Reading the Nichomachean Ethics Book I
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Reading the Nichomachean Ethics
Book I:
Chapter 1: Good as the aim of action
Every art, applied science, systematic investigation, action and choice aims at some good:
either an activity, or a product of an activity. Is there some end at which all actions aim?
(Yes¡ªit is happiness [eudaimonia].)
Chapter 2: Politics as master science of the good
That end which is most sought for its own sake is the good for man , which is subject of
the science of politics. It includes the individual¡¯s good, but also the good for the state,
which is a collective of individuals.
Chapter 3: Limitations of ethics and politics
We should seek for no more precision that the nature of the subject allows.
Politics is not a study for young men, but it does profit the rationally inclined.
Chapter 4: The many characterizations of happiness
Everyone agrees that ¡®happiness¡¯ is the name we agree to give to the good for man; but
people disagree on what kind of life it is that deserves that name. The definition of that
life is that it amounts to ¡®living well and doing well¡¯ (1095a19). But what life in
particular meets that specification, constitutes such a life?
Some of the candidates: life of pleasure; life of wealth; life of honor.
The method by which we should resolve this question is by induction: bottom- up,
rather than trying to deduce the answer from some theory. Consult the opinions of our
fellow men, preferably the wiser among them or those who have been well raised.
Chapter 5: Various views of the highest good
Although the average man considers the life of pleasure the one most likely to lead to the
goal we desire, but the notable suggest the political life, or the contemplative life. (see p.
432, 1178a5-15 for a discussion of the political life.)
--pleasure is something we share with the animals; not very classy.
--honor depends more on those who confer it, than those who receive it; and we
want something that is actually in the power of the agent.
--money is only advantageous as a means to that which it can buy.
About the contemplative life we will hear more later.
Chapter 6: Plato¡¯s view
Some things are good in themselves; some things are good as a means to things
good in themselves.
Chapter 7: The good is final and self-sufficient
That which is always chosen for itself and not as a means to anything else is called final
in an unqualified sense; and that description applies to happiness more than to anything
else. (If we do choose honor and pleasure, it is in hopes that they will contribute to a
happy life.)
One approach to characterizing happiness is to ascertain the proper function of the
human. Being alive, nutrition and growth, and perception are common to other living
things; but the active life of the rational element is unique to the human.
Just being born with the capacity to be rational does not suffice; it is the exercise
of that capacity, its full attainment, that characterizes the fully human.
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Conclusion: the good of man is an activity of the soul in conformity with
excellence / virtue¡ªand if there are several such activities, in conformity with the
best and most complete. (1098a15-17)
--But in a complete life. For one swallow does not make a spring, nor does one
summer day.
Chapter 8: Popular views confirm our position
Goods of the soul are prior to goods of the body and external goods; our specification of
the good life includes references to virtues¡ªas actualized, not as potential alone, as a
practice or activity, not just a latent characteristic.
A life of this sort is pleasurable of itself; for activities in conformity with virtue
(=excellent performance of a faculty or capacity) include pleasure as a consequence, are
in themselves pleasant.
External goods: of course perfect happiness requires external goods as well¡ªor
at least will be better for them: wealth, friends, political power, good birth, beauty and
good children¡
Chapter 9: How happiness is acquired
Is it a gift of the gods? Well, there is certainly something divine about it, but it is in fact
accessible to everyone whose capacity for excellence is unimpaired. It is acquired
through learning and training, through study and effort.
Chapter 10: Can a man be judged happy before he is dead?
Chapter 11: Do the fortunes of the living affect the happiness of the dead?
Chapter 12: The praise accorded to happiness
Chapter 13: The psychological foundation of virtue
The soul consists of two elements, the rational and the irrational.
Of the irrational part, one (the nutritive) seems to have no share in human excellence; the
other, the seat of appetite and desire in general, seems to be able to listen to reason and
accept its leadership.
This suggests that the rational part is itself dual; one element is reason in the strictest
sense, contained within itself; and the other relates to the appetitive and directs action.
Virtues are differentiated to in accordance with this division of the soul:
Intellectual virtues: theoretical wisdom, understanding, and practical wisdom
Moral virtues: generosity, self-control
Book II:
Chapter 1: Moral virtue is the result of habit
Intellectual virtues come by teaching (=require experience and time);
Moral virtues come by HABIT. We have the capacity (=potentiality) to acquire them;
and this capacity can be actualized in us¡ªby first having them put into action.
(=analogous to skills; different from perception)
¡°We become courageous by performing acts of courage.¡±
Hence it is no small matter whether one habit or another is inculcated in us from early
childhood; on the contrary, it makes a considerable difference, or rather, all the difference.
Chapter 2: Method in the practical sciences
Not a theoretical study: the object is to become good.
The correct judgment of how to behave must be determined ¡°on each different
occasion [by considering] what the situation demands.¡±
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We do have a thumb-rule on which to rely: moral qualities (=habits of correct
action) are destroyed by defect and by excess, and are preserved by the mean.
Chapter 3: Pleasure and pain are the test of virtue
Virtues have to do with actions and emotions. Pleasure and pain are consequences of
every emotion and every action. So virtue has to do with pleasure and pain. (1104b1416) Virtue makes us act in the best way in matters involving pleasure and pain.
Pleasure (or pain) accompanies all objects of choice. We use pleasure as our
criterion of choice.
So: virtue/excellence is concerned with p/p; the actions which produce it also
develop it (and can destroy it); it actualizes itself fully in those activities to which it owes
its origin.
Chapter 4: Virtuous action and virtue
The excellence of an action¡ªits virtue (or absence of that) lies not alone in the kind of
act it is¡ªbut in certain characteristics of the agent as he performs it: he must know what
he is doing; he must choose to act the way he does( and choose it for its own sake); and
the act must spring ¡°from a firm and unchangeable character.¡±
Chapter 5: Virtue defined: the genus
Virtue relates to the soul of man (=he is alive; he feels and thinks and chooses and acts;
he is an agent in the world). Aristotle here distinguishes emotions; capacities (=my
faculties, my potential for doing those things of which human beings are capable); and a
third thing, which he calls here ¡°the condition, either good or bad, in which we are in
relation to the emotions.¡± [ Ostwald (=our text) uses the word ¡°characteristic.¡± Ross uses
the word ¡°state.¡± Urmson uses the word ¡°disposition.¡± ]
Emotions: he gives a list of emotions: appetite; anger; fear; confidence; envy;
joy; affection; hatred; longing, emulation, pity¡ª¡°anything, in short, followed by pleasure
or pain¡± (=things that I like, enjoy, want, avoid; positive or negative.)
He says the virtues are not emotions (although emotions are the subject-matter of
virtue; virtue [or vice] is a specific way of reacting to our emotions, how we express or
act on them). We are not praised or blamed for our emotions (although we may be for
how we express our emotions).
Nor is there a specific moral faculty, so that we can say that we can ¡®see¡¯ the right
way to behave, and are thus free from judgment about how we then choose to act¡)
Instead, he locates ¡®virtue¡¯ in ¡°the condition we are in with respect to the
emotions.¡± He says it is how we are ¡®disposed¡¯ toward our emotions: it is a settled state
or disposition toward how we express our emotions.
Chapter 6: The differentia
There are many ¡®dispositions¡¯ or settled states toward emotions, of which virtue is
only one. It is distinguished from the others by aiming at the median (mean). (1106b15)
Now this is not as easy to determine with respect to human action as it is with respect to,
for instance, the middle point of a line, or mean household income (a statistically
determinable point, given enough information): with human action, things are not so
easy.
So: virtue/excellence is a characteristic involving choice;
It consists in observing the mean relative to us, defined by a rational principle,
--and his standard is ¡°such as a man of practical wisdom¡± might determine.
4
Virtue is the mean between two vices: an excess and a deficiency, in
respect of experiencing (and acting on the basis of) emotions: ¡°at the
right time, toward the right object, toward the right people, for the
right reason and in the right manner¡± ¨Cthat is the median, and the
best course, and the mark of virtue. (1106b20)
Chapter 7: Examples of the mean in various virtues
He realizes that this is all too theoretical, in this section, to be very clear. So he gives us
examples, with respect to the passion/emotion OF which they are the mean:
Courage is the mean between recklessness and cowardice.
Self-control is the mean between self-indulgence and [asceticism?]
Generosity is the mean between stinginess and extravagance.
Truthfulness is the virtue between self-depreciation and exaggeration.
Wit is the mean between buffoonery and boorishness.
Righteous indignation is the virtue of which envy and spite are the vices.
Chapter 8: The relation between the mean and its extremes
This is not a mechanical determination; some of the extremes are more socially
undesirable than others; and the [character? Disposition] of some individuals tends more
to one of the extremes (=vices) than the other, so to seek individual excellence may
require individuals to compensate for their own unfortunate proclivities.
Chapter 9: How to attain the mean
So: we all know now that moral virtue is a mean (and in what sense it is a mean): that it
is a mean, an appropriate balance, between two extremes (both of which count as vices)
marked by excess and deficiency; and that it aims at the median in emotions and in
actions.
It is not easy to be virtuous; it is a difficult rational task. It is clear that the
median characteristic in all fields is the one that deserves praise (and its extremes deserve
blame).
Book III:
Chapter 1: Actions voluntary and involuntary
(He reminds us here that when he talks about human beings he is talking about agents¡ª
and agents with rational capacities who are purposive, who in their actions set themselves
goals and act toward them.)
We need to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary actions; for we are
praised or blamed for the one, and pardoned or pitied for the other.
Two kinds of involuntary actions: those done from compulsion, or from
ignorance.
(a) Compelled actions: the source of the action is external to the agent, who
contributes nothing. (=swept away by a storm, or taken captive by pirates)
What about cases where the choice is between a base action and a greater evil, or
men endure ignoble things for the sake of a noble end? We consider them mixed, but
mainly voluntary¡ªbut we tend not to blame people for them, or to praise them if the end
result is noble.
(b) actions done out of ignorance: these too are of two kinds. An action done
out of ignorance that is regretted is considered involuntary: he would not
have done it if he had known the relevant circumstances, but he didn¡¯t. [The
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category of non-voluntary actions is a bit more puzzling: it seems to be
demarcated by the absence of regret. The person in this position seems to be
non-voluntary, and hence free of praise or blame, because he did not in any
relevant sense choose the action or situation that had the result. Example: I
was in the way of someone who was trying to go somewhere, so he didn¡¯t get
there, so there was a bad result? But I didn¡¯t choose to do anything in
particular, so there was no ¡®action¡¯ in the relevant sense on my part?]
(c) A list of things of which I can be ignorant: who the agent is, what he is doing,
what thing or person is affected, the means he is using, the result intended,
and the manner in which he is acting.
(d) So: a voluntary act is one in which the initiative lies with an agent who
knows the particular circumstances in which the action is performed.
(e) Acts due to passion and appetite are voluntary.
Chapter 2: Choice
Not all voluntary acts are chosen. We choose what we believe might be attained through
our own agency; and we choose the means to the ends we wish for. Choice is concerned
with things that lie within our power. It involves reason and thought, and is the result of
preceding deliberation.
Chapter 3: Deliberation
We deliberate about things that are within our power and can be realized in action.
That excludes outcomes that are certain, for about them no deliberation is
necessary. Deliberation comes into play for things with unpredictable outcome or in
cases where an indeterminate element is involved. (1112b8)
We deliberate about means, not about ends; sometimes about how to find the
relevant instruments, and sometimes about how to use them.
Conclusions: man is the source of his actions; deliberation is about the things
obtainable by human action; and actions aim at something other than themselves.
Chapter 4: Wish
Wish is concerned with the ends at which actions aim, which is the good.
But: people can wish for things that are not in fact good, though they appear so to the
individual at the time and under the circumstances. But: in such cases they are mistaken.
¡°what seems good to a man of high moral standard is truly the object of a wish, whereas a
worthless man wishes anything that strikes his fancy.¡±
The chief distinction of a man of high moral standards is his ability to see the
truth in each particular moral question.
Chapter 5: Man as responsible agent
Actions concerned with means are based on choice, and voluntary actions. The
activities in which the virtues find their expression deal with means. So our virtue or
excellence depends upon ourselves. If we have the power to act nobly or basely, and
likewise the power not to act¡ªand if such action or inaction constitutes our being good
or evil, we must conclude that it depends upon us whether we are decent or worthless
individuals.
We are in some cases responsible for our ignorance as well; in which case it is no
excuse, but blameworthy.
To sum up: 1114b25 ff
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