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MEXICAN DRUG CARTELS:

The Evolution of Violence

Executive Summary

Despite the best efforts of Mexican President Felipe Calderon's government in 2007, the deterioration of the security situation in Mexico has continued apace. The primary reason for this is an ongoing turf war between Mexico's two most powerful drug cartels, Sinaloa and Gulf. This brutal battle has brought operatives from rival cartels into each other's territory in efforts to take over lucrative transshipment points. This cartel war has included the daily kidnapping and murder of cartel members, as well as of police and government officials who have been paid off by rival cartels or have refused to accept bribes. Rumors of a cease-fire, coupled with a momentary lull in the violence this summer, suggested that Sinaloa and Gulf had agreed to a truce, but the violence soon flared up again.

The Gulf cartel has proven to be one of the most powerful in Mexico in 2007. It controls much of the import and distribution of cocaine, heroin and other drugs to the eastern United States from its plazas on the Texas-Mexico border. However, it faces significant challenges following the extradition of its leader and the loss of other high-ranking personnel. Some U.S. law enforcement officials estimate that the Gulf cartel will be a spent force within two years.

Gulf's rival, the Sinaloa Federation, controls a vast swath of territory in western and central Mexico; however, several central areas that it formerly controlled are now under dispute with Gulf. "The Federation" includes a number of smaller organizations that work together. Two other cartels, Tijuana and Juarez, are independent of Sinaloa and Gulf, but neither commands the vast territory and resources of the two majors.

Cartel tactics are brutal and have included beheading, dismemberment, torture, the burning of victims and the killing of family members. Widespread police corruption and the deteriorating security situation have led to a further breakdown of law and order in many parts of Mexico, allowing criminal groups to operate almost freely. Human trafficking and weapons smuggling networks are examples of this problem. Investigations of these criminal enterprises inevitably lead back to the powerful drug trafficking organizations.

Mexican President Felipe Calderon surprised many when he deployed nearly 30,000 troops in the country after taking office on Dec. 1, 2006. The heightened security presence and the unpredictability of police raids resulted in high-speed chases and gunfights in urban areas. Uninvolved civilians were accidentally shot and killed by stray bullets in some of these incidents. However, despite the government's efforts, the cartels -- not the authorities -- control the level of violence in the country.

The deteriorating security situation has profound implications not only for Mexico but also for the United States, since drug violence increasingly crosses the border. Calderon has committed Mexico City to greater cooperation with the United States, but there are very few arrestors in place to keep cartel violence from spreading across the border. For the time being, U.S. law enforcement efforts to combat the cartels (which are organized, wealthy, and unafraid of the authorities) suffer from poor coordination, corruption and lack of resources.

Introduction

Stratfor's 2006 report on Mexican drug cartels offered a grim assessment, with an even grimmer outlook for the future. The more than 2,100 drug-related killings in Mexico in 2006 far surpassed the 2005 total of 1,543, while fundamental problems with Mexico's security situation appeared to limit the government's capacity to respond to the growing violence.

In 2007, the deterioration of the security situation in Mexico has continued apace, despite the efforts of President Felipe Calderon's government. The myriad deaths from drug violence across Mexico -- already estimated at more than 2,100 since Jan. 1 -- will certainly make this year the deadliest yet.

The primary reason for the increasing violence in Mexico is an ongoing turf war between the country's two most powerful drug cartels, Sinaloa and Gulf. This brutal battle has brought operatives from rival cartels into each other's territory in efforts to take over the lucrative "plazas" -- cities or areas used as drug transshipment points, run by cartel "gatekeepers." This cartel war has included the daily kidnapping and murder of cartel members, as well as of police and government officials who have been paid off by rival cartels or have refused to accept bribes.

In order to understand the violence that increasingly is overtaking Mexico (and spreading northward into the United States), it is essential to take an in-depth look at the cartels' battle for control of key drug trafficking territories, the major players fighting for supremacy and the challenges facing authorities in their attempts to impose order.

Tracking the Traffic: Drug Routes

Several things are critical for the cartels' drug trafficking operations. Control of points along the U.S. border on or near major road networks are essential for a cartel. Known as plazas, these are points through which drugs flow northward into the United States and cash and weapons flow southward into Mexico. The cartels entrust each of these plazas to a gatekeeper: a high-level cartel member who oversees operations in the plaza, ensuring that the contraband gets through and proceeds from drug sales, extortion, weapons and other contraband get to the cartel.

Also of critical importance to the cartels are the entry points where drugs (usually cocaine) are brought into Mexico. Control of these entry points -- ports along Mexico's Pacific and Gulf coasts as well as the country's border with Guatemala -- is necessary to ensure that contraband acquired by the cartel from abroad gets to market. Gatekeepers also are responsible for protecting a cartel's interests at these intake points.

The transport routes from the intake points to the plazas must also be secured. This requires that the cartel have the ability to exercise some level of control along the routes, which can stretch for hundreds of miles. Occasionally, these shipments are intercepted and seized by security forces, but most shipments are moved within territory under the control of the traffickers, where complicit local authorities help ensure their safety.

Transporting drugs across the U.S. border generally requires much greater security than moving them through Mexico. In the absence of a corrupt border official to wave a shipment through, traffickers routinely conceal drug shipments among legitimate goods to be moved across the border. The list of techniques is long, but common practices include disguising marijuana among produce and hiding cocaine, crystal methamphetamine (meth) or heroin in secret compartments in large vehicles.

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Often, traffickers choose to circumvent controlled border entry points and establish their own instead. Perhaps the simplest approach is to knock down a section of the border fence and drive a truck across, or to unload the shipment from one truck into another. More sophisticated methods involve digging tunnels to be used for transporting shipments. Many tunnels make use of existing infrastructure such as sewers or storm drains to extend the network, while others are dug to connect buildings on either side of the border. A significant number of these tunnels have been discovered between San Diego, Calif., and Tijuana, in Baja California state, with many others found in Nogales and Douglas, Ariz.

Drugs also are frequently moved by air and sea, especially on routes leading to Mexico from South America. Maritime shipments have been discovered aboard legitimate ships, as well as trafficking boats. Some cartels have become known for using "submarines," though in reality these vessels are capable only of submerging to just under the waterline, which reduces their radar signature and makes them much more difficult to track. Airplanes also have proven useful to drug traffickers, and small single-engine planes are commonly used for moving drug cargo around Mexico. Cartel air fleets are not limited to small planes, as evidenced by the September crash of a 21-seat Gulfstream II in Yucatan state that had been loaded with more than three tons of cocaine.

The Major Cartels

The cartels are complex and compartmentalized entities that operate a variety of criminal enterprises, and each organization has a core territory in which it does its business. The most powerful are the Gulf and Sinaloa cartels, followed by the Tijuana and Juarez

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organizations. Some smaller cartels work sporadically with larger outfits, while others have been completely co-opted by major cartels.

Gulf Cartel

Concentrated primarily in northeastern Mexico along the Texas border, the Gulf cartel is headquartered in the city of Matamoros, Tamaulipas state, just across the border from Brownsville, Texas. The cartel's main area of influence includes the Mexican states of Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, Chihuahua, San Luis Potosi, Veracruz and much of the Yucatan Peninsula. Gulf's control of these areas facilitates its movement of drugs from South America to the United States, from ports such as Cancun on the Yucatan Peninsula along the Gulf of Mexico and into Texas. A 2007 increase in the smuggling of Cubans into Mexico through Cancun (which is in Gulf territory) has led to questions about Gulf involvement in human smuggling in the Yucatan. The strategic importance of the peninsula's ports suggests that a Gulf gatekeeper would have the area under firm control, making it difficult for other criminal groups to operate without Gulf permission.

The Gulf cartel also has an extensive operational history in the United States. Although at one point the cartel had cells established in cities as far north as Chicago, its networks in Texas are far more extensive. Its presence is strongest in cities along the Mexican border. A former member of Los Zetas -- the cartel's paramilitary enforcement group -- testified in a U.S. court this year that he had belonged to one of several Zetas cells active in Laredo, Texas, and that he had knowledge of additional cells operating in other parts of the state. Given Gulf's complete and long-established control of border plazas, the cartel almost certainly has far-reaching support networks to facilitate its smuggling activities. Gulf controls much of the import and distribution of cocaine, heroin and other drugs to the eastern United States from its plazas on the Texas-Mexico border. The July arrest of Gulf cartel gatekeeper Carlos Landin Martinez in Texas highlights the extent to which cartel members feel comfortable operating on the U.S. side of the border: He was arrested while shopping at a supermarket in McAllen, where a U.S. counternarcotics agent who also was shopping spotted him and called for assistance in making the arrest.

The Gulf cartel has proven to be one of the most powerful in Mexico, though it faces significant challenges for the future. The extradition of Gulf leader Osiel Cardenas Guillen to the United States in January intensified an internal struggle for control of the organization. Though he had been in Mexican maximum-security prisons since he was captured by Mexican authorities in 2003, all indications are that he was able to retain connections with his lieutenants on the outside due to security failings at the correctional institutions that housed him. However, his transfer to U.S. federal custody effectively terminated his ability to control the organization.

After Osiel Cardenas Guillen's 2003 arrest, control of the cartel briefly passed to his brother, Ezequiel "Tony Tormenta" Cardenas Guillen, who was previously believed to be responsible for the Matamoros-Brownsville plaza. His management was considered less than efficient, and he did not keep control of the organization for long. An April investigation by Mexican federal police revealed that he had plans to establish himself in Queretaro state and had already acquired an apartment there that was being furnished for his arrival. However, after he became aware of the police investigation, he abandoned his plan to move to Queretaro and remains in a senior leadership position in the organization.

Since the Calderon government began an intense anti-cartel effort in December 2006, the Gulf cartel has been taking the most hits, with several mid-level lieutenants arrested and/or extradited. Given the attrition rate among its upper ranks, some U.S. law enforcement officials estimate that the Gulf cartel has less than two years left to operate.

It remains to be seen how the Gulf cartel (and its rivals) will respond to its continued loss of members. One possibility is that the capture of high-ranking Gulf members will result in an overall decline in the cartel's power, allowing other organizations to slowly extend their reach. It is unlikely Gulf will disappear from the scene completely, but the organization could split into two or even three groups, and others could move in to take over lost territory. (The Juarez cartel met a similar fate following the 1997 death of leader Amado Carrillo Fuentes. Juarez had previously been the most important cartel in Mexico; it never fully recovered after his death.)

It is unclear exactly who currently maintains control over the Gulf cartel, though the name most often mentioned by U.S. and Mexican law enforcement is Jorge Eduardo "El Coss" Costilla Sanchez. Costilla Sanchez is wanted by the United States for drug trafficking and for a 1999 incident in Matamoros in which he and about 15 henchmen surrounded two U.S. federal agents and threatened them at gunpoint. The U.S. government has placed a $5 million bounty on Costilla Sanchez's head. As the highest-ranking Gulf member, he also is theoretically in charge of Los Zetas, though it is unclear how much influence he actually has over them.

It is likely that the Zetas are more directly controlled by Heriberto "El Lazca" Lazcano. Known also by his Zeta number, Z-3, Lazcano is a former Mexican special forces soldier believed to be operating primarily in Matamoros. For his personal security detail, Lazcano reportedly relies on Kaibiles -- deserters from the Guatemalan special forces who have been used extensively as hired guns for the Gulf cartel.

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Several other important changes have occurred in Gulf's gatekeeper assignments in the past year. Rumors that Gregorio "El Goyo" Sauceda Gamboa -- the gatekeeper for Reynosa, Tamaulipas state -- had been killed in a firefight were not true, though U.S. counterterrorism sources confirmed that he had been removed from his gatekeeper position due to a medical condition, most likely cancer. Another border gatekeeper, Miguel Trevino Morales, also was removed from his assignment in Nuevo Laredo, though he was reassigned to another plaza. It is believed that he is now responsible for Pacific ports in Michoacan and Colima states.

Sinaloa Cartel

Sinaloa territory extends south from the Mexico-Arizona border through Sonora, Sinaloa and Nayarit states. The cartel has previously maintained control over plazas in Jalisco, Michoacan and Guerrero states, but many of those areas are currently under dispute with the Gulf cartel, Sinaloa's main rival. Its most important plazas on the U.S. border are the Arizona border towns of Douglas and Nogales.

The Sinaloa cartel that exists today is the result of mergers and alliances with a number of smaller drug trafficking organizations. In an alliance often referred to as "the Federation" or the "Golden Triangle," Sinaloa leads a group of cartels that covers much of Mexico. The Federation is run by Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman Loera. Guzman Loera has been arrested several times but has managed to escape each one and remains at large. In one prison break, more than 30 guards and the warden were implicated in assisting his escape.

The most significant cartels aligned with Sinaloa are the Zambada Garcia organization and the Esparragoza organization -- led, respectively, by Ismael Zambada Garcia and Juan Jose "El Azul" Esparragoza Moreno, both of whom are former high-ranking Juarez cartel members.

Zambada Garcia manages a number of plazas in the states of Sinaloa, Nayarit, Colima and Michoacan. His primary responsibility involves importing cocaine shipments delivered by sea from Colombian producers, and therefore he primarily oversees Pacific port cities and the coastal area. His headquarters are located in the coastal city of Mazatlan, Sinaloa state. At one point, Zambada was referred to in both the United States and Mexico as the most powerful Mexican drug lord, and he reportedly also has reached operating agreements with other smaller non-Federation cartels.

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Esparragoza was one of the Juarez cartel founders and operated for some time in Morelos state. After spending seven years in a Mexican prison following a 1986 arrest, he began re-establishing himself in the drug trade and seeking revenge on his enemies. He reportedly has killed or ordered the murder of those he suspects of cooperating with authorities for his arrest, and he is suspected of involvement in the 1994 assassination of Mexican presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio Murrieta in Tijuana. Esparragoza has managed the trafficking of large shipments of marijuana and cocaine from Baja California state to California.

A number of other smaller organizations also fall under the influence of Sinaloa. The most important of these is the Milenio cartel, which operates mainly in Jalisco and Michoacan states. It is led by Luis Valencia and several family members; his security chief is Nemesio Oseguera Cervantes. Valencia's brother was killed by Gulf cartel gunmen in Michoacan in April; the gunmen left a dead dog at his feet with a note listing the main Milenio members by name, as a warning to them not to interfere with Gulf.

Also important to Sinaloa are Los Tres Caballeros, begun by the Beltran Leyva brothers, and Los Numeros, begun by the Enriquez Parra brothers in northern Mexico. These two smaller cartels at one time primarily cooperated with the Sinaloa hierarchy, and their areas of responsibility included parts of Sinaloa and Sonora states. Following the brutal killing of Raul Enriquez Parra in 2005 -- he was beaten to death with hammers and thrown out of an airplane -- it is unclear how strong his organization remains and whether its relationship with Sinaloa is still strong. One source has suggested that some members of Los Numeros now are working as Gulf cartel Zetas. Most likely, Los Tres Caballeros is still on Sinaloa's side.

With the army and federal police focusing on the Gulf cartel, Sinaloa has so far survived the government's campaign with few significant losses. None of the cartel's high- or mid-level members have been arrested this year, though several mid-level lieutenants were killed by rival drug traffickers, making Gulf the most meaningful threat faced by Sinaloa. Also, unlike Gulf, the Sinaloa cartel has not had to contend with a heightened security presence in its territory. However, this has made Sinaloa state the deadliest place in Mexico, the site of more than 25 percent of drug killings so far this year.

Tijuana Cartel

The Tijuana cartel's territory is concentrated in Baja California state and, to a lesser extent, Baja California Sur state. The organization is said to have nearly complete control over organized crime in the city of Tijuana, though it has largely abandoned the drug trade in favor of other criminal enterprises -- mainly kidnapping, according to a Mexican attorney general's report.

The Tijuana cartel is also known as the Arellano Felix organization, given that it is controlled by the Arellano Felix family, although the cartel's key leaders have died or been captured in recent years. Following the losses among its top ranks, Tijuana is a shadow of its former self and has proven unable to sustain the strategic relationships needed to move drug shipments over long distances.

The seven brothers and four sisters of the Arellano Felix family each have had varying degrees of involvement in the family's drug business, with only a handful occupying top positions. Benjamin Arellano Felix took over leadership in 2002 after his brother Ramon was killed in a gunbattle with security forces in Mazatlan. Benjamin was in command for less than a year before being arrested, though he reportedly had no problems controlling the organization from his prison cell. The only brother not dead or in prison is Francisco Eduardo.

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A clear leadership command has not been confirmed, though it is known that Enedina is responsible for money laundering using a series of pharmacies and hotels in Tijuana, Guadalajara and Morelia. Francisco Javier "El Tigrillo" attempted to establish himself in a position of authority but was unable to do so. He was detained by the U.S. Coast Guard in August 2006 aboard a fishing boat in international waters and is currently in U.S. federal custody.

Juarez Cartel

The Juarez cartel has limited itself to marijuana trafficking for the last several years, most likely due to deteriorated connections with South American contacts and a lack of will -- and resources -- to fight the larger cartels for a piece of the cocaine business. It is led by Vicente Carrillo Leyva, son of imprisoned former leader cartel Vicente Carrillo Fuentes, whose father, Amado Carrillo Fuentes, led the cartel from the late 1970s until he died while undergoing plastic surgery in 1997. Decoys were an important part of the Juarez cartel's security program, and both Amado and Vicente were known to use look-alikes for security purposes. Amado was once considered the most important drug lord in Mexico, but like the Tijuana cartel, the Juarez organization is no longer what it was.

Cartel Operations

Drug trafficking is clearly big business for cartels. It is unknown exactly how much money the Mexican drug trade generates, but estimates are that at least half of the $65 billion worth of illegal narcotics purchased in the United States each year comes through Mexico. This drug trade includes marijuana, heroin, cocaine and meth. Nearly all of the cocaine transported by Mexican drug traffickers comes from South American drug cartels, meaning Mexican cartels must themselves pay other cartels to obtain their wares. Marijuana, on the other hand, is often cultivated in Mexico, though its lower street price does not generate as much of a profit and it is bulkier than other drugs, making it more difficult to transport.

One of the noteworthy recent trends over the past several years has been for cartels to increase their revenues by increasing meth production in Mexico. Meth has a much higher profit margin for Mexican drug cartels than does South American-produced cocaine or heroin, since cartels control the entire process, from manufacturing to distribution.

In response to this trend, the Mexican government now requires a prescription to purchase cold medicines containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, precursor chemicals in the production of meth. However, the new prescription law will do almost nothing to stop cartel production of meth, because cartels do not acquire precursor chemicals over-the-counter from pharmacies. Instead, they steal bulk chemicals from warehouses -- or, more commonly, they establish front companies to import large industrial shipments or bribe legitimate companies to order more than necessary. The cartels use enormous quantities of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine in their meth "super labs," and it would take an astronomical number of cold pills to acquire that amount of the substance. For example, in December 2006, more than 20 tons of ephedrine was seized from a port in Michoacan state; since the total amount needed in the entire country for lawful drug production is only about 33 tons a year, it is unlikely that this 20-ton shipment was intended for legitimate use.

Kidnapping for Ransom

As the cartels have grown, they have become increasingly sophisticated, complex and compartmentalized. Rather than narrowly focusing on one operation, such as drug trafficking, most cartels have diversified their operational portfolios to include a variety of other criminal enterprises. These activities are designed to generate income and maintain or improve the cartel's position. The most significant of these is kidnapping for ransom.

In recent years, Mexico has been described as the "kidnapping capital of the world." In addition to abducting members of rival cartels or security forces, cartel members also have exercised control over kidnapping-for-ransom gangs. It is likely that many of these gangs were not established by the cartels but rather were absorbed as part of the organization because they were operating in cartel territory.

The use of these gangs offers a glimpse of the sophistication of cartel operations. For example, authorities in Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas said in July that they had arrested members of two kidnapping gangs, known as Las Estacas and Los Halcones, linked to the Gulf cartel. Police said the gangs each had different geographic areas of responsibility and were responsible for identifying, surveilling and gathering information on victims to be kidnapped. This information would then be passed onto another group (most likely the Zetas), which would perform the actual abduction.

High-value targets, such as wealthy businessmen, are increasingly the victims of these crimes. Most are released unharmed after ransoms are paid, though there are also countless reports of victims winding up dead after families have met the kidnappers' demands. Many kidnappings go unreported, making it difficult to obtain accurate statistics on the dimensions of the problem.

However, while important, kidnapping generates much less income for cartels than does drug trafficking and production. Safely transporting and holding a live person is more complicated than moving and storing drug cargo, meaning that kidnapping can require just as much manpower as drug trafficking (or even more). And from a purely business perspective, kidnapping is riskier because, unlike with drugs, the ultimate payout is not guaranteed.

Cartel Violence: Enforcers

"Enforcers" are an essential part of cartel operations. They carry out a variety of functions, including acting as personal security details for high-ranking cartel members and performing assorted dirty work. These enforcers are the reason for the high number of drug-related killings in Mexico.

The Gulf cartel's Zetas are the most well-known group of enforcers, though it is important to recall that each cartel has its own distinct group of hired guns. (The Sinaloa cartel actually has two: the Comando Negro performs general security functions, while a new group known as the Gente Nueva was created to counter the growing threat from Zetas.) However, a detailed look at the Zetas can help shed some light on the way all of these groups operate.

There are currently about 350 active Zetas in Mexico, according to an internal assessment by the Mexican attorney general's office. Most have prior military experience in Mexico or Central America and joined the Gulf cartel after either deserting or being discharged. While some more experienced Zetas are given fixed assignments (such as controlling a plaza), many are used primarily to conduct abductions and targeted killings. From a home base, a team of Zetas can deploy to reach a target anywhere in Mexico in 24 hours.

Zetas are generally grouped into units of about 30 and typically deploy to different locations as complete units. From there, the unit can be broken up into squads of five or six to complete different operations, though the size of the squad depends on the target. It also is common for Zetas to establish or maintain connections with local criminal groups that are otherwise unassociated with the Gulf cartel in order to have access to safe-houses or other local resources.

The group also makes use of "Zetitas" ("little Zetas") who have been recruited by some of the original Zetas. Once they have been brought into the organization, the Zetitas reportedly receive several weeks of training and then go to work under a higher-ranking member. Many Zetitas are recruited from local gangs, though some have military or law enforcement backgrounds. One example is a 17-year-old Zetita captured in Laredo, Texas. Although he worked for the Zetas, his assignments typically involved stealing 4x4 trucks and sport utility vehicles (SUVs) to be sent to Mexico to be used in Zetas operations.

Any cartel enforcer will be well-armed, and the Zetas are no exception. Assault rifles, automatic pistols and grenades are standard weapons. Some attacks on buildings have reportedly included rocket-propelled grenades. These weapons give the Zetas superior firepower compared with local and state law enforcement. Their preference for SUVs and trucks with powerful engines also makes them difficult to catch during chases. These vehicles allow them to go off-road during getaways, as well.

The Zetas are generally very good at what they do. Many assassinations or kidnappings are planned and carried out so that no one is aware an attack has occurred until the victim's body is discovered the next day. In cases where police are alerted and give chase, it is common for the Zetas either to engage them in a firefight and win or to escape by tossing grenades out the back window at the police cars in pursuit.

Zetas, like other cartel assassins, usually are very careful when they kill. Their methods most often involve very specific, targeted killings that limit the possibility of collateral damage. They prefer to get up close and personal, using guns and knives rather than improvised bombs like those used for assassination in Iraq and the Middle East. That said, when a group of enforcers engages in a protracted firefight with the police, military or another group of enforcers -- shootouts that tend to involve automatic weapons expending thousands of rounds, and sometimes even hand grenades or 40mm grenade launchers -- there is a significant possibility of collateral damage.

Enforcers' Tactics

Cartel hit men use a variety of techniques to kill and intimidate rival drug traffickers, as well as uncooperative or corrupt police and civil officials. The level of brutality involved rivals that of tactics used by death squads in Iraq, but Mexican cartel violence is noteworthy in that it is usually more precise and carefully targeted.

Police officers, government officials and rival drug traffickers have all been victims of targeted killings. It also is not uncommon for cartels to pressure someone by targeting family members -- spouses, siblings, cousins -- as a warning. Sometimes victims are shot dead as they are driving, or entering or exiting their homes. Although the hit men generally shoot victims numerous times in such attacks, there are rare occasions when these attempts fail. A nearby police car could interrupt the attack, preventing the gunmen from ensuring that the victim is dead. Other times, victims are kidnapped first and then killed; in these cases, most of the victims are shot twice in the head, execution-style.

Perhaps the most brutal cases of cartel violence involve the discovery of body parts or bodies that have been decapitated or mutilated. In most such cases, the victims have been killed before being dismembered. Beheading is a fairly rare occurrence; of the more than 1,800 deaths in the first eight months of 2007, less than 2 percent involved decapitations.

Torture is much more common. Kidnapping victims who have been found dead often have signs of torture on their bodies; this is especially true for kidnapped police or government officials. It is likely that enforcers use torture to obtain information from victims before killing them. Also, these acts are often recorded and the videos posted online as warnings to others. Such videos demonstrate that the cartels' enforcers have little fear of being caught.

Though it is rare, cartel hit men are occasionally content with simply abducting and threatening a victim in order to make a point. This technique is sometimes used among members of the same cartel who need to be set straight but kept alive.

By the same token, when the cartels want to intimidate an official into cooperating, it can be enough simply to make an anonymous phone call or leave a note at the official's home; every official in Mexico already understands the brutal capabilities of cartel enforcers. This technique is cheaper than a bribe and less risky than an abduction or targeted killing. Frequently, threats are reinforced by pinning a note to a dead body or dismembered body part, a technique that is even more effective when the body belongs to someone the official knows.

Fighting the Cartels: Corruption and Crackdown

A number of security forces and government authorities in Mexico are involved in the fight against the cartels. Overall, it is estimated that there are roughly 350,000 law enforcement officers at different levels in Mexico and approximately 25,000 military troops deployed as part of the war on the cartels. U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies also provide assistance. Security forces in both countries face a range of risks.

Meanwhile, the continued flow of drugs into the United States is facilitated by corrupt border officials cooperating with the cartels because of either intimidation or bribes. The large quantities of drugs that continue to cross the border suggest that corruption is a problem not only in Mexico but also in the United States.

Mexican Authorities

At the federal level, Mexico has two key enforcement agencies that deal with drug trafficking: the Federal Investigative Agency (AFI) and the Federal Preventive Police (PFP). (Officers and investigators attached to the federal attorney general's office also investigate some drug cases.) The AFI, often compared to the U.S. FBI, is the lead agency for investigating organized crime, and as such its agents have been targeted heavily by the cartels. The PFP is a national police force designed to maintain order, as it was assigned to do during a small uprising in Oaxaca state in 2006. Precise numbers for these two organizations are difficult to come by, but the PFP is believed to have about 20,000 officers, while the AFI has close to 8,000.

Corruption is a problem in both organizations, though it is more of an issue within the AFI, given the agency's organized crime focus. It is common for officers to accept bribes from drug traffickers to cooperate either implicitly or explicitly. However, those who cooperate with one cartel are at risk of being targeted by a rival cartel, while those who refuse to cooperate risk being killed in any case. This is described as a choice of "plata o plomo" ("silver or lead") -- meaning you either take a bribe or take a bullet. A week rarely goes by in which one or more AFI agents are not victims of a targeted killing.

State and local law enforcement agencies in Mexico's 31 states also are divided among preventive police forces and judicial police forces, with the latter involved most directly in organized crime investigations. Corruption at the local and state levels is as bad as or worse than federal police corruption. There have been numerous cases of people retiring from state police jobs to become cartel gunmen -- though many manage to work both jobs simultaneously. State and local police officers are killed by the cartels on a daily basis.

In addition to rampant corruption, there also are issues of accountability. In 2007, many police officers responded to the growing death toll of their colleagues by simply refusing to go to work until they received better equipment, shorter working days and higher wages -- judging that their small salaries were not worth risking their lives. Another problem involves police leadership, illustrated by a case from Veracruz state in June, where striking police officers said they had been ordered by their superiors not to report drug-related killings and simply to dispose of bodies at crime scenes. This admission reflects the state of panic that many state and local governments have felt in response to rising death counts all over the country.

There also have been many cases of Mexican immigration and customs officials cooperating with smugglers -- of drugs, people, cargo or weapons -- in exchange for bribes. For the most part, these border officials face the same choice of "plata o plomo" as do law enforcement officers, though the institutionalization of corruption throughout Mexico suggests that threats are rarely necessary for these officials. These problems have resulted in illegal immigration issues on both of Mexico's land borders.

Calderon's Crackdown

The most significant development of 2007 involved Calderon's unprecedented moves to pursue organized crime aggressively with the full resources of the federal government. Almost immediately after taking office, he ordered the deployment of approximately 7,000 army troops on counternarcotics and domestic security missions in Michoacan state -- though the military always has been a part of Mexico's efforts to stem the flow of drugs. At one point, the number of troops deployed around the country was close to 30,000, assigned to conduct security patrols, conduct raids and set up highway checkpoints in cities all over the country. Resources such as radar, ships and aircraft have contributed to efforts to intercept drug shipments.

The government strategy soon revealed itself to be a primary focus on the Gulf cartel. This approach put a large portion of law enforcement and military resources in Gulf territory, resulting in the arrests of several high-ranking Gulf lieutenants by both Mexican and U.S. authorities.

Given that the army is relatively new to counternarcotics operations, military members are generally less contaminated by corruption. In addition, soldiers are much more well-armed than police officers, making them a more formidable enemy for cartel gunmen. Nevertheless, the cartels have now begun targeting military members as they better infiltrate the ranks, learning who can be bribed, who can be intimidated and who must be eliminated.

One result of Calderon's crackdown has been an overall increase in violence in Mexico. A regional breakdown of the violence in the first eight months of 2007 reveals high numbers of incidents in the states that are most hotly disputed between the cartels -- such as Guerrero and Michoacan, where small towns along important smuggling routes are vital to controlling the plazas. These coastal states are important because of their Pacific ports, which provide access to South American drug traffickers. Farther north, the area of Monterrey, in Nuevo Leon state, also proved to be active in terms of violence, with several incidents involving firefights in urban areas, in addition to a high number of abductions and targeted killings. Because of the importance of the plazas, cities all along the U.S. border saw violent action -- most notably the small town of Cananea, Sonora state, where a series of gunbattles left more than 20 people dead over two days. Tijuana, in Baja California state, reportedly saw increasing incidents of kidnapping for ransom.

The state with the highest number of drug killings in 2007, however, is Sinaloa, where more than 540 murders accounted for more than 25 percent of the country's total. This outcome has been a result of the government's focus on Gulf strongholds, which has left few resources available for Sinaloa territory. In contrast, many Gulf areas being patrolled by the army and federal police have shown a decline in the number of drug killings, demonstrating that siege-style security clampdowns are effective at reducing violence in certain areas. The cartels, however, have also demonstrated their ability to make violence flare up elsewhere.

Regional violence trends provided the first hint of a cartel cease-fire in June, following a noticeable decline in killings across the North. Later, rumors surfaced that Sinaloa and Gulf had reached a truce in mid-June and possibly even formed an alliance after both organizations concluded that the killing had been bad for business. However, if a cease-fire agreement did exist, it has since been abandoned, based on the rise in killings in both Sinaloa and Gulf territory that began with the back-to-back killings of police officials on July 14-15 in Nuevo Leon. The implication is that the cartels -- not the security forces -- control the level of violence in the country.

In addition to producing high approval ratings at home, Calderon's efforts have earned him some praise in Washington, where Mexico recently finished negotiations over a much-anticipated counternarcotics aid plan with the United States. Washington reportedly has promised as much as $1 billion over two years for the program. The money will amount to a significant increase in the U.S. commitment and could well improve Mexico's counternarcotics capabilities. But this assistance plan will not solve all the problems faced by the two countries in trying to counter the drug trade. Both Mexico and the United States clearly have deep-rooted issues that will not be remedied by funding increases.

Nevertheless, information released in October by the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy suggests the two countries already have made important progress in some areas, especially in curbing the flow of drugs into the United States. An increase in the street price of cocaine and meth in all regions of the United States is the most convincing evidence that tighter border security and Mexican counternarcotics efforts are having a positive impact. It remains to be seen whether these achievements can be sustained, especially since any long-term disruptions in cartel operations are likely to result in greater violence.

Looking Northward

Meanwhile, along with the military crackdown in Mexico, Calderon also has committed Mexico City to greater cooperation with the United States. Of all the groups involved in counternarcotics operations in Mexico, U.S. federal law enforcement authorities are the most effective. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and FBI are the two agencies most directly involved, though their role is more hands-off; they act mainly as support, sharing information with their Mexican counterparts and assisting with training. Law enforcement authorities at the state and local levels also have increasingly come into contact with Mexican organized crime over the past few years as the cartels have sought to extend their areas of influence north of the border. Naturally, law enforcement personnel assigned to border areas have had greater contact.

Increased cooperation has included extraditing a large number of cartel members captured in Mexico and wanted under U.S. indictments. The most notable example was a large high-level extradition in January in which the Gulf Cartel's Cardenas, four high-level and two mid-level Sinaloa cartel members, a Juarez cartel gatekeeper and two high-level Tijuana cartel lieutenants were handed over to U.S. authorities.

However, there also have been indications that more of the violence is crossing the border into the United States. Cartel gatekeepers exercise a great degree of influence at entry points on the U.S. side of border, to the point of having assassinations carried out in the United States. Drug gangs in the United States no longer target only low-income Hispanic victims for intimidation and extortion; they have moved on to more prominent victims, such as bank executives. Perhaps the most pernicious trend involves reports that U.S. journalists covering Mexican drug traffickers have been threatened and intimidated in the United States. Threatening and killing journalists in Mexico is a common cartel tactic -- Reporters without Borders ranks Mexico as the most dangerous country for journalists after Iraq -- but until this year, it was not common north of the border.

It is important to note that the cartels' control of the border and their ability to smuggle drugs and people into the United States effectively suggests an ability to control officials on the U.S. side of the border, as well as on the Mexican side. Cases in recent years have revealed corruption at the federal, state and local levels all along the border.

These cases demonstrate that bribing immigration officials can accomplished with a relatively small sum of money. Like their Mexican counterparts, these officials are often unaware of the contents of the shipments they are allowing to pass through the border. Local law enforcement officers might participate in two ways: by actively taking part in smuggling activities or by more passively agreeing to look the other way at a certain time and place while smugglers transport illegal shipments. The large amount of money involved in the drug trade also ensures that low-paid officials on both sides of the border will continue to be susceptible to bribery.

There are very few arrestors in place to keep cartel violence from spreading across the border. The majority of this vulnerability comes from Mexico, where an institutionalized system of corruption and intimidation exists. On the U.S. side, however, the underreporting of crimes among the Hispanic community (especially low-income and immigrant Hispanics) and corruption among low- and mid-level U.S. law enforcement officials facilitate the northward spread of cartel activity. The United States is hampered in the fight against the cartels by the situation in Mexico, as well as by the lack of official concern in Washington. For the time being, U.S. law enforcement efforts must deal with poor coordination, corruption and lack of resources as they attempt to combat the cartels -- which are organized, wealthy and unafraid of the authorities.

The bottom line is that drugs will continue to be smuggled through Mexico into the United States as long as there is a lucrative market there for cartels to sell into.

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MEXICAN DRUG CARTELS:

The Evolution of Violence

Oct. 15, 2007

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