In those 8 strongholds (Moscow, Moscow Region, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Mordovia, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria and Dagestan), FAR received almost 35% of the vote and 22 seats in single-member districts.

While in the rest of Russia, which encompasses 81 regions and 80% of the whole Russian population, FAR received only 7.5% (compared with the Union of Right-Wing Forces’ nearly 9%), and just 9 seats in single-member districts.

The Union of Right-Wing Forces had the best media advantage.

In the vast majority of districts in the Urals, Siberia, the Far East and the Russian North, FAR lost not only to the Union of Right-Wing Forces but also to the Zhirinovsky Bloc.

The Union of Right-Wing Forces found itself with the best media advantage. Because of the relative balance between ORT and NTV, both channels tried to find additional allies in the media war, and the Union of Right-Wing Forces managed to satisfy this demand for both sides until the very end.

Besides, the host of a popular political show of yet another national TV channel (RTR), Nikolai Svanidze, sincerely showed his sympathy for the right-wingers. Yabloko, however, famous for its connections with the Most group, could not win any sympathy from ORT.

At the same time, in the last month before the elections, NTV found a new way to attract TV viewers to watch the electoral campaign -- TV debates with another popular TV host, Yevgeny Kisilev. The popularity of these debates broke all records - 40 million TV viewers.

However, because of different circumstances, the only bloc that had an advantage in these debates was the Union of Right-Wing Forces. Even according to generally pro-Yabloko media sources, Yavlinsky lost all three debates in which took part. First to Chubais and then to Kirienko, and his battle with Boos (Fatherland-All Russia) was absolutely feeble.

Leaders of the KPRF, Fatherland-All Russia and Unity refused to take part in the debates. Among all the other interesting debates, it is worth mentioning the effective battle between Nemtsov and Zhirinovsky, the feminine duel between Khakamada (Union of Right-Wing Forces) and Lakhova (Fatherland-All Russia) and also the debate between the Western-oriented Kirienko with the traditionalist Oscar-winning filmmaker Nikita Mikhalkov (Our Home is Russia).

Putin rose not because he was an “architect of war,” but because he vowed to prevent disaster.

E) The consolidation of the liberal camp, i.e. the strategic vote of the reformist electorate. This time there were only two players in the reformer field: Yabloko and the Union of Right-Wing Forces (URWF).

Past experience has shown that liberal voters are most sensitive to the breakup factor of parties. Yet it was the Union of Right-Wing Forces, and not Yabloko, which benefited most from this strategic vote. This fact can be explained by URWF’s ability, in comparison with Yabloko, to penetrate to adjoining –“soft” electorates (see B).

As for the Chechen war factor, many analysts and representatives of the losing parties regard it as the determining factor. From my point of view, the war factor just catalyzed or sped up otherwise unavoidable and deep processes.

Putin’s rise in popularity took place not because he was an “architect of war,” but because he managed to coopt Primakov’s role as the leader who prevented disaster.

Yet Putin rose not without a little help from Fatherland-All Russia, which forced Primakov to leave his position as the guarantor of stability for the hopeless fight with the Kremlin.

The explosions stopped, and the Putin myth was born.

The point is not that Putin targeted the pro-imperialistic attitudes of Russians. He succeeded because Russians set their expectations on him as the leader they had been waiting for. The leader who would say: “No, we will not wait until the next building explosion, we will not reconcile to this situation, and I guarantee that no more explosions will happen again.”

They never did happen again, and the Putin myth was born.

All of this took place in the hysterical period when millions and millions of people could not sleep at night, took turns in guarding their buildings and so on. Yes, at that moment the Chechen factor was the most important one for public opinion. However, since November it has been pushed to the periphery of the Russian popular conscious.

This means that 2/3 of voters support war to its victorious conclusion just as passively as the same 2/3 supported the end of the aggression against Chechnya in 1994-96.

And one can recall that the Chechen war factor did not have a large impact on the parliamentary elections in 1995 or the presidential elections in 1996.

It is also worth recalling that according to a VTsIOM opinion poll (which, on the whole, proved very accurate in 1999), the Union of Right-Wing Forces reached almost the same level as Yabloko a week before the leaders of the Rightists endorsed the war in Chechnya for the first time.

ONE STEP FORWARD, TWO STEPS BACK

HOW A WEAKER DUMA EMERGED FROM THE ELECTIONS

Vladimir Gelman

Professor, European University at St. Petersburg

Fulbright Scholar, Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University

KEY POINTS:

* The new Duma will be pro-government and loyal to whatever government comes along, burying plans for constitutional reform.

* The elections signify a number of antidemocratic tendencies in Russia’s political development.

* Fatherland-All Russia will soon break up, as loyal “All Russia” is already being drawn to the victor’s camp.

* Putin emerged in such a strong position that it’s hard to imagine a competitor for the presidential elections.

The results of the Duma elections and their implications for Russian political development present a contradiction.

The fact that the elections took place, and that their results (at least on the scale of the country as a whole) were not protested by any political force, signify both the presence of a certain level of maturity in the political system, and an acceptance of the “rules of the game” by political parties and politicians.

The fact that representatives of all more or less influential political movements (communists, nationalists, the liberal right, social liberals, and the party of power) are represented in the Duma and have combined to gather more than 80% of the votes, signifies that the new Duma is representative, and will probably work more productively than the previous lower chamber of parliament.

But all these unquestionably positive features of Elections-99 do not counterbalance two substantial deficiencies.

The evolving party system was undermined in favor of political machines.

First, the evolving party system was undermined in favor of “political machines” during the elections. Second, election results have demonstrated the strengthening of a number of antidemocratic tendencies.

The success of the virtual bloc Unity, which was created without a political program, organizational structure, or even politicians per se was due exclusively to the support of the popular Prime Minister and dominance on the television screen.

Unity’s success has also demonstrated the weakness of Russian parties as participants in Duma elections. At the same time, the success of “independent” candidates in single-member districts was assured primarily due to the support of regional governors.

Basically, election results in the regions were the consequence of competition between the political machines of Unity and Fatherland-All Russia (with the latter one clearly lacking resources).

As a result, those won who had; (1) more direct and indirect advertisement in electronic media; (2) more administrative resources; and (3) less concrete election programs.

While the Communist Party won the largest number of seats, they can hardly be considered election winners – the party barely managed to preserve its electorate and lost some single-member districts.

The power of regional leaders is becoming the only limit on federal executive power.

Undoubtedly, the former favorite of elections that has suffered defeat, Fatherland-All Russia, will soon break up (just like “Russia’s Choice” did in 1993): “All Russia” is already being drawn to the victors’ camp. Difficult times are probably also ahead for Yabloko, which became a victim of rough competition from the Union of Right-Wing Forces.

Fighting among “electoral machines” also led to the differentiation of election results in the regions, which was determined by the control of regional leaders over the elections process, especially in Bashkortostan and Moscow, where a number of accusations were voiced that elections have been falsified.

But in general it is unlikely that these realities have had a serious effect on the distribution of seats -- falsifications could have benefited Unity in some regions, and Fatherland-All Russia in others.

But the mere fact that administrative “political machines” are becoming the main instrument of elections calls into question the future of democratization in Russia in the foreseeable future.

Today, it appears obvious that the new composition of the State Duma will not only be pro-government, but loyal to any government. Thus not only will the plans of Constitutional reform or the parliament’s control over the government be buried, but also the very idea of autonomous legislation.

Falsifications could have benefited Unity in some regions, and FAR in others.

Filled with regional and oil/gas lobbyists, the new parliament is unlikely to become a legislative counter-weight to the executive branch.

It is more likely that it will play a legislative role only in Russia’s regions, which are, for the most part, representative organs of large corporative groups. This is the kind of obedient parliament the creators of 1993 Russian Constitution were dreaming about when they allocated rather modest powers to the Duma.

Putin, who has very high chances to win in the forthcoming presidential elections, thus assumes full control over the executive branch.

Apart from preserving his popularity during the election campaign, Putin also managed to: (1) protect himself from the dangers of competition during the elections (primarily from Primakov and Luzhkov); (2) ensure loyalty from the majority of regional leaders; (3) not join any party, thus leaving open the possibility of creating a broad coalition of support; and (4) if not assure himself majority support in the Duma, then at least avert any vote of no confidence in the government.

At the very least, it is hard to imagine who could compete with Putin in the presidential elections (but then again, who could have imagined him as a presidential candidate five months ago).

But the content of Putin’s policy (with the exception of Chechnya) remains unclear today, and even more so in the capacity of potential president.

Most likely, he can be expected to pursue a course to preserve the status quo, in the sense of dominance of informal institutions and mechanisms in Russian politics -- with the only difference being that some of the current “oligarchs” may be replaced with others.

The path to real democracy in Russia promises to be a long one.

Because there are no institutional guarantees against the abuse of almost unlimited presidential powers, the power of regional leaders (which was strengthened significantly during the December 19 elections) is becoming basically the only limit on federal executive power.

In general, December 19 showed that elections have become a norm in Russian politics – it is clear that it is impossible to cancel or postpone them under any pretext.

But elections in Russia have not become (at least not yet) a full-fledged mechanism of power transfer at the country level and in some of its regions.

Informational and administrative mobilization capabilities on the part of the “party of power” allowed it to successfully adapt elections and maintain control over the levers of governance.

The path to real democracy in Russia promises to be a long one.

NO BIG SURPRISES

THE PREDICTABLE RUSSIAN VOTER

Grigory Golosov, Professor

European University as St. Petersburg

KEY POINTS

* The ten democratic parties received 19% of the vote in ‘95, and 17.4% in ‘99. The four left-wing parties received 34.6% of the vote in ‘95 and 28.3% in ‘99 (the difference is less when correcting for the Agrarian party).

* Yabloko’s fatal mistake was allowing opponents to put its Chechnya position at the center of debate.

* Unity came out as the party of war for Russian national interests.

Sociologists did a fairly accurate job of predicting the 1999 Duma elections. VTsIOM, for one, managed to predict the results very precisely.

In part, this simply demonstrates that sociologists have started taking their jobs more seriously. But also, and more importantly, it means voters are acting more predictably. And this signals that large groups of people in Russia are more and more aligning themselves, if not with a particular party, then with a broad ideological tendency.

The percentage of people, for example, voting for candidates who more or less bill themselves as “democrats” remains practically unchanged since 1995.

The ten democratic parties received 19% of the vote in 1995, and 17.4% in 1999. The only difference is that in 1995 these votes were split, and only Yabloko made it into the Duma, while in 1999 the Union of Right-Wing Forces managed to capture most of the “democratic” vote for themselves.

And, in fact, many of the small groups that split the vote in 1995 are now in the Right coalition.

Yabloko’s principled position on Chechnya is not itself a mistake.

The distribution of votes between the Union of Right-Wing Forces and Yabloko might have been different, but Yabloko managed to make some catastrophic mistakes.

The major one was allowing its opponents to turn Yabloko’s unpopular position on Chechnya into the centerpiece of debate.

Seeing as it is guided by principle, the position itself cannot be called a mistake. But it should have been proposed alongside a position on some other issue that, though no less forceful, would also be more attractive to voters. Yabloko failed to take any such position.

On top of this, Yabloko ran an extremely unsuccessful ad campaign and managed to destroy its major electoral base when it moved to cancel the gubernatorial elections in Saint Petersburg (the latter mistake broke down Yabloko’s main electoral stronghold).

In 1995, the four left-wing parties received 34.6% of the vote. In 1999, this became 28.3%, but we should keep in mind that in 1995, the leftists included the Agrarian Party [which split in 1999, with half going to Fatherland-All Russia and the other half joining the Communists – editor]. If we correct for this, then the six parties on the left lost just 2 percentage points.

The Communist Party, meanwhile, demonstrated its superiority to its ideological brethren even more convincingly than four years ago.

The left-wing extremists, the Movement in Support of the Army and Spiritual Heritage, were crushed, while the portion of votes awarded to the Communists even increased a little.

The KPRF proved far superior to its ideological brethren.

It’s also clear, though, that the Communists failed to expand their electoral niche, and that many of those who voted for Zyuganov in 1996 did not enter the Communist mainstream.

As with the rightists, the leftists underwent a stabilization of their electorate without a broadening of it, even if their losses were minimal.

The main success story of the 1999 elections was the party of power, which in its two incarnations, Fatherland-All Russia (FAR) and Unity, received almost 25 more percentage points than Our Home is Russia (OHR) and Ivan Rybkin’s party did in 1995.

People are more and more aligning themselves, if not with a particular party, then with a broad ideological tendency.

FAR’s relative success can be chalked up to the party’s lengthy preparations, as well as the significant material resources of the Moscow mayor and the republic presidents who also entered the party.

The distribution of votes between the two parties of power can be explained by the simple fact that the Kremlin and its government finally have greater resources, which include the ability to exercise administrative pressure on regional leaders.

The Kremlin’s advantage in the informational sphere was significant, especially its control over the ORT and RTR television networks.

Even this advantage, naturally, would have been useless without an even slightly attractive leader. Vladimir Putin became this leader, gaining popularity from a war in Chechnya that happened to start just in time. And even Putin’s unsuccessful competitors from the party of power looked more convincing than OHR circa 1995. The party of power won because it was stronger.

It is more or less clear, moreover, where the votes for the parties of power came from. First off, the parties inherited Our Home is Russia’s 10%-plus.

Secondly, both parties took a more or less nationalist stance, with Unity even coming out as the party of war for Russian national interests.

The nationalist parties themselves, including the LDPR (Zhirinovsky’s Bloc), lost more than half of their votes from 1995 because these votes went to the parties of power.

Thirdly, the small “centrist” parties lost nearly five percent of the votes they received in 1995.

They were, for the most part, swallowed by Fatherland-All Russia (Union of Labor, My Fatherland, et al.), pushed into the electoral margins (Kedr) or were just less successful than in 1995 (Women of Russia).

Finally, the parties of power managed even to bite off a morsel from the Communists and democrats.

Thus, from the combination of these many ingredients was formed the party of power’s hearty electoral stew.

The Kremlin’s advantage would have been useless without an attractive leader.

In sum, a more ideologically stable vote was accompanied by a move on the part of less ideologically oriented voters to the two parties of power. This should, as a whole, be looked upon as a positive development, since it decreased the level of political fragmentation while increasing actual voter representation in the Duma by 30%.

The Duma’s future depends, of course, upon the presidential election, whose shadow significantly influenced this vote as well.

A CHANGING IDEOLOGICAL LANDSCAPE

HOW THE KREMLIN WON, AND WHAT THIS MEANS FOR RUSSIA

Sergei Markov

Director, Institute of Political Studies, Moscow

KEY POINTS

* Primakov will not be the next president. His electoral base has been destroyed.

* A new pro-government Duma will enable progress on economic reforms.

* The Kremlin was a clear winner in the elections, managing to weaken FAR, create a pro-government faction, get Zhirinovsky and Union of Right-Wing Forces into the Duma.

* The liberal pro-Western political forces in Russia have their own electorate – about 15%.

What were the political consequences of the Duma election?

The most important consequence of the elections is that Yevgeny Primakov is not a future president.

Several months ago his popularity was close to 50%, and now his bloc, Fatherland-All Russia, got only 13% of votes in the election, taking third place.

One of the lessons of 1999 is that political careers in Russia can be quickly built and destroyed, seemingly out of nowhere.

The new Duma will be much less oppositional and much more inclined towards cooperation with the government. It is quite possible that a mildly unstable but pro-government majority will be created.

This will considerably ease the implementation of economic policy for the Government. We can thus expect serious progress in reforming economic institutions in Russia.

We can expect serious progress in reforming economic institutions.

3.1 The elections can be seen as an overwhelming victory for the Kremlin, because it achieved its objectives, and even exceeded some of them. What were its objectives?

First of all, not to let Fatherland-All Russia (FAR) become an alternative “party of power,” and accordingly, to reduce the number of votes for FAR and change its image from one of solidity and predictability into one of fierce scramble and instability.

This was fully achieved. FAR’s mere 13% of the vote meant it was competing not with the Communists and not even with the newly-created pro-government Unity bloc, but with the Union of Right-Wing Forces, to which complacent leaders of FAR hadn’t even paid attention in the course of the election campaign.

The leaders of Fatherland-All Russia – Yevgeny Primakov and Yuri Luzhkov – were chased by hired journalists to such a degree that they seem to have lost confidence in their own abilities. Luzhkov, who had always radiated optimism and vitality, stopped smiling in the two last months of the campaign.

As the natural result of the destruction of Fatherland-All Russia, separate factions are being created: Fatherland, All Russia, and even a possible Agrarian faction.

Another Kremlin goal was to create a pro-government faction in the Duma, which they achieved brilliantly. The majority of observers were surprised when Unity got 23% of the vote – just behind the Communists.

It was important for the Kremlin that the Communists got many more votes than Fatherland-All Russia — as it worked out, nearly twice as many. This way, support for FAR by the Communists in the Duma is significantly complicated, as is the possibility of nominating Yevgeny Primakov as a unified candidate for the presidential elections.

The Kremlin wanted to get Vladimir Zhirinovsky into the Duma because his party has proven its readiness to support the government in the Duma. The task has been accomplished – Zhirinovsky with his party will vote as the Kremlin wishes.

FAR was given an image of fierce scramble and instability.

The Kremlin wanted to get loyal liberals from the Union of Right-Wing Forces into the Duma in order to juxtapose them to the opposition liberals from Yabloko. The task was greatly over-achieved: Yabloko barely overcame the 5% barrier, and the Union of Right-Wing Forces outran even Zhirinovsky.

The Communist influence in Russia is slowly fading away.

The Kremlin won two different competitions, one between potential “parties of power” and one between liberal parties. Nobody was afraid of the Communists getting the most votes, because everybody knows that the party cannot return to power under current conditions.

All eyes were instead on the struggle for the second and fourth places.

For second place, the race was between two de-ideologized coalitions of Moscow and federal officials and close-to-power businessmen: Unity and Fatherland-All Russia.

These coalitions were different only in one thing – Unity is pro-Kremlin, and Fatherland-All Russia is anti-Kremlin.

The pro-Kremlin de-ideologized coalition won a smashing victory.

The race for fourth place was fought by two liberal blocs: the pro-Kremlin Union of Right-Wing Forces and the anti-Kremlin Yabloko. The pro-Kremlin liberals won an unexpected and significant victory.

In view of all these reasons, the main winners of the parliamentary elections are the Kremlin, which achieved its objectives, Vladimir Putin, for whom the results of the elections opened a straight road to the presidency, and Boris Yeltsin, who can now retire after giving up his post through democratic elections to Vladimir Putin, who is supported both by the majority of the population and the majority in the Duma.

The Communists, having won first place, confirmed their status as the major opposition force in Russia. But unlike in the old Duma, the Communists will not be able to control the parliamentary majority together with their allies.

Despite the fact that the Communist Party personally increased its votes from 22% to 24%, the electoral base of the procommunist organizations in general has been reduced – from 32% to 27%. That is why we can say that the communist influence in Russia is slowly fading away.

The elections showed that the liberal pro-Western political forces in Russia have their own electorate – about 15%. Moreover, it is possible to say that the pro-Western liberals were able to significantly freshen and renovate their image. They are gradually switching from the defensive to the attack.

The elections reflected a serious change in Russia’s ideological landscape. If the previous years saw the struggle between left forces raising the banner of patriotism and right forces preferring not to bring attention to the national and state interests of Russia, now this ideological opposition is gone.

Pro-Western liberals are gradually shifting from the defensive to the attack.

Out of the six blocs surpassing the 5% barrier, the five blocs that gained most of the votes declare Russia’s national interests as a priority and underscore the patriotism of their position.

Most characteristic of this fact is the ideological renewal of the liberals, as represented by the Union of Right-Wing Forces (URWF), which wrote patriotic slogans on its banner and supported both the military operation in Chechnya and the Union of Russia and Belarus.

Luzhkov, who used to radiate optimism and vitality, stop-ped smiling in the last two months of the campaign.

Thus, the Russian liberals abandoned the maxim of Kurt Vonnegut: “Patriotism is the last resort of scoundrels.” As a result of these elections, patriotism has become the dominant ideology in Russia.

THE KREMLIN ADVANTAGE

MOSCOW USED ITS RESOURCES TO WIN, AND DEMOCRACY LOST

Vyacheslav Nikonov, Director

“Politika” Foundation, Moscow

KEY POINTS:

* The Kremlin determined the make-up of the new Duma, as abuses by those in power plagued the elections.

* Of the 3 Kremlin-supported parties, only one, the Union of Right Wing Forces, can be called democratic, and it lost its liberal innocence by supporting operations in Chechnya.

* Opposition parties contain more reformers than the parties of the administration do.

* There will be at least 10 factions in the new Duma.

A fairly popular interpretation of the Russian election results for the State Duma is that they represented a triumph of Russian democracy, demonstrated the administration’s adherence to democratic processes, brought success to the democratic pro-Kremlin forces and created the conditions for a breakthrough in reformist law making.

In my opinion, one must be endowed with a great sense of humor in order to come to these conclusions.

The main factor that determined the distribution of power in the future Duma were the administrative resources of executive power, which chose a legislature for itself.

The Kremlin was the principal campaign headquarters, which, while directing the departmental headquarters established in each of the Ministries, allocated uncontrollably enormous sums of budgetary and non-budgetary money in support of parties and candidates sympathetic to it.

The Kremlin chose a legislature for itself.

Included amicably in this game were the governors, who could hope for federal subventions only on the condition of support for the pro-administration bloc, Unity.

The Kremlin instituted strict control over the primary mass media that are sustained with taxpayers’ money, and introduced for all intents and purposes censorship on the activities of the opposition.

The unraveling of the pro-administrative parties was brought on through association with Premier Putin, who appeared as the “heroic suppressor of Chechnya” and the embodiment of Russians’ aspiration to the “hard hand,” and not at all to democracy.

Moreover, the powers that be had an unlimited capacity to openly destroy the election legislation (which, by the way, directly prohibits any administrative interference in the course of elections), confident of the full loyalty of the regulatory and judicial organs.

And once again the wise and exceptionally democratic idea of Comrade Stalin was adopted: “It is not important how the people vote, but who counts the vote.” Information on serious abuses during the calculation of the votes this time was by far greater than and other time.

Putin appeared as the “heroic suppressor of Chechnya.”

The idea that elections can be “clean and honest” went into the realm of idealistic human rights folklore.

Of the three parties supported by the Kremlin, only one can be called democratic – the Union of Right Wing Forces (URWF), which, in truth, also lost its liberal innocence having fully supported the military operation in Chechnya.

The idea of “clean and honest” became nothing but folklore.

The virtual bloc Unity having kept its program in secret until the end of the elections, presents in its ranks an amalgam of unknown statesmen of very different orientations – from liberals to more or less communists, from nationalist traditionalists to advocates for the legalization of same-sex marriages.

And even the person with the biggest sense of humor would not call the Kremlin supported operetta-like bloc of Zhirinovsky democratic.

Even if one were to suppose that the pro-Kremlin forces are all entirely democratic, it is unlikely that their success may be considered indisputable. The rightists, Unity and Zhirinovsky combined took away fewer votes than their opponents did from Yabloko, Fatherland-All Russia and the Communist Party.

Nevertheless, reformers numbered even greater in the ranks of Kremlin opponents Yabloko and Fatherland-All Russia than in the parties of the administration.

This election produced no winners.

The elections had barely ended when the process of propagation of factions in the future Duma began. The largest parties delegate a portion of their supporters to attract independent deputies, chosen from the single-member districts, to new factions.

The KPRF will try to form satellite groups of agrarians and industrialists, Unity into the faction Peoples’ Deputies, and Fatherland-All Russia will reconstitute a faction that existed in the last Duma, namely Russia’s Regions.

Thus in the new Duma there will be no less than ten factions, not one of which will have a deciding influence. And all of them will carry on with political wrangling with each other, creating the most whimsical coalitions under the influence of pressure from different groups.

It goes without saying that this election produced no winners. The Kremlin family and existing premier gained a relative victory, never before having had so many of its supporters in the Duma. And the Communist party, as well, was a relative victor, having received more votes than ever before in parliamentary elections of the 1990’s.

On the losing side – the democratic principles of “rule of law,” “fair play” and accountability of power.

GUEST COLUMN:

THE RISE OF THE INDEPENDENTS

A BREAKDOWN OF THE DISTRICT ELECTION RESULTS

Nikolai Petrov

Associate, Carnegie Moscow Center

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

KEY POINTS:

* The average winning candidate garnered 33.9% of the vote in his or her district.

* Losing KPRF candidates mostly suffered their defeat to candidates supported by FAR in the single-member districts.

* Independents won in half of the single mandate districts.

While the competition between party lists has grabbed most of the media attention, half of the Duma was elected in single-member districts, as with the US Congress, where voters vote for individual candidates and the candidate with the most votes wins. What happened in this part of the election?

Level of Competition

There were fewer candidates in this election (1999) than there were in the last one in 1995: 2320 for 224 single mandate districts (no elections were held in Chechnya). 2320, at least, is the official number registered at the time of the close of the official registration period, although this number subsequently underwent several changes.

Some candidates were removed under the authority of the court; because of different electoral offenses committed; or else by the parties themselves, usually in the case of weaker candidates, in order to increase the chances of political allies or of parties “close in ideological spirit.”

Many strong candidates were not allowed to register.

Ten incumbents (and some others) were not allowed to run at all in the 1999 elections because they fell out of favor with regional power bases.

The average winning candidate garnered 33.9% of the vote in his or her district, while the average second-place finisher had 15.7 percentage points less.

Compared with 1995, this represents an increase in both the percentage gathered by the winning candidate and the difference between this percentage and that achieved by the second-place finisher.

Big Victories, Upsets

The victories of “new retirees” in the district races are of interest. These include former premiers Chernomyrdin and Stepashin; former deputy ministers Nemtsov, Kulikov, Maslyukov, Zadornov, and Shokhin; former ministers Oksana Dmitrieva, Khakamada, Kovalev, Boos, Draganov, Khodirev, and Generalov; and former Krasnoyarsk Governor Zubov.

Political embarrassment befell other former officials, including Shakhrai, Sobchak, Shumeiko, and Krasheninnikov.

Party Competition

From the party perspective, many winners and many of the main opponents of these winners had party affiliations.

In half of the districts, however, independents won the election, and in half of them an independent also finished second. In fact, in every fourth race, party-affiliates did not come in either in first or second place, meaning that the duel (the competition between the winner and his main rival) in these races involved only independent candidates.

Political embarrassment befell former officials like Shakhrai and Sobchak.

To get an idea of the level of party penetration of the races, consider the figures for the main parties: KPRF (48 victories, 43 second-place finishes); Fatherland-All Russia (31 victories, 15 second places); Unity (9 victories, 5 second places); Yabloko (5 victories, 13 second places); Union of Right-Wing Forces (5 victories, 15 second places); others (9 victories, 16 second places).

Duels involving only party-affiliated candidates took place in 64 districts. In 40 of them, the KPRF took part, but with mixed results (20 victories, 20 defeats). Among those losing to the Communists in these duels, the candidates of Unity, Yabloko, the Union of Right-Wing Forces (URWF), Fatherland-All Russia (FAR), and other smaller forces were represented in equal numbers.

Losing KPRF candidates mostly suffered their defeats to candidates supported by FAR.

Representatives of FAR competed in 29 duels, showing the stronger results than any other party (22 victories and only 7 defeats).

Every third district is represented by the same deputy who represented it in the last Duma.

Half of these victories (or 11) came at the expense of the KPRF; the other half, against all the others, including Unity. Of the seven losses, 3 went to the Communists and 3 to other lesser parties.

Unity, Yabloko, and URWF participated equally in party duels. Unity did better (6 victories, 5 defeats), whereas Yabloko and URWF had nine defeats apiece in comparison with 2 and 3 victories for each, respectively.

Party duelists of course had their favorite dueling spots. First of all, these were the two capitals, Moscow and St. Petersburg, where more than a fourth of all the hard-fought contests took place.

In Moscow, Moscow Region, and St. Petersburg, the duels took place mostly between FAR and the parties of the right. The other favorite dueling spots were the large republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, where FAR mostly dueled with the parties of the left.

Incumbents

Of the 159 incumbent deputies who put themselves up for re-election in their home districts, 74 won. This is not at all a bad result, since in the 1995 elections, 203 incumbents sought to reclaim their seats and only 68 won.

In 1999, every third district is represented in the new Duma by the same deputy who represented it in the last Duma.

In 24 instances (representing almost a tenth of the total number of seats) Duma deputies were re-elected from their regions for a third time (the others being the elections of 1993 and 1995).

A SERIES OF TABLES COMPILED BY PETROV ILLUSTRATING THESE POINTS (AND MANY OTHERS) WILL SOON BE POSTED AT: ksg.harvard.edu/bcsia/russianelectionwatch

REW’S SPECIAL THANKS TO: Vladimir Boxer, John Reppert, Anya Schmemann

TRANSLATORS: Melissa Carr, Elena Chesheva, Mark Gessen, Olesia Jefferson, Matthew Lyberg, Eugene Mazo, Oxana Shevel

Sources for images used in REW No.6: Putin: pravitelstvo.ru, nns.ru 9/10/99, gazeta.ru 11/10/99; Yeltsin: BBC 12/31; Sobchak: sobchak.ru; Gorbachev nns.ru; Chubais: chubais.ru, nns.ru; Chechen fighters: gazeta.ru 12/20; Shaymiev: lujkov.ru; Primakov: FAR website; bombing ruins: nns.ru 9/13; Dorenko: ort.ru; Luzhkov: rbc.ru 12/19/99; Chernomyrdin: FAR website; Stepashin: fom.ru 9/29/99; Yavlinsky: gazeta.ru; Zyuganov: gazeta.ru 8/29/99.

The Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project works to catalyze support for three great transformations underway in Russia, Ukraine and the other republics of the former Soviet Union: to sustainable democracies, free market economies, and cooperative international relations. The Project seeks to understand Western stakes in these transformations, identify strategies for advancing Western interests, and encourage initiatives that increase the likelihood of success. It provides targeted intellectual and technical assistance to governments, international agencies, private institutions, and individuals seeking to facilitate these three great transformations.

SDI PROJECT, BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

JFK SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

79 JFK STREET CAMBRIDGE, MA 02138

Phone: (617) 496-1565 Fax: (617) 496-8779



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