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Schopenhauer’s Intelligible Character and Sartre’s Fundamental ProjectKimberly S. Engels Marquette University Sartre and Schopenhauer are two philosophers separated by both a century and a philosophical movement. At first glance it seems that the two thinkers have little to say to each other. However a closer examination reveals that while Sartre and Schopenhauer diverge on many topics, the authors give extremely similar accounts of the character of a human being. Schopenhauer and Sartre both hold the view that humans are responsible for having created themselves through choice. This shared assertion leads them to give very similar accounts of the character, or what Sartre refers to as “project” of a human being. While both Young and Atwell have noted in passing that Schopenhauer’s concept of a human’s intelligible character is extremely similar to Sartre’s concept of a human’s fundamental project, there has been no close analysis comparing the two accounts side by side. I here offer such an investigation, providing a detailed comparison of Schopenhauer’s and Sartre’s accounts in order to reveal the similarities in their views. My analysis also reveals two differences between the accounts and offers an explanation for their divergence on these specific points. A close examination reveals that both Schopenhauer’s and Sartre’s accounts involve a single, groundless choice of identity that is the unifying thread of all further states of consciousness. This intelligible character or fundamental project then unites the conscious states and behavior of a human being into a teleological whole. All choices, thoughts, motives, and actions are made in reference to the original choice of character or project. In spite of these similarities, there are also two key differences. First, Schopenhauer’s intelligible character involves a mythical choice of agency that takes place outside of time, while Sartre’s choice of project takes place within the boundaries of time. Second, for Schopenhauer, a human being’s intelligible character cannot be changed. Once the intelligible character is chosen, there is nothing a person can do to modify this intelligible character. Sartre’s fundamental project, on the other hand, is capable of being transformed or transcended. My comparison also reveals that the difference of views on these two points is reflective of the two thinkers’ positions with respect to the relationship between existence and essence. Schopenhauer argues that there cannot be existence without essence, meaning a person must be born with a nature. Sartre, on the other hand, is well-known for his assertion that existence precedes essence, and that a person is originally born with no inner nature. The disagreement on this point accounts for the differences in their accounts of character or project. The disparity in their views with regard to the modifiability of character can be further explained by the fact that both thinkers attempt to capture a different empirical observation about human beings. Schopenhauer sees instances in which the general features of a person’s character are fixed from birth as evidence of the permanence of character. Sartre, on the other hand, sees instances of people radically changing their character throughout their lives as evidence that the fundamental project can be modified or transcended. For Schopenhauer’s account, I rely on The World as Will and Representation Volume 1 and Volume 2, and his Prizewinning Essay on the Freedom of the Will. In the latter work he makes it clear that free will exists not in individual actions, but only in the freedom to choose one’s character. For Sartre’s account, I rely on the major work of his early period, Being and Nothingness, and also his biography of the French writer Jean Genet, Saint Genet, which Sartre uses as an example of his assertion that it is possible to transcend your original fundamental project. Part I: Schopenhauer and the Intelligible Character Understanding Schopenhauer’s conception of intelligible character requires a brief introduction to his philosophy as a whole, including his admitted reliance on Kant. Schopenhauer’s philosophy is all constructed with an acceptance of Kant’s distinction between the phenomena and the thing-in-itself. Following Kant’s thought, Schopenhauer distinguishes between the way that objects appear or are represented to us, and the way that they actually exist in themselves without being interpreted. We are simply incapable of experiencing the world as a thing-in-itself because we are separated from the world by the workings of our intellect. Our experience of the world is necessarily conditioned by our senses and rational capacities, and we only experience the world after it has been processed through our understanding. Schopenhauer accepts this distinction of Kant’s, emphasizing that the whole of this world is an object only in relationship to the perceiving subject, and so is only an appearance or representation. However, Schopenhauer makes the additional claim, not present in Kant, that the thing-in-itself is the will. He makes the observation that beneath each empirical thing is an inner striving which is directed at nothing in particular. Schopenhauer points out that all natural sciences eventually reach a boundary and cannot explain this inner striving of nature. Schopenhauer claims this is a sign that what underlies, strives, and comprises all of the world of representation is ultimately the will. Schopenhauer asserts that, like all other things in the world, it is the will that is key to understanding the core of a human being. It is the will that explains a person’s being, motives, desires, and behavior. Because Schopenhauer accepts Kant’s distinction between the thing as it appears and the thing-in-itself, he also accepts Kant’s distinction between the intelligible and empirical character that Kant describes in his “Third Antinomy.” Kant defines the empirical character as the causally determined self that exists in the world of appearances. …for a subject in the world of sense we would have first an empirical character, through which its actions, as appearances, would stand through and through in connection with other appearances in accordance with constant natural laws… The empirical character, or self, is subject to the same natural laws of causality, just as all other objects in the phenomenal world. However, Kant argues that there must also be an intelligible character that exists in the realm of the thing-in-itself and is not subject to these same causal laws. …one would also have to allow this subject an intelligible character, through which it is indeed the cause of those actions as appearances, but which does not stand under any conditions of sensibility and is not itself appearance. Kant’s argument is that freedom can only be attributed to the intelligible character, not the empirical one. Since the empirical character is bound by the causal laws of nature, it is not free of necessity. It is on Schopenhauer’s acceptance of Kant’s distinction between empirical and intelligible character that he bases his theory of human character. When the will is objectified into each individual human being, Schopenhauer calls this act of will the intelligible character. Schopenhauer contends that our intelligible character is freely chosen through a single act of the will. The world of appearances exists in, and is governed by, space and time. However, the will itself as the thing-in-itself it is not confined to the boundaries of space and time. Schopenhauer describes the intelligible character as a choice in one timeless act of the will “…the intelligible character of every man is to be regarded as an act of will outside time…” Schopenhauer asserts that the intelligible character is freely chosen because the will itself is not subject to the causal laws of nature, and the choice of intelligible character is an act of the will. Schopenhauer writes, “In this sense not only the will itself, but even man can certainly be called free.” Schopenhauer justifies the claim that the intelligible character is chosen through the fact that we feel responsible for our deeds. Because our empirical character is incapable of acting freely, we must feel responsible for another reason. Schopenhauer says a person feels responsible because he knows if he were a different person, he could have acted otherwise. He writes, …in existing circumstances and hence under the motives that have determined him, anentirely different action, in fact the very opposite of his, was quite possible and could have happened, if only he had been another person. Because he is this person and not another; because he has such and such a character, naturally no other action was possible for him; in itself, however, and thus objectively, it is possible. Therefore the responsibility of which he is conscious concerns the deed only in the first instance and ostensibly, but at bottom it concerns his character; it is for the latter that he feels himself responsible (all Schopenhauer’s italics).A different person in the same situation could have performed a different action; however, because the particular person has chosen to be this person and not a different one, there was only one possible action that he could perform. He still feels responsible for his action although he could not have done otherwise, because he knows he is accountable for being the person he is. He has, in Schopenhauer’s view, created himself through choice. Having elucidated the free chosenness of the intelligible character, I will move to the second key characteristic. Schopenhauer asserts that the intelligible character serves as the uniting thread that holds together the other conscious features of a human being. Kleist’s description of the intelligible character as a teleological unity of conscious states and actions is accurate. Kleist points out that Schopenhauer uses the intelligible character to account for the unity of human’s conscious states. Schopenhauer says there must be an extent to which our consciousness is not subject to pure incoherence and disarray. Therefore there must be a guiding thread to consciousness that arranges representations and ideas; otherwise we would be only a mixture of different fragments of thoughts. Schopenhauer rejects memory as a possibility for giving unity to consciousness, because he considers memory a faculty of the intellect that can randomly bring forth previous representations. These representations can be easily forgotten, and so cannot be the continuous thread to consciousness. It is not surprising that Schopenhauer considers the will as that which serves to unify consciousness. In The World as Will and Representation Vol. 2 he writes, But it is the will alone that is permanent and unchangeable in consciousness. It is the will that holds all ideas and representations together as means to its ends, tinges them with the color of its character, its mood, and its interest commands the attention, and holds the thread of motives in its hand. This passage illustrates the extent that the will unifies conscious states, motives, and actions towards particular ends. Kleist correctly points out that since it is the intelligible character that exists as a thing in-itself, the “character” Schopenhauer references in this passage must refer to the intelligible character. Therefore the act of will that forms the intelligible character unifies the various thoughts, desires, motives, and actions and directs them towards a certain end, shaping the human being into a teleological whole. Kleist writes, “In the formative generation of consciousness, then, individuality emerges in the teleologically unifying act of will itself.” Kleist’s analysis elucidates that the empirical character, which is an unfolding of the intelligible character, necessitates a constant unification and striving toward its necessary telos or full development. The final product is a copy of the intelligible character. “The empirical character must in the course of a lifetime furnish a copy of the intelligible character…” The final characteristic important for my analysis is that Schopenhauer makes the strong claim that the intelligible character is incapable of being modified. Since Schopenhauer defines the intelligible character as one timeless act of will, he asserts that the character cannot be changed. “Our character is to be regarded as the temporal unfolding of an extratemporal, and so indivisible and unalterable, act of will, or of an intelligible character.” Schopenhauer argues that all actions of a human being are a product of the intelligible character in combination with a certain motive. Motives are determined by the degree of knowledge that we have about ourselves. Schopenhauer is willing to accept that we may change a pattern of our behavior throughout our lives. However, this is not because we have a different character, rather because through our intellect we have come to a greater knowledge of the best way to achieve our ends and unite ourselves into a formative whole. Thus in nearly identical circumstances we might act completely different later in our lives than we acted previously. However, Schopenhauer asserts that this does not reflect a change of character, rather a change of knowledge. Thus in identical circumstances, a human being’s position can in fact be quite different the second time from what it was the first, if in the meantime he has been able to correctly and fully to understand those circumstances. Schopenhauer writes that the human intellect may believe that two opposite decisions are equally likely. He compares this to a vertical pole that has been thrown off balance, and those who watch it about to topple believe that it could fall either way. But the idea that it “can” fall either way only means that in light of the data known to us, we do not know which way it is going to fall. If we had full knowledge of all the elements affecting the pole, we would know which way it would fall. This distinct unfolding of motives on both sides is all that the intellect can do in connection with the choice. It awaits the real decision just as passively and with the same excited curiosity as it would that of a foreign will. The empirical character may perform different actions based upon different motives or drives at any given time. Schopenhauer asserts that even significant changes in behavior have not altered the internal character. He writes, Thus a man’s manner of acting can be noticeably changed without being justified in inferring from this a change in his character. What the man really and generally wills, the tendency of his innermost nature, and the goal he pursues in accordance therewith—these we can never change by influencing him from without, by instructing him, otherwise we should be able to create him anew…Even if the motives of the individual have been directed in a different direction, this does not mean that the person’s will has changed. The major traits of Schopenhauer’s intelligible character have been made apparent: it is freely chosen, it unites a human being into a teleological whole, and it is permanent and unchanging. I turn now to Sartre’s concept of fundamental project. Part II: Sartre and the Fundamental Project At the heart of Sartre’s early existential philosophy is his position with respect to being. Sartre’s ontology divides being into two different categories: being in-itself and being for-itself. Being in-itself is something that simply is what it is: a table, a rock, a pen, or a desk. Being for-itself is something that has the ability to reflect and choose or change what it is, a quality Sartre attributes only to human consciousness. A human being’s essence is not fixed, like that of inanimate objects, but is able to be shaped, formed, and altered throughout a person’s life. Because it is able to question and doubt, the For-itself is essentially different from all other being. It is this distinction between the In-itself and the For-itself that is the foundation for Sartre’s well-known position that existence precedes essence. This means that a person is not born with a preconceived essence or identity, but rather builds her essence as she lives. However, the fact that the For-itself has no inflexible essence does not mean that it carries no identity at all. The human identity or essence that a person chooses, whether after deliberation and reflection or merely as an acceptance of an identity offered to her, is what Sartre refers to as a human’s fundamental project. Like Schopenhauer’s intelligible character, Sartre’s fundamental project is freely chosen. The fundamental project is an original choice of self-identity that is groundless, baseless, and takes place very early in a person’s life. “This constantly renewed act is not distinct from my being; it is a choice of myself in the world and by the same token it is a discovery of the world.” Morris points out that when Sartre talks about an “absurd” choice, the only choice that is absurd and groundless is the choice of fundamental project. This is because the original choice of fundamental project or character is made without deliberation between options. However, decisions following the original choice of project are not absurd at all, but decisions made in light of the project already chosen. “The choice of fundamental project is in part a decision on what will count as reasons for us.” The choice of the original fundamental project takes place so early in life that it is pre-reflective. This means a person may accept an identity that her parents, siblings, or peers coerce her into at an early age. This concept of Sartre’s will be thoroughly explicated when I examine his biography of Jean Genet.Unlike Schopenhauer’s intelligible character, the choice of fundamental project takes place within the realm of space and time. This means Sartre is able to avoid the difficulty of accounting for a freely “chosen” character that is chosen outside of time. Sartre’s fundamental project is chosen as it is lived; individuals make their project exist through their very engagement with it. In this manner Sartre does not split the fundamental project into two parts like Schopenhauer—one on the level of the concrete, and another in the realm of the mythical. The second characteristic that Sartre’s fundamental project shares with Schopenhauer’s intelligible character is that it provides the unifying thread for all further conscious states and actions, thereby uniting them into a purposive totality. Both Morris and Drost give insightful accounts of how Sartre’s fundamental project unites the memories, actions, and conscious choices of a human being into a formative, teleological whole. Sartre, like Schopenhauer, rejects the ability of memory to unify states of consciousness. “…memory is dependent on the continuity of fundamental project which organizes the system of conscious relations.” Memories themselves are not capable of holding together the project; rather they are selected and organized according to the overall fundamental project of which such memories are a part. Sartre, like Schopenhauer, asserts that all motives must be grounded in something else. Sartre writes, In fact, it is this original choice which originally creates all causes and all motives which can guide us to partial actions; it is this which arranges the world with its meaning, its instrumental-complexes, ad its coefficient of adversity. We do not choose a fundamental project based on our motives or conscious states; rather our motives, actions, and conscious states are a product of the project we have already chosen. The memories that we choose to focus on are also dependent upon the project that we are projecting ourselves toward. Drost weighs in nicely on this issue, “The human act, then, consists in selecting certain features of past events, ignoring others, and arranging them in view of a project.” Drost points out that in Sartre’s view consciousness is always directed toward an ideal and non-existent state of affairs. We project our thoughts and actions toward this ideal (but at present non-existent) self. This ideal state of affairs provides the criteria for the manner in which the For-itself interprets its own memories, and accounts for consistency in its actions and behavioral relationships with people and the environment. This concept of the teleological unity of the self is very similar to Schopenhauer’s account: for Schopenhauer the actions of the empirical character are all made in reference to the original choice of intelligible character. Once the original project is chosen, a person then chooses actions that direct her towards ends that comprise her fundamental project. A human being’s contingency…expresses the finite choice which he has made of himself. But henceforth what makes his person known to him is the future and not the past; he chooses to learn what he is by means of ends toward which he projects himself—that is by the totality of his tastes, his likes, his hates etc., inasmuch as there is a thematic organization and an inherent meaning in this totality. Sartre gives the example of friends hiking together in the wilderness. One of these friends has a fundamental project that involves feeling inferior to others, and giving in easily to suffering. After several hours of walking this person becomes weak with fatigue, and finally gives up, throwing her backpack down and falling beside it. Her companion, who has the same physical stamina as she, continues to the rest site before relaxing. In this example Sartre says that the decision to stop early to rest can be understood only by reference to a fundamental project. The hiker who threw down her backpack had a fundamental project of feeling inferior and of being one who succumbs easily to fatigue. Her companion, on the other hand, embraces physical fatigue and triumphs over it. The person who threw down her backpack and failed to continue did so as a reflection of her chosen fundamental project of inferiority “Thus it is necessary to understand my reactions of inferiority and my failure behavior in terms of the free outline of my inferiority as a choice of myself in the world.” The fundamental project unifies the action of either continuing or giving up into an integrated whole. I will now move on to the primary difference in the two accounts: Sartre’s fundamental project is capable of being transcended or modified, a significant departure from Schopenhauer’s view. For Sartre, an action can be performed that is in discord with the fundamental project “…by an abrupt metamorphosis of my initial project—i.e. by another choice of myself and of my ends. Moreover this modification is always possible.” Since Schopenhauer’s intelligible character is timeless, no actions of the empirical self can alter the intelligible character. However, Sartre’s account is not subject to the same restriction of the fundamental project existing outside of time. According to Sartre, our choices are always made in light of an array of possibilities laid out in front of us that we choose to either affirm or deny. In Sartre’s language we project ourselves towards certain possibilities with the intention of achieving a certain end that is in line with our fundamental project. A change in fundamental project would necessitate projecting ourselves towards different ends and affirming different possibilities. In order to formulate a new pattern of behavior, a new fundamental project must be chosen, and then possibilities affirmed or denied based upon the new choice of project. A beginning which is given as the end of a prior project—such must be the instant. It will exist therefore only if we are a beginning and an end to ourselves within the unity of a single act…Now it is precisely this which is produced in the case of a radical modification of our fundamental project. By the free choice of this modification, in fact, we temporalize a project which we are, and we make known to ourselves by a future the being which we have chosen.As the original choice of project is usually chosen pre-reflectively, the modification of the fundamental project towards new ends is usually made after reflection with a level of awareness about the abandonment of our old project. The beginning of a new fundamental project must be the end of our previous project. Sartre says the converted atheist is not simply a Christian believer; rather he is a believer who has rejected his past project as an atheist. Thus his new choice to be a Christian is both an end and a beginning, and Sartre avers that a change in project constitutes a break in the unity of our being. An actual example of a person’s fundamental project will be useful for illuminating the depth of the similarities and differences in Schopenhauer’s and Sartre’s accounts. Sartre’s biography of the writer Jean Genet, titled Saint Genet, is an analysis of an actual example of Sartre’s theory of fundamental project, and an examination of the narrative within the text will further elucidate Sartre’s theory. After such an analysis, I will also present what Schopenhauer might say about Genet and his overall intelligible character, bringing the specific differences in their accounts to even greater clarity. Saint Genet Sartre’s 1952 biography of the French novelist Jean Genet is a detailed account of the metamorphosis of the writer’s actions and motives spanning from his early childhood as a thief to his adult life as a novelist, playwright, and poet. In Sartre’s narrative, Genet’s original fundamental project is established when he is quite young—at only ten years of age. However Sartre insists that the roots of this project go back even further. Genet’s mother gave him away when he was only two years old, and Sartre believes that this absence of mother led him to view himself as always in lack, leading him to seek completeness through material possessions. While Genet’s original fundamental project was indeed affected by his environment, particularly his lack of a mother, this was not the only choice that he could have made of himself. Therefore his first fundamental project was influenced by his environment, but not strictly determined by it. Genet ends up caught in the act of stealing at ten years old. He is then told by those around him “You are a thief!” Sartre asserts that before this moment Genet did not realize or comprehend himself as a thief. Further he insists that this act of theft was made without reflection. However this act still leads to the condemnation “You are a thief!” and Genet chooses to accept criminality as his original fundamental project. Sartre asserts that from a young age, Genet did not realize that “one is also what one does” implying that Genet need not accept his identity as permanent, because his project can be modified with his actions. “But while stealing in innocence…he is unaware that he is forging his destiny.” In this passage Sartre implies that when Genet was engaging in petty adolescent theft, he did not realize that he was accepting and affirming his fundamental project. Prior to being labeled a thief, his project was still in question.Only yesterday everything was possible. He was perhaps the son of a prince; he would perhaps become a saint. He lived in an anarchy of desire, his heart was gladdened by chance graces, the future was open. But now all is in order: he has been provided with a nature. Before accepting thievery as his fundamental project, Genet’s future was still open and he would become only what he chose to be. But now having accepted the identity of a thief, this becomes his fundamental project to which his further actions, motives, and conscious states conform. Sartre writes that since Genet now is a thief; he is not a thief only when he is in the act of stealing, but when he is sleeping, eating, or going about his life—he now projects his choices and his actions toward the fundamental project of being a criminal. The title of the chapter, “I Decided to Be What Crime Made of Me,” clearly displays that Genet chose to accept the nature of being a thief. Obviously, if men existed in the manner of tables or chairs, there would no question for them of acquiring their being. They would be, that is all. The twofold nature of Genet’s undertaking comes from the ambiguity of our condition.The ambiguity to which Sartre refers is the odd paradoxical state that comprises human beings: we both are nothing (as we have no predetermined nature or essence) and are something (as we exist and perform actions and make choices). In this passage Sartre is emphasizing that the human being is different from other objects which simply exist and are not free. Sartre argues that this aspect of human existence is both a condemnation and an opportunity. Because our essence is not pre-defined, we are free to choose ourselves. This is Genet’s saving grace, because although he has accepted thievery as a project, this project can be changed. “If Genet has the power to claim his essence, then he also has the power to reject it, to change it. He is free, and his nature is only a myth or a decoy.”Genet lands himself in prison at the young age of fifteen. While first continuing to live up to his role as a criminal by engaging in promiscuity and negative behavior, he also begins to reflect upon himself and his life for the first time. Genet begins to see that he is a product of his actions, and that the project of being a thief which he accepted was a free choice which he is free to reject. It is when Genet lands in prison again at the age of 28 that his fundamental project begins to truly change. Still behind bars, Genet begins writing poetry. Through the process of writing he leaves behind his past project as a criminal and chooses his project as a writer. “It is then that there occurs the slight click which in certain circumstances…transforms the unlucky little thief into Jean Genet…” In order to abandon his old project of thievery, he must perform actions against this project. In Genet’s case this takes the form of writing poems. Sartre explains in great detail the different poems that Genet wrote to express himself, and how each of these contributed to his metamorphosis. “…in his work…he frees himself, shakes off his reverie and transforms himself into a creator.” After this change in project, Genet’s motives, actions, and choices are made in light of his project as a playwright, novelist, and poet, and no longer as a thief. Sartre thinks that Genet’s story elucidates perfectly the formation of the fundamental project, as well as its possibility to change. The change often involves reflection and realization that we have chosen who we are, and can make a different choice. Because we are not objects like inkwells or desks, but subjects with consciousness, we have the potential to make our own being and to choose a new fundamental project. What is noteworthy in all this is the vacillation of the self that occurs in us when certain minds open before our eyes like yawning chasms: what we considered to be our innermost being suddenly seems to us to be a fabricated appearance…The truth is that ‘human reality’ ‘is-in-society as ‘it-in-the-world’; it is neither a nature or a state; it is made. Genet’s story is an articulate example of how Sartre’s concept of fundamental project is chosen, how it unites us into a teleological whole, and how it is capable of modification. Let us turn to the important question for the project at hand: What would Schopenhauer make of Genet? How would he explain the modification of Genet’s character that took place over the course of his life? In Schopenhauer’s interpretation, Genet’s intelligible character was chosen before he was born. The role of criminality which he chose to accept as a child was the best way he knew to achieve his ends at that stage in his life. Schopenhauer would explain the apparent changes in Genet not through a metamorphosis of his base character; but would say that Genet came to a better knowledge later in his life about the best way to achieve the ends that were in accordance with the qualities of his character. In Prizewinning Essay on the Freedom of the Will, Schopenhauer comments specifically on the nature of the prison system. He states that while it seeks to reform a criminal it does not change the person’s character or heart, rather merely grants him the knowledge to see that it is not to his advantage to keep resorting to crime. The general sphere of correction lies only in the cognition, where the criminal is brought to fuller knowledge, and sees that it is more beneficial to achieve his projected ends through different means. Schopenhauer would argue that Genet’s time in prison did not change his character; rather it brought him to a greater knowledge of the best ways to achieve the desires of his character. Realizing that being a criminal would only land him in jail, Genet decided to look to other means to express his character. While some may prefer Sartre’s account because it argues we are in charge of our own destiny, Schopenhauer refers to the reality that our characters cannot change as an inconvenient truth even though many deny it. He says this denial usually only comes from young people who are in the process of coming to full knowledge of their character. Often those of old age may reflect back upon their life or previous actions and say “It was all a part of discovering who I am.” (Sartre would assert that it was not a matter of ‘discovering’ what one is, rather creating it.) As evidence that we truly know the presence of a permanent character, whether we want to admit it or not, Schopenhauer points out that we often refuse to trust someone who has betrayed us even once. We realize that the act of lying was a reflection of this person’s unchangeable dishonest character. While it may seem that later in life this person has become honest or trustworthy, Schopenhauer argues that she has just realized new means through which to express her deception. Part III: Existence and Essence Close examination reveals that these differences in Sartre’s and Schopenhauer’s position are ultimately reflective of their disagreement on the relationship of existence to essence. In Schopenhauer’s view, every existing thing must have an essence. Nothing in the empirical world, including human beings, can exist without an essence, “For everything that is must have a nature essential and peculiar to it, by virtue of which it is what it is, which it always maintains…” Because every human being must have an essence when she is born, the chosen character must have been chosen before birth, and therefore is chosen outside of time. However, making such a claim forces the choice of intelligible character to remain an obscure myth. The notion of choice implies some type of change in the agent, which is not coherent outside of time. So there is unfortunately a mystery at the heart of Schopenhauer’s theory that makes his account slightly weaker. Contrary to Schopenhauer’s assertion that existence must possess essence, Sartre’s philosophy rests on the claim that existence precedes essence, and it is not necessary for the choice of fundamental project to take place outside of time external to the empirical world. It is worth pointing out, however, that the idea of someone existing without an essence contains an element of mystery itself. Schopenhauer points out that …the freedom of the will means an existentia without essentia; this is equivalent to saying that something is and yet at the same time is nothing, which again means that it is not and thus is a contradiction. So both accounts suffer from an element of mystery or paradox in their position with regard to the original choice of character or project. Schopenhauer’s position is mysterious because it is impossible to conceive of a choice taking place outside of time, and for Sartre, a person must both exist and yet have no essence, which Schopenhauer points out is to say that a person both exists and yet is nothing, which suggests a contradiction. The position of the two authors with respect to existence and essence also accounts for the differences in their views with respect to the alterability of the character or project. Since for Schopenhauer a person’s essence is determined before she is born, her essence must be constant through her entire life, for it is not possible to make another choice of essence outside of time. Because Sartre asserts that a person’s essence is not determined until after she has been born and that one chooses a project within the empirical world, it is possible to change her essence and her project. This difference can be summed up in a quote from each author: “…in what we do, we recognize what we are…” “…one is also what one does.” There is an additional reason that Schopenhauer’s and Sartre’s positions diverge with regard to the modifiability of the character or project. It is that both authors try to capture a different empirical observation about human beings. Schopenhauer seeks to capture the occurrence of people’s character being permanent and unchanging. Sartre seeks to capture the phenomenon of people radically changing their characters throughout their life. Schopenhauer uses the example of certain characteristics, such as the fact that criminality often runs in families, to support his case that there is an underlying intelligible character that cannot be changed. He goes so far as to say that this character is genetically inherited from the father, while the level of the intellect comes from one’s mother. The same character manifests itself differently in terms of intelligible character combined with knowledge. Schopenhauer maintains that the act of will that is intelligible character remains constant over generations. I would suggest, however, that there are times when a person seems to change to such an extent that he is unrecognizable to his former self. If the adult writer Genet appears to share absolutely no characteristics with his childhood criminal self, Schopenhauer’s claim that it is never possible for a person to change his character is less empirically supported. With his account Sartre tries to capture the experience we have of people, such as Genet, radically changing their character. In Sartre’s view, people who maintain very similar characteristics throughout their entire lives can be explained by the notion that they never chose to change their original fundamental project. However just because they did not choose to change their project does not mean that they were incapable of doing so. ConclusionMy analysis shows that authors who have made the comparison between intelligible character and fundamental project are correct that the two accounts hold significant similarities: specifically the idea of a freely chosen self which unites a person’s future conscious states and behavior into a teleological whole. My account also elucidates the differences in Sartre’s and Schopenhauer’s positions and offers reasons explaining the divergence in their views. I have shown that both Schopenhauer and Sartre capture something in particular about human beings, which is that we appear to have an underlying character that serves as a uniting thread through our actions and thoughts. Both accounts also suffer from some sense of ambiguity. Schopenhauer’s choice of character taking place outside of time is extremely obscure and this weakens his account. However Schopenhauer points out that it is rather puzzling to conceive of something existing without an essence, and is not willing to embrace this paradox, though Sartre does. Ultimately Sartre’s account is slightly stronger because he can account not only for constancy of character (a person never reflecting upon her original project or choosing not to change it) but also accounts for situations in which a person changes so radically that she seems to share very little or nothing at all with her former self. Schopenhauer is able to account for constancy, but his account struggles with explaining radical change. However, both authors present intriguing theories with regard to the character of a human being. ................
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