Polscie.weebly.com



REGIONAL POLITICAL PARTIES IN INDIA S. BHATNAGAR PRADEEP KUMARESS ESS Publications4837/24, ANSARI ROAD, DARYA GANJ NEW DELHI-110002ii Panjab University D.C.C. Publications—4First Published 1988 ? EditorsRs. 150.00ISBN : 81-7000-098-xComposed at:DTP Services&Consultancy (P) Ltd.B-2/17A, Lawrence Road,Delhi-110035Printed at:P.L. Printers C-3/19, R.P. Bagh Delhi-110007iii List of Contributors1. K.R. Bombwall: Formerly Professor of Political Science at Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar and Kashmir University, Srinagar(J&K). Presently residing at 74, Housing Board Colony, Ambala Cantt-133001.2. B. Rahamathulla: Reader, Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh - 202001.3. Anuradha Dutta: Reader, Department of Political Science, Gauhati University, Gauhati.4. Girin Phukon: Teaches at the Department of Political Science, Dibrugarh University, Dibrugarh (Assam)5. Haridwar Rai: Professor of Political Science, North Eastern Hill University, Shillbng. Vijay Kumar: Lecturer in the Department of Political Science, Bhagalpur University, Bhagalpur.6. V. Bhaskar Rao: Professor, Department of Public Administration, Kakatiya University, Vidyaranyapuri, Warangal - 506009 (AP.)7. Pradeep Kumar: Reader, Department of Political Science, Panjab University, Chandigarh - 1600148. R. Thandavan: Reader, in Anna Studies, University of Madras, Madras - 6000059. Vidya Bhushan: Reader, Department of Political Science, Jammu University, Jammu10. P.S. Verma: Reader, Department of Political Science, Panjab University, Chandigarh - 160014iv v ContentsPreface vii1. Regional Parties in Indian Politics: A Preview: K.R. Bombwall 12. Obsolescence of Nationalism: An Appraisal of Autonomy Forces In North-Eastern India B. Rahamathulla 173. Growth and Development of a Regional Political Party. The Asom Gana Parishad Anuradha Dutta 294. Genesis of Asom Gana Parishad Girin Phukon . 515. Jharkhand Party in Bihar Haridwar Red&Vijay Kumar 696. Telugu Desam Party V,Bhaskar Rao 817. Akali Dal in Punjab Pradeep Kumar 1078. AIADMK in Tamil Nadu: Its Emergence and Unprecedented Growth R. Thandavan 1319. The All Jammu&Kashmir National Conference Vidya Bhushan 16710. Muslim United Front P.S. Verma 18511. Index 201vi vii PREFACEThe present volume does not claim to be a pioneering effort in the field of regional politics. It is also not a comprehensive exercise to explore the nature of the regional political parties in India. The objective of bringing out this modest anthology is to put together the efforts of some of the scholars who are interested in the dynamics of the regional political parties. Even though some good works have come up in the last two decades with a focus on state politics or regionalism, they either concentrate on the political dynamics of a particular state or sometimes only on a particular party in a State. More often than not, the rise of the regional parties is seen merely as a consequence or a by-product of regionalism rather than a phenomenon in its own right.IWith the breakdown of the "dominant party" system, whatever it meant, the capacity of the Congress party to absorb or contain the various movements and smaller groups has decreased considerably. Even otherwise in a parliamentary set-up, a national political party can come closer to a regional group/party only to a limited extent, and beyond this limit, it may find it extremely difficult to identify itself completely with the regional demands/grievances/idiom etc. This necessarily leaves a gap in Such situations. This can successfully be filled only by the regional political parties which face no dilemma of reconciling the national idiom with the regional populistic idiom.While there can be various factors that have led to this phenomenon of the growth of regional politicalparties, it seems to be a natural con-Sequence of the operation of the democratic system based on adult franchise in multi-ethnic, multi-racial, multi-religious and multi-Iinguisticviii society like India. The background of the lop-sided economic development (call it capitalistic or of any other variety) provides, a strong base to these inter ethnic and inter-cultural conflicts."It seems that most of these grievances which today provide a fertile soil for the growth of regional sentiments (a regional political parties were not entirely not absent in the initial years of the Republic but the post-partition climate kept them underneath the main national cur-rent for quite sometime. The relatively unorganised nature of these regional groups/parties and their inarticulation in the early years of our freedom, can perhaps be ascribed to the genera prevailing circumstances which created a psychological necessity for national unity and security. Even raising of regional issue and demands was seen as a threat to the newly acquired freedom of the country, Naturally this regional groups had to wait for a more congenial political atmosphere which they found know in the more sympathetic way understading of the demands of the the various regions fora better treatment and their clamour for a larger and mor equitable share in the national economic cake.The regional political parties in the eighties have challenged the near-monopoly position of the Congress in the Indian politics. The rule of the various non-Congress parties (most of which are regional parties) in nearly half the state of the Union is hard fact of today, The Charisma" of national leaders has given way to "Chrismas" of local and regional leaders who claim to represent the interests of their respective regions more effectively and faithfully than their counterparts in the Congress party. This phenomenon however is not new. We had witnessed a somewhat similar situation in the late sixties. Yet eighties are not six-ties.- In the sixties it was mostly the simple opposition Congress that Dals (SVDs) to power most of these were not regional parties and they rather claimed to be national alternative to the Congress, and therefore, even adopted "Congress suffix. In fact, some of them were born only on the eve of the Fourth General elections without any specific programme with the sole motive of capturing power by indulging in all kinds of defections Interestingly most Chief-Ministers, who took over from the Congress Chief ministers in the northern States (to which the phenomenon of non-Congressism was largely confined then). were the ex-Congressmen. On the contrary, what we have particularly witnessed in the eighties is the rise of the parties which claim to have an altogether different programme from the Congress party, and do not necessarily aim at providing a national alternative to the Congress. Indeed,ix they are rooted in regional grievances. Some have actually been parties of long standing ,and trace their roots to long drawn regional movements interestingly, some of these regional parties are not necessarily opposed to the congress-centre. They rather adopted a policy of collaboration with it, with or without entering into alliances national Conference Mizo National front All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam etc.)This has given them some stability also. In fact there are parties like the AIADMK/DMK which have ruled over a long period of time. However, there are others like the Jharkhand Party and its various factions which have not yet tasted power, but it seems they have become a force to be reckoned with in their areas. What is. therefore. important is not their electoral strength but the legitimacy that they have acquired in the political system. These parties are no longer dismissed by the Congress as simply "anti-national". On the contrary, the ruling party has come to terms with some of them, thereby imparting Iegiti-macy to their aims and objectives.The present volume is humble attempt to understand some of these developments.IIThe participant-scholars of this volume were sent a general framework for their convenience. It was also the endeavour of the editors to maintain some kind of a common pattern throughout this volume. However, as is usually the case, the contributors felt relatively free to focus attention on particular aspects of the political parties they are dealing with, taking into consideration what was more significant and crucial from their point of view. This "freedom" naturally has led to some degree of imbalance as far as a common framework is concerned. But in our humble opinion, this is not only not undesirable but is welcome to some extent as it leaves enough scope for accommodating regional variations.Normally only one contribution has been included on a single regional party but exception has been made in case of the Asom Gana Parishad. Of course, no solid reason can be given for this deviation, yet in case of Asom Gana Parishad, it was partly to focus a little more on a Party which emerged out of a students' movement and finally captured the State Government in the recent past The present collection is confined to those regional parties which are "regional" in the strict sense of the term. In other words, only those parties have been included which don't have pretensions about their national support base. Even thoughx AIADMK has "All-India" prefix, there seems to be no illusion about its regional character. However, the parties which are neither "national" nor "regional" in terms of their electoral support base, or, in other words, the parties which have been rightly termed by Professor K.R. Bomb-wall as "Cross-regional parties" (see his article in the present volume), have not been considered for discussion in this collection. Thus parties like the Lok Dal, BJP, CPM, etc. have been kept outside the purview, even though they draw their electoral strength from some regional pockets. Also there are some smaller groups, or "border line case", which have been excluded. These include the Sikkim Sangram Parishad of Nar Bahadur Bhandari, Bhim Singh's Panther Party in Jammu, Subhas Ghising's Gorkha National Liberation Front in West Bengal, the Plebiscite Front in Jammu and Kashmir, the Telengana Praja Samiti of Andhra Pradesh, the Shiv Sena of Maharashtra, the Kerala Congress of Kerala and many splinter groups of various otherwise well-established regional political parties. In fact some of these like the GNLF may not be even political parties in the strict sense of the term. The reason of their exclusion is two-fold: One, many of them are too small and too short-lived to deserve attention here; Two, their inclusion would have made the present volume too big to focus any meaningful attention on the phenomenon of regional parties. Actually, all cases of regional demands, in whatever form, result in the formation of regional groups or miniscule regional parties. The inclusion of all these groups/parties and their various fragments would perhaps be closer to a discussion of regionalism rather than regional parties. Even though the two are related, yet they are not the same. Still in view of the importance of these regional (splinter) groups in the North-East India where they are particularly in abundance and where they have actually exercised immense political influence by way of successfully challenging the Congress Party (the MNF in Mizoram, the TUJS is Tripura etc.), a separate article has been included on these groups of North East India.Finally, no effort has been made to include independent contributions on the various factions or split-away groups of the regional parties. Thus, the different Akali Dals, the National Conferences, the Jharkhand Parties etc. have not been given separate treatment except their mention in the main articles.We hope the enlightened readers will excuse us for the shortcomings and will give us their considered opinions so that we can benefit from this modest effort of ours.xi IIIThe preparation of an edited volume is the final product of the collective efforts of a number of persons. More than anyone else, it is the contributors of various articles/papers who constitute the real soul of the book. They deserve our profound thanks. We are also grateful to Professor S.S. Chib who took pains to go through the manuscript so meticulously. Besides, we have a word of appreciation for Mr. Varinder Anand who prepared the index of the book, Mr. Hari Ram Sharma who read the proof pages, and Mr. Bikram Singh, Ms. Kusum Lata and Anil Sharma who typed the manuscript and M/s Ess Ess Publications who made the efforts of both the contributors and the editors see the light of the day.Chandigarh 13 May 1988S. Bhatnagar Pradeep Kumarxii 1 REGIONAL PARTIES IN INDIAN POLITICS: A PREVIEWK.R. BombwallA Regional PerspectiveNo academic endeavour to analyse or evaluate the dynamics of Indian politic today can be valid if it ignores what may be described as the regional perspective and fails to take adequate account of the increasingly critical role played by regional political parties. Some regional par-ties, such as the DMK (Dravida Munnetra Kazagham), Shiromani Akali Dal and National Conference (Jammu and Kashmir) predate or emerged soon after the country's independence. Others like Telugu Desam and Asom Gana Parishad are recent arrivals on the political scene. Currently in six of India's twenty-five states - Mizoram, Assam, Sikkim, Jammu and Kashmir, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu - regional parties are in power. But for the imposition of president's rule in May 1987, the Akali Dal (Longowal) may well have been running the government in Punjab today. The June 1987 election to the Haryana legislative assembly saw a remarkable upsurge of regional consicousness in the state and the 'injustice' done to Haryana became a potent poll issue. One would, in fact, be hardly surprised if Lok Dal (Bahuguna) which rode to an unprecedented electoral triumph on the strength of an aroused Haryanvi psyche, were to develop a distinctly regional orientation. Depending on how the tussle between the two Lok Dal factions proceeds, it may even end up as a regional party. Evidently, regional parties have become and bid fair to stay as a prominent and durable feature of India's political landscape.This development is natural and may well have been anticipated in a vast and vieragated country like India, pre-eminently a country of regions 1 Tamilnadu, Andhra Pradesh, Assam ('Kamrup' of protohistory) Bengal, Maharashtra, the Punjab: these are no mere territorial fragments of an undifferentiated land mass or just administrative units of a political behemoth. The combined alchemy of history, language, culture and economy has given a unique identity2 to each of these regions2 and each of them has become the homeland of a distinct ethno-national community3. The Iinguistic reorganisation of states in 1956 and subsequent years severed mainly to bring their territorial boundaries in closer alignment in their socio cultural coordinates. As a rule, therefore, a linguistic state is "not only a major administrative unit but also a form of national statehood 4".It has been necessary to state what should be taken as obvious because not only politicians but the print media - and largely, even the academia - have taken their time coming to terms with regionalism which, in essence, denotes a territorially based identity consciousness rooted in the shared language and culture of people living on a more or less compact territory. There is, however, a receding but nonetheless continuing tendency to conceptualise regionalism in negative terms as narrow "pro-vincialism' or 'parochialism] which leads to exclusiveness and separatism. In other words, it is viewed as a fissiparous force capable of hampering and, perhaps, disrupting the ongoing process of nation-building in India. This attitude was reflected in the reluctance and reservations with which the country's political leadership responded to the persistant and mounting demand for a radical redrawing of the political map of India on the basis of language. The attitude received reinforcement from scholarly words like Selig S. Harrison's India, the Most Dangerous Decades, which grossly overstressed the dis-integrative potential of regional identifications5.That the tendency to equate regionalism with casteism and communalism as factors which enfeeble India's national unity persists is evident from uncritical comments such as this : "in the subsequent (i.e. following the linguistic reorganisation of states) phase, linguism and regionalism were as disturbing as communalism6". As a recent study points out, "regionalism in Indian politics has generally been regarded as anti-system, anti-federal and against the basic interests of a well-integrated. and well-developed polity7".The problem arises from a popular but unwarranted assessment of regionalism as necessarily antithetical to what may be called pan-Indian nationalism. The assessment is flawed on three counts. For one thing, it is based on a monolithic concept of nationalism and, as a corollary, on the belief that every nation must find lodgement in a sovereign state of its own. For another, it tends to fly in the face of the empirical reality that nationalism, no less than regionalism, is liable to chauvinistic and aggresive aberrations. Further, regionalism is integral to a poly-ethnic mega-state like India. In any case, regionalism is "the heart of India's3 historic pluralism8". It is not, in itself, a limiting sentiment. As the States Reorganisation Commision noted, "regional loyalties do not demand that other loyalties should be eliminated9" .Besides, regionalism can be functional in complex political system such as ours and can make a positive contribution to-wards expanding the base of participatory democracy. According to Yogesh Atal10.Regionalism advances the cause of participatory culture it helps people articulate their demands and provide inputs into the political system. As long as language and relational ties do not terminate at a single point, regionalism will fail to generat isolationism... Competitive regionalism in not insular in character. The reglonalists continued orient themselves to the national system.A region by definition, implies a larger polity of which it is a part. Regional alliances and aspirations can, therefore find articulation and fulfilment in the framework of the wider polity. They may even acquire an autonomous or quasi autonomous status within this framework. Regionalism can and, in fact, does put to the test the political system's mediational, moderating and accomodative capabilities. It is however, not a source of exclusivism and exclusionism and is certainly not a first step forward towards secessionism. There is no umbilical cord linking one to the other. Indeed, secessionism is an entirely different kettle of fish. In so far as it aims at a withdrawal from a political system and, more often than not, employs violence as its instrument of action, it crosses the threshold of politics and becomes a negation of regionalism. No secessionist group operates as a regional party. On the contrary, it operates outside and beyond the arena of party politics.Inevitably, part of the opprobrm that regionalism seems to have gathered gets rubbed off on regional political parties which provide the channel through which territorial identities find expression and the aspirations and demands of regional communities are articulated and aggregated. Like regionalism, they too are often condemned as anti national11. The starting point of an objective study of regional parties must, therefore, be to discard the pointless regionalism - nationalism dichotomy.What is a Regional Political Party?So much, then, for the context in which regional parties have emerged and proliferated in India. We can now address the question: What is a regional political party? The term is used with considerable looseness as an omnibus designation for all manner of political formations. The generally accepted distinction between national' and regional parties,4 legitimised though it is by the Election Commission, is rather unsatisfactory. Insofar as the character of a party is determined by the number of States in which it has some electoral support the percentage of votes it polls in the state assembly and Lok Sabha elections, an element of instability is introduced. A national party may, over time, shrink into a state party and mutatis mutandis, a regional or state party may spread out and get promoted to the status of a national party. It is suggested that a three-tier classification - all India, cross-regional and regional par-ties - would be less ambiguous and more stable. It is suggested, further, that a regional political party Properly so-called, must satisfy three specific criteria.The criterion must, naturally, be the territorial differential By its very nature, a regional party restricts its area of action to a single region which, in the prevailing Indian situation means a state. A party which extends its organisational network and electorial concerns over more states than one becomes cross-regional and, in proportion to its territorial extension, its regional commitment gets diluted since it may have to sort out the conflicting interests of its various state units. On the contrary, a cross-regional party does not have an exclusively, or even predominently, regional commitment per se though no political party, cross regional or all- India, can always be indifferent regional pressures. At times, and particularly in respect of electorally sensitive area specific issues, every party is prone to swim with the regional tide. Our best example of a cross-regional party is the communist Party of India (Marxist)CPI(M).At the moment it controls three states Tripura in north-east, West Bengal in the east and kerala in the South. It is particularly well-entrenched in West Bengal having won three assembly polls (1977,1982 and 1987) in a row. The party has a noticeable presence in a few other states, such as the Punjab, while in the rest, especially those in the Hindi heartland, its electoral support is marginal or nonexistent. The Communist Party of India - CPI - falls in the same category even if it cannot claim a single state as its bastion. It is nevertheless a cross-regiona party since, its electoral appeal is thinly but firmly spread over several states. Similarly, some other left parties like Forward Bloc, Revolutionary Socialist Party and Peasants and Workers' Party which have achieved some sort of a toe-hold in more states than one are cross-regional rather than regional parties as they lack regional specificity which, as we have seen, is the hall-mark of a genuine regional party.Before its constituents fell apart in 1979, the erstwhile Janata conglomerate5 was an all-India party. Even though its electoral strength lay primarily in the states north of the Vindhyas, it had a varyingly thin sprinking of support in the four southern states. What remains of the Janata after its fragmentation can only be categorised as a cross-regional party. It is politically effective in only one state - Karnataka - but has a sizeable following in some others, such as Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat. Whether or not its two factions are able to re-unite, Lok Dal remains a cross-regional party with a fairly strong base in a number of states, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Bihar. Another cross-regional party, Bhartiya Janata Party is essentially, a party of the north. It enjoys considerable and committed (almost entirely Hindu) support in several states of the Hindi belt - Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh. It has not so far succeeded in its determined endeavour to cut across the north-south divide but it must be noted that it has made a significant beginning in Kerala where it has been able to put together a workable organisational infrastructure with a growing and dedicated cadre. It may be noted, in passing here, that the proposition that opposition parties - that is parties other than the Indian National Congress are, in effect, regional parties because they have regional pockets and, on specific issues, take regionalist positions is hardly tenable12. Thus, we are left with the Indian National Congress - Congress (I) - as the only archetypal all India party.The second criterion of a regional political party is that, typically, it articulates and seeks to defend are regionally based ethnic or religio-cultural identity. Thus Dravid Munnetra Kazagham (DMK and All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (AIADMK) act s as the voice and champions of Tamil 'cultural nationalism13 against the inroads of what is perceived as Aryan imperialism of the north. The shrill and confrontationist idiom in which the two parties conducted their politics until the mid-seventies has been substantially softened in recent years but the concern for Tamil identity and opposition to the 'imposition' of Hindi continue to be the main planks in their platform. N.T. Rama Rao, a former matinee idol like his Tamil counterpart M.G. Ramachandran, and his Telugu Desam burst into politics under the banner of Telugu gauravam or 'self-respect'. The akali Dal in its various incarnations, has stuck tenaciously to its claim to be the defender of the interests of Sikh Panth and the Punjab. Asom Gana Parishad was born out of the fierce popular movement which sought to stem and reverse the tide of immigration from other states West Bengal and from Bangladesh. At stake was the survival of Assamese identity.6 In the third place, it is in the very nature of a regional party to be primarily concerned with exploiting local sources of discontent or pressing a variety of primordial demand based on language, caste, community or region 14". This is so because the electoral destiny of these parties is inseperably linked with their respective regions. With no hope of capturing power or being able to play a decisive role at the Centre, they perceive their essential role as pressure groups for protecting and promoting the interests of regional communities and, to that end, mobilising local support by playing up real or imagined feelings of discrimination or deprivation. When N.T. Rama Rao opposes a 'national' policy on water resources which proposes to treat an entire river basin rather than the territorial limits of a state as a unit, his opposition results from the preception that the principle, if implemented, will trim his freedom to push on with his Telugu Ganga project despite the objections raised by neighbouring states like Karnataka. A similar perception characterises the Akali claims in respect of the distribution of Ravi Beas waters among the Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan and the Party's insistence on the riparian principle. To sum up : a regional political party has a regional support base, a regional perspective and a regional issue - orientation.Border-line Cases and Some DistinctionsEvidently, major regional parties in India - National Conference, the two main Akali Dals, both DMKs, Telugu Desam, Mizo National Front-adequately meet the three criteria laid down above. There are, however some border line cases.For instance Nar Bahadur Bhandari's Sikkim Sangram Parishad. A hurt and humiliated Bhandari set up this outfit when he was removed from the office of chief minister through a blatant misuse of the governor's powers. The rebound Bhandari founded his Parishad and rode back to power in the assembly election that followed. There are indications that he is not averse to returning to the Congress (I) fold along with his party. It remains to be seen whether the Congress and its government at the centre can meet Bhandari's demands some of which (reservation of seats in the state assembly for Nepalese and citizenship for over thirty thousand Nepali settlers) are not only stiff but, if conceded, can create problems elsewhere in the country. The Sikkim Sangram Parishad is, thus, a regional party on probation. Bhim Singh's miniscule Panthers Party which claims to fight for justice for the Jammu sub-region of the state of Jammu&Kashmir is hardly a party, regional or otherwise. It is a one-man show with little by way of electoral achievement7 to boast of. In the 1984 poll, Bhim Singh himself failed to retain his seat in the state assembly. Then there is Subhas Ghising's Gorkha National Liberation Front. Whether the Front is able to transform itself into a regional party depends on two things. One whether it accepts the best the centre and West Bengal government are prepared to offer viz. regional autonomy for the hill regions of Darjeeling as against the Front's demand for a separate Gorkhaland state within the Indian Union. Second, whether Ghising can give proof of his ability to persuade some of his 'extremist' colleagus to abandon recourse to violence and commit themselves to electoral politics and non-violent agitation as its mode of action. Jharkhand Mukti Morcha has all the makings of a regular regional party. However the movement has all along been be-devilled by leadership problems, recurring splits and hassles of self-definition in terms of the area of concern, ideology and means. The ruthlessly exploited and oppressed 21 tribal districts of West Bengal, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa which the Jharkhand movement wants to be brought together to constitute a separate state present the closest approximation to the neo-Marxist concept of 'internal colonialism.' But a biased and insensitive administration's tendency to treat the movement as being allied to Naxalism and recent murders of Morcha activists, particularly Nirmal Mahto, have thrown the JMM into a major crisis and there is some uncertainty as to whether it emerges as a regional party committed to peaceful and electoral modes of political action or explodes into insurrectionary violence15.We are excluding from our analysis a multitude of short lived regional groups which were essentially single issue parties and faded out once the issues involved were resolved one way or the other. Thus the Plebiscite Front was launched by Mirza Afzal Beg a couple of years after Shiekh Abdullah was deposed and put into jail in 1953. It had a one-point programme - a call for a referendum under U.N. auspicies to determine the future of Jammu and Kashmir. The party lost its relevance when, in 1975, the Sheikh reached an agreement with the Union government. Thereupon the Front merged itself in the revised National Conference. Telangane Praja Samiti and Majlis-e-Iitehad-ul-Muslmeen were quite active during the late sixties but, before long, setded for the maintenance of safeguards like the mulki rules, rules for the people of the Telangana region of Andhra Pradesh. The Nav Vidharbha Andolan Samiti started with a demand for a separate state and ended up with the promised establishment of a development board for the backward Vidharbha sub-region of Maharashtra. We are also taking no account of quasi-regional splinter groups like Ajoy Mukherjee's Bangla Congress, Biju Patnaik's Utkal8 Congress or the Karnataka Kranti Ranga of Dev Raj Urs which were brought into being by dissident Congress leaders and collapsed after the founder died or found a more rewarding political anchorage or simply ran out of steam. Regionally-based fundamentalist organisations like the Jammat-i-Islami or Ummati-i-Islami of the Kashmir valley have no claim to be described as regional parties. They lack a truly regional focus and instead act as Pakistan's fifth columns with secession as their objective. Even regional parties whose status as such is in no doubt are not cut out of the same cloth. Some distinctions are easily identifiable. An important axis along which they diverge relates to shifts in their social horizons and in the reach of their political goals. The DMK, for instance started out as a caste-based party to project and defend the interests of the culturally-akin backward caste Dravid people of all the four south Indian states against Brahmin 'dominance'. Over time, as Barnett writes, "the movement narrowed culturally to include only the Tamil-speaking people, but broadened socially to include all castes and classes of Tamil-nadu, even Brahmans16." As for its political goal, the DMK began with a frankly secessionist aim demanding an independent Dravidsthan, later sealed it down to a soverign Tamilnad and finally reconciled itself to a reorganised and homogeneous state within the Indian Union. After ten years of insurgency followed by a decade-long uneasy and somewhat brittle truce, Laldenga's Mizo National Front took to the constitutional path by accepting statehood for Mizoram as a component unit of the Indian federation. Telugu Desam, just over four years old, has defined and retains its goal in terms of more autonomy for states and there is no indication of its being pushed towards a separatist posture. At the same time, it has steadily widened its social base and is no longer denounced as an instrument of Kamma interests17. Punjab's Akali Dal has, however, a unique and rather ambiguous position among regional parties. As in the case of others, ethnic or cultural nationalism forms a part of its ideological and strategic baggage but its 'nationalism' draws its inspiration and sustenance more from religion than from a regional identity. In fact, the kind of political ambidextrousness it practices gives it more of a Panthik than a regional profile. Its constricted understanding of cultural nationalism excludes from its ambit a vast chunk of Punjabis who have everything in common with Sikhs except religion. And this when no two other religions in the world have so much proximity in belief and ritual as Hinduism and Sikhism. As for its political goal, the Akali Dal has raised its sights from a Punjabi 'suba' which was conceded in 1966 to a political set-up which, as spelled out in the controversial9 Anandpur Sahib resolution, will guarantee bol bala or 'preeminence' for the Sikh community. There is some indirect indeterminate indication of a rethinking on the subject so far as the Longowal Akali Dal is concerned18. In a careful analysis of the Punjab (Barnala) government's memorandum to the Sarkaria Commission, Harish Puri points out the document's "categorical rejection of the growingly strident stress on 'Sikhs are a nation' thesis that underlies Akali Dal's political objectives and activities19." As the memorandum put it 20:Nationality is a secural concept. It embraces all people speaking a given language irrespective of their religion, caste and beliefs, indeed, all those who share the sense of common and distinct identity.Further, what sets the Akali Dal apart from other regional parties is its theo-political ideology which postulates complete inseparability of ,religion and politics in so far as it is religion that sanctifies the party's goals and legitimises the means adopted in pursuing them. For all other regional parties secularism is the bedrock of politics. As we have noted earlier, the National Conference does occasionally use appeals in the name of religion to mobilise the support of its Muslim followers in the Kashmir valley. This, however, only marginally affects its image but does not negate the party's basic commitment to secular values. By and large, other regional parties, too, draw a line between religion and politics. Regional parties in the north-east, including Asom Gana Parishad constitute a distinct group. They face special problems which largely shape their perceptions, perspectives and political strategies. The British policy of fencing off the entire region, except the plains of Assam, from the rest of India left behind a dubious legacy whose effects will take time to wear off. Lack of adequate communicational links and cultural/economic contacts with the rest of the country created a persisting feeling of psychological distance from New Delhi and Indians outside the region. Besides, inspite of repeated post-independence restructuring, most northeastern states carry a sizeable portfolio of internal problems relating to socio cultural integration, identity preservation and inter-state irredentist claims. The most emotive and apparently intractable problem has resulted from the successive waves and continuing trickle of immigrants and squatters—'outsiders' from other parts of the country and 'foreigners' from Bangladesh and Nepal. It is not surprising, therefore, that regionalism in the northeast has developed a strong, almost virulent, "sons-of-soil" syndrome. The relatively insular orientation of the northeast regional parties is clearly reflected in the collective articulation of10 such demands as the extension of 'inner line' regulations and benefits of article 371 (A) of the constitution to the entire region. Naturally, the pattern of their relations with the centre is considerably affected by the manner and the speed with which, in their perception, the latter responds to their concerns.Regional Parties and the Political SystemThe growing presence and salience of regional parties is undoubtedly, the most outstanding, aspect of political development in India over the past few years. Barely six months after coming into existence, Telugu Desam Successfully stormed the Congress stronghold in Andhra Pradesh. The Asom Gana Parishad was formed in the fall of 1985 and was swept to power by the year end. In 1986, Laldenga signed an accord with the Union government, abjured insurgency and led his Mizo National Front to power in Aizwal. For some years now Congress has had an informal alliance with the AIADMK in Tamil Nadu, and early this year it joined Farooq Abdullah's coalition government as a junior partner in Jammu and Kashmir.Some of these regional parties - and, in our analysis, we have taken note of only those which have made it to political power have yet to establish their credentials and prove their durability conclusively. Asom Gana Parishad, for instance, has to give evidence of its ability to deal effectively with the problems of a polyglot state which, with its bewildering mix of races and languages, replicates India in miniature. It remains to be seen how far the party is able to heal and bind together the disruption of the Assamese mosaic23. Sikkim Sangram Parishad leader, Nar Bahadur Bhandari has been making unabashed overtures to Congress (I) Nevertheless, their bonafides have come to be generally accepted and it is no longer easy to sell the thesis that they are anti-national.Regional parties have catalysed a realignment of political forces and their impact on the structure and, processof politics has been multi-directional and far-reaching. At least three distinct dimensions of what has been described as reginalisation of politics in india can be briefly indicated here. In the first place the political clout they have acquired poses the most powerful challenge the hitherto India's 'one-party donminance or 'one party plus' system. In 1967-69 the remshackle Samyukta Vidhyak Dal (S VD) governments which replaced the Congress in most northern states quickly collapsed under the weight of their own contradictions. At the centre, Indira Gandhi was able to bring off a11 remarkable cliff-hanging act until the 1971-72 elections restored her party to its hegemonic position. The Janata Party which in 1977, captured the Congress citadels in New Delhi and in the states of the Gangetic plains turned out to be a loosely fabricated agglomerate and its disparate and squabbling constituents did not take more than thirty months to break apart. And in 1980 the Congress - in its Congress (I) incarnation—was back in the driving seat at the centre and in all the states from which the Janata had ousted it. The situation to-day is basically different. Congress has already lost twelve states, seven of them to regional parties, and is passing through one of its worst intra-party crises.In the challenge to the Congress (I) dominance at the centre that is now building up regional parties have a critically important role. It may be noted here that, taken together, they form a sizeable bloc in parliament and that Telugu Desam is the largest opposition party in Lok Sabha. It is not surprising, therefore, that it is also a front runner in the chase after a 'national' alternative to Congress (I).Another area in which regional parties have a natural stake and are bound to make a strong impact is that of centre state relations. As the present writer has stated elsewhere24. The cumulative impact of ... the regionalisation of political parties in India has been the cause as well as the effect, among other things, of the growing importance of the rural vote and the emergence of regionally oriented elites in state capitals and the districts. At the same time, most national-level leaders have become increasingly rooted in the politics of their states and are often known to promote the interests of their own regions even when this involves working against the federal centre. This is understandable. Big industrial and commercial Houses throw their weight on the side of the centre. It is from the central authorities that they have to secure licenses and fiscal concessions. Besides, their economic interests cut across state boundaries and they look upon the whole country as a single, integrated market. On the contrary, small industrialists, traders and, what is more important, the agricultural bourgeoisie have a greater stake in the state governments. The state capitals are their lobbying points. Their linkages with the state administrative machinery gives them a dominating influence on decision-making at the state level.In view of the marked change in the ecology of Indian federalism, there is bound to be some redistribution of powers to reduce the financial dependence of the states on New Delhi. Demands for greater autonomy 12 for the states range over a broad spectrum with the confederal model with a notional' centre depending on doles from the constituent units) sketched in the Anandpur Sahib resolution, taking the far out end. It seems hardly likely, the Sarkaria Commission notwithstanding, that the centre is going to be deprived of its primacy. What is more significant is a perceptible change that is taking shape on the ground. It is a change in the ambience rather than the legal framework of the centre-state interface. The states have always smarted at the centre's whiphold but it seems they are no longer willing to be beggars seeking largesse. Instead, they insist on a redefinition of the existing equation and refuse to be treated as irresponsible and erring wards in constant need of Big Brother's guidance and control. Occasional confrontations between New Delhi and this or that state prove merely that states are coming of age. In other words, what is happening is the emergence of a new and more 'federal' political culture and, in consequence, a two-way change in the form and idiom of centre-state relations.It is no longer uncommon for MPs from a particular state, irrespective of their party affiliations, collectively lobbying with central author-ides on behalf of their home state. Bhajan Lal lost the chief ministership of Haryana when his publicly expressed opposition to some provisions of the Punjab accord became an embarrassment to the centre. The centre, on its part, is beginning to show signs of being more responsive to state sensitivities. Thus, after some shadow boxing, New Delhi worked out a common approach with the left front government of West Bengal in dealing with the Gorkha land issue. At the same time, there is considerable and growing evidence of regional parties and their leaders shed-ding their 'parochialism and showing an awareness of wider horizons where all-India issues are concerned. N.T. Rama Rao may no longer be as keen on his 'Bharat Desam' project as he once was. However, he takes care to register his presence on extra-regional and national levels as often as possible; -the occasion may be a gathering of opposition leaders or an election campaign in Assam or Haryana. Particularly significant is the stand he took on the state autonomy at the recent Surajkund conclave of nine opposition parties. His was a plea for "the restoration of co-operative federalism enshrined in the constitution" and "recognition of the legitimate place of the states25." In essence, he was asking for a partnership model of federal relations in place of the, patron-client pattern that is actually in operation. More importantly, it shows that on questions of concern to the country as a whole regional parties do not necessarily, and at all times, look at things through regional blinkers.We may conclude with shorthand comment on the limited but none-13 the less positive impact of regional parties at the base of our polity. The impact has Been limited since, given their class character which is much the same as that of Congress and other non-left parties, basic restructuring of existing socio-economic relations is not on their agenda. Ritual homage to social justice and holistic claims on behalf of their regions notwithstanding, regional parties have, by and large, a status quoist social philosophy with some top dressing of welfarist tokenism and populist gimmicks.Within the liberal-democratic frame of reference, however, regional, parties can be said to have made politics more competitive and popular participation in the political process more extensive at the grass roots. So long as the Congress held a virtually undisputed way in the political arena, the party's vote bank' strategy rested on the mediation of local caste and community leaders who could deliver the rural vote at the hustings. Regional parties have inducted in the districts a new breed of sub-elites who have risen from the soil, speak in an idiom the people understand and have, as a result narrowed gap. This is a positive gain and is clearly reflected in the marked rise in voter turn-out at the polls in states where electoral contest has become keener in proportion to the displacement of the Congress from a position of monopoly, and in there invigoration of panchayati raj and urban local self-government institutions.There is, finally the activisation, slow but growing of a process of rethinking on the problem of nation-building in India. Regional parties-have helped this rethinking by compelling attention to the need for comingto terms with the territorial identity26" they articulate and defend. The outcome is a gradually unfolding new vision of an all-India 'national' identity which gathers up but does not supersede the country's smaller 'national' identities. When the nationalist in a Hurry calls upon minorities and regional collectivities to join the 'national mainstream' he does have a point What is" more important is the emerging perspective in which the mainstream is seen not as mighty waterway of which the majority community is the sole custodian and which flows exclusively through the Hindi heartland and into which all religious, linguistic and regional sub-streams must flow and lose themselves. In the new perspective the national mainstream can have no meaning except as a confluence in which the hindu tributory is only one in the many , albeit the largest. Regional parties may well claim some credit for winning a measure of legitimacy for the view that, given our plural social structure, nation-building has to be a process of aggregation not assimilation14 NOTES AND REFERENCES1. As Panikkar has put it "not one can conceive of India except in terms of the great regions ... Any other image of India would be something abstract without flesh and blood". The Foundations of New India, London. Rasheeduddin Khan describes India as "an aggregation of regions and sub-regions". "Political and Socio-cultural Determinants of Indian Federalism" in K.R. Bombwall (Ed.) National Power and State Autonomy, Meerut, 1978, p. 1222. Despite linguistic homogeneity, identity consciousness exists only partially or not at all in some states of what is described as the Hindi 'heartland'. Of Madhya Pradesh, for example, Wilson writes, "no state in India has fewer bonds underlying its unity and it can with truth be said that the parts of Madhya Pradesh" in Myron Weiner (Ed.), State Politics in India, Princeton, 1968, p. 128. The descriptions fit Uttar Pradesh even better.3. For a succint account of the factors which have contributed towards the delineation and development of regional identities see the Punjab Government's Memorandum Submitted to the (Sarkaria) Commission on Centre-State Relations, Chandigarh, April 1987, p. 1 The memorandum points out that "India's society has a multi-national profile" (p.2) and that "with the reorganisation of states on a linguistic basis, these are no longer mere administrative sub-divisions of the country. These are now deliberately reorganised homelands of different linguistic-cultural groups . . . (which) "are in fact growing into distinct nationalities", (p. 3). For a more extended though rather slanted, account see Selig S. Harrison, India, the Most Dangerous Decades, London, 1960, chaps. I and n.4. Boris I Kluyev, India : National and Language Problems, New Delhi, 1981, p. 124.5. Op. cit., n. 3, Amury de Reincourt The Soul of India, 1961 also projects the possibility of regionalism contributing to the 'Balkanisation' of India.6. R. N. Mishra, Regionalism and State Politics in India, New Delhi, 1986, p. 16 Mishra finds support in F.G. Bailey (Whom he quotes on p. 89) who feels on the basis of interviews with political leaders of Orissa that given time, "these undersirable features" castes, communalism and regionalism - will give way to a developing sense of provincial and national unity." Emphasis added.7. G. Ram Reddy and B.A.V. Sharma, Regionalism : A Study of Telengana, New Delhi, 1984, p. 4.8. Iqbal Narain, "Cultural Pluralism National Integration and Democracy in India" in K.R. BombwalL op. cit., n.l, p. 188.9. Report of the States Reorganisation Commission, Manager of Publications, Delhi, 1955, p. 510. Yogesh Atal, Building a Nation: Essays on India, New Delhi 1981, p. 1911. M. Shatrugna; "Emergence of Regional Parties in India: Case of Telugu Desam" in George Mathew, Shifts in Indian Politics, New Delhi, 1984 p. 9815 12. Rajni Kothari expressed this view in "The Congress System", Asian Survey, VI, 12, December 1964, pp. 1161-73.13. The term is used by Marguerite R. Barnett in her The Politics of Cultural Nationalism in South India, Princeton, N.J. 197614. Stanley A. Kochaneck, "India" in Robert R. Kearney (Ed.) Politics and Modernisation in Southeast Asia, New York, 1975, p. 3915. Marguerite R. Barnett, op. cit. n.13, p. 213.16. A recent decision of Jharkhad coordination committee (of which JMM is a constituent) to set up a parallel government in the Jharkhand area if the demand for a separate state is not conceded by January 1988 is a straw in the wind. As a newspaper editorial points out, the implementation of this decision "will mean serious unrest and violence in the 21 districts . .. which the proposed parallel government will cover and which are intended to constitute the Jharkhand state". The Indian Express, (Chandigarh), 18 September 1987, p.617. M. Shatrugna, op. cit., n. 11 Referring to the 1983 assembly poll, he shows that of the 288 candidates fielded by Telugu Desam 152 were from higher castes whereas 128 belonged to backward castes and weaker sections (including 40 from scheduled castes and 15 from scheduled tribes). As against this, of the 293 Congress candidates only 81 were drawn from backward (middle) castes and weaker sections (including 22 from scheduled castes and 6 from scheduled tribes), p. 10018. Such rethinking if it has, in fact, occured has not been reflected in any of the party's official pronouncements.19. Harish K. Puri, "State autonomy and the National Question: Punjab Memorandum to the Sarkaria Commission", a paper presented at the 12th All-India Social Science Congress held at Mysore, 13-17 July 1987.20. Op. cit. n. 3. p. 321. The party was formed by the merger of two major regional groups, Purbanchaliya Parisad and Assam Jatiya Dal and several smaller formations which had earlier conducted a prolonged and bitter mass struggle under the banner of All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad. The AASU (All Assam Students Union), which had provided "youth power" to the agitation, retained its separate identity.22. As a meeting of the forum of regional parties in the north-eastern states, held at Guwahati in February 1987, raised these two issues. Inner line regulations are, at present applicable to Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland and Mizoram while the provisions of article 371 (A) of the constitution are applicable to Nagaland and Mizoram. At a subsequent meeting, in April 1987, the forum claimed that regional parties alone could "safeguard the distinct identity and personality of the North East" and raised a number of additional demands such as the transfer of such subjects as oil, tea and coal from the Union list to the State list of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Udayon Misra, "North-East Regional Parties : High Hopes and Hard Realities,16 " Economic and Political Weekly, XXII, 24, 13 June 1987, p. 923.23. Sanjoy Hazarika, "Assam Full Circle". The Indian Express, 19 January 1986, p. 224. K.R. Bombwall, op. cit., n. 8, p. 21325. The Times of India, 24 September, 1987, p. 426. Ivo d. Duchacek makes use of the term in his Comparative Federalism: the Territorial Dimension, New York, 1970, chap.l17 OBSOLESCENCE OF NATIONALISM : AN APPRAISAL OF AUTONOMY FORCES IN NORTH-EASTERN INDIAB. RahamathullaThe entire tribal region of North-East India, which comprises 174,505 sq.km., has the most picturesque beauty and peculiar geographical features. It is predominantly a tribal area inhabited by more than 150 odd tribes with numerous clans and subclans of immense diversity. Cultural heterogeneity is quite conspicous in a conglomeration of myriad ethnic groups and it is a preservation of tribal heritage rather than manifestation of chauvinistic patriotism that often matters to the most of tribes in the region2. The Centre's efforts to infuse a sense of Indianness among the tribes are not fully met with a success, notwithstanding its generousity to allocate funds to accelerate a tempo of economic development. The various measures such as creation of statehood, North-eastern Economic Council, establishment of new educational institutions, reservation in employment, incorporation of provisions, both in the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State policy to preserve and protect and to safeguard the tribal traditions, however, have not attracted the attention of tribal people. Their growing desperation and self-imposed ostracism has been further encouraged by the regional insurgents whose demand for autonomy is gathering momentum despite their failure to cope with the Indian Security Forces. An attempt is made in this paper to trace out the role being played by the major autonomy forces in the tribal region and to find out reasons for their obsolescence of nationalism.Inauguration of Nagaland as the sixteenth state of the Indian Union on December 1, 1963, has certainly brought over-all changes in Naga lives and ensured every Naga citizen a political right based on democratic norms to participate whether in the State Legislature election or in general election like the other citizens in the country. Since the inception 18 of the State Legislature in 1964, six Chief Ministers excluding the present one, have ruled the State and witnessed political faction of dissension and division among the Naga leaders. On the economic front, the per capita income has gone up to Rs. 900/-. Culturally, there is a drastic change in the Naga traditions and customs within a short span of twenty-four years. In spite of all, the autonomy movement launched by Zaphu Angami Phizo, President of the Naga National Council in 1956 has not ceased rather it took a new dimension because of T.H. Muivah and Isac Swu, who are now no longer interested to continue as General Secretary of the Naga National Council and foreign Minister of the so-called Naga Federal Government because of their leader who exiled to England thirty-one years ago.The pro-Phizo hostiles are still active despite factionalism in their rank and file and they are constantly inspired and encouraged from England by their masters. During the Janata regime, the meeting between the Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, and Z.A. Phizo did take place in London. The meeting, however, failed to produce any tangible results and, at the same time, promoted misunderstanding between the two leaders. Phizo argued that the Nagas not being ethnically Indian in origin, the British withdrawal placed them in the same status and position as the former Nawabs and Princes of India. He further claimed "I have the mandate of Naga people to represent them and whether it is twenty years or forty years, as long as I have their mandate, I must carry out their responsibility entrusted to me. The reason why I came abroad was to tell the outside world that India was committing genocide on the Nagas3."The formation of National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) on January 31,1971, by T.H. Muivah and Isac Swu on the Chinese model led to their explusion from the Naga National Council and even Phizo ordered his men to deal with these traitors stringently. The main objectives and principles of NSCN are to liberate Nagaland from the Indian yoke, to establish a socialist state based on the Beijing ideology and to incorporate all contiguous areas of the Nagas into one 'Socialist Union of Nagaland'. The means of production, distribution and exchange would entirely be in the hands of an envisioned state and thereby ensure equal rights to all Nagas irrespective of their diversity of culture4. The NSCN in its recent Manifesto has called upon the Naga people to unite on the basis of sound socio-political orientation, which would, however, be the only precondition for a solution of Naga problem. This unity call has produced substantial results in strengthening the hands of NSCN rebels5. S.S. Kaplang, a Hemi Naga of Burmese origin and Commander of the19 combined Naga forces in Northern Burma also reiterated his support to Muivah and Swu organization and asserted that as long as India and Burma continue their occupation of his motherland, the Burmese Nagas would spare no efforts to fight with the Indian Security Forces. On the contrary, the former President of the underground Federal Government of Nagas Zashie Huire favoured Shillong Accord for a solution of Naga problem.Unspeakable atrocities are being perpetrated by the NSCN insurgents in Nagaland. Seventeen NNC (Naga National Council) top leaders, who were loyal to Z.A. Phizo brutally murdered, launched a campaign for recruitment of Naga youths for training in guerilla warfare and compelling the villagers to pay taxes to their organization. The NSCN rebels have already established links with PLA (Peoples' Liberation Army) and People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak known as PREPAK of Man-ipur. In a renewed armed struggle in 1982, twenty army officers were killed in an ambush at Namthirok in Manipur. It was believed that the ambush had been well-planned and faultlessly executed by the underground National Socialist Council of Nagaland, which has its headquarters across the border in Burma Laik Khemungan, President of the civilian setup of the pro-Phizo group who defected recently, was killed by the pro-Phizo group in northern Burma, his three bodyguards were also killed in the ambush. The incident took place when Laik Khemungan along with his followers was on his way to join pro-Chinese Muivah-Isac group after withdrawing obedience for the pro-Phizo factions. The NSCN is receiving perpetual armed supply from China and the other hostile organizations in the region are also equally extending their cooperation with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland.The Government of India has banned the Manipur Meitel Extremist organizations like the Peoples' Liberations Army (PLA), the Peoples' Revolutionary party of Kangleipak known as PREPAK and its off shoots like the armed wing of PREPAK called the Red Army, the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) and the KCP's Red Army for having involved in guerilla warfare and for openly advocating an independent Manipur. Despite the arrest of PLA's leader Bisheswar Singh on July 6,1981, the rebels of the PLA elected Tkoudam Kung Bihari, 35 year old Chairman of PLA, was shot dead in an encounter with the Indian army on April 15,1982, at Kadampokpi near Imphal. Twelve other associates of Kunj Bihari were also killed in that operation. This, however, did not deter the other sympathisers of PLA to extend their cooperation and help. On the subsequent day when Kunj Bihari's dead body was handed over to20 his carpenter father at Sinjamei, the youths of the locality spontaneously took out a mourning procession with the dead body and in a secretly arranged conclave at Thoubal, a village on the south of Imphal, Khai-dem Manikanta, a 25 year old college drop-out, who had studied up to B.A. in Manipur College at Sinjamei, elected as a successor to Kunj Bihari to lead PLA organization7.It is presumed that there are many local people who still express the lurking sympathy with PLA rebels and clandestinely supply money, men and materials. The PLA's attempt on May 25,1982, to dynamite the Palika Bazar in the heart of the capital should not be dismissed as an act of 'desperate bidding"8. The other two Meitei hostile groups, Peoples' Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK). Kangleipak Community Party (KCP), though suffered a setback in their recent past, their leadership is still in tact. Maoist ideology and revolution are the guiding principles to these insurgents. Cooperation extended by National Socialist Council of Nagaland from time to time during the hostile operations all the more made these Manipur autonomy forces adamant.Ukhrul, one of the mountainous districts of Manipur, is being threatened by the NSCN rebels to intensify insurgency as Rishang Keisheing - the then Chief Minister of Manipur had stepped up the security arrangements to encounter the rebels' activities in the district Incidentally, both Isac Swu and Rishang Keisheing are Tangkhula Nagas and belong to Ukhrul district Notwithstanding the security measures to protect the Chief Minister and other public officials, the NSCN rebels are perpetrating a series of crimes in the region. For instance, the Chief Minister's convoy was ambushed on December 8, 1984, and several of his security personnel were killed. On January 26,1986, the Chief Minister's very close friend, N.S. Shamithar was brought out of the public meeting in Phun-gar sub-division in Ukhrul district and shot dead and two days after this incident the NSCN rebels struck again and snatched some weapons from a patrol party of Assam Rifles at Chamu of Ukhrul district.9 Intelligence sources have confirmed that the statements often issued by the Chief Ministers to the Press about the 360 rebels, who have received training in China, now have returned to their headquarters at Somara in Burma. This area is even inaccessible to the Burmese army and it is a tough task to face the Hemi Burmese Naga tribes who control and command the entire region. The Hemi Burmese Nagas have ethnic and racial links with Nagas of Nagaland and are formulating an operational strategy in collaboration with the NSCN rebels to face any eventualities from the Indian Security Forces. The NSCN rebels are raising21 a massive fund from the villagers and the authorities are unable to stop this practice as the local people are not adequately informing for fear of reprisal from the rebels.10 Even the Imphal Valley is not free from the insurgency. The majority of the security forces are stationed in the valley, yet sometimes these forces prove inadequate and ineffective to encounter the rebels. Chief Minister Rishang Keisheing deplored the atrocities committed by the rebels and pointed out. "there were bombs, explosions, hijacking of vehicles, killing of innocent citizens, attacks on officers, raids in hospitals where patients were being treated. The government was compelled to requisition the aid of the army in 198011".The communal carnage which occurred in Tripura between the native tribes and the Bengali settlers in 1980 on the ground of cultural and economic deprivation to the former by the latter divided the two communities to a never returning-point, and promoted hatred, suspicions and jealousy. In the recent statement, the Army of Tripura Peoples Liberation Organization (ATPLO), the militant and clandestine unit of Tripura tribal extremists has expressed its firmness to "carry out armed struggle" with a view to form a "sovereign Tripura State". The statement further asserted. "It is simply due to the misrule of the State Government, and conspiracy by the foreigners that the extremely exploited Mongoloides have taken up arms in their hands to protect themselves from being completely liquidated throughout the North-Eastern region, as was the case with the freedom fighters of Vietnam". A Nine-Point Charter of Demands had been placed before the Tripura Chief Minister Nripen Chakravorty and its copies had also been despatched to the former Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi then Union Home Minister Zail Singh and the State's former Governor S.M.H. Burney12.The story goes back to the late forties when Dasarath Deb Barman the native tribal and the present Deputy Chief Minister fought the armed struggle against the then King under the banner of Upajati Gana Mukti Parishad (UGMP) for the right of self-determination of the tribals and to free from the oppressive regime of the King. The former Chief Minister Nripen Chakraborty arrived on the political scene in 1950 to organise the CPI party in Tripura. Barman joined the party but kept his UGMP alive from the beginning. There has been, however, a divergence of approach between the two in regard to the management of state affairs. Being a native Dasarath Deb Barman opposed the growing Bengali settlements in Tripura in the wake of the partition of the country. Before 1947, the tribals - Tripuris, Chakmas, Riangs, Halmas, Jamatias and other thirteen groups constituted nearly 78 per cent of Tripura's population.22 But huge influx of Hindu refugees from across the border changed the demographic structure of the state and turned the native tribes into a minority group.13 The differences between Chakraborty and Barman further intensified when both of them lost the Assembly elections in 1967. Chakraborty, however, launched a new strategy in order to strengthen the position of CPM in the state and favoured the development of Pan-tribalism in the entire north-eastern region. Barman, on the other hand, had emphasised that the tribals of Tripura would not be able to protect themselves unless they consolidated their own position and strength in the state's affairs and eventually Deb Barman inspired the formation of Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti (TUJS) to agitate for their language, restoration of lands transferred to non-tribals and the formation of autonomous district councils for administering the tribal areas. In 1977 elections, for the first time, CPM won a landslide victory by securing 54 of the 60 Assembly seats. Deb Barman was a contender for the Chief Ministership. But Charkraborty was made the Chief Minister of Tripura on the plea that the Bengalis were in a majority in the state. The native tribals expressed their resentment and launched a militant demonstration in mid-78. The renewed agitation resulted in acceptance of the autonomous district councils under the Seventh Schedule and not under the Sixth as demanded by the tribals. This again intensified the agitation and ultimately resulted in formation of Tripura National Volunteer Force (TNVF) by the educated Christian tribal Vijay Hrangkhowal and he vowed to fight for an "independent Tripura" and to drive "foreigners" from his native land. He forged links with Mizo National Front (MNF) and sent his men for armed training to the Chittagong Hills. By June, 1979, Tripura witnessed an unprecedented violence as the schools, markets, offices, medical centres etc. were set on fire and the demand for "liberation of Tripura" gathered momentum. The TUJS leader, Shyama Charan Tripuri, opposed the TNV on the direction of Deb Barman and Hrangkhowal, thus, found himself isolated. The meeting between Chief Minister Chakraborty and Hrangkhowal did take place in order to sort out the differences and to ensure peace and stability in the state. But no tangible result could be achieved from the meeting and Hrangkhowal emerged more aggressive than ever before. On the contrary, the origins of the chauvinistic Amara Bengali to protect and safeguard the interest of the Bengalis aggravated the crisis and animosity between the tribals and the Bengalis further intensified. It was Chief Minister Chakraborty who first disclosed about the formation of Amara Bengali in Calcutta and named Anil Debnath as its organiser.23 Strangely enough, Amara Bengali never attacked the TNV and the TNV did not attack the Amara Bengali. Both the parties, however, were against TUJS of Deb Barman14.Since 1982, the armed wing of TNV has carried out a number of raids both on the civilians and armed personnel. Substantial arms and material assistance is being extended to the TNV by the NSCN rebels. The Tripura National Volunteers further frustrated and intensified the extremist activities, particularly after Mizo National Front leader, Laldenga, accepted to solve all the outstanding problems within the framework of the Indian constitution. Formation of a United Front - the Manipur, Tripura, Nagaland and Assam Consolidations (MTNAC) - a conglomeration of guerilla warfare unit in 1982, has strengthened the hands of the hostiles and the demand for an "Independent Tripura" among the tribals has not ceased.In order to fight the TNV insurgents, the Central Government declared on February 4,1987, the Tripura National Volunteers, an unlawful organisation under the Lawful Activities (Prevention) Act in order to arm the State Government with Powers to effectively fight insurgency that has taken a heavy toll of life. "The declaration charged the TNV with resorting to violent activities in frutherance of its objective of gaining Independence of Tripura. This was considered secessionist. In providing justification for barring the TNV, the notification pointed out that the volunteers of the organization were involved in 42 violent incidents in 1986 in which 114 persons were killed. In the last one month of the current year four incidents took place in which 13 persons lost their lives. In order to make the anti-insurgency operations effective, the State Government will declare some areas in the State as "disturbed" under the Armed Forces (Special Power) Act16."Immediately on February 6,1987, the outlawed Tripura National volunteers issued a "quit Tripura order" to all indian citizens living illegally in Tripura after October 5,1949 - the day princely Tripura merged with the Indian Union. In an "order" to all Indian citizens living in Tripura dated January 20, this year, the self-styled TNV President Bijoy Kumar said: "When war is at your door, neither your government (India) nor the Tripura National Volunteers could provide guarantee to your lives and hence it would be adivsable that you innocent people should seek your right to homeland from the Indian government instead of hanging on to Tripura precariously". The "order" threatened Indian citizens that the TNV would "not be responsible for any unfortunate circumstances that may befall Indian citizens if they did not leave Tripure after the issuance24 of this dictum". The "order" assured "all security to those Indians ready to comply with this order whereas it also recognises the people, who were in Tripura on or before October 15, 1949". Copies of the "order" were issued to the Secretary General of the United Nations for "keeping close watch on Tripura situation" and to the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi urging him to withdraw all Indian citizen and armies to prevent unnecessary loss of lives17." The TNV has intensified its operational strategy and in an ambush on May 14,1987, killed five Border Security Force personnel at Ultacherra near the Ambassa Gandacherra road, south of Tripura.18 Mizoram, which was formerly known as Mizo Hills district of Assam was inaugurated by Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, on January 1, 1972, as the Union Territory with an area of 21,090 sq.km. and of 332,390 population. This Union Territory has had a series of political turmoil since our Independence. It was Mizo National Front (MNF) under the leadership of Laldenga who had given a call for a sovereign Mizoram in 1965. Since then the underground hosules of MNF had stepped up its military operation in Mizoram. But the signing of Mizoram accord by Laldenga with the Government of India on June 30, 1986 brought peace to the region and the subsequent inauguration of statehood ensured stability and cessation of hostilities as the Preamble of Accord emphasises: "The Government of India have all along been making earnest efforts to bring about an end to the disturbed conditions in Mizoram and to restore peace and harmony19". The Accord further reiterated that: "With a view to restoring peace and normalcy in Mizoram the MNF party, on their part, undertakes within the agreed time-frames to take all necessary steps to end all underground activities, to bring out all underground personnel of the MNF with their arms, ammunitions and equipments to ensure their return to civil life, to abjure violence and generally to help in the process of restoration of normalcy20." Thus, the secessionist movement launched by the MNF came to an end and a new era of peace began in Mizoram.,Disgruntled forces in Arunachal Pradesh often get provoked because of the Chinese proclivity in the internal affairs of Arunachal Pradesh and Beijing's claims for certain parts of the region. In 1982, Chinese authorities protested for the presence of folk dancers from Arunachal Pradesh in New Delhi during Asiad, and their displeasure was conveyed to the Government of India while the statehood was conferred on Arunchal Pradesh in June, 198621. Unsettled sino-Indian boundary dispute, however, remained as the main irritant for normalisation of relations25 between the two neighbours. It is difficult to believe that the Chinese would discourage those secessionist forces who intend to create political chaos in this part of the country in keeping in view of their claims to the Indian territory in the north-eastern sector.Assam is also not free from the secessionists as some of the hard-core students within Assam Agitation have formed the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) in collaboration with the NSCN rebels. The intelligentsia felt that the NSCN headquarters in Burma provides training for the ULFA recruits and the ULFA, of course, has to pay for the training and arms to the NSCN rebels. The ULFA, however, gets shelter at the NSCN headquarters at Challam beyond Somra tracts in Burma with the sole object to co-operate and collaborate with the NSCN rebels in an operational strategy against the Indian Security Forces. Paresh Barooah, who is one of the top leaders of ULFA is said to be in the NSCN camp in Burma and was directed by the Chinese authorities to function through the NSCN rebels. The ULFA has already involved in extremist activities in Assam. The murder of Kalipad Sen, the leader of the United Minority Front (UMF) by Paresh Barooah is an indication of new beginning of terrorism in Assam.22 The extremists in Meghalaya are also inspired by the leaders of National socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) to demand autonomy from the Indian Government. The Khasiphur National Council, a chauvinistic organization exclusively of Khasi tribes has already given a call for an autonomy movement in Meghalaya. The recent agitation against the non-Khasis indicate their growing hatred and intense desire to cooperate with the other liberation fronts in the region. The "Seven-Sisters Liberation Army" comprising the seven states has once again become active to create an independent state through an armed struggle. Formation of another underground organization called "NAMMAT" consisting Nagaland, Assam, Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh and Tripura further strengthened the hands of autonomy forces in the region.23 There has been, however, an impressive performance by the Central Government to ameliorate economic progress in this sensitive region, particularly from 1960s when the sisterly states of Nagaland were following her example of armed struggle. North-Eastern Economic Council is entrusted to deal with the economic task of the region. Meghalaya is experiencing a tremendous progress in all spheres since inception of the statehood on Janury 20,1972. At present, there are 644 small scale industries out of which 547 are in the Khasi Hills, 43 in Garo Hills and26 54 in Jaintia Hills. The Planning Commisison has recently approved Rs. 390 million for hydel project to overcome the energy crisis and providing adequate subsidies to agricultural sector in the State. The Annual Plan outlay for 1980-81 was Rs. 43.31 crores. In Manipur, the total investment during the 5th Five Year Plan on major and medium irrigation projects alone was Rs. 225 million. About 15,000 hectares of land was brought under irrigation during 1978-79. Rs. 12.68 million were allocated for the development of industries in 1977-78. A Tribal Development Plan exclusively for the development of 29 tribes and sub-tribes has been chalked out by the State Government. Mizoram, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh are also receiving substantial funds from the Central Government. Already 2,500 hectares of area is brought under permanent irrigation in Mizoram. Efforts are being made by the State Government to extend these facilities to the entire region. The annual Plan outlay in 1980-81 for Nagaland State was Rs. 48 crores. There are 1,567 small and cottage industries in this tiny state of six lakh people. There are no major industries in Arunachal Pradesh because of its geographical features and high altitudes. But 34 small-scale industries are functioning under private cooperative sectors. The Annual Plan outlay for 1979-80 was Rs. 234.05 million. All the 50 tribes and its sub-tribes are given equal shares in sphere of economic development in this Union Territory. Tripura Government has set up Small Scale Industries Corporation Limited so that every local tribe has a say in the economic progress of the State. The Annual Plan outlay for 1977-78 was Rs. 220 million24. The North-Eastern Hill University is catering to the educational needs of Nagaland, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur has its own university besides the Post-graduate Centre of Jawa-harlal Nehru University. Strangely enough, the autonomy demand has not ceased in spite of the Centre's generosity rather it became intransigent It would, perhaps, be relevant to suggest that a 'National Integration Conference' be convened at the Centre's initiative preferably at the Nagaland Peace Centre, Chidima, near Kohima and an invitation be extended to the leaders of both major and minor autonomy forces so that they would be brought to the negotiating table to put forward their point of view. So far, the Centre is dealing with the leaders like Phizo and Laldenga. The leaders of NSCN, PLA, PREPAK, ATPLO, etc. are yet to be heard by the Central Government The ethnic heterogeniety is so varied and complied among the tribes of North-Eastern India that neglect of one minor tribal sect may lead to an autonomy demand and the external agencies like China, U.S.A. and Bangladesh never cease to exploit the situation. 27 Initiation of this kind of dialogue may add to the already existing measures of removing poverty, economic progress etc. to infuse a sense of nationalism among the tribes of North-Eastern India.NOTES&REFERENCES1. See for details V. Venkata Rao, "North-East India: Problems and Prospects", The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. XXXVI, January-March, 1975, pp.1-12.2. See for details Captain St. John F. Michael, The North-East Frontier of India (Delhi: Vivek Publishing House, 1973), See Christophu Von Furer, Haimendorf, The Naked Nagas Head Hunters of Assam in Peace and War (Calcutta. Thacker, Spink and Co. Ltd., 1946). and also see S. Barakataki, Tribes of Assam (New Delhi: National Book Trust, India, 1969).3. See for details, "Conversation with Z.A. Phizo", Sunday (Calcutta: May 22, 1977), Vol. 5, No. 10, pp. 14-15.4. See B. Rahamatulla, "Evolution of National Socialist Council of Nagaland The Renewal of Insurgency", Platform (Kohima: February 25 - March 4, 1982), Vol. 5, No. 40, pp. 3-4.5. Vitto Angami, "Mores in Mizoram and Nagaland", Frontier (Calcutta: May 30, 1981), Vol. 13, No. 40, p. 11.6. The Shillong Accord was signed on November 11, 1975 between a 5-member team of Naga Underground Federal Government and North- Eastem States' Governor, L.P. Singh. The Accord envisages solution of the Naga problem through "peaceful negotiation" and also acceptance by the Naga team of the Constitution of India. See B. Rahamathulla, n. 4.7. The Times of India (New Delhi: May 27. 1982)8. Ibid., May 28, 1982.9. Rattan Mall, "Insurgency on the Rise in Manipur", Ibid., February 5,1987. 10. Horrible atrocities were committed by NSCN in 1968. For instance, in July, 1968, NSCN rebels ambushed an foot patrol of the Sixth Dogra regiment at Morem (Schingai border sub-division) killed one jawan and in July itself the rebels again ambushed Border Security Force foot patrol at New Heaven (Ukhrul Sub-division) and killed two personnel and one village volunteer force member. The rebels dropped some crude bombs on the patrol party and exchanged fire with the automatic weapons for fifteen minutes. On August 1, the rebels attacked the foot patrol party of the 9th Grenadier in Kosam Khullen (Tangkhul Nundung sub-division), killed one soldier and on August 17, the rebels ambushed a 13 Mehar regiment foot patrol party at Kachai (80km from Ukhrul) and killed one soldier and took away his weapon. In November, the NSCN rebels again ambushed the 6th Dogra regiment foot patrol party at Sihai (40 km from Ukhrul) and killed a soldier. 28 The clashes between the Security Forces and NSCN rebels are continuing and the Armed Forces Special Power Act, which was enforced in Manipur in 1980 empowered the army to arrest the rebels and to hand over to the local police. This is however, preventing armed forces to deal firmly with the rebels. Ibid.11. Ibid.12. See for details, B. Rahamathulla, "North-Eastern Region in Prospective". Uramail(Dimapur), Vol. VIII, Nos. 24 and 25, February 18 and 25,1981.13. See for details Janardan Thakur, "The Travails of Tripura", The Hindustan Times Sunday Magazine (New Delhi), January 4, 1987.14. Hrangkhowal's closest lieutanant Chun Kalai, who was arrested by the CRPF and is serving life imprisonment, confessed in his statement that he was given money about Rs. 50,000 by the Deputy-Speaker for running the TNV operation. Ibid.15. n. 7, February 5, 1987.16. Ibid.17. It is generally presumed that the TNV laid strategy to intimidate and terrorise the non-tribals in a bid to force them to leave their homes and make the Autonomous District Council areas an exclusive preserve for the tribals and also aims at forcing the Central Government to start a dialogue with the TNV on the MNF model by indulging in acts of violence, murder and plunder. Ibid., December 13, 1986.18. The State Government, however, after dithering for a long time has now come forward with the announcement of rewards of Rs. 1 lakh each for the captive, dead or alive of the TNV chief, Bijoy Hrangkhowal and the TNV's self-styled "General" Kartic, Kohai and of rewards ranging from Rs. 50,000 to Rs. 1,00,000 for the capture of 20 other top TNV leaders.Observers feel that CPM leaders attempted in a clandestine move to bring about the surrender of a section of the TNV with two or three leaders and enlist them to the party as they had done in the case of ATPLO under the leadership of late Benanda Jamatia. Jamatia was with Bijoy but later broke away from him to form the ATPLO and it was he who first declared the "independent" Tripura government of the tribals. Jamatia was ultimately killed in the hill region of Amarpur. His assassins are yet to be traced out Ibid., May 15, 1987, and January 25, 1987.19. Ibid., July 7, 198620. Ibid.21. Ibid., February 26, 1987.22. Ibid., January 7, 1987.23. See for details, B. Rahamathulla, "Ethnic Heterogeniety and Insurgency in the Tribes of North-East India. Predicament for Nationalism" in S.A.H. Haqqi (edited). Democracy, Pluralism and Nation-Building (New Delhi: N.B.O. Publishers, 1984), pp. 325-335.24. See for details. The Times of India Directory and Year book, 1980-81 under heading, "State and Union Territories".29 GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF A REGIONAL POLITICAL PARTY :THE ASOM GANA PARISHADAnuradha DuttaIIn academic discussions the term 'political culture' has become an accepted part of our vocabulary. It is obviously a variant of civic culture1used to describe a set of orientations in a given situation which may extend a period of time beyond the immediate present. The components of 'political culture' would include the orientation of men's thinking, their priorities, their ideals and ideology (the latter being a. predisposition, a long-term orientation of thought), and their conventional wisdom about normative aspects of life. Ideas change, so also opinions, and a political society finds out means based basically on its own resources to maintain and consolidate its viability. Viability usually results from consensus on basic things and in such a situation, ideological values get converted into interests, with groups competing, although not engaging in actual conflict, among themselves. It is seen that different clusters in a population add diversity to the political culture without destroying the social fabric. Considered in this light, it might be a useful study to make on the dominant status of the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) in Assam and the various minority groups. Here, of course, our theme of study is the AGP which was voted to power through the Eighth General Election to the Assam Legislative Assembly held on 16 December 1985. The AGP moved into the election battle exactly two months and two days after its formation and achieved within a few months of its birth sigular victory thereby possibly breaking all previous records in this regard including the spectacular record of NTR's Telugu Desam'.A decided product of the six-year old Assam Movement over the foreign 30 nationals' issue, AGP's birth was not fortuitous, neither it is a freak of politics in Assam. In order to appreciate in full measure the origins of the AGP, it will be necessary to make some reference to the background circumstances which paved the path for the emergence of the most popular regional political party in the nature of a mass organisation in Assam. While the Assam Movement is regarded as the most popular movement in its recorded history, it is interesting to note that the first popular movements in the province manifested themselves in the post 1857 period under the aegis of the traditional Raijmel (assembly of people) providing the leadership. The Raijmels proved to be the mother organisation of later movements and Associations. These mels functioned as effective organs of popular power in Assam before the birth of a conscious national movement. As for the Assam Movement, its most distinguishing feature had been that it functioned outside the framework of the existing party political system. Led by the All Assam Student's Union (AASU) and its creation, the All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP), the Assam Movement reached its full meridian splendour with the signing of the Assam Accord on 15 August 1985 between the Government of India and the leadership of the Movement as represented by AASU and AAGSP. In the wake of the signing of the Assam Accord and the approaching 1985 elections, there grew the AGP precisely because the traditional all-India parties remained outside the pale of mass political support One could almost find an echo of the old Raijmel in the new AGO when it claimed in its Election Manifesto that the ' ASOM GANA PARISHAD means the people of Assam and the 'people of Assam' means the ASOM GANA PARISHAD which meant that the AGP is the political party of the people of Assam. All this points to the need for some relevant discussion on the Assam Movement, its course and consequence, the Assam Accord, Post-Accord developments leading to the dissolution of the Assembly regarded widely as an illegal one as it then was and, new elections bringing the AGP to power.IIThe issue of foreign nationals was not a bolt from the blue. It is as old as the Constitution of the Indian Republic. A distinction has to be made between migration under the law and illegal immigration. Sometimes legal migration also causes problems as it did during the period of alien rule itself. Incidentally, migration of various people into Assam began after the establishment of British Raj and the main currents were31 as under : (i) immigration to the Assam tea gardens; (ii) immigration of Eastern Bengal colonists; and, (iii) immigration of Nepalis, Immigration of tea garden labourers was of a temporary nature. Initially, they came on a short-term basis and even when they settled down permanently, they did not cause any hindrance to the language or culture of Assam. They were more amenable to assimilation and at times the number of this kind of immigrants dropped.2 Nepali migration was also slower by far.But what began causing concern even during British regime was the silent invasion from Eastern Bengal. As early as 1931, C.S. Mullan, Superintendent, Census Operations, Assam, wrote: 'Probably the most important event in the province during the last twenty-five years - an event, moreover, which seems likely to alter permanently the whole future of Assam and to destroy more surely than did the Burmese invaders of 1820 the whole structure of Assamese culture and civilization — has been the invasion of a vast horde of land-hungry Bengali immigrants, mostly Muslims, from the districts of Eastern Bengal and in particular from Mymensingh ... 'Where there is waste land thither flock the Mymen-singhias'3. By 1921, the total number of East Bengali settlers including children born after their arrival in the province was at least 300,000. It rose to over half a milllion by 1931. What was the shape of things to come? Mullan wrote that in view of the existence of large areas of waste land in Assam, the North Lakhimpur subdivision, Kamrup, and the Mangaldoi sub-division would be the targets of the immigrants, it being noted that most of the waste lands of Goalpara and Nowgong had been already brought under their sway. As for the future, Mullan wrote: 'It is sad but by no means improbably that in another thirty years Sib-sagar district will be the only part of Assam in which an Assamese will find himself at home4.The problem of immigrants from East Bengal took a serious turn during the period of the Second World War when the Muslim League dominated Saadullah Ministry was in office. The Ministry's encouragement to Muslim immigration from Eastern Bengal objectively contributed to the expulsion of the local tribal people and 'their lands were passing into the hands of the outsiders...5. A From 1939 to 1946 the number of Muslim immigrants increased considerably and this encouraged M.A. Jinnah to claim the whole of Assam for Pakistan. Lord Wavell in his capacity as Viceroy recorded as follows in his journal about the antics of the Saadullah Ministry around 1943 to increase the number of Muslim Ministers to increase this immigration into the uncultivated Government lands32 under the slogan of grow more food' campaign: 'The chief political problem is the desire of the Moslem Ministers to increase this immigration into the uncultivated Government lands under the slogan of 'Grow more food'; but what they are really after is 'grow more Moslems'6. What saved Assam for India at the time of Partition was the leadership of Gopinath Bordoloi, backed by legislative majority and the people at large, combined with Mahatma Gandhi's blessings. Gopinath Bardoloi was Premier of Assam when Congress formed a Ministry on 11 February 1946 and thus Assam was saved from being included in East Pakistan via Group C in terms of the Statement of the British Cabinet Delegation and the Viceroy dated 16 May 1946.7 When freedom came through Partition in 1947, East Bengal of undivided India's Bengal became East Pakistan and there emerged Bangladesh in 1971. Before independence of the country, immigrants came from parts of India and they did become citizens of the country with the enforcement of the republican Constitution. There could be no quarrel about them in any quarter. But Bangladesh being a foreign country, its citizens in any part of India cannot but be regarded as any other than foreign nationals. It is the massive presence of these people, in the main, which created the foreigners' issue giving rise to the Assam Movement. In this connection it is interesting to remember certain remarks of Jaw-aharlal Nehru having regard to the immigration issue even under conditions of foreign rule. In his letter to the Assam Provincial Committee (APCC) from his camp at Jorhat on 1 November 1937, Nehru stated inter alia that the Assamese feared that instead of assimilitating immigrants with them, the immigrants might assimilitate them as the number of immigrants were more! If that happened Assamese would lose their culture and individuality8.An Assistant Director of Census Operations (Technical) Assam, 1971, had this to say about the demographic composition of Assam's population: 'Taking the whole population of 3.29 million (339,680) of Assam in 1901 as 'indigenous' and applying the all India rate of increase of 129.67% from 1901 to 1971, her population in 1971 would be 7.56 million (7,555,329) instead of 14.63 million (14,625,152)9. It was estimated that by 1981,10 Assam's population at the rate of growth recorded in 1971 (34.95% as against the national average of 24.80%) would be 19,743,955; calculated at the national average growth rate, it should not be more than 14.6 million. This shows that, demographically speaking, Assam had an excess population of about five million in 1981. According to an estimate, at least 85% of this excess population could be foreign 33 nationals, if one allowed for even an abnormal rate of 15% for the excess increase of population due to influx of Indian citizens from other States.11 An early Act, THE IMMIGRANTS (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950, had this to say on the disturbing situation: 'During the last few months a serious situation had arisen from the immigration of a very large number of East Bengal residents into Assam. Such large migration is disturbing the economy of the province, besides giving rise to serious law and order problems. The Bill seeks to confer necessary powers on the Central Government to deal with the situation'12. But precious little was done to mitigate the effects of the unabated influx of foreign nationals. An official document of the Government of India acknowledged in 1963: 'Long before the cry of partition was heard in united India, the slow but steady encroachment of Assam and Tripura by immigrants from areas now in East Pakistan was already in progress. Partition came, and new international frontier were written across India ... Partition did not assuage the land hunger in east Pakistan. The new international boundary was not physically marked on the ground, was largely unguarded and virtually unpatrolled'13.The people of Assam became genuinely concerned over the continued influx of foreign nationals into the State thereby jeopardising their socio-economic life, national identity and distinctive Assamese identity posing, moreover, a grave menance to the security and integrity of India. After the Sixth Lok Sabha elections, the Chief Election Commissioner himself admitted at conference of Electoral Officers (24-26 September 1978, Otacamund) that the influx of a very large number of persons from the neighbouring countries had created an 'alarming situation' in one case, i.e. Assam, that influx had become a regular feature, and that 'on the basis of increase of 34.98 per cent between the two censuses (i.e., of 1961 and 1971), the increase that is likely to be recorded in the 1991 census would be more than 100 per cent over that of the 1961 census. In other words, a stage would be reached when the State may have to reckon with the foreign nationals who may, in all probability constitute a sizeable percentage, if not the majority of the population in the state'14.Infiltrators infiltrated into the voters' lists as well. The Chief Election Commissioner stated in 1978 that 'another disturbing factor in this regard is the demand made by the political parties for the inclusion in the electoral roles of the names of such migrants who are not Indian citizens, without even questioning and properly determining their citizenship status'.15 Ear her to this, the 1963 document of the Government of34 India had acknowledged the enlistment of foreigners in the electoral rolls: 'The fact is that the enlishment of foreigners in the voters' lists has at times taken place at the instance of politically interested persons or parties. Political parties have been known to take dubious steps to inflate the number of their supporters at the election time, and some undoubtedly used the illegal settlers from Pakistan towards this end . . . The mere fact that a persons name is, rightly or wrongly, inscribed on the voters' list does not prove or confer Indian nationality or citizenship. This legal position has been confirmed by decisions of the Supreme Court of India.16 A newspaper report at the beginning of 1979 showed: 'An offshoot of this population explosion has been a sudden change in the composition of the district's (Goalpara's) electorate. The immigrants are in absolute majority in seven of the nineteen Assembly constituencies in the district. In five more constituencies they are numerous enough to be crucial for an electoral victory. There is almost a similar transformation in the smaller border district like Cachar, which returns 15 legislators to the 126-member State Assembly!17. According to a UNI survey, the increase in the Assam electoral rolls in 1979 over the 1977 figures was 18.15%, the highest being in Tripura, 21.92%.18Nearly thirty years passed from the central Act of 1950, but the Government abdicated its constitutional and lawful responsibilities and hence, the people answered through the massive Assam Movement. People felt alarmed as a result of the frightful discovery of a large number of illegal migrants' names in the electoral rolls of the Mangaldoi parliamentary constituency19. There were also widespread popular feelings that certain national political parties having vested interests in the foreigners' vote banks were out to stall the process of detection of foreigners by raising the bogey of 'harassment of Indian citizens'. Anyway, the Mangaldoi proceedings served as a danger signal. It was that if in one consitutency thousand of illegal settlers could infiltrate also into the electoral rolls, there was certain peril about the fate of election in the State as a whole. Therefore, when the mid-term poll to the Seventh Lok Sabha was announced, the Assam Movement gathered momentum with the participation of different sections of people crossing all barriers of race, language or religion.It was left to the student community to raise the first voice of an organised movement when AASU submitted a 21-point Charter of Demands to the Assam Government on 21 February 1974: stopping the influx was one of the demands. Subsequently, in mid-1979, the Assam Movement35 began and it had its origins in the popular demand that the elections to the Seventh Lok Sabha in the fourteen parliamentary constituencies of Assam should be held only on the basis of a correct electoral roll deleting the names of illegal migrants. A tremendous rally of students, youths and other sections of the people resolved in Guwahati on 6 November 1979 not to allow the holding of elections in the State till the electoral rolls were revised excluding the names of all foreign nationals. AASU and AAGSP drew up a programme of peaceful agitation and during the days of Gana (mass) Satyagraha on 12-17 November 1979, over seven lakhs of persons from the age of eight to eighty courted arrest at Guwahati alone20. It was a mass upsurge of a substantial kind and it succeeded in stalling the elections in twelve out of fourteen parliamentary constituencies in Assam demanding the fulfilment of the three Ds-detection of foreign nationals, deletion of their names from the voters' lists and, their deportation acting within the framework of the country's Constitution and the laws. The elections could not be held in the twelve constituencies due mainly to gherao (encirclement) programme by the AASU-AAGSP volunteers at the residence of prospective candidates to prevent them peacefully from filing nominations. The death of a student leader (Khargeswar Talukdar) following police action on the morning of 10 December 1979, incidentally the 3lst anniversary day of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, made a tremendous change in the situation. But State violence failed to curb the mounting popular upsurge which expressed itself basically through peaceful protest movements. By 10 December 1979 even the all-India political parties, barring the Congress (I) and the CPI(M) which fielded candidates for the two parliamentary constituencies from Cachar district, had to call for postponement of the elections; on that day, again, the lone Chief Minister from the breakaway Janata Party (other Ministers from the breakaway group having resigned) and the Governor of Assam called upon the centre to postpone the elections. This was not done even when nominations could be filed for the two Cachar seats only. If the Centre could persuade itself even by 9 December 1979 to act in good faith, Assam would have been spared of all the suffering it had to undergo.IIIThe leadership of the Assam Movement learnt to combine mass actions with negotiations and when the new Government at the Centre was formed, AASU presented a comprehensive memorandum to the Prime36 Minister on 2 February 1980. After this, there followed detailed discussions with the Home Minister on 5-6 February. The Government expressed 'broad agreement in principle' in respect of the following demands:21 (i) Foreign nationals must be detected and deported from our country.(ii) (a) Names of foreign nationals must be removed from the concerned electoral rolls before holding any election in Assam, (b) Inclusion of foreign nationals' names in the electoral rolls in the future must be made impossible with the help of an adequate and strong election machinery.(iii) Border of India with neighbouring countries must be fully protected to effectively check infiltration,(iv) Indian voters residing in Assam must be issued Identity Cards with photographs affixed.(v) Necessary constitutional safeguards should be provided to the people of North Eastern region for the next 15/20 years by making necessary constitutional provisions for the protection of the identity of the indigenous population of this region.However, nothing concrete emerged in the years following the 1980 negotiations and several rounds of discussions thereafter involving also the national political parties in the form of tripartite talks. These talks were obviously used to serve as an eye-wash to prepare the ground for an imposed election on the people of Assam. And elections were announced on 6 January 1983 for the 126 Assembly and 12 Lok Sabha seats on the basis of the highly defective 1979 electoral rolls; apart from containing the names of a large number of illegal migrants, these rolls, being unrevised, deprived an estimated eight lakhs of genuine voters who came of voting age in 1993.The Central Government descended to the lower depths in imposing the elections on an unwilling people. The stage was prepared by detaining the leaders of the Movement immediately on their return from Delhi after participating in the deceptive negotiations for a settlement. The 1979 electoral rolls were validated for the so-called elections in 1983. The irregularities in holding the so-called elections have been widely commented upon in different quarters inside and outside the country. Never ever such an election farce was enacted anywhere to fulfil a so-called constitutional obligation. It was a strange election in which a majority37 of Indians in Assam stayed away from the imposed elections and in which a majority of non-Indians voted. It was an 'election' which could be conducted only by importing polling and other personnel including drivers for vehicles from outside the State. It was also a fraudulent election in that so-called MLAs could be elected, for instance, on the basis of 266 votes cast in one booth only: the reference is to the Dharampur constituency in Kamrup district with an electorate of 69,308; votes cast 267, invalid 1. Strange new draconian laws were enforced to conduct the so-called election. It was election at gun point with 64 battalions of paramilitary forces besides 11 regular Assam Police Battalions22.The 1983 election was a double imposition on the people of Assam, imposed election combined with imposed violence at the instance of the contesting political parties and vested interests. The violence took a toll of more than 3,000 men, women and children and the blood-stained elections were designed to do almost irreparable damage to the harmonious fabric of Assamese society. It is on record that the first victims of mass violence were the indigenous people at a place called Chamariya and it was followed by engineered election clashes at Gohpur between tribal Assamese and non-tribal Assamese. The security forces were there just to kill anti-election resisters and to do 'election duty. But if the authority for maintenance of law and order really intended to discharge their lawful duties, the tragedy at Nellie could have been averted. What mattered to the ruling party at the Centre was to somehow instal a Congress (I) ministry in Assam, no matter how many human lives were lost. Small wonder, then, that the overwhelming majority of the people of Assam never regarded the ministry headed by Shri Hiteswar Saikia as a legel one. Under mass pressure, many national political parties also demanded the dissolution of the State Assembly and dismissal of the so-called ministry. Another curious matter regarding the 1983 election was that it could not just be held in 17 Assembly constituencies, in one it was countermanded and, out of the twelve parliamentary constituencies, results of five constituencies only could be declared. Thus, the 'election' was just 'completed' keeping the nation in the dark about how and in what manner it was completed.The young leadership of the Assam Movement displayed rare maturity in judgement in dealing with the nightmarish situation. It suspended the agitation programme in the supreme interest of restoring peace and harmony shattered so very rudely by the evils of the imposed election, and to restore the academic atmosphere which stood vitiated by the induction of security forces into the educational campuses as part of the nefarious 38 game to force an unwanted election. At the same time the Movement gave top priority to organising relief and rehabilitation programmes. These matched the sweep in a very substantial manner of the massive Movement itself. Further, organisational efforts were continued to consolidate the gains of the Movement in terms of popular response.IVA natural product of the Assam Movement, AGP's origins are to be traced to a series of conscious steps taken by AASU constituting the Movement Supreme leadership. It was at AASU's instance that the first National Convetion representing different sections of people met on the Campus of the Assam Agricultural University at Jorhat on 10-11 January 1984. Resolution no. 8 of this Convention recommended to the next Convention to take appropriate steps with a view to organising the masses politically in keeping with the needs of the time. A comprehensive programme was necessary to give form and content to the new national need of the people of Assam, harassed as they were by a set of usurpers foisted through the 1983 non-election. Thus, on the eve of Assam's national festival, the Bohag Bihu, a multi-dimensional Workshop was organised by AASU on, the campus of the Gauhati University in April 1984. Its purpose was to draft a Programme covering all aspects, socio-economic, educational, political and cultural, in order that the new regional political force that was due to be launched could be armed with a definitive mission to fulfil.The Report of the section of the Workshop devoted to a consideration of political, constitutional and legal issues served as a preface to the Draft Programme. It underlined the point that Assam's most massive Movement was on in the interest of preserving the unity and integrity of the country, and that experiences gained through the Movement had convinced the Assamese people in no uncertain terms that preservation of the distinctive identity of the people of Assam served the cause of both maintaining the unity and integrity of the country and making the concept of unity in diversity more meaningful. The people of Assam desired a federal state in which the Centre should have control over such matters as defence, foreign affairs, communications, foreign trade, currency, economic coordination, etc., and that the rest of the subjects should be entrusted to the care of States with autonomous powers; it was desired that the Constitution be subjected to a fundamental overhaul. Assam seeks to have appropriate control and authority over the use of the natural39 resources in the interest of the State and the country, it being noted that healthy regionalism and recognition of the legitimate aspirations of sub-nationalism i.e., the aspirations of India's multi-lingual and multi-cultural people with a number of major and minor nationalities and the tribal people are in perfect accord with the ethos of Indian nationalism as it had emerged through the Freedom Movement. The composite culture of the people of Assam is a unique example of fraternal solidarity among various sections of people with their distinctive status and identity: all sections are to be afforded full opportunities of development in terms of their native genius and needs of modern development. Shining in its own glory, Assam seeks to have its rightful place as an integral part of India.Further, based on a just recognition of the legitimate rights of the Assamese nationality,-political, economic and cultural, Assam seeks to have its rightful place as a strong and equal partner in the Republic of India based on the principles of democracy, socialism and secularism. With this end in view, the Draft Programme listed a number of long-term and short-term objectives to be pursued by the upcoming regional political organisation23.The second National Convention held in November 1984 on the campus of the Assam Agricultural University discussed in plenary session the various sectional reports of the Workshop held at the Gauhati University and approved of the Draft Programme with certain minor amendments and additive suggestions in order that the Programme could be one for the overall regeneration of Assamese society. This Programme was to lay the basis for the preparation in course of time the Constitution and Election Manifesto of the AGP.The Jorhat Convention appointed an eleven-member Preparatory Committee and charged it with the responsibility of organising a National Convention designed to given organisational shape to the regional political force as envisaged at the first Convention. It was aimed at completing the process of political unification of various ethnic groups of the Assamese nationality for achieving its rightful place in an India which should be a real federation of States. In a very real sense the Assam Movement was the product of political organisation at the grassroots; the process of political socialisation was noticeably furthered during the course of the Movement and it produced its own dynamics. Further the case of conflict between a regional party and the goal of national unity has not been proved24. In any case, the AGP was to be regional party with a national outlook.40 VMeanwhile, the people of Assam were not taken in by the antics of the illegal regime imposed through the 1983 'elections' and the popular movement proceeded apace in various forms of peaceful protest despite the continuance of a whole series of draconian laws and almost near-permanent imposition of the prohibitory order in practically all places. The National Convention proceedings formed part of the Movement and the Central Government felt compelled to resume the negotiations for a settlement of the problem. Thus, formal discussions were resumed in March 1985 and a settlement was reached on the issue in Assam in the early hours of 15 August 1985 in the form of the now famous Assam Accord.The Memorandum of Settlement (the Assam Accord) recited in the prefatory part as to how the Centre was 'fully alive to the genuine apprehensions of the people of Assam' and having kept in view 'all aspects of the problem including constitutional and legal provisions, international agreements, national commitments and humanitarian considerations', the following provisions were agreed upon on the Foreigners Issue:1. For purposes of detection and deletion of foreigners, 1.1.1966 shall be the base data and year.2. All persons who came to Assam prior to 1.1. 1966, including those amongst those whose names appeared on the electoral rolls used in 1967 elections, shall be regularised.3. Foreigners who came to Assam after 1.1.1966 (inclusive) and up to 24 March 1971 shall be detected in accordance with the provisions of the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964.4. Names of foreigners so detected will be deleted from the electoral rolls in force. Such persons will be required to register themselves before the Registration Officer of the respective districts in accordance with the provisions of the Registration of Foreigners Act, 1939 and the Registration of Foreigners Rules, 1939.5. For this purpose, Government of India will undertake suitable strengthening of the government machinery.6. On the expiry of a period of ten years following the date of detection the names of all such persons which have been deleted from the electoral rolls shall be restored.41 7. All persons who were expelled earlier, but have since re-entered illegally into Assam, shall be expelled.8. Foreigners who came to Assam on or after 25 March 1971 shall continue to be detected, deleted and expelled in accordance with law. Immediate practical steps shall be taken to expel such foreigners. 9. The Government will give due consideration to certain difficulties expressed by AASU/AAGSP regarding the implementation of the illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunals) Act, 1983. As for Safeguards and Economic Development, the Assam Accord stated that 'constitutional, legislative and administrative safeguards, as may be appropriate, shall be provided to protect, preserve and promote the cultural, social linguistic identity and heritage of the Assamese people'. Having reviewed the Government's commitment for speedy all round economic development of Assam in the interest of improving the standard of living of the people, the Accord stated that special exphasis would be placed on 'education and science and technology through establishment of national institutions'.Among Other Issues, it was agreed that the Govenment would arrange for the issue of citizenship certificate in future only by the authorities of the Central Government; that specific complaints that might be made by AASU/AAGSP about irregular issuance of Indian Citizenship Certificates (ICC) would be looked into; that the international border would be made secure against future infiltration by erection of appropriate physical barriers at relevant places; that patrolling by security forces on land and riverine routes would be adequately intensified and an adequate number check posts would be set up; that a road all along the international border would be constructed so as to faciltiate patrolling by security forces and land between border and the road would be kept free of human habitation, wherever possible; that 'it will be ensured that relevant laws for prevention of encroachment of government lands and lands in tribal belts and blocks are strictly enforced and unauthorised encroachers evicted as laid down under such laws'; that the relevant law restricting acquisition of immovable property by foreigners in Assam would be strictly enforced and, that Birth and Death Registers would be duly maintained.25 As a part of restoration of normalcy, AASU and AAGSP agreed to call off the agitation. As for their part, the Central and State Governments agreed to review with sympathy and withdraw cases of disciplinary action taken against employees during the period of the Movement,42 frame a scheme for ex-gratia payment to the next of kin of those who were killed in the course of the agitation, give sympathetic consideration to the matter of relaxation of upper age limit for employment in public services in Assam having regard to the exceptional circumstances obtaining during the period of the agitation, undertake a review of detention cases and to consider withdrawal of prohibitory orders/notifications in force. It was agreed that the Ministry of Home Affairs would be the nodal Ministry for the implementation of the above measures.The Assam Accord was a very comprehensive settlement and if the Centre acted in good faith, it bade fair to bring about peace and normalcy in the State. The Assam Movement was called off following the Accord and as a part of political decision, it was agreed that the Assam Assembly would be dissolved. The leadership of the Movement was, however, very unhappy about the Centre's decision to allow Shri Hiteswar Saikia to remain as caretaker Chief Minister after the Assembly was dissolved. The AASU President of the day, Shri Prafulla Kumar Mahanta frankly stated that they continued to regard the so-called Chief Minister as a political usurper as a result of the 1983 farce of an election, and that henceforth prior to the coming elections following the Assam Accord, all communications between the Movement leaders and the Centre would be made through the Assam Governor and the Chief Secretary26.In view of the impending elections, AASU and AAGSP demanded appropriate revision of the electoral rolls and the Union Home Minister declared in Parliament on 16 August 1985 that the Election Commission was being requested to ensure preparation of fair electoral rolls, that the time for settlement of claims and objections would be extended by 30 days and that the Election Commission would be requested to send Central Observers. Further, the Home Minister announced that in order to accelerate the industrial and educational development, the Government of India agreed to establish an oil refinery in Assam with provision of assistance in terms of institutional and Bank finance, render full assistance to the State Government to re-open the Ashok Paper Mill and Jute Mills and to the establishment of an I.I.T. in Assam. He expressed the hope that the Assam Accord would usher in an era of harmony, goodwill and prosperity for the people of Assam27.The post-Accord situation in Assam was a demonstrative spectacle of mass euphoria over the victory of the Assam Movement after six long years of struggle in which hundreds laid down their lives as martyrs. It has long been a tradition with all public functions in Assam to begin the proceedings on every occasion with homage to the martyrs. And hundreds43 of meetings were held in different places of Assam to accord a rousing reception to the leaders returning from Delhi after signing the Accord. Two charismatic leaders stood out most prominently, AASU President Prafulla Kumar Mahanta and Bhrigu Kumar Phukan, AASU General Secretary. They were verily the idols of the masses and other leaders of the Movemement were also lustily cheered whenever they appeared in public platforms. The pre-election mass rallies were evidence enough of the fact that the masses had voted with their feet, as it were, for a party that was yet to be born. The stage was now set for the National Political Convetion at Golaghat on 12-14 October 1985. AASU leaders formally resigned from the student body since as an organisation it could not have any affiliation with any political party. But it goes without saying that student and youth power was to form the bedrock of the new regional political party.VIThe Asom Gana Parishad was born on 14 October 1985 with the adoption of the draft Constitution for the Party as prepared by the Preparatory Committee formed at the second National convention held at Jorhat It was to be working Constitution till a finalised draft would be adopted at the first general session at the State level to be held later on. The Golaghat Convention appointed a subcommittee with Shri Bhrigu Kumar Phukan as Convener to consider all amendments and suggestions and to prepare a report for consideration of the Central Executive committee and final approval at the proposed general session.In view of the impending elections, certain interim measures were taken. The Golaghat Convention elected a six member Presidium with Shri Prafulla Kumar Mahanta as the Chief President and with Shri Bhrigu Kumar Phukan as one of the General Secretaries of the newly formed AGP. It may be noted that the AAGSP, and among these were the small regional parties of the day which associated themselves with the Assam Movement, i.e., the Purbanchaliya Lok Parishad (PLP) and the Asom Jatiyatabadi Dal; the Asam Sahitya Sabha, Asam Yuvak Samaj, all Assam Yuvachatra Parishad, Plains Tribal Council (Brahma Group), Karbi Parishad, and All Assam Tribal Association were also component parts of the AAGSP. It was to accommodate all groups and sections that the Golaghat Convention decided to elect a Presidium for the new party and to have several General Secretaries, as an interim measure. It was, however, unanimously agreed at the Convention that in future there would44 be only one President for the AGP. AGP's doors were made open to all Indian citizens who are permanent settlers in Assam, the minimum age for membership being 18 years. The Convention also elected a sizeable Central Executive Committee to launch the career of the new party through the elections and thereafter till such time as a regular conference would elect new office bearers.The Constitution sub-committee as appointed by the Golaghat Convention held a series of meetings and submitted its report containing several amendments to the draft. The Central Executive committee in its meeting held at Guwahati on 2-3 September 1986 accepted the recommendations, and the revised Constitution was to be placed before the State level general conference of the AGP for approval. It was expected to be a formality only since all points of view had already been considered at the Golaghat Convention and subsequently.The aims and objectives of the AGP under its revised draft Consti-tution were as under28.1. Establishment of a progressive society free from exploitation and based on political equality, economic development and social justice.2. To work for the achievement of secularism, democracy and socialism, to strive for peace, progress and social harmony and integration and to promote these causes among the people.3. To secure more rights for the State in a real federal Union.4. Full utilisation of Assam's natural resources in the interest of allround benefit for the people and on that basis to strive for strengthening the State's economic foundations.5. Protection of forests and reserved areas and adoption of measures for cultivation of fallow lands to increase productivity.6. Balanced agricultural and industrial development and extension of special benefits to indigenous cultivators and local entrepreneurs,7. To provide for full protection of the interests of local candidates in all matters of employment8. Restructuring of the State's Plan so that the benefits of a planned economy serve the interests of the poorest sections of the society and thus ensure maximum welfare for the people of Assam.9. Protection of the interests of local peasantry and workers by revising land laws and policy relating to industries.10. Equal opportunities for all in the field of education, introduction of employment-oriented educational courses, and ensuring autonomy in the field of higher education.45 11. Strengthening understanding and goodwill among different ethnic groups and sections of people, and adoption of all measures for the development of all indigenous languages, art and culture.12. Extension of health care facilities to the poorest sections also through decentralisation of public health service measures.13. To accelerate the pace of rural development by making improvement in the fields of transport and communication.14. Promotion of the scientific temper in the society in order to keep pace with future industrial development and for all this, to lay emphasis on science and technology.15. In order that national and international problems could be faced appropriately, to seek to extend cooperation with all democratic, secular and such other political parties as are opposed to regional imbalance and respect the legitimate rights of small nationalities; such cooperation would depend on the merits of the issues.16. To seek to build up unity in action with all like minded parties of the north-eastern States for facing problems of common concern.17. To adopt all measures to realise in practice the constitutional safe guards provided for in the Constitution for all comparatively backward people including S.C/S.T. categories irrespective of their habitation in hills or plains areas.The AGP's Constitution provides for two types of members - Primary Member and Active Member. A candidate or primary member could earn the rights as an active member by active participation continuously in the party's activities for not less than a year. Active members only could be chosen as office bearers. The organisational structure is patterned after the three-tier Panchayat system-Gaon Sabha in village panchayat areas, Anchalik (area, region) Sabha in Anchalik Panchayat areas, and Zila (District) Sabha in Zila Panchayat areas. At the apex there is the Central Executive Committee of 17 members elected by the Kendriya (Central) Sabha. The revised Constitution provides for one President and two General Secretaries29.VIIThe AGP fought the 1985 General Election to the Assam Legislative Assembly with a short ELECTION MANIFESTO reciting the well-known positions of the Assam Movement and with a programme of action in line with the aims and objectives of the parry's Constitution. Implementation 46 of the Assam Accord was the Central issue on which it sought the support of the State's electorate. Stating that keeping the Assam Accord in view it wanted to seek a permanent solution to the problem of infiltration of foreigners, the AGP's Election Manifesto pledged that AGP was 'determined to take effective measures to preserve peace and amity among all sections of the people living in Assam. While doing all this, AGP guarantees that no Indian irrespective of language or religion shall suffer in the least in any manner. AGP is determined to provide full security to every citizen irrespective of his/her language or religion'30.The elections assumed the proportions of a veritable referendum. Arrayed against the AGP were the all-India political parties. A new factor in the situation was the formation of the United Minorities Front (UMF) by sections of religious or linguistic minorities. If implementation of the Assam Accord was the major plank of the AGP, the UMF made scrapping the Accord its chief election issue. The parties in opposition to the AGP tried their hands in elections many a time while the overwhelming majority of AGP candidates were new not only to elections but to politics as well.It lay in the logic of the situation that the AGP should win to become Assam's young, new ruling party. It came to power riding on a wave of Assamese sub nationalism which took good care of the interests of the sections of people. A spectacular 85% of the electorate participated in the election. AGP won in 72 constituencies and Shri Prafulla Kumar Mahanta was returned from two constituencies with impressive majorities. Mahanta later on vacated one seat and it was an AGP candidate who won from that constituency, Kaliabor, with a still larger majority. Incidentally, the AGP won again in another bye-election, i.e., Golok-ganj, with a larger majority.AGP's appeal was not restricted to Assamese-speaking population alone, although among them support for it was near total. AGP's popular vote was 35.17%, victories in two bye-elections would increase the figure. The UMF secured 17 seats with a popular vote of 11.09%. The Congress (I) won 25 seats, Congress (S) 4, and CPI(M) 3 seats while the CPI, BJP and the Janata Party drew a blank. All this shows that AGP's support extended well beyond the ethnic Assamese.Falsifying the predictions of an interesting number of poll analysts, AGP won in tribal areas, tea gardens and also in areas of immigrant Muslims which constituted the vote banks of the Congress (I) all throughout these years. AGP won the major tribal constituencies in Kokrajhar district; besides winning in the autonomous district of hilly Karbi Anglong,47 it bagged seats in the plains tribal areas in Lakhimpur, Sonitpur and Dar-rang. Plantation workers in tea gardens, traditional voters for the Congress (I), chose this time to return AGP candidates. AGP won the prestigious Barpeta Parliamentary seats where immigrant Bengali Muslims constitute a sizeable section of the electorate. All this serve to indicate that AGP's support was more broad-based than most analysts had anticipated. Much was made of the tribal antipathy towards the AGP: the results falsified such interested misinformation. Protection of tribal interests found a place in the Assam Accord and, one of the first measures of the AGP Government headed by Prafulla Kumar Mahanta was to issue orders stopping alienation of tribal lands.The victories of parties other than the AGP in the election in a number of constituencies showed the division among various groups of Assam's population. While the AGP could project a national image embracing support from all sections of people, the UMF and CPI(M) succeeded in gaining support in areas where the linguistic or religious minorities predominate. The Plains Tribal Council of Assam (PTCA) also succeeded to attract tribal voters in some constituencies. While this was part of the election game, it also showed how geographically distinct areas in Assam have their particularist identity.The erstwhile student leaders from AASU, in the main, formed the AGP Government. But AASU has retained its old identity. It remains an independent student organisation which has succeeded in winning popular acclaim as a national organisation of the people of Assam. It was the major force in leading the Assam Movement, in creating a regional political party in the form of AGP. After the elections it resumed its traditional role and it has not hesitated in criticising the AGP Government on a number of issues. AASU has also been functioning as a pressure group. It is also serving as a body keeping constant vigil over the activities of the Government it had brought into existence through painstaking efforts. AASU has threatened a new stir over the issue of full implementation of the Assam Accord. The new Government has fulfilled most of its responsibilities under the Assam Accord and the failure so far of the Central Government has retarded the process of full implementation. The new Government's performance in terms of its promises under the Election Manifesto deserves a separate study. But suffice it to say that the AGP Government has basically retained its popularity and there is no viable alternative to it in the forseable future.AGP is a new party and its leaders are new in politics. Although young, they became seasoned champions of popular causes during the course of the Assam Movement. Some of them developed a sort of charisma48 around them in quite a short period of time due basically to their simplicity and tenacity of purpose. Most of the young leaders are drawn from urban middle class 'or rural middle class families. All the Ministers and MLAs of AGP at one time or the other were behind the bars during the period of the agitation. Out of the 109 AGP candidates in the Assembly election, only four of them ever contested elections earlier. Another quality of these young leaders is that almost all of them are highly educated, many of them being graduates or Master Degree holders. The Assam Legislative Assembly is probably the most educated legislative body in the whole country in terms of having Degree holders as MLAs. Over two dozen MLAs were still registered as students while they became MLAs; the Chief Minister himself was a student, then in LL.M. classes.A point of criticism arose in certain quarters about the very small number of women MLAs from AGP. The women of Assam played a very active role in the Movement and, yet, there are only two AGP MLAs from among women, one of them being a Cabinet Minister. AGP leaders explained that not many women came forward to seek election.In contrast to young AGP MLAs, the AGP sent a comparatively senior team to the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha and among AGP's Rajya Sabha members, one is a woman.Finally, it is worthwhile to note that while most of the conventional politicians being seniors have some thing to fall back upon as a profession, it appears that AGP's young leaders have to look upon politics as a full time career with little else to fall back upon. They have three to four decades of active life or politics before them, generally speaking. The natural instinct of survival could lead them on a steady course in fulfilment of their cherished objectives.NOTES&REFERENCES1. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture Boston, Little Brown, 1965, p. 122. Cf. C.S. Mullan, Census of India, 1931, Vol. HI: Assam, Part I Report p. 45.3. Ibid. pp. 49-50, 51.4. Ibid, p.525. The Assam Land Revenue Manual, Volume I, 8th edn. Introduction, p.iv.6. Penderal Moon, (ed.), Wavell: The Viceroy's Journal (Oxford University Press, London, 1973) p,42.7. Cf. Political History of Assam, Vol. Ill 1940-47 (Govt of Assam Gauhati, 1980), Chapter V; also, Appendix J, Ibid., and D.G. Tendulkar, Mahatma: Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi Vol.7, pp.286-88.8. From Nehru Papers at Nehru Memorial Library, New Delhi.49 9. Census of India 1971. Series-3 Assam Part I-A General Report, p. 47.10. There was no census in Assam due to the Assam Movement.11. From Indian Citizens vs. foreign Nationals: Memorandum to the Prime Minister of India by Asom Jagriti, 25 January 1980, 0.10.12. From statement of Objects and Reasons for the Bill.13. Influx; Infiltration from East Pakistan, Published by DAVP, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, for Ministry of External Affairs, Govt. of India, and printed at Albion Press, Delhi (3.3.63--p HI) Aug. 1963. 14. Quoted, Invasion in Disguise: The problem of Foreign infiltration into Assam (Co-ordination Committee of GU Teachers' Association, May 1980).15. Ibid.16. Vide fn. 13 above.17. The Statesman (Calcutta), 16 January, 1979.18. Ibid., 5 December, 1979.19. For details, see Debo Prasad Barooah, "Mid-Term Poll to The Seventh Lok Sabha and Assam", in Man&Development (Chandigarh), March 1981, pp. 65-75. For a more detailed study of the entire problem of foreign nationals issues see also the same author's entry of Silent Civilian Invasion: India's Danger in the North-East in B.L. Abdi (ed.) Northeast Region; Problems and Prospects of Development (Centre for Research in Rural and Industrial Development Chandigarh, 1984), pp. 287-300.20. The Assam Tribune (Gauhati), 7 November 1979; See also Debo Prasad Barooah, "The Assam Problem: An analysis" in Interdiscipline (Varanasi), Vol. 15, No. 2, 81-93.21. Chief Secretary to the Government of Assam, Letter No. PLA 937/80 of 11.2.80.22. For some details, see article in Interdiscipline by Barooah, f.n. 20 above. For a detailed analysis of the 1983 election results, see Truth Unfold: Fraudulent means cannot bury truths, published by AASU.23. From cyclostyled document of the Workshop, in Assamese. In this connection, for a background study of the ethos of the Assam Movement, see Anuradha Dutta's entry on Indian Nationalism and the Crisis of Identity of the Assamese Nationality: A study of the Assam Movement, in H.A.H. Haqqi, (ed)., Democracy, Pluralism and Nation Building (N.B.O. Publishers' Distributors, Delhi, 1984).24. Cf. Sanjib Baruah, "Lessons of Assam", in Economic&Political Weekly (Bombay),25. Text of the Assam Accord, published by DAVP, Ministry of Information&Broadcasting, Govt. of India, August, 1985.26. The Sentinel (Guwahati), Special Issue, 15 August, 1985.27. In text of the Assam Accord, f.n. 25 above.28. Gana Batori, Organ of AGP in Assamese, 1-15 October 1986.29. Ibid.30. From Election Manifesto of Asam Gana Parishad, in Assamese.50 51 GENESIS OF ASOM GANA PARISHADGirin PhukonThe emergence of Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) in 1985 is a significant political development of the Northeastern region in particular and in the country in general. It was formed just 67 days before Assam Legislative Assembly elections held in December 1985. By securing 67 seats in the 126-member Assembly, the AGP grabbed power in Assam defeating the Congress (I) which could secure only 25 seats. Although, it may seem that the AGP is the result of anti foreigner movement (1979-85), its origin may be traced back even earlier to this. There has been a long history of struggle of the Assamese people for their distinct, socio-cultural and political identity which virtually started since the twenties of this century. In fact, the anti foreigner movement is the latest phase of this struggle. Therefore, any worthwhile study of the genesis of the AGP should proceed from a discussion on the problem of immigration into Assam and growth of regional sentiment which ultimately led to the anti-foreigner movement. More importantly, it is necessary to show how and why the movement grew out of an apprehension that the Assamese would be swamped politically, culturally and economically by the non-Assamese Indians (Bahiragata : coming from outside) and particularly immigrants from Bangladesh and Nepal. In view of this, the paper is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the problem of immigration into Assam which created the anti-foreigner movement. The second part deals with the process of organising the Assamese people politically in a bid to capture political power of the state, which ultimately culminated in the formation of the AGP.IThere had been a continuous flow of non-Assamese Indians into Assam52 ever since the British occupation. In fact, in order to run the imperialist administration, clerks and officers familiar with the system of company administration were brought by the British from outside the province. Moreover, they imported a large number of working hands to work in tea plantation, transport, road construction, oil field and coal mines. A certain number of other people also came within this flow to fill the various demands of colonial economic development. A large majority of the Assamese people, like most other traditional societies, were agriculturists and most of them looked down upon wage labour i.e. working for others. At the same time, it is also a fact that like many other societies, the Assamese caste tradition did not look with favour at the low-graded professions such as barbers, washermen, shoe-makers etc. Therefore, the tea garden labourers and other manual labourers (in our time the Rickshaw pullers) came to Assam from other parts of India. The Marwaris and few Biharis came to fill the necessities of trade and business created by the opportunities of economic expansion under the British rule. Thus as a result of immigration, gradually there developed small townships, mostly peopled by middle class elements from outside the province to cater to the growing need of administration and trade1. Since the late nineteenth century the Assamese middle class became unhappy with all these developments and felt anxiety for this. They had to face keen competition in their own home even for jobs and in the field of petty trade and business, with their counterpart of the immigrant communities.More importantly, to the growing and aspiring Assamese middle class, the "Bengali" have appeared as an obstacle to their economic and cultural advancement As the Bengali Hindus were among the first social groups in India to learn English, they could move into administrative positions and then entered the modern professions. By the beginning of the 20th century the Doctors, lawyers, teachers, journalists, clerks and officers in railways and the officers of Assam Government have been mostly the Bengalis. Another factor which helped the Bangalis to grab public offices and professions was that the British introduced the Bengali language, in place of the Assamese as the official language of the province in 1837 and it remained so for nearly half a century. Although, the Assamese language was introduced in the schools of Assam in 1873, the Bengalis continued to have separate Bengali Schools and they were not inclined to adopt Assamese as their medium of instruction. Together with the Bengali Hindu elite, the Muslim immigrants from Bengal also demanded equal rights for the Bengali language. Thus, Matiur Rahman53 Mia, who presented the views of Muslim immigrants in Assam Legislative Assembly, pleaded:We are Bengalis, our mother tongue is Bengali... Under the circumstances if this Assamese language be imposed as a new burden on our shoulders, on our children's shoulders and if we are deprived of our mother-tongue, then that will amount to depriving our children from opportunities of education2.Similarly, the third session of the Assam Domiciled and Settlers' Association (Renamed as Assam Citizen's Association) which championed the views of the Bengali middle class in Assam, held at Now gong on 24 March 1940 reiterated the demand for equal citizenship rights and education through the medium of one's mother-tongue3. But the Assamese elite wanted that Bengali should learn Assamese and assimilate with the Assamese culture. The question of language got tied up with the economic issues, which, therefore, got highly politicized. Economically, the business of Assam was controlled by the Europeans and the Marwaris. Though numerically small, the Marwaris are the most visible of the migrant communities in Assam, dominating trade, commerce banking and credit. As stated earlier, the Bengali had largely captured the petty trades, clerical and other jobs and professions like law and medicine. In fact, position of influence and profit which the Assamese elite wished to hold were in large part in Bengalis' hand. It is interesting to note that although the Marwaris and the Europeans exploited the Assamese economically, the Assamese elite did not feel the pinch of their dominance as much as that of the Bengalis. This was due to the fact that the former did not pose a socio-cultural threat to the Assamese as the Bengalis did. In any case, the Assamese elite who were late in coming to commercial and industrial fields found themselves greatly handicapped and hence they developed an antisense of deprivation.This situation became more critical with the penetration of the Bengali immigrants from Bengal, particularly from the district of Mymen singh into the rural interiors of the Province. These immigrants came mainly to settle on agricultural land. So rapid and large was the immigration that C.S. Muslan, a British Census Commissioner, commented in his Census Report of 1931 that immigration was "likely to alter permanently the whole future of Assam and to destroy more surely than the Burmese invaders of 1820 the whole structure of Assamese culture and civilization"4. During the late thirties and early forties a new element emerged leading to large scale immigration. After 1926 the Provincial government of Assam was mostly dominanted by the Muslim54 League. The Assamese elite complained that the Muslim League Ministry led by Muhammad Saadulla adopted a policy of encouraging East Bengal Muslims to come to Assam with the design of increasing the ratio of Muslim popluation in Assam,5 As a part of this policy, the Muslim League Ministry adopted a "Land Development Scheme" and a "colonisation scheme". According to the former scheme wasteland was to be distributed among the immigrants thereby enabling them to grow more food. Under the colonisation scheme, the government of Assam assumed to itself the responsibility to settle the immigrants in a planned way in selected places. The first colonisation scheme was started in Nowgong in 1928 and it was followed by Borpeta and Mangaldoi sub-divisions. The areas alloted to 1,619 Muslims and 441 Hindu immigrant families under Nowgong Scheme alone amounted to 47,636 acres till March, 1933.6 During the six years preceding 1936 as many as 59 grazing forest and village reserve had been thrown open in Nowgong under the colonisation scheme for settling the immigrants7. It appeared to the Assamese elite that the Saadulla government was following as champion of the Assamese middle class. The Assam Tribune had aptly put it, a completely anti-Assamese policy"8 As a result, there was a tremendous influx of the Muslim population in the Brahmaputra valley districts (including the Gar Hills) during the period between 1911-1941. This may be shown, as follows9.Year Muslim Population 1911 3,55320 1921 5,85,943 1931 943352 1941 13,63,962 Thus the increase of the Muslim population in the province caused much anxiety to the Assamese elite. They began to believe that the Assamese would in due course, be swamped by the Muslim immigrants and mat their Province would be converted into a Muslim majority province.Since the Muslim immigrants happened to be Bengalis, their linguistic affinity with the Bengali Hindus, further gave a numerical push to the Bengali population in the province. It posed a "threat" to the socio-cultural and even political identity of the Assamese. After the partition of the country, the streams of Hindu Bengali refugees flowed into Assam from the erstwhile East Pakistan (Now Bangladesh) which further rein-55 forced this "threat". The 1951 Census Report showed the number of refugees in Assam as 274,455.10 It naturally accessperated the apprehensions of the Assamese elite that they would be swamped by the Bengalis and would have "detrimental political consequences"11. They further believed that they had been caught between the two fires: (i) there were the Muslim immigrants whose hearts would always lie in Pakistan; (ii) there were then the Hindu refugees who wanted to overwhelm the province and "Bengalize" it.12 Thus the migration into Assam, particularly, from Bengal had two major socio-political dimensions: it (i) began to increase the numerical strength of the Muslims in the province which threatened the dominant position of the Assamese Hindu elite; and (ii) created the Assamese-Bengalis tension on the issue of linquo-cultural question.Even after the inaguration of the Republic, the immigrants from erstwhile East Pakistan continued unabated and these dimensions of immigrants still continued to be a factor in Assam politics. It appears that the period 1951-1971 is marked by significant increases in the growth rate of population. In 1951, the decadal increase in population was 19.94 which shot up to 34.97 in 1961 and 34.95 in 1971. The corresponding all-India figures for these years are 13.31, 21.64 and 24.80%.13 Therefore, it is believed that the higher rate of growth of population in Assam cannot be explained only in items of the natural rate of growth but also has to be explained in terms of large-scale immigration from outside the state. (Particularly from Bangladesh). Mention may be made that in the wake of Bangladesh war of 1971-72, several lakhs of Bengali immigrants poured into Assam but after the war was over, only a few of them returned home. The Assamese Hindu who happen to be the dominant group in the Brahmaputra valley feel that the overwhelming large number of infiltrators have threatened to impair the demographic balance of the State, and upset the socio-cultural equilibrium even to the extent of obliterating the identity of the local people.14 It is assumed that the immigrant community constitutes one of the important vote banks in the state and thus it determines the trend of Assam politics. A section of the dominant Assamese elite even fear that if the Muslim immigrants become the dominant group in Assam in the years to come, a day may come when they might demand Assam's secession from India. Some suspect that Bangladesh has deliberately been conspiring to send large number of people in order to change the communal ratio in the State in the hope of justifying the annexation of Assam by Bangladesh15. Thus an Assamese gentry asserted:56 "The massive infitration is in reality a silent invasion, with the sinister conspiratorial design of turning Assam in the near future into a predominantly Bengali speaking, Muslim majority state, and on that ground annexing it to Bangladesh"16.In fact, the growing number of migrants in Assam are viewed by a large section of the Assamese people as a threat to their socio-cultural, political and economic life. Linguistically, Assam is now the most diversified state in India. It may be noted that 57 per cent of its population speaks Assamese; and 16 per cent speaks one of the local tribal language. Bengali, the language of Bangaladesh and West Bengal, is the mother-tongue of 17.4 per cent of the population. Hindi, the lauguage of migrants from Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan is spoken by 4.3 per cent of the population17. Economically, the Assamese elite feel a sense of insecurity from the point of view of what they call "economic exploitation" by the out-siders. It may be noted that the modern sinews of life such as employment, trade, business etc. are largely in the hands of the non-Assamese residents of Assam. The scope for government jobs is limited, the economic infrastructure for industrialization is grossly inadequate and land and forest are not adequately used for the economic development of the State18. Whatever employment opportunities are available, the educated Assamese middle class have to face keen competition from the non-Assamese. The non-Assamese middle class not only have much greater earnings, but their style of living stands in sharp contrast to that of the Assamese counterpart which in turn only helps to increase bitterness. The aspiring Assamese middle class therefore, considers some of the immigrant communities as a substantial 'threat' to their economic advancement. They feel that if immigration from Bangladesh, Nepal and other parts of India remains unchecked and economic backwardness of the state is not be removed, the Assamese people would soon lose their distinct identity. The movement on the issue of Foreign Nationals has been the manifestation of this anxiety. The issue of expulsion of the foreign nationals was first taken up by the All Assam Student's Union (hereinafter AASU) in July, 1979 as one of its sixteen-point charter of demands. In the meantime two regional parties, the Purbanchaliya Loka Parishad (PLP) and the Asom Jatiyatabadi Dal (AJD) were formed in 1977 and 1978 respectively which also took up the issue of the foreign nationals. At the official level, this problem was higlighted for the first time by the Chief Election Commissioner, Mr S.L. Shakdhar on 24 October 1978 in a conference of the State electoral officers. He observed, "The large scale inclusion of foreign nationals 57 (in electoral rolls) in some states especially in the northeastern region was alarming and requires drastic action".19 Speaking in the same strain the Janata Party Chief Minister, Mr. Golap Borbora declared in the Assam Assembly on 16 March 1979 that influx of foreign nationals was assuming alarming proportions and that his government had taken a firm stand in the matter20. The movement on this issue virtually started from April 1979 when a by-election to the Lok Sabha in the Mangaldoi constitutency was ordered21. The movement was spearheaded by the AASU and the All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad22 (AAGSP). To begin with the three main issues were raised viz., detecting the foreign infiltrators (mostly from erstwhile east Pakistan, now Bangladesh, and to some extent from Nepal), deleting their names from the voters' list and deporting them from the country. It needs mention that in 1978 and 1979 the terms "bedeshi" (foreigners) and bahiragata (outsider) were used interchangeably. These terms not only covered non-Indian, but also those Indians who had come to Assam from other parts of the country. Later on the Asom Sahitya Sabha the intellectual wing and the seniormost constituent of the AAGSP, intervened to narrow down the meaning of the term 'foreign nationals to the post-1951 immigrants from foreign countries with questionable citizenship status and this got wide acceptance amongst the other constituents of the movement23. In fact, it was a major tactical shift. In any case, the movement created tension throughout the Brahmaputra valley and normal life was paralysed in all the plains districts of Assam except Cachar. Meanwhile, when the movement leaders called upon the people to boycott the election of 1983, the chauvinism and communalism made the issue more complicated24. Most of the regional press made significant contribution in mobilising the public in this direction.IIAs the anti-foreigner movement got its momentum, the movement leaders and their supporters increasingly felt the need for a regional party capable of focusing the aspiration and sentiment of the Assamese middle class.25 They believed that without a well-organised regional party the problem of foreign nationals in Assam could not be solved. Although there were already some regional parties such as the AJD and the PLP, they failed to embrace all sections of Assamese people and work unitedly due to their differences over certain policy matters. Therefore, the AASU took keen and greater interest in the unification of the regional parties58 rather than in the formation of a new regional party acceptahble to all. As a first step in this direction, the AASU organised a national political convention of all like-minded organizations and people of Assam at Jorhat on 10-11 January 1984. In that convention, there emerged a consesus over the formation of a "strong regional party to capture power in the State"26. Further, the convention authorised the AASU to initiate the dialogue with the regional parties of Assam for their unification and "consolidation of the political forces"27. A resolution adopted in this regard stressed the necessity of a broad-based programme for the "construction of the greater Assamese society politically, economically and culturally"28. In pursuance of this resolution the AASU decided at an emergency meeting held at Gauhati University on 7 February, 1984 to take initiative to unite all regional parties of Assam so that the people of Assam could be politically organised on a common platform29. As a corolary to this task, the AASU organised a national workshop (Jatiya Karmahuchi Pranayan Sala) from 9 to 12 April 1984 to prepare a broad-based policy in respect of social, political, cultural, constitutional and legal aspects of the problems connected with the maintenance of distinct Assamese identity30. The workshop held under the Chairmanship of Dr Deba Prasad Baruah, Professor of Political Science, Gauhati University (later on he became the Vice-Chancellor of the University when the AGP captured power of the State) was attended by a large number of pro-movement elements and organizations. After a thread-bare discussion on different aspects of the identity crisis of the Assamese middle class, the workshop finalised a comprehensive programme for the maintenance of the distinct Assamese identity which in turn, necessitated a well-organized regional political party for its implementation31. Further, the AASU held series of dialogues with regional parties, particularly with the PLP and the AJD with a view to forming a new regional party32. But they failed to arrive at a concrete decision. It appeared that both the parties were not prepared to merge with each other because of their differences over the policy and area of operation. It needs mention that the PLP, as its very name implies, prejocted itself as a political party not for Assam alone, but for the entire northeastern region as a whole. The party had its headquarter at Gauhati with a few branches confined to lower Assam only. It did not have any influence over other states that constitute the northeastern region. On the other hand, the areas of operation of AJD confined to geographical boundary of Assam and its organizational base was much larger than the PLP. The AJD had all along been insisting that the unified regional party must have its domain exclusively59 in Assam though it might have fraternal tics with like-minded regional parties in the northeast and in the rest of the country as well. The PLP leaders were unwilling to accept this reasoning, while the AJD maintained that it was first necessary to set one's own house in order before adventuring into larger pastures. As a result, the geographical question became the first obstacle in the way of the merger of these two parties.33 Most of the PLP leaders appeared to be unhappy with any merger proposal. In fact, they were afraid of being thrown out of their existing position of prominence in the party. They saw the unification move as an ruse cooked up by some AASU leaders and their camp followers as a means of gaining AASU's popularity by taking control of the unified party. As evidence, they pointed out to the apparent "sit on the fence" tactis adopted by several prominent ex-AASU leaders who did not join either AJD or PLP perhaps to avoid serving under the leadership of these two parties34. Critics of AJD opined that the very name of the party did not encourage Assam's Tribals and Tea Garden population to join the party35. In fact, the social base of the AJD essentially comprised the small urban Assamese entrepeneurial class, the self-employed professionals and a section of the bureaucracy. These groups were frustrated by the absence of a credible political alternative to the Congress (I) with which they could identify themselves.In any case, the move for a regional party in Assam with a credible base received wide-spread support from the supporters and the sympathisers of anti-foreigner movement. The PLP and the AJD also gradually realised the growing need of the consolidation of regional forces as a credible political alternative to the national party. As a first step in this direction, the PLP and the AJD constituted a common forum called, "Anchalik Gana Morcha" (Regional Peoples Front) on 5 April 1984 to take up common socio-political programme.36 But this forum did not function effectively and could not bring about the merger. Consequently, the second national political convention was organised by the AASU at Jorhat from 21-23 November 1984. The proposal of a new regional party was strongly lobbied at the convention in spite of the opposition by the AJD and some other delegates37. Mr. Binode Goswami, President of the AJD and its General Secretary, Mr. Arup Bordoloi, while welcoming the unification of all regional political parties, strongly opposed the move for a new regional party38. It may be noted that in protest against AASU's opposition to North-East bandh of 14 August 1984, called by the regional parties of Northeast, the PLP remained absent from the convention. Later on, Mr. Thaneswar Bore, the President of the PLP refuted60 the charge of the second national convention that PLP was non-committal to the unity move which was initiated by the AASU. Mr. Boro rather alleged that the AASU was trying to "destroy the unity and integrity of the region".39 At any rate, Mr. Bhrigu Kumar Phukon, General Secretary, AASU, reported the convention that as entrusted by the first national convention, AASU organised four rounds of talks between the regional parties on the issue of "merger" on 22 September, 11 and 27 October and 10 November 1984 respectively. But no accord could be reached. Therefore, several delegates of the convention were veered round to the opinion that in view of the failure of the regional parties, particularly the PLP and the AJD, to forge unity among themselves inspite of "the wishes of the people of Assam", they were left with no alternative but to form a new regional party, capable of organising the Assamese people in a common political platform40. Further Mr. Phukon placed before the convention the political, constitutional and legal report called "Jatiya Karmahunchi Adhar" prepared by the National Workshop (Jatiya Karmahunchi Pranayan Sala) held on 9-12 April 1984 at Gauhati. The convention accepted the "Jatiya Karmahunchi" and felt the urgent need for a strong regional party for its implementation. In view of this, the convention constituted an 11-member preparatory committee headed by Mr Bindabon Goswami and Mr. Dineswar Tasha (as joint convener) to prepare the ground for a "common political platform" in Assam reflecting the political aspiration of the Assamese people. For this purpose, the convention directed the preparatory committee to hold talks with the regional parties of Assam and to invite the next political convention to form a new regional party41. Accordingly, the preparatory committee held a series of discussions with the representatives of regional parties in a bid to organising the 'Assamese people' politically.42 It may be noted that the Plains Tribal Council of Assam and the Karbi Anglong People's Conference were against losing their identities and they demanded separate state-hood. Therefore, they were not interested in talks for merger. However, under the auspices of the" Auchalik Gana Morcha" (a common platform of PLP and AJD) several round of talks were held between the PLP and the AJD on the issue of merger. As a result of such talks, these two regional parties subsequently agreed "on principle" to merge together and form a new regional political party43. Further, a six-member committee was also formed by them to work out the modalities of the new party.44 Thus, the process of unification of the two regional parties was in progress. However, despite the efforts made by both the preparatory committee and the parties themselves, no final decision could be taken on the issue of merger.61 In the mean time, the anti-foreigner movement culminated in the Assam Accord that was signed on 15 August 1985 between the movement leadership and the Union Government45. It is interesting to note that the PLP vehemently opposed and criticised the accord. Anyway, the State Legislative Assembly was dissolved after signing the Accord and the date of election was announced. In a bid to fight the election battle, both the PLP and the AJD began to make necessary preparation. The PLP even decided to fight the election independently46. But the growing widespread feeling after the Accord was that a strong regional party, capable of capturing the power of the State, should be formed, with a view to implementing the Accord properly. Thus under the pressure of public opinion, the AJD decided in a state level meeting held at Gauhati on 7 October 1985, to merge itself with the new regional party of Assam "on condition" which was to be formulated in the proposed national political convention at Golaghat. The "condition" that was thus finalised stipulated that the main political demands of AJD, such as autonomy to the state and dual citizenship, be included in the charter of the new regional party. Further, it wanted that sixty per cent of the members of executive committee of the new party should be taken from the AJD. Accordingly it decided to send ten representatives to the third national political convention and authorised them to merge with the proposed new party of Assam on fulfilment of the "conditions"47. Under these circumstances, the pre-movement individuals and organizations were anxiously looking forward to the third national political convention, which was held at Golaghat 12-14 October 1985. It may be noted that just before the convention, Mr. Prafulla Kumar Mahanta and Mr. Bhrigu Kumar Phukon, President and General Secretary of the AASU respectively resigned from their offices in order to take a leading part in the Golaghat Convention. The convention, presided over by Mr. Prafulla Kumar Mahanta (former president of AASU), was attended by a large number of delegates representing various regional political parties (including PLP, AJD, KAPC, PTCA and Cachar indigenous peoples's conference), and pro-movement socio-cultural organizations48. Besides, some educationists, Journalists (Including a noted journalist Mr. Arun Sorie) lawyers and other persons who were invited with the approval of local AASU units also attended the conference49. The issue of merger of the existing regional parties was hotly debated in the convention. The PLP, for instance, was not in favour of a complete merger of its identity with the proposed new regional party. It wanted to form a kind of a coalition with a limited objective of fighting the election. A section of the supporters of the AJD was62 also not prepared to merge itself with the new regional party unless its "conditions" were fulfilled.50 However, the majority of the delegates in the convention had shown a great deal of unanimity in the formation of a new regional party embracing all pre-agitationist elements in order to "capture the political power of the State". In view of the general consensus arrived at the convention, both the AJD and the PLP representatives in the convention finally agreed to merge with the newly formed party despite their reservations.51 Thus, a new regional party named, AGP came into existence on 14 October 1985. It embraced in its fold the rank and file of the regional parties (particularly, AJD and PLP) and organisations most of which were constitutcnts of All-Assam Gana San-gram Parishad (AAGSP) which alongwith the AASU had spear-headed the anti-foreigner movement. A four member presidium with Mr. Pro-fulla Kumar Mahanta as the working president, 3 general secretaries and 33 member- executive committee was elected to run the affairs of the new party. More importantly, the convention accepted the draft constitution (with minor modifications) prepared by the preparatory committee in conformity with the suggestions made by the second political convention held at Jorhat. Further, a 7-member committee led by Mr. Prafulla Kumar Mahanta was formed by the convention to give final shape to the Constitution. The new party pledged to work for a "free and progressive society based on secularism, democracy, and socialism"52. The Constitution of the party made the promise that AGP would strive for more powers to the state to ensure "true federal structure"53. It also emphasised that the party would provide security to agricultural and industrial workers by amending the relevant laws, adopt measures for development of local dialects, language and culture, try to forge unity among different sections of people and work for economic development of the people of the state54.In the last general election held in December 1985, the Assamese people gave their verdict in favour of the AGP. In its election pledge, the AGP assured the people that it would implement the Assam Accord in letter and spirit. Further, the AGP leaders promised to establish a "Senar Asom" (Golden Assam). Most of the Assamese people also sincerely believed that the AGP Government (which they called their "own government") would fulfil their long cherished hopes and aspirations. But unfortunately, it seems that the "hopes and aspirations" of the Assamese people appear to be shattered by the manner the AGP Government is functioning.63 IIIThis study shows that the formation of the AGP is the result of the growing apprehension on the part of the Assamese people that they would be swamped by the continuos flow of the immigrants into Assam ever since the colonial rule. The inflow of the immigrants had disturbed the socio-economic structure of Assam, thereby threatening their socio-cultural identity and economic structure. Thus, the "Assamese nationalism" began to take firm roots and the Assamese middle class undertook the task of strengthening "self consciousness" among the people with the hope that their mobilisation might transform it into a widespread movement to achieve the goals of socio-economic, political and cultural significance. The anti-foreigner movement was directed towards the realisation of such goals. It needs mention that the AASU has always been in the vanguard of various movements in Assam the Language Movement, 1960, the Movement on the medium of instruction, 1972 etc. which basically supported and advanced the interest of the middle class. Thus the formation of the AGP marks the culmination of the efforts of the AASU leaders to forge political unity among the pro-movement elements in the State.Although, the anti-foreigner movement was mainly spear-headed in the name of AASU, the leadership of the movement was in the hands of the middle class, and the AGP, born out of this movement, remained very much in the hands of the same leaders. Because of its hegemonic position in the Assamese society the interest of this section is projected and also virtually accepted as the interest of the entire Assamese society. Thus the AGP manifesto for 1985 election clearly reflected the middle class interest. The pledge of the AGP that it would protect the political rights of the Assamese people to bring about their economic prosperity and to protect their cultural identity and interest loses sight of the fact that the protection of interest of the Assamese middle class may not protect the interest of the poor Assamese peasantry. In fact, the AGP clearly emerges as the mouth-piece of the nascent Assamese burgeoisie. But the Assamese bourgeoisie is still very weak and it has to depend on the educated section of the Assamese middle class for political leadership. Therefore, the leadership of the AGP is drawn mainly from the educated elite of Assam.It may be noted that there has been the seemingly attractive (and relatively effortlessly contrived) model of a regional party under the "charismatic" leadership of other suites (particularly Andhra Pradesh and64 Kashmir) The corresponding regional formation elsewhere in the country only reflected the contradictions that the relatively strong and substantial regional bourgeoisie had begun to develop with national bourgeoisie. The absence of a corresponding class in political terms has been the crucial inhibiting factor in the consolidation of regional force as political party in Assam and in the northeast in general. This explains why strong regional parties have more or less consented to become wings of the Congress (I) in these states. The regional parties in Meghalaya, Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh had all been at one time or the other independent and sufficiently strong. But gradually they are losing their base and strength. Perhaps, the AGP would be no exception to this trend of the regional parties, particularly in the northeast.NOTES AND REFERENCES1. Amalendu Guha, "Immigrants and Autochihones in a Plural Society: Their Inter-Relations in the Brahmaputra Valley in Historical Perspective," North East India: A Sociological Study (ed), S.M. Dubcy (Dchi, 1977) p. 43.2. Speech in Bengali, Assam Legislative Assembly Debates, 16 February, 1938, pp. 66-71, (Translated).3. Reported in The Assam Tribune, 29 March, 1940.4. Census Report of India (Assam), 1931, Vol. Ill, Part I, p. 49.5. Harendranath Baruah, 'The Development Scheme: Position of Indigenous People", The Assam Tribune, 29 August, 1941.6. Reply to B.C. Goswami, March 24, Assam Legislative Council Proceeding, 1933, Vol. 13, p. 888.7. Amalendu Guha, Planters Raj to Swaraj: Freedom Struggle and Electoral Politics in Assam 1826-1947, (New Delhi, 1977) p. 209.8. The Assam Tribune, 29 March, 1940.9. Home Poll, File No. 119/46, (Poll) (i) National Archives of India. Cited in A.C. Bhuyan&S.P. De (ed), Political History of Assam, 1940-47, Vol.III, (Gauhati, 1980) p. 262.10. Census of India (Assam), 1951 Vol. XII, Part I(A) p. 337.11. The Assam Tribune, 4 April, 1950.12. Ibid, 8 July, 1949.13. See Economic Survey, Assam, 1972, Department of Economics and Statistics, Government of Assam.14. One aspect of fight for identity of Assamese has been the restoration of the Assamese Language to its rightful status of being stale language and medium of instruction. The agitation for making Assamese the State language (1960) and the movement for making Assamese the medium of higher65 education (1972) confirmed the existence of this fight in independent India too.15. It may be noted that the Bengali Muslim has already held the balance of political power in Assam. Their political clout was reflected in the State Legislature. A directive from the centre in 1975 to detect foreigners and deport them was not implemented by the Assam government because the issue provoked to the compact block of 25 Muslim MLAs and they threatened to withdrew their support from the Ministry. Many other Bengali-speaking legislators also joined with them. The emergence of United Minority Front (UMF) in Assam which secured 17 seats in the last election in a House of 126 member is also a significant development in this direction.16. See, P. Katoky, 'The Assam Movement: Sings and Portents" The Assam Mirror, July, 1980, p.9.17. See, Myron Weiner, Sons of the Soil, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1978, p.81.18. Mention may be made that while all-India average per capita income increased at the compound annual rate of 1.1 per cent during the period from 1960-61 to 1982-83, the corresponding figure for Assam was 0.2 per cent. Moreover, the number of job seekers on the live Register more than doubled from 1.89 lakh during 1975 to 4.03 lakh to during 1982, out of 4.03 lakh job seekers in 1982, 1.76 lakh were educated unemployed. (See, Jogram Hatibaruah, "Assam and the Seventh Plan", The Assam Tribune, 24 August, 1985).19. Reported in The Assam Tribune, 25 October, 1978.20. Ibid, 17 March, 1979.21. Several complaints were raised before the Election Commission alleging inclusion of names of foreign nationals in the Electoral Rolls of Mangaldoi Constituency. As a result, all arrangements for holding the election were cancelled. Reportedly, out of the alleged 70,000 names about 15,000 were found to be foreigners.22. With the initiative of the AASU, the AAGSP was formed on August 27, 1979 to run the movement. Its main constitutents were AASU, PLP, AJD, Asom Sahitya Sabha and Sadau Asom Karmachari Parishad. Although the AASU was one of the constitutent members of the AAGSP it had been maintaining its autonomy and separate identity from the very beginning.23. See Amalendu Guha, "Little nationalism Turned Chauvinist: Assam's Anti Foreigner upsurge, 1979-80" Economic and Political Weekly, Special Number, 1980, p. 1709.24. Between 1979-1985 Assam had witnessed a series of communal strife, bandhs and various violent activities. In the communal violence, more than 4,000 people lost their lives, numerous settlements were burnt, nearly 400,000 people were either displaced or rendered homeless. As a result of disruptions, the State Government lost Rs. 45 crores in revenue and suffered 66 production losses amounting to Rs. 13,000 crores. Education suffered tremendously and life became insecure because of fighting between supporters and opponents of the movement. See The Sunday, 15-21 December 1985.25. See, Traloikyanath Goswami, "Anchalik Dal Gathanar Sampakat" (Regarding formation of Regional party) DainikJanambhumi, Jorhat, 26 September, 1983.26. See, The Telegraph (Calcutta), January 12,1984. Also see, Resolution No. I, adopted in the first national Political convention held at Jorhat on January 10-11, 1984, vide Draft, Constitution placed before the third national political convention, 12-14 October 1985, (Golaghat).27. See News Star, (Gauhati) 17 January 1984.28. Ibid29. The Statesman (Calcutta) February 9, 1984.30. See, Political, Constitutional and Legal Report, prepared by Jatiya Karmahuchi Pranayan Sala (Manuscript) dt. 12.4.84.31. Ibid.32. The Plains Tribal Council (PTCA) The Karbi Anglong People's Conference (KAPC), the AJD and the PLP were the major political parties in Assam, of them the PTCA and KAPC were against losing their independent identities and were prone to shy away from the talk on merger. Another reason for this attitude of the PTCA and KAPC was that they demanded separate states.33. It may be noted that the main political demands of the AJD were (a) autonomy to states (b) dual citizenship. The PLP, though much in line with the AJD's idea of state autonomy was in favoaur of setting up the inner-line permit system in Assam to check inter-state migration.34. See, The sentinel, 4 April 1984.35. ibid.36. Ibid, 6 April 1984.37. The Assamm Tribune, 26, November 1984.38. Ibid.39. The Sentinel, 27, November 1984.40. Report of the Preparatory Committee, third National Political Convention, Gelaghat, 12-14, October 1985 (Printed) published by Mr. Bindabon Goswami and Mr. Dineswar Tasha.41. Ibid.42. See, The Assam Tribune, 10 January 1985.43. This was decided in a joint meeting between the PLP and the AJD held on February 21, 1985. (See, News Star, 22 February 1985).44. Ibid,45. Under the Accord, these foreign nationals who entered the state between 1 January 1966 and 25 March 1971 would be disenfranchised for ten years and those who came after 25 March, 1971 would be deported.67 46. Reported in the Dainik Janambhumi, 25, September 1985.47. News Star 8 October, 1985.48. Ibid, 15 October 1985.49. Dainik Janambhumi, 3 October 1985.50. It may be noted that a section of AJD workers walked out from the Convention in protest against the non-fulfilment of their conditions, later or the dissolution of AJD and its merger with the newly formed AGP evoked strong reaction, among the grass-root level workers of the Dal. They alleged that the representatives, who were authorised to merge with the then proposed new political party "on condition", "betrayed" the AJD. (See, The Sentinel, 21, October 1985).51. But other regional parties, who attended the convention did not become the constituents of the new party due to the reasons already stated. They rather prefered to make an election alliance with the new party.52. See, Draft Constitution, accepted by the national political convention, Golaghat, 12-14, October 1985 (Printed).53. Ibid.54. Ibid.68 69 JHARKHAND PARTY IN BIHARHaridwar Rai and Vijay KumarPolitical parties are product of many complex factors like tradition and history, social and economic structure, religious beliefs, racial composition, national rivalries and others. Socio-economic factors like class structure, ideological elements like liberalism and socialism and technical factors like electoral regime contribute to the nature and survival of political parties which have become essentially the lifeline of modern politics. History of every society is a record of struggle among those whose differences are marked by language, religion, race in a seemingly never ending quarrel for the symbols of esteem and pride, the reality of power and place. Organisations, group and political parties stem from these realities of social conflict. Political parties, whether national or regional in nature, are an important means of articulating and organising different political forces competing for dominance and power. One of the main functions of the regional parties is to regionalise the issues, or, to state differently, to give a more regionalised tone to the national programmes. The regional parties attempt to counterweigh the centralization by making the national legislators feel concerned about the particular problem of their regions. It is in the light of the above that the role of the Jharkhand party, which is a regional party whose support for the most part is confined to the tribal belt of Chotanagpur and Santal Pargauas region, has been analysed in historical perspective.Village commune had been the traditional socio-economic set-up of the tribals of Chotanagpur and Santal Parganas region of Bihar during the pre-British days. This traditional land system was disrupted by the British without a beneficial substitute to the indigenous people. Consequently, there was a gradual alienation of tribal land by crafty outsiders, money-lenders, shop-keepers, merchants, government and zamindar officials, 70 who flocked in for business or duty.1 The exploited Tribals in the beginning shrunk back in their own shell getting isolated from the mainstream of public life. However, when things deteriorated for the worse, these peace loving people fought back with ardour and audacity. The Santal Rebellion of 1855, the Kisan Oraon Rebellion of 1918, the Kol insurrection of 1831 and the Bhumij revolt of 1932 were precisely the violent outbursts of the pent-up fury against the many faceted exploitation of the tribals by the non-tribals and the administrative set up.2 In the early phase of the twentieth century, many organisations and groups sprang up to protect the interests and rights of the illitrate and exploited tribal masses. In 1914 the Chotanagpur Unnati Samaj was formed, in 1930 an exclusive Catholic organisation, the Catholic Sabha came up and in the subsequent year Chotanagpur Kisan Sabha was born. These sectarian tribal organisations did not prove very potent The need for a powerful organisation was realised and, consequently, in 1938 Ignes Back, brought them together under a common platform called the Chot-anagpur Adivasi Mahasabha. The first session of the Sabha was held at Ranchi in 1939 under the leadership of Jaipal singh, the 'Marang Gomke' (Supreme leader) of the tribals. From its very inception its slogan was to carve a separate tribal state out of south Bihar with an autonomous status. Its tribal leaders met and made representation before the Simon Commission and Cripps Mission and demanded the grant of separate Adivasi state out of south Bihar with an autonomous status. Its tribal leaders met and made representation before the Simon Commission and Cripps Mission and demanded the grant of separate Adivasi state, though there was no trace of either caste tension between Adivasis and non-Adivasis. With the formation of the Congress Ministry in Bihar after the 1946 elections based on limited franchise, the tension between tribals and non-tribals began to surface.3 The independence did not mean much to the tribals except for the change of the rulers. For a majority of them it only meant change of hands from the white sahibs to the brown sahibs without realising its true sense. The Adivasi Mahasabha which had taken a pro-British attitude before independence due to the dominance of the educated Christian tribals, came to adopt an increasingly anti-Congress attitude after independence.4 To press forward their demand for a separate Jharkhand State two modes were favoured ly its members. One Section favoured launching of Gandhian type satyagrah and the dominant section favoured a constitutional approach to attain the goal of a separate state. The Mahasabha adopted a constitutional approach to get their demand for a separate71 Jharkhand Province fulfilled. They submitted a memorandum to the excluded and partially excluded areas (other than Assam) subcommittee of the Advisory Committee of the Constitutent Assembly in 1947 to this effect The Mahasabha changed its nomenclature in 1950 to become the Jharkhand party advocating formation of a separate Jharkhand state. In the election of 1952 the Jharkhand party received a spectacular success emerging as the main opposition group in the state assembly.5 Having proved their strength in the general elections of 1952, thirty three members of the local legislature from Chotanagpur and Santal Parganas made a forceful representation before the States Reorganization Commission in April 1954 for the creation of a separate Jharkhand state. However, the representation of Jharkhand party in the state assembly remained unchanged even in the 1957 general elections.The effectiveness of the 'Sub-nationalistic'6 demands for the creation of a separate Jharkhand province, a separate University, Public Service Commission and a separate budget was, however, lost after the Jharkhand party merged with the Congress in 1963. The merger of the Jharkhand with the Congress party was never complete. The rank and file of the Jharkhand party did not appreciate the merger which was devised by the tribal elites to share the spoils of the ruling class.7 the political scene that emerged close on the heels of the merger was one of chaos and confusion in tribal Bihar. Those leaders who were unhappy over the merger formed many dissident groups, 'all essentially personalistic cliques', and though they went into the election fray in 1967 as independents, they used the name of Jharkhand to catch the tribal votes.8 The fragmentation process in the Jharkhand party was so acute that 'as many as nine groups' sprang up to fill the vacuum created by the merger, and the main body of the Jharkhand split up into four factions in the late 1960s'. A major split in the original Jharkhand party occured when the Santals separated themselves from the Chotanagpur tribals and formed the Bihar Prant Hul Jharkhand party in December 1968. This party too split up into two factions in 1972, one of them calling itself progressive Hul Jharkhand party. Thus in 1972 general elections names such as Hul Jhankanad, Rajya Jharkhand Christrian Adivasi Hul Jharkhand, Progressive Hul Jharkhand, Bihar Prantiya Hul Jharkhand, All India Jharkhand were off heard words.Thus, one of the factions of the original Jharkhand party was the 'Hul' Jharkhand. The only difference between the old Jharkhand party and our party is that we want to adopt some radical methods to get our demands fulfilled' said the top leaders. The word 'Hul' in adivasi language 72 means revolution and is closely associated with the name of Sidho and Kanoo and the santal hul of 1855. Leaders of the Hul Jharkhand party promised the people that they would bring revolution in the area by working for a separate state for the tribals. Rajmahal was considered a Hul Jharkhand pocket. But in almost all the constituencies of Santal parganas, the communists have penetrated and have led mass agitations against the mahajans and big cultivators.11 The Jharkhand party, in whatever apparel, appeals to the primordial sentiments of the tribal masses promising to reform not only the immediate problems of economic and agrarian nature but also promising to fulfil a uptopian dream of 'Kharwarism'12 by establishing a separate state of the tribals. it is this psychological factor - the promise of realising the Utopian tribal state - which keeps the Jharkhand consciousness still alive and significant in the tribal mind, the precipitate effect has been that the tribal political parties are not ready to relinquish the label of Jharkhand. They further try to keep the dream of the Jharkhand state in animate existence by their activities. One more such attempt was made by the All India Jharkhand Party in a memorandum submitted to the President of India on June 30, 1980 demanding the creation of a Jharkhand state comprising the tribal areas of Bihar, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh. Further memorandums keep reinforcing the demand.Most of these politcal organisastions are concerned with socio-economic development of the tribal masses apart from their much publicized aim of carving out a Jharkhand state. They hold the outsiders responsible for their social and economic backwardness. The Chotanagpur - Santal parganas region has about half the total area of Bihar and is the richest mineral belt in the country accounting for nearly half the coal deposits. It also has the biggest concentration of public sector heavy industry in the country. Yet the original inhabitants of the region remain the most exploited. They are only meagrely employed in industries. Agriculture has almost stagnated and irrigation has actually declined.13 Hinduism, Christianity, industrialization and education have affected their life patterns. Exploitation and apathy of money-lenders, contractors and government officials have compelled these peace-loving people to take recourse to violence to improve their plight. Growth of Christianity has imbibed in them the spirit of nationalism and made them conscious of self help, self-assertion and self-reliance. Education has developed such qualities that enable them to exist and lead prosperous life in industrial surroundings and also to realise that though they were the original settlers of the country, they have been economically deprived by the alien73 people. Industrilization and urbanization have displaced many tribals from their land without adequate compensation14 giving rise to large scale unemployment on the one hand and on the other have made the tribals eager to seek jobs in factories and coal mines instead of doing agricultural work. Craze for jobs in factories and mines is also an outcome of tribals' search for financial security and parity with the non-tribals. They have a feeling that more non-industrial workers have been living through debt than the industrial workers.15 Though they are not safe from the hands of money-lenders and contractors even there,16 but a general feeling of security is there because of trade union organizations. One such organisation is Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union (B.C.K.U.) whose main support comes from the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (J.M.M), an organization that is fighting for justice for the tribals and other oppressed of Bihar.The gap between the aspirations to have an identity of their own and their experience that they had no such identity has ushered in an era of extremist politics in tribal Bihar, spearheaded by the J.M.M. The tribals 'expect free access to the forest and its produce, transfer of land from the money lenders, establishment of public hospitals in large numbers, rehabilitation of homeless tribals (ejected in the wake of industrialization), construction of metalled roads in interior areas and participation of tribals in every administrative decision'17 The widening chasm between their rising expectations and growing frustrations on such counts have kept alive the demand for the promised land. Further, the grant of statehood to the tribals of Meghalaya, Nagaland and Mizoram, active support of the C.P.M. for the autonomy, activities of some extremist leftist workers and of certain anti-national communal organisations are adding fuel to the fire. Consequently, Sachidananda pointed out in 1976 that the 'political situation in tribal Bihar is at present apparently quiet but it may be a lull before the storm'.18 In a situation when the whole country is astir with regional movements and Bihar is witnessing revival of sub-nationalist feelings like the demand for 'Kolhanistan' in the Singhbhum district by the Kolhan Raksha Sangh19 a 'Jharkhand Raj' by the J.M.M. and 'Mithilanchal by Mai-thili speaking people of Mithila, it is worthwhile to look into the objectives, aims, ideologies and philosophies of change of such regional organisations and political parties. In view of the fact that ever since the demand for a separate Jharkhand state was raised, it has thrived and still remains alive instead of getting buried in the social welfare policies of the Government and other special schemes for the upliftment of the tribal74 societies, speaks volumes about their deep-seated distrust of the non-tribals and the failure of the government to implement the upliftment programmes.The J.M.M. the 'latest and most militant' of all tribal organisations was launched on 4 February 1973 amidst thousands of tribals equipped with their conventional weapons on the beating of war drums. Its very name suggests the restoration of alienated lands to their rightful tribal owners. Jharkhand Mukti Morcha literally means Tribal Land Liberation Movement The non-tribals in Chotanagpur, Santal Parganas and Purnea have fits of nervous breakdown by its very name. J.M.M. is associated with Dhankatia Movement (forcible harvesting of crops), 'land riots' and many cases of violence between the tribals on the one hand and the mahajans, police and non-tribals on the other. At one time many criminal cases were registered against its leader Shibu Soren. During the era of Emergency he carried an award of Rs. 10,000/- on his head.20 The J.M.M. propounding a radical ideology of change has emerged as a major political force in tribal Bihar after the 1980 general elections. It has not only revived once against the autonomy demand but have given the tribals a radical ideology of change. The impact of the naxalite movement and leftist parties is also visible in the agrarian programme put forth by its leaders. Its leaders have talked of land alienation, exploitation and various other grievances against the administration and the outsiders and have incited the tribals to organise themselves to fight the enemies. Under its leadership, the tribals in several areas of tribal region have forcibly harvested the crop on land which they have lost to landlords and money lenders. Sometimes, the land has been forcibly taken back.The J.M.M. has been able to withstand the disintegration fever from which most regional parties have suffered, because it has been able to respond successfully to the militancy of the tribals. Earlier organizations like the Jharkhand party lost in popularity when they started shedding their militancy. Its popularity in the region can be gauged by the fact that in the 1980 assembly elections it won 13 seats while the splinters of the old Jharkhand contented with one seat only. J.M.M. also won a parliamentary seat from Dumka parliamentary constituency elevating its leader Shibu Soren to the parliament. In the 1980 general elections, J.M.M. had an alliance with the Congress (I) and won most of the seats they contested. But this has given them a pro-establishment image which it wanted to shake off before the 1984 elections. It did not, therefore, enter into an electoral alliance or adjustment of seats with the Congress (I) in the 1984 Lok Sabha elections. In assembly election there was a75 move to forge alliance with the All India Jharkhand party (N.E. Horo group). But this could not be achieved. The parliamentary elections of 1984 were fought in an altogether different political climate. The sympathy wave, created due to the murder of Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister, was felt all around. Coupled with this, the issue of national integration and threat to the security of the nation was being experienced in all corners of the country, including the tribal Bihar. As a result of all these, the voters in tribal Bihar felt and voted in the same way the voters in the rest of the country did. The parties contesting with regional issues were rejected. The J.M.M. like wise was rejected for its regional appeal during the parlimanetary elections.The J.M.M. programme of socio-economic transformation is much more elaborate, concrete and practicable than the policies and programmes so far proposed by any tribal organization. Its leaders are aware that a social movement is impossible unless there is an ideology, in order to legitimise it, and an organization that is an instrument of ideology. J.M.M. has both an ideology to legitimise its agrarian, social and cultural reforms and an organization of devoted workers and supporters to implement its programmes. Their ideology may be lacking a 'world-view', and may not stand the specific tests of ideology; in broader sense, it has a definite ideology of social transformation and creation of a Jharkhand State.21 The Jharkhand in Bihar consists of the six tribal districts of Ranchi, Santal Parganas, Singhbum, Hazaribagh, Palamau and Dhanbad. According to the J.M.M., Jharkhand is an internal colony exploited by the outsiders. The process of development in tribal areas itself has proved exploitative because outsiders, i.e., non-tribals have floched in efforts to build up to seize all opportunities of employment. There is a Jharkhand nationality and raise demands for self determination to chalk out their own path of social formation. Thus the demand that the Jharkhand must be formed separately.As the tribals of the state are still wedded to agricultural land and forest for their survival, the agrarian question has been foremost in the J.M.M. programme. K.S. Singh points out that "The formal political slogan of a separate state was not given up but the emphasis shifted to the conditions of the tribals, the nature and consequences of exploitation isolation and neglect. There is a better articulated demand for a dominant role of the tribals in regional administration, for better educational facilities, and more employment opportunities. There is also a demand for restoration of alienated land, provision for legal and institutional safe-76 guards to protect tribal interests and to end all forms of exploitation'.A number of programmes have been taken up by the Mukti Morcha. Schools have been opened in villages, A relentless effort has been made to break the drinking habit of the tribals, for the tribal leaders feel that liquor has been a tested method of dissipating tribal anger into a self-destructive channels. Apart from this, in several areas the tribals have resorted to forcible seizure of land lost to landlords and forcible harvesting of crops standing in landlord's fields.The Morcha aims to bring about a socio-cultural transformation of its people by establishing 'AkilAkharas' (Wisdom schools), co-operatives, afforestation, small-scale industries, training centres for women, eradication of dowry, child-marriage, drinking and other social evils, organizing 'Chetav Baishi'. (Village panchayat to resolve local tribal-non-tribal conflicts) and setting up of 'grain golas' to suppoprt the tribals in adversity. The Morcha is not afraid of using force when required. They have taken step to discipline not only the tribal masses but have also tried to enforce discipline on money lenders and business people inhabiting the regions of their influence.Mukti Morcha, thus, aims at ending tribal exploitaition and usher in an era of equality, freedom and plenty for them. But then it does not give a guarantee against exploitation of the tribals.22 In an age of industrialization and modernization in which every society is 'dependent' it aims to establish an Utopian society of self-sufficient tribals. This can ultimately prove only a vote catching device rather than an earnest desire to attain the dream. Knowing it fully well that the autonomy demand is not going to be conceded because the tribals are not homogeneous group and there is no under current of political rivalry between the San-tals, the Munda and the Oragon, the leadership of J.M.M. has been propagating such a demand. On the one hand it goes for an electoral alliance with a nationalist party like Congress (I) and on the other dupes the tribal masses to support the desired state.That the influence of J.M.M. cannot be altogether overlooked, is very well reflected in the performance of the party in early 1985 Assembly elections. The attitude of the voters that largely supported the national issues at the time of 1984 parliamentary elections and as a result of which no regional party could get even a foothold, immediately realised the importance of regional issues when assembly elections were declared. The influence of J.M.M. thereby and the leadership of its leader Shibu Soren became significant right from the stage of campaigns. Even the acknowledged vote mobilisers such as Dr Jagannath Mishra and Sri77 Chandra Shekhar Singh, the Ex-chief ministers of Bihar, refrained from campaigning in the tribal area. It could not be out of place to view the fact of bypassing this area from campaign by even the Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.The J.M.M. has also effected certain changes in its mode of operation in the tribal region. Earlier the J.M.M. had become fairly unpopular among the non-tribals inhabiting Santal Parganas due to its policy of looting and harvesting the standing crops. In the recent days, however, the J.M.M. has given up this practice due to which it has now been able to endear even the non-tribals as its supporters which was adequately reflected in the last 1985 assembly elections.With respect to the electoral performance, in the region, the J.M.M. tally has declined from 14 to 10 over all and it won seven seats in the tribal belt However, five independents have also won who are believed to support the idea of Jharkhand state. The J.M.M. performance in assembly elections just on the heels of parlimentary elections where it drew a blank reveals its wide spread support. The separatist cause for which the party stands also seems to have got a shot in the arms.23 Undoubtedly, the emergence, growth and penetration of the J.M.M. in the tribal masses is an indication of their disenchantment with the poor implementation of the government policies, opening up of the floodgates of "rising expectations," growing unemployment among the educated tribals and the unbecoming behaviour of the non-tribals in general and the government officials in particular. Political extremism is something which, indeed, is not in the general nature of the tribals. The tirbal political leaders have been injecting a kind of new militancy into the younger generation of tribals. The Banjhi incidence in Sahibganj district in which 15 tribals were killed in a clash between tribals and non-tribals and the police in April 1985 marks a new beginning in the strengthening of tribal unity. Looking at their reduction to insignificant minority in their own land heading towards a socio-culutral-economic bankruptcy, the J.M.M. has begun a move to bring the tribal groups and parties under one banner to renovate their strategy for Jharkhand state. The J.M.M., the Jharkand Vichar Manch (J.V.M.), a new non-political organisation of educated tribal youth affiliated to the J.M.M. and Jharkand party (JP.) have regrouped in the second half of 1986 for a renewed stir for the creation of a separate Jharkand state in a peaceful and democratic manner under the framework of the constitution.No doubt, most of the tribal regional parties of Bihar thrive on the demand for a separate Jharkhand state. That has become a convenient78 slogan for the regional tribal leaders to evoke when their political base begins to dwindle. Jharkhand stir in the past has failed to evoke any concrete impact because the leaders could not instil faith, confidence and understanding among the tribal masses. The stir has remained leader oriented or personality oriented. Whenever the leaders compromised with the ruling parties or backed out, the agitation received serious jolts as we saw in 1963, 1967-69, and 1980. The inter-elite conflict has stood in the way of the unity of the tribal parties. The different Jharkhand parties are personalistic cliques centering around their leaders. Attempts to unite them have invariably failed because the leaders of the various factions have no desire to give up their leadership. Birsa Jaipal Singh, the UK-educated son of the Jharkand party founder, Jaipal Singh, founded the Jharkhand Mahasabha in 1984 and made a bid to unite the Jharkand factions, his attempts, however, failed.A look at the history of the Jharkand party reveals that like all regional parties, this party too has failed to fight the fragmentation and disintegration fever due to the lack of a cohesive leadership. The proliferation of Jharkhand parties in the wake of the 1963 Congress merger of the Jharkand amply demonstrates the fact. The only Jharkhand faction which carries some drive is the J.M.M. Rest of them are not even worth being called regional political parties. At best they can be called regional groupings. JMM has inherited the mantle and the legacy of the old Jharkhand party. It has been consistently engaged in building mass-support and maintaining grass-root links. Borrowing some of its ideological moorings from the leftist groups it has been able to steal the thunder from the leftist parties which were making inroads in the traditional Jharkhand areas. J.V.M. now has sprung up to educate the tribal masses and create an awareness among them of their exploitation and miseries. Acting as the 'think tank' or 'brains-trust' of the J.M.M., the J.V.M. promises to penetrate the masses to provide J.M.M. greater vigour in its political activities. Jharkhand as a party had definitely failed but as a movement it still lives on. Greater and consistent efforts are required by the government to ameliorate the dissatisfied tribal masses and bury the movement for all times to come by assimilating the tribals in the general social system.NOTES AND REFERENCES1. L.P. Sinha "Origin and Development of Political Parties in Bihar", The Searchlight, 15.8.1969.79 2. See for details, K.K. Datta, The Santal insurrection (Calcutta, 1940), and his History of the Freedom Movement in Bihar (Patna, 1957) and Tarapad Roy, Santal Rebellion, Documents (Calcutta, 1983). 3. Beatrice Pitney Lamb, India : A world in Transition (New York, 1966), p.248.4. See R .N. Dubey, Paternalistic Idea logy and the Administration of a tribal area : the Evolution and Working of the Santal System, unpublished Ph.D. thesis submitted to Bhagalpur University, 1973 pp. 293-94.5. See S.V. Kogehar and R.L. Park (eds.) Report on the Indian General Election 1951-52 (Bombay, 1956).6. See B.K. Roy Burman 'Perspective of Nagaland' The Institute of Defence Analysis Journal, Vol. I (January 1969) and See aslo L.P. Vidyarthy 'Approaches to the Problem of Integration of Tribals in India' inM. Rafiq Khan (ed.) National Integration (Varanasi, 1970), pp. 112-13, for a discussion on 'infra-nationalism', and 'sub-ntaionalism'.7. S.N. Mishra, Party Politics in a Backward State, an unpublished Ph.D. thesis submitted to L.N. Mithila University, 1977, p. 142.8. S.C. Pauchbhai, the Jharkhand Movement Among the Santal' in K.S. Singh (ed.) Tribal Movements in India, Vol. 2 (New Delhi 1983), p.35.9. K.S. Singh, 'Tribal Autonomy Movements in Chotanagpur Tribal Movements in India, p. 10.10. Quoted in Panchibhai, Op. cit., p.3911. Dube, op, cit., p.296.12. 'Kharwar'according to Rev. Skrefsrud, 'is the ancient tribal name of the Santals, and in their minds is associated with the golden era of their history, namely, the time when they lived in Champa in absolute independence, and had no rent or tribute to pay, but only to bring a small annual offering to their leaders in virtue of their office'. Ordinarily, Santals are quiet and contented but when any grievances rankle in their minds, the spirit of unrest arises and their leaders of self-interested agitators appeal to the ancient traditions of the race and the hope of independence. See H.McPharson. Final Settlement Report of Santal parganas (Calcutta, 1909), pp37-38.13. Yogi Agrawal, 'Caste-Ridden Bihar", Imprint, March 1981, pp.50-51.14. See A.N.Das, Struggle of Wrokers and Tribal Peasants in Chotanagpur' Economic and Political Weekly, Vol.10 No.9. (1975), pp 384-86.15. See P.C. Roy, Social-Political Technological Factors in Transformation' in B. Singh and J.S. Bhandari (Eds.), The Tribal World and its Transformation (New Delhi, 1980.)16. See Ajai Mishra, 'Miners always in debt', the Telegraph (Calcutta), dated 26.7.84.17. Sachichidananda. The Tribal Voter in Bihar (New Delhi, 1976), p. 23.18. Ibid.19. In 1983 the 'Kolhan' activitists submitted a memorandum to the Commonwealth General Secretary in London seeking member status for the80 State' see The Telegraph, 28.8.84.20. See for details, Panchbhai, Op. Cit., pp. 45-46.21. 'An ideology is more or less systematic interpretation of society and history, regarded by its supporters as the highest truth. If we broaden the meaning of the term 'ideology' to include opinions and preferences, whatever the degree of elaboration, every country, class and every region has its ideolgoy', See Raymond Aron, Progress and Disillusion (London, 1968), p. 194.22. This is a plausible guess in view of the fact that the social infra-structure created during the plan periods were mainly shared by the affluent section of the tribal and the suffering of the lower strate of the tribals increased. See Ghanshyam Narain Singh, 'Design of Development for the Tribal Region of Bihar' in D.M. Najundappa&R.K. Sinha (eds.) Backward Area Developments, Problems and prospects (New Delhi, 1982), pp, 243-252.23. The party has adopted a new strategy for Jharkhand in 1986. See for details theTimes of India (patna), 13.8.86 andThe Indian Nation (Patna), 14.8.86.81 TELUGU DESAM PARTYV. Bhaskara RaoIntroductionThe Telugu Dcsam Party (T.D.P.) is a new regional party which emerged in Andhra Pradesh under the leadership of N.T. Rama Rao. Surprisingly, even though its founder had no experience in politics, his party won more than 2/3rds of the seats in the Legislative Assembly elections held (in 1983) barely within nine months of its formation. It was shocking to all the political analysts to witness the defeat of all the national political parties and especially the Congress (I) which was ruling the state for 35 years without any hindrance or opposition. It is therefore, interesting to take note of the developments of this new party in a matter of nine months after its inception. N.T. Rama Rao, popularly known as 'NTR' or 'Anna' was a cine actor before he turned into a politician, and it is said that he was following the foot-steps of M.G. Ramachandran of Tamilnadu in establishing his party. The Party after winning election assumed office of the government on 9 January, 1983, in a unique and unprecedented manner in the history of the country. His ministry was sworn, in front of the people who witnessed the oath-taking ceremony of all the ministers.NTR came to power, all by himself without any political experience or without help from any established political party. He adopted a new method of electioneering, and defeated all the stalwarts in the game of politics and was a source of inspiration to all the youth and the old alike. His party candidates won in most of the constituencies because of his popularity but for him the candidates could not have won the elections, many candidates were unknown young men and women chosen by his party.The emergence of TOP appears to have changed not only the course82 of history of Andhra Pradesh but it posed many problems to the Centre and to the leadership of Mrs Indira Gandhi. The TDP created news in the world-media and after NTR assumed office as Chief Minister he had taken a series of sporadic administrative as well as political decisions. It was alleged that due to his inexperience in the field, he was hasty in taking decisions affecting all sections of the people in the fields of politics, religion, civil service, business, students, teachers, the common man, and the centre-state relations. The people were forced to look to the government for changes day in and day out for one reason or other.This study attempts to analyse the NTR wave and see what the future holds for the party and the society. Does the impact remain longer or will it fade away just as it emerged? It remains to be seen whether the party achieves its objectives, provides clean administration and establishes a welfare society.The study goes into the details of the Manifesto issued by TDP and the election promises made to voters, election technique - the campaign and propaganda employed. NTR drew thousands of people night and day in his historic 19 day electioneering and this explains the cause of TDP's victories. This study is limited in its scope and confined to only the emergence of T.D.P. and formation of N.T.R. government in 1983.Emergence of Telugu Desam PartyOn 28 May, 1981, the 59th birth day of Nandamuri Taraka Rama Rao, the matinee idol of the Telugu screen who having acted in 300 films or more and thus carved out for himself a place in the hearts of the Telugu people as a star, disclosed to a group of journalists while shooting for a film in Ootacamund, that he desired to enter into public life on the completion of his "Shashti-Poorthy" (60th year). Following this hint, members of his 900 fan clubs began to press him to join politics.In June 1981, Rama Rao celebrated the marriage of his daughter with N. Chandrababu Naidu, Minister in Anjaiah's cabinet and this relationship in a way expedited the process of his joining politics. Further, a controversy over the chairmanship of Chittoor Zilla Parishad led a rival Congress group spread a rumour that Naidu was in league with his father-in-law to form a regional party on the lines of AIADMK in Tamilnadu.In February 1982, Rama Rao went to the Raj Bhavan of Andhra Pradesh to witness the oath taking ceremony of Bhavanam Venkatram Reddy and other members of his government. Rama Rao met there a number of congress leaders who suggested that he should go in for the membership of the Rajya Sabha in order to fulfil his desire to do social service. 83 On 29 March 1982, he formed the "Telugu Desam" party, at a time when speculation was rife that Assembly elections would be held in July that year.Until 1983 when Telugu Desam captured power, Andhra Pradesh had experienced an uninterrupted rule of the Congress even though the latter had always been a divided house. To look into the factionalism of the Congress, it suffered its first set-back in 1951 when a split occurred in its ranks. One faction led by Prof. N.G. Ranga formed the Krishikar Lok Party (KLP) and the other the Kissan Mazdoor Praja Party (KMPP) by T. Prakasam. Later on, the KMPP merged itself with the Socialist Party and became the Praja Socialist Party. Prakasam left the PSP to join back the Congress fold and became the first Chief Minister of the Andhra State. After 13 months of its existence, the first Andhra Ministry was over thrown by a vote of no-confidence necessitating a mid-term poll. A United Front was formed under the leadership of the Congress party, with the KLP and the PSP as its other constituents. After the Telangana armed struggle of the peasantry,1 the communist emerged as a powerful political force to be reckoned with. The 1957 elections administered to it a major blow in terms of its representation in the state legislature.2 However, it staged a come-back in 1962 elections and became the major opposition party in the Assembly.3 Another significant development of the period was the famous Mulki agitation in the late 1960's it demonstrated the discontentment of the Telangana people against Andhras. The very logic on which Andhra was separated from Madras operated here in as much as the people of the Andhra area in their turn would practise exploitation of the less developed Telengana area. The understanding was that if an Andhra becomes the CM., the Deputy Chief ministership must go to Telangana4 and vice versa. This understanding was flouted by Sanjeeva Reddy who abolished the post of the Deputy Chief Minister5. To highlight the injustice thus done to the Telangana people, the Telangana Praja Samiti (TPS) was formed by M. Chenna Reddy as its Chairman. This movement was engineered by the feudal interests both in Telangana and Andhra areas.6 Ultimately, the TPS dissolved itself and joined the Congress (R). Thus, came to an end the TPS, which started with the head of a lion and disappeared with the tail of a snake7.Ever since the formation of Andhra Pradesh in 1956 various factors have contributed to the waning of the opposition parties and groups. Every successive election since 1957 marked their decline. In 1952 the Communists with the credit of having organised political and mass movements84 had seemed to be a sizeable force. For, they and the independents supported by them, together polled 20 per cent of votes and 39 seats in the Andhra region as against 29 per cent of votes and 39 seats by the Congress. Many notable Congress candidates had also been defeated8. In those days, the Congress could not withstand the fierce onslaught of the mighty opposition mainly due to the relatively stronger support that the latter received from non-Telugu speaking areas of Madras and Hyderabad states which were traditional weak spots for the communists.9 In 1957 the Congress recouped its strength by mobilising all non-communist parties against the communists. Since then there was no looking back and no other political group or party could fill the vacuum to make up for this erosion of the opposition support base. Subsequently, the opposition parties and groups under different labels - the Swatantra Party, the Jana-Congress, the People's Democratic Party, the Telangana Praja Samiti, the Janata Party and the Lok Dal, failed to project a viable alternative to the Congress party. In essence, the dissidents of the ruling Congress posed themselves as opposition. In fact, dissidence in the ranks of the Congress particularly in this State has been a chronic feature. The different elections were fought between the official candidates and its unofficial candidates, the latter posing as opposition. Thus, factionalism and infight in the Congress helped the opposition candidates to some extent It is this factionalism in the Party which has constrained the Congress (I) High Command to change the chief minister four times within a period of four and a half years, (i.e. between March, 1978 to September, 1982).10 Not only that, the Andhra Pradesh Governor set a new record by swearing in 177 ministers within three years.11 Referring to the nomination of K. Vijayabhaskara Reddy as Chief Minister, the State Lok Dal chief remarked that it was the second time that Mrs Gandhi had chosen one who was not a member of the state legislature12, the first being T. Anjaiah. Dr Chenna Reddy was replaced as Chief Minister because of the revolt against him by his cabinet colleagues. Anjaiah was then the Union Minister for Labour when he was asked to succeed Reddy as Chief Minister. Later on, when he was unceremoniously asked by the Congress (I) High Command to step down, there was no justifiable reason for his ouster. The criticism against Anjaiah was non-performance and he was censured for not reducing the cabinet strength of 43 members despite repeated hints.13 Bhavanam Venkatram Reddy was then appointed as the Chief Minister.Though single party dominance continued since Independence and the85 opposition parties failed to evolve a distinct indeological orientation, the politics in Andhra Pradesh was dominated by intra-party conflicts of the Congress. The role of opposition parties was minimal, whereas all the political activity in the state, including the steel plant agitation, Telangana and Andhra agitations, were initially started by the Congress dissident leaders. The opposition parties could sustain these agitations only so long as the Congress factional leaders worked against their rivals and no sooner the differences were sorted out than they conveniently gave up the struggle and rushed for political patronage. The in-fighting in the Congress ranks also shifted the locus of the decision-making power from the state Congress to 'New Delhi'. Instead of party politics, personal decisions of Indira Gandhi decided the fate of the State since 1971 and more particularly since 1978. As such, there was no politics of party or parties in the State except politics of persons and personalities as directed by Indira Gandhi.14 In fact, it was during the regime of P.V. Narsimha Rao that central interference began to increase. When J. Vengal Rao, though a choice of the Prime Minister, started functioning little independently, he was eased out.The Congress M.L.A.'s confirmed that the politics in the State was an extension of the leadership of Indira Gandhi and that the State leadership was nothing more than puppets installed by her. The party system in Andhra Pradesh had virtually disintegrated, yielding place to the personality cult. The argument was further strengthened when the Congress legislative party requested the Prime Minister to select a new Chief Minister in the place of Chenna Reddy. As many as two-third members of the Congress party were opposed to his leadership but they would not dare to change him or suggest an alternative name in his place. Indira Gandhi was virtually treated as a Mother Goddess (Amma) with a magic power to solve all problems from rising prices to poverty. The ministry showed unflinching loyalty to her. Under the circumstances, it is not untrue to say that politics in Andhra Pradesh moved round the personality of Indira Gandhi and not based on political parties. There was no single leader in the State who could command the faith of the people or lead them in their distress. All instructions came from the Centre and the local leaders followed them obediently. The State government thus for all practical purposes emerged as a puppet government in the hands of the Centre.The situation existing in the State was ripe and NTR's decision to start a new party was widely welcomed by people from all walks of life. NTR announced his decision to form the new party, and said that he was "entering86 public life to serve the suffering masses in Andhra Pradesh".15 He observed that a new party was needed to "protect the honour and self-respect of the six crore Telugu speaking people" and to unite them in a new bond of kinship. The prevailing atmosphere was conducive for the emergence of a new party called Telugu Desam under the leadership of NTR.The aim of the Telugu Desam Party was that of "uniting the people of the state on the basis of common bond of the Telugu languge." Like E.V. Ramaswami Naicker instilling in the Tamils a certain pride about the glories of Tamil language and its superiority over an Aryan language like Sanskrit, NTR laid emphasis on the pride of the Telugu language. It is against this backdrop that the formation of Telugu Desam gained importance. NTR accused the state leaders of "bartering away the interests of the Telugus for personal ends."Causes of the failure of Congress and rise of Telugu Desam:(1) Corrupt Administration: During the regime of Chenna Reddy, Indira Gandhi who was out of power, asked him to collect funds for the 1980 parliament election. The Congress (I) which had limited sources to raise the election funds concentrated on Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka where it had still retained its hold, Chenna Reddy continued the fund collection even after the elections and in due course of time 'institutionalised' corruption. Some of his ministerial colleagues were also accused of corrupt practices and he was removed from the office mainly due to corrupt administration.The administrative and political corruption spread to every nook and corner of the State. Thus, with change of Chief ministres frequently the eradication of corruption became too difficult; instead, it spread widely in the State, acquiring stronger and deeper roots. Thus, the stink of corruption, inefficiency and the greed to make money were the main causes for the Congress defeat.(2) Failure to implement the Party programme: Indira Gandhi's 20-point programme as also the 5-point programme of Sanjay Gandhi, which aimed at the uplift of the downtrodden, had immensely impressed the masses particularly when these were faithfully implemented by the then Chief Minister, J. Vengal Rao. It was because of these programmes that the Congress (I) had been returned to power in the heyday of the Janata rule. Chenna Reddy, who succeeded Vengal Rao, did not take much interest in the welfare programmes. Instead, he concentrated on parliament elections (1980) and afterwards he wanted to enjoy that glory.87 Even Anjaiah and Venkatram though failed to implement the party programme, simply tried to drag on by worshipping Mrs. Gandhi. The programmes which were already started for the benefit of the Harijans continued automatically to some extent but other programmes which were aimed at the uplift of the downtrodden and backward classes severely suffered. The poor and the middle class people were also effected by the price hike and the non-availabilty of essential commodities. Thus, it was evident that though the Harijans favoured the Congress(I), the middle class and the backward class were gradually alienated from it and favoured the new party.(3) Factionalism in the Congress (I): The Congress (0 split of 1978 created chaos in the party and left it as a divided house. Members joined the Congress at their will and left at their convenience. Though factionalism was a characteristic feature of the congress (I), it became rampant after 1980. P V Narasimha Rao and Shiv Shankar shephered their own groups and continuously interfered in the state administration to change the leadership and to include or exclude certain ministers during their tenure as Union Ministers. All the former Chief Ministers particularly Brahmananda Reddy, Chenna Reddy, Anjaiah and Venkatram and their own groups vigorously worked against one another. Even the senior ministers like N. Janardhan Reddy, Baga Reddy and Kona Prabhakar Rao had their own groups and they too cut one another. Obviously, their infighting indirectly helped for victory of the Telugu Desam party. Once a top Congress (I) functionary rightly pointed out, "If Rama Rao had one more week to Campaign in the Telangana region, our 60 seats would have been reduced to six"; another commented that" we were defeated by ourselves".(4) Conflict of caste interests: There also existed regional and caste groups in the State. The Reddy community with only 12 per cent of the population wielded a disproportionate position of pre-eminance; seven out of the eleven chief ministers belonged to it. Though spread in different factions, they hanged together when their community interests were at stake. With five per cent population, two Brahmins became the chief ministers. The Kammas had a population of 8 per cent and they dominated the State's farming and trading interests though they never occupied a pivotal position or tasted power. No chief minister ever hailed from that community. Against such a backdrop, NTR's challenge assumed new meaning, for it symbolised Kamma aspiration, the latter had rallied round him. On its part, the Congress (I) tried to counteract the exodus from its ranks by reducing the number of tickets of the Reddy's for 1980 election 88 from 81 (in 1978 election) to 69. But all in vain.(5) Interference of the Centre: The decision - making power in the State affairs had shifted to 'New Delhi1 since the time of the leadership of P. V. Narasimha Rao. In the garb of party observers, the central leadership interfered. Instead of containing the factional fights, it contributed to their growth. The New Delhi power brokers used the State leaders like pawns and made them shuttle between Hyderabad and Delhi. From the selection of candidate for a by-election to the change of chief ministership, the Congressmen repeatedly visited New Delhi in order to pull the strings in their favour. People were disgusted with frequent changes in leadership and undue pressure from the Centre. This paved the way for the rise of the Telugu Desam.(6) Distraction of women voters: Hitherto, the women voters who constituted more than half of the electorate were attracted by Indira Gandhi. When NTR entered politics and promised to them security, equal property rights with men, and a separate university, they changed their allegiance to the Telugu Desam Party.(7) Other Factors: Undetterred by any strong opposition party, on the one hand, and backed by an overwhelming legislative majority, on the other, the Congress(I) had committed many mistakes which had led to the losing of its grip on the electorate, particularly after the elections to the Panchayati Raj institutions and local bodies. Its defeat in the crucial elections for the Vijayawada and Vishakhapathnam municipal corporations at the hands, respectively, of the two communist parties and the BJP, is especially note worthy.The Telugu Desam Party particularly attracted the youth, because of its promise to provide employment opportunities to them. Impressed by its programme, they pleaded with their elders that the rot had set in the Congress(I) and that they should, therefore, vote for a change' and give one chance to the Telugu Desam party. The electorate which was disillusioned by the prevalence of corruption, inefficiency, soaring prices, atrocities against the women and the general collapse of the law and order structure, fell for a change.Above all, the Congress(I) under-estimated the popularity of NTR. His sincerity and cine glamour surpassed the charismatic appeal of even Indira Gandhi. The election was virtually between Indira Gandhi and NTR (Amma Vs Anna).When Rama Rao was ready in the early days of March, 1982 to start a new political party, Nadendla Bhaskara Rao, who once aspired to become Chief Minister and twice thrown out of the ministry by Chenna89 reddy and Anjaiah, announced his resignation from the ruling Congress(I). In a news conference on 23 March 1982 he stated that he was completely disillusioned with the functioning of the Congress(I) and expressed his willingness to join the new party. Gouthu Latchanna, MLA President of the State Lok Dal also welcomed NTR's decision to enter politics and form a regional party. Sunkara Satyanarayana, MLC, and General Secretary, Lok Dal, congratulated NTR on his decision to enter politics in the interest of the State.Finally, on 29 March 1982, Rama Rao formed the new regional party, Telugu Desam and declared that the Party would extend support to the party in power at New Delhi (whichever it may be) and so far as policies inside the State were concerned, they would pursue them independently. Four congress (I) M.L.A.'s -N Bhaskara Rao, CNarayana, Adaiah and G.Rattaiah, joined the new Party. The youth, who had organized themselves as NTR fans' associations or clubs, enthusiastically hailed the birth of new Party.To refute the criticism of the Congres(I) leaders that Kammas (both NTR and Nadendla are Kammas) had formed a separate Party to safeguard the interests of the rich, NTR declared on 31 March, 1982 that his party would support land reforms, ceiling on urban incomes and dispersal of industries throughout the State. He also firmly opposed the collection of donations by the private engineering colleges and affirmed that banks and financial institutions should lend money for huts and not for the construction of buildings.The flag that was designed for the Party consists of a wheel in red colour representing the industrial front, plough in green colour to symbolise the farmers' community and a hut in white colour, with a yellow background. The first convention of the Party was held in the Nizam College grounds at Hyderabad on 11 April, 1982. Hundreds of party workers participated in the closed meeting and thousands of people attended the convention in the evening. Rama Rao said, he took to politics, to do something for the people of Andhra Pradesh who showered their affection and admiration on him. He categorically criticised the Congress(I) rule in the State and promised to restore the 'Telugu pride'.The Party started its activities after the first convention. A steering committee was constituted to chalk out the future programme. NTR and the steering committee members started meeting their supporters from all walks of life. They also toured the State in order to consolidate their position before the second state level convention held at Tirupati in May, 1983.90 Thus, the Telugu Desam party emerged as an alternative in the state. Soon it caught the imagination of the people. The traditional support-bases of the BJP and the communists shifted to the new party. NTR attracted voters from all communities and all religions. The polarisation was purely political in nature. The secret of NTR's success lies mostly in his charismatic personality and film glamour. He had adopted a new technique of propaganda. Wherever he went, he attracted massive crowds at his public meeting.16 The Telugu Desam Party promised clean politics, proper leadership and smooth administration. The people reciprocated their feelings by voting this Party to power.Party Organisation and objectives :A political party is nothing like making a movie. It promises to be a slow and painful process. Normally, the organizational network is woven first and electoral politics is undertaken afterwards, for the former leads and sustains the latter. In the case of the Telugu Desam, the whole process was consummated in a reverse manner. It is only after wining the election and forming a government that it has started its party-building process from the grassroot level.Each legislator as also each party candidate who had lost in the January, 1983 assembly elections, was asked to enrol, respectively, at least 6,000 and 4,000 one-rupee members in their constituencies. The village with a village committee was made the lowest tier of the Party and constituency council, the next higher tier. This was done with a view to facilitate direct contact between the villagers and the legislators. The third higher tier is the district council. In addition to the 23 districts in the state, the Party has added two more (namely, Vijayawada and Vishak-apatnam) urban districts. Next comes the State-level council which decides party policies and strategies. It meets at least once in every quarter. The top tier consists of the central delegates conference which meets once every two years and elect the party's state executive.As with other political parties, the Telugu Desam also follows the principle of 'one person one post', except in the case of N.T. Rama Rao who is both Chief Minister and the Party President.Conscious of the need for educating his partymen, N.T. Rama Rao has started a school for future party politicians. Four hundred workers from all over the State are to be taught political principles, public administration, democracy and parliamentary practices, besides Telugu culture and history, Physical training and yoga are compulsory during the three-91 year course. These workers are required to spend a week every month with the people in order to acquaint them with the government's schemes of their welfare. After they pass out, they have to spend a year in a constitutency, at the end of which period they will be given eligibility certificates and a silver crest carrying the party symbol. This training would qualify them to contest future assembly elections on the Party ticket. But to join the school a party worker must be a graduate.17 The main objectives of the party are : to unite the Telugu-speaking people, to check and prevent corruption, to protect women's honour, to provide drinking water to every village, to uplift the rural people by undertaking reconstruction programmes, to ban defections and retain the freedom of the press, to have a balanced industrialization; to serve the peasants through comprehensive land reforms; to provide living wage for landless labourers; to provide a good life to the people of Andhra Pradesh and to provide adequate protection against natural calamities like drought and flood and to delegate more powers to Panchayati Raj institutions.Reorganisation of the police force with improvement in its infrastructure, to control anti-social elements, weeding out corrupt personnel and effective maintenance of law and order have also been pledged by the party. Reform of the electoral system with a view to freeing it from money power is also proposed by the party. In this connection, the party favours the government bearing the election expenditure of regional parties according to an accepted norm.When Rama Rao was asked why he had launched a regional party he said that he had come to the conclusion that it was the only way to solve the problems of the Telugu people. A national level party could not comprehend the complexities confronting the state.18 Even though Telugu Desam is a regional party, it does not appear to believe in separatism nor does the word "Desam" in its nomenclature should raise any such doubts. The party stands for national unity and integration. It owes its allegiance to the Indian Republic and proposes to strengthen it so that it can fulfil its responsibility. The party's plea for more autonomy need not be confused with separatist demands being made by some groups in the country. Further, unlike the regional parties in Tamil Nadu, the Telugu Desam does not have any anti-Brahmin or anti-intellectual bias. At one stage, the party was criticised, particularly by the Congress(I), as being a 'Kamma' party, perhaps with a view to beating it with the caste stick.19 But Rama Rao has transcended the caste factor by providing to it larger linguistic cover2092 On 8 January, 1983, NT Rama Rao issued 10 directives to the newly elected members of the Andhra Pradesh Assembly which have come to be known as NTR's Ten Commandments.(1) Telugu Desam legislators should maintain close and constant relations with the people. When the Assembly is not in session, the legislators should go round their respecitve constituencies and attend to the people's problems.(2) They should not interfere in administrative matters like transfers and promotions of government officials.(3) They should extend full support to the Government's efforts in putting down corruption and providing a clean and honest administration.(4) Felicitations and dinners should not be organised in honour of the Chief Minister or Ministers when they go on tour. The legislators should help people represent their problems to Ministers.(5) The legislators should help in curbing the activities of selfish elements as helping the poor and backward classes is the idea of the Telugu Desam.(6) The MLAs should expose those responsible for black marketing and hoarding and other anti-social elements and bring them to the notice of the officials concerned.(7) They should actively participate in the proceedings of the Assembly and bring people's problems before the House.(8) The legislators should strictly follow the directives issued by the chief whip and whip.(9) They should help in close touch with party workers and pursue party programmes with full vigour.(10). The legislators should observe strict discipline and simplicity besides being honest. They should pledge themselves to work for the implementation of the assurances given by the party to the people at the time of the elections.On November 1st 1983, the party general secretary P. Upendra, claimed a total membership of over 14 lakhs. The party proposed to have non-official vigilance committees on ministers. Active members of the Party were to be enroled upto 2 lakhs and each active member was expected to enroll ordinary members. Active members had to pay twenty five rupees per annum as membership fee while the ordinary members paid one rupee per annum.93 III Electoral VictoryThe Congress (I) felt insecure with the formation of the Telugu Desam party. To safeguard its position in the State, the Congress (I) cautiously selected its cadidates depending on whether a candidate could win his seat or not. Many of the sitting MLA's were denied ticket and the criterion of 'Loyalists' was slightly altered. Tickets were given to some members of the Kamma community to which N.T. Rama Rao belongs. This was done to win over the favour of the Kama community. With all view to preventing dissidence and minimising differences, the factions were given due importance while choosing the candidates. But the local leaders remained sharply divided as ever. Personal animosities and political jealousies hindered them to act as a united team. Though they did not undercut one another, they did not act as a team to collectively enhance the party's prospects at the hustings.The Progressive Democratic Front formed by the Lok Dal, the Janata, the Bhartiya Janata Party, the Congress (I) and the Republican Party was dissolved following a rift among its constituent members over the issues of the allocation of seats. Both the BJP and the Lok Dal demanded more seats and blamed each other for the break-up. But within a day of the PDF splitting up, another coalition emerged excluding the BJP and the Congress (S)21.Inspite of their best efforts, the CPI and the CPI(M) could not enter into electoral understanding with the Telugu Desam perhaps because of the humilating terms22 offered by its leader, N.T. Rama Rao. He also indulged in futile negotiations with the leaders of the CPI, the CPI(M), the Janata, the Lok Dal, the BJP, the Congress (S), the Republicans and the Majlis-Ittehad. Without finding any meeting ground, he finally entered into an agreement of some sort with Mrs Maneka Gandhi, the leader of the Sanjay Vichar Manch. Thus, strong centrifugal forces among the various groups made opposition unity somewhat impossible to achieve.23 However, the Janata, Lok Dal, and the Republican parties entered into an alliance with the two communist parties and this alliance contested about 170 seats. There were only 22 straight contests out of the 294 constituencies in the State, with 3-cornered fight in 32, 4-cornered in 47, and 5-cornered in 39, while six or more candidates in the field in the remaining 154 constituencies.94 CampaignBoth the parties, the Telugu Desam and the Congress(I) had campaigned vigorously for the assembly elections. The whirlwind campaign of NTR at 60, has more than a theatrical touch, because there is something powerfully dramatic about the way he was going about his quest for political power. Ranging himself across from the galaxy of the Congress(I)'s star campaigners, who with their helicopters and fleets of cars would spare no effort, NTR confessed to his being a one-man show.24 From dawn till late in the night, he rides a 40-years old Chevrolet van, owned by his Rama Krishna Cine studios and refitted to serve as a self-sufficient campaign trailer."I have had no sleep, no food for the last three days" he once said during his campaign, his voice hoarse from addressing dozens of meetings, big and small, and riding 400 kms every day. Inside the van, he sits on an aircraft-style seat, drinking soda and mopping his brawn to wipe the sweat and grime of the meeting he has just left, mentally composing himself for the next one. The van is loaded with boxes containing cassettes of his speeches and copies of his party's manifesto which are distributed to party workers.Under the bed built to one side are stacked crates of soda-water, garlands collected from meetings are strewn on the floor. There is an ice-box and a picnic hamper with fruit. Dressed in Khaki bush-shirt and slacks, his feet in dustry sneakers, NTR is alerted to an approaching crowd of people by a buzzer sounded by the van driver. A dab of cologne, a quick glance in the mirror above the van's wash basin, and the portly screen portrayer of gods and goodness climbs and aluminium step ladder, through an open hatch, onto the roof of the coach. The effect is electric. From nowhere the crowds begin to pour onto roads. Faces of men, women and children of all ages, light up as recognition dawns. The coach keeps moving to the venue of the public meeting and soon, it is surrounded by a flowing river of people, running along pellmell, stretching far behind and ahead of the coach. Normally falling hours behind his published schedule, NTR has often kept people waiting for hours, sometimes through the night coming in the morning to meetings scheduled the evening before. But there is little impatience, and none remains as his van heaves into view. At small towns, waiting crowds hail passing cars and buses, asking for his whereabouts. Jeeps travelling ahead use loudspeakers to pre-warn town folk of his imminent arrival. His campaign symbol, the bicycle - because it is the common man's vehicle and we stand for95 the common man, he explains - is most visible. The party's yellow flags with the symbol painted on in red flutter atop poles, competing for attention with the Congress(I)'s tricolour and spinning wheel, lit up at night.NTR plays down his cinema image as a factor in his campaign. "Where is the image", he asks in brief snatches of conversation in between meeting, "I am completely black (with sun beaten) there is no glamour, this dress I am wearing is ordinary. No, it is the faith of the people". But that doesn't tell the whole story, years of film acting have left an indelible mark on the man. In gesture or body language, NTR is an accomplished performer. Whether it is the flick of a hand or a turn of his shoulders to emphasise a point, the practised skill is evident. And his campaigners use large cutt-outs of NTR as Lord Krishna heaped with garlands at important vantage points. It is a role he has often played and the identification is complete."That is why the people put their hopes on me", he says by way of explanation. "I've portrayed lots of divine characters,25 so they believe I will do what I promise, that if NTR comes to power there won't be corruption".NTR offered no palliatives, no solutions. But his message was direct and aimed at the 'Telugu heart'. He speaks of the persistence of poverty in spite of nearly four decades of independence, of Telugu honour which is trampled upon because Delhi appoints and topples Chief Ministers at will, of the Telugu language and its neglect, of the need to give property rights to women, of inflation, costs, fees which deny poor people education and medical help. And to the delight of his inflamed audiences he ridicules MLAs who are happy if they get a vehicle with a flag, a phone, a bungalow and are not bothered about anything else. Do MLAs ever come back and ask you if they can solve your problems? They take votes and go and sit in MLA quarters in air-conditioned rooms, drink and play cards. Is this that purpose why you sent them there? NTR is hampered by the lack of an organisation but relies completely on a strong personal charisma. The tension he builds with his impassioned oratory keeps his crowds cheering and rapt. Roadside meetings scheduled to last a few moments extend into minutes. A scheduled 15-minute speech is prolonged to 45. And his arrivals and departures are chaotic. "I did not come here for power", he says in his panting words, "I did not come here for money. I did not come here for status and prestige. I enjoyed all this and more. I came here as a sanyasi to follow you. I have earned money. I have96 earned status. And all because you gave it to me. I want to do something in return and serve you, vote for the Telugu Desam candidate. I hope he will not disappoint you, but if he does we will throw him out with all dishonour".And as the cavalcade moves on, there is again bedlam. The river of people again begins its unsteady flow. Rowers and garlands cascade on to the coach. Slowly the crowds ebb, and the young men remaining along with the van fall behind. The catcalls and the whistles grow softer and NTR returns to the cavernous van that is his home for three weeks. Will this emotion translate into votes? "Why not? You saw how they feel for me", he says impassively. That remains to be seen but it is a question being asked anxiously all over the state.One interesting feature of the campaign was that for the first time the cassettes carried the tapes, played them in a village for some time, distributed party badges and then moved to another village, thus obviating the need for the party volunteers making speeches. The "Bur-rakatha Dalams", which used to dominate election campaigns in the earlier years, were relegated to the background because of the lack of adequate number of troops and expenses incurred in engaging them.The election campaigns were organised mainly through two or three influential leaders of a village who were considered to be capable of turning the entire electorate into the supporters of a particular party. Invariably, these leaders would be heading different factions there. The Congress(I) succeeded in uniting these factional leaders. Therefore, it was under the impression, that since all the vote-bank leaders were on its side it would win the election. However, this assumption proved to be false.The election campaign of the Telugu Daseam appeared to be, by and 29 large, secular. Though its detractors tried to paint it as a Kamma party, it had transcended the barriers of caste, creed and religion in its elections campaign. This is borne out by the fact that of the 288 contestants, 152 belonged to the upper castes, 128 to weaker sections and 8 to the minorities, from among the weaker sections, 73 hailed from the Backward class category; 40 were Harijans and 15 Girijans. In other words, about 52 per cent of the candidates belonged to the upper castes and 45 per cent to weaker sections. The position was different in the case of the Congress(I). Whereas the upper castes had 66 per cent candidates, weaker sections constituted 33 per cent. Thus the Congress-I was tilted towards the upper castes in comparison to the TDP list (for details see table-3).97 Also TDP appears to have made a serious attempt to select candidates who were educated and younger in age. Of the 288 candidates, whose educational background is known, 28 held post-graduate degrees and 125 a bachelors degree while 33 had Intermediate qualification and 61 had passed SSC. Another interesting feature of the educated candidates was that 20 were medical doctors, 46 practising advocates and 7 engineers. Thus "professionals" alone constitute 27 per cent As for age, the State-wise average age of the T.D.P. candidates was 41. Thus, while 156 candidates were below the age of 40 years (53 per cent), those below 50 years age constituted 82 per cent of the total candidates (for details see table-1). This undoubtedly leads us to the conclusion, the selection of the TDP candidates was more in favoaur of the young educated political aspirants.The Role of the PressThere are about 446 Telugu newspapers and periodicals published in Andhra Pradesh. In these elections different newspapers adopted different attitudes in consonance with their party affiliations. 'Eenadu' a Telugu daily newspaper with the largest circulation and edited by Ramoji Rao serialised the election mainfesto of Telugu Desam and campaigned openly against the Congress(I). There were editorials almost every day exhorting the people to vote for the Telugu Desam. Many satires appeared and the corrupt practices of the Congress(I) were highlighted. Thus, it turned, more or less, into a mouth piece of the Telugu Desam Party. Besides flashing the photographs of N.T. Ram Rao on the front page all through his campaign, it made a random survey of the constituencies and forecast that the Telugu Desam would bag seats between the range of 175-200, whereas the Congress(I) would get between 50-80 seats. This was something like a gallop poll and it came true. The world media took keen interest in the elections, correspondents of the BBC and other western media toured the State and gave reports.ElectionsElections in a democracy have a great significance for they are not merely indicators of public opinion but they also contribute in a measure to the evolution of the political system in the country. They have a three-fold importance - they influence the policies of the government, the organization of parties and the opinion of the citizens.After the formation of Andhra Pradesh in 1956, four general elections98 were held for the Assembly and six for the Lok Sabha. As Andhra Pradesh forms the fifth biggest state in the Indian Union, general elections attain significance both in the organisational and operational sectors. Features that are specially note-worthy in the electoral politics of this State are: firstly, the impact of caste on elections. It is no doubt misleading to say that Andhra politics conincides with the "major caste contours of the Andhra political landscape"26 but there can be no denying of the fact that all political parties exploit caste at the time of elections. Secondly, in Andhra Pradesh the Congress(I) had an unbroken record of success in elections. In the General Elections of 1967, 1972 and 1978 the State remained its impregnable stronghold. Thirdly, during the last two and a half decades the communist parties have retained their overall voting strength. Due to the split in the ranks of the communists their legislative strength has fallen, but total number of votes polled by the CPI and the CPI(M) put together have not registered any fall. Fourthly, the local and the sub-regional issues, though of just a passing nature, had their impact on general elections. Fifthly, low literacy level of the State notwithstanding, the vernacular news papers in circulation, the number of persons having radio-licences and the percentage of participation of voters in elections are quite high. This may be due to politicisation of the voters. Participation in the freedom struggle and the agitation for a separate linguistic province appears to have created high political consciousness among Andhras. Sixthly, Andhra Pradesh like many other States of the Indian Union, has witnessed in recent years many changes in leadership roles. Until the early fifties, Brahmins, like Pattabhi Sitaramayya, T. Prakasam, Kala Venkata Rao and Burgula Ramakrishna Rao, were in the forefront of electoral politics. Subsequently, Reddys, Kammas and Kshatriyas became the dominant castes. Leaderships shifted from the urban to the rural elite. After the 1969 split in the Congress party the backward classes and other weaker sections became a new force to reckon with in elections. To satisfy their political aspirations, greater and greater representation was given to them both in the legislature and the council of ministers. Political leadership still lies with the dominant castes like Reddys, Kammas, Kshatriyas and Kapus. But the support base of the Congress(I) has shifted to the backward castes. Older vote banks have lost much of their effectiveness today and the urban elite and the members of the forward castes at best act as agencies to influence the mind of the members of the backward communities.The Telugu Desam candidates were among the first to file their nomination papers. This Party had chosen their candidates quite carefully.99 One hundered and twenty five of them are graduates, 28-post-graduates, 20 medical doctors, 8 engineers and 47 lawyers. Thus, more than 80 per cent of its candidates were highly educated persons. Their average age was 41 years as against the Congress-I's 50.A disquieting aspect of the elections was that people were asked to vote not for parties or candidates as such, but only for Indira Gandhi or N.T. Rama Rao, (Amma or Anna) as though the whole poll was refrendum on their comparative claim or competence to rule the state27. The issues on which elections were fought were mainly emotional in character. Mrs Gandhi's spoke of the divisive and regional forces that had weakened the nation. She further claimed that the Congress(I) alone could safeguard the integrity of the country and ensure its development She called upon the voters to vote and support the Congress(I) in order to enable it to execute speedily the programmes for the eradication of poverty. She also criticised the emergence of the regional parties led by inexperienced people, whose career was devoted to something else. As for N.T. Rama Rao, criticising the Congress-(I) he pointed out that thirty-five years of the Congress rule had reduced the people to a state of subjugation. He gave the slogan: "Congress(I) - quit AP.". He tried to expose the Congress(I) by referring to rampant corruption and continued central interference. He asked the voters to make a choice between freedom and slavery28.Election ResultsAs anticipated, the Congress(I) was badly routed in elections. The Telugu Desam scored a landside victory by caputring 202 seats out of the total number of 294 in the State Assembly. The Congress(I) could get only 60 seats while the Congress(S) and Janata won one seat each, the BJP 3, the CPM and the Majlis 5 each. The CPI could win 4 seats while the Lok Dal was completely wiped out.Polling had been generally peaceful, barring a few stray incidents. A record number of 2,14,96,754 voters cast their votes; roughly, seven out of every ten voters exercised their franchise. Of them Telugu Desam polled as many as 96,23,367 and bagged 199 seats. The share of the Con-gress(I)'s slumped to its lowest in the decade. The party got 70,62,792 votes as against 79,08,221 in 1978 and 74,74,225 in 1972. Gloom descended on the Party. Ironically, it was also routed in Karnataka.Some of the stalwarts who lost in the Assembly elections were the Congress-I leaders. Most of them were either ministers, or chairmen of corporations or members of Zilla Parishads. The prominent among them100 were, D. Kondiiah Chowdary, Ch. Hanumaiah, K.Krishna Reddy, N. Janardhan Reddy, M.A.Aziz, K.Prabhakar Rao, C.Dass, A.Veerappa, Ch.Venkata Rao, P.Venkata Rao, N.Amarnatha Reddy, K.Keshav Rao, N.Chandrababu Naidu* (Son-in-law of NTR), C.Nageswar Rao, R.Ve-manna, K.Ranga Rao, Y.Venkata Rao, TXakshmi Kantamma, N.Vijay-alakshi, D.Indira, B.Sree Ram Murthy, I.Rama Krishna Raju. The lucky few who managed to win on the Congress-I ticket were T. Anjaiah, M.Baga Reddy, Madan Mohan, ardhan Reddy, M.Manikya Rao, D.Munswamy, KPapaiah, Y.S. Rjasekhar Reddy, Ravindra Nath, K.E. Krishna Murthy, and S.Sidda Reddy. The Cong.(I) candidates won mostly in Telangana. The Janata Party leader, S.Jaipal Reddy, was the sole survivor from that Party while Venkaiah Naidu, the BJP leader won by a comfortable majority. The prominent opposition leaders who lost were the Lok Dal leader, Gouthu Latchanna, and the CPI leader C. Rajeswar Rao. Some Stalwarts also lost while contesting on the Telugu Desam ticket. The most prominent among them was B. Ranta Sabhapati.** The first legislature party meeting of the TDP was held on 7th January where N.T. Ramma Rao was unanimously elected the leader. His name was proposed by N. Srinivasulu Reddy and seconded by N. Bhas-kara Rao.*** The new leader administered a pledge to all the MLA's. Thereafter, he formed the ministry.Thus over one-third of the total electorate favoured N.T. Rama Rao and Telugu Desam candidates and all other parties put togehter could not manage so many votes collectively. This clearly indicates that the voters were all in all for Telugu Desam only.Analysing the occupational background of the legislators, it is found that a majority of them both in the Congress(I) and the TDP were agriculturists. There was higher percentage of lawyers in the Congress legislative party as compared to the Telugu Desam party. There are more doctors in the TDP than in the Congress(I). Significantly, for the first time traders had a larger representation in the ruling party. (See table-2 for details). The fact that there is a higher representation of the professionals, especially the doctors, reflects the growing interest of professionals in local and regional politics instead* Later he became very powerful leader of the TDP** Later he joined the Cabinet of NTR*** He became Chief Minister for one month, at the instance of Ram Lal, the then Governor and deposed N.T.R. as he lost the majority in the Assembly, for details, see, V.Bhaskara Rao "a Ram Lal - The Governor" Parliamentary Demorcracy in India, (Mitul, New Delhi, 1987.)101 of remaining a political. It may further be added that the Telugu Desam is a new party, but very few of its members are defectors from other parties and many lack political experience.ConclusionOne of the most important achievements of the TDP has been that it could strike a balance between various caste groups with emphasis on backward classes in the State. A relatively younger age-group of the legislators has taken the reigns of Andhra Pradesh Legislative Assembly. Unlike the Congress legislative party in 1978, it depended more on the educated politicians than on political experience alone. The TDP Legislators lack previous political experience and have limited connections with the co-operative movement, cultural and welfare organisations. This is because of their relatively fresh entry into politics and public life in comparison to the veteran Congressmen. This lack of political experience among members of the TDP was an electoral asset in the sense that, unlike the Congress legislators, they had not yet learnt the 'art of politicking' by associating themselves with cooperatives and such other public organisations. It is perhaps for this reason that the people voted for a younger set of better educated candidates with relatively clean records. At that moment "clean records" seemed mostly a matter of political inexperience.The election result also attest that decentralisation of power, local action and local expression are likely to find acceptance with the people. The emergence of Telugu Desam was an impetus to the formation of regional parties in other states with a bid for power. But such parties must first shed the trappings of secession, communalism, and linguistic chauvinism.102 TABLE - 1(A) Educational Qualifications of Telugu Desam Candidates in 1983 Assembly Elections Level of Education Frequency % Total Post-graduates 28 10.00 Graduates 125 43.00 Intermediate 33 11.50 S.S.C. 61 21.25 Below S.S.C. 26 9.00 Hindi Pandits 2 0.70 Telugu Pandits 1 0.35 Law Diploma 1 0.35 Engg. Diploma 1 0.35 Not known 10 3.50 Total 288 100.00 (B) Age Details 30 years or below 33 11.50 31 years to 35 68 23.25 36 years to 40 55 19.05 41 years to 50 80 28.00 51 years to 60 40 14.00 61 years to 70 5 1.75 Above 70 years 1 0.35 Not known 6 2.10 Total 288 100.00 SOURCE : Telugu Desam Party Office, Hyderabad103 TABLE – 2Occupation of the Legislators of the Ruling Parties -1978 and 1983Party OCCUPATION Congress 1978 N = 251 Telugu Desam 1983 N = 197 Agriculturists 139 (55.4) 85 (43.1) Lawyers 35 (14) 25 (12.7) Doctors 10 (4) 12 (6.1) Traders 11 (4.4) 18 (9.1) Teachers 1 (4) 6 (3) Government servants -- 4 (2) Others 4 (1.6) 8 (4.1) N.A. 51 (20.1) 39 (19.8) Total 251 (100) 197 (100) Note: (Figures in brackets are percentages).104 TABLE – 3Caste-wise Break-up of the Telugu Desam and Congress(I) Contestants in 1983 Assembly Election Total No. of Telugu Desam Candidates Total No. of Congress (I) Candidates Caste (1) Category wise (2) Caste-wise (3) Category wise (4) Caste-wise (5) A. Upper castes 152 181 1. Reddy 65 73 2. Kamma 54 57 3. Kshatriya 13 30 4. Velama 5 6 5. Brahmins 3 11 6. Vysya 7 4 B. Weaker Sections 128 81 a) Backward class 1. Kapa 26 2. Velama(BC) 10 3. Gouda 9 4. Yadava 6 5. Kalinga 3 53 6. Mudiraja 3 7. Padmasali 2 8. Agnikula Kshatirya 2 9. Kurma 2 10. Balija 1 *11. Others 9 b) Scheduled Castes 40 22 c) Scheduled Tribes 15 6 C. Minorities 8 31 1. Christian 2 12 2. Muslim 6 12 D. Not known — 19 Total: 288 293 * Others = Patkara Kshatriya-2, Gavona-1, Fain-1, Chattada Vaishnava-1, Bhavasara Kshatriya-1, Kayasta-1, Rajput-1. Source: Collected from Telugu Desam Party Office and from Congress(I) Office in Hyderabad.105 NOTES AND REFERENCES1. The Presant struggle was led by communist party controlled Andhra Mahasabha, demanding own language, civil liberty and an end to feudal oppression.2. The C.P.I. captured 15 seats in the house of 196.3. The communists got 60 seats in the Assembly in 1962 elections.4. This was the understanding in the Gentleman's agreement which was signed before the formation of the state.5. Sanjeeva Reddy called the post of Deputy Chief Minister as the sixth finger.6. Both the CPI and CPI (M) characterised this agitation in that light.7. K. Seshadri, "The Rise and Fall of Telangana Praja Samiti - A case study." in 'Indian Political Parties: programmes, promises and performance, (The Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, New Delhi, p. 308.)8. The Congress candidates who lost the election included Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy, B. Gopal Reddy and Kasu Brahmananda Reddy.9. "Dissidents as Opposition", Link - April 27, 1980, p. 19.10. Dr M. Chenna Reddy in March 1978, T. Anjaiah October 11,1980,B.Ven-katram February 24, 1982, K. Vijayabhaskara Reddy, September 20, 1982.11. The Hindu, September 21, 1982 p. 1.12. Gouthu Latchana, The State Lok Dal Chief's statement was reported in The Hindu. September 21, 1982, p. 2.13. Rajiv Gandhi publicly expressed his unhappiness over Chief Minister's style of functioning when T. Anjaiah went to receive him at the Begumpet airport on February 2, 1982.14. Conclusions arrived at with interviews from nearly 50 Congress-I MLA's by V. Hanumantha Rao in Party Politics in AP. 1956-83, (ABA Publications, Hyderabad, 1983.) p. 289.15. Quoted in Sunday. Volume 9, Issue 46, 2-8 May 1982, p. 12.16. NTR travelled for 18 to 20 hours a day in his election campaign. His inflammatory speeches were recorded and produced on several thousand cassette tapes.17. India Today. 30 April, 1983, p. 57.18. India Today. 30 April, 1983, p. 55.19. G.S. Bhargava, 'The Vote Banks that misled Congress (I)" in The Indian Express. (Vijayawada.) 8 January, 1983, P. 5.20. Ibid.21. The Hindu, (Hyderabad,) 2 December, 1981, P. 1.22. The Hindu, (Hyderabad,) 5 December, 1982. P. 1. The new alliance shared the seats, as follows: CPI-52, Lok Dal-66, Janata-43, CPI(M)-29, Independent-1 and Republican party-6.23. N.T. Rama Rao was prepared to give only 60 seats to both the Communist parties while the latter claimed 70 seats. The Hindu, (Hyderabad.) 4 December, 1982, P. 1.106 24. The Hindu, (Madras). 12 December, 1982, P. 1.25. India Today, 15 January 1983, P. 24.26. Selig S. Harrison. India the Most Dangerous Decades, P. 206.27. The Hindu, (Hyderabad,) 3 January, 1983, P. 9.28. The Times of India, (New Delhi). 6 January, 1983, P. 1.107 AKALI DAL IN PUNJABPradeep KumarRegional parties have a very special role to play in a one-party dominant system. While the system may accommodate some of the regional sentiments, it is generally incapable of coping with all the regional demands and expectations. As one political scientist1 has pointed out in such a situation as this, the provincial sentiments arc expressed through the regional parties which tend to counter-weigh the all-embracing nature of the national parties.The OriginWhile some scholars2 of Indian politics, have considered regionalism to be a post-independence phenomenon, and thereby maintained that most regional parties came in to prominance only after the bargaining culture developed in the late 50's and mid 60's, the Akali Dal in Punjab traces its origin to 1920. The Dal (Shiromani Akali Dal) emerged as a movement of the Sikhs in Punjab to liberate their Gurudwaras from the control of the Mahants who had a corrupting influence on these holy shrines3. The Dal successfully wrested the power from these Mahants after the Britishers yielded to the Akali agitation and agreed to enact the Sikh Gurudwara Act of 1925. Under the act the management and control of these shrines shifted to the newly constituted body, the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee (The SGPC). It was but natural for the Akali Dal (AD) to have a firm grip over the SGPC. This further legitimised its claim as the sole political body of the Sikhs which could speak and fight for their cause.Akali Dal's influence over the Sikh community particularly in the State of Punjab where a large majority of them live, is not only in the realm of politics but to a great extent it is true of social and religious life. Unlike108 the western concept of a secular state where political and spiritual powers are separated from one another, the Sikh tradition has still not been able to separate the "Church" from the "State". It is widely believed among the Sikhs, more particularly, the Akalis, that the power and religion go together and the former is very necessary to protect the latter.4 This intermingling of religion and politics has, more often than not, created many complications and complexities in the politics of the Akali Dal. At times the Akali Dal has claimed to be the sole political party which can legitimately lay its claim on the Sikh community.5 It is this intermixing of the religion and politics that has always kept the party's membership confined to the Sikhs.6 Here it may be worthwhile to maintain that the dependence of the Dal on the support of a particular community alone, has been a source of strength as well as weakness. This is so because the more the party tries to broaden its base (say by collaborating with other secular parties or by raising non-religious broad based demands), the more it gets alienated from its own community. The latter still looks forward to it as a band of revolutionaries ready to sacrifice their lives for the Panth.7 On the contrary, its exclusive dependence on the Sikhs and its non-secular postures tend to generate some kind of a suspicion in the minds of the minority community (the Hindus). The support of the latter (even if tacit, say through some kind of a coalition) is very vital for the Dal, in view of the sizeable percentage of this community in Punjab.8 Assertions in Post Independence PeriodWhile the Muslims remained dispersed (after the partition) almost all over India (despite their sizeable percentage in many Indian provinces, including Jammu&Kashmir where they formed a numerical majority), the Sikhs were able to find themselves in a relatively more compact region, namely East Punjab, where they out numbered the Hindus after the reorganisation of the State in 1966. If the partition resulted in the weakening of the bargaining power of the Muslims (as a result of delinking of the Muslim majority provinces), it favoured the Sikhs by giving them an opportunity to organise themselves on a territorial basis.9 It is this territorial organisation alone that makes it possible for a particular socio-cultural group to manifest its strength in a federal system. It is again this territorial organisation which imparts a federal character to a plural society.10 The Sikhs, unlike the Muslims, did not suffer from any kind of suspicion after the partition. While the Muslims elite either went over to Pakistan or receded into background as a result of the renewed efforts109 to protect the nascent slate against the onslaughts of the various centrifugal (particularly communal) forces, the Sikh elite saw a new dream of an azad (free) Punjab where the Sikhs could numerically dominate.In fact the economic component of Sikh regionalism was not so obvious in the incipient years of the Republic and most of the Akali demands for a separate Sikh State were primarily based on a fear of Hindu domination.11 All that the Akali leadership wanted at that time was to have a province where the "Sikh religion will be more safe". For this Master Tara Singh, the then chief spokesman of the Akali Dal, demanded a separate unilingual Punjabi suba, thereby making a demand for a Sikh majority State.12 The creation of the Punjabi Suba in 1966 with the Sikhs as a majority community, opened a new chapter in the life of the Akali Dal. It was only after the separation of this Sikh dominant area from the rest of the Hindu dominant (Hindi&Pahari) region that the Akali Dal could consolidate its strength. This had a sobering and moderating influence on the Akali Dal. The electoral politics became more gainful for the Akalis who were compelled by the logic of electoral democracy to adopt a more pragmatic approach to politics.13 More of it at a later stage.Like most other regional movements, the Akali movement also first concentrated its efforts on the creation of a homogeneous State. Once such a State was actually carved out in 1966, the Akali Dal concentrated its efforts on consolidation of the gains of its fight for a separate Punjabi-cum-Sikh State. The logic of reorganization did benefit the Akai Dal when in the first ever general elections in the Suba (in 1967) the Dal captured power (with the help of the Jana Sangh) for the first time in the post-independence period. Although it was at a time when the overall climate had become anti-Congress (or anti-Centre), yet the reorganization of the State was a major reason for the Akali gains.The Akali Dal's main demands in the re-organised Punjab can be categorised as (a) those dealing with the clamour for autonomy14 (b) those voiced as grievances against the Centre's allegedly anti-Punjab attitude.15 This includes demands for merger of remaining Punjabi speaking areas into Punjab, handing over the management of the Bhakra-Beas Management Board to Punjab and better deal in the distribution of river waters (c) those demands which aim at deriving more benefits for the Punjabi peasantry16 (posed as industrial-agrarian divide), and last of all, (d) religious demands of the Sikhs, such as the enactment of an all-India Sikh Gurudwara Act, declaration of Amritsar as a holy city, carrying of Kirpans by the Sikhs while travelling by air, to restore the Sikh percentage110 in the defence forces, relay of the Kirtan from the Golden Temple and recognition of the Sikhs as a community distinct from the Hindus.17 While some of these demands might have been met by the Central Government, the Akali Dal has, by and large, not accepted the Government's solutions to some of these problems. The Centre's offers have been generally inadequate for the Dal's leadership.18 A cursory glance on these demands shows that they comprise all categories of demands, viz political, religious, social and, finally, economic. If some of these demands are concerned mainly with the State of Punjab, others concern the neighbouring States too. Similarly if some concern the Sikh community alone, others seem to be secular in character. In fact a peep into the genesis of these demands will show that all of them emanate from a single factor, namely, the desire of the Sikh community to enjoy considerable autonomy within the State of Punjab. Even economic and religious demands of the Akalis reflect upon their urge for some kind of "Independence" within the federation.In the early years of the Republic when the leadership of the Dal was in the hands of Master Tara Singh, this desire was in fact the desire to combat the fear of Sikhs being absorbed into the majority community of Hindus, the line between the two communities being very thin.19 However, with the reorganisation of State on the linguistic basis and shifting of the leadership from Master Tara Singh to Sant Fateh Singh, the emphasis too changed from purely religious demands of the Sikhs to the autonomy demands for the State of Punjab in particular and all States of the Union in general. Though the demand was raised several times after the creation of the new State of Punjab in 1966, it remained somewhat vague in expression. The increasing hold of the Sant's Akali Dal over the masses after the Fourth General Elections,20 pushed back the extremist leadership of Master Tara Singh and with this, the latter's demand for a Sikh Homeland within the Union of India, receded into the background. Fateh Singh's emphasis on relatively secular aspects of politics (viz-greater autonomy for the State) took him nearer to the common massess, and made his politics more pragmatic and practical which could be accommodated within the framework of the Constitution of India, without any suspicion of fear of separation.The first ever clear expression of the Akali Dal's views on various dimensions of their autonomy demand was found in the famous Anandpur Sahib Resolution21 adopted at Shri Anandpur Sahib in October 1973 by the Working Committee and finally ratified by All-India Akali conference in October 1978 at Ludhiana. Though the Anandpur Sahib111 resolution aimed at spelling out the demands of the Akali Dal, it became quite controversial owing to the vagueness of expression. The "resolution" was drafted in the Gurmukhi script and the meaning and the nuances of the various words of the Punjabi language do not have the exct counter-parts in English. Moreover, some words were capable of being interpreted in more than one ways.22 This confusion was made worse by the various interpretations of it given by the leaders of various political shades and at times by the leaders of the Dal itself. While on several occasions the senior Akali leaders23 have attempted to clarify that all that it demanded was autonomy to the State within the federal set-up and that there was not even a tinge of secession in it, the resolution goes to the extent of demanding that all powers except the defence, foreign affairs, communications, railways and currency, should be handed over to the State. As if this was not enough, even the power to frame its own constitution has been demanded for Punjab. In fact the Akali leaders have often cited the Russian analogy in this connection thereby asserting that even the right to secede from the Union does not go against the unity and integrity of the nation.24 This reference to the U.S.S.R. had sometimes given an impression that the Akalis want to share the sovereignty of the country and have diplomatic relations with other countries.25 The suspicion of the resolution also gets strengthened with the emotional speeches, made at times, by some senior Akali leaders, giving expression to the idea that it would have been wonderful if the Sikhs had decided to keep their separate territorial identity, like the Hindus and the Muslims, at the time of partition, thereby prefering even the semi-autonomous sikh State (as proposed by Jinnah within Pakistan) to the present federal set up of India26. Not only this even the senior leaders are reported to have demanded rewriting of the Constitution on Russion lines.27 It is generally alleged that the Akalis fight for autonomous status only when they are out of power but keep mum over the issue when they share power in the State. While there may be some truth in it, the Akalis have never allowed the issue to slip away from their hands. This is natural for a party which harps on the religious support base. Whenever the party feels demoralised on the election front it has to get back to its Sikh clientele which alone can revitalise it, it being essentially a party giving expression to the religious and social grievances of the Sikhs in particular. Quite vocal speeches were made by the Dal leaders during the period 1977-79 when it shared power with the Janata Party at the Central and the State levels. The then Education Minister of Punjab, Sukhjinder Singh, joined the issue with the Union Government on retaining education on the con current112 list after the 42nd Amendment. While there was some justification for Central planning soon after Independence, he alleged, it was shocking if the Centre succumbed to the temptation of arming itself with additional powers, even after so many years.28 Similarly, the then Akali Chief Minister of Punjab demanded at a meeting of the Committee of the National Development Council that it was logical that the quantum of Central assistance to the States was at least equivalent to 50 per cent of the total resources available with the Centre for Plan purpose, as against 29 per cent in 1977-78 and about 31 per cent in 1978-7929. The Chief Minister Parkash Singh Badal infact maintained that although the States had the main responsibility for development, the devolution of taxes favoured the Centre with a lion's share30. With regard to the depressed cotton prices the Akali Chief Minister pleaded his helplessness thereby maintaining that the Centre alone enjoyed real powers.31 The then President of the Dal, Jagdev Singh Talwandi, went to the extent of alleging Central discrimination against Punjab and described the Janata rule as "old wine in new bottles".32 The demand for autonomy was also made an issue in the SGPC election held during the Akali -Janata regime.The party manifesto of the Akali Dal for the 1980 Vidhan Sabha polls once again emphasised the old demands ranging from the issue of Punjabi speaking areas and the demands for internal autonomy to the modification of the formula for the distribution of Ravi-Beas waters. The manifesto also pledged to take away from the Centre the power to dissolve the Vidhan Sabhas.33 After losing power in the 1980 elections, the Dal continued to raise these demands in various formus.34 While the main grievances of the Dal may have remained the same old allegations of discrimination by the Centre against the State of Punjab in general, and the Sikhs in particular, the developments of 1984 (operation Blue Star, the assasination of Mrs Indira Gandhi and the anti-Sikh riots that followed her assasination), have changed the content and tone of these grievances. The short lived Akali Government that came to power after the 1985 elections, held in the pursuance of Rajiv-Longowal Accord (popularly known as Punjab Accord), could not fully satisfy the aspirations of its own cadres. As is usually the case with the Akalis, they are good fighters but not so good rulers. The Dal soon got split up and a separate faction under the leadership of the former Akali Dal Chief Minister Parkash Singh Badal came out of the Government to form a separate Dal, naturally opposed to the old faction which now came to be known as the Akali Dal (L). This split (which in some113 quarters was termed as power struggle only) added momentum to some of the new demands of the Akalis and the Akali Government of Surjit Singh Barnala was embarrassed to face the allegations of toying the line of the "anti-Sikh-Congress-Centre". The new emphasis was now on such demands as transfer of Chandigarh to Punjab (as envisaged in the Punjab Accord) without simultaneously transferring the territory from Abohar-Fazilka area in lieu of Chandigarh. Later demands for the release of Jodhpur detenus and stoppage of "State terrorism" and killing of "innocent Sikh youth in false encounters", gained momentum. In fact some of these demands have been picked up by the Akali Dal (Longowal) itself after the dismissal of its Government in May 1987 on the eve of Haryana assembly elections.Elections and the Akali ParticipationThe Akali Dal has always adopted the constitutional as well as the extra-constitutional methods to press its various demands. Its strategy, though at times agitational, has always kept an eye on the electoral prospects of the party in various general elections. This has, however, been a more successful strategy after the leadership passed into the hands of the relatively moderate faction of the Dal and after the Sikh dominant State of Punjab came into existence in November 1966. The Dal realised that it had no choice but to participate in the elections with all ernestness to capture power in the newly carved out State. The Akalis could never secure a sizeable number of seats in the combined state of Punjab but in the Fourth General Elections, they secured 24 seats with 20.5 percent of total votes polled.35 The mid-term polls held in 1969 further increased the Akali share in the electoral gains when it could capture as many as 43 seats with 29.59 per cent of total votes polled. This was more significant in view of reduced strength of the Punjab Vidhan Sabha after the reorganisation of the State. Earlier in the third general elections the Dal had won only 19 seats - with 11.7 per cent of total votes polled and in the 1957 general elections the Akalis had joined the Congress party in large numbers.The electoral successes in the 1967 and 1969 polls made the party more enthusiastic and pragmatic at the time of 1972 assembly polls. The Dal very strategically entered into an alliance with the urban-Hindu-Bania based Jana Sangh to counter the Congress strategy to capture power. The Dal also decided to extend its support to the CPM nominees. However, its anti-Congress strategy which had made it strike a bargain with the Jana Sangh miserably failed. The Congress - CPI combine114 was able to capture the majority in the State.The Akali defeat in the elections made the job of the moderates very difficult. The Anandpur Sahib resolution (referred to earlier) may be seen in this light. It aimed at revitalising the declining influence and grip of the Dal on the Sikh masses. However, the events took a turn in the mid-75 when the Akalis, like most other opposition parties, found them once again pitted against the Congress. This confrontation was qualitatively different from all other confrontations that the Akalis had faced against the Congress-dominated Centre. The 19 month emergency had given them an opportunity to unite once again with the Jana Sangh-turned-Janata in Punjab. It was a fight for survival. The anti-Congress sentiments were as strong in Punjab as elsewhere in northern India. The result was that the Akalis once again captured power in the June 1977 elections, this time with the help of the newly formed Janata Party. The Akali Dal secured 58 seats while its coalition partner Janata got 25. The latter had pleaded the case for decentralisation though it never went to the extent of supporting all that the Akali Dal wanted in the name of autonomy.36 Like in many other States of north-India, the Congress recaptured its dominance in the State of Punjab after the May 1980 Vidhan Sabha polls. The Akalis got only 37 seats (with 26.9 per cent votes) out of the 73 that it contested. This time there was some change in the electoral alliances. The Bhartiya Janata party (BJP), the successor of the erstwhile Jana-Sangh, decided to go alone in the elections. The CPI which had on many occasions supported the Congress, became a partner in a joint front with the Akali Dal and the CPM. This alliance was described as a political necessity37 which contested almost all the seats in cooper-tion.38 It was only at Nangal and Kharar that they clashed with each other.39 The elections of 1985 were however crucial in more than one way. In the first place, the elections were held for the first time after the operation Blue Star which had left definite impact on the Sikh psyche in general. Moreover, the anti-Sikh riots in Delhi and some other parts of north India after the assasination of the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had also hurt the Sikh community and consequently had somewhat alienated them, even if temporarily. The efforts at reconciliation via Rajiv Longowal Accord had not even completed that the signatory to the Accord from the Akali side, Sant Harchand Singh Longowal was murdered, understandably by those who opposed the Accord. The Vidhan Sabha elections, which were a part of the Accord, were, however, held almost as scheduled. The murder of the Sant was highlighted by the Dal as a115 martyrdom for peace. By and large there was a feeling among the Sikhs that the Akalis needed their electoral support. The only faction which gave a boycott call was the United Akali Dal, headed by Baba Joginder Singh, the father of the Late Jarnail Singh Bhinderwale.The Akalis for the first time emerged victorious in the State without the electoral support of any other political party. It seems that particularly the emotional factor in the wake of the sensitive incidents in the immediate past, played significant cohesive role in rallying the sikh populace behind the Akalis. It is maintained that even some Hindus this time extended their support to the Akali Dal as against the Congress party. That is why perhaps even in the Hindu dominated area of Hoshiarpur district, the Akali Dal won 3 seats. Thus with some 38 percent of the votes polled, the Akalis secured 75 percent of the seats.40 Apart from the emotional reason mentioned above, the DS-4 factor41 might have also taken away a sizeable chunk of Congress I votes thereby strengthening their rivals, the Akalis42. Last but not the least, the Akalis Victory in the elections was also attributed to some kind of an understanding in the ruling party (Congress-I) circles to allow the Akalis win the election by fielding relatively new and unknown persons on the Congress ticket The Congress&the Akalis, however denied this. The former maintained that the tickets were given to new faces only to induce fresh blood into the party.A comparative analysis of the election manifestos of the Akali Dal in the period that followed the creation of the new Punjabi suba, makes an interesting study. It seems that the Akali Dal had not forcefully pleaded for any sectarian demands, in its manifestos.43 Its emphasis had been rather on the general economic and political demands concerning broadly the general public of the State, which could conveniently be termed as secular or non-sectarian demands. This happened in 1967 elections when contrary to the Master Akali Dal's manifesto which made demand for the Sikh Home Land, the Sant's Dal simply pleaded for communal harmony and economic development of the State. This happened again at the time of the mid-term polls when the Dal got a large number of seats without making any serious reference to the autonomy demand in the manifesto. Even in 1977 the Dal did not stress the Sikh-grievances and rather pleaded its case with other secular parties. However in the 1971-72 elections the Dal did make clear references to the "really federal form" and "more autonomy" to the States particularly in the fields of finance and legislation. It also pledged to impose a ceiling on urban property to bring it one at par with the ceiling on land ownership in the rural116 areas.44 The manifesto of the dal in the 1980 Vidhan Sabha polls also made a strong plea for a complete federal Constitution and internal autonomy for the States. It also promised to set up a commission to resolve all the inter-State disputes. Keeping in view the dissolution of the Vidhan Sabhas by the Congress that had led to the May 1980 Vidhan Sabha polls, the manifesto also demanded abolition of the provisions dealing with the powers of the president to dissolve the State Legislative assemblies. It also once again promised to work for the inclusion of remaining Punjabi speaking areas into the State of Punjab.45 It seems that the moderation in the language of the manifestos of the Dal came as a result of, what can be termed as, secularisation process within the legislative wing of the party. This may be broadly ascribed to (a) the party's alliances and coalition-making with the political parties, (b) the shift in its support structure from the urban to rural Punjab and finally (c) the change in the spatial distribution of the Sikhs after the 1966 re-organisation. These three factors, put together, made the party a potential ruling party (though always with the support of the Janata/BJP). This transformation in the 70's contributed a lot towards changing the image of the Dal from a regional chauvinist party to a political party capable of ruling the State.Coalition MakingThough the reorganisation of the State elevated the status of the Sikhs to a majority community, the Hindus continued to form a sizeable minority.46 The Akalis had long time back recognised this and attempted to broaden their base by entering into electoral alliances with the other important party of the region, namely the Jana Sangh, which held a sway over the urban Hindus. The Akalis could very rightly realise their limitation that the logic of support structure would not enable them to capture power through electoral means unless the other major community also extended its indirect support to it. Thus the support bases of the two parties did not actually clash but were rather complementary.As a result of its alliance and seat adjustment with some opposition parties (the major being the Jana Sangh) the Akali Dal captured power in the 1967 Vidhan Sabha elections, the coalition government formed after the elections included the representation from the CPI. However the strained relations between the Jana Sangh and the CPI and also between a faction of the Akalis and the CPI fractured the coalition. Later defections from the Dal led to the formation of the new ministry headed by the faction leader Lachman Singh Gill, and supported (from outside)117 by the Congress party. After the mid-term polls of 1969 a new coalition was formed, this time between the Jana Sangh and the Akali Dal, under the leadership of the Akali Dal (Gurnam Singh and Parkash Singh Badal were the two Chief Ministers who led this coalition one after the other). This coalition ended a little before the 1972 elections to the State assembles.The second spell of the coalition ministry in Punjab was witnessed after the restoration of democracy in the 1977 elections. The Vidhan Sabha elections in June 1977 brought to power the Akali-Janata coalition in Punjab. The Janata, as mentioned earlier, was by and large the old Jana Sangh in Punjab. Though not much lessons were learnt by the earlier experiments with the coalition (1967-72), the fact that the Dal entered into a coalition (as a junior partner) with the Janata Party, at the Central level also, made some qualitative changes in the working of the coalition.Right since its assuming power in June 1977, the Akali Dal in Punjab came in conflict with the Janata Party, broadly on two issues.47 One of course was the old demand for greater State autonomy and decentralisation of financial powers etc. But the other issue on which the two coalition partners saw quite a strained relation, was the demand by a section of the Akali Dal to take stern measures against the Nirankari sect Here one may ignore such issues as related to prohibition, transfer of education of the State list, etc. This is a little less relevant in the context of Punjab as these issues are not peculiar to the politics of Punjab but have been raised quite forcefully by some other State Governments too. Thus the Nirankari issue and the demand for autonomy issue can be safely considered to be of special significance for Punjab. Although the autonomy issue has been raised elsewhere also (perhaps with equal eloquence), yet the geneses of the demand in Punjab are slightly different from those in other States.The Akali-Nirankari relations assumed a new political significance after the armed clash between the two that took place on the Baisakhi day (13 April) in 1978 at Amritsar. Some of the persistent demands of the Akalis since then had been the ban on the two Nirankari books, "Avtar bani" and "Yug Purush", restricting the movements of the Nirankari Baba Gurbachan Singh (who was later murdered by the terrorists) and preventing the Nirankaris from holding their Satsangs (holy congregations) at some places in Punjab. Though these demands were raised only by a faction of the Akali Dal (then known as its extremist faction) it assumed significance as this faction claimed to represent the true spirit of the118 Dal.48 Not only this, the leadership of the moderate Sikhs (like the Chief Minister Parkash Singh Badal49) was challenged by this faction.50 The Akali Dal in such a situation was placed in a dilemma where the party's coalition with a secular party (in the sense of Janata being a co-sectarian party) was at stake in view of the extremist pressures on it. The Janata leaders, both at the State and the Central levels, had expressed their resentment over the sectarian demands of a section of the Akalis.51 The Janata ultimately succeeded in restraining its coalition partner from adopting a hard line. The strong resentment against the alleged ineffectiveness of the Akali Government in tackling the Nirankari issue, shows the pressures which the moderate Akali leadership had to reckon with in order to survive its alliance with the Janata.In fact even some of the extremist leaders like Harchand Singh Longowal and Gurcharan Singh Tohra became less indomitable after they realised the contsraints on the working of their party. These leaders became less rigid and decided not to put the Chief Minister in an embarassing situation by forcing him to take a hard stand on the Nirankari issue.52 Thus, the Akalis in Punjab had been refrained from going an extremist way by their coalition partner, the Janata.53 The coalition of the Janata with the Akali Dal also resulted in the pressures on the Janata Party to listen to the Akali demands a little more seriously. In the 1978 clashes at Delhi, the Akalis were compelled to withdraw their representative from the Central Cabinet It was in fact a step towards maintaining the legitimacy of the Akali Dal a protector of the Sikh faith. This was enough to embarass the Janata partner of the coalition and consequently both the partners to the coalition agreed on a three-point settlement to ask for the withdrawal of the resignations of the two Akali Ministers, Surjeet Singh Barnala and Dhanna Singh Gulshan, from the Central Ministry. Besides this, a committee was also set up to look into the anti-Sikh preachings in the Nirankari literature.Another major issue on which the two partners to the coalition clashed, was that of greater State autonomy. The Janata Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, had been stressing the point that India was federal country but with a difference and, therefore, it had to work in the unitary spirit as evisaged in the Indian Constitution.54 The Janata President, Chandra Shekhar, was in a broad agreement with the Akalis on the demand for more devolution of powers to the States, but he had clearly opposed the move of the Akali Dal to leave with the Centre only a few items of national importance, like the defence, communications and the foriegn policy etc. He was categorical in rejecting the Anandpur Sahib119 resolution. Not only this, Chandra Shekhar even rejected the Akali demand for a true federal system.55 The Akali Dal felt that its demands for autonomy were in close approximation to Janata Party's commitment to political and economic decentralisation. It was in this context that the Janata President was invited to attend the All-India Akali Conference at Ludhiana.56 However the attempt was not fruitful and all that the Janata party agreed to, was the assurance of a frank and free discussion to devolve powers not only at the State level but also at the district and Panchayat levels.57 But in practice the Janata did not move even an inch in accepting the Akali's demand for more autonomy (either in principle or in practice).The coalition with the Janata was considered by the extremist faction of the Dal to be an unnecessary constraint on the functioning of the party. But the alliance was not a hindrance in the pursuit of the path of autonomy by the moderate Akalis. On the contrary, the alliance should be seen as a part of the strategy to bargain with the Centre, whatever little the outcome may be, the Akalis continued to pressurise the Centre through this coalition and whenever the situation was considered to be more congenial, the Akalis did not spare any chance in getting whatever little they could manage in the bargain. This happened when the Janata was in trouble at the Centre due to the internal dissensions or the threats from the opposition.Support Structure of the LeadershipThe Akali Dal generally claims to represent the interest of the Sikh community (or panth) in particular and the people of Punjab in general. However in terms of electoral support structure it has always claimed the loyalty of a section of the Sikhs, though an important section. In earlier times when the leadership was in the hands of Master Tara singh (pre-split era), the Akali Dal broadly represented the urban business community of the Sikhs, which generally was non-Jat (usually Arora/Khatri etc.). However with the shift of leadership to the Sant faction in the early 60's the support base of the Dal also underwent a change in terms of socio-economic composition.The new leaderships largely came from the Sikh peasantry of Jat origin, and was more moderate and relatively secular in nature. When the gains of the Green Revolution were consolidated in the 60's, this section of the peasantry was a major beneficiary. This affluence also strengthened their political position. Since then the leadership of the Dal has largely remained in the hands of the Sikh Jats (an agriculturally prosperous120 community)58 and the representation or support of other sections of the Sikh community was almost symbolic. On the other hand non-Jat (Arora/Khatri) and Mazbi, ad-dharmi and other scheduled caste Sikhs (these are all the lower castes among the Sikhs) have, by and large, extended their support to the Congress Party in the State.59 This is why the Congress in Punjab has always depended on these communities for countering the influence of the Dal. They have clearly opposed the demands put forward by the Akali leadership.60 So much so that the Sikh Harijans had even opposed the creation of a Punjabi Suba. The latter, they thought, would "crush" them further under the dominant Jat peasantry. These lower caste Sikhs always believed that the demand for a separate province was the demand of the Jat peasantry. To undermine the basis of the Punjabi Suba, the Sikh Harijans went to the extent of denying Punjabi as their mother tongue, and together with some Hindus, declared Hindi as their mother tongue at the time of census operations in 1961.61 It is this opposition (to the Akali demands) from the lower caste Sikhs that has paid rich dividents to the Congress at the time of general elections. It is widely believed that the Congress could rout the Akali Dal in Punjab in the Parliamentary elections of 1971, partly because of the support it could muster from the Scheduled Castes (including the Sikh Scheduled Castes) who constituted nearly one fifth of the total population of the State.62 The other section of the Sikhs that has normally found itself at a distance from the general policies of the Akali Dal, is that of the urban/industrial Sikh entrepreneurs. This perhaps accounts for the rural bias in the approach of the Akalis. It has generally been observed that the industrial and urban interests tend to support a strong Centre, and the demands for State's rights have always got strength from the agrarian population63. This is the reason that in Punjab too, the Sikh industrialists have normally opposed the Akali demands for greater State autonomy64. It has been argued by some scholars65 that the autonomy demands were raised by the rich peasants to compel the Centre to invest the surplus capital generated from the agricultural sector (more particularly after the green revolution) into the agricultural sector itself, hence the demands for investing in the agro-industries in Punjab. This industrial-agrarian divide has clearly divided the base of the Akali Dal (i.e. the sikh community) and the latter has, by and large, found itself on the side of the agriculturists.66 The 1985 elections, it seems, did not follow the support structure theory, and for a variety of reasons mentioned on earlier pages, perhaps almost the entire Sikh Community (with some percentage of the Hindus121 as well) sided with the Akali Dal. One is tempted to conclude this by the fact that the Akalis captured power on their own and this is not possible unless the lower caste Sikhs (Mazbis, Ad Dharmis etc) and the Urban middle castes (Arora/Khatris etc), the traditional support base of the Congress among the sikhs, also voted for the Akalis.Changing Contours of the Party StrategyThe working of the Akali Dal has combined both the strategies, namely constitutional methods. Though both the methods have been adopted by the Dal workers to exert pressure on the government to get their demands accepted, the dependence on either of the two strategies has been determined by the political composition of the ruling party. The Dal has generally adopted the agitational approach whenever it has been in the opposition. But when in power it has always tried to restrain its extremist faction within limits. This is a political necessity for every political party. It is worth mentioning here that on the issue of form and pace of Akali agitations, the Dal members have by and large been divided. If the legislative wing has adopted a relatively moderate approach, the organisational wing has preferred the agitational path. Or in other words, one could say that the Dal always adopted a dual approach on the issue of pressurising the government for its demands. Although, when in power, the moderate faction has been able to keep the extremist faction under its hold, yet the moderates have also been under heavy pressure to adopt stern measures to get their demands accepted. The pressure exerted on the moderate faction (headed by the then Chief Minister Parkash Singh Badal) on the issue of the anti-Nirankari measures (during the coalition of 1977-79) is a testimony to the above. It was this enormous pressure which had forced the Akali Dal to withdraw its support from the Janata-Akali coalition at the Centre and impose a ban on the Jullunder vernacular press.67 Once again the leadership went into the extrmist hands after the defeat of the Dal in 1980 Vidhan Sabha polls. This further led to a period of agitations which ultimately slipped into the hands of the terrorists.Despite the dual approach of the Akali Dal to get its various socio-economic and political demands accepted, one noticed a gradual change in its over all strategy in the 70's.68 This change was noticed in the shift of party's emphasis from a Sikh party to a party that (at least apparently) spoke on behalf of the people of Punjab. Most of the demands and grievances put forward during this period were made out to be the demands and grievances of all the communities of Punjab. It became a122 case of "anti-Punjab attitude" of the Centre rather than "anti-Sikh attitude". In fact the party had changed its form from a communal party to a regional party long back in 60's when the leadership had passed into the hands of the moderate faction led by Sant Fateh Singh. But the party became more pragmatic in approach after its victory in the 1977 elections when it collaborated with some other parties69, and made out its case for more state powers on the non-communal lines.The change in the party's broad approach was partly a result of the change in its support base from urban to rural agricultural Jat peasantry (in the 60's) and partly due to its coalition with other parties (in the 70's). the latter included not only the CPM but also the Janata Party which claimed to be national party.70 As discussed earlier in this paper the compulsions of coalescing with the Janata party restrained the Dal from taking an extreme position on communal issues.However, what is being argued is not that the Akalis ceased to be sectarian as a result of the coalition with the Janata and other parties. In fact the thrust of the argument is that while the communal tinge remained in the demands of the State autonomy, the communalism of the Dal became negotiable and pragmatic. Even though the demands made in the period, primarily aimed at the betterment of the Sikh community, the bargain with the Centre was on non-communal basis. Most of the charges that the Akalis levelled against the Centre in the 1977-79 period, were similar to such other charges as were levelled by some other regional parties also (like the CPM in West Bengal). These included charges pertaining to the Ravi-Beas waters dispute, transfer of education back to the State List, complaints of political, economic and cultural discrimination against Punjab during the 30 years of the Congress rule etc.The end of the Akali-Janata coalition rule in the year 1980, once again weaned away the leadership of the Dal from the moderates. Moreover the Dal was left free to pursue its demands through extra-constitutional agitational methods.The early 80's saw more or less complete alienation of the Akali Dal from the parliamentary politics. The rise of violence and politics of Dharma Yudha and morchas created new problems for the Akali politics. The watershed came after the happenings of June and November 1984, and the signing of the Rajiv Longowal Accord in the following year. The Accord once again brought the Akalis and the electoral politics back. Soon, however, the split in the Dal which was spearheaded by Parkash Singh Badal, made the Barnala Ministry defunct The Akali government's dismissal by the Centre in 1987 finally brought an end123 to the Akali rule. The general pattern it seems is that the Akalis fight unitedly when they are out of power, and fight separately when one faction happens to form the Government.Future ProspectsWith the increasing capability of the regional forces to manifest themselves in the wake of the declining all-India leadership, the regional parties have got a new lease of life. The post-partition climate that had made every one to see with suspicion the activities of the regional forces, has become a matter of history. After having insured the independence and integration of the country at the political level, the various sub nationalistic forces have started making a clamour for undoing the excessive centralisation in the name of nationalism. The failure of the Congress party (which for various reasons had come to develop some kind of an all-India character) to accommodate the emerging regional or State level leadership, has forced the regional sentiments to find expression in the various regional level parties71. In otherwords, the wind is in favour of the regional leadership.However, the Akali Dal has always lived in a dilemma. It has depended for its strength on the support of a particular community. While this support has given it a solid base, it has also restricted it from becoming a broad-based secular regional party of AIADMK/DMK stature, so necessary in a region where the Sikhs arc only marginally superior to the second strongest religious community in terms of numerical strength. Akali's second dilemma is that some of their demands go in fact against their election prospects. The most important is that of the merger of the remaining Punjabi-speaking areas into Punjab. It is well-known that most of these areas (such as Chandigarh and parts of Haryana, Himachal and Rajasthan) are not Sikh dominant areas and their actual merger in Punjab will further weaken the already not-so-solid electoral base of the party in Punjab.The Akali Dal has bright future, like any other regional political party, in view of the rise of peasantry in politics and changed mood of the country in favour of the regional autonomy. But, like other regional parties, it will have to undergo a metaporphosis to shed its sectarian approach. It must learn sufficient lessons from its coalition experiments with the Janata, Jana Sangh and Communist parties. The leadership must be forced by its clintele to coalesce with the other important parties of the region it will not only brighten the electoral prospects of the Dal, but will have a restraining influence on the extremist leadership of the party.124 NOTES AND REFERENCES1. Steven Muller, "Federalism and the Party System in Canada", cited by Sub-hash C. Kashyap, Indian Parties and Politics (New Delhi, ICPS, 1972) p-34.2. For example K.V. Rao argues that "autonomous provinces were artificially created in India under the Act of 1935 and the sentiments of State right as well as autonomy proper were artificial."K.V. Rao, Parliamentary Democracy of India (Calcutta, The World Press, Pvt. Ltd., 1961) pp 275-276.3. The priestly duties in most of the Sikh Gurudwaras were performed by Mahants. Many of these priests were not fully Sikhs in their priestly traditions and they also worshipped Hindu idols. As Khushwant Singh maintains some of these Mahants were men of "loose character and carried on their debauchery within temple precincts."For details see Khushwant Singh, The Sikhs Today (New Delhi Sangam Books, 1976) p 52.4. The Sikhs generally believe that Raj bina nahin dharam chale hai i.e. it is not possible to protect one's religion without acquiring political power.5. At times the non-Akali Sikhs in the Congress have been dubbed as Ganga Rams. Ganga Ram is a character in Punjabi literature and actually corresponds to a traitor or the one who has no conscience of his own.6. Though there are a few Muslim members of the Akali Dal from Maler-kotla (a muslim majority town of Punjab), and even though the Dal gave its ticket to Anwar Ahmad, a Muslim for the Vidhan Sabha poll, the non-Sikh representation is only symbolic. Even in these cases the members enjoy only "associate" status.7. Some Sikh voters in the Kajauli and Khunt villages of Rupnagar Parliamentary Constituency (1977 - General Elections) of Punjab told this author that they were voting for the Dal to protect the "Panth". Some of them even said that if Guru Gobind Singh could sacrifice his two sons to safeguard the religion, why could not they cast vote for the same. It was much smaller a sacrifice, they added.8. The Sikhs constituted 60.2 per cent and the Hindus 37.5 per cent of the total State population at the time of Census operations in 1971. The percentage of the Sikhs has gone up to 60.8 as per the 1981 Census.9. The Sikhs constituted just 12% of the total population of Punjab before the partition of the country in 1947. The percentage rose to 33% (1961 census), as a result of delinking of Muslims dominant areas. However the Sikhs got a majority (60.2%) only after the second partition of the State in November 1966.10. A plural society is not necessarily a federal society. It can be called federal only if the plurality is organised in a territorial fashion. Moreover, it is125 the organisation of the centrifugal forces that helps them manifest themselves and again it is this manifestation that has implications in a federal society. For detail see, Pradeep Kumar, Socio-Economic Determinants of Federalism in India (A Doctoral Thesis, Punjab University, 1982).11. Master Tara Singh in an interview with the then Chief Minister of Punjab, Bhim Sen Sachar, on January 21, 1955 stated: what he had in mind was not a linguistic Punjabi State but a Sikh State where the Sikhs would be in a numerical majority, what he wanted was Azadi (independcnce) for which he was ready to revolt.Cited in Baldev Raj Nayar, Minority Politics in the Punjab(New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1966) p 37.12. For Master Tara Singh's Speeches on this issue see. Ibid, p 37. Also see, Ajit Singh Sarhadi, Punjabi Suba: The Story of Struggle (Delhi, U.C. Kapur&Sons, 1970) p 171.13. the Akalis knew that without the support of the Hindu-voters they would not be able to acquire power (through electoral means) on their own. This made them coalesce with the non-Akali parties, thereby imposing on them the constraints of a coalition.14. The Akali demands pertaining to autonomy have been spelled out in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution. For the English text of the same one may see Appendix V, in Akhtar Majecd (ed.) Regionalism: Developmental Tensions in India (New Delhi, Cosmo Publications, 1984) pp 203-206.15. The grievances could be catalogued as those pertaining to the attitude of the Centre in regard to the Ravi-Beas Waters dispute, handing over the management of the Bhakra Beas Management Board to Punjab and finally the inclusion of remaining Punjabi speaking areas into Punjab.16. The Akalis claim that while mechanisation of agriculture has increased per hectare yield of foodgrains, the rising cost of the agricultural inputs has made agriculture a non-profitable profession. Consequently the procurement prices fixed for the various food grain items, on the recommendations of the Agricultural Prices Commission (APC), have remained much below the expectations of the peasantry. The Akalis therefore demand, adequate peasant-representation on the APC, subsidised agricultural inputs and higher procurement prices for their farm produce.17. A few years back, Article 25 of the Constitution of India became handy with the Akali Dal. The Akalis alleged that the clubbing of the Sikhs with the Hindus in this article, tends to merge their identity with the Hindus.18. For example: a) the Government's acceptance of the Akali demand of relaying the holy Kirtan from the Golden temple on the All India Radio, has not satisfied the Akalis. The latter want more time on the AIR for the same. b) The meat and cigarette shops have been removed from the places adjacent to the Golden temple, but the whole city of Amritsar has not been declared a holy city. c) The procurement prices of food grains126 (particularly wheat) have been increased from time to time but it has been termed grossly inadequate by the Akalis.19. Master Tara Singh stressed the need 'to retain the entity of the Khalsa Panth and — resist every effort to absorb the Sikhs into the Hindu Community". (emphasis is mine) see Ajit Singh Sarhadi Op-cit p-171.20. The seats won by the two Akali Dals in the Fourth General Election (in the 104-member Vidhan Sabha) were as given below: Akali Dal (Master Tara Singh) 2, Akali Dal (Sant Fateh Singh) 25.21. For details of the Resolution, See Akhtar Majeed Op-cit. or V.D. Chopra et at Agony of Punjab (New Delhi, Patriot, 1984).22. For example the words quam and azadi could be interpreted as community/nation and freedom/independence. For details one may see, K.S. Khosla. "Ambiguities in Anandpur Resolution" in Times of India April 2, 1982 p 7.23. While participating in the debate on the budget estimates for 1982-83 in the Vidhan Sabha, Akali leaders, Surjeet Singh Barnala and Balwant Singh have given this interpretation of the Resolution. See K.S. Khosla Ibid.24. See The Tribune March 19,1979 p 11.25. See Ibid March 21, 1979 p 1.26. Gurcharan Singh Tohra, a senior leader of the Dal is reported to have given expression to this idea. See "a Victory for Moderation", in The Tribune October 9, 1978 p-4.27. The SGPC Chief, Gurcharan Singh Tohra was one such Akali leader. See The Tribune December 27, 1978, p 1.28. See The Tribune May 23, 1978, p 1.29. Ibid. August 22, 1978, p 10.30. Ibid. December 27, 1978, p 7.31. Ibid. December 27, 1978, p 7.32. Ibid. December 27, 1978, p 7.33. Shiromani Akali Dal dachon Pattar (Punjab Vidhan Sabha 1980) (Sri Amritsar, Shiromani Akali Dal, 1980) pp 3, 5-6.34. See the Indian Express February 4, 1981, p 5. and also the Times of India, April 14, 1982, p 1.35. This docs not inclued 2 seats won by the Master Akali Dal. The Sant and the Master Akali Dals together secured 26 seats and 25.05 per cent of votes in the Fourth general elections. Sources: the Times of India Directory SYear Book, 1967 pp 1052 to 1055.Asian Recorder 1967, pp 7619. 762336. See Election Manifesto of the Janata Party (1977) (New Delhi, Janata Party, 7 Jantar Mantar Road, 1977) pp 8-10.37. The alliance of the three parties was described by the Secretary of Punjab CPI, Avtar Singh Malhotra, as "a political necessity which is neither new nor exceptional in today's politics". He interestingly conceded that there was no ideological affinity between the Akali Dal and CPI and the broad differences on policy matters still remained between the two. The Tribune May 13, 1980.127 38. The CPM leader from West Bengal, Jyoti Basu was to reach Chandigarh on May 20 on a three-day tour of Punjab to canvass for candidates of the three parties front CPI, CPM and the A.D. See The Tribune May 15,1980.39. While in Kharar it was the CPI candidate who contested against the Akali Dal candidate, at Nangal the fight was between the CPI nominee and the CPM candidate. The third such place where the front had earlier failed in reaching the choice of a joint candidate was Dasuya - where CPI and the CPM both had fielded their separate nominees. However, the CPI nominee later withdrew in favour CPM candidate.40. See Voting Bhaviour in Punjab election 1985: Report of a seminar.41. Pamphlet Series I (Institute of Social Sciences, New Delhi, 1986) p.4 DS-4 Dalit Soshit Samaj Sangharsh Samiti is an organisation of the lower castes powerful in the Doaba region.42. See Voting Behaviour in Punjab Elections Op cit p. 5.43. See the manifestos of the Akali Dal released from time to time on the eve of Vidhan Sabha Elections.44. See Manifesto of the Akali Dal released in Chandigarh on February 1,1971. Also see Asian Recorder 1971, p 10024.45. Shiromani Akali Dal da Chon Pattar (Punjab Vidhan Sabha 1980) Op-cit. pp 3-5.46. The Hindu continued to constitute 37.5% of the total population in 1971.47. For a detailed analysis of these issues, please see, Pradeep Kumar, "How a National Party coalesces with a Regional Party: A Study of Akali-Janata Coalition in the period of 1977-79." in the Indian Journal of Politics Vol. XIV No. 1,2 and 3 1980.48. Jaswinder Singh Brar, an Akali leader, had claimed that the Akali Dal Chief and the SGPC President (the extremist faction at that time) represented the soul of the Akali Dal. The Tribune September 29, 1978 p 1.49. Prem Bhatia, the Editor-in Chief of The Tribune observed, "Punjab could not have had a more secular or a more acceptable Chief Minister at this time than Mr. Parkash Singh Badal... he is not agressively theocratic, Further, he had a background of educational and social upbringing which gives him certain breadth of mind." See Prem Bhatia. "An Emotional Volcano", in The Tribune September 28, 1978 p 4.50. The former Education Minister Sukhjinder Singh had expressed his extremist stand by saying that the "conscientious" ministers might have to quit the Cabinet if the Government failed to take up measures against the Nirankaris, See The Tribune September 1978, p 9.51. The State Janata Ministers and the State level President of the Janata Party had strongly told the Chief Minister that their support could not be taken for granted. Similarly the Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, had instructed the Punjab Government to provide all necessary safeguards to the Nirankaris in the State. The reopening of the Nirankari Satsang Bhawans and lifting of the censorship from the 11 Jullunder newspapers can be accounted128 for the pressure exerted by the Janata Centre. See The Trubune September 28, 30 and October 8, 1978.52. The Tribune October 1, 1978 p 1.53. Since the Delhi Akalis, led by the late Jathedar Avtar Singh Kohli were not a party to the coalition with the Janata, they felt free to oppose the Centre's decision to allow the holding of the 31st annual congregation of the Nirankaris at the Boat Club in Delhi. The Tribune November 20,1978 p 4.54. See The Times of India, February 8, 1978, p 7.55. The Tribune October 30, 1978 pp 1&7.56. Ibid. October 27, 1978, p 1.57. Ibid. October 30, 1978, p 1.58. Jat Sikhs of Punjab are like the Patidars or Patels of Gujarat. Though the Sikh Gurus were Khatris by caste, the Jats enjoy a very high position in the social hierarchy of the Sikhs in Punjab.59. It is believed by the Congress party itself that in the 1980 Assembly elections in Punjab, a large number of Jat Sikhs voted for the Akali Dal. As against this, the Congress Party got its support mainly from among the Harijans, and the Hindus. See The Tribune June 5, 1980. Also see Pradeep Kumar&Nisha Garg, "Assembly Elections 1980: A Case Study of Candidates in a Punjab Constituency", in Paul Wallace&Surendra Chopra, (eds.) Political Dynamics of Punjab (Amritsar, G.N.D. University, 1981) pp 193-208.For the attitude of the Scheduled Castes towards the various political parties in Punjab and their views on the demand for the inclusion of Punjabi speaking areas into Punjab, please see, Pradeep Kumar and Nisha Garg, "Minorities Political Attitude a Case Study of Scheduled Castes in an Indian Village", in Indian Political Science Review, July 1982.60. See The Tribune February 5, 1979, p 8.Also see Pradeep Kumar, "Socio-Economic Determinants of Federalism in India", (Doctoral Thesis - Punjab University, 1982) Chapter VI.61. See Baldev Raj Nayar, Op-cit. p 50.62. Lloyd I. Rudolph, "Continuities and Changes in Electoral Behaviour: The 1971 Parliamentary Elections in India," in Asian Survey December 1971, p 1126.63. For details, see Pradeep Kumar, "Agrarian, Industrial and Commercial Interests in a Federation," in Journal of Political Studies, September 1978.64. The Tribune March 20, 1979 p 1.65. See for example T.R. Sharma, " Induced Capitalism and Federal Tensions in India", paper presented at an ICSSR Regional Seminar held at Kurukshetra University December 5-7, 1983.66. For details see Pradeep Kumar's Doctor l Thesis, Op-cit Chapter V.67. The issue has been discussed earlier on these pages.68. For details, one may see, Pradeep Kumar, "Communal Dimension of Regionalism in Indian Federation: A Study of trends in Akali Politics", in Akhtar Majeed, (ed.), Op-cit pp 147-158.129 69. One could refer to such parties as National Conference, CPM and Janata Party etc.70. The Janata was a national party in a very special sense of the term. It was a mixture of a number of parties which held sway over their respective regions. This made the party adopt national postures.71. For the elaboration of the point one may also see, author's article, "Growing Regionalism in India", in Asian Profile. August 1984.SOME RECENT WORKS1. Rajiv A Kapur, Sikh Separatism (London, Allen&Unwin, 1985).2. Amrik Singh (ed), Punjab in Indian Politics (Delhi, Ajanta, 1985).3. Nina Puri, Political Elite and Society in Punjab (1900-1920) (New Delhi, Vikas, 1985).4. Gopal Singh (ed), Punjab Today (Delhi, Intellectual, 1986).5. A.S. Narang, Storm Over the Sutlej the Akali politics (New Delhi, Gitanjali, 1983).6. V.D. Chopra, R.K. Mishra&Nirmal singh Agony of Punjab (New Delhi, Patriot, 1984).130 131 AIADMK IN TAMIL NADU Its Emergence And Unprecendented Growth*R. ThandavanIIntroductionNational and regional parties in India have different roles to play amidst social diversities, economic variations and political differences. Commonly, it is held that while national parties are engaged in activities that reduce diversities in the country and promote the politics of integration and modernization, regional parties are interested only in the welfare of the local groups, interests, castes or classes. Therefore much fear is entertained about the bid of the regional parties to court with the politics of traditions, culture, subnationalism and violence.1 What, then, is the nature of regional political parties? Do they function merely as political instruments for the social groups and interests? Should regional parties always resort to violence to achieve their aims? Regional parties always compete with the Centre and do not strive cooperation in Union-State relations? Do they necessarily contribute to the might of inimical forces which want the nation to disintegrate? Answers to these basic questions are manifestly important to grasp the origins, nature, characteristics and role of regional political parties in India.IIParty System in Tamil NaduAround the turn of the century, the acquisition of Western liberal education had prompted the Brahmins of Tamil Nadu to indulge in political* The article was written before the death of MGR - Editors132 aspirations. They had contributed very largely to building up of the Indian National Congress and later dominated that organisation in deciding its ends and means. The non-Brahmins of Tamil Nadu, who had been fast catching up with the Brahmins in education, had found to their distress that the Brahmin monopoly in every walk of life was unshakable. Therefore the non-Brahmins entered into a social controversy with the Brahmins and they did not hesitate to employ political means to solve that conflict. The non-brahmin political instrument was the Justice Party. Thus social problems had their sharp reflections in the political arena of the Tamils, and this trend continues to dominate till today.Politically, the Brahmins had initiated the organization of national forces in Tamil Nadu, while the non-Brahmins were responsible for the mustering up of the regional forces. With the passage of time the national forces stood divided into four major traditions, viz., Congress, Communists, Socialists and Conservatives. Likewise, the regional tradition crystalized into two groups, viz., parties for the welfare of the non-Brahmins (or progressively for Backward communities) and parties for the promotion of the glory and development of the Tamil language.While recapitulating the Congress tradition in Tamil Nadu, both the parent body and its off-shoots must be taken into consideration.2 However, the Congress neglect of the cultural specificities of Tamil Nadu and their disregard for mass politics did not allow them to move beyond a point.3 The Congress tradition is represented by Congress (I), Congress (0), Janata, Gandhi-Kamaraj National Congress, and Tamil Nadu Kamaraj Congress.The second important political force of the national tradition is the Communists. The communist force is represented by CPI, CPI (M) and CPI (ML) or Naxalite movements. The third important force of the national tradition is the Socialists. The socialist movement in Tamil Nadu contained two important streams in it, viz., democrats and Gandhians. The fourth important force of the national tradition is formed by the conservatives. The conservatives themselves can be sub-divided into communal and non-communal traditions. The Indian Union Muslim League and the Bharatiya Janata Party follow communal traditions, while the Swatantra Party before it lost its identity as a separate entity belonged to non-communal traditions.The geneaology of the regional parties, which profess the welfare of the non-Brahmins and Backward Communities, can be seen sequentially in the South Indian Liberal Federation (Justice Party formed in 1916), the Self-Respect Movement (formed in 1925), the Dravida Kazhagam133 (formed in 1944), the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (formed in 1949) and the All-India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (formed in 1972)4. The regional parties, which have attempted the propagation of the glory and development of the Tamil language, were the Tamil movement, the Tamil Arasu Kazhagam, and the Tamil Desiya Katchi.On the contrary, C.N. Anadurai, popularly known as Anna, of the Dravidian tradition, carefully blended among the Tamils the primordial concern for the non-Brahmin Backward communities and the Tamil Language. Further, he spelt out a policy of non-congressism and built a movement which could draw support from all the Conservatives and the centrists. The DMK's anti-religious posture and welfare schemes of leftist implication attracted the people to the Party in large number. Besides, the DMK had a technique of political communication of its own through oratory and cinema which fetched not only mass sympathy but also financial strength. The sheding of the demand for Dravidastan invested the DMK with political respectability and the anti-Hindi agitation that it launched in 1965 provided the immediate spark. Thus, the DMK was destined to win power in 1967 in Tamil Nadu, thereby enabling the primordialists win the day over the instrumentalists.5 IIIThe Main Differences Between the Congress and the DMKThe main differences between the Congress and the DMK were: (1) The Congress absorbed all other traditions which existed at the national level. The DMK devoured not only the national traditions except the Congress, but also the other important regional traditions which worked for the cause of the Tamil language. (2) The Congress had absorbed, in general, not merely the ideologies but also personalities from other traditions leading to factional problems. But the DMK had devoured only the ideologies of the other traditions (and very few weak personalities). Therefore serious factionalism did not appear within the DMK for quite long. (3) The Congress was concerned with only organizational problems of its growth, but the DMK gave equal attention to organizational and communication problems of the party.Since the inflow of most of these ideologies and a few personalities in the DMK were in the nature of strengthening the organization the DMK never hesitated to welcome them. However, when the influence of the film world began to dominate it, factions appeared in the DMK as well.134 In the quarrels between the organizational and extra-organizational personalities, it was seen that the former always submitted themselves to the latter. The quitting of the party by E.V.K. Sampath to form a new party of his own in 1961 and Karunanidhi's success over Neduchezhian in achieving the office of the Chief Minister in 1969 were specific instances of this truth.6 The very same problem of the clashes between the organization and the extra-organization (cinematic) personalities returned to the DMK after a decade. The emergence of Maradhur Gopalan Ramachandran, popularly known as MGR, in the politics of the State too is a case of extra-organizational strength and domination.IVEmergence of All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kaz-hagamThe emergence of the AIADMK is the outcome of intra-party factional politics of the DMK. It is an established fact that when conflicts, rigidity and factions begin to appear within the ranks of a party, sub-groups emerge. Sometimes they are found to whip up some electoral or policy controversy. Sometimes they are endeared with impressive continuity. The controversies of the first type are digested by the party as minor skirmishes. But factions with impressive continuity become troublesome, threatening the very existence of the parent party itself.7 The D.M.K. faced factional problems even before the emergence of AIADMK. One such problem arose during the lifetime of C. Annadurai and the other after his death. The former factionalism was led by E.V.K. Sampath in 1961 and later by V.R. Nedunchezhian in 1969. But these two did not affect the parent party. But the factional fight that arose in 1972 between M. Karunanidhi (the prisoner of the factional politics inside the DMK) and M.G. Ramachandran (the stalwart of the cine world and the one who had played a dominant role as a king maker in the succession struggle of 1969) rocked the organization to its very core.As early as the 1960s, Karunanidhi, Nedunchezhian, Anbazhagan and other leaders (except Annadurai) found it very difficult to share public platforms with M.G. Ramachandran. Enthusiastic audiences cheered him and almost ignored the rest. Seemingly there was a growing concern inside the DMK over the popularity and strength of MGR and his MGR manrams (political and cultural organizations) at the grass-roots level which strengthened the political base of the DMK and the charisma of135 their leader -MGR.MGR, whose early life steeped in poverty, had learnt from his experiences in the worlds of drama, cinema and politics that man should not live his life at the biological level merely to satisfy the animal appetites and desires but he must transcend those natural processes in order to live on a distinctly human level.MGR docs not believe in the self-sufficiency of material values, he desires that the unifying and ennobling impulses in human life should overrule the scramble for wealth, social position and power. His lifelong public service is inspired by the conviction that it is within the possibility of every human being to so develop as to be fully worthy of his human nature and to contribute to the welfare of all.When riches came his way, MGR began to help the poor directly. He was always the first to give disaster reliefs, to support several orphanages, hospitals, and schools and to help his collegues in the film industry and outside. This has earned him the affectionate epithet philanthropist-par-excellence. Truly, the reciprocity of his love for society and in turn, its love for him, is the secret of his success in mass relation.8 To foster the tendencies of being human, MGR cultivated several good habits from his younger days. He has been handsome, simple, soft-spoken, gentle, patient, courteous, truthful and friendly. When his association with the DMK since 1953 brought him riches he became generous and philanthropic. On the other hand, to resist the tendencies that degrade a human being he had always worked in the utmost capacity.In the world of cinema, MGR's films were born out of his own experience. Naturally, there was identification of the actor with his roles and the roles with the actor. When more and more of such films began to appear, MGR became the protector of the common man. And the common folk began to love him, discuss him, adore him and worship him in a serious vein. The fans began to organize "Rasigar Manrams" throughout Tamil Nadu. These manrams, in course of time, gave publicity of MGR's films, and also undertook the political activities of the DMK. Thus, the actor, the fan-clubs, the messes, the cinema and the DMK had become one ideological and one organizational whole. His position in the DMK was unchallengeable.9 Incindentally he had pre-empted the designs of Shivaji Gancsan (another actor of the Tamil Screen) and the congress to use the medium of cinema to obtain political power. Again, MGR's political success in Tamil Nadu had induced the actors of the neighbouring states to try their hands in politics--N.T. Rama Rao had obtained power in Andhra Pradesh and Rajkumar of Karnataka and Prem136 Nazir of Kerala are waiting for the right moments.After Krunanidhi's ascendancy to Chief Ministership the pattern of decision-making within the DMK changed rapidly. Unlike Annadurai, who could make important policy decisions and have them accepted without any question, Karunanidhi was the leader of the most important faction, rather than a leader above factions; therefore, had to accommodate and control other factions. Factionalism inside the DMK had grave consequences on several fronts. The DMK began to neglect ideological issues. To be successful, every ideology must be brought upto-date according to the changes in circumstances. Karunanidhi failed to understand the implications of this exercise. He devoted his entire time in consolidating his position in the party.Prohibition (banning of distillation and consumption of liquor) had existed in Tamil Nadu for three years when DMK government decided to scrap it and inside the DMK General Council, MGR had opposed the lifting of the dry law. It is wrongly perceived that MGR's opposition stemmed from his concern for the poor and the lower middle class, who spend limited entertainment funds on movies, might substitute liquor for films. It is also alleged that Karunanidhi had also sought to weaken MGR's position within the cinema industry by trying to launch his son, M.K. Muthu as a new Star and project him as another MGR. Karunanidhi had also arranged for the sprouting of Muthu Resigar Manrams even before Muthu's film was released. In many places, he tried to convert the MGR Manrams into Muthu Manrams. When MGR protested against such moves, Karunanidhi, in a clever move, made an appeal to dissolve all Muthu Manrams. The point was that if his sonsfan clubs were dissolved the next step would be to scrap the manrams of MGR too. Also Karunanidhi supported Shivaji Ganesan (another movie star belonging to the Congress) in certain cinema ventures.As the treasurer of the DMK, MGR had striven to perform his duties without being an 'yes' man to the 'Dictator' of the party. MGR wanted proper accounting of the huge funds of the party and wanted to know the sources of such income. What MGR asked for was the removal of certain money-bag influences over the party and the proper maintenance of party finances which had grown enormously. MGR was kept in the dark about the amount collected at the Madurai Party Conference in 1972. Feeling this neglect MGR had called for the arrest of dictatorial trends and personality cults in the party in his Pongal day message on 14 January, 1972.Whatever be the reasons for the rift, the time had arrived for an open137 confrontation between the organizational forces headed by Karunanidhi and the forces of non-political personalities symbolized by MGR. The clash had ideological, organizational and personality dimensions all rolled into one. MGR wanted to focus the public attention on something concrete and visible. And he rightly perceived and attacked the Karunanidhi's faction's Achilles heel corruption. On 8 October, 1972,, MGR, while addressing a meeting, organized to celebrate the late Anna's six-tyfourth birth anniversary, demanded that all DMK town, taluk and district secretaries disclose their financial assets. He rhetorically thundered, "People were eager to know how bungalows and cars came to the Ministers and their relatives after the DMK came to power". MGR also criticisted the DMK Government for lifting prohibition and said that if his view were not given due thought at the upcoming meeting of the DMK General Council, he would not hesitate to go to the public to gain their support for his demand.MGR's statement was clearly a transgression of party discipline, a violation of the party's policy of democratic centralism, and a direct challenge to Karunanidhi. Immediately, 12 district secretaries of the party and 8 Ministers, who were members of the Executive Committee, assembled in the State Guest House at Madras on 8 October 1972 and resolved for the suspension of MGR in the interest of party discipline and party ideals.The resolution was submitted to the General Secretary, V.R. Nedun-chezhian and the President, M. Karunanidhi. Then Neduchezhian suspended MGR from all party posts and even from the primary membership of the DMK. This move was intended to stop MGR from attending the General Council meeting on 12-14 October 1972. But when people heard of this decision, crowds of MGR fans ran through city streets attacking DMK flags and pictures of Karunanidhi. Violent incidents, agitations and protests throughout Tamil Nadu had paralysed the DMK administration for well over a fortnight.10 MGR did not even concede to EVR's advice to offer some sort of an apology. All mediatory talks by senior members of the DMK also failed. Unmoved by the mass emotional display over the party executive action, the full General Council met on 13 October 1972, 277 of 303 members in attendance approved the suspension and adopted a resolution prohibiting actions to secure a compromise and reconciliation.On 15 October 1972, MGR announced his decision to form a new political party in deference to the wishes of his supporters of 20,000 Rasigar Manrams. On 18 October, 1972 MGR christended his party the Anna138 Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam. He declared that his party would faithfully follow the principles and policies laid down by the late Anna. By the end of October 1972, the ADMK began to function as a viable political party. The formation of the new party had an electrifying effect on the masses of Tamil Nadu. MGR disclosed that he was expelled from the party because he asked for the accounts of the party. MGR, who was the cause and result of the fusion between films and DMK, had raised the banner of revolt against the DMK organization and was successful. It is true that factions disrupt ideological, organizational leadership and pragamatic energies of a party. But when the factions stabilize themselves they begin to create new and spirited energy for fresh ideologies, organization, leadership and programmes. The AIADMK under the leadership of MGR had also done likewise and began to formulate tenets of "Annaism".VAnnaismThe AIADMK accepted 'Annaism' as its basic ideology. The process of formation of an ideology is hazardous. Essentially it crosses the four stages of grounding, assimilation, introspection, purging and maturation.11 A leader perceives the nature of inequality in a society and then proposes certain solutions, theoretically at the 'grounding' level. Here he may take recourse to the ideas of some of his predecessors and may assimilate their and others viewpoints. Later on in moments of introspection, he may, add or subtract and purge such of those opinions as are necessary for practical action. Finally, he launches the crusade, which is the stage of maturation.Annaism as an ideology is a fruit of the experience of a long drawn-out process, both at the theoretical and operative levels. It has crossed all the four stages of an ideology, while trying to respond to the problems of the Tamils.Anna's contemplation on the socio-political dimensions of the Tamil society made him first to adopt EVR's views of "Northern Aryan's" domination over "Southern Dravidian". To eradicate the Brahmin domination, EVR spelt out the principles of Dravida Nadu, self-respect, rationalism, socialism, social services and a social movement Much later, he boiled down on the practical plane to the very specific theme of anti-Brahmanism. Till his death EVR was concerned only with anti-Brahminism and refused to be drawn into the argument of class,139 political efforts and new communication procedures. Then Anna assimilated a few more, introspected and purged the unnecessary viewpoints and finally emerged mature. His solutions to the problems of Tamil society contain a synthesis of the principles of Tamil nationalism, self-respect and social-reforms, the parliamentary path, mass participation, rationalism, democracy, joint sector socialism and mass communication. MGR accepted these basic tenets of Annaism in toto. However he had a few more convictions of his own, like casteless society, eradication of class-influence, social order, special treatment for women, clean administration and prohibition to bring Annaism upto date and to make it a purposeful philosophy in the spheres of society, party and the government. After formulating this ideology—' Annaims' MGR paid attention to the propagation of his party's message.12 VIElectoral ParticipationThe party system in all democracies is a projection of the social system. Where society is divided into several assertive groups, irrespective of the prevailing ballot system, parties are bound to multiply. Unless effective means are evolved to reconcile group differences, political stability cannot be realised. Realising this important fact of the political life of Tamil Nadu, the AIADMK pledged first to uphold the basic theme of the Indian constitution and styled itself as a centrist party in order to balance and equate conflicting social interests. Next the party went about contesting the elections through adept electioneering and skillful electoral alliances. Also MGR's charisma took him to uprecedented heights and he won the Assembly Elections of 1977, 1980 and 1984, thus entrenching himself solidly in power.Election ManifestosWhenever the announcement of General elections or by-elections is made, immediately thereafter the Election Committee of the AIADMK meets to discuss candidates, political alliances and electoral strategies of the party. This Committee has three important functions.1. It advises and helps the party candidates with respect of their electoral problems.2. It prepares the election manifesto and release it to the public; and140 3. It reviews the actual outcome of the elections and submits a report to the General Council for future course of action.13 So far the AIADMK placed six Manifestos for the consideration of the public. It released its first manifesto on 28 April 1973 in the wake of the by-election in Dindigul. The second manifesto was rleased on 14 February 1977 during the 1977 Lok Sabha elections. The third manifesto during the 1977 Legislative Assembly elections (30 April 1977), the fourth manifesto during the 1980 Lok Sabha elections (7 December, 1979), the fifth manifesto during 1980 Legislative Assembly elections (27 March 1980), the sixth manifesto during 1984 Lok Sabha and Assembly elections on 8 December 1984 were seen to follow in succession.All these manifestos exhibited the party's promises and policies in eight major areas. They are (1) Centre-State relations; (2) Language policy; (3) Uplift of the backward communities; (4) Policies for economic progress; (5) Education; (6) Administration and Government Personnel; (7) Women and (8) Certain civic problems.Electoral PropagandaCanvassing, raising money, organizing meetings and rallies, participating in processions, distribution of campaign literature, voting, candidature for office and holding it in the party or in the Government, form a range in the index of political participation.To commit the voter to more activity and to retain the commitment of the already converted voter—AIADMK propagates through all known forms of mass communication. The following techniques are used by the AIADMK to influence the party workers and the public alike during electioneering.1. Small public meeting,2. Postering,3. Wall writings,4. Wall drawings,5. Leafleteering,6. Submitting a memorandum to the authorities concerned,7. Press conferences,8. Issuing statements to the press,9. Short speeches through mobile loudspeakers,10. Processions,141 11. Celebrating the birthday or death anniversary of a leader,12. Broadcasts through radio,13. Telecasts,14. Narrative songs - villu pattu,15. Arranging for the broadcasts over public address systems of cinema dialogues and songs throughout the day and the night for weeks together,16. Playing party songs,17. Door - to - door canvassing,18. Display of party symbols,19. Display of huge banners and cut-outs of the leaders,20. Dancing and merry-making at the street corner,21. Free cinema through touring vans,22. Wearing party symbols on the body,23. Making dresses with the colours of the party flag,24. Display of banners depicting the misdeeds of other parties.25. Writing letters and articles in the party magazines and other journals,26. Offering the interviews,27. Conducting exhibitions,28. Entertainment through dramas,29. Providing jeeps and cars to the voters,30. Distribution of essential commodities to the people,31. Distribution of sweets and prizes to voters,32. Small processions by children,33. In 1984 elections, showing ailing MGR (Chief Minister) at New York through video cassettes throughout the State,34. Offering prayers in temples (Hindu temples, mosques and churches) for recovery of the ailing MGR,35. Short speeches of MGR through mobile loud speakers,36. Advertisement of their government in popular newspapers, etc.In such audio, visual and audio-visual methods of mass communications, MGR simply excels. He has several characteristics of his own while electioneering. He reaches public meetings even in the small hours of the morning, throughout the day and night with little rest, hugs an old woman, christens a baby, kisses a child, accepts garlands, from everybody without hesitation expresses his courtesy first to women, drinks aerated water with all, makes references of his poverty in his early life etc.142 Electoral History of AIADMKBy-election provides to the ruling party an opportunity to test its strength and reaffirm the loyalty of its supporters. It also provides an equally great opportunity to the opposition parties to undermine the foundations of the ruling party by criticising its failures, and to project themselves as the future political alternative.Even though MGR split the DMK and founded a party of his own (AIADMK) in October, 1972, the DMK leadership was unruffled by this act. The DMK cabinet remained intact and very few of the top leaders joined the AIADMK. It seemed that the AIADMK could be dismissed as being of no more consequence than the now defunct Tamil Nationalist Party of EVK Sampath.The death of Rajangam, the sitting M.P. belonging to the DMK, led to the announcement of a by-election in the Dindigual Parliamentary constituency on 20 May 1973. Immediately thereafter, AIADMK announced its decision to contest the elections. The contest involved all the four of Tamil Nadu's major political parties, the DMK, AIADMK, Congress (0) and Congress (R). The DMK spent much time, money and men on this election, for it was a prestigeous by-election for the DMK. The leader of the Congress (O), K. Kamaraj, was equally concerned about it, for the defeat would mean a serious blow both to the Party and to him. The AIADMK wanted to achieve swift victory to show the people its capacity to form a Government in future. The AIADMK won the by-election by bagging 52 percent of the total votes polled. The Congress (O) was second, the DMK third, and the Congress (R) a poor fourth. The following table illustrates the outcome of the by-election.TABLE IDindigual (Parliamentary) By-election Total electorate 6,43,704 Votes polled 5,05,253 K. Maya Thevar (AIADMK) 2,60,930 NSV Chinthan (Congress-O) 1,19,032 Pon. Muthuramalingam (DMK) 93,496 K. Cheemaisamy (Congress-R) 11,423 N. Suriyamuthu (Independent) 9,312 P. Sethurama Thevar (Independent) 695 Govindasamy (Independent) 687 O.A. Varada Desigan (Independent) 502 D.V. Anganna Chettiyar (Independent) 448 Invalid 8,698 143 Dindigul proved to be a turning point in Tamil Nadu politics. The DMK was discredited by the people, while the Congress (O) and Congress (R) had to learn that their political weight was very little. The resounding victory of AIADMK in the first-ever elections it had faced (the percentage of votes that it bagged exceeded the combined percentage obtained by other parties) had shown the fact that a new political development was in the offing in Tamil Nadu.Coimbatore By-ElectionIn the Coimbatore by-election (for the Assembly as well as the Parliamentary constituencies) held on 24 February 1974, as a measure of electoral adjustment with the CPI, the AIADMK agreed to contest only for the Assembly, leaving the Parliamentary constituency to CPI. The CPI candidate for parliamentary constituency and the AIADMK candidate in the Assembly consitituency won the seats. (Table X)Pondicherry ElectionsThe DMK - CPI coalition ministry installed in November 1969, in Pondicherry fell within three weeks of assuming office. President's rule was in force there till the elections were scheduled on 24 February, 1974. Also the death of Mohan Kumaramangalam, an M.P. from Pondicherry, caused the holding of a by-election on the same date. The DMK and the Congress (0) wanted to test their fortunes independently. But the AIADMK extended its alliance with CPI, (forged earlier over the Coimbatore by-elections) to Pondicherry. as well. The CPI agreed to the proposal of AIADMK that its sharing of scats in the 30-membcr Pondicherry Assembly would be 7-/30. The CPI also agreed to the AIADMK contesting the parliamentary seat.Normally, elections in Pondicherry do not affect the political development in Tamil Nadu. But the 1974 elections in Pondicherry had assumed significance, in view of the reason that the AIADMK had been locked in a trial of strength with its powerful opponents—the DMK and the Congress (O) as a prelude to the up-coming sixth General Elections.144 The success story of the AIADMK continued in the Parliamentary by-election and its candidates swept the polls. But the Assembly elections produced a conflicting picture and, consequently, created political instability. It was a triumph for the AIADMK, for, it had won more than it had anticipated. The DMK and the Congress (O) were defeated again. On the basis of its victory in 12 seats (Tabl XI and XII), the AIADMK formed a coalition ministry in Pondicherry under the leadership of S. Ramasamy.Sixth General Elections to Lok Sabha in 1977The fifth Lok Sabha was dissolved on 18 January, 1977 and the President of India issued a notification on 20 February 1977 for fresh elections to constitute the sixth Lok Sabha. The dates of the poll for Tamil Nadu were fixed on 16 and 19 March, 1977.14 For the Parliamentary elections in Tamil Nadu, there was a stiff contest between two electoral alliances, namely the Progressive Front which consisted of that AIADMK, Congress (R), CPI and Tamil Nadu Muslim League, Revolutionary Forward block, Backward Class Progressive Federation and the Tamil Nadu Toiler's party, and the Democratic Front comprising the DMK, Janata and the CPI (M). The partners of the Progressive Front i.e. AIADMK, the Congress (R), CPI and the Tamil Nadu Muslim League apportioned among themselves the 39 seats in the ratio of 20:15:3:1 respectively. The Democratic Front agreed for 19 seats for the DMK, 18 seats for the Janata and 2 for the CPI (M).An uncertain atmosphere prevailed about the outcome of these elections. In the Democratic Front, the Janata Party was welcome throughout the nation, while the DMK was nursing its wound. In the same manner, among the progressive Front partners, the AIADMK was welcome throughout Tamil Nadu but the Congress (R) was looked at askance for its excesses during the emergency. The Progressive Front carried the day with 35 wins. The DMK won just one seat and the Janata three.15 Probably it was the weight of the AIADMK that was responsible for the clean sweep of the polls. The following table brings out the salient features of the 1977 Parliamentary elections in Tamil Nadu.145 TABLE IITHE SIXTH LOK SABHA ELECTIONS, 197716 Parties No. of Seats Contested No. of Valid votes polled % of the total votes polled No. of seats won AIADMK 20 54,63,741 30.60 18 DMK 19 32,24,654 18.05 1 Janata 18 31,56,116 17.67 3 Congress (R) 15 39,77,306 22.27 14 CPI 3 8,22,233 4.60 3 CPI (M) 2 2,79,081 1.56 Nil Sixth General Elections to the Legislative Assembly 1977After assuming power at the Centre, the Janata party dismissed the Congress (R) Ministries in eight states. Elections in these states, together for Tamil Nadu, were ordered on 11 May 1977. The polling was fixed on 12 and 14 June 1977. The AIADMK contested the election with Tamil Nadu Muslim League, the National Forward Bloc, the Toiler's Progressive Party and the CPI (M), while the Congress (I) and the CPI formed the second front. The Janata Party and the DMK wanted to contest the elections on their own strength.Of the 234 seats in the Assembly, the AIADMK opted to contest 200, leaving 20 seats to the CPI (M) 6 to the Forward Bloc and the rest to the other partners. The DMK contested 230 seats and the Congress (I) 198. The Janata Party competed in all 233 seats.Unlike the Parliamentary elections, the AIADMK swept the polls and it formed its first ministry on 30 June 1977 with MGR as the Chief Minister. The following table shows the election results:146 Parties Total No. of seats contests No. of Valid votes polled % of votes polled No. of seats won AIADMK 200 51,94,876 30.37 126 DMK 230 42,58,771 24.89 48 Congress(I) 198 29,94,535 17.51 27 Janata 233 28,51,884 16.66 10 CPI 32 4,96,955 2.91 5 CPI(M) 20 4,77,835 2.79 12 Pondicherry Assembly ElectionThe S. Ramasamy Ministry in Pondicherry was dismissed in 1977 for want of a majority and election to the Assembly was ordered on 14 June 1977. The Congress (I) and the CPI shared 30 seats in the ratio of 24:6. The AIADMK, the Janata and the DMK contested all the 30 seats. This elections too failed to remove political instability in the state. The final results of this election were:TABLE IVPondicherry Assembly Elections, 1977 Parties No. of seats contested No of seats won AIADMK 30 14 DMK 30 3 Janata 30 7 Congress(I) 24 2 CPI 6 1 Independents 30 3 With the help of the Independents and the outside support of the Janata Party the AIADMK Ministry was sworn in on 2 July 1977. S. Ramasamy became the Chief Minister again.147 The Seventh Lok Sabha Elections in 1980The sixth Lok Sabha was dissolved on 22 August 1979 and parliamentary elections in Tamil Nadu were scheduled on 3 and 6 January, 1980. The Congress (I) revived the electoral alliance with the DMK and shared the seats in the ratio of 16:23 leaving one seat to the Muslim League. The second front was headed by the AIADMK and contained the Janata, the CPI and the CPI (M), the Lok Dal and the Tamil Nadu Kamaraj Congress. They contested in the ratio of 24:9:3:3 seats respectively. The results of the elections were, as follows:TABLE VSeventh Lok Sabha Election, 198018 Parties Total No. of seats Contested Total No. of Seats Won AIADMK 24 2 DMK 16 16 Congress (I) 23 20 Janata 9 Nil CPI 3 Nil CPI(M) 3 Nil Muslim League 1 1 Seventh Assembly Elections (1980) In Tamil NaduPresumably, at the instance of the DMK, the AIADMK Ministry and the Assembly were dismissed and President's rule was clamped on 18 February 1980. Elections were fixed for 28 and 31 May 1980.To fight the elections, the AIADMK formed a 12 party alliance and this front apportioned the 234 seats of the Assembly in this manner: AIADMK 177, CPI 16; CPI (M) 16, GKNC 10; FB 5; TNKC 7 and Congress (U) 3. The opposing front consisting of the DMK, in Congress (I) and the Muslim League, shared the seats in the ratio of 114:112:8.The AIADMK made all out efforts to get through the elections. The DMK was promised the Chief Ministership in case their front achieved the majority. The DMK was obviously optimistic. But surprisingly the148 people of Tamil Nadu thought differently. They opted for the rule of the AIADMK for the second time. The AIADMK which obtained an absolute majority, formed the ministry under the Chief Ministership of MGR on 9 June 1980. The results of the 1980 Assembly elections were as follows:TABLE VISeventh Assembly Elections (1980) in Tamil Nadu19 Parties Seats contested seats won % of valid votes polled AIADMK 177 131 38.91 CPI(M) 16 11 3.12 CPI 16 10 2.82 GKNC 10 6 1.71 FB 5 3 0.93 TNKC 7 3 1.48 Congress (U) 3 0 0.27 DMK 114 38 22.32 Congress (I) 112 30 20.73 ML 8 1 1.42 Eighth General Elections of the Lok Sabha and Legislative Assembly (1984)In the eighth General Elections of 1984, there was a tough contest between two electoral alliances, namely, the AIADMK front and the DMK front for the Parliamentary and Legislative Assembly elections in Tamil Nadu. The AIADMK front consisted of the AIADMK, the Indian National Congress (I), the Gandhi-Kamaraj National Congress, the All India Forward Bloc and the Republican Party of India (Kawai). The DMK front consisted of the DMK, the Communist Party of India, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) the Janata, the Indian Union Muslim League, the Tamil Nadu Forward Bloc, the Tamil Nadu Kamaraj Congress and the Peasants and Workers Party.Of the 232 seats 20 in the Assembly, the AIADMK agreed to contest149 153, leaving 71 seats to the Congress (I), 4 to GKNC, 3 to AIFB, one to RPI (K). For Parliament, out of 38 sests, the AIADMK opted to contest 12, leaving 25 to Congress (I) and one of GKNC.For the Assembly elections, the DMK front, namely, the DMK, CPI (M), Janata, CPI, IUML, TNFB, TNKC AND PWP apportioned among themselves the 232 seats as: 156:17:17:16:6:3:7:10 respectively. For Parliament, the DMK contested 25 seats, leaving 5 to Janata, 3 each to CPI (M) and CPI, one each to IUML and TNKC.An uncertain atmosphere prevailed about the outcome of the elections in Tamil Nadu. For the AIADMK front, the vote catching personality, its charismatic leader MGR was ten thousand miles away in New York's Brooklyn Downstate Hospital for medical treatment. Indira Gandhi was assassinated and both MGR and Mrs. Gandhi were not available for electioneering. For the DMK front, M. Karunanidhi was not contesting the elections and he was able to go to every constituency for canvassing support of his front candidates. As far as the Parliamentary election was concerned, the question was who will give a stable and strong government at the centre. The AIADMK front was able to answer firmly that the Congress was the only party able to form a stable government at the Centre. But for the Assembly elections, the question was whether the ailing MGR will be able to return to Tamil Nadu to form the government? The AIADMK and its leaders argued that MGR was recovering fast and coming back to Tamil Nadu as Chief Minister soon. In support of this argument the AIADMK took recourse to video cassettes and shown to the people—the improvement of MGR's health at Now York throughout Tamil Nadu and convinced the voters that MGR would be the Chief Minister if the AIADMK was voted back to power. The picture of the ailing MGR raising his famous churchillian "V" sign in the posters were displayed in every nook and corner of all constituencies in Tamil Nadu. The nutritious noon meals scheme introduced by MGR's Government played a great role in the elections. Even M. Karunanidhi who had criticised the scheme when it was introduced had no other alternative but to promise that he would implement it effectively, if he was elected to power.It goes to the credit of the AIADMK that the people continued to believe and support its policies and programmes despite the fact that both the vote spinners of the AIADMK and the Congress (I) combine were far removed from the scene of the electoral battle, one out of India and the other out of the world. SS. Somasundaram, formerly the Revenue Minister in the MGR's cabinet polled 52 per cent of the total votes polled in150 the Pattukottai Assembly constituency in Thanjavur District in 1980 general elections to the Legislative Assembly. However, he lost his deposit in the 1984 Assembly elections in the same constituency when he contested as a candidate of his own party, namely, 'Namadhu Kazhagam'. S.S. Rajendran, a popular actor who polled the highest percentage of votes in 1980 elections to the Assembly, lost his deposit in 1984 Assembly elections when he contested as a rebel candidate. This pattern of voting reveals the fact that the vote spinner for the AIADMK is none else but MGR.21 Throughout the elections, the founder of the AIADMK was in New York, even filed his nomination from there. MGR could not go over to his constituency or to any one's constituency throughout the electioneering process. The AIADMK also had to defend it from the attacks of the recalcitrant and runaway members of the party. The first to attack the AIADMK was the newly started party, "Namadhu Kazhagam" by the former Revenue Minister of the AIADMK government and erstwhile colleague of MGR, S.D. Somasundaram. His allegation of corruption in the AIADMK did not succeed. Likewise S.S. Rajendran, who had won the 1980 Assembly election with highest margin in Tamil Nadu, rebelled against the AIADMK and formed a new party on the eve of the 1984 elections and named it "MGR-SSR Puratchi Kazhagam".It is ironical that whenever MGR happened to be in the hospital his party had won. In 1967, when MGR was in hospital, the DMK had achieved its first electoral victory. In both the elections (1967 and 1984) MGR filled his nomination from hospital and won the elections with the highest margin of votes in Tamil Nadu.22 In these two elections (1967 and 1984) ailing MGR played a major role in electoral victory for his party and the pictures of hospitalized MGR had been displayed in all the constituencies in Tamil Nadu.The AIADMK Front swept the polls winning 198 of the 232 Assembly seats and 37 out of the 38 Lok Sabha seats for which the elections were held. Consequently, the AIADMK for the third time, was enthroned in Tamil Nadu, returning with its highest-ever election majority. The AIADMK with 133 members, was comfortably placed back in the saddle. Out of the 153 seats contested, it won in 133—whopping 86 percent success, a rate which is comparable only to the united DMK's 90 percent victory rate in 1971 when it secured 184 out of 203 seats contested. The AIADMK's ally for this election, the Congress (I), contesting 71 seats, has won 62 seats, a strength it never had in the Assembly since losing power in 1967. Ironically, the Congress (I) was to play the role of the151 main opposition party, for the DMK had been pushed to the ignominous third position. The party which had fielded the largest number of candidates for this election—156, managed only a paltry20. It was no less ignominy for the DMK's eight allies who won among themselves another 12 seats out of the 76 contested, the AIADMK and Congress (I) combine also routed the opposition in the Lok Sabha polls, winning all but one of the 38 seats with Congress (I) getting 25 and the AIADMK 12. The lone seat went to the DMK.Political parties are the powerful instruments of elections for achieving legitimacy and power. They also use the medium of elections for social change. From 1977, when AIADMK came to power, there were 12 by-elections (both Parliament and Assembly constituencies) in Tamil Nadu and in all by-elections except in the by-election at Anna Nagar and Mayiladuthurai on 20 May 1984, the AIADMK and its allies had won. Thus the AIADMK was successful electorally till date. It obtained power in 1977 and retained it in 1980 and also in 1984. It has also won the critical by-elections conducted for the Parliamentary and Assembly seats.The tables from VII to XIX bring out the salient features of the 1984 Parliamentary and Legislative Assembly elections as also the by-elections in Tamil Nadu.VIIRole of the AIADMK In Ministry and LegislatureSubsequent to the formation and propagation of Annaism, the AIADMK determined to construct an efficient organization. In mass democracies and among the centrist parliamentary parties, it has not been possible to avoid the dominance of the legislative wing over the organizational wing of the party. Further, in camera groups develop within the legislative wing in such a manner that they become informal power centres. In the AIADMK also the legislative wing has dominated over the organizational wing. However, it is MGR's charisma which is the moving spirit behind the legislative party and the organization.23 152 TABLE VIIEighth Lok Sabha Election, 198424 Total No. of Seats in Lok Sabha in Tamil Nadu 39 Total No. of Seats for which election held 38 Electorate 2,99,66,343 Votes Polled 2,20,69,708 Valid Votes 2,10,99,274 Invalid Votes 9,70,434 Name of the Parties Seats Contested Seats won Votes secured % of votes secured AIADMK FRONT AIADMK 12 12 39,60,854 18.78 Congress (I) 25 25 85,30380 40.43 GKNC 1 - 2,17,104 1.03 Total 38 37 1,27,08338 60.24 DMK Front DMK 25 1 51,54,470 24.73 Janata 5 - 9,11,931 4.32 CPI (M) 3 - 6,14393 2.92 CPI 3 - 7,38,106 3.50 IUML 1 - 1,76372 0.84 TNKC 1 - 1,44,076 0.68 Total 38 1 77,39348 36.99 Namadhu Kazhagam(NK) 6 - 67,614 0.32 BJP 1 - 15,462 0.07 RPI (G) 1 - 2,660 0.01 Cong. (J) 1 2,592 0.01 - RSM 1 2,484 0.01 - Total 10 - 90,812 0.42 153 154 TABLE VIIIEighth Assembly Elections, 1984 in Tamil Nadu25 Total Assembly Seats 234 No. of Seats for which elections held 232 Electorate 3,06,75,137 Votes polled 2,25,74,337 Valid Votes 2,15,28,548 Invalid votes 10,45,789 Name of the Party Seats Contested Seats won Valid votes polled %of votes polled No. of seats in the dissolved house AIADMK FRONT AIADMK 153 132 79,79311 37.06 131 Congress(I) 71 62 35,38,832 16.43 33 GKNC 4 2 1,20,704 0.56 3 AIFB 3 1 93,031 0.46 3 RPI (K) 1 1 47,813 0.21 1 Total 232 198 1,17,79,691 54.72 171 DMK FRONT DMK 156 20 60,11,461 27.92 32 CPI (M) 17 5 6,32,533 2.93 21 Janata 17 3 5,10,503 2.36 2 CPI 16 2 5,32,575 2.47 8 IUML 6 2 2,30207 1.05 1 TNFB 3 1 1,24,788 0.56 - TNKC 7 - 1,99,484 0.91 1 PWP 10 - 3,14,818 1.55 - Total 232 33 85,56,369 39.75 65 NAMADHU KAZHAGAM (NK) 104 - 1,92,474 0.88 4 RPI (G) 7 - 4,248 0.21 - Congress(I) 11 - 3,970 0.01 - Total 122 - 2,00,692 1.10 4 Others including Independents 895 1 9,91,802 4.43 - 155 Eighth Assembly Elections (1984) in Tamil Nadu26 District Wise Break-up of Results District AIADMK Congress. I DMK Janata CPI (M) CPI ML GKNC Others Madras 3 2 6 - - - 4 - - Chingleput 11 3 2 -1 - - - - - North Arcot 12 7 2 - - - - - - South Arcot 14 7 - - - - - - - Dharmapuri 5 4 1 - - - - - - Salem 11 6 - - - - - - - Coimbatore 7 2 - 2 1 1 1 - - Periyar 10 1 - - - - - - - Nilgiris 2 1 - - - - - - - Madurai 13 7 1 - - - - - 1 TNFB Tiruchi 12 5 1 - - - - - - Tanjavur 10 5 2 - 2 1 - - - Pudukkottai 3 2 - - - - - - - Ramanathapuram 9 4 1 1 - - - - l(AIFB) Tirunelveli 9 5 1- - - 1 2 - - Kanykumari 2 1 1 1 1 - - - 1 Hindu Munnani 133 62 20 3 5 2 2 2 3 - 156 (The Indian Socialist Party had one member and two seats were vacant in the dissolved Assembly)(The DMK combine suffered a rout in as many as five districts— South Arcot, Salem, Nilgiris, Periyar and Pundukkottai.)Results of Other ElectionsTABLE XCoimbatore West (Assembly) By-Election on 24.2.197427 Total electorate 93,360 Total votes polled 70,183 C. Aranganayakam (AIADMK) 25,183 Mr. Krishnaveni Gopal (DMK) 16,086 Narayanaswami (Independent) 175 Manickam (Independent) 600 Joseph (Independent) 692 TABLE XIPondicherry (Parliamentary) By-Election28 on 24-2-1974 Total electorate 263,743 Votes polled 2,25,335 Arvinda Bala Pazhanoor (AIADMK) 83,362 S. Sivaprakasam (Cong. 0) 72,244 N. Rajaram (DMK) 47,250 R. Somasundaram (Indep.) 3,620 G. Rangasamy (Independent) 3,219 Ramayya (Independent) 2,416 Elango (Independent) 794 157 TABLE XIIPondicherry (Assembly) Election on 24-2-197429 S.No. Parties No. of seats contested No. of seats won % of votes obtained 1. AIADMK 23 12 26.00 2. DMK 26 2 20.36 3. Congress (0) 16 5 18.35 4. Congress (R) 14 7 15.36 5. CPI 7 2 9.06 6. CPI(M) 4 1 4.34 TABLE XIIIThanjavur (Parliamentary) By Election on 17-6-197930 Total electorate 6,58,855 Votes polled 5,47,582 Singaravadivel (Cong. I) 3,09,868 Anbil P. Dharmalingam (DMK) 2,17,020 M. Ramaiah (Independent) 2,163 T.V. Anganna Chettiar (Ind) 2,158 Kulumaiyan (Independent) 1,355 S. Chinnaiyan (Independent) 1,279 M. Anwar Hussain (Indep.) 1,030 V. Sundararajan (Indep.) 961 D.A. Thangasamy Nadar (Indep.) 902 L. Seshadri Iyer (Indep.) 880 Rangasami (Independent) 617 O.A. Varadadesikan (Indep) 486 158 TABLE XIVNagapattinam (Parliamentary) By-election on 17-6-197931 Total electorate 6,82,750 Votes polled 5,71,573 K. Murugaiyan (CPI) 2,88,000 M. Mahalingam (AIADMK) 2,72,059 A. Panneer Selvam (Ind.) 2,200 V.M. Immanuel Ramaraj (Ind.) 1,141 TABLE XVPondicherry (Assembly) election on 6-1-198032 S.No. Parties Total no. of seats contested Total No. of seats won 1 AIADMK 20 - 2 Janata 5 3 3 CPI 3 - 4 CPI(M) 2 1 5 DMK 16 14 6 Congress (I) 12 10 7 Muslim League 2 1 8 Independents 214 1 TABLE XVIBy-Election Results (6-1-1980)33 S.No. Constituency Winner Name of Successful candidate Votes obtained 1 Panamarathadi (Salem) AIADMK K. Rajaram 29,618 2 Vilavamcode CPI (M) Pakkanathan 26,408 3 Usilampatti AIFB Andi Thevar 29235 159 TABLE XVIITiruppathur (Assembly) By-election on 29-11-198134 Total electorate 1,16,123 Total votes polled 79,460 R. Arunagiri (Congress-I) 42,670 T.S.S. Thirumal (Janata) 17,608 V.R. Shanmugasundaram (CPI) 11,515 Andiappan (Independent) 1,665 Mrs. Sakuntala (Ind.) 1,309 V. Govindan (Ind.) 933 R. Ramarkrishna Reddy (Ind.) 584 V.R. Veerappa Gounder (Ind.) 386 A. Rajendran (Ind.) 374 A. Mani (Ind.) 288 M. Kulandaivelu (Ind.) 260 E. Jaganathan (Ind.) 153 Invalid votes 1,404 TABLE XVIIIPeriakulam (Parliamentary) By-Election on 26-9-1982.35 Total electorate 7,66,027 Total votes polled 5,42,326 S.T.K. Jakkayan (AIADMK) 2,49,000 C. Ramakrishnan (DMK) 1,80,000 Shaikh Abdula Khadcr (Cong. I) 29,900 Abdul Wahab (CPI-M) 13,460 TABLE XIXTiruchendur (Assembly) By-Election on 27-2-1983.36 Total electorate 1,02,681 Total votes polled 81,788 R. Amiritharaj (AIADMK) 32,650 Nedumaran (DMK) 30,940 S.K. Chandrasekaran (Cong. I) 8,307 Jebamani (Janata) 3,326 Muthu (GKNC) 4,828 160 Soon after the results of the Assembly elections of June 1977, MGR, the leader of the AIADMK (which obtained 126 seats out of a total of 234 seats) was sworn in as Chief Minister. While forming his cabinet, he gave due consideration to the educational background of the members and their public stature and their seniority in the party. He did not bother about the region, religion, caste, wealth or their status. From 18 February 1980 to 8 June 1980, Tamil Nadu was under President's rule. In the Seventh Assembly elections of 1980, the AIADMK obtained an absolute majority of 130 seats out of 234, hence on 9 June 1980, the cabinet headed by MGR was sworn for a second time. In the eighth General Elections to Assembly in 1984 also, the AIADMK obtained an absolute majority of 132 seats out of 232. Thus MGR has created history by assuming charge as Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu for successive third time on 10-2-1985 after winning the elections and his Council of ministers (17 members) assumed charge on 14 and 15 February, 1985.The AIADMK translated its ideological principles into electoral promises at the first instance. After obtaining power, the electoral promises flourished into administrative policies.Parties which submit themselves to competitive electoral process for seeking power, not only constitute an integral part of the democratic structure but are active agents for the preservation and promotion of democratic values in order to make democracy a comprehensive way of life. To achieve this, the AIADMK has been using its power for fulfilling the regulatory needs, distributive requirements and justice, the AIADMK proceeded to establish socio-cultural betterment of the groups that supported the party and at the same time not losing sight of the general and developmental tasks of modernization. Change is achieved without violence and by balancing the conflicting social interests.37 VIIThe National Role of the AIADMKBoth the national and the regional parties of India were, in a sense,161 responses to the imperialist and centralising tendencies of British India. While the all-India nationalism crystallized in an integrated manner in the form of the Indian National Congress, regional, linguistic and religious specificities of India were also inspired to seek their new destinies. Thus the former became the 'great tradition' and the latter existed as 'little traditions' of India.Prior to Independence, the Congress conceived Indian nationalism as a search for new common symbols in which various groups of the society could find some sense of personal and collective identify. On the contrary, the little traditions considered that nationalism was a product of a new type of education percolating into the society for socio-political changes. Hence a conflict between the great and little traditions was unavoidable and the latter were branded as "separatists".In the post Independence period also the Congress continued its notion of nurturing the loyalty of the citizen of the nation-state. Therefore it proceeded to destroy all the tribal, ethnic, religious and linguistic loyalties through the procedures of the integration of Indian states, linguistic re-organization of Indian provinces etc. It also brought forward the Constitution (sixteenth Amendment) Act in October 1963. Therefore the DMK, the leader of the little traditions in Tamil Nadu, abandoned its aim of a separate Tamil Nadu and began to insist for state autonomy. However, its agitational approach with the centre did not yield tangible results.The AIADMK was born in 1972 in the little traditions and at the hour of crisis of proving that regional parties and regionalism were two different entities and there was no essential correlation between the two. Therefore the AIADMK was required to develop harmonious relations with national parties that could obtain federal power. Operationally the AIADMK must: (1) strive to set right the regional economic imbalances; (2) see that the federal government does not unnecessarily interfere in the smooth working of the federal process; (3) check the undue centripetal tendencies at the cost of the interests of the nation; and, (4) decisively conclude whether the co-operative or conflictual courses of action, or a successful combination of them would be beneficial to the interest of the State.Everywhere in the federal world, federalising processes exhibit centrifugal and centripetal tendencies. The AIADMK observes that there need not be any conflict between the two process and pleads for decentralization. Since, federalism in India has been handed down by the British as an institutional mechanism and as an administrative convenience,162 the AIADMK feels that there is much of centralization in the constitutional and extra-constitutional processes leading to regional imbalances in India. At the same time the party understands that the political relations are the denominator for harmonious centre-state relations. Therefore, the party has shunned conflictual tactics and has willingly accepted the co-operative strategy as the basis for all federal relations.Co-operation may lead to proper understanding and better bargaining, which in turn may result in the initiative of the centre to sort out the problems of Tamil Nadu and solve them in the future. This strategy of the AIADMK proved to be successful with the Janata Government.A second reason for their cordial relations was that the Janata itself was a consummation of several little traditions in India. Naturally there was no animosity between the two. But the Congress(I) finds that, though it belongs to the powerful great tradition, it cannot erase the little 'Dravidian Tamil Tradition' and its recent manifestations, the AIADMK, obstensibly the AIADMK following the DMK, model has retaliated the great tradition by observing the rule of 'simple majority single ballot' system. Hence the strained relations between the two.Still, the AIADMK believes in co-operation. It is keen on national accommodation rather than mere national integration. It is for this that it has permanently stationed a special representative at New Delhi to do liaison work between the two levels of the government. And again it finds that inter-state relations are also equally important in federal relations and therefore it wants to promote such relations by promoting such super-techniques like 'Southern Chief Ministers' Conferences'. The AIADMK has become the pioneer in the co-operation strategy in the relations between the great tradition and little traditions in India. It has also clearly shown that regional parties need not have a regional mind. Its sub-nationalistic fervour wants to set right the regional imbalances. It resists over-stepping. Thus, the AIADMK hoped and keeps hoping for the new horizons in the federal relations in India.38 IXConclusionThe most important issues concerning a regional party in India are: (1) reconciling the Indian Cultural tradition and social structure with the needs of a modern state; (2) keeping up with mass expectation; and (3) achieving a sense of proportion between the unity and diversity of India.39 Pragmatic solutions may issue forth for these problems if only163 the regional party has a strong base and efficient organization.In the eighties, as has been the case earlier, society, politics and the economy of Tamil Nadu however around the uplift of backward communities, Scheduled Castes and Tribes and women; a concern for the Tamil language; establishment of the democratic way of life; and the achievement of economic growth together with justice and equality. To achieve these objective the AIADMK functions, firstly, as a mobilizing movement to enlighten the Tamil society about its social conflicts, social inequalities and the ways by which they can be eliminated. For this, the ideology of Anaism helps the AIADMK. Secondly, as an organizational expression, the AIADMK fosters and preserves the solidarity of the exploited people in Tamil Nadu. For this, MGR's charisma contributes greatly to the party. Thirdly, as an educational instrument, the party suggests the merits of reforms for orderly and peaceful social change. Power through electoral victories and the consequent aministrative actions help the AIADMK in this endeavour.The Constitution of India founded upon the assumption of the infallibility of the centre, makes available to it enormous powers to deal with an inconvenient state and does not provide any remedy for a state against the 'unconstitutional' acts of the centre. Further, the dominance of the Congress Party, both at the Centre and in the states has prevented the relationship between the two from developing as contemplated by the Constitution and has subordinated it to party interests.But, the federal theory neither envisages patriarchal patronage on the part of the centre nor expects feudal fidelity to be maintained their cultural identify, to develop themselves as regional democracies and to contribute to the cohesion of Indian society and the integrity of the nation, they must be trusted with a wiser and unencroachable autonomy. As in human life too much parental control can only retard the development of the offspring, so in politics too much centralization leads to regional imbalances. It is in this context that the AIADMK believes and works for co-operative and democratic federalism in the direction of enhancing the authority of the centre sustained by the autonomy of the states.But the vital question of the future of the AIADMK remains to be answered. MGR's charisma, mass following and the social injustices of Tamil Nadu react to one another today as an inestimable way to produce creative energies for the welfare of one and all. As long as the social injustices and the specific cultural problems of the Tamils endure and as long as people trust MGR's leadership, the AIADMK will steer the state for its proper destination. Since the fame and mass following of164 MGR is unquestionable people do not think of the succession now.Thus, the AIADMK, which is born out of factionalism, has first set for itself the task in consonance with the regional and primordial specificities of Tamil Nadu, and proceeded to consolidate its organization through the charisma of MGR and the mass media, in order to win power through skilful electioneering and masterly electoral alliances, so that it may be used for the balancing of the claims of the social inequalities and the general welfare, in the context of pleading and co-operating with the centre for state autonomy so that fuller democratic life in Tamil Nadu and India may be realized. Therefore, the AIADMK, with independence, identification and legitimacy, continues to be the representative manifestation of Tamil Nationalism answering to the continuing social injustices in Tamil Nadu.NOTES AND REFERENCES1. J. Walch, Faction and Frong (New Delhi, Young Asia Publications, 1976) p. 47.2. For a description of Indian National Congress, see S.A. Kochanek, The Congress Party of India: The Dynamics of One-Party Democracy, (Princenton Univ. Press 1968).3. K.S. Ramanujan, Big Change (Madras, Higginbothams, 1967) p. 212.4. M.R. Barnett, The Politics of Cultural Nationalism in South India, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1976).5. Mr. Barnett, "Cultural Nationalist Electoral Politics in Tamil Nadu in South India" in Myron Weiner and John O Field (ed) Electoral Politics in the Indian States (Delhi, Manohar, 1975) p. 314.6. M.R. Barnett, op. cit., p. 164.7. S.J. Eldersveld, Political Parties: A Behavioural Analysis (Chicago, Rand MCNally, 1964) p. 6.8. Excerpts from University of Madras citations presented to M.G. Ramachandran at the time of the conferment of Doctor of Law (Honoris Causa) to him dated 20 the Sep. 1983.9. Ananta Naryanan, The Story of Tamil Cinema (Madras, New Century Book House, 1981) p. 464.10. For a description of the activities of the enthusiasts of MGR, see The Hindu, October 11-20. 1972.11. W. Mulline, "On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science", American Political Science Review, June 1972, pp. 498-510.12. M.G. Ramachandran, Egalatarian Justice (Madras, np.n.d.) p. 3.13. AIADMK, Constitution of the AIADMK (Madras, The Party Head Office, 1978). p. 20.165 14. S.P. Srinivasan, Report on the Sixth General Elections to Lok Sabha (Madras, Government of Tamil Nadu, 1978). p. 47.15. S.P. Srinivasan, Op. cit. p. 47.16. S.P. Srinivasan, Op. cit. p. 47.17. D.K.Oza, Report on the Sixth General Elections to the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly (Madras, Government of Tamil Nadu, 1978), p. 755.18. The major reason for the defeat of the AIADMK and the success of the DMK-Congress (I) was that people wanted a stable and strong government at the centre. The Hindu 8. Jan.19. D.K. Oza, Report on the Seventh General Elections to Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly (Madras, Government of Tamil Nadu, 1982), p. 32.20. For two of the 234 seats in the Legislative Assembly and one of the 39 seats in the Lok Sabha constituencies in Tamil Nadu, elections have been countermanded due to the murder of one Independent candidate.21. Dr. C.A. Perumal, Professor and Head of the Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Madras, Madras on Poll Panel Discussions in Telecasts on 29-12-1984, K.S. Ramakrishnan in Indian Express, 4 Jan. 1985.22. Report on the Fourth General, Elections to Legislative Assembly (Madras, Government of Tamil Nadu, 1967), The Hindu, 2 Jan. 1985.23. R .L. Hardgrave Jr., "The Celluloid God. MGR and the Tamil Film", South Asian Review, IV, 1971, p. 312.24. The Hindu, 2 January, 1984.25. The Hindu, 2 January, 1985.26. News Today, 3 February, 1984.27. The Indian Express, 26 February, 1974.28. Ibid.29. Ibid.30. The Hindu June 19, 1979.31. This by-election is unique for one important point. The highest percentage (83.71%) of votes were polled here. This is an all-time record for Tamil Nadu. The Hindu, June 19, 1979.32. The Hindu, January 8, 1980.33. Ibid.34. Ibid. December 1, 1981.35. The Indian Express, September 28, 1982.36. The Hindu, February 28, 1983.37. Government of Tamil Nadu, Chief Minister Replies in the Legislature (Madras, Government of Tamil Nadu, February, 1982).38. AIADMK Election Manifesto, 1980, p.3.39. P.E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief System of Mass Public" in D. Apter (ed.), Indeology and Discontent, (New York, Free Press, 1965), pp. 132-162.166 167 THE ALL JAMMU AND KASHMIR NATIONAL CONFERENCEVidya BhushanIThe Circumstances Leading to the Formation of the All Jammu and Kashmir National ConferenceBefore 1931, there was little political activity in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and consequently political parties did not exist. However, the masses did not remain completely isolated or immunised from the influence of the national movement in British India. Some of the young men who went for higher studies to the universities outside the State happened to mix with their contemporaries and thus get socialised in patriotic feelings and sentiments. The launching of the first civil disobedience movement by Mahatma Gandhi in 1921, followed by another movement in early thirties, and the intermitted hartals and satyagrahas, etc. did not fail to percolate into the students of the State.2 The growth and role of the press particularly from British India had greatly helped in disseminating these news in the State. The growing tide of nationalism in the then British India, thus, found a ready echo in Kashmir State because of the poverty and exploitation of the masses, who too were not satisfied with the bureaucratic functioning of Maharaja's Government, their inadequate representation in the State services, neglect of their education, appointment of Rajputs at responsible posts, discrimination against them, denial of religious freedom, and lack of freedom of the press and platform were the main grievances particularly of the Muslims, which comprised a majority of population, against the state administration.3 A small group of educated youngmen were, therefore, clamouring for a share in the state services.In 1916-17, Summander Khash, however, applied to Maharaja Partap168 Singh for the permission to set up a non-political Muslim Association.4 On the grant of permission in 1921, a society known as 'Anjuman-e-Islamia' was formed in Jammu to look after the educational and social welfare of the Muslims.5 With the passage of time, a group of the youth tried to broaden its sphere of activity but it was opposed and resented by the elder members. Under the circumstances, the Youngmen Muslim Association was formed for the popular mobilisation of political awakening.6 On the other hand, Sheikh Mohd. Abdullah, Mohd. Rajab, Qazi Saif-ud-din and Ghulam Ahmed Muhtar returned to Srinagar in April, 1930 after completing their studies in Muslim University, Aligarh. They brought with them broad outlines of the plan for starting an agitation in Kashmir. Perhaps in accordance with that plan Mohd. Rajab and Sheikh Mohd. Abdullah in conjunction with Bashir (a retired Revenue Assistant) had set up a small Reading Room in the house of one Syed Ali Akbar in 1930,7 where lengthy discussion took place as to how the Muslim grievances could be redressed.8 Encouraged by the response of the educated Muslims and the interest shown by the uneducated, the Reading Room was given a regular organisational shape and Mohd. Rajab and Sheikh Abdullah were elected its president and secretary, respectively.9 The Youngmen Muslim Association of Jammu, also decided to coordinate the campaign of the Reading Room.10 Alongwith the happening of 1931, when the Muslim population of the State blew the bugle of Jehad against the autocratic rule of the Dogra Maharaja, a need was felt to bring all Muslims of the state on one common platform in an organised manner. With that end in view, the various Muslim groups coalesced to form the All-Jammu&Kashmir Muslim Conference. Its first session, with Seikh Abdullaha as president, was held on 14, 15&16 October, 1932.11 The party supported two-nation theory of the Muslim League, although it had time and again declared that if and when it would come in power, non-Muslims would be treated fairly and even generously.12 It took part in Praja Sabha (State Assembly) elections of 1934 and 1939 and captured 16 out of 21 and 19 out of 21 Muslim seats, respectively.During the early years of its life, the Muslim Conference was to see that more and more Muslims were absorbed in the government services, as recommended by the Glancy Commission of 1931. The leadership of the party soon found out that problem of the Muslim masses was something more than its due representation in State services. The party, therefore, began to clamour for a responsible government,13 and the 8th of May, 1936 was observed as 'Responsible Government Day' through-169 out the State. On the appeal of Sheikh Mohd. Abdullaha many progressive Hindus and Sikhs also joined hands and made the day a success.14 The leaders of the Muslim Conference then realised that if the gates of the Party were opened to the Hindus and the Sikhs, the Party would have a more effective voice. In August 1938, the Party issued a National Demand slating that the ultimate goal of the people was to bring about complete change in their social and political outlook and to achieve responsible government under the aegis of the Maharaja.15 It was also customary of the government, to dub the leaders of the Muslim Conference as Muslim Communalists who cared much for the interest of the Muslims only. It was, therefore, felt that the inclusion of a large number of the Hindus and the Sikhs would take the string off any such criticism.IIThe Formation of the National Conference and Its Struggle for Freedom in Pre-Independence PeriodThus, in these circumstances, the Working Committee of the Muslim Conference met on 28th June, 1938 at Srinagar and after a hot discussion lasting for five days and spread over 52 hours passed the resolution for the transformation of the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference into the the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference.16 The delegates of the special session of the Muslim Conference almost unanimously passed this resolution of its Working Committee in mid-June 1939.17 The first session of the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (henceforth to be referred as the National Conference) was, however, held in the end of September 1939 and, among other things, it ratified the document known as the National Demand. The National Conference thus began to carry out its activities on the lines of the Indian National Congress (henceforth to be referred to as Congress (I). Till today, it is one of the most popular and very well organised political parties of the J&K State.The Jammu and Kashmir Constitution of 1939, on the other hand, superseded the 1934 Constitution with little reforms. By the end of 1943, However, the Maharaja inaugurated some more Constitutional reforms in the State and the elected members were appointed as ministers. But the National Conference leadership regarded these reforms as half-hearted measures. They were struggling for a representative government, and170 were not satisfied with a puppet assembly and a council of Ministers responsible only to the Maharaja. The National Conference, therefore, held its annual session on 29 and 30 September, 1944 at Sopore and unanimously approved a manifesto, 'NEW KASHMIR' as its objective.18 The National conference in its memorandum to the Cabinet Mission (1946) criticised the working of the J&K Constitution of 1939. The Memorandum concluded with the words: "these mock reforms only injured the legitimate aspirations of politically awakened masses of Kashmir and whipped them into conducting more intensive struggle for establishment of the responsible government".19 In May 1946, the National Conference, therefore, launched a mass movement, known as Quit Kashmir, which challenged the validity of the Treaty of Amritsar, 1946. It was a struggle of the people in the State against autocracy. Thus bewildered at this new slogan , the bureaucrary was now full of vengeance and they were then out to 'do' and not to 'die' even if that meant finishing all people. The government was thus fully prepared to wipe off the popular movement. Military squads paraded the streets of Srinagar all day and night. Army was posted at all the important points.20 Despite all this the movement went on and the National Conference proved to be the best organised party on non-communal lines with the nationalistic outlook, experienced leaders and progressive programme of its own.IIIPost-Independence Period and Its LeadershipIn the wake of the brutal Tribal-cum-Pakistan invasion on the State of Jammu and Kashmir, Sheikh Mohd Abdullah, the president of the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference took over as the head of the Emergency Administration and gradually managed to establish a grip over the affairs of the State. To the credit of the National Conference goes the accession of the State to the Indian Union in 1948.Just after the installation of popular government in the State in 1948, the National Conference leadership devoted their attention towards translating the dream of 'Naya Kashmir' into a reality. The first major thing, the National Conference government did was the passage of the Big Landed Estate Abolition Act and transferred land to the tillers. As a result, thousands of poor peasants were, therefore, relieved from exploitation.21 In order to end the state of uncertainty created by the Pak invasion as also the consequent inability of the United Nations to undo it, the171 General Council of the National Conference issued in recognition of the Kashmiris right of self-determination, a mandate to its supreme National Executive for the convening of the State Consembly for the purpose of determining the future shape and affiliation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.22 The National Conference, thus, captured all the 75 seats of the Consembly because of its policy, programme and leadership.The party leadership have succeeded in giving a separate distinctive Constitutional personality to the State. Because of their constant and forceful struggle the aspirations of Kashmiri Nationalism have been spelt out in Art 370 of the Constitution of India, Delhi Agreement of 1952, the salient features of which were: the abolition of monarchy, the desire to have an elected head of the States, a separate flag and separate emblem. In short, the National Conference under the charismatic leadership of Shekih Mohd. Abdullah, who had ever symbolised Kashmiri Nationalism, and Farooq Abdullah-his son, stressed the autonomous position of the State within the Indian Polity. The National Conference under the dynamic leadership of G.M. Bakshi stood for and achieved ratification of the State's accession with India. The National Conference during 1964-1971, under the progressive and nationalistic leadership of G.M. Sadiq, however, found ripe time for progressive integeration of Kashmir with India.24 The then National Conference Government, therefore, took many steps including the extension of some of the beneficial Union laws to the State, the extension to the Congress activities to the State and the merger of the National Conference with the Indian National Congress on 26 January, 1965.25 The National conference was revived again in July, 1975 by Sheikh Mohd Abdullah. It was a logical corollary of the historic Indira-Sheikh Accord of 1975.After getting an absolute majority in 1977 Assembly elections, the National Conference leadership tried to revive the pre-1953 policies of the Party. Under the dynamic leadership of Farooq Abdullah the party emerged again as the most popular and well-organised party of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It succeeded in securing a majority of seats in all assembly elections till today.In short, the National Conference represented continuity of political movement in the State. It is the State's most well-organised and the oldest party comparable in some way to the Indian National Congress. The party has outrightly rejected the two nation theory and has given a lead to the people to follow secularism, socialism and democracy. It is unified and stands solidly behind its leadership.172 Inspite of factionalism and personality conflicts in the party, the National Conference has been able to continuously maintain its dominance because of the charisma of its leaderships, the pragmatic character and populist appeal of its programme and policies ; an efficient and strong party organisation; weak, fragile and fragmented structure of the opposition and the party's electoral performance and the nature of State elections as a whole.26 The Party OrganisationThe Party is particularly suited to evolve a composite personality of the State by harmonising the diverse regional personalities and accommodating their respective needs and sentiments. The Party is organised on the basis of a federal structure with provincial committees for each of the three regions of the State (Jammu, the Valley and Ladakh). It also proposes to reorganise the internal constitutional set up of the State on similar lines which would provide regional automony and help further decenteralise political power through appropriate institutional arrangements at the district, block and village levels.Starting from below, the primary members of the Party elect a Gram (Village) Committee in each village. Each Gram Committee has an elected president, a secretary and a treasuer. The Gram Committees in a Patwar (Circle) elect a Patwar Committee in rural areas while in urban areas there are Halka Committees. The Patwar and the Halka Committees then elect their delegates to the Block Committee, one delegate for each group of five hundred members. The delegates of the block committees, in turn, elect zonal committee - the next higher tier of the party. The delegates of each region/province of the State then elect the regional/provincial committee and its office bearers. Finally emerges the General Body of the Party whose members are elected by the regional/provincial delegates. Each group of five delegates elects one member for the General Body. The General Body of the Party as well as the delegates elect the party president, who, in turn: nominates the vice-president, the general secretary and the treasurer of the Party. In addition, he appoints the Working Committee which constitutes the apex of the Party.The Party also has a youth wing, called the Jammu and Kashmir Youth National Conference. Besides, the party also has a separate labour wing with a number of trade unions affiliated with it. The headquarter of the party is at Majaid Manzil Srinagar.173 IIIThe Party Ideology, Programme and PoliciesThe National Conference held its annual session on 29 and 30 September 1944 at Sopore and unanimously approved the 'New Kashmir' - the party programme and ideology/manifesto. The New Kashmir, was declared to be an objective of the National Conference. Consisting of two parts (constitutional and economic), it is a radical, dynamic and historic document providing blueprints for the replanning and rebuilding of the State on secular, socialistic and democratic lines. Politically, it proposes to democratise the whole governmental structure from village panchayat right up to the National Assembly, linking it with the independence of judiciary, on the one hand, and responsible executive, on the other.In the economic sphere, it envisages a planned economy on a socialistic pattern.29 The first part of the New Kashmir, however, covers - a) citizenship; b) national assembly ; c) council of ministers ; d) ruler ; e) justice; f) local administration, and g) national language. The second part, on the other hand, underlines the need for the setting up of a National Agriculture Council to execute and supervise the national agriculture plan, the basic principles of which would be: a) abolition of landlordism; b) land to the tiller; c) cooperative associations; d) feeding the people as its primary objective and e) people's control of the forests.It also proposes nationalisation of key industries on the principles of: a) abolition of big private capitalists; b) state management of all key industries; c) abolition of private monopoly - whether formal or virtual; and d) constitution of a national industrial council for the implementation of the policy.30 IVFactionalism and Defections in the National ConferenceIntra-party factionalism is the bane of all or nearly all political parties and groups. In other words, party system and intra-party factionalism as well as defections exist in political culture of several countries in general and in developing countries in particular. In India too, no political party is beyond the pull of factions. In fact, factionalism is a true feature of the Indian political scene, more so at the State level.31 If factionalism is taken purely as a struggle for power, there was no174 factionalism as such in the National Conference in the 1940s, the reason being that up to 1947, the National Conference was leading a movement against the autocratic government of the Dogra dynasty. It was in the middle of 1949 that the first breach in the National Conference had taken place, when Ghulam Mohiuddin Karrar, the one who was not given a place in the first cabinet which Sheikh Abdullah formed under the Maharaja, left the Party in anger in 1949.32 He then organised a new political party, named the Kashmir conference in June 1953.33 In the State of Jammu and Kashmir, factional politics was also relatively unknown during the early phases of the National Conference headed by Sheikh Mohd. Abdullah. When it assumed power in 1948, it was more cohesive and united, perhaps because of the personality of the Sheikh. After some time, however, some form of factional activities crept in, though in a highly subdued form, and Sheikh Abdullah did not seem to have taken any cognizance of the same. Bakshi Ghulam Mohd. was heading that faction. It did not come in the open until 1953 when Sham Lal Saraf was asked to resign from the cabinet on the ground of his having made a statement against the Prime Minister of the State. This faction ultimately succeeded in getting, first, the Sheikh Abdullah ministry dismissed on 9 August, 1953,35 and then capturing power itself. This may be said to be the first phase of factionalism in the National Conference.After the arrest of Sheikh Abdullaha in 1953, a new kind of factionalism developed in the Party. It was spearheaded by the pro-Sheikh faction, which was led by M.A. Beg, a close associate of the Sheikh. But G.M. Bakshi, who had assumed power after the outster of the Sheikh, had been able to maintain the dominance in the Party.The State's new constitution was enforced on 26 January, 1957. The people of the State were to go to the polls for electing the legislature under the new constitution. There was, however, some dissatisfaction over the selection of the Party candidates. That led to the emergence of a new faction soon after the said election. This faction was led by G.M. Sadiq.The dissension within the Party came into the open when the Sadiq faction nominated one G.R. Roengeu for the Legislative Council in late 1957. This was resented to by the pro-Bakshi group. Besides this, the Sadiq faction had also been vehemently insisting on the inclusion of all the members of the previous government of Bakshi in the new government which he (Bakshi) was to form after the 1957 Assembly elections. But Bakshi was not favourably disposed to that suggestion. G.M. Sadiq and DP. Dhar also accused G.M. Bakshi by levelling a number of charges against him. Later on, they resigned from the working committee and175 defected away from the Party and then formed a new party, named the Democratic National Conference. However, with the intervention of the central leadership, Sadiq dissolved his party and again joined the National Conference. But the return of the faction did not lead to the true union of hearts38.G.M. Bakshi's resignation from the state politics under the Kamraj plan led again to the emergence of the same old intra party factionalism. With the deliberate subverting of the election of G.M. Sadiq as the new party leader in October, 1963 by the Bakshi faction again pushed the Party into a worst kind of factional politics. Khawaza Shamus-ud-Din was, however, unanimously elected as leader of the Legislative Party and thus became the Prime Minister of the State.The intra-party factionalism became more serious during Shamus-ud-Din's regime because of the theft of the Holy Relic from the Hazarat Bal Shrine (Srinagar). This led to a large scale arson, loot, and violence and ultimately to the handing over of power by Shamus-ud-Din ministry to G.M. Sadiq. Afterwards, the pro-Bakshi faction tried to topple the Sadiq ministry but in vain.The factional politics, however, dragged on. When the Sadiq ministry decided to merge the National Conference with the Indian National Congress with a view to becoming a party of the mainstream of national politics,40 the Bakshi faction made an abortive attempt to stop the move. Twenty pro-Bakshi members of the state legislature informed the Speaker that they would continue to belong to the National Conference. This phase of factionalism, however, ended with the death of G.M. Bakshi and the resultant disappearance of the faction.On assuming power again in 1975 after a laspse of 22 years under the Indira-Sheikh accord, Sheikh Abdullah decided to revive the National Conference. In 1977 state assembly elections, the newly-revived National Conference returned to power with a comfortable majority. Again, the factional trouble emerged in the National Conference.M. A. Beg, one of the most trusted and the closest lieutenants of Sheikh Abdullah, sponsored the candidature of his son-in-law for the state legislative council. The voting pattern revealed that some members (more than expected) of the ruling party had voted for Beg's son-in-law. At this, Sheikh Abdullaha suspected the bonafides of M.A. Beg. In order to test his sincerity towards him, the Sheikh asked the members of the ruling party to take an oath of personal loyality and allegiance to the party leader42, which step M.A. Beg did not approve of. Therefore Sheikh Abdullah relieved him from the post of the Cabinet Ministry.176 It marked the climax of the factional crisis of this phase. Feeling humiliated, M.A. Beg defected from the National Conference and formed another party, named the Inqlabi National Conference. He and his few supporters started sitting separately in the State Assembly. There was also a danger of further defection in the National Conference as well as the Assembly. The latter, therefore, moved an Anti-Defection Bill and got it passed by the State Assembly.43 In the last days of his life, Sheikh Abdullah declared his son, Farooq Abdullah, as his successor and got him elected to the presidentship of the National Conference. This was resented by G.M. Shah, a Cabinet Minister and the son-in-law of the Sheikh, for he had considered himself as second in command in the Party and hence a legitimate successor of the Sheikh. The factional fight once again started in the Party. This time it was led by G.M. Shah.After the death of Sheikh Abdullah in 1982, his son Farooq Abdullah who was the president of the National Conference at that time became the Chief Minister with the blessings of the central leadership.44 Farooq did not include in his ministry even a single member of the erstwhile council of ministers, perhaps for the reason that most of the members of the previous cabinet were the supporters of G.M. Shah.45 As a result, the Shah faction started organising itself and looking for an opportunity to topple the Farooq ministry. The factional rivalry between the two contenders for power (the then Chief Minister, Farooq Abdullah, and his brother-in-law, G.M. Shah) did not abate even after the former's ascendancy to the coveted high office. Rather it had happened in its true colour as a factional fight between the ruling clique and the dissident group. In fact, Farooq found it difficult to fight against a faction, composed of several former ministers of Sheikh Abdullah's government, and the others owing allegiance to G.M. Shah. In some of the district level meetings of the Party, the rival groups had freely exchanged hot words and levelled serious allegations against each other. The ensuing dog-fight in the ruling party then had made the confusion worst confounded. Shah did not even hesitate to take the help of the Pradesh Congress through one D.D. Thakur who was a member of Sheikh Abdullaha's last cabinet. The climax of this factional fight came on 22 July 1984 when 12 members of the Assembly belonging to the ruling party and one independent member accompanied Shah to the leader of Congress(I) Legislative Party, and pleaded that Farooq Abdullah had lost the confidence of the majority of the members of the Assembly and, therefore, had forfeited his constitutional as well as moral right to continue to be in office.47 As for177 Farooq, he wanted that loss of confidence be decided on the floor of the Assembly and if that was not somehow acceptable to others, that Assembly might be dissolved. The Governor, however, did not find any justification in accepting either of the two suggestions. Instead, he dismissed the ministry and appointed G.M. Shah as the Chief Minister of the State.48 The factional fight between the two groups - the National Conference (Khallida) and the National Conference (Farooq), further intensified and wriggled on until the end of the Shah ministry. When in the wake of the Farooq-Rajiv Accord, Farooq returned to power, the intensity of the fight lessened.VElectoral AlliancesAlliance in the electoral process, however, refers to one of those pre-poll strategies that political parties and individual candidates adopt by which they enter into mutual electoral arrangement with one another in order to win an election. These alliances are, therefore, formed, in terms of either explicit pact or implicit content avoidance.The National Conference had contested most of the State Assembly elections without having alliance with any other party. It was in 1977 Assembly election that there took place talks, for the first time, for an electoral alliance between the National Conference and the Janata Party. But these talks ultimately failed and both the parties decided to go it alone. However, the Jamat-i-Islami Gong accused of extra-territorial loyalities) made an electoral alliance with the Janata Party.49 The Jamat-i-Islami did not sponsor its candidates where the Janata Party decided to put up its own candidates, and vice versa. Their alliance, however, could not break ice and the Janata Party captured only 13 seats and the Jamat-i-Isalami only one.It was in 1983 Assembly elections, that the National Conference president, Farooq Abdullah, reached an understanding with Mirwaz Maulvi Farooq. As a result, there emerged a clear-cut political polarisation between the two regions - the Hindu-dominated, Jammu and the Muslim-dominated, Kashmir. However, it may be wrong to conclude that both the parties had won seats on communal basis. A deeper analysis of the election result shows that both the parties had made deep inroads into each others strong-holds.178 In 1985 parliamentary elections, the leaders of the National Conference (K) and the Congress (I) decided to contest elections jointly and to field candidates for all the six seats. In pursuance of that alliance, Mrs. Khaleda Shah the president of the National Conference(K) declared that her party would work in close collaboration with the Congress (I). In fact, such a declaration was nothing but a re-affirmation of an earlier alliance between the two parties, forged in July, 1984 when, Pradesh Congress(I) legislative party had decided to extend support to thirteen members of the National Conference (K) in the State Assembly with a view to outing Farooq Abdullah50. Accordingly, the National Conference (K) put up its candidates in two constituencies of the Valley - Srinagar and Baramulla, whereas the remaining four constituencies (Anantnag, Ladakh and two in the Jammu region) had been left for the Congres-(I) candidates.51 To counter the Congress(I) National Conference(K) alliance, Farooq Abdullah, president of the National Conference(F), had also made efforts to forge a united front among the opposition parties of the State. But when unity talks failed to mature on account of ideological differences among various parties and their divergent approaches to the major political issues, Begum Akbar Jahan, the widow of Sheikh Abdullah and the mother of Farooq Abdullah intervened and an alliance was forged among the National Conference(F), the Awami Action Committee, the Peoples' Conference and the Panther's Party. As a result, the National Conference (F) supported by its allies contested all the three seats in the Valley, one in Ladakh and one in Jammu. In the Udhampur constituency, it decided to give support to Bhim Singh, the president of the Panther's Party while in return the latter offered its support to the National Conference(F) candidate in the Jammu-Poonch constitutency.52 The years to follow witnessed many developments on the chessboard of the State politics. The Farooq-Rajiv Alliance brought about a radical change in the existing power pattern, nullifying the older alliances and floating the new ones. To spell out, in the March 1987 Assembly elections the Indian National Congress again entered into an electoral alliance with the ruling faction of the National Conference which this time was not the one owing allegiance to Shah but to Farooq. Under the new alliance the National Conference (F) was to contest 45 seats out of a total number of 76 while the remaining 31 seats would be contested by Congress(I). The former fielded its candidates in 36 constituencies out of 42 in the Kashmir Valley and 8 out of 32 constituencies in Jammu. It also shared the two Ladakh seats with the Congress. Thus, the Congress contested 6 seats in the Valley, 24 seats in the Jammu region and one179 in Ladakh.53 This alliance was forged with a view to wining over the estranged forces and thereby bringing them into the mainstream.54 On the other side, the National Conference (K) tried to seek an electoral alliance with the Muslim United Front. The Election Commission of India, however, registered the National Conference headed by Begum Khaleda Shah as a political party in the State and allotted to it the symbol of the 'rising sun, for the forthcoming Assembly election.55 The talks for the alliance between the National Conference (K) and the Muslim United Front ultimately failed. As a result, the former asked all its candidates to retire from the contest because the Party was not in a position to bear heavy poll expenses.56 The ruling alliance of the National Conference(F) and the Congress(I) however, secured an absolute majority in 76-member State Assembly.VIElectoral Performance and Voting TrendsElections in a democracy are considered a process politics and may be regarded as a procedure for aggregating preferences of a particular choice.57 It is the only accepted device to determine which party or parties be accorded the authority for governance for a defined period of time. Election is, therfore, not only the barometer of democracy but indeed its life breath.58 As already pointed out, the National Conference always secured a majority of seats in all State Assembly elections since Independence because of its progressive programmes, charismatic and dynamic leadership.In the Consembly (Kashmir's) elections of 1951, the National Conference bagged all the 75 seats. As for the other parties, there was only one party in the opposition, named the Praja Parished. It had a hold only in the Jammu region. It had boycotted the elections under protest and had levelled a number of serious allegations of malafide tactics against the ruling National Conference, such as not holding elections simultaneously in both provinces (Kashmir and Jammu); irregular delimitation; no provision for a general seat; out of the way polling stations; unwarranted rejection of 41 (out of 65) nominations of the Praja Parished candidates; undue favours to the National Conference candidates; and official interference. It charged that election had not been free and fair because of manipulation on the part of the persons involved in elections.59 Refuting all these charges, the National Conference had maintained that the elections had been perfectly normal. Since the National Conference had180 been the most popular party in both Jammu and Kashmir regions, it was bound to succeed.60 In manifestation of the mass satisfaction with the three years of developments during the regime of G.M. Bakshi, the National Conference got 56.52 per cent of the votes polled and captured 68 out of 75 seats in second Assembly election (1957)61 and formed the government. Similarly, in the third Assembly Elections of 1962 the National Conference again came to power with 66.92 per cent of votes polled and captured 70 out of 75 seats,62 perhaps because of a weak and fragmented opposition. In the fourth state Assembly elections (1967) when the National Conference merged with the Indian National Congress, it won a landslide victory and again maintained its dominance in the Assembly. In 1977 Assembly election, the revived National Conference under the charismatic leadership of Sheikh Mohd. Abdullah got 46.22 per cent of the votes polled and got 47 seats of the Assembly. In June 1983 Assembly election, the first post-Abdullah election, the National Conference got 46.17 percent of the votes polled and captured 47 Assembly seats.64 Similarly, in 1987 Assembly election, the electorate reaffirmed its faith in the National Conference by returning it to power with a thumping majority.65 The Percentage of votes Polled and Number of Seats Won by the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference in State Assembly Elections Since IndependenceYear of Election Percentage of votes polled Number of seats won 1951 --* 75 1957 54.38 68 1962 93.30** 70 1977 46.22 47 1983 41.46 46 1987 - 43 * All the National Conference nominee returned unopposed. In Nabakadal and in Baramulla constituencies in Kashmir the polling scenes were set but the independent candidates at both places refused to contest in the end. There were two contests in Jammu region i.e. at Kanachak and in Akhnoor constituencies. But at both constituencies National Conference candidates won the seats.** After 1962 Assembly elections and before 1967 assembly Elections, National Conference had been merged with Indian National Congress. National Conference was however, revived in 1977.181 The electorates in the State have strong commitment to socialism and democracy. The commitment to secularism is apparent from their outright rejection of the communal parties. The fact that a majority of the people in the State have demonstrated their firm faith in Indian democracy as also in the federal nature of the Indian nationalism, there does not exist any scope for secesionism. Whatever little of it existed in the Vally earlier, it has disappeared now. If regional aspirations of Kashmir sub-nationalism are not curbed, secessionism is not likely to raise its head again.Another main issue in the elections in J&K State is Article 370 of the Constitution of India. The National Conference always cashed votes by exploiting this issue in Muslim dominant areas. The Muslims of the State are of the opinion that Article 370 is a safeguard to the Muslims of the State against the Hindu majority of India. They feel that the retention of Article 370 is necessary until and unless communalism exists in the country. The Hindu, on the other hand, regard this Article as an obstacle to national integrity. Thus, the choice to vote is always moulded by using this issue in all the elections in Jammu and Kashmir.Another recent trend in Kashmir elections is the erosion of the phenomenon of one dominant party system. The National Conference though secured a majority of seats but, at the same time, the Congress (I) has emerged as a main opposition party in the State. Since 1983 the Congress-(I) and the National Conference have been locked in electoral contests and the election results attest this fact. The support-base of the BJP seems to have shifted towards the Congress(I). The voters do not appear to have changed their ideological loyalities, instead, they have changed their parties. They got the same thing in Congress (I) which BJS or BJP had promised them. The BJP is, thus, no more a threat to the Congress (I) in Jammu whereas the National Conference (F) is trying hard to build its support base in the region and to emerge as a viable opposition.The voting trends in March, 1987, State Assembly elections were quite different from those of the previous elections. A glance over the election data reveals that vital changes had taken place in the political landscape of the State since the last elections in 1983. Politics then was polarised between the National Conference and the Congress. The Muslim United Front has now replaced the latter as the main challenger in the Kashmir Valley, pushing the Jamat-i-Islami to a marginal place. The Muslim United Front got four seats out of 42 in the Valley and 32 per cent of the valid votes. Thus, the Muslim United Front has emerged as182 the main alternative to the ruling National Conference-Congress alliance in the Valley.In the Jammu region, the position of the Congress(I) remained intact. All opposition parties proved to be negligible. The voting behaviour of the majority of sections of the population was influenced by the caste factor. The independent candidates for the first time got more votes than those of the opposition parties and got elected. The National Conference which contested seven seats in the region as an ally of the Congress improved its position and got 15.10 percent of votes. "Jammu thus emerged after the elections, as a fragmented personality, leadership and rudderless".66 VIIThe Support BaseThe National Conference has a broad base. It has been able to get support from all communities as well as all working classes. It is the most popular in the Kashmir region of the State. But in the Jammu region, the Muslim-dominated belts (Poonch, Rajouri, Bhawderwa, Doda etc) have invariably supported the National Conference. The Party, however, could not get a mass support in the Hindu-dominated belts of the Jammu region as well as in Ladakh which is dominated by the Buddhists.NOTES AND REFERENCES1. Indu Bhushan: The Government And Administration of Jammu&Kashmir, Dissertation (Unpublished) Lucknow University 1942 p.136.2. Ibid.3. K. Brahama Singh: Political Agitation in Jammu&Kashmir 1931, And the Emergence of the Muslim Conference' M. Phil Dissertation, University of Jammu 1982 pp.29,33,37,39= and 40.4. Muhammad Yusaf Saraf: Kashmiri's Fight For Freedom. Ferozons Ltd. Lahore 1977, Vol. I p. 352.5. P.N. Bambri: History of Kashmir, Metropolitan, Book Company Pvt. Ltd., 1962, p. 651.6. Muhammad Yusaf Saraf: op. cit. p. 352.7. Ibid, p. 357.8. Prem Nath Bazaz: Inside Kashmir, Srinagar 1941 pp. 100-101.9. Muhammad Yusaf Saraf: op. cit. p. 354.10. Ibid. p. 357.183 11. P.N. Ganju: This is Kashmir, S. Chand&Co. Delhi, 1948. p 7.12. Jagan Nath Sathu: Bahnial: the Iron Curtain in Kashmir Kashmir Democratic Union, 30 Faiz Bazar, Delhi January 1952, p.9.13. Indu Bhushan: op. cit. p. 13714. M. Ganju: op. cit. pp. 815. The National Demand: Published by M.M. Sayeed Mujahid Manzil, Srin-agar.16. M. Ganju: op. cit. pp. 9,10.17. Indu Bhushan: op. cit. p. 14418. Naya Kashmir Manifesto, published by K.N. Bamzai, Director Kashmir Bamzai, Director, Kashmir Bureau of Information, 5 Privithi Raj Road, New Delhi p. 24.19. The National Conference Memorandum to the Cabinet Mission, 1946. the people Age, Bombay, Jan 2, 1946.20. M. Ganju: op.cit. pp 13-14.21. Sheikh Mohd. Abdullah: His Life and Deeds. A phamplet issued by Department of Information (Publication Unit) J&K Govt. year not mentioned p.4.22. Constituent Assembly for Jammu and Kashmir - Resolution adopted by the General Council of the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference on the 27th Oct., 1950. Published by B.P. Sharma, Principal Information Officer Jammu and Kashmir year not mentioned.23. Vidya Bhushan: State Politics and Government: Jammu and Kashmir. Jay Kay Book House, Residency Road, Jammu Tawi 1985 pp. 108, 109.24. CA. Debate Vol. IV No. 4 Dt. 6th Feb. 1954 p.4825. Santosh Koul: Evolution of the Constitutional Relationship between J&K State and Indian Union. Unpublished thesis, University of Jammu, 1972 pp. 14626. Balbir Singh: State Politics in India. Macmillan India Ltd., New Delhi 1982, p. 56.27. Why National Conference. A phamplet issued by publicity Deptt J&K National Conference, year unknown.28. Interview with Shri Amar Nath Office Secretary of J&K National Conference, Jammu Province dated 19.9.87.29. New Kashmir: Published by K.M. Bamzai the Director Kashmir Bureau of Information, 5 Privithi Raj Road, New Delhi, year not known, p.24.30. Ibid.31. Paul R .Brass: Factional Politics in An Indian State. Bombay, Oxford University Press 1966.32. Parkash Chandra: Factional Politics in Jammu&Kashmir A case study of Factional Behaviour in the ruling party of the State. Dissertation submitted to MNV 1977 pp 146-47.33. Ibid p. 15034. Lord Bird Wood: Two Nations and Kashmir: Robert Hale. 63 Old Brompton Road, London, S.W. 7 1956 p. 157.184 35. Vidya Bhushan: op. cit. p. 157.36. Balbir Singh: op. cit. p. 164.37. Ibid. p. 165.38. Ibid. p. 166.39. Ibid. p. 169.40. Ibid. p. 177.41. The Indian Express 25th Feb., 1975.42. Balbir Singh: op. cit. p. 184.43. The Kashmir Times (Jammu English Daily) Sept. 8, 1963.44. The Kashmir Times45. Dev Batrohi: Constitutional And Political Aspects July 84 Events in Kashmir. Published by the Directorate of Information (Publication Division) J&K Govt Aug. 1984. p. 4.46. The Kashmir Times. Nov. 4, 1982.47. Dev Batrohi: July 84 Events in Kashmir Constitutional and Political Aspects.48. Ibid.49. The Times of India, New Delhi, 22 th June, 1977.50. Zarina Banu Magrey: Eighth Parliamentary Elections in J&K State An. M. Phil Dissertation (Unpublished) 1986. p.76.51. The Kashmir Times, Nov. 19, 1984.52. The Daily Excelsior (English Daily, Jammu) Dec. 22, 1984.53. The Kashmir Times, Feb.23, 1984, p. l.54. The Kashmir Times, March 12, 1987.55. The Kashmir Times, Feb.22, 1987 p. l.56. The Kashmir Times, Feb.28, 1987. p. l.57. International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences: Macmillan and Free Press USA 1986, Vol. 16, p. 387.58. Shri Ram Maheshwari: Electoral Politics in National Metropolics Ritu Delhi. p1.59. Vidya Bhushan: op. cit. p. 119.60. Elections to the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly, A phamplet issued by Ministry of Information and Broadcasting J&K Govt. year not known 9-53.61. Z.M. Qureshi: Elections and State Politics of India, A case study of Kashmir (New Delhi) Sundeep Parkashan 1979 p 51.62. Ibid. p. 54.63. Ibid. p. 68.64. Sheikh Nazir Ahmed: Toppling Game in Jammu and Kashmir J&K National Conference p 1.65. Ibid.66. Balraj Puri: "Portents of J&K Elections" in The Kashmir Times May 26&27, 1987.185 THE MUSLIM UNITED FRONT IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR (1987)P.S. VermaIntroductionGenerally, the people in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, in line with their political socialisation, tend to give far more importance to ethno-religious and regional identities than to considerations of a unified and secular political culture. This, among other things, has led to the development of a phenomenon in which northern Kashmair speaking valley, predominantly Muslim, has remained impregnated with Islamic fundamentalism and the Dorgri-speaking southern region, preponderantly Hindu, has become vulnerable to the Hindu chauvinistic tendencies. Occasionally, similar tendencies have been witnessed among the Tibetan-Mangoloid Budhists who form the major chunk of population in the Ladakh region. The Muslim fundamentalists generally make a show of their pan-Islamic loyality and attachment to the Muslim country across the border, whereas their counterparts in Jammu area like to over emphasise nationalism and a complete merger of the state of Jammu and Kashmir at par with the other states of the Indian Union. Likewise, the people in the Kashmir valley like to put more emphasis on the issue of autonomy of the state, whereas in Jammu they, in the existing set up, tend to favour a strong centre. The Kashmiri Muslim organisations often mount pressure for the autonomy of the state as against the centre whereas their counterparts in the Hindu dominated Jammu area demand autonomy against the Kashmiri Muslim domination.Once in the early fifties the extremist section in the "Praja Parishad Movement" even moved for a resolution of "Quit-Jammu" against Sheikh Abdullah's government, though this move was foiled by the more mature and older leadership within and outside the Parishad. At times, demands have been made for the creation of a 'sub-state' for the Jammu region.186 More recently, the "Shiv Sena" in Jammu even demanded for the creation of a separate "Dogra-land" amounting to the formation of a separate state for the Jammu region. Earlier in 1978-79, a person no less than Dr Karan Singh (former ruler of the State and a long time Central Minister) also warned mat if the Jammu regional problems were not tackled with understanding and imagination, it would lead to "separation of Jammu region from the Kashmir valley". In response to this, the Chief Minister, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, quickly retorted "if the majority of people in the Jammu region believe that they can progress by carrying out a separate state of Jammu, then there is nothing to stop them and we must part as friends."1 His reaction sounded more of a Kashmiri leader than a Chief Minister or leader of the whole state. Almost, similar was his reaction to the "All-party Action Committee of Ladakh" when it started an agitation for the regional autonomy" of the Ladakh region in 1981. At that time the Sheikh said that he would not stand in the way if Ladakh decided not to stay on with the State.2 Besides autonomy, a prominent Budhist leader of Ladakh, Kushak Bakula, "has for long been demanding direct Central administration over his area."3 Its is only rarely that a prominant leader or political group in the State has ever considered the unified or integrated state as something "sacrosanct". Even the Sheikh, without whom in fact nobody else could have easily prevented the Muslims of Kashmir "from being swayed by the perverse logice of partition", himself in an ambivalent manner had expressed his inclination towards the bifurcation of the State on community lines as early as in 1948. The idea was again formally revived in a memorandom to the U.N.O. on behalf of 110 prominent citizens of Kashmir Valley, presumbaly with the consent of Sheikh Abdullah, in 1963.4 This apart, from 1953 to 1975 he and his associates had emphasised and sought for the right of "self-determination' and Kashmir's distinct identity. Whereas, the "Praja Parishad" in Jammu had lauded an agitation against article 370 which had accorded a special status to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Likewise, in reaction to the demand for a plebiscite, the Praja Parishad fought for a "zonal plebiscite". "Expressing similar anxieties about possibility of the result of a plebiscitie being favourable to Pakistan, Chewang Rig/dm, President of the Budhist Association of Ladakh asserted, in a memorandum to Nehru, that Ladakhi Buddhists were a separate nation-with distinct race, language, religion and culture and claimed the right of self-determination for it, separately for Kashmir."5 Likewise fundamentalists in the Jamaat-e-Islami have been constantly pleading that federation of religious communities would be187 a better arrangement than that of any secular basis for the reconstruction of the State.Unfortunately, in the wake of people's mobilization more emphasis is placed on ethno-religious considerations rather than on culture, region or economic factors. Due to the concentration of the people of one community in a particular region, religion and region in the case of the state of Jammu and Kashmir have become almost synonymous. Therefore, any movement in the Jammu region would ultimately be identified with the Hindus, in Ladakh with the Buddhists and in the Kashmir valley with the Muslims. Most issues including the perdcnnial topic of discrimination in either of these regions have also been based mainly on the ethno-religious considerations. Even minor matters such as the settlement of the 1947 refugees, family welfare schemes, formation of new districts or assembly constituencies, opening of professional and technical institutions, distribution of funds for developmental activities, recruitments, transfers, promotions have been to some degree, influenced by religio-communal considerations. So much so, even the formation or shaping of most of the political parties, right from the very beginning, has been greatly determined by the factor of religion.Instead of being as new such type of tendencies in the politics of the State have been gaining ground since long. The roots of such tendencies may be traced from the pre-partition period. Even the erstwhile Dogra rulers had used religion and other parochial ties of the people for maintaining their exploitative hold over the hapless Muslim masses in the State. Likewise, an organised freedom struggle against the autocratic Dogra rulers which begun around 1930 was also initiated and sustained on the basis of such primodial tics. The educated youngmen representing the Muslim middle class families had formed "All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conferences (1932)" which spearheaded the battle for freedom against the Dogra regime. The emotive and sentimental issues such as "Tauhin-i-Quran" (though mis-stated) were used to spark-off and ignite the movement in the State in the 1930s. Frequently, political speeches were made from the Mosques under the cloack of religious exhortations with a view to mobilizing the general masses. The movement had a revolutionary potential and was focussed against an old time oppressive and exploitative regime but owing to its being rooted into primodialism it failed to escape the trauma of a conservative and reactionary bias. The counterpart Hinduities viewed this movement as "pan-Islamic" in nature. Some old and the newly formed Hindu organizations in collaboration with the erstwhile rulers not only took to malign the movement but also188 intensified the process of communalisation among the Hindus of various hues. As a result, the communal politics "reigned supreme both among the Muslim and the Non-Muslim communities"6 and the right type of the education could not be imparted to the people.The elections held to the State Legislature within a period of four years from 1934 to 1938 had also revealed the height of communalism among Muslims and non-Muslims. Among the Muslims, the "Muslim Conference" and the "Azad Party Muslim Conference" were pitched against each other. The behaviour of these two Muslim parties became "so untoward that the fight for vote had become virtually a war between believers and non-believers" or what has been termed a "war between Islam and the Kafirs (infidelity)". Even the Ballot Box was religionised by the Azad Party.7 Incidenlly, the politics of the "Muslim United Front" of today has a close resemblance with that of the Azad Party of the thirties. However, like the Muslims, the Hindus were also mobilised by the communal groups such as the "Sanatan Dharma Yuvak Sabha" of the Kashmiri Pandits and the "Hindu-Sikh Naujawan Sabha" of Jammu province. These groups had a reactionary and communal character and obviously taken contradictory stands on most major issues of public importance. As an example, when the Muslim organisations demanded for the establishment of a "responsible government" their Hindu conterparts interpreted it as an effort to replace the Hindu raj by the Muslim rule. The Kashmiri Pandits even went to the extent of suggesting to all minority groups in the State to unite and organise under an "All Jammu and Kashmir Hindu Conference" for fighting their political and other demands separately.8 Fortunately, during the period between 1939 and 1947 the political life in the state remained somewhat free from the communal factor. It was a period when the frequency of interactions between the nationalist and local elite had considerably increased. There occurred hardly any noticeable communal polarisation in the Slate. Even the demand for self-determination echoing the CPI line and the "Quit-Kashmir" movement against the Hindu Dogra rulers in 1946 did not deflect the nationalist direction of the states politics. Nor was the holocaust of 1947 repeated in the Kashmir valley, although in Jammu some Muslims were killed by the Hindu communalists. But this trend could not be stabilised as the politics in the State in the early fifties again turned to a reverse phase. The Kashmiri Nationalism (which in reality had become indistinguishable from Muslim Nationalism in the valley) during the period following the arrest of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah in August 1953 had also189 acquired militant proportions. The Muslims in the valley were so mobilised and provoked that they, among other things, had also become vulnerable to secessionist politics. New organisations were formed to preach cummunal and secessionist politics. Important among these organisations were the political Conference (1953) of G.M. Kara, Plebiscite Front (August 1955) led by Mirza Afzal Beg and the Awami Action Committee of Maulvi Mohammad Farooq. Maulvi Farooq actually shot into prominance during the relic agitation in 1963-64. This phase coupled with communal and secessionist politics continued till 1975 when Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah had agreed to assume power in accordance with the Delhi accord which was signed in November 1974. But the 22-year long movement launched by the late Sheikh and his followers had given a new meaning and dimension to the entire political fabric of the state. The events that followed and the forces that got created during this phase were bound to influence the state in a certain sense in the years to come. The MUF also happens to be the product of such type of politics in the state. Therefore, any systematic understanding about the MUF would certainly warrant the aforesaid discussion and analysis.Origin, Composition and Ideology of the MUFIn terms of its origin, the MUF came into existence on the first day of Muharram in September, 1986. Prior to this, the fundamentalist groups which joined the Front had operated separately and had never projected collectively as an alternative to the National Conference (N.C.) in the Muslim dominated constituencies. In view of certain new developments around the mid-1980s these groups came to believe that the situation was quite favourable for strengthening their position and becoming a formidable rival to the ruling National Conference in the Valley, if not in the State. They had hardly any pretention of coming into power at the State level. Out of a variety of factors, which were considered by these groups as favourable, the split of the National Conference into two viz. the N.C. (Farooq) and N.C. (Khalida) seemed as most important. Besides this, the N.C. (F) and the ruling Congress(I) at the centre, at the time of the formation of the front, had also reached an agreement which was soon declared in the form of an "accord" on 7 November, 1986. Mention may be made here that in Kashmir even there exists an anti-centre attitude which percolate even down to some common people particularly in the Muslim dominated valley.This accord which was the culmination of the political dialogue between the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, and the Chief Minister, Dr. Farooq190 Abdullah, was stated to be a forceful expression of the desire of the two leaders to accelerate "the pace of progress in this backward State and fight unitedly the obscurantist and disruptive forces".9 While summing up the spirit of the accord Dr. Farooq Abdullah said, "the biggest political gain 9for the accord will be to fight the united forces of disruption in Jammu or in Kashmir, to fight fundamentalists whether Hindu or Muslim and to be able to spend our energies in getting something better for the siate, remove poverty, disease and unemployment".10 It was on the basis of this Accord that the NC(F) and Congrcss(I) had joined hands and contested the March 1987 election as allies.The Front leaders, as expected, interpreted this Accord as a sell-out of the State to Delhi. Likewise, they had also accused the late Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah for abjectly surrendering before the Centre under the compulsions of power politics in 1975. The Sheikh under the November 1974 accord had given up the confrontationist path with the centre and agreed to assume the office of the Chief Minister on 26 February, 1975. He had also disbanded the "plebiscite Front" and revived his National Conference which in the changed context "had to cast away its pro-plebiscite robe and don the pro-accession attire". Besides the Delhi accord (1974), the Sheikh was also accused of converting the 'Muslim Conference' into the national Conference in 1939 and the State's accession to the Indian Union in 1947. But his role between 1953 and 1975 had won the appreciation of the Front Leaders. The Sheikh during this period used to address the people as "I will either secure a life of freedom and dignity for the Kashmir nation or die."12 Besides the Accord, the growing communal scenario in the country in general and the neighbouring State of Punjab in particular had also inspired the various fundamentalist groups to form a United Front against the ruling party. The state of Jammu and Kashmir had itself experienced a large-scale communal violence in February 1986 in which no life was lost but property worth of several crores was destroyed in certain towns of the valley like Anant Nag.As regards the composition of the front, the major fundamentalist groups which had been banned together under the banner of the "Muslim United Front" in September 1986 were Jamaat-e-Islami,Umaat-e-Islamia, and Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen. The other constituents of the MUF were the Tahafuz-e-Islam units of different districts in the Valley. These units were essentially Jammaat-e-Islami outfits. Initially, the People's conference of Abdul Gani Lone and some other units including the one led by Mr. G M. Shah, the ex-Chief Minister and son-in-law of late Sheikh191 Mohammad Abdullah, had also expressed solidarity with the Front. But later on they fell out on the election-eve because they could not be adjusted under the growing influence of the Jamaat-e-Islami. The Jamaat-e-Islami was more interested in ascertaining the cooperation of Dr. Qazi Nisar and Maulvi Abbas Ansari to the extent possible in achieving its political objectives. Since Dr. Nisar and Maulvi Ansari considered shrines as effective power centres they were found more suitable to the Jamaat than Mr. A.G. Lone and G.M. Shah. As aptly commented:"By snapping links with Mr. A.G. Lone's People's conference the Muslim united Front has expectedly come into its own, a clergy outfit constituted by Jamaat-e-Islami to cover its own weaknesses. The latter, as is well known, has not been acceptable to the people in general in Kashmir mainly because of its too radical an approach to religion. For instance, it is not beholden to shrines, an attitude totally unacceptable to Kashmiris in general and Muslims in particular. It is this weakness which the highly scheming Jamaat leadership has sought to cover by ropping in Maulvis like Qazi Nisar and Abbas Ansari who, like many others of their clan, see Shrines as effective power centres".13 During the elections with the exception of Qazi Nisar and Abbas Ansari (a Shia leader) the Front virtually remained a Jamaat affair. A study of Party affiliations of those who had filed nominations as MUF candidates would also reveal that the Jamat had taken a quota of 24 seats on its own name and 16 other constituencies in the name of its satellite organisations.14 In all, the Front contested 53 assembly scats during the March 1987 elections.The Jamaat which commands cadres numbering several thousands is a fundamentalist body. It calls for going back to the fundamentals of Islam. The secular system according to Jamaat neither allows Islam to flourish nor ensures safety and security of life of Muslims in India. Syed Ali Shah Geelani (a top Jamaat Stalwart), who before becoming a full time Jamaat activist in the early sixties also served as a school teacher, believes that any political system divorced from religion tends to be tyrranical. Once he said that even Ram Rajya would be far better for Muslims than the present Indian system.15 He perceives that by asking votes in the name of Islam and assurances to voters to bring Nizam-e-Mustafa (the prophet's order of governance or Islamic way of life) was not a crime but being true to Islam. Initially the Jamaat had achieved respectability in192 the politics of Jammu and Kashmir during the 1972 assembly elections when it made its poll debut with five assembly seats.Ideologically, the Jamaat believes in the religious purity and concerns itself with the affairs and activities of the Muslim community. But it has no affiliation with the All India Jamaat-e-Islami. The contention is that since the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is not final how can it join any all-India Organisation or party. It has been repeatedly alleging that Delhi has converted Kashmir into its colony. Moreover, the Jamaat is reported to have pro-Pakistan leanings. The so called Islamic stance of the Post-Bhutto government in Pakistan and growing Pan-Islamic consciousness has further tempted the Jamaat to be friendly with Pakistan and favour the theory of self-determination for the settlement of the Kashmir Problem. While supporting Bhotto's execution, the Jamaat in Kashmir had also become victim of mass fury in April 1980.Though it claims to believe in non-violence but in practice tends to draw inspirations from the militant tendency. Its youth wings and the militant organisations believe in militancy and at times instigate violence. The organisations such as Mahaz-e-Azadi, Peoples League, Tulba, Taf-usal Islam have a militant character.The support structure of the Jamaat in the countryside has not spread as far and wide as in towns. But it has developed an infrastructure for widening its base and preaching its ideology in almost all areas of the Kashmir Valley. With a view to spreading its influence, the Jamaat, besides running a network of schools under a separate trust has been lately running a weekly Azhan, a daily Uqab and monthly Takbeer.16 In addition, it has been running several study circles in different parts of the valley which, as reported, are being financed from Arab countries through the medium of "Muslim Welfare Society. As reported, the Muslim Welfare Society receives huge petro-dollars from Arab countries in the name of spreading Islamic culture."17 The Jamaat has a significant following in the educational institutions. It, in fact, lays greater emphasis in indoctrinating the post-independence generation.Next to Jamaat, the Umaat-e-Islamia of Qazi Nisar forms as a major group of the MUF. Though the MUF came to be dominated by the Jamaat-e-islami it was initially authored by Dr. Qazi Nisar. His Umaat, as reported, was mainly born out of the communal carnage of February, 1986. He, among other things, has been also enjoying the status of a "MirWaiz" of District Anant Nag since 1984. It is also believed that some top Congress(I) leaders, with the motive of weakening Dr. Farooq Abdullah and his National Conference, had projected Qazi Nissar as the real193 defender of the faith and a true Muslim. During the 1983 assembly elections he, in fact, had helped the Congress party against the National Conference headed by Dr. Farooq Abdullah. As rightly observed "Qazi Nisar and Umaat-e-islamia were the creation of a faction of the Congress in kashmir18". But with the passage of time he emerged as a force to reckon with in the Anant Nag district. His group has been able to elicit sufficient following in this area. Interestingly, Anantnag has been a traditional stronghold of the Congress party but in the 1987 election the Congress candidate had failed to get even a fourth of the votes polled by the MUF candidate. The MUF candidate secured 24,800 out of the total number of 33,549 valid votes polled in the constituency whereas the score of the Congress(I) candidate remained as low as 8,095.Maulana Abbas Ansari of the Ittehad was made the convener of the MUF. He happens to be a prominant Shia leader. The Shias in the state have been mostly loyal to the Congress Party in the past. This time in 1987 it so happened that no Shia candidate was allotted a Congress ticket. The spiritual head of the community and President of the Anjuman-i-Sharishian, Agha Syed Mustafa Alsafri, while criticising the Congress for denying the party ticket to Maulvi Iftikar (a Shia leader) said that it was a great shock to the community which in the past not only provided the Congress a platform which it needed badly but also paid heavily for openly supporting the Congress in the State especially the valley.19 However, in areas like Badgam the dominant faction of the Shia community has been also nearer the National Conference.Maulvi Abbas Ansari is a religious leader and as a convener he had chosen to adopt a silent posture on the controversial issue of "Accession". In principle it was decided that the Front would neither speak in support nor oppose it. The Manifesto of the MUF also maintained this stand. It seems that the front instead of making the accession issue as central to its election compaign intended to moblise the Muslim masses in some indirect manner. While taking to the Press, Maulvi Abbas Anasri, for example, said: "We are interested in restoration of democratic rights to the people, both Muslims and non-Muslims living in the State. India that claims itself to be the biggest democracy of the world has deprived the people of this State of their democratic rights ever since 1947".20 The aforesaid discussion shows that the MUF is a conservative conglomeration of various fundamentalist groups in the Kashmir valley. It concerns with the affairs of the Muslim community of Kashmir and has nothing to do with the problems of other sections, basically, it was founded to safeguard the identity and rights of the Muslim community as also194 the culture and civilisation of the Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir. "The MUF Constitution itself says that the Muslim United Front will be aloof from politics in so far as it will not involve itself in any non-Muslim political activity."21 The Front partners do not at all believe in any secular politics. The March, 1987 assembly election was thus described by the Front as a contest between "Islam and Secularism". The front had also asked for the holy Quran as its symbol but it was denied by the election commission. The cadre of the various groups is dominated by the indoctrinated youth falling mainly between the age group 20-30 years or so. Educationally, most of them had obtained college and university education. Mention may be made here that the spread of certain groups of the MUF such as the Jamaat-e-Islami in the educational institutions, government services and professions has been significant.As regards the finances, the Front is reported to have sufficient economic resources at its command. Frequently, it is accused of receiving petro-dollars and money from across the border. Besides the external factor, the Front partners themselves represent relatively well-off economic sections in the Kashmir Valley. The Kashmir valley in recent years has acquired considerable economic prosperity. The major inducement to its prosperity has come from the developments in the field of horticulture, modern agriculture, tourism, transport, hotels, handloom industry, Gulf money, etc. etc. All this has brought about a vast change in the life of Kashmiris who earlier had to undertake labour and hard work to earn their livelihood. In terms of class interests the MUF, by and large, represents the well to do sections belonging to the upper strata of society in the fruit rich areas and business circles in the valley. It is also reported that several wealthy sections who have accumulated wealth by exploiting the poor Kashmiri Muslim masses, are supporting the Jamaat-e-Islami to serve their interests. The following comment further explains about the class character of the dominant group in the MUF as:"cadres of Jamat-e-Islami are invariably affluent and rich people. It was for nothing that in the aftermath of the execution of Z.A. Bhutto in Pakistan in 1979, to which Jamaat-e-Islami was a party there, the properties of the members of Jamaat became the special targets for destruction at the hands of the protesting people in Kashmir. Their orchards were felled down, their black and white and colour T.V. sets were set at fire, their jersey cows were slaughtered".22 Like the Jamaat, the Umaat's base also lies among the well to do and prosperous business groups in the Anant Nag area. Thus, the MUF,195 broadly represents the economically well entrenched sections in horticulture, business and also services. Strange as it may seem, the role to the Mirs, Maulvis, Mullahs and Mosques instead of declining has gone up with the rising affluence of the people in the valley in recent years. The logic of the structure is such that the affluent classes hardly want any check on the growth of religion communal and conservative forces. They rather frequently use them for safeguarding their vested interests. The cry of religion and other issues including the accession of the State instead of being as real have been usually raised for purposes of serving the vested interests.The accession issue, as mentioned above, was not raised in the Manifesto but it was pledged that the Front would strive to see that the leaders of both India and Pakistan improve relations between the two countries in the spirit of the Simla agreement to bring to an end once for all the "political uncertainity hovering over Kashmir for the past four decades." However, in the wake of electioneering all sorts of issues including accession were raised to whip up peoples emotions.The CampaignInterestingly, with the election date coming closer, the Front leaders made it a war cry against the NC(F) - Congress (I) combine. The Front in fact had entered the assembly elections on the slogan of Nizam-e-Mustafa! The Front leaders asked the voters to vote for the Front's candidates in the name of Islam. Quran-Sherif was prominently inscribed on the banners of MUF. The election was regarded as a Jehad (religious battle). While pleading for an Islamic State in J&K, they repeatedly announced that "Islam cannot survive under secularism". Dr. Qazi Nissar said, "This is a fight for restoration of rights of the Kashmiri Muslims. It is against "Brahman Samrajya". We want to defeat this "Imperialism".23 These leaders accused India of treating Kashmir as its colony. Morever, they also alleged that the family of Sheikh Abdullah has been exploiting the Kashmiris for the last 50 years or so. Most of the Front partners had in fact never reconciled with the Sheikh and his family. The front, for making the campaign more intensive, had also pressed cassettes into its poll campaign which were played on the tape recorders from numerous mike-fitted vehicles deployed in different constituencies. The cassettes extolled the Islam and Quran and spoke of Nizam-e-Mustafa. Interestingly, Dr. Farooq Abdullaha, due to his coming closer to the central ruling elite of the Congress (I), was described as a "Tilak Dhari Pujari of Vaishno Devi".196 Most interestingly, the Front also devised a strange way of introducing its candidates to the voters in Srinagar. The candidates were dressed in white coffins and paraded as suicide squads. As candidate after candidate was presented before thousands of people at Iqbal Park on 4 March 1987, the slogans of "Rehbar Rehnama, Mustafa Mustafa", "Muslim Muthada Mahaz Ki Mallab La-illa, Ill-Allah" rented the air. They took the oath that they would accept the ultimate authority of "the Koran, Sunnat" and that they would fight for the cause of the Muslims and strive for an Islamic revival and protection of Islamic identity. They held green flags with pictures of the Holy Koran embossed on them. The Iqbal Park (Srinagar) reverbrated with slogans of "Rehbar Rehnuma, MUP", Musl-mano Ki Shinakhat, MUF", "Kashmiriyon Ka Taz, MUF and "Allauho-Akbar"24. Mr. Syed Ali Shah Geelani while raising the issue of Kashmir's settlement said that "accession was not done in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiri Muslims". Whereas Qazi Nisar in this regard accused Sheikh Abdullah of having gone back on promises he had given to the people in 1947. He said, "Kashmiris were given an understanding that one day they will see Islamabad and Rawalpindi but their hopes were belied." Whereas Mr. Abdul Gani (MUF leader) during his speech said "I love Pakistan" but added "It does not mean I hate India". Mr. Geelani appreciated the Sheikh for his role in 1953 but accused him for the 1975 accord with Mrs. Gandhi. Similarly he accused Dr. Farooq Abdullah for bowing before the Centre to become the Chief Minister in 1982 and 1986. They all accused the Sheikh and his family for perpetuating family rule in Kashmir.During the course of their fierce battle against the Congress (I) and the National Conference alliance the front leaders warned the voters and said, "If they (Muslims) do not vote for the MUF they will get the blame that Muslims in Kashmir had voted against Islam". Mention may be made here that throughout the electioneering there was hardly any emphasis on the economic programmes, policies and developomental activities. Not to blame the MUF alone, even the other groups and parties including N.C. (F)-Congress (I) alliance also did the same to the issues of socio-economic development during the elections in the state.Electoral PerformanceThe National conference which had so far monopolished the votes in the Valley was put into serious difficulties by the MUF in about 36 assembly seats out of the total 42 in the valley. Generally, it was believed that an alliance between the National Conference and Congress (I) would197 promote secular tendencies but things have proved the other way. The MUF got as much as 18.9 per cent of the total valid notes polled in the State. Interestingly, in the Valley it scored as high as 31.9 per cent of the total valid votes cast. It will be interesting to mention here that the score of the Congress (I) in the Valley remained only 7.9 per cent. Moreover, the National Conference which got 59.3 per cent valid votes in the Kashmir Valley during the June 1983 assembly elections was reduced to 45.2 per cent in the March 1987 elections. The Jamaat-e-Islami a major partner of the MUF in 1983 could score only 6.6 per cent votes in the Valley. What a sizeable gain (31.9%) in March 1987? It may be mentioned here that had the original combination of the MUF with the A.G. Lone and G.M. Shah continued during the elections the situation perhaps would have undergone considerable change. A.G. Lone's Peoples Conference in these elections even against heavy odds, got as much as 94045 votes in different parts of the Valley. In some constituencies like Handwara, Kupwara, Bandipore etc., the peoples' Conference candidates got very close to the National Conference. Interestingly, in about half a dozen constituencies where the MUF and peoples Conference candidates were facing each other their score together went far higher than the winning NC(F) candidates.In terms of seats the Front could win only four seats but, as mentioned, it mustered almost 32 per cent of the valid votes. Apart from this, it lost in three constituencies by narrow margins; in Bijbehara by 100 votes, in Wachi by 122 votes, and in Shopian by 336 votes. It may also be mentioned here that the number of rejected votes in these constituencies was 1,177,1,703 and 1,122, respectively. It exceeded the margin of victory of the National Conference candidates. More than this, the MUF after the declaration of results converted the whole State into a tense situation on the allegation of large scale rigging by the ruling National Conference. The results were thus followed by bundhs, strikes, violent incidents resulting in large scale arrests of the MUF activists; some of whom are still languishing in the States' jails.The results of the 1987 elections in Jammu and Kashmir contrary to the assessment of the media and others reveal that the role of the fundamentalist forces in the State has increased tremendously. As very aptly remarked: "It is a measure of either ignorance or hypocracy on the part of the national political leadership and the national media that they have hailed the results of the elections to the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly as a triumph of secularism and rout of fundamentalism. On the contrary, the election results reflect a phenomenal increase in the strength of198 fundamentalist forces in the Kashmir Valley."25 In brief, it can be concluded that the fundamentalist consciousness in the State of Jammu and Kashmir instead of declining has vastly increased in recent years. It has been built upon the feelings so aroused and shaped over a considerable period of time. The MUF is also a product of this scenario. So far, it has been dominated by the Jamaat-e-islami which stands for the rights and identity of the Muslims in the Jammu and Kashmir State. It entails some pro-Pak feelings and regards the accession of the State to India as controversial.Economically, the Front enjoys a sound position. Most of its constituents represent the well-to-do sections of the State. Its spread in the rural areas is of course limited. But it has been gradually increasing through the medium of educational institutions and other propaganda devices. Its strength lies in the committed and indoctrinated Muslim youth in the Kashmir Valley. Most of its candidates who contested the March 1987 elections were also young and highly educated. Like the other front leaders, they also described the March 23 election as a referendum between the Islamic fundamentalism and the Indian secularism.NOTES AND REFERENCES1. Quoted in R .N. Kaul, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah: A Political Phoenix, New Delhi, Sterling Publishers, 1985, p. 107.2. Ibid.3. Balraj Puri, "Problems and Prospects of Federalisation: The case of Jammu and Kashmir" in EPW, vol XVI, 20, May 16, 1981. p. 896.4. Ibid.5. Balraj Puri, "The Era of Sheikh Mohammad Abdulla", in EPW, Vol. XVIII, February 5, 1983, P. 189.6. G.H. Khan. "Freedom Movement in Kashmir" (1931-1940), New Delhi, Light and Life Publishers. 1980, P. 256.7. Ibid.8. Ibid, p. 260.9. Directorate General of Information and Public Relations, "Accord : A Watershed", Published by the Publication Division, Jammu, p. 1.10. Ibid, p. 2.11. Mohd. Sayeed Malik, "National Conference in Twilight", in The Kashmir Times, February 10, 1987.12. The Hindustan Times, April 24, 1964.13. See, the editorial, Daily Excelsior, February 20, 1987.14. See, Daily Excelsior, February 25, 1987.199 15. The Indian Express, April 9, 1987.16. See Srinagar Reporter, "Anatomy of Secessionists" in the Jammu Panorama, June 1987, p. 22.17. Ibid, p. 2118. Prem Nath Bhatt, "Kashmir Congress X-rayed" Daily Excelsior (Jammu), March 19, 1987.19. See, The Kashmir Times, March 22, 1987.20. The Kashmir Times, Feb 14, 1987.21. Shyam Kaul, "MUF is tough, Is it?" The Kashmir Times, March 11, 1987.22. R.K. Khashoo, "Known and Unknown Devils: Pre Poll Scenario" The Kashmir Times, March 18, 1987.23. See, The Kashmir Times, March 5, 1987.24. Ibid. Also see Daily Excelsior, March 5, 1987.25. Balraj Puri, "Fundamentalism in Kashmir, Fragmentation in Jammu" in EPW, Vol. XXII, May 30, 1987, p. 835.200 201 INDEXAIADMK 10, 82, 131-65Election Committee 139Election manifestos 139Electoral history 142-43Electoral participation 139Electoral propaganda 140-41Emergence of 134-38Ideology 138National role 160-62Abdullah, Farooq 171, 176Abdullah, Sheikh Mohd. 171, 176Adivasi Mahasabha 70Akali Dal 5, 8, 107-29Akali Dal, Autonomy, Demand for 109, 119Boundary disputes 109Coalition 116-19Communication 122Demands 109Elections, participation of 113-16Emergence of 107Future prospects 123Jana Singh, Alliance of 113, 116Janta Party, Alliance of 114, 117, 118Janta Party, Conflict of 117Party Strategy 121-23Peasantry, Demands of 109Politics Versus Teligion 108Post independence period 108Religious demands 109Sant faction 119Sikh homeland. Demand for 110Split of 112-13 Akali Dal Government, Dismissal of 122Akali Dal leadership, support of 119-21Akali Dal (Longowal) 1, 9, 112Akali Dal manifesto, Assembly elections (1980) 112Akali-Nirankari relations 117Akali Akharas 76All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad, 30, 57Citizenship, issue of 41Electoral roll Revision of 42All Assam Student's Union 30, 57Citizenship, issue of 41Demands 34, 36, 56Electoral roll, Revision of 42National Convention (1984) 38, 58, 59National Convention (1985) 43National workshop (1984) 58All Assam Tribal Association 43All Assam Yuvachatra Parishad 43All India Akali Conference (1978) 110, 119All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagham see AIADMKAll I&K Hindu Conference 188All J&K Muslim Conference 168, 187All J&K National conference see National Conference202 All Party Action Committee of Ladakh 186Alsafri. Agha Syed Mustafa 193Amarnatha Reddy, N 100Anadurai, C.N. 133Anandpur Sahib Resolution 9, 12, 110, 114, 119Anchalik Gana Morcha 59, 60Andhra Agitation 85Andhra Pradesh, Elections, Casteism 98Emergence of 83Legislators, Directives to 89Regional Parties 1Anjuman-e-Islamia 168Anjuman-e-Sharishian 193Annadurai, C 134Annaism 138-39Ansari, Maulana Abbas 193Army of Tripura People's Liberation Organization 21Article (370) 171, 181Article(371 A) 10Arunachal Pradesh, Chinese Interference 24Industries 26Assam Yuvak Samaj 43Ashok Paper Mill 42Asom Gana Parishad 1, 5, 9, 10, 29-48Constitution of 44-45Elections (1985) 29, 45Emergence of 38, 43, 62Golaghat Convention 43Government, Formation of 47Membership of 45Organisational structure 45Women MLAs 48Asom Jatiyatabadi Dal 43, 56Assam, Assembly elections (1985) 46Bengali immigrants 31, 33Bengali Language 52Bangalis 52Casteism 52Census report (1931) 53Census report (1951) 55Citizenship 41Demography 32Domiciled and Settlers Association 53Economic development 41Elections (1983) 37, 40Electoral rolls (1979) 36Employment opportunities 56Foreigners issue 40-41IIT 42Immigrants 51, 52, 63Immigrants, Votes of 55Language movement 63Language problem, 52Languages 56Marwaris 53Muslim immigrants 31, 53, 54National Political Convention (1985) 61Population 55Post accord situation 42Regional Parties 1Assam accord 42, 61Assam agitation 25Assam Agricultural University 38Assam problem Foreign Nationals 30,33Settlement 40Assam Provincial Committee 32Assam Sahitya Sabha 43Atal, Yogesh 3Avtar Bani 117Back, Ignes 70Badal, Parkash Singh 112, 117, 118, 121Bakshi, G.M. 171, 174, 180Bangla Congress 7Bangladesh, Emergence of 32203 Banjhi incidence 77Barman, Dasarath Deb 21Barnala, Surjit Singh 113, 118Baruah, Deba Prasad 58Beg, Mirza Afzal 7, 174, 175, 176Bhajan Lal 12Bhandari, Nar Bahadur 6, 10Bharatiya Janata Party, Tamil Nadu 132Bhaskara Rao, Nadendla 88, 89Bhaskara Rao, V. 81Bhim Singh 6, 7Bhumij revolt (1932) 70Bhutto, Z.A. 194Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union 73Bihar Prantiya Hul Jharkhand 71Bihari, Tkoudam Kung 19Bombwall, K.R. 1Borbora, Golap 57Bordoloi, Arup 59Burdoloi, Gopinath 32Bore, Thaneswar 59Burney, S.M.H. 21CPI 4Tamil Nadu 132Tripura 21CPI (M) 4Tamil Nadu 132CPI (ML), Tamil Nadu 132Cachar District, Legislators 34Centre State Relations 11Chakravorty, Nripen 21Chandigarh, Transfer of 113Chandra Shekhar 118, 119Chenna Reddy, M. 83Chetav Baishi 76Chittoor Zilla Parishad 82Chotanagpur, Jharkhand Party 69Minerals 72Chotanagpur Adivasi Mahasabha 70Chotanagpur Kisan Sabha 70Chotanagpur Urtnati Samaj 70Chowdary, D. Kondilah 100Civil Disobedience Movement 167Coimbatore, By-Election 143Congress, Andhra Pradesh, Failure of 86-90Congress, Andhra Pradesh, Intra-party conflict 85Factionalism 89Split of 83Congress, DMK, Differences of 133-34Majhabi Sikhs, Support of 120Congress (I) 5, 11Andhra Pradesh 87Tamil Nadu 132Congress (O), Tamil Nadu 132Cotton Prices, Punjab 112Cripps Mission 70Cross Regional Party 4, 5DMK 1, 5, 8, 133Factional fight 134Madurai Party Conference (1972) 136Winning of power (1967) 133Darjeeling, Regional autonomy 7Dass, C. 100Delhi accord (1974) 189Desai, Morarji 18, 118Dhankatia movement 74Dhar, D.P. 174Dharampur Constituency, Electorate 37Dindigual Constituency, By-Elections 14243Dravida Munnetra Kazagham see DMKDravida Nadu, Principles of 138Dutta, Anuradha 29Election Commission 4Emergency 114204 Fateh Singh 110, 122Gandhi, Indira 11, 21, 75, 112, 114Gandhi, Indira Versus Telugu DesamGandhi, Rajiv 24, 77Gandhi, Sanjay 86Gandhi-Kamraj National Congress 132Ghising, Subhash 7Gill, Lachman Singh 116Glancy Commission (1931) 168Goalpura district. Electorate 34Gorkha National Liberation Front 7Gorkhaland 7Goswami, Biode 59Grain golas 76Gulshan, Dhanna Singh 118Gurbhachan Singh (Baba) 117Gurnam Singh 117Hanumaiah, Ch. 100Haridwar Rai 69Harrison, Sellig S. 2Haryana Legislative Assembly, Elections of 1Hindu-Sikh Naujawan Sabha 188Hrangkhowal, Vijoy 22Hul Jharkhand 71Immigrants act (1950) 33Imphal Valley, Insurgency 21Indian Union Muslim League 132Indira, D. 100Indira-Sheikh Accord 171, 175Inqlabi National Conference 176Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen 190Jammat-i-Islami 8, 190Janata Party, Alliance of 177Jammu and Kashmir, Anti Defection Bill 176Assembly elections (1977) 171Assembly elections (1987) 181Communal Violence 190Constitution (1939) 169Pakistan invasion 170State elections 174Jammu and Kashmir Youth National Conference 172Jana Sangh, CPI, Relations of 116Hindus, influence of 116Jana-Congress 84Janardhan Reddy, N. 87, 100Janata Party 4, 11, 84Gujarat 5Karnataka 5Tamil Nadu 132Uttar Pradesh 5Jharkhand, Districts of 75Jharkhand Mahasabha 78Jharkhand Mukti Morcha 7, 73All India Jharkhand Party, Alliance of 75Assembly elections (1985) 76Congress (I), Alliance of 74Elections, Performance of 77Jharkhand Party, Bihar 69Congress, Merger of 71Split of 71Jharkhand Vichar Manch 7Kamraj plan 175Kangleipak Communist Party 19Kantamma, T. Lakshmi 100Kaglang, S.S. 18Karan Singh 186Karbi Anglong People's Conference 60Karbi Parishad 43Karrar, Ghulam Mohiuddin 174Karunanidhi, M. 134Kashmir Conference 174Kashmiris Right of Self Determination 171205 Keisheing, Rishang 21Keshav Rao, K. 100Khash, Summander 167Khasi tribe, Meghalaya 25Khasiphur National Council 25Khemungam, Laik 19Kisan Oraon Rebellion (1918) 70Kissan Mazdoor Praja Party 83Kol insurrection (1831) 70Kolhan Rasha Singh 73Kolhanistan, Demand for 73Krishikar Lok Party 83Lakhimpur 31Laldenga 10Latchanna Gouthu 89Linguistic reorganisation. States 2Lok Dal 5Lok Dal (B) 1Lok Sabha (5 th), Dissolution of 144Lone, Abdul Gani 190Longowal, Harchand Singh 114Mahanta, Prafulla Kumar 42, 43, 61,62Maharashtra, Regional Parties 1Mahasabha 71Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul-Muslmeen 7Mangaldoi constituency. By-elections 57Manikanta, Khaidem 20Manipur, Industries 26Irrigation projects 26Manipur, Tripura, Nagaland, and Assam Consolidations (MTNAC) 23Manipur Meitel Extremist Organization 19Master Tara Singh see Tara Singh Meghalaya, Autonomy 25Extremism 25Hydel projects 26Industries 25Mishra, Jagannath 76Mizo National Front 6, 8, 10, 22, 23,24Mizoram, Area 24Disturbances 24Irrigation 24Muhtar, Ghulam Ahmad 168Mukherjee, Ajoy 7Mulki agitation 83Mullan, C.S. 31Muslan, C.S. 53Muslim Conference 188Muslim League, Assam 54Muslim United Front 181, 185-99Electoral performance 196-98Emergence of 187Ideology 189Muthu, M.K. 136Muthu Resigar Manrams 136NAMMAT 25Naga Federal Government 18Naga National Council, President of 18Nagaland, Annual plan (1980-81) 26Per capita income 18Statehood 17Nagas Zashie Haire 19Nageswar Rao, G. 100Naicker, E.V. Ramaswami 86Naidu, N. Chandrababu 82, 100Narasimha Rao, P.V. 87, 88Narayana, C. 89National Conference 1, 6, 9, 167-84Annual session (1944) 170Electoral alliances 177Electoral performance 179Emergence of 167-69Factionalism 173-74First session (1939) 169Ideology 173206 Indian National Congress, Merger of 171Janata Party, Alliance of 177Leadership 170-72Organisation 172Programmes and Policies 173Split of 189Struggle for freedom 169-70National Conference, Voting trends 179National Conference (F), Congress (I), Accord of 189National Conference (K), Congress(I), Alliance 178National political parties. Role of 131National Socialist Council of Nagaland 18, 19, 25Nav Vidharbha Andolan Samiti 7Naxalite movement, Bihar 74Nedunchezhian, V.R. 134, 137Nepalese, Citizenship, India 6North-East bandh (1984) 59North-East India, Area 17Autonomy 17-28Tribes 17-26North-Eastern Economic Council 17,25North-Eastern Hill University 26Operation Blue Star 114Panthers Party 6, 7Pan-Tribalism, North-East India 22Parliamentary elections, Tamil Nadu 144Partap Singh 167Patnaik, Biju 7People's Democratic Party 84People's Liberation Army 19People's Revolutionary Party 19Phizo, Z.A. 18, 19Phukan, Bhrigu Kumar 43, 60Phukon, Girin 51Plains Tribal Council of Assam 43, 47, 60Plebiscite Front of Assam 7, 189Political Culture 29Political Parties, Regional see Regional PartiesPolitics, India, Regional Parties 1-16Pondicherry, Assembly elections (1977) 146Elections 143-44Prabhakar Rao, Kona 87, 100Pradeep Kumar 107Praja Parishad Movement 185Praja Socialist Party 83Prakasam, T 83Progressive Democratic Front 93Progressive Hul Jharkhand 71Punjab, Agro-industries 12Assembly elections (1967) 109Assembly elections (1972) 109Assembly elections (1977) 117Assembly elections (1980) 114General elections (1957) 113General elections (4th) 110, 113Mid term poll (1969) 113, 117Regional Parties 1Punjab accord 112, 114, 122Punjab assembly, Dissolution of 116Punjabi Suba 8, 109, 120Purbanchaliya Lok Parishad 43,56, 58Quit Kashmir Movement 170, 188Quit Tripura Movement 23Rai, Haridwar see Haridwar RaiRajiv Longowal Accord see Punjab AccordRaju, (I. Rama Krishna 100Rajya Jharkhand Christian Adivasi207 Hul Jharkhand 71Rama Rao, N.T. 5, 6, 12, 81, 82, 135Ramchandran, M.G. 5, 81, 134, 135, 137Ranga, N.G. 83Ranga Rao, K. 100Rattaiah, G. 89Ravi-Beas Water Dispute 6, 122Reddy, Baga 87Reddy, Brahamanand 87Reddy, Chenna 84, 86, 87Reddy, Sanjeeva 83Region, Definition of 3Regional parties, alignment of 10Politics, India 1-16Role of 131Regional Party, Definition of 3-4Regionalism 3North East 9Versus Casteism 2Religion versus politics 9Roengeu, G.R. 174SGPC 107Saadulla, Muhammad 54Sachidananda 73Sadiq, G.M. 171Saikia, Hiteswar 42Sampath, E.V.K. 134Samyukta Vidhyak Dal 10Sanatan Dharam Yuvak Sabha 188Sant Fateh Singh see Fateh Singh Santal Parganas, Jharkhand Party 69Minerals 72Santal rebellion (1855) 70Saraf, Sham Lal 174Sarkaria Commission 9Self Respect Movement, Tamil Nadu 132Sen, Kalipad 25Seven-Sisters Liberation Army 25Shah, G.M. 176Shakdhar, S.L. 56Shillong Accord 19Shiv Shankar 87Shivaji Ganesan 135Shorie, Arun 61Sikh Gurudwara Act (1925) 107Sikh regionalism 109Sikkim Sangram Parishad 6, 10Simon Commission 70Singh, Jaipal 70Singh, K.S. 75Singh, Sri Chandra Shekhar 77Sino-Indian Border Dispute 24-25Socialist Union of Nagaland 18Soren, Shibu 74, 76South Indian Liberation Federation 132Sree Ram Murthy, B 100States, Autonomy 11-12States Reorganisation Commission 3Steel Plant Agitation 85Sukhjinder Singh 111Swatantra Party 84Syed Ali Akbar 168Tapafuz-e-Islam 190Talukdar, Khargeswar 35Talwandi, Jagdev Singh 112Tamil Nadu, Assembly electons (1977) 145-46Assembly elections (1980) 147-48General elections (1984) 148Lok Sabha elections (1977) 144, 147Party system 131-33Prohibition 136Regional parties 1Tamil Nadu Kamraj Congress 132 Tara Singh 110, 119Tashd, Dineswar 60208 Tauhin-i-Quran 187Telangana Agitation 85Telengana Praja Samiti 7, 84Telugu Desam Party 1, 5, 6, 10, 11, 81-106Aim of 86Convention (1982) 89Convention (1983) 89Election campaign 94-97Election manifesto 82Emergence of, 82-86Flag of 89Legislative Assembly (1983) 87Legislators, Castes (1983) 104Legislators, Educational qualifications 102Legislators, Occupation 103Membership 90Objectives of 90Organisation of 90Telugu Ganga Project 6Telugu newspapers and periodicals 97Thakur, D.D. 176Thandavan, R. 131Tohra, Gurcharan Singh 118Tripura, Assembly elections 22Bengali settlers 21Tribes 21Tripura National Volunteer Force 22, 23, 24Tripuri, Shyama Charan 22 20 Point Programme 86Unimat-e-Islamia 190United Liberation Front of Assam 25United Minority Front 25, 46Upajati Gana Mukti Parishad 21Urs, Dev Raj 8Utkal Congress 8Veerappa, A 100Vemanna, R. 100Vengal Rao, J. 86Venkata Rao, Ch. 100Venkata Rao, P. 100Venkata Rao, Y. 100Venkataram Reddy, Bhavanam 22Verma, P.S. 185Vidya Bhushan 167Vijay Kumar 69Vijaybhaskara Reddy, K. 84Vijaylakshmi, N. 100West Bengal, Gorkha issue 12Youngmen Muslim Association 168Yug Purush 117Zail Singh 21 ................
................

In order to avoid copyright disputes, this page is only a partial summary.

Google Online Preview   Download