Avoiding New Borders: Regional Cooperation from the Baltic ...



This report was prepared by the staff of the European Security Programme, IEWS

Contents

Introduction

Executive Summary

Opening Remarks

Avoiding New Borders: National Interests and Regional Goals

Frameworks for Cooperation Among States in the Region

Existing sub-regional groups

Emerging interlocking networks

International Organiziations and Sub-Regional Cooperation

Russia's Policy on Regional Cooperation

Belarus in Sub-Regional Cooperation

The Potential of the Euro-region concept for Sub-Regional Coordination

Final Panel Discussion: Identities and Interests in Sub-Regional Cooperation

Appendix A: Workshop Agenda

Appendix B: List of Participants

Appendix C: Background Paper

Introduction

'Security and Integration in Eurasia's New Boundary Zones: The Role of Sub-Regional Relations' is the second year of a project which the Institute for EastWest Studies (IEWS) is running with generous support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. This project explores the contribution made by intergovernmental sub-regional groupings to security and integration in the OSCE area. In 1996-97 a detailed comparative study of six Central and Eastern European groups was undertaken and the role they play in assisting states of the region in their democratic transition, in entering wider European integration processes and in increasing the stability and security of the the region. Two conferences were held and a book summarizing the conclusions of the six case studies will shortly be published. Cooperative relations with OSCE, EU and WEU have been established to help develop these international organizations' policies toward sub-regional relations.

The second year of the project aims to continue this work and, at the same time, to extend lessons learned in the Central and Eastern European cases to three areas within the OSCE security space which have not yet been fully integrated into the m ain European institutional architecture. These areas are South-Eastern Europe; the Western NIS/Eastern CEE (which IEWS terms 'New Central and Eastern Europe') and the 'Southern Tier' of the Trans-Caucasian and Central Asian Republics. Three workshops exploring sub-regional cooperation in these areas - initiatives to date, obstacles, opportunities - will take place and the final conclusions drawn together in a second volume. The project is guided by a high-level international Steering Board, meeting twice annually, under the chairmanship of Swedish Deputy State Secretary, Ambassador Anders Bjurner.

This report is a summary of the second workshop of the series, Existing and Emerging Cooperation in New Central and Eastern Europe. The workshop agenda and list of participants are attached as appendices A and B. For further information on the project, please contact IEWS.

Opening Remarks

Ambassador Anders Bjurner (Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), speaking at the opening reception of the workshop, drew attention to the importance of sub-regional cooperation in contemporary Europe. This relevance stems from the particular values of the sub-regional process: it is a cooperative approach based on equality of all participants; it attends to specific current problems that determine human and state security and which are of day-to-day practical concern for the populace; it combines top-down initiatives with bottom-up development, building security from the level of the individual; it leads to the creation of economically interdependent networks, thereby supplementing and assisting wider integration processes which are often slower and more opaque from the perspective of domestic populations; it concentrates on the tasks which it can tackle through concrete projects and avoids unfeasible and/or over-ambitious goals. National policymakers and international organizations are increasingly coming to recognize this potential and to pay greater attention to regional processes in Europe. Ambassador Bjurner concluded that such cooperation is crucial to European security and will play an increasing role in the future.

Avoiding New Borders: National Interests and Regional Goals

H.E. Anton Buteiko (First Deputy Foreign Minister, Ukraine) emphasized the importance of regionalism and increased interdependence among states for security and economic prosperity throughout Europe. Ukraine’s geography and economic development made it particularly conscious of this fact. According to Mr. Buteiko, regional cooperation should be aimed at the re-establishment of economic and cultural ties weakened by artificial creation of an east-west vector. Cooperation should be based on the principles and rules of international law and should distinguish between transfrontier and sub-state regional cooperative efforts. NATO and EU enlargement further underlined the significance of regional cooperation as a way of avoiding new dividing lines. At the same time, sub-regional cooperation can assist CEE states’ EU integration prospects. Ukraine is an active participant in a variety of sub-regional initiatives: it was one of the founding states of BSEC and participates in CEI. It has encouraged GUAM to develop economic cooperative links and stresses that the grouping is not directed at any organization. Finally, Mr. Buteiko drew attention to emerging tri- and quadrilateral networks and Euro-regions and suggested that these fluid cooperative ventures could bring positive economic benefit for all.

Professor Charles King (Georgetown University) set out some of the challenges facing regionalism which stem from the very logic of sub-regionalism itself. There was first the question of terminology: OSCE and the Council of Europe could be described as the only truly regional organizations in Europe. Yet their very inclusiveness weaken them considerably. The informality and ad hoc nature of sub-regional cooperation, however hard to define, offer far more potential to address states’ needs. Sub-regional cooperation encompasses a wide variety of arrangements which makes it difficult to speak of general models. It is not an instrument, so much as an outcome and thus can not be easily employed as a policy tool. Regional cooperation is not a new phenomenon in Central and Eastern Europe and the imperatives shaping earlier interwar efforts still remain: avoiding new dividing lines, providing cooperative links among states in case of a resurgent Russia and demonstrating to external forces that CEE states can be security providers. In this respect Professor King noted two ironies. Current sub-regional efforts are integrally linked to CEE states’ EU membership applications and this raises questions as to the survival of sub-regional groupings if and when enthusiasm for EU wanes. Second, sub-regional cooperation in CEE may be intended to carve out a space from Russia but to be successful, Russia must be involved in the process.

In discussion some challenged the view that sub-regional efforts will decline as EU enlargement proceeds. The lengthy nature of the latter and the lack of involvement of domestic populations in the accession process may encourage increased attention on sub-regional initiatives as a more immediate and tangible process for the electorate. Others questioned the degree of domestic interest in and support for sub-regional cooperation. Several participants argued that sub-regionalism could be a tool as well as an outcome, particularly in avoiding dividing lines and also in the potential capacity of sub-regional organizations for conflict-resolution. Russia’s involvement in northern European regional efforts was noted as an example of how a big state could be successfully integrated into cooperative processes. While there was no way of binding states permanently into such organizations, relative lack of institutionalization remained one of the most positive features of sub-regionalism and should not be discouraged.

Frameworks for Cooperation

Existing Sub-Regional Groups

Dr. Oleksandr Pavliuk (IEWS) surveyed two existing sub-regional groups in which states from the region were involved: Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) and the Central European Initiative (CEI). In recent years the stature of both had grown and possible membership expansion was currently under discussion. BSEC and CEI were engaging in new substantive cooperative projects and considering greater institutionalization (e.g. the BSEC recent decision to transform iself from a loose grouping into a regional organization with its own statute). The sustainability of these developments, however, was challenged by external and internal developments. Future EU membership for some participants raised serious questions for the continued survival of sub-regional groups: EU border regulations represented the most obvious example of the tensions that would arise. EU active participation in sub-regional groups was thus crucial both from a political and a financial support point of view. Internally, the diversity of enlarging sub-regional groups like BSEC and CEI, when coupled with their lack of institutionalization, made common approaches or joint projects difficult to implement. Dr. Pavliuk suggested that this could encourage the development of smaller cooperative schemes among group members, the overall effect of which on BSEC and CEI needed to be explored. As these sub-regional organizations continued to develop there was increasing need for closer cooperation between them.

Emerging Interlocking Networks

Professor Antoni Kaminski (Polish Institute of Political Studies) outlined the background to and current state of Polish-Ukrainian-Romanian cooperation. Poland initiated this cooperation in early 1992, following Ukrainian independence, an act which illustrated the significance of Ukraine for Poland. The cooperation has been consistently called strategic and indeed, defence and social/cultural cooperation form the scope of the cooperation. There has been little by way of practical projects to date and any cooperative projects will be likely to take place within larger existing frameworks such as PfP or the Carpathian Euro-region. Nevertheless, the triangle does encourage positive feeling and increased understanding between the three governments. There was a deep commitment in Poland to preserving these relations as it prepared to enter EU and take on the obligations of EU membership. Professor Kaminski suggested that trilateral cooperative networks could take on the regimes and standards reflected by the EU and that Poland could then negotiate strongly for the maintainence of such relationships in the accession process.

Ambassador Sergiu Celac (Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) noted that although Ukraine, Romania and Moldova had declared their intention to develop cooperation in economic, ecological, minority, cultural and education spheres, this cooperation - apart from the establishment of two Euro-regions - had been slow to develop. This was principally due to the lack of legal and institutional frameworks in which to develop practical projects. Moreover, the different legislative and administrative priorities of each of the three states made it difficult to embark on common projects. Ambassador Celac also noted the financial and time constraints facing each of these countries. He suggested that more responsibility and resources needed to be delegated to local and regional authorities in order to enable practical projects to be implemented. The establishment of trilateral cooperative networks was an ad hoc process still in its infancy which, although having a good rationale, needed more coordination.

In discussion it was pointed out that grass-roots cross-border cooperation was taking place, unrecorded, in many parts of the region. National governments played an important role in creating a fruitful environment for sub-regionalism but successful implementation demanded adequate state decentralization. Others questioned the extent of existing bottom-up cooperation and suggested that top-down initiatives would be necessary if sub-regional relations were going to play a significant future role. Some queried whether trilateral networks were a way of stopping short of full regional cooperation, at best a rhetorical tool that resulted in minimal practical commitment. There was substantial discussion of future EU enlargement and the particular pressures it placed on the five applicant states. In order to ensure their successful accession and prevent any possibility of a ‘two-class’ Union, these states had to meet the obligations of the acquis in full. However, this posed genuine problems for relations with states on their eastern borders and in turn, for stability and prosperity in Europe.

International Organizations and Sub-Regional Cooperation

Mr. Piotr Iwaszkiewicz (Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs) addressed the relationship between OSCE and sub-regional cooperation. Although most sub-regional groupings concentrated on political and economic cooperation (with exceptions such as BALTBAT, Danish-German-Polish military cooperation and peace-keeping batallions, e.g. Hungary-Italy-Slovenia), regional cooperation was an important factor in developing European security. The OSCE recognised the contribution of the sub-regional level and was increasingly turning its attention to how it could be maximised. One potential way was to formulate a set of guiding rules for sub-regional organizations, encompassing the principles and norms of the OSCE. Mr. Iwaszkiewicz noted that the German, French and Polish OSCE delegations were now working on the establishment of such rules which would, when complete, be inserted in the OSCE Charter on European Security.

Mr. Jiri Vogl (Council of Europe) set out the role of the Council of Europe (CoE) as a framework for regional cooperation. The CoE played an important role in establishing common values and standards for human rights and democracy in Europe. Membership presupposed that a state not only conformed to the rule of law but that it was prepared to comply fully with membership obligations. The CoE acted as a discussion forum for states and an important training ground in helping prepare states for entry into European integration structures. Its convention on trans-frontier cooperation established the legal framework for the rights of local and regional authorities to engage in cross-border ventures. This document also provides models for cooperative initiatives and is an important instrument in establishing standards for regional cooperation.

Mr. Stephan de Spiegeleire (WEU Institute for Security Studies) explored the relationship between sub-regionalism and NATO and WEU, arguing that the logic of security organizations was an introspective one that concentrated on defence planning among states of a particular region. An inherent tension existed between it and the ‘cross-regional sub-regionalism’ under discussion. Yet the policies that NATO and WEU were now developing, particularly in non-article 5 activities, increasingly focused on bottom-up subsidiarity. The logic of flexible initiatives like EAPC ad hoc group discussions, NATO CJTFs and WEU’s FAWEU was to encourage countries to cooperate in a militarily useful way, develop cultures of transparency and communication and facilitate successful NATO/EU enlargement. By default, rather than design, such policies could help foster sub-regional organizations. At the same time, there was a limit to this process as, at a certain point, proliferation of sub-regional initiatives would challenge the efficiency of regional security structures embodied in NATO/WEU.

In discussion some argued that the very nature of many non-article 5 tasks meant they could only be performed by sub-regional groupings and pointed out the potential of sub-regionalism as a mechanism for reducing ethnic conflict. Others countered that the sub-regionalism contained in the CJTF concept is that of flexible, dynamic coalitions of states as opposed to permanently-established sub-regional groups. It was suggested that in an enlarged EU states could come to consider their interests differently and align themselves accordingly: sub-regionalism (both within and across the borders of EU) might thus be a positive externality of enlargement. Some claimed that active EU involvement in sub-regional groups could help reduce the tension between the logic of internal EU and cross-border regionalism. From a practical perspective, such involvement would considerably facilitate knowledge about EU within CEE states and would help make EU support to these countries more effective. Noting the multiplicity of institutions for cooperation in Europe, speakers agreed that there was need for interaction and coordination between them.

Russia’s Policy on Regional Cooperation

Mr. Petr Lillenurm (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs) stated that Moscow’s perspective on sub-regional cooperation was based on the view that forms for cooperation should be tailored in a pragmatic way to the specific needs and problems of each sub-region. The broad purpose of the process was to overcome old dividing lines. As two very positive examples he gave a comprehensive presentation on the work of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) and the Council for Baltic Sea States (CBSS). According to Russian estimates, joint efforts in the field of environment (including nuclear safety and radiation) undertaken within these groups gave Russia a return of approximately 20 US dollars for every dollar spent. It was also worth noting that cooperative initiatives in the Baltic Sea region were moving further toward various forms of confidence-building. Russia welcomed this development but believed it was also important to relate regional security issues to the broader European security process. The OSCE has an obvious role to play in the sub-regional context, more, however, as a liaison centre than as a kind of mentor.

Mr. Rein Oidekivi (Estonian Embassy, Kyiv) in his comment claimed that the most important future aspect of the CBSS would be its potential as a forum for economic cooperation, given that this was an issue of rapidly expanding significance in the Baltic Sea region. Although somewhat slow today, the future development of St. Petersburg could give a crucial impulse in this direction.

The discussion focused partly on how Moscow could translate some of the positive experiences from sub-regional cooperation in the north-west to more complex sub-regions along Russia’s southern borders. It was also noted that the subjects of the Russian federation have an important direct role to play in sub-regional cooperation. Moscow preferred however to organize this kind of cooperation in the way it has been done in the Barents region, i.e. with a special council of the regions. This model could be applied also to the Baltic Sea region.

Belarus in Sub-Regional Cooperation

Mr. Wladzimir Astapenka (Belarusian State University) underlined that Belarus is not actively involved in sub-regional cooperation due to both geographical (Belarus is a land-locked country with no access to the Baltic and Black seas) and geopolitical factors. The only sub-regional grouping of which Belarus is a member is CEI but CEI is not a priority in Belarusian foreign policy, nor is Belarus a priority for CEI. Belarus also participates in the Nieman Euro-region and plans to join the Buh Euro-region. It would be more accurate, therefore, to speak about sub-regional relations, rather than sub-regional cooperation. Mr. Astapenka further drew attention to the country’s present international isolation in many areas. New borders - between Belarus on the one hand, and Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine, on the other - are being built in the region, impeding human contacts and travel. The border issue is becoming particularly acute in view of NATO and EU enlargement and needs to be addressed. In this regard, Mr. Astapenka suggested that Euro-regions could play an important role in fostering human contacts and that the EU should allocate special funds for their development in this area of Europe.

Mr. Vladimir Ulakhovich (Centre for European Studies, Minsk) specified three approaches among foreign policy thinkers and politicians in Belarus as to the development of sub-regional cooperation. The first is the official (government) approach which emphasizes the ‘voluntary’ nature of Belarusian-Russian integration and ignores multilateral sub-regional cooperation. The second approach is represented by the ‘nationalist opposition’, which views Belarusian-Russian integration as a ‘mortal threat’ to Belarus, and consequently places particular importance on the the country’s active involvement in sub-regional cooperation. The third - centrist - approach favours a balance between different foreign policy vectors and directions of sub-regional cooperation. Mr. Ulakhovich expressed his overall optimism as to the future participation of Belarus in sub-regional cooperation and stressed the need to involve Belarus in these processes. Ukraine, particularly, could play a positive role in promoting Belarusian involvement.

Dr. Timothy Snyder (Harvard University, USA) commented that one might differentiate between varieties of sub-regionalism: that stemming from fear, that coming from conviction and the sub-regionalism of modest hope. With regard to Belarus, Dr. Snyder argued that it is in the national interests of neighbouring countries, Poland in particular, to involve the former in sub-regional cooperation. There are several means of doing this: to encourage more active Belarusian participation in CEI; to open CEFTA to new members in the east, including Belarus; to encourage ‘back-door’ sub-regional cooperation with Belarus (e.g. support for Ukrainian NGOs which develop contacts with their Belarusian counterparts).

Dr. Snyder also stressed the need to elaborate a special strategy of ‘preemptive implementation’ of the Schengen agreement. This strategy should involve measures concerning border regulations with eastern neighbours to be taken by the EU and the five first round entrants, particularly Poland, over the course of the next few years of accession negotiations. In particular, these measures should include the development of border infrastructures and technical improvements, and the introduction of a 3-year pre-Schengen multiple visa for citizens of Poland’s eastern neighbours.

In discussion, it was argued that the Schengen agreement should not be viewed as a ‘brick-wall’ constructed against states and populations. On the contrary, it facilitates the movement of people: having crossed the border once, a person can freely travel within all Schengen countries. Others emphasized that, in speaking about Belarus’ isolation, it was important to remember that so far all attempts of international organizations such as the CoE to influence the Belarusian authorities have failed. Sub-regional cooperation and support could be a helpful way of bridging this international isolation and it is necessary to give greater thought to the potential practical roles of Ukraine and Russia in this regard. It was noted that an OSCE mission would be opened in Minsk this February, and that this kind of international support could help Belarus overcome its self-imposed isolation.

The Potential of the Euro-Region Concept for Regional Coordination

Dr. Vasil Hudak (IEWS) outlined the development of the Euro-region in CEE noting that many countries of the region showed initial reluctance towards the first example, the Carpathian Euro-region, in 1992. It took time for governments to comprehend the value of Euro-regions and to realize that Euro-regions serve to create a framework for ‘bottom-up’ cross-border cooperation that in turn facilitates the solution of practical problems. Euro-regions contribute to conflict prevention; promote regional economic development; facilitate the process of EU enlargement by contributing to the avoidance of new dividing lines; and play a role in democratic state development by helping to promote decentralization, stable local government and popular democracy.

At the same time, Dr. Hudak noted that the further development of Euro-regions faces challenges from inadequate financial and often human resources as well as the process of NATO and particularly EU enlargement. With regard to the latter, he suggested that Euro-regions could become useful case-studies for the pre-Schengen process, and could develop a set of recommendations as to how successful cross-border cooperation between EU and non-EU members might be maintained.

Dr. Fraser Cameron (European Commission), speaking on the practical role of EU in sub-regional cooperation, underlined the need for flexiblity in thinking about regional and sub-regional cooperation in CEE. Both are only at the beginning of their development and their full potential remains to be discovered. It is also worth remembering the gradual, functional nature of these processes which, over time, shape and change identities and loyalties. The EU plays a key role in this quietly revolutionary process: it can provide technical advice and financial support to cooperative projects and exert pressure on countries wanting to join EU to develop closer cooperation with their neighbours. EU determines its support for sub-regional cooperation on the degree to which an initiative is developed in accordance with UN, OSCE, and EU principles and demonstrates added value. However, it is important to realize that sub-regional cooperation can successfully develop only when there is a clear willingness among states themselves to cooperate with their neighbours. The success record of cooperation in the north of Europe, compared to the lack of sub-regionalism in South-Eastern Europe, testified to this. Dr. Cameron further stressed that many sub-regional cooperation projects do not require a lot of money, but rather the genuine will and maturity of the countries involved.

In discussion it was pointed that out cross-border cooperation did require significant financial investment in border infrastructure and development just as much as good will. Some questioned whether the Euro-region was becoming a rather amorphous, indiscriminately-used concept rather than a specific framework for practical cooperation among border regions. It was agreed that there is now greater realism as to what Euro-regions can and cannot do and the state commitment needed for their development. However, the view expressed by one speaker that the Carpathian Euro-region is now almost defunct was strongly refuted by others. Attention was drawn to the importance of a combination of both bottom-up and top-down approaches for sub-regional cooperation. The bottom-up approach should be a real driving-force, yet top-down support is critical both to initiate and implement sub-regional processes. The EU’s role is particularly important in this regard. It was suggested that the EU could underline more strongly that sub-regional cooperation throughout Europe is extremely important; further emphasize the importance of sub-regional cooperation with Russia; and take a more cohesive and structured approach (with clear priorities) in its financial and practical support to sub-regional efforts.

Final Panel Discussion

Mr. Anatol Lieven (Financial Times) drew attention to the existence of a number of ‘grey areas’ in European security today. This was particularly the case if one viewed security in its broadest sense. These ‘grey areas’ were those parts of Europe only partly integrated into Euro-Atlantic integration structures and they were not going to disappear in the forseeable future. Sub-regionalism could play some role in managing relations between the grey areas and EU and NATO frameworks: it was important, therefore, to see sub-regional cooperation not as a waiting-room for further integration but as a good to be pursued in and of itself. Some areas of Europe clearly stood much more chance than others to develop sustainable sub-regional cooperation but nevertheless, attempts should be made within all. The ongoing development of EU, particularly monetary union, would create new levels of ‘grey areas’ and Mr. Lieven suggested that full European membership would not mean what it has in the past. CEE states will need to rethink their views in this regard and some may come to see advantages in staying, at least for the short-term, outside.

Mr. Laszlo Poti (Hungarian Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies) pointed to Hungary’s experience in regional cooperation. Hungary’s activism in this regard stemmed from its unique geopolitical situation and the remarkable changes that have taken around its borders since 1989. Regional cooperation was a way of negotiating this process and linking together states from perceived different areas of Europe (central vs south-eastern) as well as a way of preparing for European integration. He suggested that the most fruitful forms of regional cooperation were bi- and trilateral relationships placed within a wider European framework although there was still a place for inclusive regional structures such as CEI.

In discussion it was agreed that it was premature to speak of the emergence of a regional and/or sub-regional ‘identity’ in this part of Europe. In many parts of CEE the prior development of a national identity was first necessary. Only through progress at the national level could the civil society and institutions fundamental for sub-regional cooperation be developed. Although imported sub-regionalism was doomed to failure, it was pointed out that tangible incentives and active leadership were needed for the process to get underway in CEE. Common interests could sustain sub-regional cooperation even where a common identity did not exist. In the long-term, the development of the latter from the bottom-up would be needed to sustain comprehensive active regionalism. The absence of discussion of defence-related regional cooperation in New Central and Eastern Europe was noted which, when contrasted with discussions in South-Eastern Europe, revealed the diverse, area-specific nature of sub-regional processes.

Ambassador Bjurner brought proceedings to a close by thanking workshop participants. He expressed his appreciation to the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for its assistance, particularly in the provision of visas, and noted that the issues raised during the meeting would be reflected in the volume to be produced at the conclusion of this project on sub-regional cooperation.

Appendix A: Agenda

Security and Integration in Eurasia’s New Boundary Zones:

The Role of Sub-Regional Relations

Workshop

Existing and Emerging Cooperation in New Central and Eastern Europe

Kyiv, 18 -20 February

Wednesday, 18 February 1998

1900-2100 Opening Reception hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ukraine

and the Institute for EastWest Studies

Welcoming Remarks: IEWS representative

Address: Sub-regionalism: A crucial piece in the European jigsaw

Ambassador Anders Bjurner, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden

Thursday 19 February 1998

915-1030 Avoiding new borders: Regional cooperation from the Baltic to the Black Sea

H.E. Anton Buteiko, First Deputy Foreign Minister, Ukraine

National Interests and Regional Goals

Professor Charles King, Georgetown University

1030-1100 Coffee

1100-1245 Frameworks for cooperation among states in the region

Existing sub-regional groups – BSEC and CEI

Dr. Oleksandr Pavliuk, Director, IEWS Kyiv Centre

Emerging interlocking networks

Ukrainian-Romanian-Moldovan cooperation

Sergui Celac, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Romania

Polish-Ukrainian-Romanian cooperation

Professor Antoni Kaminski, Polish Institute of Political Studies

1245-1400 Lunch

1400-1530 International organizations and sub-regional cooperation

The role of OSCE and sub-regional cooperation

Piotr Iwaszkiewicz, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Poland

The Council of Europe and sub-regional cooperation

Jiri Vogl, Council of Europe Secretariat

NATO, WEU and regional dimensions of security

Stephan de Spiegeleire, WEU Institute for Security Studies

1530-1600 Tea

1600-1700 Russia’s policy on regional cooperation

Petr Lillenurm, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia

Commentator: Rein Oidekivi, Embassy of Estonia, Kyiv

1900-2130 Dinner buffet hosted by the Swedish Embassy

Friday, 20 February 1998

0915-1030 The case of Belarus in sub-regional cooperation – a conditional embrace?

Wladzimir Astapenka, Belarusian State University, Belarus

Commentator: Dr. Timothy Snyder, Harvard University

1030-1045 Coffee

1045-1200 Functional models: the potential of the Euro-region concept for regional coordination projects

Dr. Vasil Hudak, Institute for EastWest Studies, Prague

The practical role of EU: integrating partnerships

Dr. Fraser Cameron, EU Commission, DG1A, Brussels

1200-1300 Final discussion

How important is regional identity for regional coordination? What fields offer the greatest scope for potential cooperation? Where does this area fit into wider European-building processes?

Anatol Lieven, Financial Times

László Póti, Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies, Hungary

1300 Lunch and departure

Appendix B: List of Participants

Dr. Burak Akcapar

Defense Planning and Operations

NATO Headquarters

Leopold III

1110 Brussels, Belgium

Tel/ 32 2 707 3944

Fax/ 32 2 707 5230

Email/ Error! Reference source not found.

Mr. Wladzimir Astapenka

Belarusian State University

4 Skaryna avenue

Minsk 220050, Belarus

Tel/ 375 17 226 5878

Fax/ 375 17 226 5878 375 17 220 8821

Email/ Error! Reference source not found.

Mr. Gilles Bertrand

Forward Studies Unit

European Commission

Rue de la Loi 200

Brussels B-1049, Belgium

Tel/ 32 2 295 55 12

Fax/ 32 2 299 22 23

Email/ Error! Reference source not found.

Ambassador Anders Bjurner

Deputy State Secretary

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Stockholm SE-103 39, Sweden

Tel/ 46 8 405 5659

Fax/ 46 8 723 1176

Email/ Error! Reference source not found.

H.E. Anton Buteiko

First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kyiv

Mykhaylivska sqr. 1

Kyiv 252018, Ukraine

Fax/ 38 044 293 0516

Dr. Fraser Cameron

European Commission, DG1A

200, Rue de la Loi

Brussels 1049, Belgium

Tel/ 32 2 295 6108

Fax/ 32 2 295 8625

Email/ Error! Reference source not found.

Ambassador Sergiu Celac

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

14, Modrogan Str.

Bucharest , Romania

Tel/ 40 1 230 2638

Fax/ 40 1 230 7961

Mr. Nicolae Chirtoaca

Euro-Atlantic Center

Chisinau , Moldova

Fax/ 3732-234379

Email/ Error! Reference source not found.

Ms. Zsuzsa Debreczeni

Senior Information Services Officer

Institute for EastWest Studies

Kálvária tér 7.

Budapest H-1089, Hungary

Tel/ 36 1 303 9300 (ext. 4061)

Fax/ 36 1 333 0315

Email/ Error! Reference source not found.

Dr. Renata Dwan

Project Manager

Institute for EastWest Studies

Kálvária tér 7.

Budapest H-1089, Hungary

Tel/ 36 1 303 9300 (ext. 4061)

Fax/ 36 1 333 0135

Email/ Error! Reference source not found.

Mr. Andrii Fialko

Deputy Director

Department of Foreign Policy

Administration of the President

Kyiv, Ukraine

Fax/ 810 44 291 57 15

Mr. Leonid Gubersky

Institute for International Relations

Kyiv State University

Kyiv , Ukraine

Fax/ 38 044 213 0767

Mr. Dag Hartelius

Vice President

Institute for EastWest Studies

700 Broadway, 2nd Floor

New York, NY 10003, United States

Tel/ 1 212 824 4131

Fax/ 1 212 824 4149

Email/ Error! Reference source not found.

Mr. Mykhailo Honczar

Consultant

National Security and Defense Council

Kyiv, Ukraine

Tel/ 38 044 291 5512

Dr. Vasil Hudák

Director & Vice-President

Institute for EastWest Studies

Rašínovo nábrezí 78

120 00 Prague 2

Czech Republic

Tel/ 420 2 2198 4222

Fax/ 420 2 29 43 80

Ambassador Martti Isorao

Embasy of Finland

Kyiv, Ukraine

Tel/ 38 044 228 7551

Fax/ 38 044 228 2032

Mr. Piotr Iwaszkiewicz

Member of OSCE CoordinationTeam

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Al. J. Ch. Szucha 23.

Warsaw 00-580, Poland

Tel/ 48 22 623 9205

Fax/ 48 22 628 0358

Ambassador Göran Jacobsson

Embassy of Sweden

35/33 Ivana Franka Street, 3rd floor

Kyiv 252 030, Ukraine

Tel/ 380 44 462 05 80

Fax/ 38 044 462 05 81

Email/ Error! Reference source not found.

Professor Antoni Kaminski

Institute of Political Studies

Polish Academy of Sciences

ul. Polna 18-20

Warsaw 00 625, Poland

Tel/ 48 22 25 52 21

Fax/ 48 22 252 146

Email/ Error! Reference source not found.

Professor Charles King

Chair of Romanian Studies

Department of Government

Georgetown University

Washington D.C. 20057, United States

Tel/ 1 202 687 5907

Fax/ 1 202 687 5858

Email/ Error! Reference source not found.

Mr. Anatol Lieven

Financial Times, Budapest

Kecskeméti u. 9.

Budapest , Hungary

Tel/ 36 1 266 6153

Fax/ 36 1 117 4279

Mr. Petr Lillenurm

Department for European Cooperation

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Moscow, Russian

Tel/ 7095 244 1480

Fax/ 7095 244 1797

Ms. Rachel Lutz

Conference Coordinator- Europe

Institute for EastWest Studies

Rašínovo nábrezí 78

120 00 Prague 2, Czech Republic

Tel/ 420 2 2198 4222

Fax/ 420 2 29 43 80

Email/ Error! Reference source not found.

Mr. Rein Oidekivi

Counsellor

Embassy of Estonia

Vladymyrska 45

Kyiv, Ukraine

Te/ 380 44 224 1403

Fax/ 380 44 294 8055

Dr. Oleksandr Pavliuk

Director

Institute for EastWest Studies, Kyiv Centre

Room 315, 3rd Floor

Hrushevsky Street 4

Kyiv 252001, Ukraine

Tel/ 38 044 417 6938

Fax/ 38 044 228 5281

Email/ Error! Reference source not found.

Mr. László Póti

Research Fellow

Institute for Strategic and Defense Studies

P.F. 181

Budapest 1241, Hungary

Tel/ 36 1 262 19 20

Fax/ 36 1 264 9623

Email/ Error! Reference source not found.

Mr. Ihor Sahach

Deputy Director

Department of European and Euro-Atlantic Integration

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mykhaylivska sqr. 1

Kyiv 252018, Ukraine

Tel/ 38 044 212 8570

Dr. Tim Snyder

Center for International Affairs

Harvard University

1737 Cambridge Street

Cambridge, MA 02138

email/ tsnyder@fas.harvard.edu

Mr. Stephan de Spiegeleire

Associate Fellow

WEU Institute for Security Studies

43 Avenue du President Wilson

Paris 75775 Cedex 16, France

Tel/ 33 1 5367 2200

Fax/ 33 1 4720 8178

Email/ Error! Reference source not found.

Mr. Ivan Spidla

Department of International and Commercial Cooperation

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Stromova 1

Bratislava 83336, Slovakia

Tel/ 421 7 802 063

Fax/ 421 7 802 017

Email/ Error! Reference source not found.

Ambassador Jutta Stefan-Bastl

Head of the Austrian Mission to the OSCE

Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Schenkenstrasse 8-10

Vienna A-1010, Austria

Tel/ 43 1 5315 3585

Fax/ 43 1 5318 5227

Mr. Kilian Strauss

Delegation of the European Commission

Kyiv , Ukraine

Tel/ 38 044 293 1483

Fax/ 38 044 230 2390

Email/ Error! Reference source not found.

Mr. Vladimir Ulakhovich

Director

Centre for European Studies

Masherov Av. 1/2-30

Minsk 220004, Belarus

Fax/ 375 172 281 371

Mr. Andrij Vesselovsky

Director

Policy Planning Department

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mykhaylivska sqr. 1

Kyiv 252018, Ukraine

Tel/ 38 044 212 8455, 8503

Fax/ 38 044 226 3169

Mr. Jiri Vogl

Council of Europe

Strasbourg Cedex F-67075, France

Tel/ 33 388 41 25 32

Fax/ 33 388 41 27 46

Email/ jiri.vogl@coe.fr

Appendix C: Background Paper

Sub-Regional Cooperation in New Central and Eastern Europe:

Realities and Possibilities

These brief notes are intended to assist participants at the workshop and to identify certain themes and issues which may be explored in the course of discussions. It is not intended to be comprehensive and should not in no way dictate the character or limit of the workshop.

It has been increasingly recognized over the past two years that sub-regional cooperation in post-Cold War Europe is an important element in stabilizing relations among the neighboring states, strengthening democracy, assisting transitions of the post-Communist countries to market economies, contributing to the development of regional and all-European security and stability, and facilitating the process of wider European integration.

Sub-regional cooperation appears to be of particular importance for New Central and Eastern Europe, as the region including the Baltic states, Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova, was recently termed by Sherman Garnett. It is this area where an enlarging Europe meets and overlaps with the post-Soviet space. On the one hand, the region is directly effected by NATO and EU enlargement. While most CEE states have applied for and are perceived as potential candidates for full accession to NATO and/or EU (the Baltic states are included as well: if not for NATO, certainly for the EU membership), by and large Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus find themselves on the margins of European integrative processes, regardless of their own preferences. On the other hand, New CEE states (each in its own way) present a central preoccupation of Russian foreign policy and are vital for Russia’s attempts to create an integrated community within the CIS.

As a result, the whole issue of whether European security will be inclusive and transparent or exclusive and divisive will depend to a large extent (in addition to relations between the West and Russia) on the situation of the New CEE countries and particularly Ukraine, the largest among them. What should be the place of each of these states, as well as the region as a whole, in the emerging European order and how to best weave those that have expressed the desire into European integration processes? Is there a role to play for sub-regional cooperation, both existing and emerging? In the last two years, CEE sub-regional cooperation, has been seen as a useful tool for “cushioning” potential new dividing lines by stretching beyond them and providing additional fora for neighboring countries to meet and address mutual concerns. Could it also help in harmonizing national interests and shaping common regional goals?

New CEE states are members of several existing sub-regional groups that have developed from 1989 onwards from the Barents to the Black Sea. Ukraine and Moldova were among the founders of BSEC; the two of them, as well as Belarus, were admitted to CEI back in 1996. Ukraine has also repeatedly expressed its interest in joining CEFTA.

The recent EU and NATO enlargement debate has drawn much attention to BSEC, CEI and other sub-regional groupings and raised the profile of their contribution to stability and security in Europe. As if to match the expectations, both BSEC and CEI have recently become much more active and dynamic. Having passed the first - organizational - stage of their development, the groupings are moving toward a new quantitative level of cooperation, which should enhance their members’ interdependence, an, in turn, have a positive spill-over effect on regional peace and stability. Last year, BSEC countries decided to transform the BSEC from a loose grouping into a sub-regional organization through the adoption of the BSEC statute, and stated their intention to establish a BSEC free-trade area. Hence, in spite of remaining serious difficulties and initial pessimism among many observers and even participants, both BSEC and CEI are gradually gaining ground. The recent growing interest of outsiders in joining the groupings is an indication of their rising attractiveness.

Still, the question remains as to the sustainability of further consolidation and expansion. The future of at least one CEE sub-regional organization - CEFTA - is already under question, given that most (if not all) its current members are likely to join the EU. At the same time, the BSEC and CEI diversity and often unequal interest of their members in various joint projects, as well as their deliberate avoidance to directly tackle sensitive political and hard security agenda, raise the question of whether they are sufficient forums for sub-regional cooperation? Or maybe they could/should rather serve as facilitators and umbrella organizational frameworks for smaller sub-regional cooperative schemes involving fewer member-states? As the experience of the existing sub-regional structures has proved, the smaller and more coherent a grouping is (e.g. CEFTA), the better chances it has for developing common approaches to larger issues of international politics, including European integration.

Recently we have witnessed the emergence of several new smaller cooperative networks within existing sub-regional frames: Ukraine-Moldova-Romania (all three countries belong to both BSEC and CEI), Romania-Ukraine-Poland (all three are CEI members), Georgia-Ukraine-Azerbaijan-Moldova/GUAM (all four are participants in BSEC). In each of them Ukraine is a central component. So far these interlocking and overlapping cooperative networks remain loose and non-formalized, while their activities lack regular character. Their emergence and possible evolution are still to be analyzed and understood. Much will certainly depend on their practical actions and projects. Is the emergence of these groups a natural reaction to the problems encountered by large sub-regional groups, or is this a trend that has more to do with traditional power politics and “alliances”? What are the agendas of the countries involved? What is the function of these new frameworks, and what are the prospects for their future development? Are these only the short-term and transitory patterns or could/would they sustain in the long-term? Will these emerging groups compliment and facilitate greater sub-regional cooperation or, on the contrary, will fracture and disrupt wider cooperative efforts, like BSEC? And finally, how can these two processes of smaller and wider sub-regional cooperation, as well as the interaction between different emerging networks, be coordinated?

One New CEE country which has so far had only limited involvement in existing sub-regional structures (membership in CEI, and participation in the Nieman Euro-region), is Belarus. The ongoing tension in relations between Belarus and the West has very recently been accompanied by the deterioration of Belarusian-Polish relations. In addition, Belarus is finding itself excluded from the newly emerging patterns of sub-regional cooperation: the “Belarusian factor” has rather stimulated ad-hoc sub-regional initiatives, like the joint Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian statement on the situation in Belarus. The question, however, remains of what should be the place of Belarus in sub-regional cooperation: should the country be encouraged and embraced or neglected and isolated; and if the former -- what are the best ways of drawing Belarus into the sub-regional forums?

The three New CEE states -- Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus -- are often referred to as Western NIS -- the area which is perceived by external states and organizations as a sub-set of the CIS. Although their transition since independence has been uneven and varied, their common Soviet historical legacy, as well as the nature and speed of current economic transformation, substantially distinguish them from other more advanced CEE countries. Yet, while Belarus (at least under the current leadership) has opted for closer integration with Russia and has taken a negative stance on NATO enlargement, Moldova and especially Ukraine explore their options for participation in European integration, and see themselves as a part of CEE rather than the CIS space. Hence, their active participation in sub-regional cooperative schemes that bring them together with their Western neighbors, anchoring them more firmly in CEE region and linking them closer to the Western fully integrated structures.

As noted above, CEE sub-regional cooperation which brings together “ins” and “outs” of the enlargement process, is believed to substantially contribute to the indivisibility and transparency of security. But is there a role for sub-regional cooperation among “left-outs” themselves? And in this regard, is a form of sub-regional cooperation possible and necessary among Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, given the differences in their domestic development, as well as their varied foreign policy orientations? Are these countries homogeneous enough and is there a sense of commonness among them? Do they actually want to recognize themselves as a separate geographic/political/economic/ historical/etc region? And finally, could/would such trilateral cooperation stimulate internal transformation in each of these countries, be beneficial for sub-regional and European stability, and promote their involvement into the larger integrative processes?

The dynamics of CEE sub-regional cooperation is enormously influenced by an external factor, namely by the position taken by the West and its core multilateral institutions toward regional cooperative initiatives. Left to themselves, the Central and Eastern Europeans have often lacked either the necessary political will or sufficient capabilities and resources to solve complex problems in interstate relations and to assure mutual rapprochement. Recently, outside states and larger international institutions - OSCE, CoE, NATO, EU and WEU - have become much more supportive of sub-regional cooperation from the Barents to the Black Sea. In this regard, what role could they play to support sub-regional cooperation in New CEE, and especially the newly emerging interlocking cooperative networks? Should the latter be encouraged and stimulated, and if so -- what practical help can be best provided to them (political support, financial assistance, etc.)?

Russia’s policy toward and participation in sub-regional cooperation must also be comprehensively. The principles of equality and non-dominance by any one state which constitute an essential condition for sub-regional groups formation, have led to some speculation as the feasibility of the integration of a large state into sub-regional cooperative schemes. Initial concerns among some BSEC members over the potential or perceived dominance of Turkey and/or Russia are a good example. The experience of the past few years has proved, however, that under certain conditions a large state - in this case Russia which is a member of the BEAC, CBSS and BSEC - could play an important and constructive role in the development of sub-regional groupings. Consequently, does Russia have a role to play in sub-regional cooperation in New CEE and what is her attitude toward this cooperation, particularly toward the newly emerging forms of tri- and multilateral cooperation? Does Russia perceive them as resistance and/or alternative to CIS integration (especially GUAM) or a “cordon sanitare” around Russia or rather as the legitimate frames in pursuit of positive shared interests?

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