Pleading



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

| | |Case No.: |

|ELLIS W. STRICKLAND II, | | |

|Petitioner, | |PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS |

|v. | | |

|JIM DOYLE, GOVERNOR,, STATE OF WISCONSIN, | | |

|Respondent | | |

Petitioner, Ellis Willis Strickland II, a prisoner in the State of Wisconsin, currently held in the Stanley Correctional Institution, 100 Corrections Drive, Stanley, Wisconsin. Pro se, the petitioner now submits a request for this court to issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. sec. 2241(a)(c)(3)(5) and hereby challenges the custody of the state of Wisconsin for the following reasons:

1. Because Emmanuel Vuvunas, the presiding judge of the Racine County Circuit Court, Branch 4, Entered an Illegal Judgment of Conviction against the petitioner on August 8, 1985.

2. Based upon the Illegal Judgment of Conviction, petitioner was given an Illegal Sentence of 14 years, 12 consecutive times, totaling 168 years for armed robbery on September 9, 1985.

3. The indictment against the petitioner stated 13 counts of armed robbery based upon one incident involving the supposed Robbery of 13 victims in a business establishment by two(2) armed men.

4. The petitioner testified at a Jury trial after he pleaded not guilty to the 13 counts of armed robbery. But he still was Illegally convicted.

5. During the petitioner’s state appellate attempts Wisconsin prison mailroom employees were jointly engaged in a conspiracy with employees at the State Public Defenders office and a private attorney supposedly appointed by the Wisconsin State Public Defenders office to Sabotage the petitioner’s Direct Appeal under Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 809.30 by the use of a mail fraud scheme.

6. The scheme to deceive the petitioner began with several letters from a Mark Lukoff, first assistant State Public Defender, stating that he(Lukoff) was himself assigned to represent the petitioner throughout his appeal of the state conviction and sentence in Racine County. Then directly subsequent to the petitioner’s January 31, 1986 letter, acknowledging both the receipt of Lukoff’s letter and his appointment as the petitioner’s appellate counsel, the petitioner received another letter from attorney Lukoff informing him that he (Lukoff) was withdrawing from his case, and that an attorney from Racine,Wisconsin was being appointed to represent the petitioner on appeal, due to a “Conflict of interest” in the office in which he (Lukoff) worked. The newly appointed attorney was John J. Wargo. The January 31, 1986, letter from the petitioner, informed attorney Lukoff of his (petitioner’s) confidence that both the trial errors pointed-out by his trial attorney, along with errors that he believed mandated reversal of the Judgment of Conviction and Sentence were indeed meritorious.

7. Throughout a fifteen(15) month period, beginning February, 1986 and extending to May of 1987, the private attorney, John J. Wargo, had deceived the petitioner (Strickland) into thinking that he had filed a full, well-researched appeal, by briefing all of the issues which merited a new trial, as mandated by the Wisconsin Statutes Chapters 809.32, 809.30, the U.S. Supreme Court in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed. 2d 494 (1967) and clarified in U.S. V. Fernandez, 174 F. 3d 900 at 901 (7th Cir. (1999), when in fact, he (attorney Wargo) had filed some type of No Merit Brief without allowing the petitioner to respond, thereby securing his (petitioner’s) Illegal State Court Conviction, without an adequate Review by any Judge of the Wisconsin State Court of Appeals.

8. The petitioner had written Mr. Wargo a letter acknowledging his appointment as his (petitioner’s) appellate attorney. In his return letter, Mr. Wargo had assured the petitioner of his ability to handle the Appeal, and said that he (Wargo), would (1) Send for copies of the court transcripts of all proceedings in Strickland’s case, then, (2) He would meet with the petitioner (Strickland’s) attorney during the trial, Cynthia Pierce, then, (3) He would come to the prison to discuss with the petitioner features of the proceeding that he appellate attorney) thought were worth citing to the State appellate court as a ground of error. However, when the petitioner(Strickland), repeatedly requested a personal meeting with Mr. Wargo to discuss what he (petitioner Strickland) felt were inadequacies in the appellate Brief that he (attorney Wargo) was planning to submit to the court of appeals in Wisconsin, he flatly told the petitioner that he was not required to visit with him to discuss the issues of his (Strickland’s) case that merited consideration by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals. Then, after attorney Wargo had sent the petitioner a copy of the brief, he (the petitioner) submitted a Motion for an Extension of the Briefing Schedule, to file a supplemental Brief to the Wisconsin State Court of Appeals, because of the inadequacies in the appellate brief (I.e., the appellate attorney did not brief all of the meritorious issues of the case). In response, to the petitioner’s Motion, he received an unsigned order supposedly sent from the Wisconsin State Court of Appeals, denying the petitioner’s motion, and saying that the Brief was adequate. The petitioner then relied upon the activities of the appellate attorney.

9. It is the petitioner’s contention that the Waupun State prison mail-room employees intercepted his motion to the Wisconsin State Court of Apeals, then sent him (petitioner) the unsigned denial of his motion. (See Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 558, 559 (7th Cir. 1995, which explains that prison officials are liable for damages when they interfere with prisoner’s Right of Access to the Courts).

10. The petitioner has never received a document signed by any Wisconsin State Court of Appeals Judges. Nor has the petitioner re-

ceived any signed denial of a Petition for Review by the Wisconsin State Supreme Court. (Note: Attorney Wargo sent the petitioner an unsigned copy of a denial of his (Wargo’s) petition to the State Supreme Court for Review of the petitioner’s case, then sent the petitioner Strickland letters deceiving him into thinking that he (attorney) would request funding from the Wisconsin State Public Defender’s office, to submit a Petition the U.S. Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari. Attorney Wargo then ceased his representation of the petitioner’s case)(See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 81 L.Ed. 2d 758, 104 S.Ct. 2820 (1984), this case governs this Illegal Conspiracy by private persons (i.e., attorneys) engaged jointly with state officials to secure the petitioner’s Illegal State Court Conviction and sentence to prison. In effect, these schemes have prolonged the petitioner’s Illegal Custody.

11. On November 28, 1990, the petitoner had submitted for filing a Request for a Writ of Habeas Corpus – listing the Issues meriting a Reversal of his Conviction and sentence. The Response dated December 4, 1990 was so incoherent and Evasive, that the petitioner again attempted by U.S.CERTIFIED Mail to contact Chief Judge Robert W. Warren, at the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. In the letter/petition dated February 28, 1991, petitioner, Strickland informed him Judge Warren that he believed that the prison mailroom staff were interfering with this Legal Claims by sending Fraudulent Reponses to his Claims on behalf of himself and other U.S. District Court Officials. The Response to his petition was also evasive and incoherent. Petitioner contends that this is an attempt to block his access to the Courts. (See again, Gentry v. Duckworth, supra.

12. Therefore in May 1991, the petitioner sent the relevant documents accompanied by an affidavit to his daughter, Mrs. Roshena Andrews of 2035 Orchard St., Racine, Wisconsin, 53405, authorizing her to speak to court officials on his (Strickland’s) behalf. And with those documents in her possession, she (Roshena Andrews) made a personal visit to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, to ask Judge Warren to verify whether he had indeed signed the Evasive and confusing responses to petitioner Strickland’s Legal Claims. Judge Warren’s Secretary, Katie Spruell, harshly Refused to allow Strickland’s daughter to meet personally with the Judge, so she could verify that the Court documents that she possessed were an authentic representation of his (Judge Warren’s) rulings on the claims that he (Strickland) had presented to him by U.S.Mail.

13. Also, in October, 1991, Juan Casteel (Waupun Prisoner paralegal), did, during a U.S. District Court appearance for himself, personally hand-presented to Judge Warren a copy of petitioner Strickland’s February 28, 1991, letter/petition requesting relief from the illegal behavior of the prison officials in Wisconsin.

14. In May, 1992, the petitioner Strickland submitted a Pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus to Chief Judge William J. Bauer of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Chicago, Illinois, with a coverletter, requesting that he exercise his supervisory authority over the petitioner’s case, because of the Fraudulent mailings that he received in Response to his Legal Claims.

1 The petitioner Strickland, received Fraudulent documents by U.S. Certified Mail in response to his attempts to submit his Habeas Corpus Claims along with Complaints of Abuse by Prison officials, to the U.S. Courts and Federal agencies on the following dates:

a) October 27, 1992, Pro se Motion for a Certification of Probable Cause to Judge Bauer, 7th Circuit Court of Appeals.

b) February, 1993, Request for an Investigation to the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois Fred Foreman.

c) See Note Below, 1994, Request for an Investigation to the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, James B. Burns. (Note: The Exact date can be produced as an evidentiary matter, by inspecting the U.S. Certified Mail Records at the U.S. Postal Service; Petitioner’s sister is a supervisor with the U.S. Postal Service.)

d) August, 1996, Clerk at the U.S. Court of Appeals (7th Circuit.) Refused to file documents, presented to him for filing. He (Clerk), told petitioner’s family to get a lawyer, and go back to the District Court.

Therefore, the State Appellate Process was subverted by Fraudulent documents sent by U.S. Mail to Confuse, Delay and Defraud petitioner’s Appellate attempts by Prison Mailroom staff members engaged in a conspiracy to secure his (petitioner’s) illegal conviction, with the trial judge, private appellate attorney and state appellate defender’s office. This proves that the petitioner’s appellate issues are Meritorious, thereby giving the Federal Court Jurisdiction to Issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus, setting him FREE, under Title 28 U.S.C. sec. 2254 (d)(1-4)&(6-8).

The petitioner’s analysis of the Jurisdiction of the Federal Court to Grant Habeas Relief is based on Title 28 U.S.C. sec. 2241(a)(c)(3)(5). The basic power to grant the Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Subjiciendum to the Petitioner is given to any U.S. Court in the United States of America by 28 U.S.C. sec. 2241(a)(c)(3)(5), for the following reasons:

1) Wisconsin District Courts refuse to entertain the petitioner, Strickland’s Habeas Corpus Issues in the Civil Rights Complaint that the petitioner refiled in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin in Madison, Wisconsin, according to the orders of the Clerk of the U.S. Court of Appeals in Chicago, Illinois dated August, 1996. (See paragraph 15(d) on page 7 of this petition)(Refer to Pages 20 through 25 in petitioner’s forty-five(45) paged Complaint. Entitled Strickland v. McCaughtry, et al. Case No. 99-C-452-C, along with the District Court order dated September 29, 1999. Also see, November 28, 1990, Habeas Petition along with the incoherent and Evasive Refusal to Entertain the Petition, dated December 4, 1990).

2) Wisconsin State Court in Racine, Wisconsin, forfeited its’ Judgment of Conviction, when members of the State Public Defender’s Office, Wisconsin Prison Officials, and a State-Appointed Private attorney from Racine, Wisconsin engaged in a Mail Fraud Conspiracy, using state appellate clerks documents to defraud the State Appellate process, thereby securing this Illegal State Court Conviction and creating circumstances that satisfies the exhaustion requirements of 28 U.S.C. sec. 2254(b).

3) The improper activities Engaged in by state court officials, that are defined as intentional misconduct in Tower v. Glover, Supra. Page 5, require both the U.S. Circuit and U.S. District Court Judges to Issue the “Great Writ” setting the petitioner Strickland Free under 28 U.S.C. sec. 2254(d)(1-4) and (6-8) for the following reasons:

( The arrest procedures were conducive to irreparably mistaken Identification of Defendant/Petitioner by shaken and Confused Eyewitness/victim of an outrage such as armed robbery.

1. The Descriptions of the offenders by the victims before the impermissibly suggestive police show-up did NOT match the defendant/petitioner: the descriptions were of Black males all in their Early twenties with Black curly hair, but the defendant/petitioner was thirty-eight(38) years old, with salt and pepper(i.e., gray and black) hair.

2. The county Jail line-up had proved that the police had influenced the Identification at the on the scene “show-up” with the defendant in handcuffs and statements that they (police believed that these were the perpetrators of the crime.

b) The Judge and Prosecutor intentionally excluded an essential part of the Evidentiary hearing, thereby excluding the vital testimony of arresting officer DeBorg from the Mount Pleasant Police Department, because he (DeBorg) would have discredited the perjured testimony of Sergeant Vyvyan of the Racine County Police Department about the how the arrest occurred.

c) Hearsay statements violated the defendant/petition-er’s right of confrontation during the trial as guaranteed by the amendment to the U.S. Constitution, when the Judge deliberately allowed the Prosecutor and Police to scheme to violate an Order to limit the state's witnesses to direct testimony.

1. Before the trial, the petitioner’s Defense attorney submitted to the trial judge a motion in limine and obtained an Order commanding the prosecutor to instruct his witnesses Not to speak of people referring to the defendant, if they were not going to testify at the trial.

2. The Judge showed prejudice in favor of the prosecution when he(judge) attempted to “Evade” granting the defense Motion in Limine, by saying to the petitioner’s defense attorney, “but you never know what a witness might say,” but he (the judge) fully realized how Effective an Order to limit is in stopping witnesses from speaking outside of their(prosecutor’s) instructed boundaries, and reluctantly granted the Motion in Limine to the Defense attorney.

3. The Judge allowed the prosecutor to violate his order to instruct prosecution witnesses to limit their testimony during the trial, when he(prosecutor) conspired with police to Elicit the “hearsay” statement of a non-testifying co-defendant, just to implicate the defendant in the crime. The prosecutor had admitted that the non-testifying co-defendant had discredited himself, by telling two or three lies. (Note: The police and prosecutor did NOT want the discredited witness to testify that the police had committed Perjury about the arrest procedures. In essence, the he (non-testifying co-defendant) dis- credited himself, by changing his original statement that was recorded in the police reports by the arresting officers, in exchange for a conviction for lesser charges related to the robbery, as well as probation on another felony charge unrelated to the instant case. The Judge should have Ordered a Mistrial, so the Evidence could be considered by another Jury, with out the hearsay statement in the minds of the Jurors.

The Intentional Misconduct at the Trial Stage Began during the Jury Selection Process.

d) The trial Judge abused his discretion by showing prejudice in favor of the prosecutor, when he dismissed an entire array of potential jurors along with several Jurors already selected to hear the case, immediately after one of the potential jurors, when questioned said, that he couldn’t be unbiased if he was selected to hear the case, because a friend of his was “set-up” by Racine Police and sent to Prison.” The prosecutor immediately objected, and the defense and prosecution met in the Judge’s chambers. The prosecutor used the pretext of hostility of the po0tential Jurors as a reason to dismiss the entire array, including the Jurors that were already selected. The defense attorney advised the petitioner to continue the selection process, because she saw the Jurors as only truthful people-NOT hostile. The Judge decided in favor of the prosecutor and Dismissed the entire Jury-including the selected ones.

The Petitioner contends that the Judge should have declared a mistrial and impaneled a new jury after the hearsay statement, if he dismissed the selected Jurors. Because, it is obvious that the Judge dismissed the selected Jurors due to the fact that they had heard the potential Juror’s statement “Damaging the Credibility” of the Racine Police Department. A Curative instruction should have been sufficient to continue the selection process as with the hearsay statement.

e) The Judge and Prosecutor deliberately Violated the Wisconsin Subpoena Laws, when they colluded with the petitioner’s attorney to deliberately Exclude Exculpatory testimonial Evidence of a Prosecution Eye-witness/victim. Before the trial began, the petitioner’s trial attorney had asked the prosecutor(Guttenberg), had he sent-out all of the Subpoenas to the Witnesses that he intended to cal to testify at the trial. To that the prosecutor answered affirmatively, that he had indeed sent subpoenas to all of his witnesses. However, when it became time for a particular Eye-witness/victim to testify during the trial, the petitioner’s trial attorney advised him(petitioner, Strickland) that one of the prosecution’s Eye-witness/victims (Howard Hadlock) was in Florida on Vacation and therefore could not testify at the trial. (Note: The petitioner’s trial attorney said to the petitioner that since the Witness/victim was on a Vacation in Florida, he (the Prosecutor)was offering to drop that charge, because the witness had to testify at the trial that a crime had been committed against him. She (trial attorney) had also advised the petitioner that it didn’t make any difference and that to wait would only delay the trial). The petitioner contends that his lack of knowledge of the Legal significance of Howard Hadlock’s testimony, couple with the trial attorney’s willingness to continue the trial without his (Hadlock’s) vital testimony, led to his conviction. The Prosecutor and Judge did NOT want Howard Hadlock to testify to a Jury that (1) The police had lied in the police Reports; and (2) That he had said that the petitioner was not the one who had robbed him, during the County-Jail line-up and at a Pre-trial Evidentiary hearing. The petitioner Strickland contends that had this testimonial Evidence been heard by the Jury, that they would have acquitted him of the crime.

f) The Judge abused his discretion, when he instructed the Jury to consider two options for finding the defendant guilty. He(Judge) also showed prejudice when he agreed with the prosecutor by granting his (prosecutor’s) Request to add an aiding and abetting charge for the Jury to decide.

1. The Special Jury Instruction was unnecessary and confusing the prosecutor’s opening statement to the Jury at the start of the trial. For, in that opening statement, the prosecutor had only presented one charge and theory for the jury to consider on which to find the defendant/petitioner guilty. He(the prosecutor) said to the jury, that during the trial, he would prove that the defendant had robbed the victims.

2. The Prosecutor made no mention, during his opening presentation, of having any doubt about proving that the defendant had committed the crime. The aiding and abetting charge was added, however, because, in his(prosecutor’s) own words, “Your Honor, I can see from the Identification testimony that the Jury might NOT find the defendant(Strickland) guilty of being the one who did it, but because of the Evidence, they might find him guilty of aiding and abetting.” This Special Jury Instruction show “prosecutorial doubt” about the prosecutor’s original declaration and Confused the Jury about their duty during their deliberations.

3. Finally, the added charge sends a message to the Jury that, “if, you can’t find him guilty of being the one who robbed those people, then find him guilty anyway.” The Trial attorney made this statement to support her objection to the confusing instruction, then she especially challenged the Jurisdiction of the Court.

g) The Judge Abused his discretion when he sentenced the petitioner based on False information about his prior Record, without making sure that he had read the pre sentence investigation report before the sentencing hearing.

Therefore, in analyzing the purpose of Title 28 U.S.C. sec. 2254(d) in the context of the facts of this case, a reasonable person must determine that the Intentional Misconduct by State Court officers as described above require consideration under Paragraphs 1 through 8. And then determine that the Illegal activities of the Respondents Illegal Network to “Close the doors” of the Court to Petitioner’s Claims constitutes an admission by the Respondent that Petitioner Strickland’s Habeas Corpus Claims merit the Relief that he Requests: FREEDOM!

WHEREFORE, the petitioner prays that the Court grant petitioner relief to which he is entitled in this proceeding.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated this 17th day of December, 2002.

__________________________

Ellis Willis Strickland II

Petitioner, Pro se

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